Lauren Silver POLS 540: Interest Groups 11-5-09

In All Votes are not Created Equal: Campaign Contributions and Critical Votes,
Stacy B. Gordon argues that prior research on the influence of financial contributions on
legislators voting patterns has failed to uncover a consistent relationship because the
research has not focused on those votes that are most likely to be swayedcritical votes.
In other words, Gordon tests the theory that contributions are more likely to influence a
legislators vote when that vote means the difference between a contributing groups
success or defeat on a bill.! "nlike studying aggregate member voting scores or
individual legislative votes on a small number of billsas is the case with the ma#ority of
studies in this areaGordon asserts that e$amining the influence of contributions on
critical votes will answer the critical %uestion of whether contributions actually influence
policy outcomes, i.e., to what e$tent does the political conte$t matter&
Gordon e$amines votes on '() bills in the *alifornia Senate Governmental
+rgani,ation *ommittee from the '-./0'-.. session, focusing on an individual
legislators vote on the final passage of a single bill 1aye or nay2 as the dependent
variable. She finds that contributions affect votes differently depending on whether she
e$amines '2 the relationship across a large number of bills, groups, and issues or )2
critical votes only. In terms of the former, she finds that contributions given to legislators
by groups opposing a bill have a significant effect on legislators votesthe more money
given in opposition, the less likely the legislator will vote in favor of the bill. 3he reverse
relationship, however, only appears when Gordon analy,es the data using only critical
votesshe finds that legislators are significantly more likely to vote in favor of a bill
with increasing contributions by groups supporting that bill, and vice versa. 3he
probability that a legislator will vote 4aye for a bill if she received no contributions is .
Lauren Silver POLS 540: Interest Groups 11-5-09
/5, however, that probability increases to ../ if the legislator receives 6'(,((( in
contributions. 7s a result, Gordon concludes that legislators are, in fact, more likely to
respond to contributor pressure when their votes may decide whether the bill succeeds or
fails. 3hus, while contributions may have an effect on very few votes, it does not mean
they cannot have a significant influence on policy outcomes.!
Gegory 8awro, in A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-
Call Votes, finds that political action committees 197*s2 do not e$ert a significant
influence on legislators voting patterns via their financial contributions. 8awro analy,es
panels of roll0call votes on legislation deemed important by business 1"S**2 and labor
17:;0*I+2 groups while accounting for legislators individual propensities to vote for or
against business or labor. 8awro finds that 97* contributions have little to no effect on
*ongress members voting either for or against business or labor interests.
8hat accounts for the difference in findings between the Gordon and 8awro
articles& 8awro e$amines all roll0call votes related to "S** and 7:;0*I+ interests
across three sessions of *ongress. 7s Gordon asserts< focusing on the rate of roll0call
support that a legislator gives a group=masks the true issue< to what e$tent do
contributions affect political outcomes&! 8awro appears to be focusing on the rate of
support provided by legislators rather than on whether contributions are influencing the
passage of pieces of legislation that are most important to business and labor groups.
3hus, he is committing the mistake that Gordon emphasi,es has plagued this area of
research< finding that contributions affect only a small number of votes should not lead
us to accept that financial advantages do not e$ist.!