DDR Sierra Leone March 2006

United Nations Office of the Government of the
Special Adviser on Africa Republic of Sierra Leone
Disarmament, Demobilization,
Reintegration (DDR) and Stability
in Africa
Conference Report
Freetown, 21-23 June 2005
United Nations ? New York, 2005

Conference Report on DDR and Stability in Africa
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 3

A. Summary of the Freetown Deliberations and Recommendations adopted at the Conference ........3
B. Other Key Messages from the Opening Session.....................................................................................4
C. Presentation of National Papers .................................................................................................................5
D. International Initiatives................................................................................................................................5
E. Working Groups...........................................................................................................................................6
F. Networking ....................................................................................................................................................6
G. Recommendations........................................................................................................................................6
II. BACKGROUND............................................................................................................................................. 7
III. OPENING SESSION..................................................................................................................................... 9
IV. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH DDR IN AFRICA..................................................................10

A. Common Lessons .......................................................................................................................................11
B. Individual Experiences ..............................................................................................................................12
1. Angola.....................................................................................................................................................12
2. Burundi ...................................................................................................................................................14
3. Democratic Republic of The Congo ..................................................................................................16
4. Liberia .....................................................................................................................................................17
5. Mozambique...........................................................................................................................................19
6 Rwanda ...................................................................................................................................................20
7. Sierra Leone ...........................................................................................................................................22
8. Zimbabwe ...............................................................................................................................................24
V. INTERNATIONAL DDR REFORM INITIATIVES .........................................................................26

A. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) .........................................................................................26
B. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) ................................................26
VI. RESULTS OF WORKING GROUPS ....................................................................................................26

A. Common Lessons .......................................................................................................................................27
VII. DDR AND NETWORKING......................................................................................................................27

A. Building a Network of African Practitioners .........................................................................................27
VIII. CLOSING SESSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................28
ANNEX I: CONFERENCE PROGRAMME ................................................................................................ 31
ANNEX II: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ...........................................................................................................34
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Summary of the Freetown Deliberations and Recommendations

adopted at the Conference
The Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Stabili t y

(DDR) in Africa took place from 21 to 23 June 2005 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. It
w a s c o -o r g a n i s e d b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a L e o n e a n d t h e
United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), with the aim of
bringing together African practitioners and their international partners to share
experiences and ideas about ways to improve the design, operation and
implementation of DDR programmes, to better attain sustainable peace on the
continent.
The Conference drew more than 100 participants, including from 15 African
countries, as well as representatives of a number of donor countries and
international and regional organisations. The African participants represented a
broad spectrum of DDR stakeholders, including government offi cials, current
and former members of national DDR commissions and other experts,
beneficiaries of DDR programmes, members of armed forces, representatives of
host communities and women’s and civil society associations.
T h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s o p e n e d b y t h e P r es i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a L e o n e , H i s
E x c e l l e n c y , Dr. Alhaj i A h m a d T e j a n K a b b a h, a n d c o -c h a i r e d b y t h e M i n i s t e r o f
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou Koroma and Dr.
N a m a n g a N g o n g i , t h e f o r m e r S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e S e cr e t a r y -G e n e r a l f o r
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, representing OSAA.
In his opening statement, His Excellency President Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan
K a b b a h w e l c o m e d t h e C o n f e r e n c e p a r t i c i p a n t s t o t h e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a L e o n e.
H e d i s c u s s e d D D R i n t h e c o n te x t o f A f r i c a ’ s o w n e f f o r t s t o r e s o l v e a n d m a n a g e
its conflicts, through the peace initiatives of the African Union and regional
groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
W i t h t h e s u p p o r t o f o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e in t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y ,
Sierra Leone was able to make the transition from war to peace, with DDR at its
heart.
Mr. Ngongi delivered the address of the Special Adviser on Africa, Prof. Ibrahim
G a m b a r i , w h o h a d j u s t b e e n n a m e d t h e U N ’ s n e w U n d e r -S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l f o r
Political Affairs. He stressed the UN’s recognition of the importance of DDR,
c i t i n g t h e S e c r e t a r y- G e n e r a l ’ s H i g h -L e v e l P a n e l o n T h r e a t s , C h a l l e n g e s a n d
Change, which noted that “demobilizing combatants is the single most important
factor determining the success of peace operations.” He added that lasting and
d u r a b l e p e a c e a l s o r e q u i r e s i n t e g r a t i n g e x -c o m b a t a n t s i n t o w e l l- f u n c t i o n i n g a n d
w e l l- g o v e r n e d s o c i e t i e s t h a t o f f e r a t t r a c t i v e l o n g-t e r m o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d b e n e f i t s
for all citizens.
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M r . K o ro m a w e l c o m e d t h e U N ’ s d e c i s i o n t o h o l d t h e C o n f e r e n c e i n S i e r r a L e o n e ,
as a sign of confidence by the international community in the country’s return to
peace and stability. Not all DDR programmes in Africa have been successful,
however, and he challenged the participants to come up with recommendations
for doing better. He also observed that DDR programmes cannot be implemented
i n a v a c u u m o r o n t h e i r o wn , i f t h e y a r e t o e n s u r e s u c c e s s .
Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, former President of Mano River Union/Mano Rive r
W o m e n ’ s P e a c e N e t w o r k ( M A R W O P N E T) , p r e s e n t e d a m e s s a g e c o n v e y i n g a c i v i l
society perspective on African DDR experiences, especially in the Mano River
countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in which her group has been
active. She cautioned that sometimes the way such programmes are implemented
can feed a perception that they are rewarding the perpetrators of violence.
B. Other Key Messages from the Opening Session
Ñ DDR must be guided by :

a) A peace agreement among the warring factions. This framework will
define the role of other key actors and institutions that are critical to
p e a c e m a k i n g , p e a c e c o n s o l i d a t i o n a n d p e a c e b u i l d i n g;
b) th e p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h i n w h i c h a D D R
programme is implemented; and
c) a drive for genuine national reconciliation .
Ñ The focus should not only be on the immediate requirements to remove
weapons from the hands of non -s t a t e ( r e b e l ) a c t o r s a n d t o b r i n g t h e m b a c k
i n t o m a i n s t r e a m s o c i e t y , b u t a l s o t h e i n c l u s i o n o f l o n g- t e r m s t a b i l i s a t i o n
and development programmes in peace agreements .
Ñ DD R programmes primarily emphasiz e the disarmament and
demobilization of ex -combatants. However, for durable peace and
sustainable development ex-combatants must be reintegrated into well -
function i n g a n d w e l l -g o v e r n e d s o c i e t i e s .
Ñ DDR programmes are a vital component of any peace process but they
cannot be implemented in a vacuum nor can they make a peace process
successful on their own .
Ñ DDR programmes must stress partnership , especially with civil society.
Ñ R e i n t e g r a t i o n p r o g r a m m e s must be more gen d e r -s e n s i t i v e t h a n i n t h e
past.
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C. Presentation of National Papers
National papers were presented by a number of countries that have undergone

DDR experiences, including Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Liberia, Moza mbique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra Leone and
Zimbabwe, highlighting the diversity, common features and central importance
of DDR programmes. The papers reflected different stages, contexts and types of
DDR.
P a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t f or m a l r e p o r t s , i n c l u d i n g E r i t r e a , Cô t e
d’Ivoire, Somalia and Uganda also shared their experiences. The World Bank
also made a presentation on the Multi -Country DDR Program in the Greate r
Great Lakes Region of Africa.
The following points were highlighted:

• While commonalities exist, there is a need to stress that each DDR process
is unique, especially as regards the R’s (Rehabilitation, Resettlement,
Reinsertion, Reintegration ).
• Lessons learned have not always been incorporated into the planning and
d e s i g n of s u b s e q u e n t D D R p r o g r a m m e s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s .
• D D R p r o g r a m m e s c a n n o t b e t h e s o l u t i o n t o a l l p o s t- c o n f l i c t p r o b l e m s .
Parallel programmes need to be planned and implemented, especially for
vulnerable groups (including women and children). Particular emphasis
should be placed on psychological counselling and support.
• The regional dimensions of DDR should be taken into consideration in the
design and implementation of a programme in any one country.
• N a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p a n d l e a d e r s h i p i s k e y t o a n y D D R p r o g r a m m e a n d it
must include all stakeholders .
• In order to build trust and confidence in a DDR programme key

commanders should be encouraged to participate in all relevant stages .
• The underlying causes of conflict must be taken into account in des igning
the earli er parts of DDR .
• D D R s h o u l d b e e m b e d d e d i n a b r o a d e r p o s t-c o n f l i c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d
development framework.
• Insufficient funding, weak institutions and lack of local capacity were

identified as common difficulties in the i mplementation of DDR
programmes .
D. International Initiatives
• Partici p a n t s w e r e b r i e f e d a b o u t o t h e r D D R i n i t i a t i v e s .
• P a r t i c i pa n t s n o t e d w i t h a p p r e c i a t i o n t h e e f f o r t s o f S I D D R a n d U N I A W G
DDR to improve the functioning of DDR operations in Africa and to
m a x i m i z e t h e i m p a c t o n l o n g-t e r m d ev e l o p m e n t o n t h e c o n t i n e n t
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• The UN briefed participants on the draft of the Integrated DDR Standards

(IDDRS), and invited participants (especially national delegations) to
provide inputs before the publication of the first edition in the fall of
2005.
E. Working Groups
Five working groups deliberated on various DDR themes from three

perspectives: Strategic, Organisational and Implementation , and agreed on
numerous recommendations. The deliberations led to the realisation that DDR
p r o g r a m m e s a r e n o w e n t e r i n g a n e w p h a s e, w i t h t h e f o c u s o n a n i n t e g r a t e d
approach that involves all key stakeholders in a Peace Process.
F. Networking
African DDR practitioners and stakeholders met and decided to establis h a n

o p e r a t i o n a l n e t w o r k t h a t a d d r e s s e s p r e s s i n g r e g i o n a l D DR i s s u e s a n d l i n k s w i t h
oth e r D D R i n i t i a t i v e s a n d n e t w o r k s .
G. Recommendations
Delegates to the conference adopted the following recommendations at the end

of the deliberations:
a . D D R s h o u l d n o t b e o v e r b u r d e n e d w i t h a l l p o s t-c o n f l i c t d e m a n d s . R a t h e r ,
it s h o u l d h a v e b a c k w a r d a n d f o r w a r d l i n k a g e s t o t h e b r o a d e r p e a c e
process (includ ing peace agreements) and peacebuilding programmes.
DDR should always be accompanied by parallel relief, resettlement and
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n e f f o r t s f o r a l l w a r-a f f e c t e d p o p u l a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e
context of local communities, as well a s security sector reforms (SSR).
b. N a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p o f D D R p r o g r a m m e s i s c r i t i c a l f o r s u c c e s s . I n t h i s
regard, efforts should be made to genuinely support national
s t a k e h o l d e r s ( g o v e r n m e n t , c i v i l s oc i e t y , w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s a m o n g o t h e r s )
through technical a ssistance and capacity building.
c. The international community should support and work in genuine

partnership with national DDR stakeholders and it should also better
coordinate its own efforts and ma ke its DDR funding mechanisms more
flexible and timely.
d. E v e r y e f f o r t s h o u l d b e m a d e a t t h e c o u n t r y -l e v e l t o i n c l u d e r e g i o n a l
perspectives in the design and implementation of DDR programmes.
e. Sp e c i a l g r o u p s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y w o m e n ,
children and the disabled) should be provided with protective measures
i n t h e de s i g n a n d p l a n n i n g s t a g e s o f D D R p r o g r a m m es .
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f. Participants recognised that DDR programmes are complex. It was

t h e r e f o r e r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t a n i n t e g r a t e d a p p r o a c h , i n v o l v i n g na t i o n a l
and international stakeholders, should be used in the planning process of
DDR programmes.
g. Payment or non -p a y m e n t o f a r e i n s e r t i o n p a c k a g e ( c a s h o r i n k i n d ) t o
demobilised ex-combatants to support their transition to normal civilian
life should be given careful consideration during the design phase of a
DDR programme.
h. All stakeholders should be aware of the importance of small arms

collection and control at the community level following the conclusion of
formal disarmament programmes.
i. T o p r o m o t e lo n g- t e r m s t a b i l i t y a f t e r a D D R p r o g r a m m e , l o n g e r - t e r m
development programmes that address the root causes of the conflict (e.g.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – PRSPs or other national recovery
frameworks) as well as programmes for the prevention and co ntrol of
HIV/AIDS should be initiated and adequately funded.
j. T h e n e t w o r k o f A f r i c a n D D R p r a c t i t i o n e r s n e e d s t o b e s t r e n g t h e n e d t o
share experiences and innovative ideas and convey their perspectives to
t h e U N a n d o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a r t n e r s . I n s u p p o r t of t h e s e e f f o r t s , t h e
conference proposes that African DDR practitioners and stakeholders
meet every two years to review the progress made and seek ways of
further improving DDR programmes and their contribution to stability in
Africa.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Les s t h a n a d e c a d e a g o , 2 5 A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e e n g a g e d i n a r m e d
conflict or were experiencing severe political crises and turbulence. Within the
last six years, this dire state has dramatically improved. Today, only about 3
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s c a n b e c o n s i de r e d t o b e i n a s i t u a t i o n o f v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t a n d
few countries are facing deep political crises.
2. However, international efforts at building peace have had mixed results

since roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse into violence
w i t h i n fi v e y e a r s .
3. In recent years, it has been acknowledged that disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) are critical elements in
the transition from war to peace and development. Many African countries have
acquired expertise in DDR exercises, both within and outside a UN framework.
4. However, many DDR programmes have not been designed and

i m p l e m e n t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f a n i n -d e p t h a n a l y s i s o f t h e s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l
and economic contexts of conflict environments. Also, they have not always been
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conceived within a larger l o n g-t e r m development and peace stabilisation

strategy.
5. L a t e l y , t h e r e h a s b e e n a g r o w i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t c o n t e x t-s e n s i t i v e
DDR, as well as other factors such as regional harmonization, are key to
p r e v e n t i n g a r e c u r r e n c e o f c o n f l i c t i n p o s t-c o n f l i c t c o u n t r i e s o r n e i g h b o u r i n g
countries. Creating an enabling environment for DDR, embedding it in wider
p e a c e b u i l d i n g a n d p o s t -c o n f l i c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t s , a n d s u c c e s s f u l l y
a d d r e s s i n g r e g i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i m en s i o n s o f D D R a r e a l l v i t a l t o c r e a t i n g
a l o n g-l a s t i n g s t a b i l i t y t h a t s e r v e s a s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
e f f e c t i v e , d u r a b l e p o s t-c o n f l i c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o a d d r e s s
t h e n e e d s o f s p e c i a l g r o u p s , n o n -c o m b a t a n t s , a s s o c i a t e s of ex- c o m b a t a n t s a n d
war affected communities ; strengthen institutions, international assistance and
coordination, and tackl e planning challenges associated with these elements.
6. Addressing these issues from strategic, organisational and

implementation pers pectives is critical to achieving overall coherence and
greater effectiveness of DDR programmes.
7. While there are some efforts underway to reform DDR programmes in this
regard, they need to be complemented by, and benefit from, the insight and
experience of African stakeholders in DDR, both implementers and beneficiaries.
D D R p r o g r a m m e s a r e c e n t r a l t o t h e e n o r m o u s s o c i e t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t p o s t-
conflict societies undergo. The perspectives of African stakeholders in DDR are
t h e r e f o r e c r u c i a l i n m e e t i n g t h e c o m p l e x p o l i t i c a l a n d c o u n t r y -s p e c i f i c d u a l
challenges of creating enabling environments for DDR and embedding DDR in
p o s t- c o n f l i c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e s .
8. Th e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a L e o n e a n d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
O f f i c e o f t h e S p e c i a l A d v i s e r o n A f r i c a ( O S A A ) d e c i d e d t o c o -o r g a n i s e a t h r e e -
day Conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Stability in
A f r i c a t h a t t o o k p l a c e o n 2 1 -2 3 J u n e 2 0 0 5 i n F r e e t o w n , S i e r r a L e o n e
9. T h i s C o n f e r e n c e g r e w o u t o f a M i n i s t e r i a l B r e a k f a s t R o u n d ta b l e e n t i t l e d
“Do Current Practices of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Lead to
Stability and Development in Africa?” organised by OSAA during the UN ECOSOC
High-Level Segment on 29 June 2004. This roundtable revealed the need to
examine in greater depth the issues of disarmament, demobilisation,
reintegration and stability in Africa.
10. To ensure a coordinated UN approach in the preparation of the

C o n f e r e n c e , a U N I n t e r- A g e n c y T a s k F o r c e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d c o m p r i s i n g t h e
Permanent Mission of Sie rra Leone to the UN, UNDP, DPKO, OCHA, DDA a n d
the World Bank. OSAA chaired the Task Force and provided secretarial support.
T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f S i e r r a L e o n e a l s o s e t u p a local C o n f e r e n c e P l a n n i n g
Committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Af fairs and
International Cooperation to coordinate local preparations for the Conference.
11. The overa l l a i m o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s t o r e v i e w t h e c h a l l e n g e s o f D D R

programmes, examine the extent to which current pra ctices of DDR programmes
a c t u a ll y l e a d t o s t a b i l i t y a n d d e v e l o p m e n t a n d i d e n t i f y t h e n e c e s s a r y
preconditions for success.
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12. The Conference’s specific objectives were to:
a . De e p e n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i m p a c t o f D D R p r o g r a m m e s o n l o n g-t e r m
s t a b i l i t y a n d d e v e l o p m e n t;
b. ca p t u r e t h e v i e w s o f A f r i c a n D D R st a k e h o l d e r s o n t h e c h a l l e n g e s o f D D R
a n d s t a b i l i t y;
c. pr o v i d e a p l a t f o r m f o r A f r i c a n p e r s p e c t i v e s t o b e a r t i c u l a t e d a n d t o b e
incorporated into current DDR reform debates ; and
d. pr o v i d e a f o r u m f o r A f r i c a n D D R s t a k e h o l d e r s a n d p r a c t iti o n e r s t o b u i l d
networks.
13. To capture the perspective of diverse DDR stakeholders in Africa, pre-

Conference national consultations were held in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic
R e p u b l i c o f C o n g o , L i b e r i a , M o z a m b i q u e , R w a n d a , th e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a L e o n e
and Zimbabwe. On the basis of the national workshops, national background
papers were prepared and presented at the Conference to reflect and summarise
the experience and views of national stakeholders on DDR.
14. The conference, which focused on the articulation of African views on
DDR and stability from the perspective of practitioners and stakeholders,
c o m p l e m e n t e d r e v i e w e f f o r t s u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e U N I n t e r -a g e n c y W o r k i n g G r o u p
on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR). U N
I A W G D D R a i m s t o i m p r o v e t h e w a y t h e U N c ol l e c t i v e l y d e s i g n s , i m p l e m e n t s
and monitors DDR programmes while the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR)
focuses on funding, political and peacebuilding aspects of DDR. Represen tatives
o f b o t h i n i t i a t i v e s m a d e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d t h e C o n f er e n c e .
15. T h e C o n f e r e n c e b e n e f i t e d f r o m t h e g e n e r o u s s u p p o r t of t h e g o v e r n m e n t s
of Sweden, Germany and Finland.
16. The Conference drew more than 100 participants, including from
15 African countries, as well as representatives of a number of donor countries
and international and regional organisations (for a list of participants, see Annex
II). The African participants spanned a range of DDR stakeholders, both male
and female, including government officials, current as well as former members
of national DDR commissions and other experts, beneficiaries of DDR
p r o g r a m m e s , m e m b e r s o f t h e a r m e d f o r c e s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f h os t c o m m u n i t i e s ,
women’s and civil society organisations.
III. OPENING SESSION
17. The C o n f e r e n c e w a s o p e n e d b y t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f S i e r r a
L e o n e , H i s E x c e l l e n c y , D r . A l h a j i A h m a d T e j a n K a b b a h . I t w a s c o -c h a i r e d b y t h e
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou
Koroma and Dr. A. Namanga Ngongi, former Special Representative of the
S e c r e t a r y- G e n e r a l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r t h e D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c o f C o n g o ,
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e U n d e r -S e c r e t a r y -G e n e r a l a n d S p e c i a l A d v i s e r t o t h e S e c r e t a r y -
9
General on Africa, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, who had just been app ointed the
U N ’ s U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y -G e n e r a l f o r P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s .
18. H i s E x c e l l e n c y P r e s i d e n t Dr. A l h a j i A h m a d T e j a n K a b b a h w e l c o m e d t h e
Conference participants to Sierra Leone. He regretted the protracted period of
c o n f l i c t t h a t l e d t o m a n y d e a t h s , t h e d i s p l a ce m e n t o f a l a r g e p a r t o f h i s c o u n t r y ’ s
population, wanton abuse and the violation of human rights. The President
stated that Sierra Leone’s conflict was the result of deprivation, disaffection and
t h e e x t r e m e p o v e r t y o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . H e pl a c e d t h e C o n f e r e n c e
within the context of Africa’s own efforts to resolve and manage its conflicts
through the peace initiative of the African Union and regional groupings such as
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He expressed
s a t i s fa c t i o n t h a t w i t h t h e s u p p o r t o f o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e
international community, Sierra Leone was able to make the transition from war
to peace and stressed the central role that DDR played in that transition.
19. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, stressed that to be

successful, DDR had to be placed within the framework of a peace agreement, be
implemented within a favourable political, economic and social environment and
that there should be a genuine national drive for peace and reconciliation. DDR
in itself was not sufficient to restore peace and stability. The President
e m p h a s i z e d t h e n e e d t o i m p l e m e n t l o n g- t e r m m e a s u r e s t o t a c k l e t h e r o o t c a u s e s
of conflict. President Kabbah expressed appreciation for the sacrifice a n d
financial suppor t of ECOWAS , the United Nations and troop contributing
countries for the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone.
20. Dr. Ngongi delivered the address of the Spe cial Adviser, Professor
Gambari. He stressed the critical importance of DDR, citing the UN Secretary-
G e n e r a l ’ s H i g h -L e v e l P a n e l o n T h r e a t s , C h a l l e n g e s a n d C h a n g e , w h i c h n o t e d t h a t
“demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the
success of peace operations.” He added that lasting and durable peace also
requires that ex -c o m b a ta n t s b e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g a n d w e l l -
governed societies that offer attractive long-term opportunities and benefits for
all citizens.
21. The Special Adviser on Africa emphasised that the Conference

complemented efforts by international partners, in particular the Stockholm
I n i t i a t i v e o n D D R a n d t h e U N I n t e r -A g e n c y W o r k i n g G r o u p o n D D R , t o i m p r o v e
the implementation of DDR programmes in Africa. He informed that the
Conference was organised as a response to a proposal made at a Ministerial
R o u n d T a bl e B r e a k f a s t e n t i t l e d “ D o c u r r e n t P r a c t i c e s o f D i s a r m a m e n t ,
Demobilization and Reintegration Lead to Stability and Development in Africa?” that
w a s o r g a n i s e d b y O S A A d u r i n g t h e U N E C O S O C H i g h -L e v e l s e g m e n t o n J u n e 2 9
2 0 0 4 . T h e S p e c i a l A d v i s e r s t a t e d t h a t th e o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e w e r e t o
review the challenges of DDR programmes, examine the extent to which current
practices lead to genuine stability and development as well as identify the
n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c c e s s . P r o f. G a m b a r i t h a n k e d t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f
S i e r r a L e o n e f o r c o -o r g a n i s i n g t h e C o n f e r e n c e a n d e x p r e s s e d t h e h o p e t h a t o t h e r
countries would learn from the country’s successful DDR programme.
22. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou

K o r o m a w e l c o m e d t h e U N’ s d e c i s i o n t o h o l d t h e C o n f e r e n c e i n S i e r r a L e o n e .
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This was recognized by the Government as a sign of confidence by the

international community in the return of the country to peace and stability. He
regretted that not all DDR programmes in Africa have been successful and
challenged the participants to formulate recommendations that would lead to
better results. Mr. Koroma further observed that DDR programmes could not be
impleme n t e d i n a v a c u u m if they are to ensure success.
23. Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, former President of the Mano River Women’s
Peace Network (MARWOPNET), presented a message conveying a civil society
perspective on African experiences, especially in the Mano River countries of
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in which her group has been active. She
pointed out that the way DDR programmes were sometimes implemented could
feed the perception that they were rewarding the perpetrators of violence. Dr.
Daraba Kaba stressed that it was necessary to identify the needs of special
g r o u p s , e s p e c i a l l y w o m en a n d c h i l d r e n , a n d d e s i g n a n d i m p l e m e n t s p e c i f i c
activities to meet those n e e d s .
24. Mr. Momodou Koroma w e l c o m e d p a r t i c i p a n t s t o t h e f i r s t p l e n a r y s e s s i o n

and informed them that after extensive consultations, it was decided that Dr.
F r a n c i s K a i- K a i , f o r m e r E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r o f S i e r r a L e o n e ’ s N a t i o n a l
C o m m i s s i o n o n D D R w o u l d s e r v e a s R a p p o r t e u r f o r t h e C o n f e r e n c e . The decision
was strongly approved by applause. The Co -Chair then requested the Conference
Coordinator, Mrs. Ruth Bamela Engo, to present the draft programme. Mrs.
B a m e l a Engo r e v i e w e d t h e p r o g r a m m e , p o i n t i n g o u t w h e r e a d j u s t m e n t s h a d b e e n
made. The programme was adopted. (See Annex I)
V. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH DDR IN AFRICA
25. National papers were prepared and presented by the national consulta n t s
for a n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a v e u n d e r g o n e D D R e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e s e i n c l u d e d
Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda,
the Republic of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. The national papers highlighted the
d i v e r s i t y o f e x p e r ie n c e s , c o m m o n f e a t u r e s a n d t h e c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e o f D D R
programmes in the restoration of peace and stability in post conflict countries.
The papers reflected different stages, contexts and types of DDR programmes.
P a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d in g C o t e d ’ I v o i r e , E r i t r e a , S o m a l i a a n d
Uganda that did not have formal reports also shared their experiences. The
W o r l d B a n k a l s o m a d e a p r e s e n t a t i o n o n t h e M u l t i- C o u n t r y D e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d
Reintegration Programmes (MDRP) in the Greater Great Lakes Region.
A. Common Lessons
• While many commonalities exist, there is a need to stress that each DDR
process is unique, especially as regards the Rs (Reinsertion, Reintegration,
Resettlement, Repatriation).
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• Lessons learned have not always been incorporated into th e planning and
design of subsequent DDR programmes either in the same countries or in
other countries in the region.
• D D R p r o g r a m m e s s h o u l d n o t b e b u r d e n e d w i t h a l l p o s t-c o n f l i c t p r o b l e m s .
P a r a l l e l p r o g r a m m e s n e e d t o b e p l a n n e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d, e s p e c i a l l y fo r
vulnerable groups (including women and children). Particular emphasis
s h o u l d b e p l a c e d o n p s y c h o-s o c i a l c o u n s e l l i n g a n d s u p p o r t f o r w o m e n
t r a u m a t i z e d b y r a p e a n d o t h e r f o r m s o f s e x u a l v i o l e n c e, a n d c h i l d r e n
traumatized by horrific war experiences.
• The r egional dimensions of conflicts and DDR should be taken into
consideration in the design and implementation of DDR programmes,
especially in West Africa where most of the conflicts have regional
implications.
• Nation a l ownership and leadership are key to the successful
implementation of any DDR programme and must include all
stakeholders.
• Key commanders of all the parties to a conflict should be encouraged to

participate in all relevant stages of a DDR programme in order to build
trust and confidence.
• The und e r l y i n g c a u s e s o f a c o n f l i c t m u s t b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t i n
designing the different stages of DDR programmes.
• DDR programmes should be embedded in broader p o s t-c o n f l i c t

reconstruction frameworks.
• Insufficient funding, weak institutions and the lack of local capacity were
common difficulties in the implementation of DDR programmes.
B. Individual Experiences
1. Angola
26. Angola experienced violent conflict for almost forty years starting from
t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s . T h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l i s m , t h e u s e o f A n go l a n s a s
“slave” labour for the exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources by a
small group of colonials and the confiscation of most of the country’s arable land
b y a w h i t e m i n o r i t y f u e l l e d t h e d r i v e f o r s e l f-d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e
t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g gl e . T h r e e n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s , t h e
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
(UNITA) spearheaded the struggle.
27. Ne g o t i a t i o n s c o n c l u d e d i n N e w Y o r k i n 1 9 8 8 f o r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f
neighbouring Namibia resulted in a package deal; South African troops would
withdraw from Namibia and Cuban forces that were supporting the Angolan
government would pull out of the country. This was the first Angolan DDR
experience, although not a classic one. The New York agreement was soon
12
followed by another agreement, the Gbadolite Agreement. This second

agreement was in turn followed by a third agreement, the Bicesse Accords,
signed by the Go v e r n m e n t a n d U N I T A i n M a y 1 9 9 1 .
28. The Bicesse Accords included a DDR programme that envisaged the
disarmament of combatants of the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of
Angola (FAPLA) belonging to the MPLA Government and those of Armed Forces
for t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f A n g o l a ( F A L A ) o f N a t i o n a l U n i o n f o r t h e T o t a l
I n d e p e n d e n c e o f A n g o l a (U N I T A) , t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n i n t e g r a t e d A r m y o f 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,
(20,000 each from FAPLA and FALA, 6,000 to be selected professionally for the
air force and 4,000 for the Navy) and the demobilisation of approximately
200,000 troops. The second DDR programme laid emphasis on the ‘Ds’ but was
not fully implemented because of the resumption of the war as a result of
UNITA’s refusal to accept the outcome of the 1992 election. Although the DDR
programme failed, it established institutions and created structures for
d e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d t h e s o c i a l a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s .
29. The Lusaka Peace Agreement of 1993 led to the creation of a Government
of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) and the integration of some UNITA
forces into the national army. The DDR programme was a mere formality a s
UNITA did not fully adh ere to it. Consequently, the war resumed in 1998 and
ended with the death of the leader of UNITA in Februa ry 2002. The Government
seized the opportunity and released a Peace Agenda which granted a general
amnesty to UNITA soldiers and provided for their disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration into civilian life. The preparation of an emergency
humanitarian assistance programme, including the resettlement of the more than
f o u r m i l l i o n i n t e r n a l l y d i s p l a c e d A n g o l a n s w a s i n i t i a t e d. T h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f
UNITA generals was sought and obtained by the Government.
30. A Joint Commission was established to supervise the implementation of

t h e D D R p r o g r a m m e . T h i r t y -f i v e Q u a r t e r i n g A r e a s w e r e s e t- u p n a t i o n w i d e f o r
the UNITA forces and an equal number of Reception Areas for family members
and dependents of the troops. Every effort was made to treat the UNITA soldiers
with res p e c t a n d a s p i r i t o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e p r o c e s s . A t o t a l o f
91,127 UNITA soldiers and 288,756 fa mily members were registered during the
DDR process. Some 5,000 UNITA soldiers were integrated into the Angolan
National Army, in cluding 18 generals, and 40 of them joined the National Police.
The rest were demobilized and enrolled in civilian reintegration programmes.
31. Reintegration programmes for demobilized ex-combatants started in

September 2003. These are implemented through t h e Institute of S ocio-
P r o f e s s i o n a l R e i n t e g r a t i o n f o r E x- C o m b a t a n t s ( I R S E M ) a n d i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g
activities: (i) vocational training, traditional apprenticeships and on -the-job
training; (ii) community works; (iii) access to tool kits; and (iv) micro-business
training, advisory services and microcredit. As of June 2005, over 20,000 ex -
combatants were benefiting from reintegration support and 7,800 were expected
to join the programme shortly. Programme design and implementation is
e x e c u t e d b y s e v e r a l N G O s , bo t h n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l .
32. The current Angolan DDR programme faces many challenges: lack of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t ; r e c y c l i n g o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s d i s a r m e d a n d
d e m o b i l i z e d i n p r e v i o u s D D R s , t h e l a r g e n u m b e r o f w a r- d i s a b l e d , e s p e c i a l l y
13
a m o n g t h e G o v e r n m e n t t ro o p s ; d e p e n d e n c y s y n d r o m e a m o n g s t p e o p l e w h o h a v e
spent many years in the military; lack of experience in reintegrating ex -
combatants in to urban settings; and logistical difficulties.
Key Lessons:
Ñ DDR should be a seamless process, and the R should not be a n

a f t e rt h o u g h t.
Ñ DDR should be closel y linked to a political process; holding elections in
1992 while there were three armi es in the country was a mistake.
Ñ F i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t a n d a v a i l a b l e w h e n n e e d e d.
Ñ Monitoring and evaluation is critical for programme adjustments to
ensure success.
Ñ T r u s t a n d r e c o n c i l i a t i o n s h o u l d b e e s t a bl i s h e d e a r l y i n t h e D D R p r o c e s s .
Ñ State administration should be extended throughout the national territory
to en s u r e s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
Ñ C o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t a n d s u p p o r t t o f a m i l i e s a r e c r i t i c a l f o r l o n g-t e r m
stability .
2. Burundi
33. B u r u n d i h a s e x p e r i e n c e d a l o n g-s t a n d i n g p o l i t i c a l a n d e t h n i c c o n f l i c t w i t h
regional ramifications that started before independence in 1962. The conflict
intensified in 1972 with a Hutu invasion from Tanzania that saw a systematic
killing of Tutsis. In 1993 the conflict peaked after the assassination of the first
elected Hutu President. Again , Tutsis were systematically targeted. The
repression of the National Army against Hutus was equally brutal. More than
300,000 persons have died in the conflict since 1993 and up to 24 per cent of the
population was displaced at the worst period of the war. Destruction of
infrastructure and disruption of economic activity led to a drop in per capita
GNP from 180 USD to 110 between 1993 and 2000 and an increase of the
population living in poverty from 35 per cent to 67 per cent during the same
period.
34. Many internal negotiations took place between 1993 and 1996 with the
formation of successive g overnments but failed to end the conflict. External
negotiations between 1997 and 1999 that were facilitated by the Organisation of
African Union (OAU) resulted in the signing of the Arusha Agreement of August
2000, the formation of a transitional Governme nt the same year and a general
ceasefire in November 2003. The last rebel group joined the Agreement in May
2005 but it is still in conflict with the transitional Government.
35. The Arusha Peace Agreement offered a partial amnesty to those involved
i n t h e c on f l i c t a n d d e t a i l e d s p e c i f i c a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a n
integrated National Army and the implementation of a Disarmament,
D e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d R e i n t e g r a t i o n P r o g r a m m e f o r e x -c o m b a t a n t s . T h e O A U a n d
the United Nations appointed Special Representatives in 1993 after the massacres
to assist the parties in their reconciliation efforts. The OAU deployed an
14
Observer Mission in 2002 and a Peacekeeping Mission in 2003 to improve the

security environment. This role was taken over by a United Nations
P e a c e k e e p i n g M i s s i o n ( O N U B ) i n 2 0 0 4 . H o w e v e r , th e f a c t t h a t n o t all the parties
sign ed the a g r e e m e n t m e a n t t h a t i t w a s i m p l e m e n t e d i n a n i n s e c u r e
environment.
36. The DDR programme drew lessons from similar operations in Africa. A
N a t i o n a l P r o g r a m m e f o r D D R ( P N D D R ) wa s f o r m u l a t e d i n 2 0 0 3 a n d p l a c e d
under the political leadership of a National Commission for DDR (CNDDR) that
is chaired by the President. A Joint Operations Plan (POJ) was developed by all
t h e p a r t i e s t o i m p l e m e n t t h e p r o c e s s . T h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e P OJ were to:
• D i s a r m a n d d e m o b i l i z e 5 5 , 0 0 0 e x -c o m b a t a n t s , i n c l u d i n g 8 , 0 0 0 c h i l d
soldiers o f t h e B u r u n d i a n A r m e d F o r c e s (F A B ), Parties of A r m e d P o l i t i c a l
M o v e m e n t s ( P M P A ), a n d u l t i m a t e l y o f t h e N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e F o r c e s (F D N ) ,
and assist in their reintegration into civilian life ; and
• assist in the disarmament of 20,000 members of a government militia and
10,000 members of PMPA and the dismantling of their chains of command.
37. The M u l t i- C o u n t r y D e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d R e i n t e g r a t i o n P r o g r a m ( M D R P ) o f
t h e W o r l d B a n k p r o vi d e s a p l a t f o r m f o r d i s c u s s i o n a n d r e f l e c t i o n f o r a l l p a r t n e r s
supporting Burundi’s DDR programme.
38. Disarmament has not proceeded as planned in assembly areas due to

mutual mistrust between the parties , but all ex -c o m b a t a n t s e n t e r i n g
d e m o b i l i z a t i o n c e n t e r s a r e d i s a r m e d . 1 0 , 0 0 0 e x -c o m b a t a n t s , i n c l u d i n g 2 , 7 0 0
children, had been d e m o b i l i z e d b y 1 J u n e 2 0 0 5 . R e i n s e r t i o n a l l o w a n c e s
e q u i v a l e n t t o 1 8 m o n t h s of wages are paid to ex -c o m b a t a n t s , h a l f o n l e a v i n g t h e
demobilization centers and the rest in three equal instalments paid at three-
m o n t h i n t e r v a l s i n t h e c o m m u n i t y o f r e i n t e g r a t i o n . E x- c o m b a t a n t s a r e a l s o
e n t i t l e d t o r e i n t e g r a t i o n b e n e f i t s o f 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 f r a n c s (Fbu ). Child ex -
combatants are provided special care under a UNICEF sponsored programme.
Women a n d t h e h a n d i c a p p ed a l s o h a v e s p e c i a l p r o g r a m m e s .
39. Burundi’s DDR programme was conceived to have linkages with other
medium to l o n g- t e r m security, social reintegration and development
p r o g r a m m e s ( s u c h a s t h e P o v e r t y R e d u c t i o n S t r a t e g y P a p e r s (P R S P ) . T h e
im p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s e p r o g r a m m e s w o u l d f a c i l i t a t e t h e p h a s i n g- o u t o f t h e
DDR programme.
Key Challenges:
Ñ Continued conflict as one of the rebel movements has not respected the
agreement.
Ñ Resistance to disarm before arrival at demobilization centers beca use of
m i s t r u s t b e t w e e n p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e p r o g r a m m e.
Ñ Inaccurate numbers of armed forces communicated by the parties .
15
Key Lesson:
Ñ Fo r D DR t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d e f f e c t i v e l y , a l l p a r t i e s t o a c o n f l i c t s h o u l d
p a r t i c i p a t e i n p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d s i g n t h e p e a c e a g r e e m e n t.
3. Democratic Republic of The Congo
40. T h e D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c o f T h e C o n g o (DRC) h a s e n d u r e d m a n y c o n f l i c t s
since gaining independence in 1960 although there have been intermittent
periods of relative peace. The United Nations approved and deployed a
p e a c e k e e p i n g m i s s i o n t o t h e D R C i n 1 9 6 1 i n t h e w a k e o f p o s t-i n d e p e n d e n c e
political crises , and again in 1974 following the attempted secession of the
Province of Katanga . The numerous signed peace agreements did not lead to
d u r a b l e p e a c e an d s t a b i l i t y s i n c e s o m e o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g c a u s e s o f t h e c o n f l i c t
( e t h n i c i t y, decen t r a l i s a t i o n , b a d g o v e r n a n c e a n d r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ) w e r e n o t
satisfactorily resolved.
41. In 1997 a coalition of rebel movements under the leadership of the

A l l i a n c e o f D e m o c r a ti c F o r c e s f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f C o n g o -Z a i r e (A D F L) , w i t h
support from neighbouring countries, overthrew the government of President
Mobutu and took power. Internal discord within the alliance and disagreements
with some neighbouring countries over the acti vities of foreign armed groups on
DRC territory led to a resumption of the conflict that saw the involvement of
five Congolese belligerents; Government, four major rebel groups: Congolese
R a l l y f o r D e m o c r a c y (R C D ), M o v e m e n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n o f C o n g o ( MLC ) ,
K i s a n g a n i L i b e r a t i o n M o v e m e n t (R C D - K / M L ) a n d C o n g o l e s e R a l l y f o r
D e m o c r a c y -N a t i o n a l (R C D -N ) a s w e l l a s s i x f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s A n g o l a , C h a d ,
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, in support of either the government
or the rebels.
42. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU),
facilitated a peace process in Lusaka under the leadership of a Neutral
Facilitator that started in 1998. The UN approved and deployed a Peacekeeping
Mission in 1999. The peace negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of foreign
forces and the signing of a peace agreement by the main warring factions in 2002
and formation of a transitional government in June 2003. All the main belligerent
forces were allotted prominent positions in the transitional government.
H o we v e r , t h e a r m e d g r o u p s i n t h e I t u r i D i s t r i c t w e r e n o t p a r t o f t h e p e a c e
process and did not sign the peace agreement nor were they included in the
transitional government.
43. The peace agreement included specific reference to a DDR programme for
the former Co n g o l e s e b e l l i g e r e n t f o r c e s a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a n in t e g r a t e d
national army. A DDR programme for members of Rwandan armed groups in the
DRC was also included in the agreement. It was estimated that some 150,000
Congolese combatants, including 30,000 child soldiers would participate in the
DDR programme and that the estimated 25,000 members of Rwandan armed
groups would be disarmed, demobilized and repatriated to Rwanda, under the
leadership of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
( MONUC ) , f o r r e s e t t l e m e n t a n d r e i n t e g r a t i o n .
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44. An Inter-Ministerial Commission was established to handle policy matters

r e g a r d i n g D D R w i t h a Na t i o n a l P r o g r a m m e f o r D D R a d m i n i s t r a t i o n set up t o
ensure:
• Di s a r m a m e n t o f f o r m e r a r m e d g r o u p s a n d h a n d o v e r of a r m s c o l l ec t e d t o
the new integrated army;
• de m o b i l i z a t i o n o f e x - c o m b a t a n t s o n a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s ; a n d
• re i n t e g r a t i o n o f d e m o b i l i z e d e x - c o m b a t a n t s i n t o c o m m u n i t i e s o f t h e i r
choice within the framework of projects with sustainable benefits.
45. Demobilized ex-combatan ts received a package consisting of a transport
a l l o w a n c e , f o o d a l l o w a n c e a n d a n i n i t i a l s a f e t y -n e t p a y m e n t . T h e t o t a l p a y m e n t
a m o u n t e d t o 1 1 0 U S D . E x -c o m b a t a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a d d i t i o n a l s a f e t y-n e t
p a y m e n t s o f 2 5 U S D p e r m o n t h f o r 1 2 months at their chos e n a r e a s o f
r e i n t e gr a t i o n a n d m a y a l s o r e c e i v e t r a i n i n g i f t h e y w i s h .
46. The DDR programme has resulted in the disarmament and demobilization
of o v e r 1 6 , 5 0 0 a d u l t e x - c o m b a t a n t s a n d 7 , 6 5 1 c h i l d s o l d i e r s . A b o u t 6 , 2 4 8 s m a l l
arms, 235,000 ammunitions, 296 grenades, 963 bombs and 973 mines have been
c o l l e c t e d . 3 0 0 0 d e m o b i l i z e d e x -c o m b a t a n t s h a v e b e e n r e i n t e g r a t e d a n d 1 0 , 0 0 0 a r e
in the process of reintegration. Reintegration activities are designed and
implemented in partnership with a number of NGOs, both national and
international.
Key Challenges:
Ñ Issue of disarming the civilian population .

Ñ Th e c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e o n D R C t e r r i t o r y o f R w a n d a n a r m e d g r o u p s .
Ñ The establishment of linkages between DDR and other l o n g-t e r m
reintegration and reconciliation programmes .
Ñ Ta c k l i n g t h e p r o b l e m s o f v u l n e r a b l e g r o u p s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w o m e n a n d
children .
Ñ Securing adequate financial resources for the reinte gration phase of the
programme.
Ñ The unfavourable economic environment in which DDR is being
i m p l e m e n t e d m a y i m p a c t n e g a t i v e l y o n t h e r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s
raising serious concern s a b o u t t h e future stability of the country .
4. Liberia
47. The fourteen -year conflict that wrecked Liberia left the population in a
s t a t e o f a p p r e h e n s i o n . A g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f a D D R p r o g r a m m e th a t w a s
h a s t i l y i m p l e m e n t e d f r o m 1 9 9 4 -9 7 , f o l l o w i n g a l u l l i n t h e c o n f l i c t , a n d t h e
ensuing donor fatigue, Liberians anxiously await the end of the brutal self
destruction and regional instability that have resulted from the conflict. Failure
to learn from the mistakes of the past DDR experience could derail the current
peace process and destabilize not only Liberia but also the entire sub region.
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48. Although mechanisms were put in place in 1994 to jumpstart DDR, the
r e s u m p t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s i n A p r i l 1 9 9 6 an d t h e r e s u l t a n t l o o t i n g a n d d e s t r u c t i o n
of assets including databases seriously hindered the process. The Abuja Peace
A c c o r d o f 1 9 9 7 b r o k e r e d by E C O W A S e n d e d h o s t i l i t i e s b u t t h e i s s u e o f s o c i a l
reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life remained un resolved.
Consequently the international community and the national stakeholders opted
for a “quick and dirty” approach that did not provide for adequate encampment
of ex -c o m b a t a n t s f o r d e t r a u m a t i z a t i o n . T h e e x -c o m b a t a n t s w e r e t h u s n o t f u l l y
demobilized in preparation for genuine reintegration.
49. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e D D R p r o c e s s f o c u s e d m a i n l y o n g u n -c a r r y i n g c o m b a t a n t s ,
thus vulnerable groups, including women and children and followers of warring
factions, were not considered. Other major shortcomings of the 1997 DDR
programme included the failure of the elected government to restructure the
Ar m e d F o r c e s o f L i b e r i a ( A F L ) i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e A b u j a P e a c e A c c o r d s i n c e t h e
government was preoccupied with its own security and survival . The
government also failed to include leaders of other warring factions in key
decision-making positions. This led to dissatisfaction and a mass exodus of ex -
c o m b a t a n t s a n d t h e i r r e g r o u p i n g i n a n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r y t o r e -l a u n c h f u l l
scale war on Liberia in 1999.
50. The cornerstone of th e current peace process is the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) signed on 18 August 2003. The Agreement called for adherence
to the Ceasefire Agreement signed by the warring factions - Government of
L i b e r i a , L i b e r i a n s U n i t e d f o r R e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d D e m o c r a c y ( L U R D) a n d
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL); establishment and deployment of
an ECOWAS multinational force as well as a UN peacekeeping force; cantonment
( a s s i g n m e n t o f t r o o p s t o t e m p o r a r y q u a r t e r s ), d i s a r m a m e n t , d e m o b i l i z a t i o n ,
r e h a b i l i t a t i on a n d r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f a l l c o m b a t a n t s o f t h e w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s ;
creation of a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization,
Rehabilitation and Rein tegration (NCDDRR) comprising representatives of the
warring factions, relevant agencies of the National Transitional Government of
L i b e r i a ( N T G L ) , T h e E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y O f W e s t A f r i c a n States (E C O W A S ) ,
UN, African Union and the International Contact Group on Liberia. The mandate
of the NCDDRR was to coordinate and supervise DDRR (Disarmament,
Demobilizati on, Rehabilitation and Rein tegration) activities and also conduct the
elections.
51. The current DDR programme that was launched in 2003 is being
implemented in line with standard DDR principles and procedures but there are
existing policy and operational challenges which, if unresolved, may derail the
process. Among the key challenges are the lack of national ownership and the
marginalization of the National DDR Commission whose statutory functions are
coordination and supervision of the process. Nevertheless, the DDR programme
has addressed some conventional issues including the disarmament of 103,019
ex -c o m b a t a n t s , w e l l o v e r t h e i n i t i a l p r o j e c t i o n s o f 3 8 , 0 0 0 . S o m e 2 8 , 0 0 0 w e a p o n s
were collected by the official end of the DD phase on 31 December 2004. The
current DDR has also addressed issues related to vulnerable groups including
child soldiers, women, war wounded and followers of warring factions.
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Key Challenge:
Ñ R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a n d r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e l a r g e n u m b e r o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s .
C o n t r i b u t i o n s m a d e t o a U ND P T r u s t F u n d b y s o m e d o n o r s h a v e
permitted the engagement of 24,000 ex-combatants in various skills
training and other reintegration activities. The large number of ex -
combatants not covered by the reintegration programme so far constitutes
a s o u r c e f o r se r i o u s c o n c e r n . T h e y h a v e a l r e a d y t h r e a t e n e d t o d i s r u p t t h e
2005 elections if they are not enrolled in meaningful training programmes.
5. Mozambique
52. Conflict erupted in Mozambique as part of the nationalist struggle for

independence of the former Portugu ese colonies in Africa. A united front
prevailed until independence in 1975.
53. The installation of a one party state by the victorious Liberation Front of
M o z a m b i q u e (F R E L I M O ) c a u s e d d i s e n c h a n t m e n t i n p a r t s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t
w a n t e d m u l t i -p a r t y d e m o c r a cy . T h i s l e d t o t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a r i v a l m o v e m e n t ,
M o z a m b i c a n N a t i o n a l R e s i s t a n c e (R E N A M O) , i n 1 9 7 6 . T h e M a r x i s t-o r i e n t e d
Government also seized church-owned property and disrega rded traditional
rulers. These factors, combined with pressure from neighbourin g countries , were
at the base of the conflict.
54. I n 1 9 9 0 di r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s t o o k p l a c e b e t w e e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t a n d
R E N A M O f a c i l i t a t e d b y S a n t o E g i d o, a C a t h o l i c G r o u p b a s e d i n R o m e . T h e P e a c e
A g r e e m e n t t h a t w a s s i g n e d b y t h e t w o p a r t i e s i n 1 9 9 2 c l e a r l y d e m on s t r a t e d t h e
w i s h o f t h e t w o l e a d e r s t o e n d t h e c o n f l i c t . T h e p o p u l a t i o n w a s a l s o w a r- w e a r y
and amenable to reconciliation and forgiveness. The Peace Agreement included a
DDR programme that envisaged the completion of disarmament and
d e m o b i l i z a t i o n i n 1 8 mo n t h s . T h e p r o g r a m m e p l a c e d e m p h a s i s o n d i s a r m a m e n t
and demobilization but not much on social and cultural reintegration. An
integrated national army of 30,000 was to be formed. The United Nations
approved and deployed a Peacekeeping Mission, ONUMOZ, to provide a security
environment for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the DDR
process.
55. Disarmament was made difficult by the lack of reliable information on the
number of troops fighting on both sides. The strength of RENAMO's force was
estimated at between 11,000 and 13,000 and the Government army was estimated
to be many times the size of RENAMO's force. However, at the end of the
d e m o b i l i z a t i o n p h a s e o v e r 9 2 , 0 0 0 e x -c o m b a t a n t s h a d b e e n p r o c e s s e d , s o m e
7 0 , 5 0 0 o n t h e G o v e r n m e n t s i d e a n d m o r e t h a n 2 1 , 0 0 0 f r o m R E N A M O . It was
estimated that between 1.5 million and 6 million small arms and ammunitions
had been distributed in the country but only 200,000 light arms and ammunitions
were collected by the UN Mission in Mozambique by the end of its mandate i n
1995, of which some 24,000 were destroyed. The Mozambique Christian Council
is continuing the weapons collection programme and has collected an equal
amount of weapons and ammunitions in exchange f or basic in -kind support.
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56. D e m o b i l i z e d e x - c o m b a t a n t s r ec e i v e d a r e i n s e r t i o n a l l o w a n c e e q u i v a l e n t t o
12 months of salary, three months paid at the assembly areas and the rest at the
c h o s e n d e s t i n a t i o n s o f t h e e x -c o m b a t a n t s . T r a n s p o r t a t i o n w a s a l s o p r o v i d e d t o
d e m o b i l i z e d e x -c o m b a t a n t s b u t m a n y w h o c a m e f r o m r u ra l a r e a s o p t e d t o s e t t l e
in cities. Child soldiers were demobilized in separate centers at which they
r e c e i v e d s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . E f f o r t s t o r e u n i t e f a m i l i e s w e r e s u c c e s s f u l . Female ex -
combatants w h o h a d b ee n a b d u c t e d a n d s e x u a l l y a b u s e d w e r e r e u n i t e d w i t h
t h e i r f a m i l i e s a n d p r o vi d e d w i t h p s y c h o-s o c i a l s u p p o r t . T h e w a r - d i s a b l e d
received attention at special centers and were entitled to pensions as other
d e m o b i l i z e d e x -c o m b a t a n t s .
57. Reintegration that is long-term was not accorded high priority and was
m o r e di f f i c u l t b e c a u s e o f t h e l o w e d u c a t i o n l e v e l s o f t h e e x - c o m b a t a n t s . S k i l l s
d e v e l o p m e n t a c t i v i t i e s w e r e o r g a n i s e d f o r t h e e x -c o m b a t a n t s b u t o n l y 7 , 7 0 0
benefited from such activities.
58. Many organisations, both national and international, participated in the

im p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e D D R p r o g r a m m e u n d e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e
Ministry for the Coordination of Social Action. Overall policy coordination was
the responsibility of the National Commission for Social Coordination that was
based in the Office of the Prime Minister. The United Nations approved and
deployed a Peacekeeping Mission, ONUMOZ, with primary focus on
disarmament and demobilization.
59. Mozambique’s DDR faced many challenges, including the short-term focus
o f O N U M O Z , t h e l o w l e v e l o f e d u c a t i on of ex -c o m b a t a n t s , t h e r e l u c t a n c e o f
many ex -c o m b a t a n t s t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s , t h e c o n t i n u e d
circulation of a large number weapons and ammunitions and financial
constraints that led to the formation of a smaller integrated army (11,000 ins tead
of the 30,000 agreed). The refusal of RENAMO to disarm and demobilize a group
of 1000 soldiers based in the District of Maringue has been a continuing source
of concern.
Key Challenges :
Ñ En s u r e n a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p a n d l e a d e r s h i p .
Ñ Fo c u s o n m e d i u m t o l o n g- t e r m reintegration not just on s h o r t -t e r m
disarmament and demobilization .
Ñ Encourage the involvement of neutral organisations in programme
implementation to improve the spirit of reconciliation among
M o z a m b i q u e’ s p a r t i e s i n c o n f l i c t.
6. Rwanda
60. Rwanda experienced one of the most brutal genocides in recent history
r e s u l t i n g in the death s o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y one mill i o n p e o p l e i n 1 9 9 4 . T h e
slaughter ended when rebels under the leadership of the Rwanda Patriotic Front
(R P F ) o v e r t h r e w t h e G o v e r n m e n t . M o r e t h a n t w o m i l l i o n R w a n d a n s f l e d t o
20
neighbouring countries as refugees , including thousands of former soldiers of

t h e G o v e r n m e n t ’ s F o r c e s A r mé e s R w a n d a i s e (F A R ) a n d m i l i t i a s ( I n t e r a h a m w e )
who participated in the genocide. A new Government of National Unity,
inclu d i n g t h e R P F a n d a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t h a t w e r e n o t i n v o l v e d i n t h e
genocide, was formed in July 1994.
61. T h e G o v e r n m e n t a c c o r d e d p r i o r i t y t o t h e r e -e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s t a t e
authority throughout the country, rebuilding institutions and reorganising
public administration. In 1997, the Government decided to tackle the problem of
resettling the returnees and screening ex-combatants for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Disarmament was the responsibility of
the Ministry of Defence while Demobilization and Reintegration were entrusted
to the newly established Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
(RDRC) that was placed under the supervisory authority of the Ministry of
F i n a n c e a n d E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g . A S t e e r i n g C o m m i t t e e c o m p o s e d o f high -l e v e l
officials from participating line Ministries was charged with policy development
and coordination.
62. The overall mission of RDRC was to support the successful social and
e c o n o m i c r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o m m u n i t i e s a n d to
realise national security, reconciliation and development. The reintegration
component was envisioned to be an integral part of the overall national
reconciliation and reconstruction strategy and it supports directly the Poverty
Reduction Strategy of the Government.
63. Wi t h s u p p o r t f r o m t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , R D R C d e v e l o p e d t h e
Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) that was expected
t o w o r k t h r o u g h e x i s t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s t r u c tu r e s . T h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e s o f R D R P
are to:
i. de m o b i l i z e a n e s t i m a t e d 2 0 , 0 0 0 R w a n d a P a t r i o t i c A r m y ( R P A- f o r m e r
r e b e l s ), ex -c o m b a t a n t s f r o m t h e R w a n d a D e f e n c e F o r c e s ( c u r r e n t a r m y ) ,
a n d 25,000 members of ex -a r m e d g r o u p s ( A G ), a n d s u p p o r t t h e i r
tra n s i t i o n t o c i v i l i a n l i f e ;
ii. s u p p o r t t h e r e -i n s e r t i o n o f 1 5 , 0 0 0 e x - F A R c o m b a t a n t s ;
iii. s u p p o r t t h e s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e i n t e g r a t i o n o f a l l e x -c o m b a t a n t s
d e m o b i l i z e d i n S t a g e I I ( 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 5 ) a n d a l l S t a g e I ( 1 9 9 7 -2002) ex -
combatants who remained economically and socially vulnera ble; and
iv. facilitate the rea l l o c a t i o n o f G o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e f r o m m i l i t a r y t o

social and economic sectors.
64. Rwanda’s DDR experience has been mostly positive. By June 2005, 35,367
ex -c o m b a t a n t s , i n c l u d i n g 2 , 5 0 0 c h i l d s o l d i e r s , h a d b e e n d e m o b i l i z e d o u t o f t h e
e s t i m a t e d 6 0 , 0 0 0 . S o m e 1 5 , 0 0 0 e x -c o m b a t a n t s from the ex - FAR and ex - A G h a v e
been integrated into the National Army. Most of those not yet demobilized are
members of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Demobilized ex -
c o m b a t a n t s r e c e i v e d a r e i n s e r t i o n B a s i c N e e d s K i t ( B N K ) t h a t i s e q u i v a l en t t o
50,000 Frw (110 USD) for food, seeds, tools and basic household items and were
also transported to the communities of their choice. In addition to the BNK,
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p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s ( e x -RDF and ex -F A R c o m b a t a n t s ) r e c e i v e d R e c o g n i t i o n o f
S e r v i c e s A l l o w a n c e s ( R S A ) t h a t r a n g e d f r o m 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 Frw ( 3 3 0 U S D ) t o 5 0 0 , 0 0 0
Frw (1 ,1 0 0 U S D ) d e p e n d i n g o n y e a r s o f s e r v i c e a n d s e n i o r i t y . M o r e t a r g e t e d
support through a Vulnerability Support Window has been provided on grant
b a s i s t o 1 1 , 7 7 0 e c o n o m i c a l l y v u l n e r a b l e e x -c o m b a t a n t s . S p e c i a l c o u n s e l li n g a n d
s u p p o r t p r o g r a m m e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r w o m e n , c h i l d r e n a n d t h e w a r- d i s a b l e d .
65. RDRP recognized that reintegration is a long-term issue and developed

linkages with other reconciliation, stability and development programmes.
R e i n te g r a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s t a k e p l a c e a t c o m m u n i t y l e v e l . E x -c o m b a t a n t s a r e g i v e n
orientation, including sensitization on HIV/AIDS, at discharge centres and
c o m m u n i t i e s a r e a l s o s e n s i t i z e d p r i o r t o t h e a r r i v a l o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s . S u p p o r t i s
extended to communities through locally existing institutions to encourage
c o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t a n d e n h a n c e t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o s u s t a i n e x -c o m b a t a n t s .
Access to land is a key factor in deciding whether ex-combatants reintegrate into
r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s . E x -c o m b a t a n t s h a v e a w i d e r a n g e o f c h o i c e s o t h e r t h a n
agriculture but most of them lack skills. Skills development was introduced late
i n t h e R D R P . B e t w e e n 2 0 0 2 a n d 2 0 0 4 s o m e 7 1 5 e x -c o m b a t a n t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n
skills development activities.
Key Challenges:
Ñ The slow repatriation of former members of Rwandan armed groups in the

Democratic Republic of Congo. This issue needs to be addressed with
urgency to ensure durable peace in the Great Lakes Region.
Ñ Extending the life of the reintegration phase of the RDRP. Skills
development needs greater attention to enhance the possibility of ex -
combatants securing sustainable livelihoods and reintegrating
successfully, especially in urban areas .
7. Sierra Leone
66. The ten - y e a r c o n f l i c t i n S i e r r a L e o n e e n d e d w i t h a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t

wherein all parties eventually became committed to stability and therefore
decided to comply with the provisions of the various peace documents they
signed.
67. The Lomé Peace Agreement signed on 7 July 1999 ultimately became the
o p e r a t i o n a l d o c u m e n t f o r t h e p e a c e p r o c es s i n S i e r r a L e o n e . O n e o f t h e k e y
provisions of this agreement was the development of a viable Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDRP) for combatants of the
v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s t o t r a n s i t i o n t h e c o u n t r y f r o m w a r t o p e a c e a n d c o n s e q u e n tl y
bring about stability.
68. The overall goal of DDRP was to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex -
c o m b a t a n t s i n o r d e r t o c o n s o l i d a t e s h o r t -t e r m s e c u r i t y a s a b a s i s f o r l a s t i n g
peace in Sierra Leone. The three key objectives were:
22
a ) Co l l e c t , r e g i s t e r , d i s a b l e a n d d e s t r o y a l l c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s a n d
m u n i t i o n s r e t r i e v e d f r o m c o m b a t a n ts d u r i n g t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p e r i o d ;
b) d e m o b i l i z e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 5 , 0 0 0 e x - c o m b a t a n t s o f t h e A r m e d F o r c e s o f
S i e r r a L e o n e , R e v o l u t i o n a r y U n i t e d F r o n t (R U F ), C i v i l D e f e n c e Forces
(CDF) and paramilitary forces; and
c ) p r e p a r e a n d s u p p o r t e x -c o m b a t a n t s f o r r e i n s e r t i o n a n d s o c i o - e c o n o m i c
reintegration upon discharge from demobilization centers.
69. In developing the DDR programme, several policies, strategies and

a s s u m p t i o n s w e r e m a d e a n d a r o b u s t in s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l
arrangement put in place. The emphasis was on national ownership and
partnership with key international and national partners for effective planning,
coordination and implementation.
70. The DDR programme went through three distinct phases with associated
setbacks such as a coup d’état, initial non -compliance with peace agreements,
programme restructuring, etc. Despite the setbacks the programme was
successfully implemented and recorded some of the following key successes:
establishment and management of several disarmament and demobilization
centres in collaboration with key implementing partners across the country;
disarmament and demobilization of over 71,000 ex-combatants; and payment of
T r a n s i t i o n a l S a f e t y A l l o w a n c es t o o v e r 5 4 , 0 0 0 e l i g i b l e b e n e f i c i a r i e s t h a t
voluntarily registered for such schemes. They also benefited from economic
reintegration programmes ranging from vocational/apprenticeship skills
training and agriculture to formal education. Also, social reinte gration measures
that promoted forgiveness and reconciliation were largely achieved. Vigorous
information and sensitization campaigns and monitoring and evaluation systems
were key activities of the programme that contributed to the overall success of
the DDRP in Sierra Leone.
Key Challenges:
Ñ Misunderstanding of eligibility criteria

Ñ Prolonged period of encampment
Ñ Limited access to parts of the country to start reintegration activities
Ñ Limited availability of credible and capable implementing partners
Ñ Inad e q u a t e s u p p o r t t o d e p e n d e n t s of e x -c o m b a t a n t s and women
associated with fighting forces
Ñ The weak pro gramme link between DDR and RRR
Key Lessons:
Ñ The DDR programme significantly contributed to bringing sustained peace

t o S i e r r a L e o n e.
Ñ However, it did not address all the root causes of the war, which are part
of a wider political, social, economic and juridical recovery effort. These
23
l o n g- t e r m i s s u e s a r e b e i n g a d d r e s s e d t h r o u g h d e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s ,
decentralisation of governance, security sector reform, reconciliation
drives, judicial reform and transitional recovery programmes (through the
N a t i o n a l R e c o v e r y S t r a t e g y ) a n d a m e d i u m- term (2005 -2 0 0 7 ) P o v e r t y
Reduction Strategy.
8. Zimbabwe
71. Zimbabwe experienced a protracted period of conflict starting from the

late 1960s. The conflict intensified in the 1970s and ended only after a peace
agreement was signed in 1979. Zimbabwe had been ruled as a British colony,
Southern Rhodesia, for over eighty years until the White minority declared
unilateral independence (UDI) in 1965. UDI intensified the frustration of the
African majority that was already agitating for independence. The White
minority of 250,000 also owned most of the arable land of the country. The
c l a m o u r f o r la n d r ed i s t r i b u t i o n a n d m a j o r i t y r u l e w e r e t h e p r i m a r y u n d e r l y i n g
causes of the conflict. Two nationalist parties, Zimbabwe African National Union
(Z A N U ) a n d Z i m b a b w e A f r i c a n P e o p l e s U n i o n (Z A P U ) , f o r m e d a u n i t e d f r o n t
and fought the Rhodesian army. The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference of 1978
laid t h e b a s i s f o r t h e L a n c a s t e r H o u s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a l k s t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e
peace agreement.
72. The constitutional talks, facilitated by the UK, included all the parties to
the conflict. Agreement was reached on the constitutional arrangements for
m a j o r i t y ru l e b u t t h e l a n d i s s u e w a s o n l y p a r t i a l l y r e s o l v e d . T h e U K w a s t o
assist financially in the purchase of land held by whites for redistribution to
Africans. The total number of combatants at the end of the conflict was close to
100,000 men, women and children: 60,000 to 70,000 for the nationalist forces and
10,000 to 12,000 for the Rhodesian army. It was agreed that 40,000 men and
women from the three forces would be integrated into the new Zimbabwean
National Army (ZNA) and the surplus troops would be demobilized and
reintegrated into civil society.
73. Disarmament was undertaken in designated assembly areas and was

totally voluntary and without compensation. The large majority of troops
participated because the political and military leaders in whom they had
co n f i d e n c e w a n t e d p e a c e . W e a p o n s c o l l e c t e d w e r e r e c y c l e d t o Z N A . A J o i n t
Operations Command composed of all belligerent parties managed the
disarmament process and a Joint High Command supervised the process of
i n t e g r a t i n g f o r c e s t o f o r m Z N A . D a i l y b r i e f i n gs a n d t e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m t h e
British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) facilitated the process.
BMATT also provided standardized training to improve internal cohesion.
74. Demobilization was problematic and was conducted twice; 1981 in

assembly area s and in 1997 for all demobilized personnel throughout the
c o u n t r y . P a y m e n t s o f Z $ 6 0 0 w e r e m a d e t o a l l i n c a p a c i t a t e d e x -c o m b a t a n t s a n d t o
other ex -c o m b a t a n t s w h o r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r h o m e s . The Demobilization
Directorate of the Ministry of Labour managed a compensation scheme and paid
a n a d d i t i o n a l a m o u n t o f Z $ 1 8 5 p e r m o n t h t o e a c h d e m o b i l i z e d e x -c o m b a t a n t f o r
a period of two years. Under pressure from the Zimbabwe War Veterans
24
Association, a second compensation scheme was launched in 1997. 52,000

veterans claimed compensation and each claimant received a Z$50,000 lump sum
and was entitled to a regular monthly allowance of Z$2,000.
75. Reintegration was also problematic. Operation Soldiers Employed in

Economic Development (SEED) which was designed to assist in th e social and
economic reintegration of ex-combatants failed. Its weaknesses included the lack
o f a c l e a r o b j e c t i v e , t h e d i v e r s e n a t u r e o f t h e n e e d s o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s , r e s i s t a n c e
b y h o s t c o m m u n i t i e s t o t h e r e t u r n o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s a n d t h e c o n t i n u e d o p e r a t i o n
of the Rhodesian negative propaganda machinery. In addition, resources were
inadequate, particularly for land acquisition. Training programmes for a variety
of skills enabled many ex -c o m b a t a n t s t o g a i n u s e f u l e m p l o y m e n t i n c l u d i n g
setting up their own busin esses but this was not adequate. Special needs of
children and the handicapped were met through the establishment of schools
a n d r e h a b i l it a t i o n c e n t e r s . P r o v i d i n g b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e s a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c a r d s
was also accorded priority.
Key Challenges :
Ñ In a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e f o r c e s
Ñ Poor design of Operation SEED
Ñ Th e r e s i g n a t i o n o f m o s t s k i l l e d w h i t e m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s
Ñ Resistance from communities
Ñ R e l u c t a n c e t o e m p l o y e x - co m b a t a n t s i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r
Ñ Di s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t f e m a le ex -c o m b a t a n t s
Ñ I n a d e q u a cy o f r e s o u r c e s w h i c h c o m p r o m i s e d t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e l a n d i s s u e
Key Lessons :
Ñ A genuine spirit of reconciliation is essential
Ñ Co m m u n i t y s e n s i t i z a t i o n a n d s t a n d a r d i z e d m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m m e s
are very important
Ñ M e e t i n g th e s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f e x -c o m b a t a n t s i s c r i t i c a l i n
order to avoid social and political tension
Ñ Meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups and having a diversified

and relia ble resource base is essential
25
V. INTERNATIONAL DDR REFORM INITIATIVES
A. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR)
7 6 . T h e S t o ck h o l m I n i t i a t i v e o n D i s a r m a m e n t , D e m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d R e i n t e g r a t i o n
(SIDDR) focuses o n f u n d i n g , p o l i t i c a l a n d p e a c e b u i l d i n g a s p e c t s o f D D R . T h e
c h a i r p e r s o n o f t h e S I D D R , A m b a s s a d o r L e n a S u n d h , b r i e f e d C on f e r e n c e
p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e o b j e c t i ve s o f t h e i n i t i a t i v e . S h e e m p h a s i s e d t h a t t h ei r
main objective is to support DDR programmes. SIDDR focuses principally on
f u n d i n g , p o l i t i c a l a n d p e a c eb u i l d i n g a s p e c t s o f D D R . S I D D R w o r k s i n c l o s e
collaboration with many partners in reviewing DDR operations with a view
to improving funding modalities and strengthening political and financial
s u p p o r t f o r p e a c e b u i l d i n g . S h e f u r t h e r s t a te d t h a t t h e f i n a l p h a s e o f t h e
current review process would take place in a meeting to be held in
Stockholm in October 2005.
B. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR)
7 7 . U N I n t e r -A g e n c y W o r k i n g G r o u p ( U N I A W G D D R ) w o r k s t o i m p r o v e t h e
way t h e U N c o l l e c t i v e l y d e s i gn s , i m p l e m e n t s a n d m o n i t o r s D D R
p r o g r a m m e s . T h e C h a i r p e r s o n o f U N I A W G D D R , Mr. K e l v i n O n g , m a d e a
presentation on the work of the Group. He stated that the main objective of
the Group was to ensure that the entire United Nations System worked
towards improving the way it collectively designs, implements and monitors
DDR programmes. He informed that the Group was in the process of
finalizing a publication on Integrated DDR Standards and welcomed
c o m m e n t s a n d s u g g e s t i o n s o n t h e d o c u m e n t a n d C D -R O M t h a t w e r e
distributed.
78. Conference participants noted with appreciation the efforts of SIDDR and
UN IAWG DDR to improve the functioning of DDR operations in Africa and
m a x i m i z e t h e i r i m p a c t o n l o n g-t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e c o n t i n e n t . T h e
participants urged SIDDR and UN IAWG DDR to continue their endeavours.
P a r t i c i p a n t s e x p r e s s e d th e h o p e t h a t b o t h i n i t i a t i v e s w o u l d t a k e i n t o
consideration the outcome of the Conference in reaching decisions on their
support to DDR programmes and stability in Africa.
VII. RESULTS OF WORKING GROUPS
79. F i v e w o r k i n g g r o u p s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d t o d e l i b e r a te o n v a r i o u s D D R
themes from three different perspectives: Strategic, Organisational and
Implementation. The Working Groups formulated numerous recommendations
aimed at improving DDR programmes in Africa. Some of the major issues raised
during deliberation s on the reports of the Working Groups included the
following:
26
Common Lessons
• DDR programmes need to be more comprehensive and more emphasis

n e e d s t o b e p l a c e d o n b r i n g i n g c o m m u n i t i e s a n d e x -c o m b a t a n t s t o g e t h e r
in t h e p r o c e s s o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .
• There should be more flexibility in the design of DDR programmes owing
to w e a k n e s s e s i n d a t a b a s e s . L a c k o f r e l i a b l e d a t a c a n n e g a t i v e l y i m p a c t
D D R p r o g r a m s d u r i n g t h e p r e- p l a n n i n g p h a s e b e c a u s e t h e r e ' s o f t e n n o
w a y t o a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t t h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e w h o wi l l r e q u i r e s e r v i c e s .
• Flexibility in resourcin g arrangements is essential .
• The potential conflict between the pursuit of justice and the need to
achieve peace and stability quickly should be accorded serious
consideration.
• P a y m e n t o r n o n -p a y m e n t f o r a r m s s h o u l d b e c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d .
• The issue of weapons collection, registration and disposal needs more
attention.
• The presence of foreign ex -c o m b a t a n t s i n m a n y A f r i c a n c o n f l i c t s n e e d s
serious consideration.
VII. DDR AND NETWORKING
80. T h e c o -c h a i r , D r . N a m a n g a N g o n g i , i n v i t e d D r . N a n c y W a l k e r t o i n t r o d u c e
the topic. In her introduction she stressed the importance of networking and the
need for existing networks to coordinate their efforts.
A. Building a Network of African Practitioners
81. A f r i c a n D D R p r a c t i t io n e r s a n d s t a k e h o l d e r s m e t t o e x p l o r e w a y s o f
strengthening contacts and mutual support in the implementation of DDR
programmes. They decided to establish an operational network that would
address pressing regional DDR issues and also establish linkages wi th other
DDR initiatives and networks .
82. While members recognized the relevance of existing DDR Network

initiatives, it was observed that such initiatives were not sufficiently inclusive
a n d t h e r e f o r e e m p h a s i s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f:
• Establishing a much broade r and all embracing networking structure.
• En h a n c i n g l i n k a g e s w i t h e x i s t i n g n e t w o r k s .
• Es t a b l i s h i n g a n o p e r a t i o n a l n e t w o r k t h a t w o u l d a d d r e s s p r e s s i n g
regional DDR issues including:
- Roving combatants
- Protection of children
27
- Female ex -c o m b a t a n t s
- Circulation o f small arms
- Training and research
- Information and experience sharing.
83. It was proposed that a steering committee be established and a hub

created at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
in Ghana; the steering committee should be established to include relevant
national DDR Commissions, representatives of relevant agencies and NGOs such
as Mano River Union/Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and
as well as ex-combatants.
VIII. CLOSING SESSION AND CONCLUSIONS

84. The clos i n g s e s s i o n s t a r t e d w i t h a p r e s e n t a t i o n b y a d a n c e g r o u p , T h e
F r e e t o n g P l a y e r s , which i n c l u d e d s o n g s a n d s k i t s d e p i c t i n g c o n d i t i o n s d u r i n g
t h e c o n fl i c t a n d t h e r o l e p l a y e d b y D D R . A y o u n g s c h o o l g i r l f r o m t h e A n n i e
W a l s h M e m o r i a l S e c o n d a r y S c h o o l , F r e e t o w n , Ms. A m i n a t a P a l m e r , r e a d a p o e m
entitled “Thank you DDR” on the conflict in Sierra Leone.
85. T h e S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e S e c r e t a r y- G e n e r a l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
for Sierra Leone and Head of UNAMSIL, H.E. Mr. Daudi Mwakawago addressed
t h e C o n f e r e n c e in t h e C l o s i n g S e s s i o n . I n h i s a d d r e s s , t h e S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
commended the spirit of cooperation evidenced by all the stakeholders in Sierra
Leone as they worked together to ensure successful implementation of the DDR
p r o g r a m m e . H e a l s o s t r e s s e d t h e im p o r t a n c e o f c o n s i d e r i n g t e c h n i c a l , h u m a n
and financial requirements in the design of DDR programmes.
86. H.E. M r . M w a k a w a g o e m p h a s i z e d t h a t r e i n t e g r a t i o n w a s a l o n g-t e r m

process and should be linked to wider recovery strategies. Sufficient resources
s h o u l d al s o b e a v a i l a b l e f o r p r o g r a m m e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . H e u r g e d d o n o r s t o
provide long-term funding rather than focusing on quick fixes. The special needs
of vulnerable groups including women and the handicapped deserved particular
attention , a n d t h e h i g h r a t e o f u n e m p l o y m e n t w a s a c a u s e f o r s e r i o u s c o n c e r n .
The SRSG expressed the hope that future DDR programmes would benefit from
the lessons learned from past experiences.
87. The Rapporteur of the Conference, Dr. Francis Kai -Kai, presented a
S u m m a r y o f t h e F r e e t o w n De l i b e r a t i o n s a n d R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . T h e C o n f e r e n c e ,
after discussion adopted the following recommendations:
a. D D R s h o u l d n o t b e o v e r b u r d e n e d b y a l l p o s t-c o n f l i c t d e m a n d s . R a t h e r ,
it should be linked backward and forward to the broader peace process
( i n c l u d i n g p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s ) a n d p e a c e -b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m m e s . D D R
should always be accompanied by parallel relief, resettlement and
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n e f f o r t s f o r a l l w a r-a f f e c t e d p o p u l a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e
context of local communities as well as by Security Sector Reform.
b. National ownership of DDR programmes is critical for success. In this
regard, efforts should be made to genuinely support national
28
stakeholders (government, civil society and warring factions among

o t h e r s ) t h r o u g h t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e a n d c a p a c i t y bu i l d i n g .
c. The international community should support and work in genuine
partnership with national DDR stakeholders and it should also better
coordinate its own efforts and make its DDR funding mechanisms more
flexible and timely.
d. Every effort should be made to include regional perspectives in the
design and implementation of DDR programmes.
e. The special groups associated with warring factions (particularly
women, children and the disabled) should be provided with special
protective measures in the design and planning stages of any DDR
programme.
f. The complexity of DDR programmes was recognised by all. It was
therefore recommended that an integrated approach, involving national
and international stakeholders, including humanitarian agencies, should
be used in th e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s o f D D R p r o g r a m m e s .
g. P r o v i s i o n o r n o n -p r o v i s i o n o f a r e i n s e r t i o n p a c k a g e ( c a s h o r i n k i n d ) t o
demobilized ex-combatants to support their transition to normal civilian
life should be given careful consideration at the design phase of a DDR
programme.
h. All stakeholders should be aware of the importance of small arms
collection and control following the conclusion of formal disarmament
programmes.
i. T o pr o m o t e l o n g- t e r m s t a b i l i t y f o l l o w i n g a D D R p r o g r a m m e i n a g i v e n
c o u n t r y , p a r t i c i p a n t s a g r e e d that longer - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m m e s
that address the root causes of the conflict (e.g. Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other national recovery frameworks) as
well as programmes for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS should
b e i n i t iated a n d a d e q u a t e l y f u n d e d .
j. The network of African DDR practitioners needs to be strengthened to
share experiences and innovative ideas and convey their perspectives to
the UN and other international partners. In support of these efforts, the
Conference propos ed that African DDR practitioners and stakeholders
meet every two years to review the progress made and seek ways of
further improving DDR programmes and their contribution to stability
in Africa.
88. D r . N a m a n g a N g o n g i , C o - C h a i r o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e , i n h i s c l os i n g
statement, expressed appreciation to participants for their active participation in
the deliberations and for the concrete and useful recommendations that were
adopted. He expressed the hope that current and future DDR programmes in
A f r i c a w o u l d b e n e fi t f r o m t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . D r .
Ngongi thanked all those who helped make the Conference successful. Particular
appreciation was extended to the interpreters and catering staff. Finally,
appreciation was extended to the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone for
the support and hospitality given to Conference participants.
29
89. Hon. Momodou Koroma, Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone and Co-Chair of
the Conference delivered a closing statement. The Foreign Minister ended his
statement by formally declaring the Conference closed.
Thank You DDR

b y A m i n a t a P a l m e r , 1 1 y e a r s o l d, S i e r r a L e o n e
KABOOM! With heavy guns and bombs and jets,

Children were made to flee from their mother’s laps.
Yesterday, I was invited to a conference.
T hey g a v e m e a p a p e r w h i c h s a i d D D R
The paper said PEACE, DDR says PEACE
I asked, Peace after War?
I thought! My brothers, sisters, d ead!

I mean DEAD! And DDR says PEACE!
PEACE, yes, PEACE! With Peace as white as snow,

Children can once more play accrah,
Tell stories our grannies once told us – and laugh.
Yes! Children can freely laugh and say Thank You DDR!
30
ANNEX I: PROGRAMME
Tuesday, 21 June 2005
Opening Session
8:00 - 9:00 Registration
9:00 - 10:15 Introductory Remarks by Co-chairs:
• Message from Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, United
Nations Special Adviser on Africa, delivered by Dr. Namanga Ngongi,
former Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of
The Congo
• Hon. Momodu Koroma, Minister of Foreign Affairs & International
Cooperation, Government of Sierra Leone
Messages:
• Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, Former President of MARWOPNET
Opening Address:
• H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
10:15 - 10:30 Tea/Coffee Break
Plenary Session I: Presentation of National DDR Papers

10:30 - 13:00 • Sierra Leone (Dr. Francis Kai-Kai)
• Liberia (Dr. Moses Jarbo)
• Democratic Republic of Congo (Mr. Daniel Kawata)
13:00 - 14:00 Lunch Break
Plenary Session I (continued)

14:00 - 15:45 • Rwanda (Mr. David Munyurangabo)
• Burundi (Mr. Liberat Ntunzwenimana)
• Zimbabwe (Mr. Moyo Sibusiso)

16:15 - 17:15 International Initiatives:
• UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG [DDR]):
31
Mr. Kelvin Ong, Chair, UN IAWG [DDR]

• Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR): Ambassador Lena Sundh,
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
17:15 - 18:30 General Debate
18:30 Reception hosted by the Government of Sierra Leone
Wednesday, 22 June 2005
Plenary Session II
8:30 - 9:15 Presentation of National Papers from Angola and Mozambique
9:15 - 9:45 Interventions of African Countries without National Papers
9:45 - 10:15 Overview of Main Issues and Working Group Methodology
Dr. Namanga Ngongi (Former SRSG for the Democratic Republic of Congo)
Working Groups Session

10:30 – 13:30 • Group 1 – Strategic Perspective (ENGLISH)
Facilitator: Mr. Kelvin Ong
Secretary: Ms. Daiana Cipollone
Creating an Enabling Environment for Effective DDR
DDR and Peacebuilding and Reconciliation
DDR and Regional and International Challenges
• Group 2 – Strategic Perspective (FRENCH)
Facilitator: Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba
Secretary: Ms. Sophie da Camara
DDR and Specialized Needs
Strengthening Institutions and Coordination
Planning Challenges
• Group 3 – Organisational Perspective (FRENCH)
Facilitator: Mr. Cyriaque Agnekethom
Secretary: Mr. Edmond Junior De Fabribekers
• Group 4 – Organisational Perspective (ENGLISH)
Facilitator: Dr. Nancy Walker
Secretary: Mr. Abdel-Fatau Musah
DDR and Specialized Needs
Strengthening Institutions and Coordination
Planning Challenges
• Group 5 – Implementation Perspective (ENGLISH)
Facilitator: Hon. Justice Peter Onega
Secretary: Ms. Geraldine O'Callaghan
13:30 – 15:00 Lunch Break
32
Plenary Session III: Reporting of Working Groups

Groups report to Plenary Session
15:00 – 17:00 Groups 1-5 report back to Plenary
17:00 – 17:30 Tea/Coffee Break
17:30 – 18:30 General Debate on the outcome of the Working Groups and adoption of
the recommendations of the Working Groups
Thursday, 23 June
Plenary Session IV: Building a Network of Practitioners
8:30 - 9:00 Overview and Methodology of Networking Meetings

Facilitator: Dr. Nancy Walker (AfricaNet)
Networking Session
9:00 - 10:00 Building a Network of African DDR Practitioners

Facilitators:
Mr. Charles Achodo (UNDP Liberia)
Mr. Jonathan Sandy (Office of National Security, Sierra Leone)
9:30 - 10:00 Networking between

• The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR),
• The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG
[DDR]) and
• Members of the African National DDR Commissions
Facilitators:
Ambassador Lena Sundh (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Mr. Kelvin Ong (UN IAWG [DDR])
Closing Session: The Way Forward
11:00 – 13:30 • Reporting by Conference Rapporteur on the outcome of the

Conference, Dr. Francis Kai-Kai
• Message from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Sierra Leone, H.E. Daudi Mwakawago
• DDR and the People (Cultural and musica l performance)
• Closing remarks by Co-Chairs Hon. Momodu Koroma, Minister of Foreign
Affairs & International Cooperation, Government of Sierra Leone
& Dr. Namanga Ngongi (Former SRSG for the Democratic Republic of Congo)
13:30 - 15:00 Lunch Break
33
13:30 - 14:00 Press Conference
34
ANNEX I I: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME COUNTRY ORGANISATION
CANDEIAS, Amilcar ANGOLA INSTITUTE FOR THE SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL

REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS
(IRSEM), ANGOLA
FREIRE DOS SANTOS, Ambrosio ANGOLA DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF NATIONAL

De Lemos POLICE
SIMAO, Pembele ANGOLA MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, ANGOLA
NJELE, Felisberto ANGOLA STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER OF ANGOLA

(CEEA)
ZAMBI, Hilaro ANGOLA MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, ANGOLA
DA CAMARA, Sophie BELGIUM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BELGIUM
DE FABRIBEKERS, Edmond Junior BELGIUM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, BELGIUM
GATOTO, Desiree BURUNDI CHILD SOLDIERPROJECT, BURUNDI
MASABO Salvator BURUNDI BUREAU DIOCESAIN DE DEVLPT DE

BUBANZA (BURUNDI)
NIBIZI Isaie BURUNDI CNDDR BURUNDI
NTUNZWENIMANA Liberat BURUNDI SECRETARIAT EXECUTIVE DE LA

COMMISSION NATIONALE DRR
BURUNDAISE, BURUNDI
ZENOBE, Niragira BURUNDI PROGRAMME OF REINSERTION AND

REINSTATEMENT OF WAR-AFFECTED
PERSONS AND EX-COMBATANTS
KAWATA Daniel DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMMISSION NATIONALE DE

CONGO DEMOBILISATION ET REINSERTON
(CONADR), RD CONGO
SILLASEN, Grete DENMARK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DENMARK
HAILE, Kaleab ERITREA NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR

DEMOBILISATION & REINTEGRATION
PROGRAM, ERITREA
HASHI, Ayan Abdullahi ETHIOPIA OGADEN WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT

ASSOCIATION, ETHIOPIA
WOLTER, Detlev GERMANY (UN MISSION IN NY) PERMANENT MISSION OF GERMANY T O THE
UN
RICHTER-ADDO, Charles GHANA KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL

PEACEKEEPINGTRAINING CENTER
(KAIPTC), GHANA
DARABA KABA, Saran GUINEA RESEAU DES FEMMES DU FLEUVE MANO

POUR LA PAIX (MARWOPNET), GUINEA
TAHAGHOGHI Ali IRAN IRAN EMBASSY, IRAN
O’NEILL Grainne IRELAND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IRELAND
FUKOMOTO, Hiroki JAPAN EMBASSY OF JAPAN, GHANA
35
SETOGUCHI, Nobuhiro JAPAN JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

AGENCY (JICA), GHANA
GAYFLOR, Yabah Kazaku LIBERIA MINISTER OF GENDER& DEVELOPMENT,

LIBERIA
JARBO, Moses LIBERIA NCDDRR, LIBERIA
PAASEWE, Molley LIBERIA NCDDRR, LIBERIA
ROLAND, Isaac LIBERIA NCDDRR, LIBERIA
TOWALID Daniel LIBERIA CIVIL SOCIETYMOVEMENT OF LIBERIA
FRANCISCO, Antonio Alvaro MOZAMBIQUE MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND SOCIAL

WELFARE, MOZAMBIQUE
GASPAR Antonio Da Costa MOZAMBIQUE CEEI/ISRI MOZAMBIQUE
JORGE Mario Francisco MOZAMBIQUE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MOZAMBIQUE
MUNATEIA Antonio MOZAMBIQUE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

MOZAMBIQUE
KAYITESI, Eugenie RWANDA NDABAGA ASSOCIATION, RWANDA
MUNYURANGABO, David RWANDA COMMISSION NATIONALE DE

DEMOBILISATION RWANDAISE (RDRC),
RWANDA
RWIGEMA, David RWANDA KIGALI VETERAN’S CO-OPERATIVE

SOCIETY, RWANDA
JUSU-SHERIF Yasmin SIERRA LEONE MANO RIVER WOMEN’S PEACE NETWORK

(MARWOPNET)
BENJAMIN, John SIERRA LEONE KAILAHUN DISTRICT COUNCIL, SIERRA

LEONE
COLLINS, Eldred SIERRA LEONE RUF, SIERRA LEONE
COLLINS Ben Sie-Tal SIERRA LEONE LIBERI AN EMBASSY, FREETOWN, SL
CONTEH Santigie SIERRA LEONE COUNCIL MEMBER, SIERRA LEONE
DAVIES, Rupert SIERRA LEONE PERMANENT MISSION OF SIERRA LEONE T O

THE UN
ELZIYADI Ali SIERRA LEONE WORLD ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY, SIERRA

LEONE
GRENAWA Michael SIERRA LEONE RUF SIERRA LEONE
KABO Morie SIERRA LEONE CIVIL SOCIETYMOVEMENT, SIERRA LEONE
KAI-KAI Francis SIERRA LEONE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

COORDINATION OFFICE
KARGBO, Fatou SIERRA LEONE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE, GENDER&

CHILDREN'S AFFAIRS, SIERRA LEONE
KOROMA, Anthony SIERRA LEONE MINISTRY OF YOUTH & SPORTS, SIERRA

LEONE
MASSALAY, Eddy SIERRA LEONE EX-CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE, SIERRA LEONE
36
MCARTHY, Rosaline SIERRA LEONE NATIONAL WOMEN’S FORUM, SIERRA

LEONE
PEMAGBI, Amb. Joe SIERRA LEONE AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT

REPRESENTATIVE OF SIERRA LEONE TO
THE UN
PRATT Memunatu SIERRA LEONE PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES,

UNIVERSITY OF SL
PRATT Nana Claris SIERRA LEONE MARWOPNET
ROSENBROCK Christine SIERRA LEONE GTZ
SANDY, Jonathan SIERRA LEONE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SIERRA

LEONE
SESAY Fatu SIERRA LEONE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY,

SIERRA LEONE
UMARU Wurie SIERRA LEONE FOREIGN MINISTRY, SIERRA LEONE
TEJAN-KELLA Mustapha SIERRA LEONE DDR CONSULTANT
Mabell IYATUNDE V. COX SIERRA LEONE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE SOCIETY
JULEUS, Stefan SWEDEN NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE, SWEDEN
SAMUELSSON, Jens SWEDEN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SWEDEN
SUNDH, Lena SWEDEN AMBASSADOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, SWEDEN
LÜETHI, Denise SWITZERLAND SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND

COOPERATION (SDC), SIERRA LEONE
RYCHNER, Daniel SWITZERLAND SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT (SDC),

SIERRA LEONE
KNEGT, Hein -Peter THE NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

NETHERLAND
VAN DE GOOR, Luc THE NETHERLANDS CLINGENDAEL INSTITUTE, NETHERLANDS
ONEGA, Peter UGANDA UGANDA AMNESTY COMMISSION
STONE Lydia UNITED KINGDOM STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD, UK
MOYO, Sibusiso ZIMBABWE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ZIMBABWE
MUSAH, Abdel-Fatau ECOWAS ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF WEST AFRICAN

STATES (ECOWAS), NIGERIA
CHOGA Andrew I.O.M SIERRA LEONE
DORE, Ousmane INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF),

SENEGAL
ZEKENG Leopold UNAIDS UNAIDS, SIERRA LEONE
RICO-BERNABE Raquel UNAMSIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA

LEONE
37
ELOSIUBA Obianuju UNAMSIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA

LEONE
ADEKERA, Daniel UNAMSIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA

LEONE
AGNEKETHOM,Pawoumotom UN-DDA UN DEPARTMENT OF DISARMAMENT

AFFAIRS (DDA), TOGO
CIPOLLONE, Daiana UN-DDA DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

(DDA), NEW YORK
ASANGA Nancy UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (SIERRA LEONE)
O'CALLAGHAN, Geraldine UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (UNDP/BCPR), GENEVA
MOHAMED, Ahmednur Sheik UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (UNDP), ETHIOPIA
SCHARF, Robert UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMNE (UNDP), SOMALIA
ZAHABI, Sidi UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMNE (UNDP), SOMALIA
ACHODO, Charles UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (UNDP), LIBERIA
ANDERSON A. UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME SIERRA LEONE
LJUNGREN, Bengt UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME (UNDP), SIERRA LEONE
HARSCH, Ernest UN-DPI UN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

INFORMATION, NEW YORK
ONG, Kelvin UN-DPKO UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING

OPERATIONS/ UN DDR IAWG, NEW YORK
AHOHE, Emile UN-ECA UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

(ECA), NIGER
LAM Nai-Jit UNHCR UNHCR , FREETOWN
CAPPELAERE, Geert UNICEF SIERRA LEONE
FARR, Vanessa UNIDIR GENEVA SWITZERLAND
ADDOU, Hodan UNIFEM UNIFEM, KENYA
KIWANUKA, Julie UNMIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

(UNMIL), LIBERIA
MALIK, Nisar UNMIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

(UNMIL)
PERRY, Eric UNMIL UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

(UNMIL)
ADEKOYA, Aderemi UNMIS UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN

(UNMIS)
VREY, Waldemar UNOB UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN BURUNDI
38
LUDOVIC DE LYS, Herve UN-OCHA OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA), SENEGAL
FOWLER Dandeson UN-OCHA UN OCHA SWITZERLAND
HOUDEGBE Guy Ange UNOCI UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE

D’IVOIRE
KABIE Boni UNOCI UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE

D’IVOIRE
KRECOUM Boua Marius UNOCI UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE

D’IVOIRE
NGONGI, Namanga Amos UN-OSAA UN-OSAA CONSULTANT
ENGO, Ruth Bamela UN-OSAA UN OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON

AFRICA, NEW YORK
IKEGAME, Mieko UN-OSAA UN OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON

AFRICA, NEW YORK
BAKHIT, Karim UN-OSAA UN OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON

AFRICA, NEW YORK
RODIN, Jacqueline UN-OSAA UN OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON

AFRICA, NEW YORK
WALKER Nancy UN-OSAA UN-OSAA CONSULTANT
McCARTY, Susan USA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USA
SACKEY James WORLD BANK WORLD BANK, SIERRA LEONE
VERHEUL, Adriaan WORLD BANK WORLD BANK (MDRP), WASHINGTON DC, USA
39

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United Nations Office of the Government of the

Special Adviser on Africa Republic of Sierra Leone

Freetown, 21-23 June 2005

United Nations ? New York, 2005

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 3

III. OPENING SESSION..................................................................................................................................... 9

IV. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH DDR IN AFRICA..................................................................10

V. INTERNATIONAL DDR REFORM INITIATIVES .........................................................................26

VI. RESULTS OF WORKING GROUPS ....................................................................................................26

VII. DDR AND NETWORKING......................................................................................................................27

VIII. CLOSING SESSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................28

ANNEX I: CONFERENCE PROGRAMME ................................................................................................ 31

ANNEX II: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ...........................................................................................................34

A. Summary of the Freetown Deliberations and Recommendations

The Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Stabili t y

B. Other Key Messages from the Opening Session

Ñ DDR must be guided by :

C. Presentation of National Papers

National papers were presented by a number of countries that have undergone

The following points were highlighted:

• In order to build trust and confidence in a DDR programme key

• Insufficient funding, weak institutions and lack of local capacity were

• The UN briefed participants on the draft of the Integrated DDR Standards

Five working groups deliberated on various DDR themes from three

African DDR practitioners and stakeholders met and decided to establis h a n

Delegates to the conference adopted the following recommendations at the end

c. The international community should support and work in genuine

f. Participants recognised that DDR programmes are complex. It was

h. All stakeholders should be aware of the importance of small arms

2. However, international efforts at building peace have had mixed results

3. In recent years, it has been acknowledged that disarmament,

4. However, many DDR programmes have not been designed and

conceived within a larger l o n g-t e r m development and peace stabilisation

6. Addressing these issues from strategic, organisational and

10. To ensure a coordinated UN approach in the preparation of the

11. The overa l l a i m o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s t o r e v i e w t h e c h a l l e n g e s o f D D R

12. The Conference’s specific objectives were to:

13. To capture the perspective of diverse DDR stakeholders in Africa, pre-

III. OPENING SESSION

19. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, stressed that to be

21. The Special Adviser on Africa emphasised that the Conference

22. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou

This was recognized by the Government as a sign of confidence by the

24. Mr. Momodou Koroma w e l c o m e d p a r t i c i p a n t s t o t h e f i r s t p l e n a r y s e s s i o n

V. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH DDR IN AFRICA

• Key commanders of all the parties to a conflict should be encouraged to

• DDR programmes should be embedded in broader p o s t-c o n f l i c t

followed by another agreement, the Gbadolite Agreement. This second

30. A Joint Commission was established to supervise the implementation of

31. Reintegration programmes for demobilized ex-combatants started in

Ñ DDR should be a seamless process, and the R should not be a n

Observer Mission in 2002 and a Peacekeeping Mission in 2003 to improve the

38. Disarmament has not proceeded as planned in assembly areas due to

3. Democratic Republic of The Congo

41. In 1997 a coalition of rebel movements under the leadership of the

44. An Inter-Ministerial Commission was established to handle policy matters

Ñ Issue of disarming the civilian population .

50. The cornerstone of th e current peace process is the Comprehensive Peace

52. Conflict erupted in Mozambique as part of the nationalist struggle for

58. Many organisations, both national and international, participated in the

neighbouring countries as refugees , including thousands of former soldiers of

iv. facilitate the rea l l o c a t i o n o f G o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e f r o m m i l i t a r y t o

65. RDRP recognized that reintegration is a long-term issue and developed

Ñ The slow repatriation of former members of Rwandan armed groups in the