[Administrative Procedure In adjudication of cases due process cardinal

primary rights]
UP Board of Regents vs. CA
Aug. 31, 1999
J. Mendoza

P: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR
ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR.
FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and
MARICHU LAMBINO
R: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET
CELINE

Facts:
AWMC citizen of India. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the UP College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy
After completing units required for coursework, went on leave, returned to the
Philippines in to work on her dissertation entitled, Tamil Influences in
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Anthro dept chairperson wrote to Assoc Dean Diokno certifying that private
respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense
One of the members of the dissertation panel, Dr. Medina, informed CSSP
dean Paz that portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted,
without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and
Eastern and Southern Asia and from John Edyes article entitled Description
of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives
of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their
Coasting Navigation in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
Journal
Nevertheless, she defended dissertation. 4 out of 5 panelists gave her
passing mark.
AWMC requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina,
to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral
defense. The meeting was held at the deans office with Dean Paz, AWMC,
and a majority of the defense panel present.i[6] During the meeting, Dean
Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a
student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the
Deans representative
CSSP College Faculty approved her graduation
University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation. The
list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included
AWMC s name
Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs,
requesting the exclusion of AWMCs name from the list of candidates for
graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation
Letter did not reach BOR on time; Univ Council approved
Dean Paz also wrote a letter to AWMC that she would not be granted an
academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to
her be withdrawn
Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from
various disciplines and chaired by Dr. Duka-Ventura, to investigate the
plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended
to UPD Chancellor Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on AWMC be
withdrawn
Dean Paz informed AWMC of the charges against her
Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least 90
instances or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted from
sources without proper or due acknowledgment
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw AWMCs degree and forwarded its recommendation to the Univ
Council. UC approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the BOR.
BOR deferred action.
Chancellor Roman summoned AWMC to a meeting on the same day and
asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the
charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating
committee.ii[13] AWMC, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation
in a letter
Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and AWMC to discuss
her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on but AWMC did
not attend it, alleging that the BOR had already decided her case before she
could be fully heard
AWMC wrote to UP President. Also wrote to Chair of BOR, complaining that
she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no
longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted
Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94
constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from
the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Councils
recommendation to withdraw private respondents degree. With the approval
of the BOR and the UPD Executive Committee, Posadas created a 5-man
committee, chaired by Dr. Zafaralla. Members of the Zafaralla committee and
AWMC met
Zafaralla Committees report: recommending the withdrawal of private
respondents doctorate degree
BOR withdrew her degree
AWMC sought reinvestigation of case. Denied.
Filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages w/ RTC QC: alleged that petitioners had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process. Dismissed on the grounds of academic freedom.
CA reversed and held that AWMC was denied due process. Ruling: It is
worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly
culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal
of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard
until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners
subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing


Issue: WON was accorded due process (YES)

Held:
various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that AWMC
had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in
her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university
proceedings before AWMC was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there
were too many committee and individual investigations conducted
in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.iii[27] A party who has
availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have
been denied due process
AWMC was informed in writing of the charges against heriv[29] and afforded
opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written
explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993.v[30] AWMC then
met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to
discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position
not tenable for to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the
BOR. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.vi[32] It is noteworthy that
the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the BOR
Nor indeed was entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla
committee as part of her right to due process. ADMU vs Capulong:
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination
BOR determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee
composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that AWMC
committed no less than 90 instances of intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. BOR decision to withdraw doctorate was based on documents
on record including her admission that she committed the offense
was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to
refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her
responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of
Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven.
Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties
in the absence of proof to the contrary
Indeed, as the appellate court observed, AWMC is no longer within the ambit
of disciplinary powers of the U.P. cannot even be punished since, as she
claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary
proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What
U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic
integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she
obtained through fraud
CA reversed.

[Administrative Procedure In adjudication of cases due process cardinal
primary rights]
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. CA
Nov. 7, 1979
J. Aquino

P-appellants: ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, VIOLA S.
NAVA, FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA, HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO
S. NAVA, PURIFICACION SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO
ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA
R-appellees: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ,
ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO
YABUT, ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, CASIMIRO N. EBIDO,
ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN,
FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE,
PABLO PABILONA, ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIO
OOVILLA

Facts:
In Mines Administrative Case, Director Gozon issued an order wherein he
dismissed the case filed by Zambales Chromite and other petitioners. In that
case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of 69 mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales
Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and
located mining claims in accordance with law
Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Martinez and Pabilona,
were duly located and registered
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Sec of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. While the appeal was pending, Gozon was appointed Sec of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided
the appeal, as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus,
Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal
from his own decision. he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same
case
ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims.
Dismissed appeal from his own decision.
petitioners filed a complaint in the CFI Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's
decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors
LC sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. Held that
the disqualification petition of a judge to review his own decision or ruling
does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the
Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary from deciding an appeal from a case
which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground
for disqualification; that the petitioners did not seasonably seek to disqualify
Secretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence
that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or
hostility to the petitioners
CA reversed: improper for Gozon to affirm his own decision as Director of
Mines (second decision); LCs judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision,
should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review
anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further
proceedings will be taken in the trial court. Held that Secs decision void bec
he was disqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines.

Issue: WON Zambales Chromite was denied due process (YES)

Held:
Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his
decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of
Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.
Mining Law: SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations
shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: Provided, That the
decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its
receipt. In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or
order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction
within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the
said decision or order shag be final and binding upon the parties concerned.
Provision of section 61 that the decision of the Director of Mines may be
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates
that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case
He should have asked Undersecretary to undertake review
Respondents denied due process (fundamental fairness) when Secretary
Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines
we set aside the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
dated August 16, 1963 as affirmed by the trial court as well as the first
decision of the Court of Appeals
Case returned to Minister of Natural Resources


[Administrative Procedure In adjudication of cases due process cardinal
primary rights]
Gannapao vs. CSC
May 31, 2011
J. Villarama

P: RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO
R: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC), THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, ARIEL G. RONQUILLO, J. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, JOSE F.
ERESTAIN, JR., and KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, ALL NAMED INDIVIDUALS
IN THEIR CAPACITY AS OFFICERS OF THE CSC, RICARDO BARIEN,
INOCENCIO M. NAVALLO, LIGAYA M. GANDO, LEA MOLLEDA, FE R. VETONIO,
PRIMO V. BABIANO, PATIGA J., JOSE TAEZA, G. DELOS SANTOS, LOSBAES,
W., AVE PEDIGLORIO and CRESENCIA ROQUE

Facts:
Private respondents, who are stockholders and board members of United
Workers Transport Corp. filed a verified complaint before the PNP, charging
RG with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for
Preventive Suspension and Disarming. PRs are former drivers, conductors,
mechanics and clerks of the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corp. UWTC
started operating MMTCs buses which it acquired under a conditional sale
with right of repossession. At about the same time, RG was allegedly
employed by Atty. Gironella, the general manager appointed by the Board of
Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard. Majority stockholders of
UWTC sued Atty. Gironella and 5 other members of the UWTC Board of
Directors for gross mismanagement.
Upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by them and other
stockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a "task force" composed of
former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by RG. Armed with deadly
weapons such as guns and knives, RG and his group intimidated and
harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses.
RG is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act
as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the
drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. PRs prayed for the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination
after due hearing
complaint passed a pre-charge investigation with The Inspector General,
Internal Affairs Office of the PNP, and petitioner filed his Answer
.
Denied the
allegations of the complaint and averred that he was never employed by Atty.
G as bodyguard. Instead, it was his twin brother who worked as messenger at
UWTC. In an undated Memorandum,
6
Chief Service Inspectorate Police
Superintendent Atty. Casugbo recommended the dismissal of the complaint,
citing the affidavit of desistance allegedly executed
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum Circular No. 96-
010
7
dated July 31, 1996, was issued, and a summary hearing on the
complaint was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service, PNP National
Headquarters in accordance with the newly promulgated rules.
Atty. Sierra of the Office of the Director General, PNP, issued a subpoena to
RG requiring him to appear at the hearing of Adm. Case.
8
RG moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, citing the earlier
dismissal of the complaint against him by Chief Service Inspectorate
Casugbo.
9
However, PNP Chief. Sarmiento denied the MTD
Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision: Guilty.
MR denied. Elevated case to NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board. Appeal
dismissed.
Brought case to DILG. Sec denied appeal and affirmed suspension for 3
months.
RG then appealed to the CSC claiming that he had been denied due process
in the proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service. He also sought to
set aside the penalty of three months suspension
CSC issued Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal but modifying his
penalty of 3 months suspension to dismissal. Ruled that act of serving as
bodyguard of Atty. G and harassing the bus drivers of UWTC is so grave as
to warrant the penalty of dismissal.
CA affirmed CSC decision. CA ruled that RG cannot claim denial of due
process since he was given ample opportunity to present his side. where the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, and the party could present its side or defend its interest in due
course, there is no denial of procedural due process.
RG contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before the
Office of the Legal Service of the PNP since no notice and summons were
issued for him to answer the charges and no hearing was conducted. He
claims that his dismissal was not proper and legal as there was no
introduction and presentation of evidence against him and he was not given
the opportunity to defend his side

Issue: WON Gannapao was accorded due process (YES)

Held:
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
21

In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to
be heard.
22
As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Procedure (NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010): Pre-Charge
Investigation - 4.01 Within three (3) days from the receipt of the complaint,
the Command/Unit Inspector, upon directive from the Disciplinary Authority
concerned, shall conduct a preliminary inquiry/pre-charge investigation
wherein both the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, if any
shall be summoned to appear. x x x After the inquiry, the Command/Unit
Inspector shall submit to the Disciplinary Authority concerned his Report of
Investigation, together with his recommendation; Summary Hearing - 5.01
After it has been determined from the results of the pre-charge investigation
that the complaint is a proper subject of summary hearing, the respondent
PNP member shall be furnished with a copy of the complaint or charges filed
against him to include copies of affidavits of witnesses and other documents
submitted by the complainant should there be any, and he shall be directed to
submit an answer within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint, attaching
therewith pertinent documents or evidence in support of his defense.
RG was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he
submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-
charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a
summary hearing on the complaint, was again duly notified of the
proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side
Claim that he did not file an answer since no subpoena was issued to him
thus deserves scant consideration. had ample opportunity to present his side
during the hearing and he was even advised by the hearing officer that he
may file a supplemental answer or a counter affidavit or he may adopt his
answer filed. Instead, petitioner filed a MTD, reiterating the ground of res
judicata, based on his own assertion that the case against him had already
been heard, tried and finally terminated. however, he did not present proof of
such dismissal. Indeed, he could not have presented such proof because, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the undated memorandum of Atty.
Casugbo, the hearing official who conducted the preliminary inquiry/pre-
charge investigation, was merely recommendatory
when the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP found the complaint to be a
proper subject of a summary hearing, and a further investigation was
conducted pursuant to the rules, the recommendation to dismiss was deemed
not adopted or carried out. Having been given a reasonable opportunity to
answer the complaint against him, cannot now claim that he was deprived of
due process
assertion that the complainants/witnesses against him have not been cross-
examined by him, is likewise bereft of merit. While the right to cross-examine
is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not necessarily
require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this
right if desired by the party entitled to it.
27
In this case, while Memorandum
Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall
take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, RG
missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline
for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly
the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with
the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with copy of complaint and
its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit
and instead filed a motion to dismiss reiterating the previous recommendation
for dismissal made by Atty. Casugbo. Moreover, after the PNP Director
General rendered his decision, he filed a MR which was denied. He was also
able to appeal from the decision of the PNP Director General to the DILG Sec
and eventually to the CSC. We have held that the fact that a party filed
motions for reconsideration and appeals with the tribunals below, in which he
presented arguments and through which he could have proffered her
evidence, if any, negates claim that denied opportunity to be heard
CA decision affirmed.

[Administrative Procedure In adjudication of cases due process cardinal
primary rights]
Goss vs. Lopez
Jan. 22, 1975
J. White

Facts:
Ohio law, Rev.Code provides for free education to all children between the
ages 6 and 21. Sec 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio
public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel
him. In either case, he must notify the student's parents within 24 hours and
state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or his parents, may
appeal the decision to the Board of Education, and, in connection therewith,
shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The Board may reinstate
the pupil following the hearing. No similar procedure is provided in 3313.66
or any other provision of state law for a suspended student. No procedure
issued by state nor individual procedures from high schools involved.
9 named appellees, each of whom alleged that he or she had been
suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to 10 days without a
hearing pursuant to 3313.66, filed an action against the Columbus Board of
Education and various administrators of the CPSS. complaint sought a
declaration that 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it permitted public
school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education
without a hearing of any kind, in violation of the procedural due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to enjoin the public
school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to 3313.66, and to
require them to remove references to the past suspensions from the records
of the students in question
Suspensions arose bec of wide student unrest, on account of disruptive or
disobedient conduct committed in the presence of the school administrator
who ordered the suspension. No one was given a hearing to determine the
operative facts underlying the suspension, but each, together with his or her
parents, was offered the opportunity to attend a conference, subsequent to
the effective date of the suspension, to discuss the student's future
Other incidents: 1) Disturbance in the lunchroom no hearing conducted 2)
Demonstrating in a highschool other than that she was attending, brought to
police station but released w/o being formally charged before going to
school, she was notified of 10-day suspension, no hearing 3) No school files
as to suspension
District Court declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law because
they were "suspended without hearing prior to suspension or within a
reasonable time thereafter," and that Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 3313.66 (1972)
and regulations issued pursuant thereto were unconstitutional in permitting
such suspensions. ordered that all references to plaintiffs' suspensions be
removed from school files
Although not imposing upon the Ohio school administrators any particular
disciplinary procedures and leaving them "free to adopt regulations providing
for fair suspension procedures which are consonant with the educational
goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics of their school and
locality," that there were "minimum requirements of notice and a hearing prior
to suspension, except in emergency situations." In explication, the court
stated that relevant case authority would: (1) permit "[i]mmediate removal of a
student whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school,
endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials, or damages property";
(2) require notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the student's
parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct them; and (3) require a
hearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his removal.
Finally, the court stated that, with respect to the nature of the hearing, the
relevant cases required that statements in support of the charge be produced,
that the student and others be permitted to make statements in defense or
mitigation, and that the school need not permit attendance by counsel
Argument 1: appellants contend that, because there is no constitutional right
to an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect
against expulsions from the public school system
Argument 2: even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Due
Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when the State
subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10
days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is
therefore of no relevance

Issue: WON high school students were accorded due process (NO)

Held:
On Argument 1: Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Protected
interests in property are normally "not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined" by an independent source
such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits.
on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of
entitlement to a public education. It is true that 3313.66 of the Code permits
school principals to suspend students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may
not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had their
own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosen
to extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class generally,
Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has
occurred
young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not
excepted
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: authority possessed by the
State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although
concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional
safeguards. Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a
student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest
which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken
away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required
by that Clause
Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. "Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him," the minimal requirements of the Clause
must be satisfied. School authorities here suspended appellees from school
for periods of up to 10 days based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and
recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with
their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment. apparent that the claimed
right of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that
misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the
Constitution.
On Argument 2: "whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.
Length and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to
weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the
basic right" to a hearing of some kind. gravity is irrelevant to the question
whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause
On the question of what process must be due: Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co: at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard
Grannis v. Ordean: one is informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to . . . contest
Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly imposed,
but it disserves both his interest and the interest of the State if his suspension
is, in fact, unwarranted
Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order,
but a valuable educational device. The prospect of imposing elaborate
hearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with great concern,
and many school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a
strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication
was sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of
his dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure
that an injustice is not done
due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if
he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story
no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of the hearing;
disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity
to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told
what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is
Since the hearing may occur almost immediately following the misconduct, it
follows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of
the student from school. We agree with the District Court, however, that there
are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted
upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be
immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and
rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable, as the District
Court indicated.
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide,
that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student
the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the
incident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in
each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more
than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing
the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature
may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool, but also destroy
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process
On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting
the student to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge
against erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to the
existence of disputes about facts and arguments about cause and effect. He
may then determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-
examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In more
difficult cases, he may permit counsel. In any event, his discretion will be
more informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student
and disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the
factfinding function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the
conduct forming the basis for the charge
we have addressed ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding
10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school
term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor do we put
aside the possibility that, in unusual situations, although involving only a short
suspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures will be
required
District Court found each of the suspensions involved here to have occurred
without a hearing, either before or after the suspension, and that each
suspension was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional insofar as it
permits such suspensions without notice or hearing.
District Court judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of
education. The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather
than educational officials and state legislatures, have the authority to
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom discipline of children and
teenagers in the public schools. It justifies this unprecedented intrusion into
the process of elementary and secondary education by identifying a new
constitutional right: the right of a student not to be suspended for as much as
a single day without notice and a due process hearing either before or
promptly following the suspension.
Court's decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. In
my view, a student's interest in education is not infringed by a suspension
within the limited period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that
there may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and
insubstantial to justify imposition of a constitutional rule.
Ohio statute that creates the right to a "free" education also explicitly
authorizes a principal to suspend a student for as much as 10 days
Ohio suspension statute allows no serious or significant infringement of
education. Only max of 8 school days. No significant damage.
The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper functioning of its public
school system for the benefit of all pupils and the public generally. Few
rulings would interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of schools
than subjecting routine discipline to the formalities and judicial oversight of
due process. Suspensions are one of the traditional means -- ranging from
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion -- used to maintain
discipline in the schools. It is common knowledge that maintaining order and
reasonable decorum is a major educational problem
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to protect pupils from unfair
minor discipline by school authorities, the Court ignores the commonality of
interest of the State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, it thinks in
traditional judicial terms of an adversary situation. To be sure, there will be
the occasional pupil innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly
suspended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspension. But, while
there is no evidence indicating the frequency of unjust suspensions, common
sense suggests that they will not be numerous in relation to the total number,
and that mistakes or injustices will usually be righted by informal means
The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice both to parents and the
Board, is compatible with the teacher-pupil relationship and the informal
resolution of mistaken disciplinary action. We have relied for generations
upon the experience, good faith and dedication of those who staff our public
schools, and the nonadversary means of airing grievances that always have
been available to pupils and their parents. One would have thought before
today's opinion that this informal method of resolving differences was more
compatible with the interests of all concerned than resort to any
constitutionalized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by the Court
constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions not only represents a
significant and unwise extension of the Due Process Clause
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more than eight school days,
requires written notice including the "reasons therefor" to the student's
parents and to the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspension.
The Court only requires oral or written notice to the pupil, with no notice being
required to the parents or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the
statutory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action by the principal.
The Board, usually elected by the people and sensitive to constituent
relations, may be expected to identify a principal whose record of
suspensions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on written notice
may exercise their rights as constituents by going directly to the Board or a
member thereof if dissatisfied with the principal's decision
Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to provide significantly
more protection than that already available. The Court holds only that the
principal must listen to the student's "version of the events," either before
suspension or thereafter -- depending upon the circumstances. Such a
truncated "hearing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the
opportunities for correcting mistakes already available to students and
parents. Indeed, in this case all of the students and parents were offered an
opportunity to attend a conference with school officials