G.R. No.

L-50550-52 October 31, 1979

CHEE KIONG YAM, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NABDAR J. MALIK, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that respondent Municipal Judge Nabdar J. Malik of Jolo, Sulu,
acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion when:
(a) he held in the preliminary investigation of the charges of estafa filed by
respondents Rosalinda Amin, Tan Chu Kao and Augusto Sajor against
petitioners that there was a prima facie case against the latter
Respondent Rosalinda M. Amin charges petitioners Yam Chee Kiong and Yam
Yap Kieng with estafa through misappropriation of the amount of P50,000.00.
But the complaint states on its face that said petitioners received the amount
from respondent Rosalinda M. Amin "as a loan."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal complaints constitute estafa.
HELD:
We agree with the petitioners that the facts alleged in the three criminal complaints
do not constitute estafa through misappropriation.
In order that a person can be convicted under the abovequoted provision, it must
be proven that he has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or
personal property that he received. Petitioners had no such obligation to return the
same money, which they received from private respondents. This is so because as
clearly stated in criminal complaints, the related civil complaints and the
supporting sworn statements, the sums of money that petitioners received were
loans.
It appears that respondent judge failed to appreciate the distinction between the
two types of loan, mutuum and commodatum, when he performed the questioned
acts, He mistook the transaction between petitioners and respondents Rosalinda
Amin, Tan Chu Kao and Augusto Sajor to be commodatum wherein the borrower
does not acquire ownership over the thing borrowed and has the duty to return
the same thing to the lender.


G.R. No. L-24968 April 27, 1972
SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
In July 1953 the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as Saura, Inc.) applied to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), before its conversion into DBP, for an
industrial loan of P500,000.00, to be used for the manufacture of jute sacks.
It appears, however, that despite the formal execution of the loan agreement the
reexamination contemplated in Resolution No. 736 proceeded. In a meeting of the
RFC Board of Governors on June 10, 1954, at which Ramon Saura, President of
Saura, Inc., was present, it was decided to reduce the loan from P500,000.00 to
P300,000.00.
On December 17, 1954 RFC passed Resolution No. 9083, restoring the loan to the
original amount of P500,000.00, "it appearing that China Engineers, Ltd. is now
willing to sign the promissory notes jointly with the borrower-corporation," but
with the following proviso:
1. That the raw materials needed by the borrower-corporation to carry
out its operation are available in the immediate vicinity; and
2. That there is prospect of increased production thereof to provide
adequately for the requirements of the factory."
However due to failure to meet the requirements imposed by the plaintiff upon
the defendant, the former sent a letter saying that they cannot approve the loan.
With the foregoing letter the negotiations came to a standstill. Saura, Inc. did not
pursue the matter further.
On January 9, 1964, almost 9 years after the mortgage in favor of RFC was cancelled
at the request of Saura, Inc., the latter commenced the present suit for damages,
alleging failure of RFC (as predecessor of the defendant DBP) to comply with its
obligation to release the proceeds of the loan applied for and approved, thereby
preventing the plaintiff from completing or paying contractual commitments it
had entered into, in connection with its jute mill project.
HELD:
We hold that there was indeed a perfected consensual contract.
There was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in this case: the application of
Saura, Inc. for a loan of P500,000.00 was approved by resolution of the defendant,
and the corresponding mortgage was executed and registered. But this fact alone
falls short of resolving the basic claim that the defendant failed to fulfill its
obligation and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover damages.
It should be noted that RFC entertained the loan application of Saura, Inc. on the
assumption that the factory to be constructed would utilize locally grown raw
materials, principally kenaf. There is no serious dispute about this. It was in line
with such assumption that when RFC, by Resolution No. 9083 approved on
December 17, 1954, restored the loan to the original amount of P500,000.00.
The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature cf MUTUAL DESISTANCE,
a mode of extinguishing obligations. Subsequent conduct of Saura, Inc. confirms
this desistance.
It was only in 1964, nine years after the loan agreement had been cancelled at its
own request, that Saura, Inc. brought this action for damages. All these
circumstances demonstrate beyond doubt that the said agreement had been
extinguished by mutual desistance


G.R. No. 175139 April 18, 2012
HERMOJINA ESTORES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ARTURO and LAURA SUPANGAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Hermojina Estores and respondent-spouses Arturo and Laura
Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale
5
whereby petitioner offered to
sell, and respondent-spouses offered to buy, a parcel of land. Located at Naic,
Cavite for the sum ofP4.7 million.
After almost seven years from the time of the execution of the contract and
notwithstanding payment of P3.5 million on the part of respondent-spouses,
petitioner still failed to comply with her obligation.
Hence, in a letter
7
dated September 27, 2000, respondent-spouses demanded
the return of the amount of P3.5 million within 15 days from receipt of the letter.
In reply,
8
petitioner acknowledged receipt of the P3.5 million and promised to
return the same within 120 days. Respondent-spouses were amenable to the
proposal provided an interest of 12% compounded annually shall be imposed on
the P3.5 million.
9
When petitioner still failed to return the amount despite
demand, respondent-spouses were constrained to file a Complaint.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,
12
petitioner and Arias averred that they are
willing to return the principal amount of P3.5 million but without any interest as
the same was not agreed upon.
CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC finding the
imposition of 6% interest proper.
25
However, the same shall start to run only
from September 27, 2000 when respondent-spouses formally demanded the
return of their money and not from October 1993 when the contract was
executed as held by the RTC.
ISSUE:
The propriety of the imposition of interest and attorneys fees.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract.
Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[i]nterest may, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
contract."
The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case.
General rule is that the applicable rate of interest "shall be computed in accordance
with the stipulation of the parties." Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum "when the obligation arises out of a loan or a
forbearance of money, goods or credits.
In other cases, it shall be six percent (6%)."
32
In this case, the parties did not
stipulate as to the applicable rate of interest. The only question remaining
therefore is whether the 6% as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or
12% under Central Bank Circular No. 416, is due.
The contract involved in this case is admittedly not a loan but a CONDITIONAL
DEED OF SALE.
Petitioners unwarranted withholding of the money which rightfully pertains to
respondent-spouses amounts to forbearance of money which can be considered
as an involuntary loan. Thus, the applicable rate of interest is 12% per annum,
and should be reckoned from said date of demand until the principal amount and
the interest thereon is fully satisfied.


G.R. No. L-52478 October 30, 1986
THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEMENCIO R. MEDINA and JOSEFINA G.
MEDINA, respondents-appellants.

FACTS:
In 1961, herein private respondents spouses Nemencio R. Medina and Josefina G.
Medina (Medinas for short) applied with the herein petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS for short) for a loan of P600,000.00. The GSIS Board of
Trustees, in its Resolution of December 20, 1961, approved under Resolution No.
5041 only the amount of P350,000.00, subject to the following conditions: that the
rate of interest shall be 9% per annum compounded monthly; repayable in ten (10)
years at a monthly amortization of P4,433.65 including principal and interest, and
that any installment or amortization that remains due and unpaid shall bear
interest at the rate of 9%/12% per month. The Office of the Economic Coordinator,
in a 2nd Indorsement dated March 26, 1962, further reduced the approved amount
to P295,000.00. On April 4, 1962, the Medinas accepting the reduced amount,
executed a promissory note and a real estate mortgage in favor of GSIS. On May
29, 1962, the GSIS, and on June 6, 1962, the Office of the Economic Coordinator,
upon request of the Medinas, both approved the restoration of the amount of
P350,000.00 (P295,000.00 + P55,000.00) originally approved by the GSIS. This
P350,000.00 loan was denominated by the GSIS as Account No. 31055.
Upon application by the Medinas, the GSIS Board of Trustees adopted Resolution
No. 121 on January 18, 1963, as amended by Resolution No. 348 dated February
25, 1963, approving an additional loan of P230,000.00 in favor of the Medinas on
the security of the same mortgaged properties and the additional properties to
bear interest at 9% per annum.
Beginning 1965, the Medinas having defaulted in the payment of the monthly
amortization on their loan, the GSIS imposed 9%/12% interest on an installments
due and unpaid.
On May 3, 1974, the GSIS notified the Medinas that they had arrearages in the
aggregate amount of P575,652.42 and demanded payment within seven (7) days
from notice thereof, otherwise, it would foreclose the mortgage.
Trial court rendered judgment declaring the extra-judicial foreclosure , null and
void
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INTEREST
RATES ON THE LOAN ACCOUNTS OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE SPOUSES ARE
USURIOUS; and WITH RESPECT TO COMPOUNDING OF INTEREST
HELD:
To recapitulate, the difference in the computation lies in the inclusion of the
compounded interest as demanded by the GSIS on the one hand and the exclusion
thereof, as insisted by the Medinas on the other.
As to whether or not the interest rates on the loan accounts of the Medinas are
usurious, it has already been settled that the Usury Law applies only to interest by
way of compensation for the use or forbearance of money (Lopez v. Hernaez, 32
Phil. 631; Bachrach Motor Co. v. Espiritu, 52 Phil. 346; Equitable Banking
Corporation v. Liwanag, 32 SCRA 293, March 30, 1970). Interest by way of
damages is governed by Article 2209 of the Civil Code
Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Code permits the agreement upon a penalty
apart from the interest.
Based on the finding that the GSIS had the legal right to impose an interest 9% per
annum, compounded monthly, on the loans of the Medinas and an interest of
9%/12% per annum on all due and unpaid amortizations or installments, there is
no question that the Medinas failed to settle their accounts with the GSIS which as
computed by the latter reached an outstanding balance of P630,130.55 as of April
12, 1975 and that the GSIS had a perfect right to foreclose the mortgage.


G.R. No. 84719 January 25, 1991
YONG CHAN KIM, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Yong Chan Kim was employed as a Researcher at the Aquaculture
Department of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC).
As Head of the Economics Unit of the Research Division, he conducted prawn
surveys which required him to travel to various selected provinces in the country
where there are potentials for prawn culture.
On 15 June 1982, petitioner was issued Travel Order No. 2222 which covered his
travels to different places in Luzon. Under this travel order, he received P6,438.00
as cash advance to defray his travel expenses Within the same period, petitioner
was issued another travel order,requiring him to travel from the Head Station at
Tigbauan, Iloilo to Roxas City. Petitioner received a cash advance of P495.00.
On 14 January 1983, petitioner presented both travel orders for liquidation,
submitting Travel Expense Reports to the Accounting Section. Expense Reports
were audited, it was discovered that there was an overlap of four (4) days (30
June to 3 July 1982) in the two (2) travel orders for which petitioner collected per
diems twice, when he did not actually and physically travel as represented by his
liquidation papers, was P1,230.00.
Petitioner was required to comment
In his reply, petitioner denied the alleged anomaly, claiming that he made make-
up trips to compensate for the trips he failed to undertake under T.O. 2222 because
he was recalled to the head office and given another assignment.
In September 1983, two (2) complaints for Estafa were filed against the petitioner
MTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Was petitioner under obligation to return the same money (cash advance) which
he had received? We belive not.

HELD:
In order that a person can be convicted under estafa, it must be proven that he
had the obligation to deliver or return the same money, good or personal
property that he had received.
Liquidation simply means the settling of an indebtedness. An employee, such as
herein petitioner, who liquidates a cash advance is in fact paying back his debt in
the form of a loan of money advanced to him by his employer, asper diems and
allowances.
In other words, the money advanced by either party is actually a loan to the
other. Hence, petitioner was under no legal obligation to return the same cash
or money, i.e., the bills or coins, which he received from the private respondent.
Since ownership of the money (cash advance) was transferred to petitioner, no
fiduciary relationship was created. Absent this fiduciary relationship between
petitioner and private respondent, which is an essential element of the crime of
estafa by misappropriation or conversion, petitioner could not have committed
estafa.


G.R. No. 97412 July 12, 1994
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and
broker-forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants'
custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such
losses/damages.
On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant
Eastern Shipping Lines.
Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged
unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without
seal .
On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made
deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to
one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake.
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the
consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of
defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to
pay the same
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the
consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it
became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against
defendants.

ISSUE:
whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be
computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision
appealed from is rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest,
referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%).

HELD:
It is easily discernible in these cases that there has been a consistent holding that
the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to
loans or forbearance
16
of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6%
interest under the Civil Code governs when the transaction involves the payment
of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the
performance of obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common
time frame in the computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e.,
from the time the complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.
With regard particularly to an AWARD of interest in the concept of ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and IT CONSISTS IN THE PAYMENT OF A SUM
OF MONEY, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing.
21
Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
22
In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169
23
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, NOT CONSTITUTING A LOAN OR FORBEARANCE OF
MONEY, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court
24
at the rate of 6% per annum.
25
No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
26
Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment
of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.


G.R. No. 115324 February 19, 2003
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST INTERNATIONAL
BANK), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANKLIN VIVES, respondents.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1979, private respondent Franklin Vives was asked by his neighbor
and friend Angeles Sanchez to help her friend and townmate, Col. Arturo
Doronilla, in incorporating his business, the Sterela Marketing and Services
("Sterela" for brevity). Specifically, Sanchez asked private respondent to deposit in
a bank a certain amount of money in the bank account of Sterela for purposes of its
incorporation. She assured private respondent that he could withdraw his money
from said account within a months time.
On May 9, 1979, private respondent, Sanchez, Doronilla and a certain Estrella
Dumagpi, Doronillas private secretary, met and discussed the matter. Thereafter,
relying on the assurances and representations of Sanchez and Doronilla, private
respondent issued a check in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) in favor of Sterela
Subsequently, private respondent learned that Sterela was no longer holding
office in the address previously given to him. Alarmed, he and his wife went to the
Bank to verify if their money was still intact. The bank manager referred them to
Mr. Rufo Atienza, the assistant manager, who informed them that part of the
money in Savings Account No. 10-1567 had been withdrawn by Doronilla, and that
only P90,000.00 remained therein.
To convince the plaintiffs that their money was safe, Doronilla issued several checks
which was dishonored.
Private respondent instituted an action for recovery of sum of money against
Doronilla, Sanchez, Dumagpi and petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the transaction between private respondent and
Doronilla IS A SIMPLE LOAN (MUTUUM)
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the transaction between him
and Doronilla IS NOT A MUTUUM BUT AN ACCOMMODATION,
21
since he did not
actually part with the ownership of his P200,000.00.

ISSUE:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT THE
TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT DORONILLA AND RESPONDENT VIVES
WAS ONE OF SIMPLE LOAN AND NOT ACCOMMODATION;

HELD:
No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the transaction
between private respondent and Doronilla WAS A COMMODATUM and not a
mutuum.
The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall be accorded primordial
consideration in determining the actual character of a contract.
27
In case of doubt,
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties shall be considered in
such determination.
28

As correctly pointed out by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the
evidence shows that private respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings
account of Sterela specifically for the purpose of making it appear "that said firm
had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with the promise that the amount
shall be returned within thirty (30) days."
Doronillas attempts to return to private respondent the amount of P200,000.00
which the latter deposited in Sterelas account together with an
additional P12,000.00, allegedly representing interest on the mutuum, did not
convert the transaction from a commodatum into a mutuum because such was
not the intent of the parties and because the additionalP12,000.00 corresponds to
the fruits of the lending of the P200,000.00.


G.R. No. 154878 March 16, 2007
CAROLYN M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
RICA MARIE S. THIO, Respondent.

FACTS:
Sometime in February 1995, respondent Rica Marie S. Thio received from
petitioner Carolyn M. Garcia a crossed check
4
dated February 24, 1995 in the
amount of US$100,000 payable to the order of a certain Marilou Santiago.
In June 1995, respondent received from petitioner another crossed check
9
dated
June 29, 1995 in the amount ofP500,000, also payable to the order of Marilou
Santiago.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to pay the principal amounts of the
loans (US$100,000 and P500,000) when they fell due. Thus, on February 22, 1996,
petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages in the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 58 against respondent, seeking to collect the sums of US$100,000, with
interest thereon at 3% a month from October 26, 1995 and P500,000, with interest
thereon at 4% a month from November 5, 1995, plus attorneys fees and actual
damages.
12

Respondent denied that she contracted the two loans with petitioner and
countered that it was Marilou Santiago to whom petitioner lent the money. She
claimed she was merely asked by petitioner to give the crossed checks to
Santiago.
17
She issued the checks for P76,000 and P20,000 not as payment of
interest but to accommodate petitioners request that respondent use her own
checks instead of Santiagos.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled
that there was no contract of loan between the parties.


ISSUE:
who borrowed money from petitioner respondent or Santiago?

HELD:
We instead agree with the ruling of the RTC making respondent liable for the
principal amounts of the loans.
We do not, however, agree that respondent is liable for the 3% and 4% monthly
interest for the US$100,000 andP500,000 loans respectively. There was no written
proof of the interest payable except for the verbal agreement that the loans
would earn 3% and 4% interest per month.
Be that as it may, while there can be no stipulated interest, there can be legal
interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.
41



G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004
COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.

FACTS:
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo ("Pajuyo") paid P400 to a certain Pedro
Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City.
Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his
family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra ("Guevarra")
executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the
cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and
demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 31 ("MTC").
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of
possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150
hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing.
MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC .
ISSUE:
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.

HELD:
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra
was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to
pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The
imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from
a commodatum.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one
of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over
possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and
Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested property.
The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos
better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The
absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would still be an
implied promise to vacate.


G.R. Nos. 173654-765 August 28, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO PORRAS, respondents.

FACTS:
On 7 November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office filed before Branch
68 of the RTC in Dumangas, Iloilo, 112 cases of Qualified Theft against
RESPONDENTS Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who were the
Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of PRIVATE COMPLAINANT Rural Bank of
Pototan, Inc
After perusing the Informations in these cases, the trial court did not find the
existence of probable cause that would have necessitated the issuance of a
warrant of arrest based on the following grounds:
(1) the element of taking without the consent of the owners was missing
on the ground that it is the depositors-clients, and not the Bank, which filed
the complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the money allegedly
taken by respondents and hence, are the real parties-in-interest; and
(2) the Informations are bereft of the phrase alleging "dependence,
guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the offended party
that would have created a high degree of confidence between them which
the respondents could have abused."
HELD:
It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a
Bank who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the
confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand, where
monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very clear not only
from the express provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The
relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and
debtor.
In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly established the
nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits therein, and the duties
being performed by its employees who have custody of the money or have come
into possession of it. The Court has consistently considered the allegations in the
Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the
damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of
the money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft.