Arroyo vs.

De Venecia (on rules of proceedings)

August 14, 1997

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House.
During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of
the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.








Alejandrino vs. Quezon (on discipline of members)
September 11, 1924

Facts:
"Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is
hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate
for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on
the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.

Issue:
Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays
the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

Held:
As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed
without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.

Ratio:
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in
the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained.

The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp.
Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary
to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere
of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments
as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other
departments.

In view of the propriety of mandamus
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary,
and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate
to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the
nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined."

In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-
Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until
removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)

They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may
thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish,"
a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a
power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and
the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.

In view of effects of punishment
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving
the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the
legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives
the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to
fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for
one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.

In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and
more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does
not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be
said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the
repository of all wisdom and all power.





































Osmena vs. Pendatun (on discipline of members)
October 28, 1960

Facts:
Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives,
made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15
members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the
President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such
imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,
Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious
disorderly behavior.


Issue:
Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech


Held:
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in
Congress, the Senators or Members of theHouse of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other
place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.



















Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan (on discipline of members)
April 19, 2001

Political Law Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019
FACTS:
On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said
to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two
other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding
Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since
she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court
battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda)
to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.

HELD:
The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other
hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the
case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13
of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal procedure.





















De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan (on discipline of members)
February 5, 2002

Facts:
On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente
Lite. In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the
Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through
counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on
13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose
C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days
from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto
P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B.
Tuao, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
(1) Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary
measure; and (2) Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from
the mandate of R.A. 3019.

Held:
As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is
imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of
powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of
suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Ratio:
Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing
witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of
either branch.



Casco Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez (Enrolled bill theory)
1963

Political Law J ournal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily
in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which
are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central
Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum
establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in
same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained
that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund
(pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he
maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The
margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea
formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the
terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made
on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and
formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea
formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress
itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the
enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

















































United States vs. Pons (Probative value of the journal)
1916

Political Law J ournal Conclusiveness of the J ournals
FACTS:
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso.
Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities
noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso
not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25
barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act
2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not
approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses
claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the
Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond
the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.










Astorga vs. Villegas
April 30, 1974

Political Law Journal When to be Consulted
FACTS:
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under
authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition
with this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of RA 4065.

Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act
Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law
passed the 3
rd
reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas.

Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for
deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter
approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065.

It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had
no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the
Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.

Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures
does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.

HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and
other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only
to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC
also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate
that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be
to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making
body.






































Morales vs. Subido
February 27, 1969

Political Law J ournals vs Enrolled Bill
FACTS:
Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former
Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the
petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service
eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified
for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of
a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a
city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as
officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion
of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support
his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was
signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals,
to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is
not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bi ll. To
be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently
being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.