AGLIPAY Vs.

RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ
of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's
attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of
the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people
ICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE UNION Leave a
comment
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE
WORKERS UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION, defendant-
appellant.
GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known
as the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350,
the employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees. On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875,
as follows: xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the
Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service
because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The Company
in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the
Union from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the union security
clause of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and
contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or
not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association.
Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art
IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the
right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations
of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or
join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions,
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by
law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not
an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time. The right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The law
does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before
the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
RA No.3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a)
(4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization. What the exception provides is that members
of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with
labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign
up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual
obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in
permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was
indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the
Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the
state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special
application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor
which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief
and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their
natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which
work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own
life and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is
confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a
union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus
protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new
source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from
which the individual also needs protection the collective bargaining
relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make
a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of
the state. The Constitution even mandated that the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in
favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement,
and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and
welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-
being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of
closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the
interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may
benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious
sects is merely incidental and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The
rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875
and the new Labor Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any
lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any
religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious
sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No.
3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the
coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join
or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of
any positive act on his part.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.
Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a member of the
EPWU. Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop
agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the
factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain
employment in the said factory one must be a member of the said
Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU
claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop
agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because
apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any
labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union
was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then
moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the
EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the
close shop agreement because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that
said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As
such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the
fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms
of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to
join or not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of
a constitutional right over a contractual right.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-691 September 10, 1993
SULU ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF MASJID
LAMBAYONG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE NABDAR J. MALIK, Municipal Trial Court, Jolo,
Sulu, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
On June 5, 1992, Imam Hashim Abdulla, Imam Hadji Tambing, Hatib
Illih Musa, an officers and members of the Sulu Islamic Association of
Masjid Lambayong, filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Nabdar J. Malik, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Jolo,
Sulu, charging him with violation of R.A. 2260 (An Act to Amend and
Revise the Laws Relative to Philippine Civil Service) and serious
misconduct committed as follows:
1. Nepotism by recommending the appointment of Omar
Kalim, his nephew, and Hanina Kalim, his niece-in-law, as
process server and clerk, respectively;
2. Graft and Corruption by using Omar Kalim to extort
money from court litigants, e.g.:
a. P13,000.00 in exchange for the freedom of
Datu Tating Erwin, who had been charged an
accessory in a robbery case;
b. demanding P10,000.00 thru a certain P/Sgt.
Duran Abam Tating, Erwin's brother-in-law; and
c. blackmailing litigants;
3. Immorality engaging in an adulterous relationship with
another woman with whom he has three children.
In his letter/comment dated October 19, 1992, Judge Malik alleged
that the complainants are fictitious persons and that the charges
against him are false and fabricated. He asked that the complaint be
dismissed.
The Supreme Court referred the case to Judge Harun Ismael of the
Regional Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu, for investigation report and
recommendation.
On April 7, 1993, Judge Malik addressed a letter to Judge Ismael,
enclosing affidavits of four witnesses, namely : (1) Imam Hashim
Abdulla; (2) Mrs. Jamura Tambing; (3) Mr. Mirad Tambing; and (4)
Marina Balais Malik.
He alleged that Datu Tating Erwin is the nephew of Kaya B. Sarabi
who had previously filed "many fabricated charges" (p. 235, Rollo)
against him which had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. He
implied that Erwin was being used by Sarabi, and that the affidavit
was false.
Imam Hashim Abdulla, one of the "complainants," denied any
knowledge of, or participation in, the filing of the complaint against
Judge Malik. He disowned his supposed signature in the complaint as
a forgery. He alleged that Judge Malik is his neighbor and he knows
him to be "honest and righteous" (p. 238, Rollo).
Illih Musad, another "complainant," died on February 24, 1991 yet. His
widow, Jamura Musad, executed an affidavit certifying that she knows
Judge Malik personally because he has been her neighbor for many
years. It was physically impossible for her late husband to have signed
the complaint dated June 5, 1992 against Judge Malik because her
husband died more than a year before the signing of the complaint.
The signature of another complainant, Imam Hadji Tambing Arong,
was impugned by his son, Mirad Tambing. He said his father could not
have signed the complaint because he had been sick and bedridden
for five years before his death. In fact, he died on August 15, 1992.
Marina Balais Malik, wife of respondent Judge N. Malik, disowned her
supposed affidavit which she supposedly signed before Notary Public
Attorney Rodrigo Martinez in Zamboanga City, in February 1991 (p.
250, Rollo).
She, however, denied having appeared before the Notary Public to
subscribe said affidavit which attacks the "honor and integrity of her
beloved husband" (p. 251, Rollo).
After conducting an investigation of the charges, Judge Ismael on May
25, 1993, submitted a Report to the court. Of the three (3) charges
against Judge Malik, only the charge or nepotism holds.
On the charge or graft and corruption, Judge Ismael observed that:
. . . practically all of those who testified denied any
knowledge of any particular instance that Judge Malik
extorted or received bribe money from litigants having
pending cases before his sala. Mrs. Beatriz Abbas, Clerk of
Court II of Municipal Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu presided by
Judge Malik, testified that the people praised highly Judge
Malik because of his honesty. She attests to this because
she was, at one time told by Judge Malik to return to
litigants something which litigants wanted to give to Judge
Malik. However, one of those who testified confided, but
refused to be quoted in his testimony for fear of reprisal,
suggested that in order for the Court to be spared of any ill
suspicion, Omar Kalim should be transferred to another
Municipal Circuit Trial Court branch where Judge Malik has
no supervision. Accordingly, it's just not nice and good
looking to have Omar Kalim where he is now. This
information is worth considering. The only obstacle is
Judge Malik is Acting Judge in all Municipal Circuit Trial
Court branches except Siasi, Sulu. However, no hard
evidence was adduced linking Judge Malik to graft and
corruption as alleged in the complaint. (p. 51, Rollo.)
With regard to the charge of adultery or immorality, the investigating
Judge observed that under Muslim Law the marriage of a Tausug (the
tribal group to which Judge Malik belongs) to as many as four (4)
wives in sanctioned provided the man can support them and does not
neglect any or them. Judge Ismael's report states:
As regards the claim that Judge Malik has two (2) wives, all
those who testified at the investigations confirmed the
same. Mrs. Marina Balais-Malik, the first wife, admitted that
Judge Malik has a second wife (Lourdes) but she does not
mind them since she and her children are financially taken
cared of all their eight children are going to school and
three (3) have reached college level. Moreover, under the
Muslim Shari'a (Law) marrying more than one wife is
allowed provided the man can afford financially and can
give equity and justice to the wives. Mrs. Marina Balais
Malik claims that Judge Malik is financially capable.
The Holy Qur'an (the Muslim Holy Scripture) provides in
Surah 4:3 (Chapter 4, verse 3) thus:
3. And if ye fear that ye
shall not.
Be able to deal justly
With the orphans,
Marry women of your
choice
Two, or three, or four;
But if, ye fear that ye shall
not
Be able to deal justly (with
them)
The only one, or
That which your right hand
possess
That will be more suitable,
To prevent you
From doing injustice.
Strictly, Islam enjoins only monogamous marriage. While
Islam allows marrying more than one wife, it however sets
limitation, i.e., not more than four at a time and the man be
financially capable in order for him to provide equity and
justice to the wives. Theme revelations came to the
Prophet Muhammad after the Battle of Uhud whereby
many Mujahideens died thus leaving more widows and
orphans. This particular revelation serve, as it was then, as
a remedy to the impending situation of the widows and
orphans left unattended. By allowing the mujahideens to
take them in marriage helped prevent them from engaging
in illicit marital relations like fornication. Marrying more than
one wife does not per secreate any stint (sic) of social
immorality, since this marriage, like any other ordinary
marriages, is made public and are (sic) accepted by the
people in the community. Any issue out of this marriage is
legitimate before the eyes of the Almighty Lord and the
people.
True, Islam sanctions such marriage but very few Muslim
males practice it. Worst yet today, however, this
permissible marriage is used as a means of building social
standing in the community. As a judge, there is no doubt
that Judge Malik has acquired higher respect and social
standing in the community, and is deemed financially
capable. Hence, he can marry more than one wife in
accordance with the Muslim Shari'a. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
Mrs. Marina Malik consented to her husband's wish to contract, a
second marriage because he does not neglect to support her children.
Three of them are in college. She has no ill-feelings against Malik's
second wife, who married her husband under Muslim law. Since Art.
180 of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal laws of the Philippines, provides that the penal laws relative
to the crime of bigamy "shall not apply to a person married . . . under
Muslim Law," it is not "immoral" by Muslim standards for Judge Malik
to marry a second time while his first marriage exists.
The charge of nepotism, however, is a different matter.
Judge Nabdar Malik was appointed and confirmed as Judge of
Municipal Court of Jolo on May 29, 1972. He assumed office on May
29, 1972.
1
On June 16, 1978, he recommended the appointment of his nephew, Omar Kalim, the
son of his older sister, Nuridjan Ambutong, to the position of Janitor of his court. He falsely certified that
Kalim was not related to him by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree:
This is to certify that Mr. Omar Kalim, a proposed appointee
for the position of Janitor in the Municipal Court of Jolo,
Branch 1, is not related to the undersigned within the third
degree either by affinity or consanguinity.
xxx xxx xxx
NABDAR J. MALIK
Municipal Judge
(Certification dated June 16, 1978, 201 File.)
The truth is that, being his sister's son, Kalim is related to Judge Malik
by consanguinity within the third degree.
Later, Omar Kalim was promoted an MTC Aide and still later, in 1985,
he became a Process Server.
2
In support of Kalim's promotion, Judge Malik again issued
a false certification that Kalim in not related to him by affinity or consanguinity.
This is to certify that MR. OMAR N. KALIM, a proposed
appointee for the position of MTC PROCESS SERVER in
the Office of the Municipal Trial Court of Jolo, is not related
to the undersigned appointed official either by affinity or
consanguinity. (Certification dated January 2, 1985, 201
File.)
Similarly, Kalim falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik in
answer to question No. 23 in his Personal Data Sheet.
Are you related within the third degree of consanguinity or
of affinity to the appointing or recommending authority, or
to the chief of bureau or office, or to the person who has
immediate supervision over you in the Office, Bureau or
Ministry you are to be appointed?
His answer was "No".
The prohibition against nepotism in the government service is found in
Section 59, Chapter 7, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of
the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the
rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential
capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however,
That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be
applicable to the case of a member of any family who, after
his or her appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions,
cases of previous appointments which are in contravention
hereof shall be corrected by transfer, and pending such
transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed
in favor of the relative or relatives who were appointed in
violation of these provisions.
In the case of Layno vs. People (213 SCRA 686, 696-697), the
incumbent Mayor, of Lianga, Surigao, appointed his legitimate son as
Meat Inspector, but certified that the appointee was not a relative by
consanguinity or affinity. He was prosecuted criminally and punished
for falsification of public document (Art. 171, par. 4 or the RPC).
One of the legal issues raised was whether the appointing authority is
obliged to disclose his true relationship to the appointee., That
question was answered by this Court in the affirmative:
The law on nepotism, as provided in Section 49(a) or PD
No. 807, prohibits the appointing or recommending
authority from making any appointment in the national,
provincial, city or municipal governments or in any branch
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, in favor of his (appointing or
recommending authority's) relative within the third degree
of consanguinity or affinity. Thus, in order to guarantee that
the law is duly observed, it is required, among others, that
the appointment paper should be accompanied by a
certification of the appointing or recommending authority
stating therein that he is not related to the appointee within
the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although
Section 49(a) or PD No. 807 does not explicitly provide that
the appointing or, recommending authority shall, disclose
his true relationship with the appointee in the form or a
certification, nonetheless, in the light of the rulings in the
aforecited cases, the legal obligation or the appointing or
recommending authority to state the true facts required to
be stated in the certification is inherent in the law on
prohibition against nepotism and the nature and purpose of
such certification.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
Memorandum
The general purpose of P.D. No. 807 is to "insure and
promote the constitutional mandate that appointments in
the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness, to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personnel administration, and to adopt measures
to promote moral and the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, and professionalism in the Civil
Service." (Section 2, PD No. 807.)
The civil service laws are designed to eradicate the system
of appointment to public office base on political
considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the
element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making
appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit
system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of the
appointment; to secure more competent employees, and
thereby promote better government. (Meran vs. Edralin,
154 SCRA 238 [1987])..
Indeed, there are many cases wherein local elective
officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found
power by appointing their own protegees, and even
relatives, in violation of civil service laws and regulations.
Victory, at the polls should not be taken as authority for the
commission of such illegal acts. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 78053, June 4, 1990, citing Nemenzo vs.
Sabillano, 26 SCRA 1 [1968]).
By making untruthful statements and certifications regarding their
relationship to each other, Judge Malik and his nephew, Omar Kalim,
committed the crime of falsification under Article 171, subparagraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code.
Nepotism is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 46, subpar.
30, Chapter 5, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause an provided by law and after
due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(30) Nepotism as defined in Section 59 of this Title.
Section 67 (Penal Provision) of the Administrative Code provides the
following penalty therefor:
Sec. 67. Penal Provision. Whoever makes any
appointment or employs any person in violation of any
provision of this Title or the rules made thereunder or
whoever commits fraud, deceit or intentional
misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil
service matters, or whoever violates, refuses or neglects to
comply with any of such provisions or rules, shall upon
conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court. (Executive Order 292, Emphasis
ours.)
Disclosure of one's relatives in the Government is required of every
public official or employee:
Sec. 8. . . .
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be
the duty of every public official or employee to identify and
disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his
relatives in the Government in the form, manner and
frequency prescribed by the Civil service Commission.
(Sec. 8 (B), Rep. Act 6713 [Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees].)
Judge Malik did not merely fail to disclose his relationship to Omar
Kalim, but he falsely certified that he was not related to the latter.
Kalim, likewise, falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik. Their
acts violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees and are punishable under Section 11 of the
Code, with removal from office.
Sec. 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee,
regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment
in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular
capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be
punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6)
months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year,
or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after
due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency.
If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute.
Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years,
or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or
both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative
proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
classifies nepotism as a grave offense punishable with dismissal from
the service, even as a first offense.
Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light,
depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said
acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding
penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) Nepotism [1st Offense, Dismissal]
Moreover, by committing nepotism and covering up his malfeasance
by falsely disavowing any relationship to the appointee, Judge Malik is
also guilty of gross ignorance of the law and falsification and violated
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that "a judge shall not
allow family, social, or other relationship to influence his judicial
conduct or judgment" (Canon 2, Rule 2.03) and enjoins a judge to "be
faithful to the law" (Canon 3, Rule 3.01). Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct are serious offenses punishable by any of the
following sanctions under Section 10-A, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended:
1. Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits
(except accrued leaves) and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
a government-owned or controlled corporation;
2. Suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary
and benefits; or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than
P40,000.00.
With respect to Judge Malik's niece-in-law, Hanina M. Hailidani Kalim,
her appointment did not violate the law against nepotism.
Hanina began her service in the judiciary on August 6, 1973. She was
then known as "Mrs. Hanina M. Hailidani-Ainin," for she was married
to Hadji Abubakar Ainin, clerk of the Municipal Court, Branch 1. Omar
Kalim entered the service in 1978 or five years after Hanina. She was
already a widow when she and Kalim met and married in a ceremony
performed by Judge N. Malik on July 24, 1982. Evidently, when
Hanina was appointed as a member of Judge Malik's staff in 1973,
she was not yet related to him by affinity or consanguinity. Her
marriage to Omar Kalim after both had entered the government
service is expressly excluded from the prohibition against nepotism.
Section 59 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:
Sec. 59. . . .
(2) . . . "The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall
not be applicable to the case of a member of a family who,
after his or her appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Nabdar J. Malik GUILTY of
nepotism, falsification and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
His Process Server and nephew, Omar Kalim, is likewise found
GUILTY of falsification and deceit. The Court hereby orders their
DISMISSAL from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges (if any), except
the money value of their earned leave credits. Respondent Judge is
ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order
or decision, or continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever,
effective immediately upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

N o v 8 , 2 0 1 2
Ebranilag v. The Division of Supt. of Schools Digest
Ebranilag, et. al. v. The Division Supt. of Schools
March 1, 1993


FACTS:
1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.
Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students
in several towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the
religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.


2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities
in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions


3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A.
Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in
Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same
counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.


4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious
devotion only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State . They
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which
the Constitution protect against official control


5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to
the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the
Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.


6. The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and
Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in
violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship


7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately
re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.


ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid


NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to
refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs.
Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest
priority and amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the
expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative
of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to
education under the 1987 Constitution.




Although the Court upholds in this decision nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country
will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898
City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for
operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the
permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license
fees under protest
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529
and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the
Ordinances in question
Trial Court dismissed the complaint
American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO
Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of
the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license
from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is not among those enumerated
However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation
not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax
said business, trade or occupation.
2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is
empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including
importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some
other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale
dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be
classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential
commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but
where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory
for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by
ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee
that a retail dealer has to pay per annum
As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these
freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this
Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray
the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax
levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is
almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.
Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make
its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who
do not have a full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue
Code,Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from
any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Societys
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
from it