Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3622)
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3623)
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622, and 3623.
1

On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations.
2

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V
of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an
aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited
the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and
peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of
land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and
herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No.
2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn
inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these
two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan
Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and
the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from
Manila and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected
monthly rentals from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now
San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by
plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned,
possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili,
Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as
owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products
and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11,
1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their
claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City,
Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places,
after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or
tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the
peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with
the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing
and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit
trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question,
disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries
regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had
either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants,
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the
registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were
docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the
decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the
amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision
was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6,
1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman
Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the
beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are
different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette;
that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the
beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description
appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No.
7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph
V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly
recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the
lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are
also null and void.
3

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land
described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No.
7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel
No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of
Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No.
735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case
may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same;
(7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their
agents and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance
with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court on July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The
preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds
in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the
motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others,
specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that
the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case
No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order
of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that
the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing
prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in
the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with
law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered
to pay damages as therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by
the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints
as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional
indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs.
4

On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon
grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The
plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in
an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss.
5

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the
Defendants as follows:
A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void,ab initio, and of no effect
whatsoever;
B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void
from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;
C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the
Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;
D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels
of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-
40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187
(Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");
G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the
parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh.
"UU and Exh. "VV");
H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for
uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;.
J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for
uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .
K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .
L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit."
6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the
court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on
appeal.
7
The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29,
1965.
8

Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue
decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as
published in the Official Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that,
therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to
dismiss filed on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said
ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these
suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance
of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio,
having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having
been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the
degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly
emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the
conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said
title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246
square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853
square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less;
and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel
1.
9
The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and
the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
10
It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands
involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration
an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an
area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was
another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November
20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published
in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default
against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On
December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and
the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the
portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed
"that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act
2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which,
among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain
areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land
Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and
whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in
the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been
excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration
proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y
de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la
Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on
January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any
land that had not been previously included in the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and
of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land
applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be registered in the
names of the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of
the Survey Division addressed a communication to the registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of
March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3).
The Court of Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431
was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No.
7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that
Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was
stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2
has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated
in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90
square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants,
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in
LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2,
known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to
numerous parties Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to
private individual and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation
Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided,
transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title
that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from
Original Certificate of No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included
in Parcel 1 which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it
be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while
the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In other words, the area of the six
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial
court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration
proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding
the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical
with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of
the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration,
as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court
that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking
out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the
application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not
acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
11
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with
respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be
prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.
12
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.
13
In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the
remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.
14

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was
amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included in the
original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels were
included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913
(Exh. 24), We read the following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos unidos a los mismos
para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.
xxx xxx xxx
POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los
planos originales ...."
15

On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We
read the following:.
Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado,
el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:
1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la
1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno
alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales.
16

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the
Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as described in the
amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas,
that were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the Official Gazette. There was,
therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No.
735 was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared
null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration proceedings,
which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and no new
publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of
registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the
purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the
barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in
which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail,
held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or
Certificate of Title No. 735.
17
The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original
plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the
non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:
Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is
void, and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the
court for the amendment of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the
court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in
the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the
rule stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional land, different from that included in the
original survey is intended to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the
exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from
this it does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped.
18

The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this
Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these
cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and
Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte."
19
But what matters is
the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in
order to include land not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in
the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of
Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the
application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the boundaries stated
in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our impression is that
the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the
original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised
within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary
to confer jurisdiction upon the Court."
20

Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as
published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too
minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower
court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to the
area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22),
stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance
with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no
terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los
planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already included in the
original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation of
the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the
application as published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the
explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment
of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest
millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the
nearest minute only".
21
We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the
amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that
Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the
computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered
substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The
appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot,
therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was covered by the
original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could acquire jurisdiction over
that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was
amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any
person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan.
On the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the
addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the
registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan.
22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration
proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it
is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration
proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is
concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if
it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and
void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
23

And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square
meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of
27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and
void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and voidab initio Original Certificate of Title 735
which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire
area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very
beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would
nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And
not only that. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those
transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares),
whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are
now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, would render
useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would
certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the
indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases.
And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these
cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1
in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the original application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to
the Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and because there was no such
republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this
ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands
that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties
of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the
SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock &
Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was
published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some differences in the names of
the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the
designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de
Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681)
on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock &
Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of
hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its
southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1,
appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had
been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC
No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of
Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those very
parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree
of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered
that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan must have found
that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co.
when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock &
Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was
decided on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of
Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description
of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914,
that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that
Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC
No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of
registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically
all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been
permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in
the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical
descriptions would lead to chaos.
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the
northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern
boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the
southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the
appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the
lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no
effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1,
because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and
then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower
court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these
cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries
of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the
lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned
both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record,
show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte), until it
reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the
boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of
the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of
the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of
Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This
finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are
included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in the amended complaint,
in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1
(known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal."
24
In their appeal brief, the
appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil
cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735".
25
In the pre-trial order of the lower court of
December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735.
26
The lower court itself, at
the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623 are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735"
27
The
appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part
of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not
only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of
Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly can not
give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not
transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the
`ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be
Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title,
which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet
containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No.
735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of
the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a
transcription of the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order ....
28

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy
of such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of
Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the
province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the
"Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the
register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal
of his office....
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It
shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under
disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as
finally determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title
hereinafter mentioned.
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one,
the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon
the date of the transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of
deeds in the registry.
29

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of
deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).
30
We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the
requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was
registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in
his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their
spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the
technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these
lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical
descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of
registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as
a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description of
Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling that the decree of
registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and
void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of
the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also noted and this fact is undenied that the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a
fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as
copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first
page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of
the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this
was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What
matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in
Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496
and strictly applied its construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section
41 of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far as
may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done
by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would render null and void the original
certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in
the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration
regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the
Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would
certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given
landed property
31
; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title
32
; to quiet
title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title
33
; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and
indisputable.
34

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees,
and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever.
35

In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found
that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of
registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion,
and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical
descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as
required by law. The records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which
was not included in the original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We have
found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and
that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have
found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six
parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether
or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the
six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the
nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being
considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants
named in their complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person
must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be
wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as
against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the
property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.
36

The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null
and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that
some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as
described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any
statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after
adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is
valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration
case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern",
and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any
court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided
no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate of
title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681
was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period
of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been
incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
37

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y
de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la
Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No.
735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the three
cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants
named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not
appear, and so they were all declared in default.
38
It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955
the ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In
fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became
involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
39
During the pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were
administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in
Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to it of the sum of
P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997,
which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands
executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in
the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17,
1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the
transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom.
40

The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was
formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as
purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would
sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is
the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons
belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to see
two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or
separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735)
from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently
approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired
the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby
acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold
same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value even if it appears that the
incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that
the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of,
and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be
remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or
ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed
by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of
1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili).
41
These annotations simply reveal
that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the
tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the
lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
42
This is borne by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955,
issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three were pending, as
follows:
3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for
sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of
preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final
judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such
injunction would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at
the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof
be respected by defendant J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which
represents the land on which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68
hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic)
to answer for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained
of.
43

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be
unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title
No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent
transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate
of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the
court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including
the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn
were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc.
The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are
purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches.
But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands
that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of
title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel
them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due
process of law.
44
The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property
covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible.
45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail..
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the
appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any person, for that matter had not filed a petition for the review of the
decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that
had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An
action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be
entertained.
46
Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already
prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present
cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land
claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands.
The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent purchase for
value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the
court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No.
35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision.
Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they
acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered
owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees.
47

Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the
original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the
registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing that the registration was procured
fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases
now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration
that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court
declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their
predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application
to these three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili,
Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in
Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as
plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their
complaint Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in
the complaint
48
that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous
possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of
armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a
parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than
thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that
said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the
registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper title
for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register
of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable
consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the
corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which
parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914,
defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and
their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants
caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the
inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations
which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against
the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the
defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of
limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the
same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in
the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the
lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended
complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the appeal.
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of
the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears
that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both
original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that
as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or
whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the
whole world, whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which
defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The
supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the
registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration
proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or
right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and
because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land
Registration Act).
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case, supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings
which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which
defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no longer question the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by
his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases
which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs
all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and the
common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso
Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the
complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground
"that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three
cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct
evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior
judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the
lower court.
49

In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantaracase was not a bar to the action in these
three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one
hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground
of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground."
50

Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between
the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R.
No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated December
18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in them cases
Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623.
51

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in
the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and
deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had
been in actual, open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was
obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the
defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since
time immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In
Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs.
52
It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in
the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual
Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan
Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to
the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No.
Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil
Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of
the plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of
Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in
Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantaracase
would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it
was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five
Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were:
(1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that
as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had
two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted
by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the
heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623
Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered
by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in
Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is
a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to
Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No.
3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623.
53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their
being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two
parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No.
3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest
of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners
of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time
immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their
respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three
persons, or their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their
representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing
the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the
heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against
all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias
Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil
Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156.
They all claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the common
predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623
the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his
predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be
Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the
decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of
Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also
foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over
any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in
1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8,
1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in
Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the
effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based
on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156.
54
It may well be said that the
interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by
Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in
interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case
No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960)
55
, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that
their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the
Spanish government on May 12, 1848
56
; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously
and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same
character as that of their predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children who,
together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-
plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of
title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No.
Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become
final
57
; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the
land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they,
nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to
include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication
in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which
included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive
prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against
them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their complaint;
that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119;
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title
embracing only those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon
the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.
58
Regarding the contention of Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res
judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this
Court held:
We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other
heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were
not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is
authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal
party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately
represented in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the
present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same
property (S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in
favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion
con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies
to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then
appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action
of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex
A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights.
It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R.
No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither atitulo de
informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio
Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A).
59
This Court held in that previous case
that the document was unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the
judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the
registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in
these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and
conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of
registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The
registration proceedings, as proceedingsin rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of
title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases
cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the
registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914,
neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this
Court held:
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such
prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and
extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of
registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act
496, section 46).
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was
issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has
made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
60

In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it
declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three cases.
61

We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees
62
,
considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay damages in any form.
63
We believe that the appellees
had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they
meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is
reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered
cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23,
Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAVITE, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the original sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud because based
on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present holders of the property claiming to be innocent purchasers for value and not privy to the alleged
forgery, contend that the action cannot lie against them.
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square meters.
1
It was originally purchased on installment from the government
on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed
Cenizal, in 1922.
2
Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio.
3
In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a joint
affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the said land
on which they said they had already made full payment.
4
On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed
No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants.
5
Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044
(replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina
Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval.
6

When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were Remedios Miclat
under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394.
7
They were named as
defendants and asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal
having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which
Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based.
8

In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the joint affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in good faith and for
value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata.
9
For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that the government had no cause of action against her because there was no allegation that she had violated the plaintiff's right, that the
government was not the real party-in-interest because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens system, and that in any event the action was
barred by prescription or laches.
10

The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted the motion.
11
The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists that it has a valid cause
of action and that it is not barred by either prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed a forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were already dead at
the time they were supposed to have signed the sworn statement, even the most cursory examination of the document will show that the three signatures
affixed thereto were written by one and the same hand.
12
There is no doubt about it. It is indeed difficult to understand how such an obvious forgery
could have deceived the people in the Bureau of Lands who processed the papers of this case and made possible the fraudulent transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles derived
therefrom also ineffectual ab initio?
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint
13
filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged
joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading.
Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder
indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same
free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in
good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which
may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned
by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and
the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government.
14

xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act.
15

xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
16

The decision in Piero v. Director of Lands
17
is not applicable to the present proceeding because the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the Pineros. The action for reversion was filed by the government against them as the
original transferees of the properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents issued by the government pursuant to which the
corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the government as a ground for the reversion sought was
imputable directly to the Pineros, who could not plead the status of innocent purchasers for value.
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after several
transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint affidavit, but that is a bare and hardly
persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would still not prove any collusion between him and the private respondents. The mere fact that
Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress of Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser
for value because she is charged with knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that
Remedios did not merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without knowledge of its original defect. The
agreement to subdivide,
18
which she presented to show that she had acquired the land for valuable confederation, is more acceptable than the
conjectures of the petitioner. It is also consonant with the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction
over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends as if it made any difference of the Friar Lands. The subject
property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in
1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now denominated
the Property Registration Decree, which applies even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of
the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands.
19

This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus:
Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest, the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land Registration Act.
The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of limitations because the original transfer of the land was null and void ab initio and did not give
rise to any legal right. The land therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the action for this reversion could be filed at any time. The
answer to that is the statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez
20
that "even if respondent Tagwalan
eventually is proven to have procured the patent and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not revert back to the State,"
precisely because it has become private land. Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and void ab initio, for the fact is
that it is not so. It was only voidable. The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the
Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals.
21

A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is
part of the public domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the
land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not belong to such
category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113): (1) upon
proof of actual fraud; (2) although valid and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct proceeding therefor (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590), not collaterally (Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259, 262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184;
Henderson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs. Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the statutory period therefor (Sec.
38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33 Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764;
Reyes vs. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs. Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director
of Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title would be conclusive against the whole world, including the Government (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).
And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:
22

. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and
becomes private property over which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when
registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, subject to
review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the action for the annulment of the
certificate of title issued upon the land grant can no longer be entertained. (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson but both were
dismissed and the titles of the registered owners were confirmed by the trial court.
23
This decision was later sustained by this Court.
24
While this is not
to say that the present petition is barred by res judicata, as the government was not a party in these cases, it does suggest that the issue it wants to rake
up now has long been settled. It should not be the subject of further judicial inquiry, especially at this late hour. Litigation must stop at some point
instead of dragging on interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to
him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even
more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As in this
case.
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although
fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49776 January 28, 1980
RODOLFO, ANDRELINA, NORMA, LYDIA, VIRGINIA, SONIA, ELSA, ROGELIO and RAFAEL, all surnamed ZUIGA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (First Division), FELISA CERDENA, MARCIANA CERDENA, Heirs of EUSTAQUIO CERDENA, Heirs of
PLACIDO CERDENA, Heirs of ROSA CERDENA, and Heirs of CELESTINA CERDENA,respondents.
Virginia Zuiga-de Vega for and in his own behalf.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for review by certiorari, to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 11, 1978 (CA-G.R. No. 50537-R), vacating the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan of August 31, 1971. This decision of the trial court ordered the registration of a parcel of land, situated in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, described in Plan Ap-19129 (Exhibit "E") and its accompanying technical description (Exhibit "F"), in ten (10) undivided shares
each in favor of Rodolfo, Andrelina, Norma, Lydia, Sonia, Virginia, Elsa, Rafael and Rogelio, all surnamed Zuiga, and the minors Pablito, Anselmo
Marina and Alex Zuiga, represented by their mother, Adoracion Padilla. The thrust of the petition is that the respondent Court of Appeals, in declaring
that the trial court had no jurisdiction in passing upon questions involving ownership of the land in dispute, had decided the question in a manner
contrary to law and applicable decisions of this Court.
The present proceedings originated from the application for the registration of title filed on January 22, 1970 by Felisa Cerdea, Marciana Cerdea, and
the Heirs of Eustaquio, Placido, Rosa and Celestino, all surnamed Cerdea, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, over a certain parcel of land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. They alleged, among others, that they are owners of the land in fee simple, having inherited the same from their deceased parents,
Canuto Cerdea and Francisca Serrano.M
At the initial hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the application, except the heirs of Felix Zuiga. An order of general default was entered against the
whole world, with the exception of the aforementioned oppositors.
In their opposition, the oppositors (now petitioners) alleged, inter alia, that they are the owners in fee simple and in undivided share and interest over
the parcel of land subject of registration, having inherited the same from their father, Felix Zuiga, who died intestate on January 31, 1966 in
Meycauayan, Bulacan; that the property was previously owned in common by Felix Zuiga and Francisco Serrano, having purchased the same on March
4, 1919 from Benita Francia y Abacan that after the death of Francisca Serrano, her heirs, namely, Celestino, Rosa, Felisa, Marciana and Sixta all
surnamed Cerdea, sold the share which they inherited from their mother, Francisca Serrano, consisting of one-half (1/2) thereof to Felix Zuiga and
Rustica Tapispisan, parents of the oppositors. Hence, the oppositors Rodolfo, Andrelina, Norma, Lydia, Virginia, Sonia, Elsa, Rogelio and Rafael, all
surnamed Zuiga, together with their nephews and nieces, as the legitimate heirs of Felix Zuiga who died intestate on January 31, 1966 at Meycauayan,
Bulacan, became the exclusive and absolute owners of the entire property. They further ' alleged therein that they had been in actual, physical, peaceful,
public, uninterrupted and continuous possession of the same as the true and lawful owners thereof and have caused the cadastral survey of the land now
known as Lot No. 4400, Meycauayan Cadastre, and the issuance of Plan Ap-19129 in the name of the Heirs of Felix Zuiga.
During the course of the hearing, the applicants, Felisa Cerdea, et al., filed on March 29, 1971, a motion praying that a document handwriting expert
from the National Bureau of Investigation be appointed to conduct an examination of the deeds or documents submitted by oppositors at the hearing on
February 22, 1971, consisting of; (a) a deed of sale executed on March 4, 1919 by Benita Francia (Exhibit "1-Oppositors"); and (b) a deed of sale executed
on November 27, 1946 by Rosa Cerdea and Celestina Cerdea (Exhibit "2-Oppositors"). This motion was granted by the trial court on May 4, 1971. On
May 27, 1971, Felisa Cerdea, et al. filed with the trial court an urgent ex parte motion for amendment/modification of the order of May 4, 1971 to the
effect "that the Provincial Assessor for the Province of Bulacan submits or surrenders to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for examination
purposes, the documents (Exhibits 1 and 2, oppositors), as well as instruments available thereat bearing sample standards of the thumbmarks of Benita
Francia of Meycauayan, Bulacan, ... and directing the National Bureau of Investigation to examine said documents, firstly: to determine the genuineness
and authenticity as to age, type and execution, and secondly: to examine the thumbmarks appearing on said documents with sample standards furnished
by the Provincial Assessor for Bulacan, with respect to Benita Francia, and those furnished by the applicants herein, the latter upon previous notice to
oppositors or counsel."
On May 31, 1971, the trial court issued an order, declaring that it was the duty of the applicants "to search for and provide the documents to serve as
standards of comparison for the examination", and if the applicants are aware of such documents," they should submit the same to this Court for
approval as standards, otherwise the order for examination of the documents will be cancelled."
On June 11, 1971, applicants Felisa Cerdea, et al. again presented a motion for the transfer of the custody of the deeds of sale submitted by the
oppositors from the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan to the Acting Chief, Dactyloscopy Section, Criminalistics Division, National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila, for examination. This was granted by the trial court on June 14, 1971.
On August 31, 1971, the trial court rendered decision, declaring and stating as follows:
The facts as found by the Court from the evidence are as follows: The land was originally owned by Benita Francia, who sold it in
1919 to Francisca Serrano and Felix Zuiga. (Exh. 1, 1-A and 1-B). Felix Zuiga was the grandson of Francisca Serrano, being the son
of the latter's daughter, Celestina Cerdea. Francisca Serrano died in 1933, and her half of the property was inherited by her children
Celestina, Rosa, Felisa and Marciana Cerdea. Under a public document dated November 27, 1946, they sold their half of the
property to Felix Zuiga (Exh. 2). Ownership therefore became consolidated in Felix Zuiga, and upon his death on January 31, 1966
his heirs, oppositors in this case, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate with waiver (Exh. 4).
Applicants, who are led by Felisa Cerdea and Sixta Cerdea, denied that they executed Exhibit 2 and that the thumbprints
appearing thereon were theirs. The document was submitted to the NBI for a determination of the authenticity of the thumbprints.
The NBI examiner, Tomas Toribio, found the question prints to be slurred, smudged, or fragmentary, and declared that they cannot
be used as basis for an examination
The mere denial by Felisa Cerdea and Sixta Cerdea that the thumbmarks were theirs is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the notarial document was validly and regularly executed.
It appears further that the Zuigas have always been in possession of the property, to the exclusion of the applicants. This fact
bolsters the claim of the oppositors that their father owned the property. This ownership, which is traced back to the purchase of the
property from Benita Francia in 1919 has lasted for at least 50 years.
It having been satisfactorily established that oppositors and their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, public, continuous,
adverse and notorious possession of the land aforementioned under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than fifty years prior to
the filing of the application oppositors are therefore entitled to the registration applied for under C.A. 141.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land covered by plan Ap-19129 (Exh. E) and its
accompanying technical description (Exh. F) in the following manner: 1/10 undivided shares each in favor of Rodolfo Zuiga,
married to Lucia Urian; Andrelina Zuiga, married to Luis Porras Norma Zuiga, married to Epifanio Diano; Lydia Zuiga, married
to Leopoldo Jaime, Jr., Virginia Zuiga, married to Arsenio de Vega; Elsa Zuiga, married to Beltran Fitalcorin; Rafael Zuiga,
married to Aida Arzadon; Rogelio Zuiga, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and residents of Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan; and
1/10 undivided shares in favor of Pablito, Anselmo, Marissa, and Alex, all surnamed Zuiga, represented by their mother, Adoracion
Padilla, minors, Filipinos, and residents of Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan as their exclusive property.
This decision was appealed by Felisa Cerdea, et al. to the Court of Appeals, contending that the lower court erred in finding that: (a) the land applied for
was sold by Benita Francia in 1919 to Francisco Serrano and Felix Zuiga; (b) the heirs of Francisco Serrano sold their half of the property to Felix
Zuiga; (c) the possession by the Zuigas of the property bolster their claim that their father owned the property, and, as a consequence, in ordering the
registration of the property in the names of the oppositors.
It was on the basis of the afore-cited facts that the Court of Appeal instead of solving the factual issues raised, declared the court a quo as without
jurisdiction to pass upon questions involving the ownership of the land in dispute and vacated the judgment appealed from without prejudice to having
the issue of ownership litigated in an ordinary action before a before court of first instance.
The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: the ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property; to make, so far as
it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever
any question of legality to a title; and to decree that land title to be final, irrevocable and, undisputable."
1

It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has limited and special jurisdiction. lt cannot be denied, however, that when the
law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.
2
The purpose
of the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute or simple title over the property sought to be registered, otherwise his application will be denied. All
absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant. If successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor. As
to whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee simple title over the property sought to be registered necessarily requires a resolution of the
question as to whether or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicants. hence, the relevancy of the issue of the validity
of the conveyances in question. This issue is not foreign but intimately related to the principal question involved in the registration proceedings.
Conceding the materiality of this question, both parties submitted for resolution to the court a quo the issue on the genuineness and authenticity of the
deed of sale, executed by Benita Francia on March 4, 1919 in favor of Francisca Serrano and Felix Zuiga (Exhibits "1", "1-A" and "I-B"). and the deed of
sale executed by applicants on November 27, 1946 in favor of Felix Zuiga (Exhibit "2"). Thus, private respondents, as applicants in the afore-mentioned
proceedings, moved on March 29, 1971 before the land registration court, for the appointment of a handwriting expert to conduct an examination of the
aforesaid deed of sale submitted by oppositors on the hearing of March 22, 1971. Even after this motion was granted by the trial court on May 4, 1971,
private respondents again on May 27, 1971 sought the modification of the order of the trial court of May 4, 1971 to the effect that the Provincial Assessor
of Bulacan should submit to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination purposes "the documents (Exhs. I and 2, Oppositors) as well as
instruments available thereat bearing sample standards of the thumbmarks of Benita Francia of Meycauayan, Bulacan." Subsequently on June 11, 1971,
applicants moved for the transfer of the possession and custody of the afore-cited documents from the Provincial Assessor to the Acting Chief,
Dactyloscopy Section, Criminalistics Division, NBI, Manila for examination, which motion was granted by the Court on June 14, 1971. The result of the
examination was discussed in the decision of the trial court. The validity of the aforesaid conveyances was, therefore, duly threshed out in the hearings
before the trial court. Full opportunities were given to both parties in the presentation of their respective sides and in the submission of evidence in
support thereof. The evidence presented by the parties was fully considered by the court in its decision. As a matter of fact, on appeal, the main
assignment of error of private respondents before the Court of Appeals dealt with the sufficiency of the finding of fact of the trial court that the land in
question was sold to the oppositors. In Franco, et at v. Monte de Piedad
3
this court stated in emphatic terms that although the general rule is that a land
'registration court has no power to decide cases involving issues properly litigated in ordinary actions, yet inasmuch as in this jurisdiction it is the courts
of first instance that also function as courts of land registration, our jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to said rule, where the parties have acquiesced
in submitting the issues for determination in the registration proceedings. and they are given full opportunity to present their respective sides and
submit their evidence.
4
From the cases, it may be gathered that, from the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of a land registration court, being
special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to issues properly litigatable in ordinary civil action,
deviations have been sanctioned under the following conditions: (1) the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid issues for
determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) the parties have been given full opportunity in the presentation of their respective sides of
the issues and of the evidence in support thereof; and (3) the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is
sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues.
5
The foregoing situations exist in the case at bar.
To require that this case be litigated anew in another action between the parties would lead to multiplicity of suits, abet unnecessary delays in the
administration of justice and negate the constitutional right of all persons "to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies."
6

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 50537-R is hereby set aside, and the respondent
Court is hereby directed to decide the appeal on the basis of the questions of fact raised by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ. concur.


Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The Court of Appeals misapplied and misunderstood the rule that "questions which involved the ownership of the litigated lands
are not within the province of a court of land registration" (Tomada vs. Tomada L-21887, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1028).
That rule applies only to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, subsequent to the original
registration of the land, or to incidents affecting registered land such as the cases arising under section 112 of Act No. 496, regarding alteration or
amendment of the certificate of title.
It does not apply to the land registration proceeding itself where the basic question in issue is the ownership of the land or whether the applicant or
oppositor has a registerable title to the land or the land should be declared public land.
The instant case is an original land registration proceeding. So, naturally, the question of ownership and all the incidents thereof have to be decided by
the land registration court that is, whether it is the Cerdea applicants or the Zuiga oppositors who have an imperfect title that may be confirmed under
section 48 of the Public Land Law. (See Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890.)
In this case, the Court of First Instance, in order to determine the issue of ownership or the registerability of the title of the Cerdeas or Zuigas correctly
passed upon the issue of whether the deed of sale relied upon by the Zuiga oppositors was forged or is authentic. That issue is a mere incident in the
proceeding. A separate action to determine that issue is not necessary.
The determination of that issue falls within the exclusive competence of the trial court acting as a land registration court in an original land registration
proceeding as distinguished from a proceeding involving land already registered or a proceeding subsequent to the original land registration proceeding.


Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The Court of Appeals misapplied and misunderstood the rule that "questions which involved the ownership of the litigated lands
are not within the province of a court of land registration" (Tomada vs. Tomada L-21887, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1028).
That rule applies only to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, subsequent to the original
registration of the land, or to incidents affecting registered land such as the cases arising under section 112 of Act No. 496, regarding alteration or
amendment of the certificate of title.
It does not apply to the land registration proceeding itself where the basic question in issue is the ownership of the land or whether the applicant or
oppositor has a registerable title to the land or the land should be declared public land.
The instant case is an original land registration proceeding. So, naturally, the question of ownership and all the incidents thereof have to be decided by
the land registration court that is, whether it is the Cerdea applicants or the Zuiga oppositors who have an imperfect title that may be confirmed under
section 48 of the Public Land Law. (See Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890.)
In this case, the Court of First Instance, in order to determine the issue of ownership or the registerability of the title of the Cerdeas or Zuigas correctly
passed upon the issue of whether the deed of sale relied upon by the Zuiga oppositors was forged or is authentic. That issue is a mere incident in the
proceeding. A separate action to determine that issue is not necessary.
The determination of that issue falls within the exclusive competence of the trial court acting as a land registration court in an original land registration
proceeding as distinguished from a proceeding involving land already registered or a proceeding subsequent to the original land registration proceeding.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him.
On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without
notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they
failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that
the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name.
Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa,"
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the
world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title
than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence
of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy.
There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between
the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no
persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and
with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by
the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates
of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part,
comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of
two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
(of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for
fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide
that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said
Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and
so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were
served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to
foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto,
and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had
their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted
in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold
their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the
first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of
the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his
failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall
is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to
him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is
the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently
sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their
land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee?
Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to
be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of
said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said
sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never
issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the
land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in
its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y.,
351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show
that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law.
The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that
statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance
have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was
a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that
all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical
to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser,"
when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55,
and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He
cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied
to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than
that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the
world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his
vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the
appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record
of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose
of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors,
should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that
view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now
having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first)
that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer
of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double registration to take
place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate,
and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the
issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general
rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable
to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said
that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it
first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows:
It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same land, under the
Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard
should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the
Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration
"mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such
cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration
all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases
wherein still more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise
equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply
this equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19
Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping
registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of
the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke
the"just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later
certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the
issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons
personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier
certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second
applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it
undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both
such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general
rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to
demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may and should always be imputed
to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly
registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the various systems of land registration, other than those
based on the torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of
each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so that negligencemay
be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the
thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased
by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the
land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the
thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for
the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking
farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is
said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure
to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple,
expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to
ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser
to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration
Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others
dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and
I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack
of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that,
unknown to him, such lands have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should he
adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or
the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the
existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double
or overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the
certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry.
Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate,
under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective
equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a
default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with
notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and
defend his title when he has actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking
to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the
certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or
overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or
necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a
court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he
should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or
overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities
are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule
is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so
that those dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder
of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the
land. The decision of that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the other and to
that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier
certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which
he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree
with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and
defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied
with, all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting
a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the
equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder
of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his
lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was
not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which
imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor
of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the
fact that he has been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the
conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate
who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later
certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong
reasons of convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such
persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other
ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no
burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he
has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum
by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in
favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or
overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be
entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of
judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the
very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the
fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in
the very nature of things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held
by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without
personal service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon
the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can,
even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property
owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration,
relying upon the records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was
included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default
judgment to be entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of
another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice
of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there
can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff
will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when
challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to
innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of
Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
Southworth and Faison for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C,
and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel
A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.
I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos.
84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the
south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.
II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the
topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y
Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig
River. The point marked on the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and
the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of
beginning for the topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net
| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |

| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |
| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
| D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
| F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
| J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | |


The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic,
and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the
estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.
The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S.
44, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention
is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but its importance to the questions presented will be discussed
below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said
persons, as follows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to my
information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila,
Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner
of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of
March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other
parcels, the recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions
of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90;
Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo
Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs.
Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226,
and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No.
113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo
Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa,
these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui,
Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and
Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio
Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following described land:
Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly
bounded and described as follows:
Parcel A. Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the
chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S.
46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42 E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94
m. to pt. "G"; N. 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt.
"K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig
River.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW.
by the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the
25th day of April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said
application will be taken as confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.
Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred and six.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to
each of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including the
representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff
of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily
newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the following certificate relating to the notice and to the
publication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.
I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a
notice referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st
of the same month and year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands;
the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo
Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico;
Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa,
Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one
on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April,
1906.
A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the
court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said
attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our attention has not been called to any
order made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9
o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio
Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the
petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the
fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of
errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or
judgment in default against all persons:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real estate described herein,
vs.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler;
F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez;
Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde
& Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario
Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants.
The present case having been duly tried, and
Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from referring to the application mentioned, in two
newspapers of general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this
city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the
Spanish language to each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;
Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the
notice in Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding
that set for the termination of the period fixed;
Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law;
This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application,
which is granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant,
spinster, is the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is
hereinafter set forth:
A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on
the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection
S. of Calle Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C;
thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E.,
10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to
point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N.,
44 W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26, 1905.
Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the
name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said
Act that may be in force and effect.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred
and six, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.
Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.
A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the
property became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of
Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we find that the
assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.
MOTION.
The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and respectfully represents;
I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500;
II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street;
Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in the plan filed in this case.
Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C,
and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to
the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said
plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section
4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the
certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents:
1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to
four estates, among them the following:
(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.
2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to
230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just
past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents
United States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b) was
assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of
the estate designated by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States
currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and
are annexed to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under consideration there are
erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone
and masonry in that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c).
5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of
land and the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein,
the buildings erected on them are likewise mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the
application; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel
of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of
title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application.
8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance
fund, the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts
and vouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit
them, but averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the
office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegated therefor by the applicant.
9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of
the building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said
omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court
with the request that you order the correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without
modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of
acquisition annexed to the above-entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.
10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the
building erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein are stated
the two points mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal
proceedings, correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein
record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third paragraph of this application.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her
rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple
Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance
with the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan
presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page 48):
After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:
(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;
(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in
accordance with her original petition; and
(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from
Maria del Consuelo

{bmc 029048.bmp}

Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings
on said motion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in
addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the question of the correctness of the original plan
presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection to
the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and
specific statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears that their
objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was
based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A.
Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous
decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of
the lower court were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the
Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case
was appealed to this court. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:
1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.
2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.
3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be
discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the
24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21,
1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said property."
Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now
allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record
shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of the heirs of Don
Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were
the representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present proceedings. So far as the
record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys
were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on
their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was
absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original
proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original
certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all
of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said
registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had been given and that a
publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during
which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate
showing that that notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk that he
had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of
such service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No.
496 provides: "If no person appears and answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it
may concern," all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report of
the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal
notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall
bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the
general description 'To all whom it may concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens
system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners
and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in
registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and 32
of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it
may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person
of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be
subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice? Section 101 and 102
(Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law.
(Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions
of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration
and the granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent
purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an
innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightes degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point.
The requirements relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of the
provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been presented to this court. The same question was presented to
this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that fraud existed,
simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that
question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):
In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was
not personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a
tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those
outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would
hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff,
when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The
record shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even
with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has
and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration
of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration.
It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever
character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent
transfer of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into
court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims,
for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible
unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the
res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first
established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His
ship was found in the most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its
business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might
also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue its
voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and
not its real owner. Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader purposes of the Torrens
land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the
State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this
question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceedingin rem, dealing with a tangible res,
may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it,
and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the
power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make a
distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which
that may occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.)
So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by
publication may be had. Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the condemnation of
private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.
The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by notice by publication to all persons."
(Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs.Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal., 580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state
had control over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are
subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the
purpose of determining these question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey,
181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S.,
316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to
establish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc.,
Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkinsvs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceedingin rem, or in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118;
Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland,
117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs.McLaughlin, 122 Iowa,
343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24;
Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable
method for securing substituted services against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on all interest and persons
known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the
Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of
unknown as well as known claims indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by
personal service upon the claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue
that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and to
property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the
subject. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the
subject with which the statute deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in
suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his
estate without any actual knowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation, that
the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature
to determine in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of constructive notice shall be
sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S.,
47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts
and the decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the
appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and
19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was
destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable
possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee
simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss,
prayed that the be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple,
absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that
he be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that no one else had any estate,
rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper, as
was required by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of the
petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and
on the 19th days of December, 1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the
possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof,
either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after
the entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the
United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple,
absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San
Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action and
proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other
than his rights of possession and occupation." The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not
seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon
them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property
herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant,
Zeiss, demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S.,
47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court
below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the
legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction of
public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real estate,
where records had been destroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which would
furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in several
counties in the State of California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that whenever the
public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or
earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding under him,
in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court
for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons
claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or notice was required to be issued, containing the names
of the court and the country in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved, which notice
was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was
brought, at least once a week for a period of two months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it
is herein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and
every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the
possession and control of said property, for the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is
provided for in the law.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the
title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of
the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated,
that the law was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to
support the contention of the appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the
title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law; and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the
conclusion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right of
the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition
for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law
have been taken. The land is registered. It is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan,
said plan will not close that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error
of the character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original petition. Upon the
question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than were included in the original petition, we find the following
statements made by one of the judges who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it
was adjudicated in this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should be the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by him to
a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved
practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or not additional lands had been included in the new
plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:
Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and
established by an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be that
the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line
between said properties beginning on the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and
approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been
enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining
land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some
of the roots of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provisions
of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the
plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the
certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains
no application why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That error, in our
judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is
entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located upon the
parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land
in question, together with the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land as described in her
petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an
errors. on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors. Section 112 provides that the
registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original certificate was
entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of
land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not
mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original
certificate be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA, BENITO SANTAYANA,
FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY, FELIMON GUTIERREZ, ET AL.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
Bonifacio, Perez & Concepcion for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
Eduardo Cagandahan for respondent Santos del Rio.

CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of Appeals
2
have been consolidated in this single decision, having arisen from
one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, Laguna), and presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the registration of the land in favor of applicant,
now private respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public
domain and therefore not registerable. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by
dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in possession of the same for more than twenty (20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20)
meters therefrom (Exh. D),
3
in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of
Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the
year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and
the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by
the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was
no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private
oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in
1966.
4
Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the
Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application
for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed
their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the same issues, to wit :
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
5
Public lands, or those of
public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public
purposes.
6
The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the
same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshoreland, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code
quoted above and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth.
(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose
7
to be the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year." The foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to
disturb the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake.
8
While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides
9
in seas and
oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. 10 Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary
occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season.
Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion
of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 11
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into
Laguna de Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a
foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or
basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not applicant private
respondent has registerable title to the land.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts
ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from
whom he inherited said land. In addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and also
tax receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, 15 they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his father before
him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years, counted from
April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. 17 The record does not show any circumstance of note sufficient enough to
overthrow said findings of facts which is binding upon us. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in
good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. 18 Applicant has more than satisfied this
legal requirement. And even if the land sought to be registered is public land as claimed by the petitioners still, applicant would be entitled to a judicial
confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the following:
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide c of ownership, for at least tirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title ...
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have reclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have
possessed the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their position. In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim
land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had
been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the
authority earlier granted.
20
Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the
litigated parcel must fall. In the second place, their alleged possession can never ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.
21
As correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners
entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or another did
not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and
these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession
22
which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this
application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of land described in his application, he is clearly
entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the registration in favor of applicant private-respondent of the
land described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman), is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-
R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it
from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on
June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of
about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered
area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest,
were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February
18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners,
and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs.
Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of
the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern
boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion
has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by
accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact
that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to
defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that
they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot
be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs,
the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been
occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as
the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action
was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the
land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this
opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively
established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the
real issue in this case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question
pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less
than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by
specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the
protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area
given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just
as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the
area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude
acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in
possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax
declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from
Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of
age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940
or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone
witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that
they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the
said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because
the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished
their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is,
moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken
steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their
property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The
payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to
have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had
been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since
1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the
title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial
property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered
land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees
were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in
1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is
conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or
1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 31688 : December 17, 1990.]
192 SCRA 296
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Second Judicial District and ABRA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FERNAN, J.:

The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on Certiorari is a limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are,
according to petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly registered corporation established for the purpose of setting up a cement
factory, claims on the other hand, to be the owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and
PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for
registration in its name of said parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 1 as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof since July 26, 1894. 2
The requisite publication and posting of notice having been complied with, the application was set for hearing. Except for the Director of Lands, nobody
appeared to oppose the application. Hence, the court issued an order of default against the whole world except the Director of Lands.
After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial fiscal, appearing for the Director of Lands, submitted evidence supporting the opposition filed by
the Solicitor General to the effect that AIC had no registerable title and that the highly mineralized parcels of land applied for were within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve which had not yet been released as alienable and disposable land pursuant to the Public Land Law.
On July 22, 1966, the lower court 3 favorably acted on the application and ordered the registration of the parcels of land under the Land Registration
Act. It ruled that although said land was within the forest zone, the opposition of the Director of Lands was not well-taken because the Bureau of
Forestry, thru the District Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to exclude the same area from the forest reserve." 4 It found that the parcels of land had
been acquired by purchase and AIC's possession thereof, including that of its predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-nine (49) years.
The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that except for a 4-hectare area, the land
covered by PSU-217518, 217519 and 217520 fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that
although it had been denuded, it was covered with massive, corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a fifth of
which was suitable for the manufacture of high grade portland cement type and that the limestone, being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of
cement a day for 1,000 years. 5 He contended that, while the land could be reclassified as mineral land under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the
process of exclusion from the Cordillera Forest Reserve had not yet been undertaken pursuant to Sec. 1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and therefore it was
still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935 Constitution.
AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration, the lower court denied it on September 28, 1967 holding that the grounds raised therein
were relevant and proper only if the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to the case. It added that the motion for intervention filed
by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines was improper in land registration cases. 6
The Director of Lands filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 7 Hence, on
December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of
land in the name of AIC.
Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or on May 22, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, invoking Section 38
of Act No. 496, filed in the Court of First Instance of Abra a petition for review of the decrees of registration and the lower court's decision of July 22,
1966. The Solicitor General alleged that although the evidence presented by AIC showed that it had purchased from individual owners only a total area of
24 hectares, the application included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and therefore AIC "employed actual fraud" which misled the
court "to error in finding the applicant to have a registerable title over the parcels of land subject of the application." 8
On November 27, 1969, the lower court 9 denied the petition on the ground that if, as alleged by the Solicitor General, then presiding Judge Macario M.
Ofilada was mistaken in appreciating the evidence presented, the judicial error was "not synonymous with actual fraud." 10
Without asking for a reconsideration of said order, on February 25, 1970, the Solicitor General, representing the Director of Lands, the Director of
Forestry and the Republic of the Philippines, filed the present petition for review on Certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440.:-cralaw
The petition was forthwith given due course by the Court 11 but inasmuch as no action was taken on their prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, the petitioners filed a motion reiterating said prayer. Finding the motion meritorious, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the private respondent and its agents and representatives "from further acts of possession and disposition to innocent purchasers for value of
the parcels of land involved" in this case. 12
AIC filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on the grounds that it raises "unsubstantial" issues and that it was filed out of time. The motion was
denied by the Court 13 but it bears pointing out that AIC's second ground for dismissal, which is premised on its perception that a motion for
reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is necessary before the filing of the instant petition, is incorrect.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an appeal, petition for review or a petition for review on Certiorari. 14 The reglementary
period for filing the petition for review on Certiorari in the instant case was thirty (30) days from notice of the order or judgment subject of review 15
which period, parenthetically, is now fifteen (15) days pursuant to Section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. 16 Petitioners having been granted a total of
sixty (60) days 17 within which to file the petition, the same was timely filed.
Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting the application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that
they are within the forest zone. The District Forester's failure to object to the exclusion of the area sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not
enough justification for registration because under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude an area from the forest zone belongs to the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and not the District Forester or even the
Director of Forestry.
Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in denying the petition for review based on actual fraud because under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a
decree of registration may be reviewed not only by reason of actual fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of the decision upon which the decree is based,
provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced.
We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Muoz 18 and consistently
adhered to in a long line of cases 19 the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 20 that forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian
doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides that:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber, . . . and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must first be released from its classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in
accordance with the certification issued by the Director of Forestry as provided for by Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. 21 This is
because the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts. 22 Moreover, a
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 23
Being the interested party, an applicant for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. 24 In this case, AIC asserts that the land in dispute is no longer part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because
the communal forest in Bucay, Abra which had been established in 1909 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-298, had been "cancelled and
de-established" by Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-622 dated October 1, 1965 and issued by then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Jose Y. Feliciano. 25 AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the fact that as there was no longer a forested area, the same area had
become alienable more so because its actual occupants, who had been devoting it to agriculture, had relinquished their rights over it in favor of AIC "to
give way for greater economic benefits for the people in the locality." 26 It should be emphasized, however, that the classification of the land as forest
land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 27 Hence, the fact that the
contested parcels of land have long been denuded and actually contains rich limestone deposits does not in any way affect its present classification as
forest land.: nad
While it is true that under Section 1839 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, may
change the location of a communal forest, such executive action does not amount to a declassification of a forest reserve into an alienable or disposable
land. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 28 it is no less than the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 29 The President shall also declare from time
to time what lands are open to disposition or concession. 30 AIC therefore, should prove first of all that the lands it claims for registration are alienable
or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not only failed to prove that it has a registerable title but more important]y, it failed to show that the lands are no
longer a part of the public domain.
The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of the decision ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in view of its patent infirmity.
The lower court closed its eyes to a basic doctrine in land registration cases that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. 31
Its decision to order the registration of an inalienable land in favor of AIC under the misconception that it is imperative for the Director of Forestry to
object to its exclusion from the forest reserve even in the face of its finding that indeed a sizable portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is
involved, cannot be allowed to stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent infirmity which must be corrected.:-cralaw
WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969 denying the petition for review under Section 38 of Act No. 496 and the decision of July 22, 1966 insofar
as it orders the registration of land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made permanent. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.


EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.
Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine
Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after
hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land included in her
petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes
than for agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the course of that decision the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined the plans and all the evidence presented in this case and are of the opinion that the trial
court was correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean the old road to Bogabon. The fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land
is a further indication that the applicant's possessory information title did not include the land running up to the road to Bongabon, because all the
papers which the applicant has regarding this property call the land palayero."
1
chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an amended plan in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the
land in question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence before us showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land included in the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when
the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action. She presented her opposition in the present
action, claiming the very land which she claimed in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support of her claim in the present action
was the proof which she had presented in the former action. No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she was
entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had been conceded to her in the first
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in
the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in
her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering
all of the land included in her opposition in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in question is
not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is
presented in support thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been presented. It cannot, therefore, be
considered now. It is not newly discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to justify the granting of a new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the trial of this cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first
cause, we are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the
intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which
had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Avancea, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN,
BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of
the case are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial
park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648
of the Philippine Commission.
1

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916;
2
December 28,
3
and January 17, 1917.
4
Diego Palomo donated
these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173
5
to his
heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
6

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with
the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.
7
The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953.
8

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division
of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon
9
and introduced improvements by planting rice,
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged
the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then
Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo
Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913
and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15
parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its
favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following
decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and
damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles
Nos. 153,
10
169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of
Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in question that are found therein and
introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,
11
3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173
and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered.
12

The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of land in question
before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of
the Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued only when
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of
the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-
9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area,
13
the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the government is against our existing
law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance
in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of
Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of
any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject
lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the
United States of America which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse
possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands,
whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could
only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion Especial or
Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much
reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823,
dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th
Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.
14
The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the
judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50
years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo.
Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in
preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in
1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped from
questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.
15

Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the
Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present.
16
Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof,
no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
17
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
18

Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears
emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently
knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title
inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in
1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948
19
contains the following note, "in
conflict with provincial reservation."
20
In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the
registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with
respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,
21
were within the perimeter of the
national park,
22
no pronouncement as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976
square meter area falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.