Agrarian Law Compiled Case Digests

AGRARIAN LAW CASE DIGESTS
CRUZDAVIDDELOS SANTOSGATACELOISMAELLAZARO
MEDINAMONTESMONZONROMANOTIBURCIO
1. CORPUZ vs. GROSPE (CRUZ)

G.R. No. 135297
June 8, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation
Land Transfer Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform. He was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer over two parcels of agricultural
land. In order to pay for the hospitalization of his wife, he mortgaged
the subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract
expired, he again mortgaged it to respondent Hilaria Grospe for a
period of four years. The parties executed a contract, which allowed
the respondents to cultivate the land during the duration of the
mortgage or until December 05, 1990.
Corpuz subsequently instituted a complaint which alleged that the
Grospe's had entered the disputed land by force and destroyed the
palay that he had planted on it. However according to the Grospes,
Corpuz had already executed a "waiver of rights' over the landholding
in favor of the spouses in consideration of 54k.
PARAB adjudicator Ernesto Tabar ruled that Corpuz abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija.
Said Samahang Nayon even passed Resolution No. 16 and 27
recommending the reallocation of said lots to the Grospes, who were
the most qualified farmers-beneficiaries. DARAB and CA affirmed the
decision
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the 'waiver of rights' is contrary to agrarian law
2. Whether or not Corpuz had abandoned his landholding
3. Whether or not Corpuz had voluntarily surrendered his landholding
HELD:
1. Yes. The sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
certificate of land transfer is void except when the alienation is made
in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This
ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in
which the landowners reacquire vast tract of land thus, negating the
government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the
soil.
2. No. Corpuz surrendered of possession did not amount to an
abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of the
Grospe's to return the possession of the landholding upon full payment

of the loan. There was no clear, absolute or irrevocable intention to
abandon.
3. Yes. Corpuz' intention to surrender the landholding was clear and
unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon
Resolutions. His voluntary surrender to the samahang nayon qualifies
as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action
forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and reallocation of of
farmholdings of tenant farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of
pd 27.
2. ESTOLAS vs. MABALOT (DAVID)

G.R. No. 133706
May 7, 2002
FACTS:
On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in
favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot located in Barangay
Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing
money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land
to the petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of
rice. According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer,
the DAR officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and
issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed a
Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the subject land and the
case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.
On July 8, 1988, the DARs District Office submitted an investigation
report finding that respondent merely gave the subject land to
petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending
that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the money
loan be returned to petitioner.
Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the
Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional Director Antonio
M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in
surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting
abandonment thereof, and denied respondents prayer for redemption
of the subject land.
CA ruled: The transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should
be returned to respondent. Respondent had not effectively abandoned
the property, because he tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby
making it available to other qualified farmer-grantees?
HELD:
There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be
transferred to anyone other than the Government. PD 27 specifically
provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that
of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be
transferable except to the grantees heirs by hereditary succession, or
back to the government by other legal means. The law is clear and
leaves no room for interpretation.
For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a)
a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert
a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is
expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a
projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated
or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another.
Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines
abandonment or neglect as a willful failure of the agrarian reform
beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or
develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any
specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar
years. In the present case, no such willful failure has been
demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to claim
dominion over the land.
Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiarys
landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The
proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there
was indeed an abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary is a
qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
3. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (DELOS

SANTOS)
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
FACTS:
The government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed
a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and
II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out

all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land. A few years after, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered
into through negotiation without public bidding.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion
are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and the JVA itself is illegal.
On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domains as a violation of Sec 3, Art XII of
the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to
enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own the
lands under the amended joint venture agreement having 367.5
hectares s. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay
in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The
592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being

contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
The Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution which
allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, and
the 1987 Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce
Cases cannot serve as authority for a private corporation to acquire
alienable public lands, much less submerged lands, since under the
present Constitution a private corporation like Amari is barred from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
4. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (GATACELO)
G.R. No. 86889
December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, prayed that Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657, including the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, be declared unconstitutional for
being repugnant to the due process clause. Sections 13 and 32
directed "corporate farms", which included livestock and poultry raisers
to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) that would distribute from three
percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net
profits to their workers as additional compensation. Luz Farms also
argued that livestock or poultry raising was not similar to crop or tree
farming; it was not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represented no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Thus, they must not be
covered by the law. On the other hand, DAR commented that livestock
and poultry raising were embraced in the term "agriculture" based on
Webster's International Dictionarys definition. The Court, then, took
cognizance of the case, as it assailed the constitutionality of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the contested provisions and implementing rules, which covered
livestock and poultry industry under agrarian reform, were
unconstitutional.
HELD:

Yes. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly
showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government. Moreover, the Committee adopted the definition of
"agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud
devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands,
saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land. Simply, the said
provisions and rules were violative of the Constitution.
6. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE (LAZARO)
vs.
HON.
G.R. No. L-29381

September 30, 1969
FACTS:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of
three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30 meters adjoining
one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of
way running from Manila to Legazpi. These strips of land lie within the
municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center
thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width
where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running locomotives.
On both sides of the track, or about two (2) to five (5) meters away
from the embankment of the track, are telegraph and telephone
posts fifty (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain
communication wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR
draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track whenever it
is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them as depository
of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges
during washouts. or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by
derailments or other calamities.
The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track
had been a source of trouble. People occupied them; they reap profits
therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up.
It is on the face of all these that, with adequate provisions to safeguard
railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations.
Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land
aforementioned which are on both sides of the track, after a
competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a
period of three (3) years. A civil law lease contract in printed form was,

on April 15, 1963, entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing.
That contract expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and
use the property . . . temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing, however,
failed to take possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was
occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of
previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways
(PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its
right of way for its railroad operations but temporarily leased, are
agricultural lands within the purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
and the Agricultural Land Reform Code, such as would come within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
2. WON CAR has jurisdiction over the present case.
HELD:
The answer to both issues is no.
According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural
tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both."
The term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the
constitutional sense. The phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally
speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber lands
and embraces within its wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural
or devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes but also commercial,
industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other
hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code,"
'[a]gricultural Land means land devoted to any growth, including but
not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned
land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively."
It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does
not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to
agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot
engage in agriculture.

The entire width of 30 meters is important to PNR's railroad operations
which should not be hampered. And, communication lines must not be
disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track.
Because, it is not so easy to prevent people from walking along the
track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could
be along the track itself which might cause derailment. All of these
could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary
precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to
the trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.
The use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad
operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities. The contract of
lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to
make repairs, place its materials on the land. It may even take soil
from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water
during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct another
parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot
prevent or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure so
important in landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.
In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third
person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had no jurisdiction over
the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the parties,
as the third person was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder.
Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no
power to sublet. There is also thus ho legally cognizable relationship of
tenancy between the parties.
We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case
at bar and the proceedings below are thus null and void.
7. KRIVENKO vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS (MEDINA)

G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
FACTS:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which
was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the
ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court
rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.

ISSUE:
WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. "Public agricultural lands" mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the
1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands,
the Court stated: Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.
Thus
Section
5,
Article
XIII
provides:
Save
in cases
of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.
8. ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA (MONZON)

G.R. No. 127876
December 17, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered
owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. The
events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President
Corazon C. Aquino who issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a
Provisional Constitution. Before the laws effectivity, petitioner filed
with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and
Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent
DAR in accordance with the Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988(CARL).
In a letter, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a
reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform.
Respondent Secretary also denied petitioners withdrawal of the
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) on the ground that withdrawal could only
be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for
agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the
land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of
Hacienda Caylaway, petitioner filed its application for conversion of
both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. petitioner, through its President,

Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over
Hacienda Caylaway
Petitioner instituted Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by
respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged
that the haciendas had been declared a tourist zone, is not suitable for
agricultural production. DARAB held that the case involved the
prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian
reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. Petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals. It questioned the expropriation of its properties
under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its
landholdings.
Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was
denied by the MARO. Petitioners petition was dismissed by the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied by court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAR observes due process of the proceedings over
the three haciendas
HELD:
The acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for
respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In
accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the
applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to
respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination
of petitioner's application for conversion. failure of respondent DAR to
comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs
already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to
short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular
course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico
alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since
then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands.
It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to
deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they
till.
9. MORTA VS. OCCIDENTAL (ROMANO)

G.R. No. 123417

June 10, 1999
FACTS:
Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime
Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly
gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective
land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental
claimed that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina
Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners of
the land in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla.
Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable
by the DAR Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the
lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a
tenancy-related problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.
HELD:
NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land,
the issue is clearly outside DARABs jurisdiction. Whatever findings
made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not
conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to be
the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancyrelated for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming
arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the
landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship
between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites,
the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit:
1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee;
2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and

6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
10. VDA DE TANGUB vs. CA (TIBURCIO)

UDK NO. 9864
December 3, 1990
FACTS:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the
RTC of Lanao del Norte, an agrarian case for damages by reason of
their unlawful dispossession in which they were tenants from the
landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil.
Several persons were also impleaded as defendants which has
interests over the land. The judge dismissed the complaint. He ruled
that based on EO No. 229, EO No. 129-A in relation to RA No. 6657,
agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case.
HELD:
RTC has no jurisdiction. DAR has jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the DAR based on EO No. 229 and
EO No. 129 - A, are:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the
Department.
Further, RA 6657 states:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.
The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters

involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
[DA] and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources [DENR].
The RTCs have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other
hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which
are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court at least
one (1) branch within each province to act as such. These Regional
Trial Courts as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57
of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under . . [the] Act."
The RTC City was therefore correct in dismissing the case. It being a
case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural
land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as
a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly,
the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield
the adjudicatory powers of the Department.
11. THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE ET. AL vs. CA (CRUZ)

G.R. No. 138016.
January 30, 2002
FACTS:
The spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of
agricultural land in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates,
the Romeros sold
separate
portions
thereof
to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson. Claiming to be the
agricultural tenants of the land in question, Jose Juanite (now
deceased) and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a complaint with the
Provincial Agricultural Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
(DAR),
against
the
spouses Edilberto and Felisa Mercado and their vendees above-named
for the cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to
exercise their right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12
of which reads:

Sec. 12. Lessees Right of Redemption. In case the landholding is
sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee,
the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold
must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or
more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of
redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by
him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have
priority over any other right of legal redemption.
Edilberto Romero, et al., as defendants, filed their answer with special
and affirmative defenses. They alleged that the Romeros, being the
owners of the property, had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof
to any person. They strongly denied the allegation of the Juanites that
the latter were their tenants.
On October 28, 1993, the PARAB (Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board) rendered his decision declaring the Juanite spouses
as tenants; directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to
prepare the leasehold contract in their favor; declaring the deeds of
sale
executed
by
the
Romero
spouses
in
favor
of Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonsonnull and void; and
directing the latter to vacate the premises.
On appeal, the DARAB reversed. In its decision dated April 21, 1998 ,
it declared that the Juanites were not tenants on the subject
landholding; and hence, had no right of redemption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were tenants of the Romero spouses
(respondents) as to entitle them to the right of redemption.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of PARAB. The PARAB declared the
petitioners to be tenants on the basis of the following evidence:
a) certification of 28 persons to the effect that spouses Juanite had
been working on the land as tenants;
b) in the deed of absolute sale signed by Edilberto Romero as vendor,
he stated that spouses Juanite were his tenants;
c) the spouses Juanite had been in possession and cultivating the land
since 1969.
Without any evidence to support its finding, the DARAB reversed the

finding of the PARAB and found that petitioner Juanites were not
tenants because they failed to submit evidence that they
were sharing the harvests of the with the landowners, respondent
Romero spouses. SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship
between
the
parties. The
absence
of
one
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has
established his status as a dejure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws.
But note that from the time of the landowners admission that
petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of
sharing harvest is assumed as a factual element in that admission.
12. HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA vs. CA (DAVID)

G.R. No. 132048
March 6, 2002
FACTS:
On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order
of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural
land in Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and
19,808 square meters, respectively, under the following conditions:
- Within 6 months, he shall personally cultivate at least of the
area; or
- Occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and
pay at least the first installment
In no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale be issued in favor
of the covering the lots without a certification issued by the Land
Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement Superintendent that
the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted to some productive
enterprise at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed
his/her/their house therein in case of residential land.

After twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the
Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase
of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth
in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest
against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation
of private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of
the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his
own application for said parcels in opposition to that of private
respondent.
On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation and found
that the subject lots were previously tenanted by other persons and it
is clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the terms and
conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor.
On January 24, 1994, petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio
M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order, cancelling Order of Award issued in
favor of Jose Verdillo and giving Restituto Rivera the opportunity to
purchase said lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners claim
that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction
HELD:
Yes the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its
officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The case involves the strict
administrative implementation and award of lots. The matter falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction and administrative competence of the
DAR (Regional Director and Department Secretary) and not of the
DARAB (including the Provincial Adjudicator and the Provincial
Adjudication Board itself).
Centeno vs. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and
appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A.

6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations.
Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), agrarian dispute is
defined to include (d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
13. ALMUETE vs. CA (DELOS SANTOS)

G.R. No. 122276
November 20, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel
of land located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) on
March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the subject
property peacefully and exclusively. However, unknown to petitioner,
an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin on
August 17, 1979 filed false reports making it appear that Almuete has
waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo
Andres was the actual occupant of the land from 1967 to date.
Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent
who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos,
immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive right of
ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted
no time in filing an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession
against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela. The Trial
Court rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and
executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a
petition for certiorari to prevent the implementation of the writ of
execution which was entertained by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not this case is considered an agrarian dispute.
Whether or not regular courts have jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
said thatit gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and
held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by
petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts. The Supreme Court
held that this case is not of an agrarian dispute. An agrarian dispute is
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In this case no juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged
between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so
characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner
and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same
parcel of land. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was
for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title: there is no
"agrarian dispute" involving tenancy relationship between the parties
that the issue should fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
14. SPOUSES ATUEL ET AL vs. SPOUSES VALDEZ

(GATACELO)
G.R. No. 139561
June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. They assailed the decision of the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which ordered the segregation of the
subject lot from the land of respondents and awarding the same to
petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB
which reversed the decision of the MARO. After a review of the issues

raised, the question is whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to resolve
the controversy.
ISSUE:
WON DARAB has jurisdiction to try and hear this case.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the DARAB has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the respondents' complaint for recovery of possession of
the subject lot. Though the parties did not challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of
jurisdiction. The court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. In the case at bar,
the respondents did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if
any, between them and the petitioners. The allegations in the
complaint indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant
case is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. For the DARAB
to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy
relations between the parties. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is
vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
15. OCA vs. CA (ISMAEL)

G.R. No. 144817
March 7, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond
known in the locality as the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan,
Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of another
called the "Salayog" property. Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole and
exclusive owner of two fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and
the "Fabian" properties. Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be
the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that he
had been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid
fishponds from the time he received the same from the petitioners Oca
brothers until the first week of May 1992 when he requested from them
the share of the harvest and instead of acceding, petitioners
demanded that he vacate the lands.
A complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with
Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory Order was filed by the
respondent against the petitioner with the PARAD. Petitioners in their

answer denied that the respondent is a caretaker/tenant of the land.
They acknowledged that the respondent is merely an industrial partner
who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of
P140,000.00. After due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in
favor of the respondent declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the
subject fishponds.
The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but
the Board affirmed in toto the Decision of the PARAD. Petitioners
sought relief with the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the Decision ruling that the
private respondent cannot be a tenant of the "Salayog" property, he
having sold his share and interest and had consequently, waived any
interests he had thereon. Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new
argument the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the PARAD over the
subject fishponds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners be permitted to impugn for the first time
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case?
HELD:
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot
be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act
or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. Well
to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at
any instance, as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked
even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is
understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily
determined.This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances, estoppel or waiver may
operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this
form of defense. Thus, we have held in the leading case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from
invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of
said party invoking the plea. We defined laches as "failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,

by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or has declined to assert it."In the case at bar, we find
the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they
never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any
stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the
DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of
numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest
the adjudicator's exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they register a
hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from
contesting its jurisdiction during the eight years this case was under
litigation.
The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be
allowed to defeat the tenant's right by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the
Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean
rendering useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time,
effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the
litigants and of the State. This is especially oppressive for the
respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted
litigation.
16. REMIGIO ISIDRO vs CA (LAZARO)

G.R. No. 105586
December 15, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the
overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the
swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1)
hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his
family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to
the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand.
Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted
the same into a fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from
petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and

return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and
invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found
that the land in question is a fishpond and, thus, in a decision dated 30
May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian
relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now
embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land involved in this case is an agricultural
land.
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
As to the first issue, the answer is yes. As to the second issue, the
answer is no.
The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the

ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore the question
at issue is agrarian. In this
connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised
Rules of Procedure, provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to

farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be
an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond.
And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural
land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in Republic Act No. 6657 and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Republic Act No. 6657
defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make
such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction.
The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. The law provides for
conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being
agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian
dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over
lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such
arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant: (2) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of
harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order
to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of
one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person
establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws.
Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of
Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce
or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or
juridical person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or

legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his
land for a price certain.
Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear
that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing
between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no
contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private
respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for
petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his
harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was
paying rent for the use of the land.
18. ONQUIT vs. BINAMIRA-PARCIA (MONZON)

A.M. MTJ-96-1085
October 8, 1998
FACTS:
The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry
case with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with damages. Said case was assigned to her
sala. The complainant and her two brothers were therein codefendants. Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that
said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over
an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants
filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion for Disqualification,
Request for Disqualification and Request for Resolution. Basically,
these motions were founded on the trial courts alleged lack of
jurisdiction. In a single Order, respondent Judge denied all three
motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to
respondent Judge , the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar
would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.
Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which
was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A
seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the
palay from the land in question.
ISSUES:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case.
WON that the plaintiffs injunction bond was approved by respondent
Judge without first serving a copy to the complainant and the motion of

issuance of seizure order was not served resulting in a violation of due
process.
WON the complainants were ordered to leave the land because they
will certainly lose the case
WON the sheriff seized all the palay harvested without issuing a
receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the
plaintiff.
HELD:
The case was dismissed. The court held that it is a basic rule that the
material averments in the complaint, which in this case is for
ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence
dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein
the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. It
is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the veracity
of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09
February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented,
the land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted.
The records belie the claim of complainant that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was not served to the defendants. Records show that said
writ was served to the defendants on February 16, 1996 at their
residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefore,
nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy to the defendants.
As to the allegation that the judge was persuaded with money and told
the complainants to leave the land were not supported by evidence
apart from the self-serving statements made by complainant. The
court is not persuaded by said accusations hurled by complainant
simply because there is no evidence thereon to implicate the
respondent Judge.
Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in his
duty to issue a receipt for the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not
issue the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier
for issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next
day. From the record, complainant made no averment that respondent
Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving
complainant a receipt. It was reasonable to briefly wait until
measurement could be made as to the volume of the palay after being
cleaned and threshed before issuance of the receipt. In the absence of

contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff has
regularly performed his official duty.

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