Philsoc Student Essay Prize Hilary 2013: Second Prize

Critically evaluate Hlderlins claim that !ein" e#$resses the %oinin" o&
Su'%ect and ('%ect)
by Chris !ailey
The principle of sufficient reason seems to set up an infinite series in which each conclusion has to
be conditioned by a previous one. To avoid this situation philosophy must try to find an uncondi -
tioned truth that it can begin from. Hlderlins claim that Being is the initial unconditioned truth
was actually meant to show the impossibility of such a beginning for philosophy. However, it even-
tually turned out to be an important development in the history of philosophy.
Hlderlin's position was primarily aimed at ichte, but in fact it challenged the entire !artesian tra-
dition of beginning from the "nowing sub#ect as a supposedly presuppositionless starting point for
philosophy. Hlderlin showed that such a position inevitably led to a dualism between sub#ect and
ob#ect. $uch dualism had been obvious in the case of %escartes and &ant, but ichte thought he had
succeeded in overcoming this dualism.
ichte believed the ''' could be an unconditioned starting point for philosophy because it "new it-
self directly through what he called 'intellectual intuition'. Because this intuition gave truth through
direct unmediated e(perience alone it did not involve the use of #udgement and concepts and could
not be derived or demonstrated by reason. Because it is the ''' "nowing itself directly, ichte be-
lieved that this self-"nowing ''' represented an initial identity between sub#ect and ob#ect from
which the 'not-'' was then derived as ob#ect for the '''.
Hlderlin showed that ichte's starting point could not represent an identity between sub#ect and
ob#ect as he claimed. Beginning from the "nowing ''' inevitably involved a separation between sub-
#ect and ob#ect even when the ''' itself was its own ob#ect. Hlderlin insisted that the identity of
sub#ect and ob#ect only e(isted at the level of Being itself and that Being preceded consciousness.
Hlderlin retained the idea of intellectual intuition in #ustifying Being as the unconditioned. He in-
sisted that we did not "now Being through reason - it was something we were immediately and di -
rectly aware of as a unity between ourselves and nature before we began to reason about it.
)lthough they both began with intellectual intuition to provide "nowledge of an unconditioned be-
ginning there was a ma#or difference between Hlderlin and ichte concerning the development of
"nowledge beyond the unconditioned. ichte had seen the ''' as a first principle from which philos-
ophy could begin. He regarded it as a starting point for building an entire philosophical system.
or Hlderlin however the unconditioned, Being, could not be a first principle for philosophy at all.
*n the contrary it showed that philosophy could never "now the true nature of the universe. Being,
which Hlderlin e+uated with the entire universe, the ')bsolute', everything that 'is', preceded con-
sciousness and could not be the ob#ect of consciousness. ,eason -.udgement/ was seen as in-
evitably dividing this )bsolute that Being represented into sub#ect and ob#ect and 0no separation
can ta"e place without in#uring the nature of that which is to be divided1. The unity of sub#ect and
ob#ect that Being e(pressed could only be seen as a presupposition, a transcendent ground, for re-
flection and consciousness and could not itself be consciously thought.
But if Being could only be "nown through an initial intellectual intuition and reason could ta"e this
"nowledge no further, then this Being really amounted to 2othing. )s 2ovalis, who agreed with
Hlderlin against ichte, pointed out3 0*ne "nows nothing of a thing if one "nows only that it is.1
-4565. 7age 856/
The way Hlderlin and the early 9erman ,omantics attempted to get around this was by e(tending
the idea of intellectual intuition to be much wider than #ust "nowing that Being simply was the
unity of sub#ect and ob#ect into including some "nowledge of the nature of that unity. 'n particular,
they insisted on something they called aesthetic intuition as a special form of intellectual intuition
that was e(hibited in artistic, particularly poetic, e(pression. $ince art too" the form of imagery
8
rather than being a form of conceptual thought they believed that it could evince a "nowledge of
the )bsolute without the problems they saw as being involved with reason.
By its very definition it must be impossible to give a rational account of intellectual intuition. 't has
to remain a mystery. 7erhaps if everyone was able to ac"nowledge that they possessed this intu-
ition then its e(istence might be accepted. But, although this might arguably be true concerning the
initial intuition of Being, it certainly is not the case with the wider claims of aesthetic intuition. 't
would seem to be limited to individual poets and artists. The only possible conclusion would seem
to be that they have a mystical form of "nowledge of the )bsolute that the rest of us do not possess.
The error of Hlderlin that leads ultimately to mysticism lies in his initial premise. )s Hegel would
later point out, Being, the )bsolute, cannot #ust consist of sub#ect-ob#ect identity, but has to be seen
as the identity of sub#ect-ob#ect identity and sub#ect-ob#ect non-identity. Hlderlin has in fact him-
self divided Being when he separates it from 0.udgement1. The concepts of #udgement 'are'. They
cannot be outside of Being. The early 9erman ,omantics themselves divided the )bsolute into
two: a world of appearance and a world of reality lying beyond and apart from this. The appearance
must itself be part of reality. 't is the appearance of the infinite )bsolute e(pressed in finite human
thought, reason. Though it may proceed continually through error and appro(imation reason is not
by its very nature bloc"ed from "nowing the )bsolute.
;nwittingly, Hlderlin, despite believing he was showing the impossibility of philosophical "nowl-
edge, actually founded a new philosophical school, 9erman ob#ective idealism. He gave Being an
independent, 7latonic, e(istence by e+uating it with the universe. 't was no longer #ust a sub#ective,
purely mental idea. %espite his insistence that starting with the )bsolute as Being could not be the
foundation for a philosophical system, that is precisely what it did become for Hegel.
*e&erences:
2ovalis ichte $tudies <dited by .ane &neller. !ambridge ;niversity 7ress =>>?.
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