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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila


THIRD DIVISION


SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, G.R. NO. 157472
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, J J .

HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Promulgated:
Respondents. September 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:


Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy
[1]
(petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the
Orders dated October 25, 2002
[2]
and December 18, 2002
[3]
issued by Presiding
Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in
the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18
th
day of March 2002, in the Municipality
of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in
disregard of his rank.
[4]



On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge
set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.
[5]


However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge
issued another Order,
[6]
likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing
out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and
in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained
exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.
[7]



On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial,
petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner
objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his
plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for
him a plea of not guilty.
[8]


On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to
Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion
[9]
on the ground
of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was
validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was
terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was
terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for
Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.

In an Order
[10]
dated October 25, 2002,
[11]
the respondent judge denied the
Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not
constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered
acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner
was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide
was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate
the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance,
so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, the crime of Homicide is
qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration.
In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction
in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the
charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and
existing jurisprudence.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which
constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again
for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to
respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing
to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment
and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be
done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double
jeopardy.

In his Order dated December 18, 2002,
[12]
the respondent judge denied the
Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby
DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall
continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is
reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide stands.
[13]


In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a
close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of
rank is merely a generic mitigating
[14]
circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.

On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the
following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION FOR MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING
THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH
WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.
[15]



Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the
Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank, which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondents ruling
that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified
the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused
and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that
disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial
amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.

Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder,
considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was
terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense
would place him in double jeopardy.

Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his
Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's
prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information
for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration
did not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal
of the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy;
thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the
Homicide case.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's
Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering
its amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that
petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with
substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12,
2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not
entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.

Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his
Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended
Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings
under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was
not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the
charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double
jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and
that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper,
for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.
[16]
A
strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
[17]


In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the
proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of
information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double
jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution
which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against
being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to
prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.

The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner
had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The
argument of petitioner --

Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already
terminated without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and
arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that
the termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent is
equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is
tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.
[18]



is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

x x x

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.


with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. -
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the
offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused
shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss
the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under
Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag
[19]
is
instructive, viz:

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information
or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the
information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in
the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave
of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in
substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for
if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under
the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under
the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information
involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is
sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this
is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense
may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
[20]



In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to
Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening
paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word
Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There was no change in
the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the
jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance.
Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
Homicide to Murder as purely formal.
[21]


Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and
when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information.
[22]
Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended
Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there
could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there
be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account
of rank qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating
circumstance,
[23]
we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and
did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.

Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the
change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder
back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for
Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.

Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.

Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense
of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1)
a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
[24]


As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
[25]


It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination
of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
[26]


Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his
case for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal,
is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite
or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.
[27]
And for the dismissal to
be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under
the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for
convenience, we quote again --

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused
shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the
court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not
apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
[28]


Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of
the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was
amended by merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word
Murder, instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after
realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling
was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted
anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.

A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent
judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double
jeopardy exists, but on his realization that disregard of rank is a generic
aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to
murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information
for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither
convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
[29]


WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson



MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division





C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.


REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice








[1]
Spelled as Pakoy in Certification/Verification attached to the Petition, rollo, p. 24 and as it appears
corrected in the Information, records, p. 1.
[2]
Id. at 96-99.
[3]
Id. at 162-163.
[4]
Id. at 1.
[5]
Id. at 82.
[6]
Id. at 83.
[7]
Id. at 1.

[8]
Records, p. 85.
[9]
Id. at 88-92.
[10]
Id. at 96-99.
[11]
We note that the Motion to Quash was filed on October 28, 2002 but the Order was dated October 25,
2002.
[12]
Records, pp. 162-163.
[13]
Id. p. 163.
[14]
Should have been aggravating.
[15]
Rollo, p.13.
[16]
Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 474 SCRA 153, 161 (2005).
[17]
Id. at 162.
[18]
Memorandum (For the Petitioner), rollo, p. 136.
























EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148468. January 28, 2003]
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003]
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003]
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition
for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas
corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one
of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P.
Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation
established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students,
and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the
Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President
Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its
operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with
the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints
were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754;Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T.
Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The
other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4,
2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several
co-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a
special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended
Information reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17],
more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES
AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit
public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50];
AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution
finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation.
[2]
Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable
Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against accused Edward Serapio.
[3]

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
[4]

In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001
in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.
[5]
When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National
Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp
Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in
Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for
hearing on May 4, 2001.
[6]
For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada
filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the
June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition
for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, the
Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning
the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioners) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on
petitioners petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the
prosecutions pending motions as well as petitioners motion that his petition for bail be
heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners April
6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner
had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to
hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.
[7]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance
of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The
Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of
the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering
that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.
[8]

However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due
to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001.
[9]

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing
on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as
against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does
not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have
been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of
bribery and illegal gambling.
[10]
By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The
prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the
petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to
resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even
before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare
void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim
that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have
waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised
on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners guilt of plunder,
that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.
[11]

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan
a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on
said date a copy of said resolution.
[12]
The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy
Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner
manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration
of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to petitioner to file a
motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered
petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the
fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him do not
constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said amended
Information, for more than one offense. Jose Jinggoy Estrada likewise filed petition for
certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution
dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June
25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to
have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.
[13]

Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with
plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
[14]

Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information of a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constituting plunder as
described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege a pattern of criminal acts. He avers that his single act of toleration
or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not
constitute the requisite combination or series of acts for plunder. He further claims
that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of said
resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada on
several occasions does not cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner
insists that on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or
illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17
amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is
not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
[15]

The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must
allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to
the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of
alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his
defense.
[16]
Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction
in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
[17]
The use of derivatives or synonyms
or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
[18]

In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused,
including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to
commit plunder through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or
similar schemes or means. And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information,
petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount
of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et
al.,
[19]
we held that the word series is synonymous with the clause on several
instances; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word combination contemplates the
commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We
ruled that plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused
therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate
act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and that:
x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances,
money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former
President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x
x x.
[20]

It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section
3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that
matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information.
[21]

The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
[22]
that the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in
paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused
in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired and confederated with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged
of having conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or
more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of
others. In contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.
[23]
Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they
wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in
the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.
[24]

Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of bribery and
illegal gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not
charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with
one crime that of plunder:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more
than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code),
malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not
charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does
not make any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No.
7080, as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the
overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from
malversation of public funds, the law also uses the generic terms misappropriation,
conversion or misuse of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be
penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as
predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be
taken or to be understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished
under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[25]

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended
Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of
plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the
predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIOS URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY
2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND
MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE
TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER
SERAPIO.
[26]

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of
probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the
charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded
exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with
plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support an indictment
for plunder as against him.
[27]

Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even
mention him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in
1998
[28]
and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph
Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation.
[29]
More importantly, he
claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew that theP200 million he
received for the Foundation came from jueteng.
[30]

Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million
he received does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080;
[31]
(2) there is no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money;
[32]
(3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million
constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.
[33]

Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the
absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against
him,
[34]
and hence he should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of
a public trial.
[35]

Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond
judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the
existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may
do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance.
[36]
Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds
for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the
Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder
and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.
[37]
He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various
charges against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was
only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of
the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in
relation to the other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein were
also used against him, although he was only charged in the plunder case.
[38]

The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion. They assert that since the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the
same. They further argue that a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and
prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused, and that
petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his
guilt or innocence may finally be determined.
[39]

The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the
only grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed.
[40]

The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with
plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.
[41]

This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion
in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan
[42]
, the
Court ruled:
x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans
discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in
the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for filing of information against
the supposed offender.
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,
[43]
the Court ruled thus:
Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in
nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa
through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact
here. His arguments are anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsmans
appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where
neither question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is
concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for
plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioners
motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information. In its
Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the
Ombudsman that probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the
crime of plunder, thus:
In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER
and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several
other pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of
accused former President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose Jinggoy
Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21,
2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds
that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants
of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
John Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a
Delia Rajas.
[44]

Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served
upon all the accused.
[45]
It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that
there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were
deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution dated
April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of
preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence,
or that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which
are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution may
be granted.
[46]

It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.
[47]
The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the
same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information.
[48]
If the lack of a preliminary
investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over
the case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
[49]
As the
Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
[50]

Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other
officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officers finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.
[51]
The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in
the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution denying
petitioners motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners
claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case.
[52]

The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals
[53]
that an accused shall not be deemed
to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said
investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered
evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner had
participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had
already denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereon prior to his arraignment.
[54]
In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the
issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for
bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the
other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People
waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner
and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5)
Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558
and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the
hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a
plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the
conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be
heard immediately.
[55]
Petitioner maintains that his arraignment before the bail hearings
are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is
evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate
investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.
[56]
Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present all
its evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a
voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution,
[57]
and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the
evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present during bail
hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial.
[58]
Petitioner likewise assures the
prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he
be granted bail.
[59]

The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The
People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for
bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file
said petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed
of the precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to
prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he
was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that, under
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such
proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
[60]
Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accuseds
flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had
only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned.
[61]
The People also contend
that the conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the
undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecutions evidence before he pleads
guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.
[62]

Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not
guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the
issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in
petitioners case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar.
[63]

The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a
prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
[64]
An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for
bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,
[65]
this Court ruled on the issue of whether an
accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an
accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial courts imposition of the condition that he
should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein that in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
[66]

However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the
hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule
is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him.
[67]
The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as
well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained
therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
[68]

It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also
implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if
the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence
against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash
during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash
and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each
other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of the
accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that
such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention cannot be forced to
speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a
petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed.
[69]
He also insists that the grant of
a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an accused from
detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
[70]

The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth
under the Rules of Court.
[71]
Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial.
[72]
As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
[73]

On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information.
[74]
An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general
rule, before arraignment.
[75]

These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each
other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged
with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or
when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing,
evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded,
however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that
the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the
petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada in Criminal Case No.
26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be
heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to
have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might
be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution.
[76]

For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from
having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence
where it would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-
conspirators in the crime of plunder.
[77]

In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
to participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was
made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio
were to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused
Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and
when they will already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to
file any, that they will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody
will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to go through the process of
introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four
times, as many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is
not conducive to the speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be
characterized as an orderly proceeding.
[78]

There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for
bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of
whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two
different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must
take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but
also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and
the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the
other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States
Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our
historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
become rampant over the earth.
[79]

It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,
[80]
this Court held that in a
petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter
into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid
duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the
prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings
of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President
Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the
former president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a
completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is
antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose Jinggoy Estrada can
only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to
amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged with having
conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling,
x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.
[81]
Thus, with respect
to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against
him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or
collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioners petition for bail and
the trial of the former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine
intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition
for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the
prosecution shall have concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on
cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioners
bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to
petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to
obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail
was succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable
certainty insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not
be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a
greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any crime.
[82]

While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best
conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
[83]
the Court finds
that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and
the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the
Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the pre-eminent position
and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his provisional liberty
resolved without unnecessary delay,
[84]
only to make a volte face and declare that
after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose Jinggoy Estrada and the
trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously. In
ordering that petitioners petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case
against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in
effect allowed further and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of
petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail
hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-
accused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of
numerous manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.
[85]
They assert that
they filed the motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the
original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21-25, 2001.
[86]

They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses.
[87]
In support
thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
[88]

The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provide:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
[89]

Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his
case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon
the court.
[90]
Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8
which states:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for
bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
[91]

Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt
against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a
hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong.
[92]
The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all
the evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose.
[93]
When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the courts duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.
[94]

In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to
prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has
refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not
waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already
scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail but the same were reset
due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents
had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was
eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not
push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore
not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also
partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and
by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation;
(2) conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of
house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other
proceedings pending determination of probable cause;
Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant
of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance,
dated April 25, 2001;
Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando,
Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for
Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the
earliest possible time;
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May
27, 2001;
Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated
June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.
[95]

Motions filed by the prosecution:
Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;
[96]

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;
[97]

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion
to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;
[98]
and
Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in
Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.
[99]

The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid
delay by their filing of the following motions:
Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that
the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that he be (1) excluded from the Amended Information for
lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3)
be allowed to post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house
arrest during the pendency of the case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by
reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of
the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) within which to respond to the
Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related
distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001,
filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May
11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed
on house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;
Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for
detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present
at petitioner Serapios hearing for bail be reconsidered;
Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
waiving their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings
and reserving their right to trial with assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for
free dates for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of
production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of
alias case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for
permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.
[100]

Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an
accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a
hearing on said application.
[101]
The rationale for such requirement was explained
in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:
[102]

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal.
[103]

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong
before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for
petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State,
through the prosecutions refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayans
refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as
against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner
contends that the prosecution launched a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive
and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the
prosecution moved for petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail
hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing;
manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence
in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution
presented its entire case upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to
quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose
to pursue only one of these two remedies.
[104]
He further claims that the Sandiganbayan,
through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law.
[105]

Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders
canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic
the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a
continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail.
[106]
He argues further that the fact that
he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the
efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner
cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,
[107]
where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to
instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.
[108]

However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was
arrested pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court,
[109]
the
warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities.
[110]

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which jurisdiction to do so.
[111]
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
[112]
Thus,
in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid,
[113]
and even though the persons praying for its
issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.
[114]

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court which had jurisdiction to issue the same
[115]
applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001
after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against
petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to
the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile
[116]
that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation
of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing on
petitioners application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the
hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or
on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover,
a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to
bail.
[117]
It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right
but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,
[118]
or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse
is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to
allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also
preempt the Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application for bail of
petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his
application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex L of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
petitioners petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10,
2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Carpio, J., no part, prior inhibition in plunder cases.



[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, pp. 49-51.
[2]
Rollo, G.R. No. 149116, p.16.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 18, 249-281.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[5]
Rollo, G.R. No. 146468, p. 54.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 61-66.
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. 149116, p. 412.
[8]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 112.
[9]
Ibid., p. 114.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 147-164.
[11]
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
[12]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148769, pp. 165-197.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[14]
Rollo, p. 46.
[15]
Supra.
[16]
Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al., G.R. No. 148965, February 26,
2002.
[17]
Luz Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance, et al., 115 SCRA 729 (1982).
[18]
People vs. Ronnie Quitlong, et al., 292 SCRA 360 (1998).
[19]
G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002.
[20]
Supra, p. 14.
[21]
Luz Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, supra.
[22]
See note 19.
[23]
People vs. Rodolfo Hilario, et al., 354 SCRA 534 (2001).
[24]
Territory vs. Goto, 27 Hawaii 65 (1923).
[25]
Rollo, pp. 194-195.
[26]
Rollo, p. 21.
[27]
Rollo, G.R. No. 149116, p. 21.
[28]
Ibid., p. 25.
[29]
Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[30]
Ibid., p. 30.
[31]
Ibid., pp. 30-33.
[32]
Ibid., pp. 33-36.
[33]
Ibid., p. 36.
[34]
Ibid., p. 39.
[35]
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
[36]
Ibid., pp. 295-298.
[37]
Ibid., p. 298.
[38]
Ibid., p. 301.
[39]
Ibid., p. 472.
[40]
Ibid., pp. 473-480.
[41]
Ibid., pp. 480-492.
[42]
335 SCRA 581 (2000).
[43]
233 SCRA 439 (1994).
[44]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 59.
[45]
Ibid., pp. 408-409.
[46]
Rollo, G.R. No. 149116, pp. 412-413.
[47]
Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992).
[48]
People vs. Madraga, 344 SCRA 628 (2000); Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993).
[49]
Rule 112, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995).
[50]
Supra, pp. 675-676.
[51]
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. vs. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254 (2000); Raro vs. Sandiganbayan, 335 SCRA
581 (2000).
[52]
Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
[53]
206 SCRA 138 (1992).
[54]
Vide Note 4.
[55]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 366.
[56]
Ibid., pp. 366-367.
[57]
Ibid., p. 367.
[58]
Ibid., p. 368.
[59]
Ibid., p. 369.
[60]
Ibid., pp. 212-215.
[61]
Ibid., p. 215.
[62]
Ibid., p. 216.
[63]
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).
[64]
Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369 (1973).
[65]
324 SCRA 321 (2000).
[66]
Id., p. 330.
[67]
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 364 (1945).
[68]
Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[69]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, pp. 37-38.
[70]
Ibid., p. 374.
[71]
Rule 114, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[72]
Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975).
[73]
Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369 ( 1973).
[74]
Smith v. State, 78 S 530.
[75]
Rule 117, Section 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[76]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 373.
[77]
Ibid., pp. 220-225.
[78]
Ibid., pp. 112-113.
[79]
Kotteakos vs. United States, 90 L.Ed. 1564 (1945).
[80]
77 Phil. 55 (1946).
[81]
Vide Note 16.
[82]
Ibid., pp. 643-644.
[83]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 112.
[84]
Ibid., p. 68.
[85]
Ibid., pp. 233-242.
[86]
Ibid., p.188.
[87]
Ibid., p. 210.
[88]
Ibid., p. 211, [emphasis by respondents].
[89]
Ibid., p. 211, [emphasis by respondents].
[90]
People vs. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334 (2000); Goodman vs. De La Victoria, 325 SCRA 658 (2000).
[91]
Supra.
[92]
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505 (2000); Tolentino vs. Camano, 322 SCRA 559 (2000).
[93]
People vs. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 (1992); Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946).
[94]
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 155 (1996).
[95]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, pp. 240-241.
[96]
Ibid., pp. 70-74.
[97]
Ibid., pp. 75-82.
[98]
Ibid., pp. 97-100.
[99]
Ibid., pp. 115-116.
[100]
Ibid., pp. 233-239.
[101]
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, supra; Tolentino vs. Camano, supra; Baylon vs. Sison, 243 SCRA 284
(1995).
[102]
269 SCRA 220 (1997).
[103]
Id., p. 513, (emphasis supplied).
[104]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, pp. 31-36.
[105]
Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[106]
Ibid., pp. 392-393.
[107]
141 SCRA 233 (1986).
[108]
Rollo, G.R. No. 148468, p. 396.
[109]
Ibid., pp. 246-247.
[110]
Ibid., pp. 245-251.
[111]
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464 (1991); Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 (1969).
[112]
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971); citing Harris v. Nelson, 22 L Ed 2d 281.
[113]
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, supra.
[114]
Moncupa vs. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986); Caunca vs. Salazar, 85 Phil. 81
(1949); Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778.
[115]
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Luna vs. Plaza, supra.
[116]
Supra.
[117]
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685 (1994); Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990).
[118]
Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946).







Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION


DANTE BUEBOS and G.R. No. 163938
SARMELITO BUEBOS,
Petitioners, Present:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
*
J.,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,
**

CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 28, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


REYES, R.T., J .:


THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only
among members of the bar, but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment
often centers on what law to apply and what penalty to impose.

In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are
liable for simple arson or arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up
to reclusion perpetua.


Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that
[2]
of the
Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos and
Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.

The Facts

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe
was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick
child.
[3]
She was lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She got
up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela,
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of
her hut.
[4]
When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on
fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four
fled.
[5]


At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for
help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Years
Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping
over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.
[6]
He also saw Rolando
Buela running away.
[7]


On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together
with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an
Information bearing the following accusations:


That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 oclock in
the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province
of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the
latters damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
[8]


The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally
supplied by private complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.

Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of
petitioners and their co-accused. The trial court summed up the defense evidence
in the following tenor:

The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time
of the incident; Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents house on
occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also
claimed to have been at Romeo Callejas having gone there in the evening
of December 30, 1993and left the place at 12:00 oclock noontime of January 1,
1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay,
Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that
he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence
at Agas after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the
accusation five (5) days after the incident happened when he visited his parents at
Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to corroborate their
testimonies.
[9]


RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of arson. The dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:


WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused
ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and
ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.
[10]


Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate
court. In their appeal, they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them
guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy; and
(3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their defense of
denial and alibi.

On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate
Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
[11]


In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be
convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an
inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information
failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused
should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.
[12]



Issues

Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present
recourse. The following arguments are now raised for the Courts consideration:

I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;

II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
[13]


Our Ruling

Overview of the law on arson

The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of
annotation on this part of our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the
least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar, a brief
legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.

Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of
the Revised Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms
of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding articles),
Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes involving
destruction), Article 325 (burning ones own property to commit arson), Article
326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article 326-a (in
cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima
facie evidence of arson).



On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful
enforcement and prosecution of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code
provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance read:

SECTION 1. Arson. Any person who burns or sets fire to the property
of another shall be punished by prision mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own
property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of
another.

SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned
is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where
explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any
edifice devoted to culture, education or social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where
people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or
conveyance for transportation of persons or property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative,
judicial, administrative or other official proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing
tenement, shopping center, public or private market, theater or
movie house or any similar place or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a
populated or congested area.

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of
the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its
agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft,
platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field,
orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. The
penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:

1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the
owner or occupant of the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a
syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons.

SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on
the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed.

SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. Any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the
building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are
stored within the building not necessary in the business of the
offender nor for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or
combustible substances or materials soaked therewith or
containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or
electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or
traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or
premises of the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more
than its actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance
policy more than two fires have occurred in the same or other
premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or
insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects
insured and stored in a building or property had been
withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of
business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was
made before the fire in exchange for the desistance of the
offender or for the safety of other person or property of the
victim.

SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. Conspiracy to commit
arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.

SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which is
the object of arson including the land on which it is situated shall
be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that
he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.

On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No.
1744. The new law expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of
reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also
paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on destructive
arsonists.

When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again
underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is
worded, thus:

Art. 320. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings,
committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or congregate
for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or
merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited
to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had
knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at
the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the
building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law,
or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding
creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be
imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons
or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or
destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general
museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24,
2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a capital offense.
[14]


We proceed to the crux of the petition.

Circumstantial evidence points to
petitioners culpability

Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on
circumstantial evidence. They argue that the inference that they were responsible
for the burning of private complainants hut was not duly proven by the People.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would
result in setting a felon free.
[15]


At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of
guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind
intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction.
[16]
Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[17]


The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
for a conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven
in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
[18]


After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find
that the circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify
petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina
Borbe:

1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her
house at around 3:00 a.m.;

2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw
petitioners, together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;

3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;

4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant
desperately shouted for help.

The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved
through positive testimony.
[19]
Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken
chain of events leading to one fair conclusion the culpability of petitioners for the
burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the circumstances, taken together,
leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson.

Conspiracy evident from coordinated
action of petitioners

Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both
the trial and appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was
premised on speculation and conjecture.

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence,
as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met
together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case,
the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be
deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.
[20]



In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated
movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood
outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group
making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the
roof of Adelinas house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose
and design, and community of interest.

We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:

Accused-appellants assertion that conspiracy has not been established is
belied by the accounts of the prosecution witness. The manner by which the
accused-appellants behaved after the private complainant shouted for help clearly
indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the part of the
accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the
accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire, the
doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of
prior agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior agreement be
demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely
documented by agreements in writing.
[21]


Crime committed and the penalty

The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On
appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:

The information charges accused-appellants with violation of P.D. 1613
without specifying the particular provision breached. The information having
failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having been
established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area, accused-
appellants should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under
Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple
arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.


There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case
at bar accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period as provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be anywhere within
the range ofprision correccional.
[22]


The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section
3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of
the following:

x x x x

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;


The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
[23]
Admittedly,
there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the information
failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or
dwelling. That is fatal.

Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.



Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation
of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic
aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of
the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the
information.
[24]


Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally
burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information
merely recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and maliciously set on fire the niparoof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latters damage and prejudice.
[25]


Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the
petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied
retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.
[26]


In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,
paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.

This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of
occasions, modified the RTC and CA judgments for having applied the wrong law
and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano,
[27]
the accused was found guilty of
destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court held that
he should be held liable only for simple arson. The explanation:


However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3,
par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned
by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating
inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as
houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore
be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case
of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall
be construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there
is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house
or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by
the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive
Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the
offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-
appellant was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that
he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite
or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be
worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing
circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-
appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
[28]







An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more
recent case of People v. Malngan.
[29]
Said the Court in Malngan:

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty
of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson:
1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, 48 to wit:

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive
Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the
law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this
dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and
despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of
this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime
takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the
malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its
commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater
impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
[Emphasis supplied]

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other
industrial establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is
to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political
stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to
offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to
lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis
supplied]

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by
the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that
the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson
may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the
crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson for having
deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated
in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued
and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses,
were razed by fire. [Emphasis supplied]

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case
of People v. Soriano. The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a
particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5)
neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive
arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however,
declared that:

x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3,
par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the
properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically
described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings
under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should
therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of
the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal
laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned
is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged
with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of
Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may
be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the
case notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts
constituting the crime alleged therein. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5
of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple
arson is:

SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of
or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
supplied]

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
[30]


Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which
has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any
of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment
is AFFIRMED in full.

SO ORDERED.



RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:




MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson




DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice




ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice




A T T E S T A T I O N


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson






C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.




REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice





*
Vice Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, who is on official leave per Special Order No.
497 dated March 14, 2008.
**
Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
[1]
Rollo, 65-72. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (now deceased), with Associate Justices B. A.
Adefuin-de la Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 26-28. Criminal Case No. T-2563. Penned by Judge Mamerto M. Buban, Jr, RTC, Branch
18, Tabaco, Albay.
[3]
TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 5.
[4]
Id. at 6.
[5]
Id. at 12.
[6]
TSN, December 8, 1994, p. 14.
[7]
Id. at 16.
[8]
Id. at 25.
[9]
Id. at 27.
[10]
Id. at 28.
[11]
Id. at 72.
[12]
Id. at 71.
[13]
Id. at 16.
[14]
Those found guilty of destructive arson would now be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
[15]
People v. Matito, G.R. No. 144405, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 617.
[16]
People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.
[17]
Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, Sec. 5 reads:
Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[18]
People v. Casitas, supra.
[19]
TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 4-29; TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 3-38.
[20]
People v. Quinao, G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 495; People v. Saul, G.R. No.
124809, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 636; People v. Mozar, 215 Phil. 501 (1984).
[21]
Rollo, p. 71.
[22]
Id. at 71-72.
[23]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 367.
[24]
People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 125784, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 193.
[25]
Rollo, p. 25.
[26]
People v. Vallejo, supra.
[27]
Supra note 23.

[28]
Id. at 374-376.
[29]
G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 294.

[30]
People v. Malngan, id. at 327-331.

















THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,



-versus



SPO1 ARNULFO A. AURE
and SPO1 MARLON H.
FEROL,
Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 180451

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
MORALES,
*

CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 17, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01127, dated 29 July 2005, affirming in toto the Decision,
[2]
dated 5 December
2000, of theCaloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 127, in Criminal
Cases No. C-58617 and No. C-58693, finding accused-appellants Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Arnulfo A.Aure and SPO1 Marlon H. Ferol guilty of rape, and
imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The records of the case bear the following facts:

On 20 January 2000, two separate informations
[3]
for rape were filed with
the RTC charging appellants of rape, thus:

In Criminal Case No. C-58617:

That on or about the 7
th
day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have sexual intercourse with one AAA,
[4]
45 years old, married, against the latters will
and without her consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-58693:

That on or about the 7
th
day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means
of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have sexual intercourse with one AAA, 45 years old, against the latters will and without
her consent.


Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. When arraigned
on 30 May 2000, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels de parte,
pleaded Not guilty to the charges.
[5]
Trial on the merits thereafter followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, Philippine Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) Police Chief Inspector
Ricardo Dandan (Inspector Dandan), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent
Ronald Abulencia (Agent Abulencia), NBI Agent Antonio Erum, Jr. (Agent Erum),
Dr. Nora Leonor Espino (Dr. Espino), Dr. Annabelle Soliman (Dr. Soliman) and
Federico Abesia (Abesia). Their testimonies, woven together, present the
following narrative:

On 7 November 1999, at around 3:00 p.m., AAA slept inside her house
located at XXX. Later, CCC (AAAs son), awakened AAA and told her that several
policemen entered the house. AAA stood up and saw
appellant Aure accompanying her housemaid, Maricel Formentera (Formentera),
in walking out of the house. AAA rushed to appellantAure and Formentera and
tried to pull back Formentera inside the house but she failed to do so. AAA went
out of the house and saw appellant Ferol and a certain SPO4
HonestGaton (SPO4 Gaton) holding her two minor
housemates, Nerissa Ubay (Ubay) and Judelyn Borenaga (Borenaga). She also saw
several barangay tanods and kibitzers standing nearby. At this juncture, AAA
asked appellant Aure why they were taking the three young girls and why they
entered her house without warrant. Appellant Aure replied that they are Central
Intelligence Service (CIS) agents and were tasked to rescue the three young girls
whom she was keeping and allegedly abusing and exploiting. Appellant Aure told
AAA to explain her side at the Central Intelligence Division Group (CIDG)
office. Thereafter, appellants, SPO4 Gaton and several barangay tanods took AAA
and the three young girls to the XXX barangay hall where the incident
was blottered and, afterwards, to the CIDG office for booking and investigation.
[6]


At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while still inside the CIDG office for
interrogation, AAA sat on a sofa near the main door of the office. Appellant Aure,
who was inside the computer room of the office, called AAA and instructed her to
approach him. When AAA entered the computer room, appellant Aure told her to
sit beside him. AAA complied. Appellant Aure asked her where she hid the two
other minor companions of Ubay and Borenaga but AAA disclaimed any
knowledge thereof. Irked, appellant Aureaccused her of deriving her livelihood
from trading the flesh of the children. Thereupon, appellant Aure placed his hand
on her shoulder and gradually massaged her back. She resisted these moves but
appellant Aure told her: HUWAG KA NANG PUMALAG, MAGPAKABAIT KA NA
LANG. She shouted for help but nobody responded. She tried to free herself but
he punched her thigh and held her shoulder tightly. He pointed a gun at her side
and directed her to stand. She fought back by pulling down his head but he
punched her other thigh. He made her stand by poking a gun at her side. At this
point, he started kissing her from face down to her breast. She shouted and
fought back again but he threatened her PAPATAYIN KITA, HUWAG KA NG
PUMALAG. He forcibly pulled down her pants which caused her to fall on the
floor. Afterwards, he took off his own pants and placed himself on top of
her. She struggled by putting her knees together but he forcibly separated her
legs. He kissed her face, neck and breast and pinned her both arms. Thereafter,
he inserted his penis into her vagina and made pumping motions for less than five
minutes until she felt a warm liquid inside her vagina.
[7]


Appellant Aure, who was panting for breath, stayed on top of her for a few
minutes. Later, he stood up and wore his pants. He picked AAAs pants and
threw it at her. He told her to dress up and act as if nothing happened. He
peeped through the window of the computer room and warned her not to tell
anyone of what happened or he would kill her. He then went out of the
computer room. After several minutes, he instructed her to get out of the
computer room which she did. She sat on the sofa and saw appellant Aurejoin
several persons drinking liquor and playing cards inside the office. She saw
appellant Aure talking and drinking liquor with appellant Ferol and some police
officers. Subsequently, appellant Aure left the office while appellant Ferol stayed
and continued drinking liquor with some police officers.
[8]


While AAA was sleeping on the sofa inside the office at about 2:00
a.m. of 8 November 1999, appellant Ferol tapped her shoulder and signaled her
to proceed to his table. He gave her coffee and told her to
produce P300,000.00 in exchange for the dropping of the cases they would file
against her. She answered that she did not have that amount of money and would
rather be jailed. Disgusted, he remarked TIGNAN NATIN KUNG HINDI KA
IIYAK BUKAS SA DAMI NG MGA KASONG IPA-FILE NAMIN LABAN SA IYO. He
poked a gun at her temple and back and instructed her to go to the computer
room. While inside the computer room, he ordered her to remove her pants but
she was unable to move due to fear and numbness. He removed her pants and
pushed her to the ground. He placed himself on top of her and kissed her face,
neck and breast. He forcibly separated her legs, pulled up her arms and uttered
to her HUWAG KA NA LANG PUMALAG PATAPUSIN MO NA LANG AKO KUNG
AYAW MONG MASAKTAN. Thereupon, he inserted his penis into her vagina and
made pumping movements. When he stood up, she saw sperm cell on his organ.
He ordered her to dress up and fix herself. He warned her WALANG DAPAT
MAKAALAM NITO, TANDAAN MO PAPATAYIN KITA. Later, both of them went out
of the computer room.
[9]


At about 8:30 a.m. of the same day, appellants and other CIDG operatives
took AAA and the three young girls to
Prosecutor Dionisio Sison (Prosecutor Sison) of theCaloocan City Prosecutors
Office for inquest proceedings on the charges of Violation of Republic Act
No. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law, Physical Injuries, and
Illegal Recruitment.
[10]


After the inquest, appellants and SPO4 Gaton brought AAA to
the Ospital ng Kalookan for medical examination. AAA refused to be examined
therein and was constantly crying and refusing to answer the questions of her
attending physician, Dr. Espino. Hence, Dr. Espino did not push through with the
examination and merely indicated in AAAs medico-legal certificate the following
observation: No visible sign of external physical injury. Thereafter, appellants
and SPO4 Gaton brought AAA to the Caloocan City Jail where she was detained.
[11]


At 6:00 p.m. of the same day, AAA was released from jail pursuant to a
Release Order issued by Prosecutor Sison. BBB, husband of AAA, then
immediately brought AAA to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a second medical
examination with Dr. Espino. During the examination, Dr. Espino found linear
abrasions on the forearms of AAA. Dr. Espinoincluded this finding in AAAs
medico-legal certificate.
[12]


On 9 November 1999, at around 10:00 a.m., AAA, per advice of Dr. Espino,
went back to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a third medical examination.
Dr. Espino discovered the following injuries on AAAs body: Old contusions both
scapular area; (RT) & (L) arm, middle 3
rd
both thighs. Dr. Espino added these
observations in AAAs medico-legal certificate. The over-all findings of Dr. Espino,
as stated in AAAs medico-legal certificate, are as follows:


November 8, 1999 11:40 a.m.

- No Visible Sign of External Physical Injury
- Disposition: Back to SPO2 Marlon Ferol

Came back around 7:10 p.m. of November 8, 1999 with the following injuries:
- Linear abrasions forearm posterior aspect bilateral; arm anterior aspect bilateral.

Follow-up OPD November 9, 1999 10:00 a.m. shows:
- Additional findings: Old contusions both scapular area; (RT) & (L) arm, middle
3
rd
both thighs.

- Disposition: Referred to NBI for OB-GYNE Examination.
[13]



During the examination, AAA broke down and confided to Dr. Espino that
she was raped. Dr. Espino handed her a Laboratory Request for OB-GYNE
examination.
[14]


On 11 November 1999, AAA, per advice of her lawyer, reported the rape
incident to the NBI. The case was assigned to Agent Abulencia and Agent Erum,
Jr. before whom AAA narrated the rape incident. The incident was reduced into
AAAs sworn statement. NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Soliman also conducted a
genital examination on AAA.
[15]
The findings of Dr. Soliman as stated in AAAs
medical certificate are as follows:

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident signs of extragenital physical injury was noted on the body of the subject
at the time of the examination.

2. Hymen posteriorly attenuated.

3. Vaginal orifice wide (3.0 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
new hymenal injury.
[16]


After investigation, the NBI, through Director Federico Opinion, Jr.,
submitted a letter-referral to the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office
recommending the conduct of inquest proceedings on appellants and the filing of
charges against appellants for robbery, extortion and rape. The letter-referral
was studied by Caloocan City Chief Inquest Prosecutor Oscar Yu (Prosecutor
Yu). Prosecutor Yu also conducted a preliminary examination on
AAA. Thereafter, Prosecutor Oscar Yu, Agent Abulencia, Agent Erum, a certain
Agent Sixto Comia, and four other NBI agents proceeded to the CIDG office for
the purpose of inquesting appellants. Upon arriving therein, however, Colonel
Edgar C.Danao (Colonel Danao), Chief of the CIDG office, refused to turn over
appellants to Prosecutor Yu and to the NBI agents for inquest
proceedings. Prosecutor Yu and the NBI agents then left the CIDG office.
[17]


Subsequently, a preliminary investigation on the case was conducted but
appellants did not appear during the hearings despite notice. Thereupon,
appellants were charged with rape before the RTC and corresponding warrants
for their arrest were issued.
[18]
Appellants then were arrested and detained at the
PAOCTF office by Inspector Dandan and his men.
[19]


The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statement of AAA (Exhibit A)
[20]
; (2)
medico-legal certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Soliman (Exhibit B)
[21]
; (3) referral-
letter of the NBI to the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office (Exhibit C)
[22]
; (4) joint-
affidavit of AgentAbulencia, Agent Erum and other NBI agents (Exhibit E)
[23]
; (5)
medico-legal certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Espino (Exhibit G)
[24]
; (6) release
order for AAA (Exhibit H)
[25]
; (7) laboratory request for genital examination of AAA
(Exhibit J)
[26]
; (8) resolution of the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office dismissing the
charges of violation of Republic Act No. 7610 and Illegal Recruitment against AAA
(Exhibit K)
[27]
; (9) resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the
charge of physical injuries against AAA (Exhibit L)
[28]
; and (10) memorandum from
the CIDG-NCR confirming the arrest and detention of appellants by PAOCTF
operatives pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by the RTC (Exhibit N).
[29]


For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, SPO2
Jaime Acido, Virgilio Torres, Ronald Orcullo, Mary Ann Aglibar,
Roberto Illut, Juvy Winnie de Guzman, Colonel Danao, Barangay Chairman
Antonio Galgana and Dr. Reymundo Dave and Ms. Florenda Negre to refute the
foregoing accusations. Appellants denied any liability and interposed the defense
of alibi. Appellants version of the incident, as corroborated by their witnesses,
are as follows:

On 7 November 1999, at around 7:30 a.m., appellants reported for work in
the CIDG office. At about 11:30 in the morning of the same day, a
certain Emelita Pajaron(Pajaron) and Analyn Guinarez (Guinarez) arrived at the
office and reported that their two cousins, Ubay and Borenaga, were being
detained and maltreated by AAA at the latters house in XXX. After securing the
approval of their boss, Colonel Danao, appellants, together
with Pajaron and Guinarez, went to the barangay hall of XXX to coordinate their
rescue operation of Ubay and Borenaga. Thereafter,
appellants, Pajaron, Guinarez and several barangay tanods proceeded to the
house of AAA at XXX. Upon arriving thereat, appellants
saw Ubay, Borenaga and Formentera at the gate of AAAs house. The three young
girls were waving at them and crying. AAA went out of the house and told the
three young girls to get inside the house but they refused. AAA berated and
cursed appellants. Appellants then invited AAA to the CIDG office for
investigation to which the latter
acceded. Appellants, Ubay, Borenaga, Pajaron, Guinarez and AAA went first to
the barangay hall to blotter the incident and thereafter proceeded to the CIDG
office.
[30]


Upon arriving at the CIDG office at about 5:00 p.m., appellants brought the
three young girls to the Ospital ng Kalookan for medical examination of the
injuries found on their bodies. Appellants and the three young girls went back to
the CIDG office at 7:00 p.m. where they were met and interviewed by members of
the media namely, Aglibar, Illut and de Guzman. Later, BBB, CCC, AAAs daughter-
in-law, and an unnamed policeman-friend of AAA, arrived at the office and talked
with AAA. At this juncture, appellants were busy preparing the pertinent
documents for the filing of charges against AAA. Appellants went back and forth
to the computer room checking the drafts and having them typed by their
encoder, Torres. The interview of the three young girls by members of the media
and appellants preparation of relevant documents lasted until 11:30
p.m. Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of 8 November 1999,
appellants, Aglibar, Illut, de Guzman and the three young girls proceeded
to Waray Waray Restaurant at Pier 12 to rescue two more minors allegedly kept
by AAA in the said place. Appellants surveillance and operation yielded negative
results. Thus, appellants and company went back to the CIDG office arriving
therein at about 3:00 a.m. After half an hour, appellant Aure left the office and
proceeded home.
[31]
Appellant Ferol stayed in the office because he was then on
24-hour duty. Appellant Ferol slept on his table inside the office until 8:30 in the
morning. Orcullo and a certain Ricky Masangkay, both of whom were errand boys
of the office, also slept inside the office near appellant Ferol.
[32]


At about 8:30 a.m., appellant Aure arrived at the office. Subsequently,
Colonel Danao also arrived. Appellants then brought AAA to the Caloocan City
Prosecutors Office for inquest proceedings. AAA was charged with violation of
Republic Act No. 7610, Physical Injuries and Illegal Recruitment and was detained
in Caloocan City Jail.
[33]


On 12 November 1999, Prosecutor Yu and several NBI agents swooped
down in the CIDG office to conduct an inquest proceeding on appellants for the
rape of AAA. Colonel Danao refused to turn over appellants because the
proceeding was improper as appellants were not previously arrested.
[34]


The defense also adduced documentary and object evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (a) referral-letter of Colonel Danao to
the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office requesting inquest of AAA for Violation of
Republic Act No. 7610 and for Physical Injuries (Exhibit 1)
[35]
; (b) preliminary
report of Dr. Soliman (Exhibit 2)
[36]
; (c) medico-legal certificate issued by Dr.
Soliman (Exhibit 3)
[37]
; (d) medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Espino (Exhibit
4)
[38]
; (e) Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay ofUbay, Borenaga and Formentera (Exhibit
5)
[39]
; (f) joint-affidavit of de Guzman, Aglibar and Illut (Exhibit 6)
[40]
; (g) a picture
showing the entrance to the computer room of the CIDG office (Exhibit 8)
[41]
; (h)
sketch of the CIDG office (Exhibit 10)
[42]
; (i) certificate of completion of the
Practical Investigative Techniques issued by the CIDG to appellantAure (Exhibit
11)
[43]
; (j) complaint sheet charging AAA of maltreatment of minors, illegal
recruitment and illegal detention (Exhibit 12)
[44]
; (k) certification issued by
ChairmanGalgana that appellants proceeded to the barangay hall before going to
the house of AAA (Exhibit 13)
[45]
; and (l) joint-affidavit of appellants (Exhibit
14).
[46]


After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 December 2000 convicting
appellant Aure of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617 and acquitting him of rape in
Criminal Case No. C-58693. On the other hand, appellant Ferol was convicted of
rape in Criminal Case No. C-58693 but was acquitted of rape in Criminal Case
No. C-58617. The RTC explained that in Criminal Case No. C-58617, the
prosecution has duly established that appellant Aure raped AAA on 7 November
1999, at around 7:00 p.m., inside the computer room of the CIDG
office. Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to prove that
appellant Ferol conspired with appellant Aure in raping AAA at such time and,
hence, appellant Ferol is acquitted of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617. With
regard to Criminal Case No. C-58693, the prosecution had proven that
appellant Ferol raped AAA on 8 November 1999, at 2:00 a.m. inside the computer
room of the CIDG office. However, appellant Aure is acquitted of rape in this
instance because there was no evidence that he conspired with appellant Ferol in
committing such rape.

In addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, each of the appellants was
also ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P60,000.00
as moral damages, and P70,000.00 as attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established to a
moral certainty the guilt of Accused ARNULFO A. AURE and Accused MARLON H. FEROL
in Crim. Case Nos. 58617 and 58693, respectively, of the crime of Rape as defined and
penalized under R.A. 8353, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances,
hereby sentences each of the said Accused to suffer the lesser penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua; to each indemnity the Private Complainant the civil indemnity
of P50,000; and to each pay her moral damages of P60,000.00 as well as attorneys fee
ofP70,000.00 each, and to pay the costs, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

Anent the respective criminal liability of Accused MARLON FEROL in Crim. Case
No. 58617 and Accused ARNULFO AURE in Crim. Case No. 58693, for failure of the
prosecution to overcome with the required quantum of proof their constitutional
presumption of innocence, they are ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by both Accused shall be credited in full in
the service of their respective sentences in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
[47]



Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
[48]
but this was denied.
[49]


On 10 February 2002, appellants elevated the instant case to us for
review.
[50]
However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,
[51]
we remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.

On 29 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC Decision. Appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration
[52]
which was denied.
[53]


Before us, appellants assigned the following errors:

I.

THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AURE IN CRIMINAL CASE
NUMBER 58617 WITH RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 COMMITTED
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1999 AND AT THE SAME TIME ACQUITTING HIM IN CRIMINAL CASE
NUMBER 58693 OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A.
8353 ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED ON SAME AND ONE OCCASION/INCIDENT OF RAPE
NOVEMBER 7, 1999.

II.

THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL IN CRIMINAL CASE 58693
WHICH ACCUSES ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL WITH THE CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 1999 AND AT THE SAME
TIME ACQUITTING HIM IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 58617 ALSO OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 1999,
WORST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 8, 1999 WITH WHICH HE WAS NOT BEING CHARGED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 58693.

III.

THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED
AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AND
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE COMMISSION AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED CRIMES OF RAPE DEFINED AND ALLEGED IN THE
TWO (2) INFORMATIONS UNDER CRIMINAL CASE NUMBERS 58167 AND 58693.



IV.

THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS EACH OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLEGATION AND CHARGE OF
CONSPIRACY AND WHEN RESPONDENT JUDGE HERSELF FOUND ABSENCE OF
CONSPIRACY.

V.

THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND
WITNESSES ARE BUT ALIBI AND DEFINITELY FALLS WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF NEGATIVE
AND SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE.

VI.

THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ACCUSED APPPELLANTS FOR THE
CONDUCT OF THE REQUISITE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

VII.

THE RTC IN RENDERING AND PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT ASSAILED DECISION
MANIFESTED CLEAR SIGNS OF BIAS, PARTIALITY AND PREJUDICE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

VIII.

THE RTC ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO PAY FOR DAMAGES AND COST
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.


In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles, to wit: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
[54]


As a result of these guiding principles, credibility of the complainant
becomes the single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is
credible, convincing and consistent with human nature, and the normal course of
things, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
[55]


We have carefully examined AAAs court testimony and found it to be
credible and trustworthy. Her positive identification of appellant Aure as the one
who ravished her on 7 November 1999 and of appellant Ferol as the one who
defiled her 8 November 1999, as well as her direct account of the bestial acts, are
clear and consistent, viz:

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

x x x x

A [At] 7:00 p.m. [7 November 1999] SPO1 Aure called me to the computer room.

Q After you were brought to the computer room by SPO1 Aure, what happen?

A I was made to sit and he sat beside me.

x x x x

Q After that what transpired next?

A He place his hand on my shoulder.

Q What was your reaction when Aure place his arm to your shoulder?

A Hinahawi ko po iyong kamay niya na nakapatong sa balikat ko. Pero po iyong ka
may niya inihahagod po niya sa may likuran ko.

Q After that what transpired?

A Sabi niya, Huwag ka ng pumalag, magpakabait ka na lang.

Q What was your reaction to the statement of Aure?

A I was shouting for help because of what he was doing.

Q Did anybody respond to your shout for help?

A Wala pong sumaklolo sa akin.

Q After that what transpired?

A Pinipilit ko po na alisin and kamay ni SPO1 Aure sa likod ko, nagpipiglas po ako, bi
gla po niyang sinuntok ang hita ko.

Q After Aure hit your thigh, what happen next?

A Inakbayan po niya ako ng mahigpit sa balikat, itinutok po niya iyong baril sa tagili
ran ko.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q. What was your reaction when Aure poked the gun to your side?

A I was very afraid and do not know what to do.

Q After that what happen?

A He was forcing me to stand by pulling up my shoulder.

Q After that what happen?

A I was trying to release myself from his hold and try to get hold of his head.

Q When you were not able to reach the head of Aure what transpired?

A He got mad and punch me on the other thigh.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q After Aure hit your thigh again what transpired?

A Pilit po niya akong itinatayo. He was forcing me to stand up and went behind my
back and his hand were near my breast.

COURT:

Q To make you stand with his both hands?

A Bale nakatutok po sa may tagiliran ko iyong baril. Iyong kamay po niya iyong isa
nakayakap po dito sa pagitan po ng suso ko.

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q What hand of Aure is holding the gun?

A Right hand holding the gun.

Q After that what happen?

A He was able to make me stand.

Q When you were already on standing position what transpired?

A Pinaghahalikan na po niya ako sa iba-
ibang parte ng katawan, nagsisisigaw po ako, nanlalaban po ako sa kanya.

x x x x

Q For how long did Aure kissed you in different parts of the body?

A Noong nakatayo na po kami, nanlalaban po ako sa kanya. Sinabi niya sa akin, pa
patayin kita, huwag ka ng pumalag.

Q What was your reaction when Aure threatened you of death?

A I was very afraid. I almost die.

Q After that what transpired next?

A He told me to take off my pants.

Q Did you do as Aure directed you to take off your pants?

A Sa takot ko po hindi ko po namalayan na sumunod po ako sa kanya. Inalis ko po a
ng butones at saka po binaba ko po.
[56]



ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

x x x x

Q After that what happened?

A SPO1 Aure pulled my pants down, sir.

Q After SPO1 Aure pulled your pants down, what happened next?

A Napaupo po ako at bumagsak sa cemento.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q What was SPO1 Aure doing at that time when you were already on the floor?

A Taking off his pants, sir.

Q After he took off his pants, what happened?

A I cringed in fear and trembling, sir.

Q After that what happened next?

A SPO1 Aure approached me and held my knee.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q What was your reaction to the action of SPO1 Aure?

A I was trying to free myself from his hold and made my knees sticked (sic)
together.

Q After that what transpired?

A Nag-iiyak po ako sa takot. Nasasaktan po ako sa ginagawa niya.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q Was he able to open your knees?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when SPO1 Aure opened your knees, what happened next?

A Itinuhod po niya yung tuhod niya sa pagitan ng aking mga hita.

Q After that what did SPO1 Aure do, if any?

A He laid down at (sic) top me, sir.

Q When SPO1 Aure laid down on top of you, was he already naked?

A Yes, no more pants, and brief, sir.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

x x x x

Q When SPO1 Aure put his knees between your legs, what transpired next after
that?

A He laid at (sic) top me and kissed all over my body, sir.

Q What particular parts of your body did SPO1 Aure kiss?

A My face, neck and breast sir.

Q For how long that situation last?

A I tried to fight back as I tried to lift his body from me, and I even hit him on the
back.

Q When you were fighting back with SPO1 Aure what was his reaction?

A Napakalakas niya, yung dalawang braso ko inipit niya sa dalawang kamay niya.

Q After that what happened?

A Nag-pump na po siya tuloy-tuloy po yung pag-
papump niya, pabilis ng pabilis po.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q Do you recall how long SPO1 Aure was pumping above you?

A Seconds only then he kissed my body, sir.

Q After that what happened?

A I felt his foot kicked my pants down until it was taken off, sir.

Q After your pants was taken off, what transpired?

A Tinutok niya yung ari niya sa aking pagkababae.

ATTY. DIETA:

At this point Your Honor I would like to manifest that the witness is already
crying.

x x x x

COURT TO WITNESS:

Q You want to tell this Court that he was able to insert his penis into your private
part?

A Opo.

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q After SPO1 Aure inserted his penis to your private part, what did he do next?

A Pabilis ng pabilis ang kanyang pagpapump hanggang sa may naramdaman po ak
ong mainit na likido na pumasok sa aking ari.

Q Do you recall how long did that pumping happen after you felt a warm liquid to
your vagina?

A Wala pa pong limang minuto.

Q After you felt that liquid discharged from SPO1 Aure, what happened next?

A Humihingal si SPO1 Aure na bigla na lang po siyang dumagan sa katawan ko,
flat po.

x x x x

Q After that what happened?

A SPO1 Aure stood up and wore his pants.

Q After SPO1 Aure put on his pants, what did he do next?

A Hinagis po niya ang aking pantalon at sinabi po niya na mag-
ayos ako ng aking sarili na parang walang nangyari.

Q On your part what did you do when SPO1 Aure gave your pants back?

A Hindi ako makakilos sa takot at hindi ko kaagad naisuot yun.

Q What about SPO1 Aure what did he do?

A He approached me and poked the gun on my face.

Q What was your reaction when SPO1 Aure poked his gun on your face?

A I obeyed him and put on my panty and my pants.

Q After you put on your panty and pants, what happened next after that?

A I sat on a chair and SPO1 Aure went to the door.

Q After that what did SPO1 Aure do?

A He opened the door and peeped outside, sir.

Q After SPO1 Aure opened the door and peeped outside, what happened next?

A Lumapit po sa kinauupuan ko at sinabi niya na tandaan mo walant dapat makak
aalam nito kundi papatayin kita.

Q What was your reaction to his statement?

A Umiyak ako ng umiyak, hindi po ako makakilos.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q So it was SPO1 Ferol who approached you and tapped your shoulder at
about 2:00 a.m. of November 8, 1999?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q After that what happened next?

A He poked his gun on my temple and told me to enter the computer room.

Q When you were inside the computer room, what transpired, if any?

A Pinahuhubad niya po sa akin yung pantalon ko.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q While you wee inside the computer room, what happened next?

A He told me to take off my pants, sir.

Q What did you do?

A Sa pagkakataon pong yun di ako makakilos, namamanhid po yung buong katawa
n ko sa nerbiyos.

Q As you mentioned that you were already numb due to fright, what did you do if
any?

A I could not move and I felt that he was the one unbuttoning my pants.

Q You mentioned that he was the one unbuttoning your pants, to whom are your
referring to?

A Ferol, sir.

Q Was SPO1 Ferol about to unbutton your pants?

A Yes, up to my thigh.

Q After that what happened next?

A He pushed me to the folding bed, sir.

Q After he pushed you to the folding bed, what happened?

A Facing down to the folding bed he pulled me down to the cement floor and my
back hitting the floor first.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q After you were pulled down to the cement, what happened next?

A He approached me and pulled my pants down.

Q After SPO1 Ferol pulled your pants down, what did he do next?

A He hurriedly took off his pants, sir.

Q After SPO1 Ferol took off his pants, what did he do if any?

A Dinaganan niya po ako sa aking katawan paluhod.

Q That particular moment what were you doing at that time?

A HINDI NA PO AKO MAKAKILOS SA NERBIYOS.

Q When SPO1 Ferol was already kneeling above your body as you mentioned, what
transpired next?

A He took off his T-shirt, sir.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q After SPO1 Ferol put off his T-shirt, what did he do next?

A He bent down and started kissing me. Malikot po siya.

Q Will you tell this Court what part of your body was kissed by SPO1 Ferol at that
time?

A Face, neck, head, body up to my breast.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q When SPO1 Ferol was kissing you what were you doing at that time?

A I was trying to free myself but he was forcing me to open my legs.

Q Was SPO1 Ferol able to open your legs?

A Yes, sir.

Q After he opened your legs, what did he do next?

A Nag-pump siya ng nag -
pump, ang katawan niya nasa pagitan ng aking mga hita.

Q For how long did SPO1 Ferol make that pumping motion between your legs?

A Due to fright I could not remember anything.

Q After that what transpired?

A I tried to hit or box him but he held both my arms and pulled it up.

Q After SPO1 Ferol held your hands, what happened next?

A Sabi po niya, huwag ka na lang pumalag patapusin mo na lang ako kung ayaw m
o masaktan.

Q What was your reaction to the statement of SPO1 Ferol?

A I was trying to free myself and crying but I could not do so.

Q After you were not able to free yourself from the body of SPO1 Ferol what
happened next?

A Nag-pump po siya ng nag-pump.

COURT: (butts in) TO WITNESS:

x x x x

Q When he was pumping, was his penis inside your private part already?

A Yes, he was able to make his organ entered to (sic) my organ, Your Honor.

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q For how long did SPO1 Ferol make this pumping?

A Only for a short while, all I felt was I could not feel anything except fear.

Q After that what happened?

A He stood up and I saw white sperm in front of him.

Q Where did you see that white sperm?

A Outside of his organ, sir.

Q After that what did you do, if any?

A Napaluhod po ako, nanginginig po ako sa takot. Inutusan po niya akong magsuo
t ng aking panty at pantalon.

Q Were you able to put on your panty and pants?

A I could not move at that time.

x x x x

ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:

Q After that what happened?

A He told me to fix myself or else he will kill me and due to fear I crawled to get my
pants.

Q Were you able to put on your panty and pants?

A Yes, sir.

Q After that what did you do next?

A I was crying and he told me
walang dapat makaalam nito, tandaan mo papatayin kita.
[57]



It is settled that the testimony of a married rape victim, such as AAA, is given
full weight and credence because no married woman with a husband and children
would place herself on public trial for rape where she would be subjected to
suspicion, morbid curiosity, malicious imputations, and close scrutiny of her
personal life, not to speak of the humiliation and scandal she and her family
would suffer, if she was merely concocting her charge and would not be able to
prove it in court.
[58]


It is also significant to note that the RTC gave full credence to the foregoing
testimony of AAA as she relayed her painful ordeal in a candid manner. It found
the testimonies of AAA to be clear, spontaneous and reliable. Jurisprudence
instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in
this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded respect if not conclusive
effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and was in the best position to discern whether
they were telling the truth. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.
[59]


Further, the abovementioned testimonies are consistent with the
documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found the testimonies of AAA to be credible.

Appellants, nonetheless, claim in their first, second and fourth assigned
errors that the informations in Criminal Cases No. C-58617 and No. C-
58693 both alleged that they conspired in raping AAA once on 7 November
1999. The RTC, however, found no conspiracy between appellants in raping
AAA. Nonetheless, it held that appellant Aure alone raped AAA on 7 November
1999 and thus convicted him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617 but acquitted
him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58693; while appellant Ferolalone raped AAA
on 8 November 1999 and, hence, convicted him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-
58693 but acquitted him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617. Appellants
maintain that the foregoing findings and rulings of the RTC are inconsistent with
the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot
individually and separately convict appellants of rape because the informations in
the two cases alleged conspiracy between them in raping AAA. Also,
appellant Ferol cannot be convicted in Criminal Case No. C-58693 of rape
committed on 8 November 1999 because such fact was not alleged in
the informations. Appellants argued that the said finding and ruling of the RTC
violated their constitutional rights to be informed of the nature of the case
against them, to be presumed innocent of the charges, and to due process.
[60]


Although the informations in Criminal Cases No. C-58617 and No. C-
58693 both alleged that appellants conspired in raping AAA, it does not
necessarily follow that the RTC cannot individually and separately convict
appellants of rape. The rule is that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one
is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by
the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove
conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for
their own respective acts.
[61]
In the instant cases, the RTC ruled that the
prosecution failed to establish conspiracy between appellants in raping
AAA. Nevertheless, on the basis of AAAs credible testimony and documentary
evidence for the prosecution, the RTC found that appellant Aure alone raped AAA
on 7 November 1999and that appellant Ferol alone raped AAA on 8 November
1999. Thus, the RTC was correct in holding appellants individually responsible for
their respective acts of rape.

It is true that the information in Criminal Case No. C-58693 alleged that
appellants conspired in raping AAA on 7 November 1999, and that the RTC
convicted appellantFerol alone in Criminal Case No. C-58693 of raping AAA
on 8 November 1999. Nonetheless, the discrepancy on the actual date of rape
does not constitute a serious error warranting the reversal of
appellant Ferols conviction. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a
material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time or date
when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such,
the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that
the information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as
possible to the date of its actual commission.
[62]
In sustaining the view that the
exact date of commission of rape is immaterial, we held in People
v. Purazo
[63]
that:

We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the
crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such,
the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as
1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an
essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the
precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.


Further, we have held that even a variance of a few months between the
time set out in the information and that established by the evidence during trial
does not to constitute a serious error warranting the reversal of conviction solely
on that ground.
[64]
In the case at bar, the difference between date/time of the
rape as alleged in Criminal Case No. C-58693 (7 November 1999) and as testified
to by AAA (8 November 1999) was one day only. Indeed, appellant Ferols actual
commission of rape was not that remote or far with the date of rape alleged in
the information under Criminal Case No. C-58693. Besides, all the essential
elements of rape were stated in the said information and the prosecution had
duly established that appellant Ferol had carnal knowledge of AAA through force
and intimidation on 8 November 1999.

Appellants posit in their third and fifth assigned errors that AAA was
motivated by revenge in charging them with rape because they refused her plea
to dismiss the charges of child abuse, illegal recruitment and physical injuries on
her; that AAAs non-disclosure of the rape incident to Prosecutor Sison during her
inquest with the latter for child abuse, illegal recruitment and physical injuries
shows that the rape charges were fabricated; that it was physically impossible for
appellants to rape AAA because the latter was taller and stronger than them; that
AAAs statement in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she felt pain in her vagina after
the rape incidents was inconsistent with the medical findings of Dr. Soliman that
AAAs vaginal orifice was wide (3.0 centimeters in diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing hymenal injury; and that their corroborating
witnesses were credible and should have been believed by the RTC.
[65]


Motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this
Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a rape victim.
[66]
Also, ill
motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim which clearly established the liability of the
accused.
[67]
In the present case, AAA categorically identified appellants as the one
who ravished her. Her recount of the incidents, as found by the RTC, the Court of
Appeals, and by this Court, was sincere and truthful.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats and shame does
not affect the credibility of the complainant nor undermine her charge of
rape.
[68]
The silence of a rape victim or her failure to disclose her misfortune to
the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is
baseless and fabricated. It is a fact that the victim would rather privately bear the
ignominy and pain of such an experience than reveal her shame to the world or
risk the rapists making good on his threat to hurt or kill her.
[69]


AAA testified that appellants threatened to kill her if she would divulge the
sexual attacks on her.
[70]
Considering that appellants were police officers
and armed, and that AAA was still under appellants custody when
Prosecutor Sison inquested AAA, the latters initial reluctance to report the
incidents was understandable. Further, she narrated that she did not
immediately tell the authorities and her husband of the rape incidents because
she was confused and ashamed.
[71]


Besides, AAAs delay in reporting the rape incidents was not that
unreasonably long. The rape incidents took place on 7 and 8 November 1999 and
AAA reported the matter to the NBI after three days therefrom, or on 11
November 1999. In several cases we have decided,
[72]
the delay in reporting the
rape incidents lasted for months and even for years; nevertheless, the victims
were found to be credible.

The fact that AAA was taller and stronger than appellants does not imply
that it was physically impossible for appellants to rape AAA. It should be recalled
that appellants poked a gun at AAA and inflicted physical injuries on the latter
during the commission of rapes. Further, the rapes were committed in the office
of appellants. Under these circumstances, AAA was no match for appellants and
could not use her tall and strong built to resist the advances of appellants.

The alleged inconsistency between AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay and the
medical findings of Dr. Soliman is immaterial. Whether or not AAA felt pain in her
vagina during the rapes is beside the point since virginity is not an element of
rape. Further, rape is consummated from the moment the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim.
[73]
Full penetration of the vagina is not essential; any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, is
sufficient.
[74]
AAA testified that appellants inserted their penis into her vagina
through force and intimidation.

Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-
serving. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
[75]


Appellant Aure claims he was inside the CIDG office and was constantly in
and out of the computer room at around 7:00 p.m. of 7 November 1999. AAA
testified that she was raped inside the computer room of the CIDG office at the
same time and date. On the other hand, appellant Ferol alleges that he was at
Pier 12, Tondo, Manila, at 2:00 a.m. of8 November 1999 and subsequently slept
on his table inside the CIDG office at around 3:00 a.m. of the same date. AAA
testified that he was raped by appellant Ferol inside the computer room of the
CIDG office at around 2:00 a.m. of 8 November 1999. It is apparent from the
foregoing that appellants were at or near the crime scene during the rape
incidents and that it was not physically impossible for them to be at the crime
scene during the rape incidents. Having failed to comply with the requirements of
the law for an alibi to prosper, appellants respective alibis, though corroborated
by other defense witnesses, cannot serve as basis for their acquittal. It should be
stressed further that as between denials and alibi of appellants and positive
testimony of AAA, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.
[76]


Appellants maintain in their sixth, seventh and eighth assigned errors that
the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office did not conduct preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of the present cases; that they did not receive any subpoena as
regards the said preliminary investigation; and that the RTC judge, Judge
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, was bias, partial and rendered the assailed Decision
without any factual and legal basis.
[77]


It appears from the records that upon filing of a complaint by AAA for rape
against appellants with the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office, a preliminary
investigation was scheduled on 3 and 17 December 1999 by Prosecutor
Yu.
[78]
Thereafter, two subpoenas for the said investigation, dated 22 November
1999 (for the 3 December 1999 schedule) and 3 December 1999 (for the 17
December 1999 schedule), were sent by Prosecutor Yu to appellants at the
latters CIDG office.
[79]
Despite receipt of these subpoenas, appellants did not
appear during the conduct of preliminary investigation. Appellants claim that
they did not receive said subpoenas in the CIDG office does not inspire belief
because they were active, on-duty police officers at the CIDG during the period of
November and December 1999. In fact, appellant Ferol was the acting Chief of
the Warrant Department of the CIDG office during the period of November and
December 1999.
[80]
The said department was in charge of receiving subpoenas
and warrants from courts and other offices. It was unbelievable that they did not
receive, nor was informed, of the subpoenas.

Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is not enough since
bias and partiality can never be presumed.
[81]
There was no plausible proof that
Judge Vidal was bias. On the contrary, the records show that Judge Vidal was fair
and considerate to both prosecution and defense. We have examined the RTC
Decision and found that it contains sufficient factual and legal basis. In the said
47-page Decision, Judge Vidal has thoroughly and extensively discussed the facts
and the law on which appellants conviction for rape were based.

We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed by the RTC
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for rape
committed through force and intimidation, as in these cases,
is reclusion perpetua. The same provision also states that the death penalty shall
be imposed if the victim was raped while under the custody of the police
authorities, or, when the rape is committed by any member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) or any law enforcement agency.
[82]


In the case under consideration, AAA was raped by appellants while she was
under the custody of the CIDG. Further, appellants were members of the PNP-
CIDG at the time they raped AAA. Nonetheless, these aggravating/qualifying
circumstances were not specifically alleged in the informations. It is settled that
the aggravating/qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in
the information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated, even if they are
subsequently proved during the trial.
[83]
Thus, the RTC was correct in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of the appellants.

The RTC was also correct in holding that each of the appellants is liable for
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 because such award is mandatory
upon the finding of fact of rape.
[84]
Also, the award of moral damages is proper
but the amount thereof should be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00 for
each of the appellants pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.
[85]
Likewise, the
award of attorneys fees in the amount of P70,000.00 is in order
[86]
because the
records show that AAA incurred such expenses in hiring a private prosecutor for
the instant case.
[87]
However, such attorneys fees should be paid jointly by
appellants and not by each of them as erroneously held by the RTC. AAA testified
that she spent a total amount of P70,000.00 in prosecuting both Criminal Cases
No. C-58671 and No. C-58693.
[88]


WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01127, dated 29 July 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the amount of P60,000.00 imposed on each of the appellants
as moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the amount of P70,000.00 as
attorneys fees should be paid jointly by appellants and not by each of
them. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.


MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson



MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice



ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice



ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.


CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.



REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice



*
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Ruben T.
Reyes per raffle dated 18 February 2005.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta concurring; rollo, pp. 3-25.
[2]
Penned by Presiding Judge Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; CA rollo, pp. 47-91.
[3]
Records, pp. 2 & 13.
[4]
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004 and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the real names
of her immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials instead are used to represent
her, both to protect her privacy. People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA
419, 421-426.
[5]
Records, p. 102.
[6]
TSN, 10 July 2000, pp. 1-6; TSN, 18 July 2000, pp. 1-8.
[7]
TSN, 18 July 2000, pp. 8-26; TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 2-8.
[8]
TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 8-11.
[9]
Id. at 11-20.
[10]
Id. at 20-26.
[11]
Id. at 26-28.
[12]
Id. at 28-34; TSN, 26 July 2000, pp. 2-7.
[13]
Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, pp. 19-20.
[14]
TSN, 26 July 2000, pp. 7-9.
[15]
Id. at 11-15.
[16]
Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, pp. 9-10.
[17]
TSN, 26 July 2000, pp. 15-25.
[18]
Id. at 26-37.
[19]
TSN, 14 August 2000, pp. 1-23.
[20]
Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, pp. 1-3.
[21]
Id. at 4-5.
[22]
Id. at 6-9.
[23]
Id. at 10-11.
[24]
Id. at 16-17.
[25]
Id. at 15-16.
[26]
Id. at 17.
[27]
Id. at 18-24.
[28]
Id. at 25-27.
[29]
Id. at 29.
[30]
TSN, 14 September 2000, pp. 2-24.
[31]
TSN, 14 September 2000, pp. 24-36.
[32]
TSN, 7 September 2000, pp. 43-44.
[33]
TSN, 14 September 2000, pp. 37-40.
[34]
TSN, 5 September 2000, pp. 19-25.
[35]
Folder of Exhibits for the Defense, pp. 1-2.
[36]
Id. at 3.
[37]
Id. at 4.
[38]
Id. at 5-6.
[39]
Id. at 7-8.
[40]
Id. at 9-10.
[41]
Id. at 11.
[42]
Id. at 13.
[43]
Id. at 14.
[44]
Id. at 17.
[45]
Id. at 18.
[46]
Id. at 32-35.
[47]
Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[48]
Records, pp. 449-458.
[49]
Id. at 459-460.
[50]
CA rollo, pp. 232-235.
[51]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[52]
CA rollo, pp. 67-79.
[53]
Rollo, p. 80.
[54]
People v. Mangitngit, G.R. No. 171270, 20 September 2006, 502 SCRA 560, 572.
[55]
Id.
[56]
TSN, 18 July 2000, pp. 20-25.
[57]
TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 3-21.
[58]
People v. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159, 174-175 (2003); People v. Ferrer, 415 Phil. 188, 200 (2001); People
v. Mendoza, 354 Phil. 177, 188 (1998); People v. Igdanes, 338 Phil. 624, 631 (1997).
[59]
People v. Bejic, G.R. No. 174060, 25 June 2007, 525 SCRA 488, 504.
[60]
CA rollo, pp. 276-284, 311-313; rollo, pp. 34-42.
[61]
People v. Figueroa, 390 Phil. 561, 574 (2000).
[62]
People v. Ching, G.R. No. 177150, 22 November 2007, 538 SCRA 117, 129.
[63]
450 Phil. 651, 671-672 (2003).
[64]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 172373, 25 September 2007, 534 SCRA 140, 146; People v. Buban, G.R.
No. 166895, 24 January 2007, 512 SCRA 500, 518.
[65]
CA rollo, pp. 284-311, 313-17.
[66]
People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 531, 549.
[67]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 172322, 8 September 2006, 501 SCRA 325, 343.
[68]
People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 659, 670.
[69]
People v. Bertulfo, 431 Phil. 535, 549 (2002).
[70]
TSN, 18 July 2000, pp. 8-26; TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 2-11.
[71]
TSN, 26 July 2000, p. 8.
[72]
People v. Arsayo, G.R. No. 166546, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 275, 290; People v. Dimaano, G.R.
No. 168168, 14 September 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 663; People v. Salvador, 444 Phil. 325, 332 (2003).
[73]
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105, 114; People v. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912,
920 (2000); People v. Arango, G.R. No. 168442, 30 August 2006, 500 SCRA 259, 279.
[74]
Id.
[75]
People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 661-662.
[76]
People v. Major Comiling, 468 Phil. 869, 890 (2004).
[77]
CA rollo, pp. 317-324.
[78]
TSN, 26 July 2000, p. 25-26; TSN, 5 April 2000, p. 2.
[79]
TSN, 5 April 2000, pp. 2 & 21; TSN, 6 April 2000, p. 6; Exhibits A-Motion and B-Motion.
[80]
TSN, 5 April 2000, pp. 16-17; Records, pp. 72-73.
[81]
Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 173551, 4 October 2007, 534 SCRA 668, 700.
[82]
Revised Penal Code, Article 266-B (2) & (7).
[83]
Catiis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153979, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 71, 84.
[84]
People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88; People v. Antonio, G.R. No.
157269, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 627; People v. Esperida, 443 Phil. 818, 826 (2003).
[85]
People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 280, 298; People v. Balbarona, G.R. No.
146854, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 127, 145; People v. Antivola, 466 Phil. 394, 418 (2004).
[86]
People v. Barbosa, 414 Phil. 542, 560 (2001); People v. Tabarangao, 363 Phil. 248, 262 (1999); People
v. De Guzman, 333 Phil. 50, 71 (1996).
[87]
TSN, 31 July 2000, p. 21.
[88]
Id.




























SECOND DIVISION


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179477
Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
JIMMY TABIO,
Appellant.
Promulgated:

February 6, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:


Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single
Information,
[1]
the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora
[2]
] the said accused,
did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal knowledge of
mentally retarded AAA
[3]
by means of force and intimidation three times all committed
while the victim was alone inside their house and during nighttime which was taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
[4]
Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA
testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appellant
entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAAs breast, removed her clothing,
fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a
bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize
the appellant as her house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that
the appellant on two succeeding occasions again entered her home and repeated
the same acts on her.
[5]


Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAAs
mental condition. A doctor
[6]
who had trained with the National Center for
Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she
was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a
six-year old child.
[7]
AAAs mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental
retardation and the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them.
[8]


Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and
offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the
rape.
[9]
Appellants wife
[10]
and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista,
[11]
tried to
corroborate his alibi through their own testimony.

On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant
guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape,
defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B,
paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered appellant to
pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity andP50,000.00 as moral damages.
[12]
The
records of the case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review.
On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a Resolution
[13]
transferring the case to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action.
[14]


The Court of Appeals
[15]
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple
rape only and not qualified rape. It also reduced the civil indemnity to P50,000.00
and added an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
[16]


The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned
three (3) errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of
death in view of the prosecutions failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in
the information; whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts
of rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellants favor.
The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not
qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B(10)
[17]
of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the
offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of
the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition
of the death penalty. Rule 110
[[18]]
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both
qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the
information.
[[19]]


In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant
had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that
appellant knew of the mental disability of the complainant at the time of the
commission of the crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically
stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus,
be applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed.
[20]



Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal
that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with
specificity in the information.

The Court also observes that there is duplicity
[21]
of the offenses charged in
the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash.
[22]
Three (3) separate
acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to
interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver.
[23]


We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty
of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively
proven. The second and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found
guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the
prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.
[24]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants candor is the single most
important issue. If a complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.
[25]


We have thoroughly examined AAAs testimony and found nothing that
would cast doubt on the credibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the
pertinent portion of her testimony:

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

x x x

Q Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June 2002?
A Yes, Sir.

Q What time was that?
A Night time, Sir.

x x x

Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there?
A He fondled my breast, Sir.

Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house?
A Yes, sir.

x x x

Q Dont be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When Jimmy saw you
what did he do with your clothes, if any?
A He removed my dress, Sir.




x x x

Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed your
clothes. What did he do after removing your clothes?
A He placed himself on top of me.

COURT: to the witness

Q Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you?
A I was sitting, Sir.

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude?
A He was naked, Sir.

Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do while he was
on top of you?
A He pressed a knife on me.

Q On what part of your body did he press the knife?
A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast)

Q What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near your breast?
A Jimmy was in our house, Sir.

Q Do you know what penis is?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis?
A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he do with his penis?
A He placed his penis to my vagina.

Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that?
A I felt pain, Sir.

Q After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do?
A Nothing more, Sir.


Q Did he move while he was on top of you?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you?
A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.)

x x x

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness
Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your vagina?
A There was some kind of milk, Sir.

COURT: to the witness

Q Where?
A In my vagina, Sir.

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q Why did you notice that? What did you do?
A I watched my vagina, Sir.

Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?
A I have a light, Sir.

Q What kind of light was that?
A Gas l[a]mp, Sir.
[26]
(Emphasis supplied.)


AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAAs
testimony is distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension or hint
of a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned from her
answers in the direct examination. The fact of her mental retardation does not
impair the credibility of her unequivocal testimony. AAAs mental deficiency lends
greater credence to her testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as
her could not speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she
has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the appellant.
[27]


Appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence,
cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of
AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.
[28]
We have meticulously reviewed the
records and found no justification to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial
court that

Accuseds alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods during the period
when [AAA] was raped deserves no consideration. When the accused took the witness
stand, he gave an evasive, confused and vague account of his whereabouts at the time
the crime was committed as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts
from the locus criminis. Accuseds wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his
(accuseds) testimony that he was in the mountain during the commission of rape but to
no avail.

x x x

In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused allegedly was is
less than half a kilometer (200 meters) which could be negotiated in less than an hour. x
x x
[29]



However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the
offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force or intimidation. The only evidence
presented to prove the two other charges were AAAs monosyllabic affirmative
answers to two leading questions if appellant repeated during the second and
third times he was in her house what he had done during the first time. We quote
that only portion of AAAs testimony relating to the second and third alleged
rapes, to wit:

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do during the
second time?
A He entered our house, Sir.

Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first time.
A Yes, Sir.

Q How about the third time? What did he do?
A He has a knife, Sir.

Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?
A Yes, Sir.
[30]
(Emphasis supplied)


AAAs testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and
lacked many specific details on how they were committed. Her bare statement
that appellant repeated what he had done to her the first time is inadequate to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes. Whether
or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine
[31]
based
on the evidence offered. The prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail
the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA
to the effect that the appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not
be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed
been committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum
of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that.

In the case of People v. Garcia,
[32]
wherein the appellant was charged with
183 counts of rape, we held that:

x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes committed in November,
[sic] 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of
rape committed in May and June and on July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants
aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that
appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the

defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of
them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite
testimonial evidence that complainant was raped every week is decidedly inadequate
and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required
quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are
uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this category.
[33]
(Emphasis supplied)


We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to
support conviction.

As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate
court of the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, but on rather different premises,
considering our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three counts of rape.

The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less
than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00),
[34]
and P50,000.00 for simple
rape.
[35]
This civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such
that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to
pay P50,000.00 for each count, orP100,000.00 in all.

We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for all three counts of simple rape. Such award would have been
improper for a conviction for three counts of simple rape.
[36]
Still, because
appellant is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as the
appropriate amount of civil indemnity.

In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages
are awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is
assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.
[37]
In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages by way of public example is also proper.
[38]


WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01301 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE
count of simple rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape.
Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to
pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.


DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:




LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson





ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice






PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice


ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.




REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice








[1]
Record, pp. 1-2.

[2]
The complete address of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R.
No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419,425-426.

[3]
The real name of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy.

[4]
Presided by Judge Corazon Soluren.

[5]
TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 2-8.

[6]
Dr. Roman Balangue; TSN, 13 February 2003, pp. 3-8.

[7]
Id., at 10.

[8]
TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 11-16; and TSN, 20 January 2003, pp. 3-7.

[9]
TSN 7 May 2003, pp. 2-6.

[10]
TSN 3 June 2003, pp. 2-6.

[11]
TSN 8 May 2003, pp. 2-5.

[12]
Records, p. 109.

[13]
Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 656.

[14]
CA rollo, p. 19-A.

[15]
Through the decision dated 23 January 2007 penned by Associate Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

[16]
Rollo, p.21.

[17]
Art. 266-B. Penalties. x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating or qualifying circumstances: x x x

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)

[18]
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complaint of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

[19]
People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 597, 615.

[20]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.

[21]
Rule 110, Sec. 13. Duplicity of the offense.A complaint or information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

[22]
Rule 117, Sec. 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint or informationon any of the
following grounds: x x x x
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law; x x x x

[23]
Rule 117, Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.The failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not
file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

[24]
People v. De Guzman y Pascual, 388 Phil. 943, 952-953 (2000, citing People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246
(1997).

[25]
Id. at 954.

[26]
TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 2-6.

[27]
See People v. Toralba, 414 Phil. 793, 800 (2001) citing People v. Ducta, G.R. No. 134608, 16 August
2000, 338 SCRA 272; People v. Lubong, 332 SCRA 672 (2000); People v. Cabingas, 329 SCRA 21 (2000); People
v. Tipay, 329 SCRA 52 (2000) and People v. San Juan, G.R. No. 105556, 4 April 1997, 270 SCRA 693.

[28]
See People v. Ejandra, G.R. No. 134203, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 364, 379.

[29]
Records, p.107.

[30]
TSN, 17 December 2002, p.7.

[31]
FRANCISCO, RICARDO; EVIDENCE, 1996 ed., p. 348.

[32]
346 Phil. 475 (1997).

[33]
Id. at 497.


[34]
People v. Perez, 357 Phil. 17, 35 (1998); People v. Bernaldez, 355 Phil. 740, 758 (1998); People v.
Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209-210 (1998).

[35]
See People v. Mendoza, 432 Phil. 666, 684 (2002).

[36]
See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 435-436.

[37]
People v. Pagsanjan, 442 Phil. 667, 687 (2002).

[38]
People v. de los Santos, 439 Phil. 630, 641 (2002).

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