Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 75321 June 20, 1988
ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS (ATU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, MOLE, BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. and TRADE UNIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)-WFTU, respondents.
Puerto, Nunez & Associates for petitioner.
Tupaz and Associates for respondent Union.
Jose C. Espinas collaborating counsel for private respondent.
Agapito S. Mendoza for respondent Baliwag Transit, Inc.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

CRUZ .J,:
The resolution of this case has been simplified because it has been, in Justice Vicente
Abad Santos's felicitous phrase, "overtaken by events."
This case arose when on March 25, 1986, the private respondent union (TUPAS) filed
with the Malolos labor office of the MOLE a petition for certification election at the
Baliwag Transit, Inc. among its rank-and-file workers. 1 Despite opposition from the
herein petitioner, Associated Trade Unions (ATU), the petition was granted by the
med-arbiter on May 14, 1986, and a certification election was ordered "to determine
the exclusive bargaining agent (of the workers) for purposes of collective bargaining
with respect to (their) terms and conditions of employment." 2 On appeal, this order
was sustained by the respondent Director of Labor Relations in his order dated June
20, 1986, which he affirmed in his order of July 17, 1986, denying the motion for
reconsideration. 3 ATU then came to this Court claiming that the said orders are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and so should be reversed. On August 20, 1986,
we issued a temporary restraining order that has maintained the status quo among the
parties. 4
In support of its petition, ATU claims that the private respondent's petition for
certification election is defective because (1) at the time it was filed, it did not contain
the signatures of 30% of the workers, to signify their consent to the certification
election; and (2) it was not allowed under the contract-bar rule because a new
collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by ATU with the company on
April 1, 1986. 5
TUPAS for its part, supported by the Solicitor General, contends that the 30% consent
requirement has been substantially complied with, the workers' signatures having
been subsequently submitted and admitted. As for the contract-bar rule, its position is
that the collective bargaining agreement, besides being vitiated by certain procedural
defects, was concluded by ATU with the management only on April 1, 1986 after the
filing of the petition for certification election on March 25, 1986. 6
This initial sparring was followed by a spirited exchange of views among the parties
which insofar as the first issue is concerned has become at best only academic now.
The reason is that the 30% consent required under then Section 258 of the Labor Code
is no longer in force owing to the amendment of this section by Executive Order No.
111, which became effective on March 4, 1987.
As revised by the said executive order, the pertinent articles of the Labor Code now
read as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized
establishments, when a petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Ministry within the sixty-day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of
the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results
in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a runoff election shall be
conducted between the choices receiving the two highest number of votes.
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there
is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a
legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least
twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and
verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a
certification election.
The applicable provision in the case at bar is Article 256 because Baliwag transit, Inc.
is an organized establishment. Under this provision, the petition for certification
election need no longer carry the signatures of the 30% of the workers consenting to
such petition as originally required under Article 258. The present rule provides that as
long as the petition contains the matters 7 required in Section 2, Rule 5, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations, as amended by Section 6, Implementing Rules of
E.O. No. 111, the med-arbiter "shall automatically order" an election by secret ballot
"to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit." The consent
requirement is now applied only to unorganized establishments under Article 257, and
at that, significantly, has been reduced to only 20%.
The petition must also fail on the second issue which is based on the contract-bar rule
under Section 3, Rule 5, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. This rule
simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for
certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except
within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire.
The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and
the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original
period.
ATU insists that its collective bargaining agreement concluded by it with Baliwag
Transit, Inc, on April 1, 1986, should bar the certification election sought by TUPAS as
this would disturb the said new agreement. Moreover, the agreement had been ratified
on April 3, 1986, by a majority of the workers and is plainly beneficial to them because
of the many generous concessions made by the management. 8
Besides pointing out that its petition for certification election was filed within the
freedom period and five days before the new collective bargaining agreement was
concluded by ATU with Baliwag Transit, Inc. TUPAS contends that the said agreement
suffers from certain fatal procedural flaws. Specifically, the CBA was not posted for at
least five days in two conspicuous places in the establishment before ratification, to
enable the workers to clearly inform themselves of its provisions. Moreover, the CBA
submitted to the MOLE did not carry the sworn statement of the union secretary,
attested by the union president, that the CBA had been duly posted and ratified, as
required by Section 1, Rule 9, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations.
These requirements being mandatory, non-compliance therewith rendered the said
CBA ineffective. 9
The Court will not rule on the merits and/or defects of the new CBA and shall only
consider the fact that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification
election had already been filed by TUPAS and was then pending resolution. The said
CBA cannot be deemed permanent, precluding the commencement of negotiations by
another union with the management. In the meantime however, so as not to deprive
the workers of the benefits of the said agreement, it shall be recognized and given
effect on a temporary basis, subject to the results of the certification election. The
agreement may be continued in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers or may be rejected and replaced in the event that TUPAS
emerges as the winner.
This ruling is consistent with our earlier decisions on interim arrangements of this kind
where we declared:
... we are not unmindful that the supplemental collective bargaining contract, entered
into in the meanwhile between management and respondent Union contains provisions
beneficial to labor. So as not to prejudice the workers involved, it must be made clear
that until the conclusion of a new collective bargaining contract entered into by it and
whatever labor organization may be chosen after the certification election, the existing
labor contract as thus supplemented should be left undisturbed. Its terms call for strict
compliance. This mode of assuring that the cause of labor suffers no injury from the
struggle between contending labor organization follows the doctrine announced in the
recent case of Vassar Industries Employees v. Estrella (L-46562, March 31, 1978). To
quote from the opinion. "In the meanwhile, if as contended by private respondent
labor union the interim collective bargaining agreement which it engineered and
entered into on September 26, 1977 has, much more favorable terms for the workers
of private respondent Vassar Industries, then it should continue in full force and effect
until the appropriate bargaining representative is chosen and negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement thereafter concluded." 10
It remains for the Court to reiterate that the certification election is the most
democratic forum for the articulation by the workers of their choice of the union that
shall act on their behalf in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement with
their employer. Exercising their suffrage through the medium of the secret ballot, they
can select the exclusive bargaining representative that, emboldened by their
confidence and strengthened by their support shall fight for their rights at the
conference table. That is how union solidarity is achieved and union power is increased
in the free society. Hence, rather than being inhibited and delayed, the certification
election should be given every encouragement under the law, that the will of the
workers may be discovered and, through their freely chosen representatives, pursued
and realized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order of August 20,
1986, is LIFTED. Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the contract bar rule applicable where a collective bargaining agreement was hastily
concluded in defiance of the order of the med-arbiter enjoining the parties from
entering into a CBA until the issue on representation is finally resolved? This is the
primary issue in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) is a corporation
established and existing pursuant to Philippine laws and is engaged in the manufacture
and processing of copper cathodes with a plant operating in Isabel, Leyte. It employs
more or less eight hundred fifty (850) rank-and-file employees in its departments.
Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with PASAR which expired on April 1, 1987. Several days before the expiration of the
said CBA or on March 23, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations Regional Office in Tacloban City docketed as MED-ARB-RO VII Case No. 3-
28-87, alleging, among others, that no certification election had been held in PASAR
within twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the said petition.
Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its petition. In the
order dated April 21, 1987, 1 Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha dismissed the
petition. However, the order of dismissal was set aside in another order dated May 8,
1987 and the case was rescheduled for hearing on May 29, 1987. The said order
likewise enjoined PASAR from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with any
union until after the issue of representation is finally resolved. In the order dated June
1, 1987, 2 the petition for certification was dismissed for failure of NAFLU to solicit
20"7c of the total number of rank and file employees while ALU submitted 33 pages
containing the signatures of 88.5% of the rank and file employees at PASAR.
Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
While the appeal was pending, petitioner ALU concluded negotiations with PASAR on
the proposed CBA. On July 24, 1987, copies of the newly concluded CBA were posted
in four (4) conspicuous places in the company premises. The said CBA was ratified by
the members of the bargaining unit on July 28, 1987. 3 Thereafter, petitioner ALU
moved for the dismissal of the appeal alleging that it had just concluded a CBA with
PASAR and that the said CBA had been ratified by 98% of the regular rank-and-file
employees and that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced their membership
thereat and affirmed membership with PEA-ALU in separate affidavits.
In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent gave due course to
the appeal by ordering the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of PASAR with ALU, NAFLU and no union as choices, and denied petitioner
's motion to dismiss. 4
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the said resolution. However, both motions
were denied by public respondent in the order dated April 22, 1988.
Hence, the present petition. 5
The petition is anchored on the argument that the holding of certification elections in
organized establishments is mandated only where a petition is filed questioning the
majority status of the incumbent union and that it is only after due hearing where it is
established that the union claiming the majority status in the bargaining unit has
indeed a considerable support that a certification election should be ordered,
otherwise, the petition should be summarily dismissed. 6 Petitioner adds that public
respondent missed the legal intent of Article 257 of the Labor Code as amended by
Executive Order No. 111. 7
In effect, petitioner is of the view that Article 257 of the Labor Code which requires the
signature of at least 20% of the total number of rank-and-file employees should be
applied in the case at bar.
The petition is devoid of merit.
As it has been ruled in a long line of decisions, 8 a certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a
non-adversarial and fact-finding character. As such, it is not covered by the technical
rules of evidence. Thus, as provided under Article 221 of the Labor Code, proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence. The Court had previously construed Article
221 as to allow the NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case on the basis of
position papers and other documents submitted without resorting to technical rules of
evidence as observed in regular courts of justice. 9
On the other hand, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized labor organizations
and not to establishments like PASAR where there exists a certified bargaining agent,
petitioner ALU, which as the record shows had previously entered into a CBA with the
management. This could be discerned from the clear intent of the law which provides
that
ART. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the
petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least
twenty per cent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
Upon receipt and verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
Said article traverses the claim of the petitioner that in this case there is a need for a
considerable support of the rank-and-file employees in order that a certification
election may be ordered. Nowhere in the said provision does it require that the petition
in organized establishment should be accompanied by the written consent of at least
twenty percent (20%) of the employees of the bargaining unit concerned much less a
requirement that the petition be supported by the majority of the rank-and-file
employees. As above stated, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized
establishments.
The Court reiterates that in cases of organized establishments where there exists a
certified bargaining agent, what is essential is whether the petition for certification
election wasfiled within the sixty-day freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 111, provides:
ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In
organized establishments, when a petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must
have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the
valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of
all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three
or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid
votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the choices
receiving the two highest number of votes.
Article 256 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The mere filing of a petition
for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the respondent
Director to order the holding of a certification election.
Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom period? The record
speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into by petitioner ALU was due to expire on
April 1, 1987. The petition for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well
within the freedom period.
The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for certification election was
filed either before or after the freedom period. Petitioner, however, contends that since
the new CBA had already been ratified overwhelmingly by the members of the
bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been consummated and the members of
the bargaining unit have been continuously enjoying the benefits under the said CBA,
no certification election may be conducted, 10 citing, Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS vs.
Noriel, 11 and Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services vs. Inciong. 12
The reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. In Foamtex the petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the order of the Director of Labor Relations which
in turn affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election was
dismissed by the Court on the ground that although a new CBA was concluded
between the petitioner and the management, only a certified CBA would serve as a bar
to the holding of a certification election, citing Article 232 of the Labor Code.
Foamtex weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's stand. As pointed out by public
respondent, the new CBA entered into between petitioner on one hand and by the
management on the other has not been certified as yet by the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
There is an appreciable difference in Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services
(TUPAS for short). Here, as in Foamtex the CBA was not yet certified and yet the Court
affirmed the order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations which dismissed the
petition for certification election filed by the labor union. In TUPAS, the dismissal of the
petition for certification, was based on the fact that the contending union had a clear
majority of the workers concerned since out of 641 of the total working force, the said
union had 499 who did not only ratify the CBA concluded between the said union and
the management but also affirmed their membership in the said union so that
apparently petitioners therein did not have the support of 30% of all the employees of
the bargaining unit.
Nevertheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner herein has
the majority of the rank-and-file employees and that some members of the NAFLU
even renounced their membership thereat and affirmed membership with the
petitioner, We cannot, however, apply TUPAS in the case at bar. Unlike in the case of
herein petitioner, in TUPAS, the petition for certification election was filed nineteen
(19) days after the CBA was signed which was well beyond the freedom period.
On the other hand, as earlier mentioned, the petition for certification election in this
case was filed within the freedom period but the petitioner and PASAR hastily
concluded a CBA despite the order of the Med-Arbiter enjoining them from doing so
until the issue of representation is finally resolved. As pointed out by public respondent
in its comment, 13 the parties were in bad faith when they concluded the CBA. Their
act was clearly intended to bar the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU. A
collective bargaining agreement which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the
holding of a certification election. 14 Such indecent haste in renewing the CBA despite
an order enjoining them from doing so 15 is designed to frustrate the constitutional
right of the employees to self-organization. 16 Moreover, We cannot countenance the
actuation of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not conducive to
industrial peace.
The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification
election for the very reason that the same was not yet in existence when the said
petition was filed. 17 The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented. 18
Petitioner posits the view that to grant the petition for certification election would open
the floodgates to unbridled and scrupulous petitions the objective of which is to
prejudice the industrial peace and stability existing in the company.
This Court believes otherwise. Our established jurisprudence adheres to the policy of
enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their
bargaining representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there already
exists a bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as
the petition for certification was filed within the freedom period. What is imperative is
that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given the
opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not
only some but all of them should have the right to do so. 19 Petitioner's contention
that it has the support of the majority is immaterial. What is equally important is that
everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. Time and
again, We have reiterated that the most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election. 20
Finally, petitioner insists that to allow a certification election to be conducted will
promote divisiveness and eventually cause polarization of the members of the
bargaining unit at the expense of national interest. 21
The claim is bereft of merit. Petitioner failed to establish that the calling of certification
election will be prejudicial to the employees concerned and/or to the national interest.
The fear perceived by the petitioner is more imaginary than real. If it is true, as
pointed out by the petitioner, that it has the support of more than the majority and
that there was even a bigger number of members of NAFLU who affirmed their
membership to petitioner-union, then We see no reason why petitioner should be
apprehensive over the issue. If their claim is true, then most likely the conduct of a
certification election will strengthen their hold as any doubt will be erased thereby.
With the resolution of such doubts, fragmentation of the bargaining unit will be
avoided, and hence coherence among the workers will likely follow.
Petitioner's claim that the holding of a certification election will be inimical to the
national interest is far fetched. The workers are at peace with one another and their
working condition is smooth. There has been no stoppage of work or an occurrence of
a strike. With these facts on hand, to order otherwise will be repugnant to the well-
entrenched right of the workers to unionism.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court in the resolution dated October
10, 1988 22 is hereby lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004]
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU),
and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the decisioni[1] dated July 19, 2000, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier reversed the decisionii[2]
dated January 30, 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
Case No. V-0112-94.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling
Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private
respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity),
a duly certified bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years.
The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it
would expire on November 30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a
proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10)
days.
As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters
from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on
grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no
longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and
Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a
union which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to
dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on
how the company may improve its operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any
massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed
by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.
On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground
of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the
grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to refer
to our letter dated December 16, 1991.iii[3]
Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC,
Arbitration Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part
of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-
organization; and (3) discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the
recommendation that a petition for certification election be held to determine if the
union still enjoyed the support of the workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC.
On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision. Citing Article
253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,iv[4] which fixed the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the
CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning December 1,
1991, the date when the original CBA ended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also
ordered GMC to pay the attorneys fees.v[5]
In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715,
the duration of a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5)
years which, in the case of GMC-Independent Labor Union was from December 1, 1988
to November 30, 1993. All other provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not later
than three (3) years after its execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union
remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic
provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter
into negotiation with the union.
The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of withdrawal from the union
submitted by 13 of its members from February to June 1993 confirmed the pressure
exerted by GMC on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found
GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to
self-organization.
With respect to the unions claim of discrimination, the NLRC found the claim
unsupported by substantial evidence.
On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside its decision of January 30,
1998, through a resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMCs doubts as to the
status of the union justified and the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the
unions members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. For failure of the union to attach the required copies of
pleadings and other documents and material portions of the record to support the
allegations in its petition, the CA dismissed the petition on February 9, 1999. The
same petition was subsequently filed by the union, this time with the necessary
documents. In its resolution dated April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the
refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due course.
On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The NLRC Resolution of October 6,
1998 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998 is, except with
respect to the award of attorneys fees which is hereby deleted, REINSTATED.vi[6]
A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by GMC, but in a resolution dated
October 26, 2000, the CA denied it for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT
NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING
THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS
BASED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING
THAT THE NLRC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.vii[7]
Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for our determination is whether or not
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to
bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-
organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two
years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.
On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,
states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective
Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained
and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of
such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years
after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years.
The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60
days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a
renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the
certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said
renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December
1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period
from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It
was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the
union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on
the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under
Article 248 of the Labor Code, which provides that:
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
. . .
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
. . .
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to bargain
collectively, thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain
collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory
duty to bargain in good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the individual case.viii[8]
There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.ix[9] Good faith or bad faith is an
inference to be drawn from the facts.x[10] The effect of an employers or a unions
actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such
occasions or actions, considered as a whole.xi[11]
Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity
of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to
devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its
membership to prevent any negotiation.
It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is
mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial
peace. Thus:
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be
observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
(Underscoring supplied.)
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is
indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt
the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to
be utterly baseless.
We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA
negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to
submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of
the duty to bargain collectively.xii[12]
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions
proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor
practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the
circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.
Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-organization? The CA found that
the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their
resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its
employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the
union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of
the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter
shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union.
We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the
union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to
self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right
of its employees to self-organization.
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA
proposed by the union for two years commencing from the expiration of the original
CBA?
The Code provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective
bargaining agreement. ....It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring supplied.)
The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the
process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general
rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the
relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily
presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad
faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying
the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted.
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,xiii[13] we found that petitioner therein, Sweden Ice Cream
Plant, refused to submit any counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees
certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former had thereby lost its right to
bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to impose on
the erring company the CBA proposed by its employees union - lock, stock and barrel.
Our findings in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to wit:
petitioner Companys approach and attitude stalling the negotiation by a series of
postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in
submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is
unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at
any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims
and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its objection thereto.xiv[14]
Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,xv[15] petitioner therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to
perform its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld the unilateral imposition on
the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word University Employees Union.
We said further:
That being the said case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should
be a primordial consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its
action which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it could have
asserted as an employer.xvi[16]
Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant case, it would be unfair to
the union and its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would
continue to be imposed on GMCs employees for the remaining two (2) years of the
CBAs duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old
CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC
which violated the duty to bargain collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word
University of Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the
terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
We carefully note, however, that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this case,
there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine Word
University of Tacloban. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the
rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule otherwise would be to allow
GMC to have its cake and eat it too.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor
controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an
erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning
negotiations by going through empty gestures.xvii[17] Thus, by imposing on GMC the
provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity
and fair play were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was
lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.
The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the NLRC as to the reasonableness of
the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since they are supported
by substantial evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC, after it had
committed unfair labor practice, the draft CBA proposed by the union for the remaining
two (2) years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness, equity, and social justice
are best served in this case by sustaining the appellate courts decision on this issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision dated July 19,
2000, and the resolution dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986
KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM
PLANT, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG
KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents.
Ablan and Associates for petitioner.
Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent.

CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated July 20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream
guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of par. (g)
of Article 249 2 of the New Labor Code, 3 and declared the draft proposal of the Union
for a collective bargaining agreement as the governing collective bargaining agreement
between the employees and the management.
The pertinent background facts are as follows:
In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa
(Union for short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently
certified in a resolution dated November 29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor Relations as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution was denied on January 25, 1978.
Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7, 1978, the Union furnished 4 the
Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same
time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the
aforesaid request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating its request for
collective bargaining negotiations and for the Company to furnish them with its
counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
Company.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining
table, the Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining. 5
Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off
period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the Bureau
of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as
amended. The labor arbiter, Andres Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the
initial hearing for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the parties to submit their
respective position papers as required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to
another date. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its position paper. The Company did
not, and instead requested for a resetting which was granted. The Company was
directed anew to submit its financial statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978.
The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the withdrawal of the Company's
counsel of record, Atty. Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato
Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel for the Company only to
request for another postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting himself
with the case. Meanwhile, the Company submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.
When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as scheduled, the Company's
representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined, failed to appear. Atty.
Panganiban then requested for another postponement which the labor arbiter denied.
He also ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and,
therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution.
On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino submitted its report to the National
Labor Relations Commission. On July 20, 1979, the National Labor Relations
Commission rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden Ice Cream is hereby declared
guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g)
Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the
draft proposal for a collective bargaining agreement (Exh. "E ")
hereto attached and made an integral part of this decision, sent by
the Union (Private respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein)
and which is hereby found to be reasonable under the premises, is
hereby declared to be the collective agreement which should govern
the relationship between the parties herein.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the aforesaid decision contending that the
National Labor Relations Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the
challenged decision. On August 4, 1980, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however, the Resolution of dismissal was
reconsidered and the petition was given due course in a Resolution dated April 1,
1981.
Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been
violated when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand
and when its request for further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends
that the National Labor Relations Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for
refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence considering that it was
only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed
Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the
Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and
adopted by the National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal
basis.
The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order.
Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement,
6 is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to
stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound
and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union
and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the
Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under
such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if
requested by either party.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not
under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. 7 The mechanics of collective
bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are
present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the
employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of
which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.
From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation,
there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its
(Company's) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and
failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith.
We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement that petitioner
Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established that
(1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite
request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered and
unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of
which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. 8 A Company's refusal
to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process,
may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's request for a
counter proposal is left unanswered. 9 Even during the period of compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling the
negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted,
and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion
except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely
and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its
opposition thereto. 10
The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for in the Herald Delivery Carriers
Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald Publications 11 the rule had been laid down that "unfair
labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer, after
having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did
not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal This doctrine was
reiterated anew in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations 12 wherein it was further
ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does
contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and
make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement
As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the decision sought to be reviewed,
petitioner capitalizes on the issue of due process claiming, that it was denied the right
to be heard and present its side when the Labor Arbiter denied the Company's motion
for further postponement.
Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress Us. Considering the various
postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared
totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had
not even honored respondent Union with any reply to the latter's successive letters, all
geared towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother
to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal despite persistent requests
made therefor. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company were
in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed
towards expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is not prepared
to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.
Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's stand that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement which was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity
for it lacks the company's consent, much less its argument that once the Collective
Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the prospect of closing
down because it has to pay a staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union
that will equal if not exceed its capital. Such a stand and the evidence in support
thereof should have been presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper forum
for the purpose.
We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor
controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an
erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes
feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. 13 More so, as in the instant
case, where the intervention of the National Labor Relations Commission was properly
sought for after conciliation efforts undertaken by the BLR failed. The instant case
being a certified one, it must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate of P.D.
873, as amended, which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonableness of
the terms and conditions of employment embodied in any Collective Bargaining
Agreement. To that extent, utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any
Collective Bargaining Agreement as the governing agreement by the employees and
management must be accorded due respect by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued on August 27, 1980, is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127422 April 17, 2001
LMG CHEMICALS CORPORATION, LMG CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, and CHEMICAL WORKER'S UNION,
respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the orders dated October 7, 1996 and December 17,
1996, issued by the then Secretary of Labor and Employment, Hon. Leonardo A.
Quisumbing,1 in OS-AJ-05-10(1)-96, "IN RE: LABOR DISPUTE AT LMB CHEMICALS
CORPORATION"
The facts as culled from the records are:
LMG Chemicals Corporation, (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of various kinds of chemical substances, including aluminum
sulfate which is essential in purifying water, and technical grade sulfuric acid used in
thermal power plants. Petitioner has three divisions, namely: the Organic Division,
Inorganic Division and the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. There are two unions within
petitioner's Inorganic Division. One union represents the daily paid employees and the
other union represents the monthly paid employees. Chemical Workers Union,
respondent, is a duly registered labor organization acting as the collective bargaining
agent of all the daily paid employees of petitioner's Inorganic Division.
Sometime in December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started negotiation for
a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as their old CBA was about to expire.
They were able to agree on the political provisions of the new CBA, but no agreement
was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic issues were not also settled.
The positions of the parties with respect to wage issue were:
"Petitioner Company
P40 per day on the first year
P40 per day on the second year
P40 per day on the third year
Respondent Union
P350 per day on the first 18 months, and
P150 per day for the next 18 months"
In the course of the negotiations, respondent union pruned down the originally
proposed wage increase quoted above to P215 per day, broken down as follows:
"P142 for the first 18 months
P73 for the second 18 months"
With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock, on March 6, 1996, respondent union filed a
Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, National Capital
Region. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator,
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
On April 16, 1996, respondent union staged a strike. IN an attempt to end the strike
early, petitioner, on April 24, 1996, made an improved offer of P135 per day, spread
over the period of three years, as follows:
"P55 per day on the first year;
P45 per day on the second year;
P35 per day on the third year."
On May 9, 1996, another conciliation meeting was held between the parties. In that
meeting, petitioner reiterated its improved offer of P135 per day which was again
rejected by the respondent union.
On May 20, 1996, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, finding the instant labor
dispute impressed with national interest, assumed jurisdiction over the same.
In compliance with the directive of the Labor Secretary, the parties submitted their
respective positive papers both dated June 21, 1996.
In its position paper, petitioner made a turn-around, stating that it could no longer
afford to grant its previous offer due to serious financial losses during the early months
of 1996. It then made the following offer:
Zero increase in the first year;
P30 per day increase in the second year; and
P20 per day increase in the third year.
In its reply to petitioner's position paper, respondent union claimed it had a positive
performance in terms of income during the covered period.
On October 7, 1996, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued the first assailed
order, pertinent portions of which read:
"xxx. In the light of the Company's last offer and the Union's last
position, We decree that the Company's offer of P135 per day wage
increase be further increased to P140 per (day), which shall be
incorporated in the new CBA, as follows:
P90 per day for the first 18 months, and
P50 per day for the next 18 months.
After all, the Company had granted its supervisory employees an
increase of P4,500 per month or P166 per day, more or less, if the
period reckoned is 27 working days.
In regard to the division of the three-year period into two sub-periods
of 18 months each, this office take cognizance of the same practice
under the old CBA.
2. Other economic demands
Considering the financial condition of the Company, all other
economic demands except those provided in No. 3 below are rejected.
The provisions in the old CBA as well as those contained in the
Company's Employee's Primer of Benefits as of Aug. 1, 1994 shall be
retained and incorporated in the new CBA.
3. Effectivity of the new CBA
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that when no
new CBA is signed during a period of six months from the expiry date
of the old CBA, the retroactivity period shall be according to the
parties' agreement, Inasmuch as the parties could not agree on this
issue and since this Office has assumed jurisdiction, then this matter
now lies at the discretion of the Secretary of labor and Employment.
Thus the new Collective Bargaining Agreement which the parties will
sign pursuant to this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.
x x x
Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary
in his order dated December 16, 1996.
Petitioner now contends that in issuing the said orders, respondent Secretary gravely
abused his discretion, thus:
I
"THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING
THE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S FINANCIAL LOSSES AND IN GRANTING A
P140.00 WAGE INCREASE TO THE RESPONDENT UNION.
II
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECREEING THAT
THE NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED BY THE
PARTIES SHALL RETROACT TO JANUARY 1, 1996."
Anent the first ground, petitioner asserts that the decreed amount of P140 wage
increase has no basis in fact and in law. Petitioner insists that public respondent
Secretary whimsically presumed that the company can survive despite the losses being
suffered by its Inorganic Division and its additional losses caused by the strike held by
respondent union. Petitioner further contends that respondent Secretary disregarded
its evidence showing that for the first part of 1996, its Inorganic Division suffered
serious losses amounting to P15.651 million. Hence, by awarding wage increase
without any basis, respondent Secretary gravely abused his discretion and violated
petitioner's right to due process.
We are not persuaded.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition dated July 1,
1996, respondent Secretary considered all the evidence and arguments adduced by
both parties. In ordering the wage increase, the Secretary ratiocinated as follows:
"xxx
In the Company's Supplemental Comment, it says that it has three
divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division and the
Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. The Union in this instant dispute represent
the daily wage earners in the Inorganic Division. The respective
income of the three divisions is shown in Annex B to the Company's
Supplemental Comment. The Organic Division posted an income of
P369,754,000 in 1995. The Inorganic Division realized an income of
P261,288,000 in the same period. The tail ender is the Pinamucan
Bulk Carriers Division with annual income of P11,803,000 for the
same period. Total Company income for the period was P642,845,000.
It is a sound business practice that a Company's income from all
sources are collated to determine its true financial condition.
Regardless of whether one division or another losses or gains in its
yearly operation is not material in reckoning a Company's financial
status. In fact, the loss in one is usually offset by the gains in the
others. It is not a good business practice to isolate the employees or
workers of one division, which incurred an operating loss for a
particular period. That will create demoralization among its ranks,
which will ultimately affect productivity. The eventual loser will be
the company.
So, even if We believe the position of the company that its Inorganic
Division lost last year and during the early months of this year, it
would not be a good argument to deny them of any salary increase.
When the Company made the offer of P135 per day for the three year
period, it was presumed to have studied its financial condition
properly, taking into consideration its past performance and
projected income. In fact, the Company realized a net income of
P10,806,678 for 1995 in all its operations, which could be one factor
why it offered the wage increase package of P135 per day for the
Union members.1wphi1.nt
Besides, as a major player in the country's corporate field, reneging
from a wage increase package it previously offered and later on
withdrawing the same simply because this Office had already
assumed jurisdiction over its labor dispute with the Union cannot be
countenanced. It will be worse if the employer is allowed to withdraw
its offer on the ground that the union staged a strike and
consequently subsequently suffered business setbacks in its income
projections. To sustain the Company's position is like hanging the
proverbial sword of Damocles over the Union's right to concerted
activities, ready to fall when the latter clamors for better terms and
conditions of employment.
But we cannot also sustain the Union's demand for an increase of
P215 per day. If we add the overload factors such as the increase in
SSS premiums, medicare and medicaid, and other multiplier costs, the
Company will be saddled with additional labor cost, and its projected
income for the CBS period may not be able to absorb the added cost
without impairing its viability. xxx"
Verily, petitioner's assertion that respondent Secretary failed to consider the evidence
on record lacks merit. It was only the Inorganic Division of the petitioner corporation
that was sustaining losses. Such incident does not justify the withholding of any salary
increase as petitioner's income from all sources are collated for the determination of its
true financial condition. As correctly stated by the Secretary, "the loss in one is usually
offset by the gains in the others."
Moreover, petitioner company granted its supervisory employees, during the pendency
of the negotiations between the parties, a wage increase of P4,500 per month or P166
per day, more or less. Petitioner justified this by saying that the said increase was
pursuant to its earlier agreement with the supervisions. Hence, the company had no
choice but to abide by such agreement even if it was already sustaining losses as a
result of the strike of the rank-and-file employees.
Petitioner's actuation is actually a discrimination against respondent union members. If
it could grant a wage increase to its supervisors, there is no valid reason why it should
deny the same to respondent union members. Significantly, while petitioner asserts
that it sustained losses in the first part of 1996, yet during the May 9, 1996
conciliation meeting, it made the offer of P135 daily wage to the said union members.
This Court, therefore, holds that respondent Secretary did not gravely abuse his
discretion in ordering the wage increase. Grave abuse of discretion implies whimsical
and capricious exercise of power which, in the instant case, is not obtaining.
On the second ground, petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion when he ordered that the new CBA which the parties will sign shall
retroact to January 1, 1996, citing the cases of Union of Filipro Employees vs. NLRC,2
and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan Confesor.3
Invoking the provisions of Article 253-A of the Labor Code, petitioner insists that public
respondent's discretion on the issue of the date of the effectivity of the new CBA is
limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA is
limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA to the
agreement of the parties or (2) ordering that the terms of the new CBA be
prospectively applied.
It must be emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute because it is impressed with national interest. As noted by the Secretary, "the
petitioner corporation was then supplying the sulfate requirements of MWSS as well as
the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and consequently, the continuation of the strike would
seriously affect the water supply of Metro Manila and the power supply of the Luzon
Grid." Such authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction carries with it the power
to determine the retroactivity of the parties' CBA.
It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to
enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.4
In St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres5, a deadlock developed during the CBA
negotiations between the management and the union. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and ordered that their CBA shall retroact to the date of the expiration of
the previous CBA. The management claimed that the Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion. This Court held:
"xxx
Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact
to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the
position of the petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Art.
253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated
by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991
'Anent the alleged lack of basis for retroactivity provisions
awarded, We would stress that the provision of law invoked
by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of
agreement by and between the parties, and not arbitral
awards.'
Therefore in the absence of the specific provision of law prohibiting
retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such
as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof."
Finally, to deprive respondent Secretary of such power and discretion would run
counter to the well-established rule that all doubts in the interpretation of labor laws
should be resolved in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed orders of respondent
Secretary, this Court is only giving meaning to this rule. Indeed, the Court should help
labor authorities in providing workers immediate benefits, without being hampered by
arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking but
financially burdensome in the long run.
As we said in Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor6:
"Social Justice Legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to
our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long winded-
arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits
received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to
promote, not to defeat, social justice."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed orders of the Secretary of
Labor dated October 7, 1996 and December 16, 1996 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 121227 August 17, 1998
VICENTE SAN JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OCEAN TERMINAL
SERVICES, INC., respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul a Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated April 20, 1995 in NLRC-NCR-CA-No. 00671-94
which reversed, on jurisdictional ground, a Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated January
19, 1994 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-02101-93 a case for a money claim
underpayment of retirement benefit. Records do not show that petitioner presented a
Motion for Reconsideration of subject Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, which motion is, generally required before the filing of Petition for
Certiorari.
While the rule prescribing the requisite motion for reconsideration is not absolute and
recognizes some exceptions, there is no showing that the case at bar constitutes an
exception. Nevertheless, we gave due course to the petition to enable the Court to
reiterate and clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between Labor Arbiters and Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over money claims, and to render
substantial and speedy justice to subject aged stevedore retiree who first presented
his claim for retirement benefit in April 1991, or seven years ago.
Labor law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be fully conversant with
the requirements for the institution of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. For instance, it is necessary that a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission must first be resorted to.
The ruling in Corazon Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112630,
September 5, 1997, comes to the fore and should be well understood and observed.
An ordinary allegation ". . . and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" (Rule 65, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of
Court) is not a foolproof substitute for a Motion for Reconsideration, absence of which
can be fatal to a Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner cannot and should not rely on the
liberality of the Court simply because he is a working man.
In the Jamer case, this court said:
. . . This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal infirmity
as ruled in a long line of decisions, most recently is the case of
Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
The filing of such motion is intended to afford
public respondent an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a
re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of
the case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under
the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of
the right and opportunity of the respondent
commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly
imputed. . . .
Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence
certiorari proceedings, as in this case, will not prosper.
As stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-0201-93,
dated January 19, 1994, the facts of this case are undisputed. The Labor Arbiter
reported, thus:
Complainant, in his position paper (Record, pages 11 to 14) states
that he was hired sometime in July 1980 as a stevedore continuously
until he was advised in April 1991 to retire from service considering
that he already reached 65 years old (sic); that accordingly, he did
apply for retirement and was paid P3,156.39 for retirement pay . . .
(Rollo, pp. 15, 26-27, 58-59).
Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-
Case No. 00-03-02101-93, January 9, 1994
(Rollo, pp. 15017, at pp. 16-17).
The Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the merits of the complaint. Nowhere in
the Decision is made mention of or reference to the issue of jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter (Rollo, pp. 15-17). But the issue of jurisdiction is the bedrock of the Petition
because, as earlier intimated, the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, hereinbelow quoted, reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision on the issue of
jurisdiction. Reads subject Decision of the Labor Arbiter:
Respondents, in their Reply to complainant's position paper, allege
(Record, pages 18 to 21) that complainant's latest basic salary was
P120.34 per day; that he only worked on rotation basis and not
seven days a week due to numerous stevedores who can not all be
given assignments at the same time; that all stevedores only for
paid every time they were assigned or actually performed
stevedoring; that the computation used in arriving at the amount of
P3,156.30 was the same computation applied to the other
stevedores; that the use of divisor 303 is not applicable because
complainant performed stevedoring job only on call, so while he was
connected with the company for the past 11 years, he did not
actually render 11 years of service; that the burden of proving that
complainant's latest salary was P200.00 rests upon him; that he
already voluntarily signed a waiver of quitclaim; that if indeed
respondent took advantage of his illiteracy into signing his quitclaim,
he would have immediately filed this complaint but nay, for it took
him two (2) years to do so.
The issue therefore is whether or not complainant is entitled to the
claimed differential of separation pay.
We find for the complainant. He is entitled to differential.
We cannot sustain a computation of length of service based on the
ECC contribution records. Likewise, the allegation that complainant
rendered service for only five days a month for the past 11 years is
statistically improbable, aside from the fact that the best evidence
thereof are complainant's daily time records which respondent are
(sic) duty bound to keep and make available anytime in case of this.
The late filing has no bearing. The prescription period is three years.
It is suffice (sic) that the filing falls within the period.
Whether or not complainant worked on rotation basis is a burden
which lies upon the employer. The presumption is that the normal
working period is eight (8) hours a day and six (6) days a week, or
26 days a month, unless proven otherwise.
Also, the burden of proving the amount of salaries paid to employees
rests upon the employer not on the employee. It can be easily
proven by payrolls, vouchers, etc. which the employers are likewise
duty bound to keep and present. There being non, we have to
sustain complainant's assertion that his latest salary rate was P200 a
day or P5,200 a month. Therefore, his retrenchment pay differential
is P25,443.70 broken down as follows:
P200 x 26 days = P5,200 x 11 years
2
= (P2,600 x 11 years) - P3,156.30
= P28,600 - P3,156.30
= P25,443.70
The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC-NCR-CA No. 06701-94
April 20, 1995 (Rollo, pp. 18-21).
The National Labor Relations Commission reversed on jurisdictional ground the
aforesaid Decision of the Labor Arbiter; ruling, as follows:
. . . His claim for separation pay differential is based on the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between his union and the
respondent company, the pertinent portion of which reads:
. . . ANY UNION member shall be compulsory retired (sic) by the
company upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years, unless otherwise
extended by the company for justifiable reason. He shall be paid his
retirement pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every
year of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered as
one (1) whole year.
. . . The company agrees that in case of casual employees and/or
workers who work on rotation basis the criterion for determining
their retirement pay shall be 303 rotation calls or work days as
equivalent to one (1) year and shall be paid their retirement pay
equivalent to one half (1/2) month for every year of service.
xxx xxx xxx
Since the instant case arises from interpretation or implementation
of a collective bargaining agreement, the Labor Arbiter should have
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 217 (c)
of the Labor Code, which reads: (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter and the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in
said agreements.
Petitioner contends that:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL DESPITE THE
FACT 4 (SIC) THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THERE IS NO
SHOWING THAT A SURETY BOND WAS POSTED.
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF . . . DATED 19
JANUARY 1994 AND DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE ISSUE DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY
PROVISION OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. (Rollo,
pp. 7-8)
The Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment) sent in on December 6, 1995 by
the Office of the Solicitor General support the second issue, re: jurisdiction raised by
the Petitioner (Rollo, pp. 26-33, at pp. 38-32).
Labor Arbiter Decision
Labor Arbiters should exert all efforts to cite statutory provisions and/or judicial
decision to buttress their dispositions. An Arbiter cannot rely on simplistic statements,
generalizations, and assumptions. These are not substitutes for reasoned judgment.
Had the Labor Arbiter exerted more research efforts, support for the Decision could
have been found in pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, its implementing Rules,
and germane decisions of the Supreme Court. As this Court said in Juan Saballa, at al.
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102472-84, August 22, 1996:
. . . This Court has previously held that judges and arbiters should
draw up their decisions and resolutions with due care, and make
certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and
their final dispositions. A decision should faithfully comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which it is
based. If such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside,
upon the modified decision, such resolution or decision should
likewise state the factual and legal foundation relied upon. The
reason for this is obvious: aside from being required by the
Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden
change of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking
back of its solemn conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier
decision. The same thing goes for the findings of fact made by the
NLRC, as it is a settled rule that such findings are entitled to great
respect and even finality when supported by substantial evidence;
otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a
requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal. . . .
This is not an admonition but rather, advice and a critique to stress that both have
obligations to the Courts and students of the law. Decisions of the Labor Arbiters, the
National Labor Relations Commission, and the Supreme Court serve not only to
adjudicate disputes, but also as an educational tool to practitioners, executives, labor
leaders and law students. They all have a keen interest in methods of analysis and the
reasoning processes employed in labor dispute adjudication and resolution. In fact,
decisions rise or fall on the basis of the analysis and reasoning processes of decision
makers or adjudicators.
On the issues raised by the Petitioner, we rule:
1. Timeliness of Appeal
And Filing of Appeal Bond
The Court rules that the appeal of the respondent corporation was interposed within
the reglementary period, in accordance with the Rules of the National Labor Relations
Commission, and an appeal bond was duly posted. We adopt the following Comment
dated August 14, 1996, submitted by the National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
. . . While it is true that private respondent company received a copy
of the decision dated January 19, 1994 of the Labor Arbiter . . . and
filed its appeal on February 14, 1994, it is undisputed that the tenth
day within which to file an appeal fell on a Saturday, the last day to
perfect an appeal shall be the next working day.
Thus, the amendments to the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
Resolution No. 11-01-91 which took effect on January 14, 1992,
provides in part:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Rule VI, Sections 1 and 6 are hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Period of Appeal Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter . . . shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter
. . . . . . If the 10th day . . . falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Holiday,
the last day to perfect the decision shall be the next working day.
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, it is crystal clear that the appeal was filed within the
prescriptive period to perfect an appeal. Likewise, the petitioner's
contention that private respondent did not post the required surety
bond, deserves scant consideration, for the simple reason that a
surety bond was issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc., in
the amount of P25,443.70 (Rollo, pp. 63-64).
2. Jurisdictional Issue
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is clearly defined and specifically delineated in the Labor Code. The
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, read:
A. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter and the Commission. (a)
Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
and,
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic
or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator so maybe provided in
said agreement.
B. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the collective
bargaining agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations
of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such
agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of
the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the
Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
The aforecited provisions of law cannot be read in isolation or separately. They must
be read as a whole and each Article of the Code reconciled one with the other. An
analysis of the provisions of Articles 217, 261, and 262 indicates, that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly
include money claims in one form or another.
2. The cases where the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction are
enumerated in Article 217, and that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators in Article 261.
3. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is qualified by an exception
as indicated in the introductory sentence of Article 217 (a), to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters . . . (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . the following cases
involving all workers. . . .
The phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code" refers to the following
exceptions:
A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in
said agreement.
B. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Parenthetically, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
under Article 217 (c), for money claims is limited only to those arising from
statutes or contracts other than a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims "arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies", under
Article 261.
4. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is provided
for in Arts. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code as indicated above.
1. A close reading of Article 261 indicates that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is limited only to:
. . . unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies . . . Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining
agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. . . . .
2. Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, however, can exercise
jurisdiction over any and all disputes between an employer and a union and/or
individual worker as provided for in Article 262.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 262 must be voluntarily conferred upon by both
labor and management. The labor disputes referred to in the same Article 262 can
include all those disputes mentioned in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
As shown in the above contextual and wholistic analysis of Articles 217, 261, and 262
of the Labor Code, the National Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioner's money-claim-
underpayment of retirement benefits, as the controversy between the parties involved
an issue "arising from the interpretation or implementation" of a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy under Article
261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter.
3. Merits of the Case
The Court will not remand the case to the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators for hearing. This case has dragged on far too long eight (8) years. Any
further delay would be a denial of speedy justice to an aged retired stevedore. There is
further the possibility that any Decision by the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators will be appealed to the Court of Appeals, and finally to this Court.
Hence, the Court will rule on the merits of the case.
We adopt as our own the retirement benefit computation formula of the Labor Arbiter,
and the reasons therefor as stated in the decision abovequoted.
The simple statement of the Labor Arbiter that "we cannot sustain a computation of
length of service based on ECC contribution records", was not amply explained by the
Labor Arbiter; however, there is legal and factual basis for the same. It is unrealistic to
expect a lowly stevedore to know what reports his employer submits to the Employee's
Compensation Commission under Book IV, Health, Safety and Welfare Benefits, Title
II, Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund, of the Labor Code, simply
because the insurance fund is solely funded by the employer and the rate of
employer's contribution varies according to time and actuarial computations. (See
Articles 183-184; Labor Code). The worker has no ready access to this employer's
record. In fact, it is farthest from his mind to inquire into the amount of employer's
contribution, much less whether the employer remits the contributions. The worker is
at all times entitled to benefits upon the occurrence of the defined contingency even
when the employer fails to remit the contributions. (See Article 196 (b), Labor Code).
All employers are likewise required to keep an employment record of all their
employees, namely: payrolls; and time records. (See Book III, Rule X, specifically
Secs. 6, 7, 8, 1 and 12, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).
The respondent-employer was afforded the opportunity to show proof of the
petitioner's length of service and pay records. In both instances, the respondent-
employer failed. By its own folly, it must therefore suffer the consequences of such
failure. (South Motorists Enterprises v. Tosoc, 181 SCRA 386, [1990]) From the very
beginning by the provision of the retirement provision of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, i.e., the length of service as requirement for retirement, and salary as a
basis for benefit computation the employer was forewarned of the need for accurate
record keeping. This is precisely the basis of retirement, and the computation of
benefits based on years of service and monthly wage.
To recapitulate; the Court hereby rules
1. That the National Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the case, because the case involved an issue "arising from the
interpretation or implementation" of a Collective Bargaining Agreement;
2. That the appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission was filed within the
reglementary period and that the appeal bond was filed; and
3. That we adopt the computation formula for the retirement benefits by the Labor
Arbiter, and the basis thereof, The respondent must therefore pay the petitioner the
additional amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Three and Seventy
Centavos P25,443.70) Pesos.
In view of the long delay in the disposition of the case, this decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119293. June 10, 2003]
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM),
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of
the Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Injunction
Case No. 00468-94 dated November 29, 1994,xviii[1] and its resolution dated
February 1, 1995xix[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file
employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they
agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also
included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. The pertinent
provisions of the said CBA are quoted hereunder:
ARTICLE IV
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
Section 1. - The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor
and management may be solved through friendly negotiation;. . . that an open conflict
in any form involves losses to the parties, and that, therefore, every effort shall be
exerted to avoid such an open conflict. In furtherance of the foregoing principle, the
parties hereto have agreed to establish a procedure for the adjustment of grievances
so as to (1) provide an opportunity for discussion of any request or complaint and (2)
establish procedure for the processing and settlement of grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE V
ARBITRATION
Section 1. Any and all disputes, disagreements and controversies of any kind between
the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to wages, hours
of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations arising during
the effectivity of this Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
through a Committee in accordance with the procedure established in this Article. No
dispute, disagreement or controversy which may be submitted to the grievance
procedure in Article IV shall be presented for arbitration until all the steps of the
grievance procedure are exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE VI
STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES
Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or
slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise,
picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other
interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of this
Agreement.
Section 2. The COMPANY agrees that there shall be no lockout during the term of this
Agreement so long as the procedure outlined in Article IV hereof is followed by the
UNION.xx[3]
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal
dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting
out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6)
harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union
officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.xxi[4]
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president
Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only
contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5)
other acts of unfair labor practice. This was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-
94.xxii[5]
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike
with that of the Colomeda group,xxiii[6] to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs
lack of authority in filing the same.xxiv[7]
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to
Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they
affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.xxv[8]
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real
issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-
orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive
mediation. The said letter-orders, in part, read:
During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real issues
involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes, which
affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests of the
MAGNOLIA-NESTLE CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN
MIGUEL JUICES, INC.
Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded employer-respondent,
and considering further that the aforesaid companies are separate and distinct
corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike as
Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve
voluntary settlement of the disputes. . . .xxvi[9] (Emphasis supplied)
On May 16, 1994, while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the
Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner
opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote
Illegal,xxvii[10] invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon,xxviii[11] which held that no strike
could be legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB Director
Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the
conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive mediation and emphasizing
the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which is not
strikeable, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
A perusal of the records of the case clearly shows that the basic point to be resolved
entails the question of as to who between the two (2) groups shall represent the
workers for collective bargaining purposes, which has been the subject of a Petition for
Interpleader case pending resolution before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Similarly, the other issues raised which have been discussed by the
parties at the plant level, are ancillary issues to the main question, that is, the union
leadership...xxix[12] (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against
petitioner, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-05-263-94. Additional grounds were set forth
therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal
closure.xxx[13] The NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of
those alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the
consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to
preventive mediation.xxxi[14] On the same date, the group likewise notified the NCMB
of its intention to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
On May 27, 1994, the Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike
vote, which favored the holding of a strike.xxxii[15] In reply, NCMB issued a letter
again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is
deemed not to have been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for
lack of compliance with the notice requirement.xxxiii[16] Despite this and the
pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on
strike. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly
worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.xxxiv[17]
Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public
respondent NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization
Order.xxxv[18] After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and
egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful
picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.xxxvi[19]
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of
the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of good faith talks between the
management and the labor management committees. The MOA, signed in the
presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated
that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected in any
manner whatsoever by the agreement.xxxvii[20] The picket lines ended and work was
then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to
dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a result
of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic there
being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.xxxviii[21]
Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM,
as proof of the unions alleged threat to revive the strike.xxxix[22] The NLRC did not
rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
On November 29, 1994, the NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition
for injunction for lack of factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did
not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful
acts.xl[23] It likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated February 1, 1995.xli[24]
Hence, this petition.
Aggrieved by public respondents denial of a permanent injunction, petitioner contends
that:
A.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY
INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION
AND NOT TO STRIKE.
B.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN WITHHOLDING INJUNCTION WHICH
IS THE ONLY IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE DISASTROUS
ECONOMIC WARFARE THAT ARBITRATION IS DESIGNED TO AVOID.
C.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE TRO TO LAPSE
WITHOUT RESOLVING THE PRAYER FOR INJUNCTION, DENYING INJUNCTION
WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND
ISSUING ITS DENIAL FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE TRO.xlii[25]
We find for the petitioner.
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued
by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of
the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly
confers upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or restrain actual and threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a
particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in
favor of such party x x x. The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor
organization or the employer engages in any of the prohibited activities enumerated
in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to
restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation
v. NLRC,xliii[26] where the same issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was
raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
petition for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike based on non-
strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC,xliv[27] we held that it is the legal duty
and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law.
Failure promptly to issue an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held
therein to be an abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondents
strike. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of
the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. However, to
be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.xlv[28] One of the procedural
requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is
the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of
encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes,xlvi[29] this requirement has been
held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.xlvii[30]
In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive mediation as it
found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the
NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to
settle the dispute amicably,xlviii[31] and in line with the state policy of favoring
voluntary modes of settling labor disputes.xlix[32] In accordance with the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing
the notices of strike filed by respondent.l[33] A case in point is PAL v. Drilon,li[34]
where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the
NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a preventive mediation case. We ruled,
thus:
The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as appropriate for preventive mediation.
The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside)
was to drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the
NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive
mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared... The strike which the union
mounted, while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described
by the petitioner as an ambush. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB
ordered the preventive mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the
notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded with
the strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of
NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike. In the case of NUWHRAIN v.
NLRC,lii[35] where the petitioner-union therein similarly defied a prohibition by the
NCMB, we said:
Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB
when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of
discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not strikeable. The refusal of the
petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the
Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good
faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.liii[36]
The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner sought recourse from
the public respondent. The NLRC issued a TRO only for free ingress to and egress from
petitioners plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the fatal lack
of notice of strike, and five months after came out with a decision summarily rejecting
petitioners cited jurisprudence in this wise:
Complainants scholarly and impressive arguments, formidably supported by a long
line of jurisprudence cannot however be appropriately considered in the favorable
resolution of the instant case for the complainant. The cited jurisprudence do not
squarely cover and apply in this case, as they are not similarly situated and the
remedy sought for were different.liv[37]
Unfortunately, the NLRC decision stated no reason to substantiate the above
conclusion.
Public respondent, in its decision, moreover ruled that there was a lack of factual basis
in issuing the injunction. Contrary to the NLRCs finding, we find that at the time the
injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as
evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which led the
union. These flyers categorically declared: Ipaalala nyo sa management na hindi
iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay pwede nating muling
itirik ang picket line.lv[38] These flyers were not denied by respondent, and were
dated June 19, 1994, just a day after the unions manifestation with the NLRC that
there existed no threat of commission of prohibited activities.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Codelvi[39] explicitly
states that a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a
prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with
Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to
prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners argument pointing out
the unions failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the
case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC,lvii[40] we ruled that the union therein violated the
mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of strike without availing of the
remedies prescribed therein. Thus we held:
x x x For failing to exhaust all steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration
proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike
should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In the case of Liberal Labor
Union vs. Phil. Can Co., the court declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for
not complying with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. . . (Citations omitted)
As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with
the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC to compel observance of the
grievance and arbitration proceedings. Respondent however resorted to force without
exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited
CBA provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against
the strike. As we said long ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a
collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive
arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if
their ends have to be achieved.lviii[41]
As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA,
jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in
nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices.lix[42] The notices filed in
the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would
entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding
herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this
issue.
We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of legal requirements
imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of
settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution.lx[43] Trade
unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But
misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall
grave injury to a business enterprise.lxi[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of
the NLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the
dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration
proceedings as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.