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SUMMARRY OF THE CASES FOR PERSONS:

II. Human Relations (Civil Code, Arts. 19-22)
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CASES:
1. Taada vs. Tuvera-April 24, 1985
) As to the necessity of publication, the Supreme Court ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of
such is to gie the general public ade!uate notice of the arious laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citi"ens. #ithout such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
ma$im %ignorantia legis non e$cusat.% &t would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citi"en
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoeer, not een a constructie one.
The publication of all presidential issuances %of a public nature% or %of general applicability% is mandated by
law. 'biously, presidential decrees that proide for (nes, forfeitures or penalties for their iolation or
otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as ta$ and reenue measures, fall within this category. 'ther
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administratie and
e$ecutie orders need not be published on the assumption that they hae been circulari"ed to all concerned
2. Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, etc., Dec.
23, 2008)
The re!uisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic re!uirements of due process. Publication
is indeed imperatie, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citi"en for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoeer, not een a constructie one. #hat constitutes
publication is set forth in Article ) of the Ciil Code, which proides that %laws shall ta*e e+ect after 1, days
following the completion of their publication either in the '-cial .a"ette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. An electronic data message, or an electronic document, as the functional e!uialent of a written
document only for eidentiary purposes, in other words, the law merely recogni"es the admissibility in eidence /for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and0or electronic documents. &t does not ma*e the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
3. Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, G.R. No. 159747, Jun.
15,2004)
&n the case of People s. 1ue Po 2ay, 34 Phil. 546 /13,4). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a
penalty for its iolation should be published before becoming e+ectie.
7 &n the case of Ta8ada 9. Tuera, 145 Scra 4,: /13;5), The <onorable Court rules that=
o &nterpretatie regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the
administratie agency and not the public, need not be published. >either is publication re!uired of the so called
letters of instructions issued by the administratie superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in performance of their duties.
'?@AB'C Coint Circulars no. 3,A661 is merely an internal circular between the B'C and the o-ce of the
'mbudsman, 'utlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the B'C and of the o-ce of the
'mbudsman in the conduct of preliminary inestigation. &t does not regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.
4. Rep. vs. Claude A. Miller and Jumrus Miller, April 21, 1998
Des. An alien !uali(ed to adopt under the Child and Douth #elfare Code, which was in force at the time of the
(ling of the petition, ac!uired a ested right which could not be a+ected by the subse!uent enactment of a new law
dis!ualifying him.
5. Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005
The petitioner is presumed to hae acted with malice or eil intent when he married the priate complainant.
As a general rule, mista*e of fact or good faith of the accused is a alid defense in a prosecution for a felony by
doloE such defense negates malice or criminal intent. <oweer, ignorance of the law is not an e$cuse because
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eeryone is presumed to *now the law. F&gnorantia legis neminem e$cusatG #here a spouse is absent for the
re!uisite period, the present spouse may contract a subse!uent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptie death of the absent spouse to aoid being charged and conicted of bigamyE the present spouse
will hae to adduce eidence that he had a wellAfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subse!uent marriageE thus, een if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be conicted of the crime.
The court rules against the petitioner.
6. Phil. Bank of Comm. V. CIR, Jan. 28, 1999.
7. Ferrer vs. Diaz, 619 SCRA 26; April 23, 2010
&s ComandanteHs waier of hereditary rights alidI Is petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver
likewise valid and efective?
A contract may be classi(ed as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article
1:4J, where the following re!uisites concur=
/1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
/)) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritanceE and,
/:) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an e$pectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature.
:;
&n this case, there is no !uestion that at the time of e$ecution of ComandanteHs #aier of <ereditary Kights
and &nterest 'er a Keal Property /Still Lndiided), succession to either of her parentHs properties has not
yet been opened since both of them are still liing
8. Isabelo dela Cruz vs. Lucila dela Cruz; Dec. 04, 2013
did 2ucilaHs a-dait of waier ceding to &sabelo half of the subject property coneys to him a right of
ownership oer that halfI
The phrase %hereby waie% means that 2ucila was, by e$ecuting the a-dait, already waiing her right to the
property, irreersibly diesting herself of her e$isting right to the same. After he and his coAowner Mmelinda
accepted the donation, &sabelo became the owner of half of the subject property haing the right to demand its
partition.
9. HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES, et al vs. JOSE CALUMPANG, et al, October 30, 2006
<oweer, the e!uitable rights barred by laches still subsist and are not otherwise e$tinguished. Thus,
parties guilty of laches retains e!uitable rights albeit in an empty manner as they cannot assert their rights
judicially. <oweer, such e!uitable rights may be reied or actiated by the waier of those whose right
has ripened due to laches, and can be e$ercised to the e$tent of the right waied.
The waier is clear. The recent case of Valderama v. Macalde reiterated the three (3) essential
elements o a !ali" #ai!er$th%s= F/a) e$istence of a rightE /b) athe *nowledge of the e$istence thereofE
and, /c) an intention to relin!uish such right.G
N),O
These elements are all present in the case at bar.
&n this factual setting, respondents could hae (led an action for reconeyance to recoer their shares in
2ot >o. :;;6. <oweer, instead of instituting such a suit, respondents were able to conince 9ictorino, 2uis,
and Coito, all surnamed Keyes, to e$ecute a Beed of 1uitclaim restoring to them their shares. Therefore,
it is clear that the !uitclaim is not a donation for the three /:) Keyeses
10.INING vs. VEGA; August 12, 2013
'ne who is merely related by a-nity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a coA
owner of the decedentHs property. Conse!uently, he cannot e+ect a repudiation of the coAownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedentHs heirs
11.In the matter of the adoption of Stephany Nathy Astorga Garcia, March 31, 2005
'ne of the e+ects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents
and purposes pursuant to Article 1;3 of the Pamily Code and Section 1J of Article 9 of KA ;,,J.
@eing a legitimate by irtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights proided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any *ind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Ciil Code and Pamily 2aw Committees. &n fact, it
is a Pilipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
12.Rep. vs. Orbecido III, Oct. 5, 2005
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The court ruled that ta*ing into consideration the legislatie intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
)5 Par.) should be interpreted to include cases inoling parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Pilipino citi"ens, but later on, one of them becomes naturali"ed as a foreign citi"en and
obtains a diorce decree. The Pilipino spouse should li*ewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemni"ation of the marriage.
<ence, the courtHs unanimous decision in holding Article )5 Par ) be interpreted as allowing a Pilipino
citi"en who has been diorced by a spouse who had ac!uired a citi"enship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
13.Van Dorn vs. Romillo Oct. 8, 1985
The policy against absolute diorce coers only Philippine nationals. <oweer, aliens may obtain diorce abroad,
which may be recogni"ed in the Philippines proided they are alid according to their national law.
Prom the standards of American law, under which diorce dissoles marriage, the diorce in >eada released
priate respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, priate
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. <e would hae no standing to sue in the case as petitionerHs
husband entitled to e$ercise control oer conjugal assets. <e is estopped by his own representation before said
court from asserting his right oer the alleged conjugal property.
14.Llorente vs. CA and llorente- Nov. 23, 2000
Art. 15. Keal property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
F<oweer, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic alidity of testamentary proisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whateer may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.G
As to the alidity of the foreign diorce, jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proen that an indiidual is no longer
a Pilipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a diorce abroadE its e+ects shall be recogni"ed in the Philippines.
The Supreme Court held that the diorce obtained by 2oren"o <. 2lorente from his (rst wife Paula was alid and
recogni"ed in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
>ow, the e+ects of this diorce /as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
#hether the will is intrinsically alid and who shall inherit from 2oren"o are issues best proed by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proed. #hether the will was e$ecuted in accordance with the formalities re!uired is
answered by referring to Philippine law. &n fact, the will was duly probated.
The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the KTC is reersed. Court KM?A>BS the cases to the court of origin
for determination of the intrinsic alidity of 2oren"o >. 2lorenteHs will and determination of the partiesH successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framewor* of the Kules of Court.
15.Rep. vs. Orbecido III -Oct. 5, 2005
16.Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera- 174 SCRA 653 (1989)
The law speci(cally proided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
(le the complaint should be the o+ended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
priate respondent is the o+ended spouse, the latter obtained a alid diorce in his country, the Pederal
Kepublic of .ermany, and said diorce and its legal e+ects may be recogni"ed in the Philippines in so far
as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, priate respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the o+ended spouse at the time he (led suit.
17.Garcia vs. Reccio, Oct. 2, 2001
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2 of the Famil! "ode allows the former to contract a subse#uent marriage in case the
divorce is $validl! obtained abroad b! the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarr!%. A divorce obtained abroad b!
two aliens, ma! be recogni&ed in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before
our courts can recogni&e a foreign divorce, the part! pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformit! to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and 'amson appears to be authentic, issued b! an Australian
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famil! court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign
laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner(s failure to ob)ect properl! because he
ob)ected to the fact that it was not registered in the *ocal "ivil +egistr! of "abanatuan "it!, not to its admissibilit!.
+espondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validl! admitted as evidence, ade#uatel! established
his legal capacit! to marr! under Australian law. ,owever, there are two t!pes of divorce, absolute divorce terminating
the marriage and limited divorce merel! suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not -nown which t!pe of divorce the
respondent procured.
.ven after the divorce becomes absolute, the court ma! under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. /nder the
Australian divorce decree $a part! to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigam!%. This shows that the divorce obtained b! the respondent might have been restricted. +espondent also
failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, the! don(t absolutel! establish his legal capacit! to remarr! according to the alleged foreign law.
"ase remanded to the court a #uo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and
void based on lac- of evidence conclusivel! showing the respondent(s legal capacit! to marr! petitioner. 0ith the lac- of
such evidence, the court a #uo ma! declare nullit! of the parties( marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.
18.Rep. vs. Iyoy-Sept. 21, 2005
The eidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Purthermore, Article
:5 Fcontemplates downright incapacity or inability to ta*e cogni"ance of and to assume the basic marital
obligationsE not a mere refusal, neglect or di-culty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
&rreconcilable di+erences, conQicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, se$ual in(delity or perersion, and abandonment, by themseles, also do not
warrant a (nding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.G Pinally, Article :5 Fis not to be
confused with a diorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themseles. &t refers to a serious psychological illness aRicting a party een before the celebration of
marriage. &t is a malady so grae and so permanent as to deprie one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.G
19.San Luis v. San Luis 6 February 2007
1. 9enue was properly laid. Lnder Section 1, Kule J: of the Kules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate should be (led in the KTC of the proince Fin which he resides at the time of
his deathG. &n the case of .arcia Pule . CA, we laid down the rule that for determining enue, the
residence of the decedent is determining. Kesidence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile proided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. &t is possible that a
person may hae his residence in one place and domicile in another.
). The diorce decree obtained by ?erry 2ee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Pelicisimo to remarry would
hae ested Pelicidad with the legal personality to (le the present petition as the suriing spouse.
<oweer, the respondent was not able to proide su-cient documentation to proe the decree of diorce
obtained in <awaii.
Men assuming that Pelicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 13J4, neertheless, we (nd
that the latter has the legal personality to (le the subject petition for letters of administration as she may
be considered the coAowner of Pelicisimo as regards the properties ac!uired during their cohabitation.
The case is therefore remanded to the KTC for further proceedings.
20.MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,February 8, 2012
&t appears that the trial court no longer re!uired petitioner to proe the alidity of 'rlandoHs diorce under
the laws of the Lnited States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need
to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of eidence to establish the fact of
diorce.
Should petitioner proe the alidity of the diorce and the subse!uent marriage, she has the preferential
right to be issued the letters of administration oer the estate. 'therwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or ne$t of *in of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 5 of Kule J; of the Keised Kules of Court.
Thus, it is imperatie for the trial court to (rst determine the alidity of the diorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration oer the estate of 'rlando @. Catalan.
21.Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas, Aug. 11, 2010
The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. )5, S) of the Pamily Code as the substantie right it
establishes is in faor of the P&2&P&>' SP'LSM.
Art. )5, S) was included in the law to aoid the absurd situation where the Pilipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a diorce, is no longer married to the Pilipino spouse. The
legislatie intent is for the bene(t of the Pilipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
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doubts created by thediorce decree. Mssentially, Art. )5, S) proided the Pilipino spouse a substantie
right to hae his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissoled, capacitating him or her to
remarry. #ithout Art. )5, S), the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of diorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
signi(cance to the Pilipino spouse since our laws do not recogni"e diorce as a mode of seering the
marital bond.
An action based on Art. )5, S) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign diorce decree. &f the court
(nds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Pilipino
spouse is li*ewise capacitated to contract another marriage. <oweer, no Philippine court can ma*e a
similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally goerned by his
national law.
22.Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 404 SCRA 495
As a general rule, diorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recogni"able in our
jurisdiction. @ut the legal e+ects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
@efore our courts can gie the e+ect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
#olfgang by the .erman court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been gien
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Kule :3, Section ,6 of the Kules of Court /now Kule
:3, Section 4;, 133J Kules of Ciil Procedure).
&n the present case, it cannot be said that priate respondent was gien the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the .erman court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard
to the rights of #olfgang to hae parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the .erman
court were summary. As to what was the e$tent of CarmenHs participation in the proceedings in the
.erman court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any (nding that priate respondent is un(t to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.
23.Herald Dacasin vs. Sharon Dacasin- Feb. 5, 2010
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authorit! shall be exercised b! the parent designated b! the
"ourt. The "ourt shall ta-e into account all relevant considerations, especiall! the choice of the child over seven !ears of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Art. 2035. 1o compromise upon the following #uestions shall be valid2
345 The civil status of persons;
325 The validit! of a marriage or a legal separation;
365 An! ground for legal separation;
375 Future support;
385 The )urisdiction of courts;
35 Future legitime. 34947a5
"ourt(s +ationale2
o It is precluded from ta-ing cogni&ance over suit considering the Illinois "ourt(s retention of )urisdiction to enforce
its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custod! of 'tephanie to respondent
o The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this )urisdiction
Agreement is void
o The agreement is void for contravening Article 2:68 paragraph 8 of the "ivil "ode prohibiting compromise
agreements on )urisdiction.
Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle 'tephanie(s custod!.3Article 213 of the
Family Code lost its coverage over 'tephanie. 'tephanie was alread! almost 48 during this time thus, she is entitled to
choose to whom she want to be5
24.Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, ET. AL. June 26, 2013
&SSUES=
/1) #hether the Kule on Beclaration of Absolute >ullity of 9oid ?arriages and Annulment of 9oidable
?arriages /A.?. >o. 6)A11A16ASC) is applicable.
/)) #hether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can (le a petition to recogni"e a foreign judgment
nullifying the subse!uent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citi"en on the ground of
bigamy.
/:) #hether the Kegional Trial Court can recogni"e the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Ciil Kegistry under Kule 16; of the Kules of Court.
RAT&ONA'E( HO')&N*:
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&. Por Philippine courts to recogni"e a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citi"en of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to proe the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Kules of Court. To be more speci(c, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
eidence and proen as a fact under Kule 1:), Sections )4 and ),, in relation to Kule :3, Section 4;/b) of
the Kules of Court.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage a+ects the ciil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. <oweer, the e+ect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To e$tend the e+ect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
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Article 1, of the Ciil Code proides that %NlOaws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citi"ens of the Philippines, een though liing abroad.% This is the rule of lex nationalii in priate
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may re!uire, for e+ectiity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment a+ecting its citi"en, oer whom it e$ercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citi"en.
Courts are not allowed to dele into the merits of a foreign judgment. 'nce a foreign judgment is admitted
and proen in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds e$ternal to its merits, i.e. , %want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mista*e of law or fact.
#hile the Philippines does not hae a diorce law, Philippine courts may, howeer, recogni"e a foreign
diorce decree under the second paragraph of Article )5 of the Pamily Code, to capacitate a Pilipino citi"en
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a diorce decree abroad.
5,
There is therefore no reason to disallow Puji*i to simply proe as a fact the Capanese Pamily Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between ?arinay and ?ae*ara on the ground of bigamy. #hile the Philippines has no
diorce law, the Capanese Pamily Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared oid from the beginning under Article :,/4) of the Pamily Code. @igamy is a crime under
Article :43 of the Keised Penal Code.
&&. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only re!uires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the ciil registry under Kule 16; of the Kules of
Court. Kule 1, Section : of the Kules of Court proides that %NaO special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
see*s to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Kule 16;, Section 1 of the Kules of Court states=
Sec. 1. Who may fle petition. T Any person intereste" in any a+t$ e!ent$ or"er or "e+ree concerning
the+i!il stat%s o ,ersons #hi+h has -een re+or"e" in the +i!il re.ister$ may (le a eri(ed petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Kegional Trial Court of the proince
where the corresponding ciil registry is located. /Mmphasis supplied)
Puji*i has the personality to (le a petition to recogni"e the Capanese Pamily Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between ?arinay and ?ae*ara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his ciil
status as married to ?arinay. Por the same reason he has the personality to (le a petition under Kule 16;
to cancel the entry of marriage between ?arinay and ?ae*ara in the ciil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Capanese Pamily Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
&&&. A Pilipino citi"en cannot dissole his marriage by the mere e$pedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the ciil registry.
<oweer, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a ciil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citi"en of the foreign
country. There is neither circumention of the substantie and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Pamily Courts under K.A. >o. ;:53. Kecognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. &t is an action for Philippine courts to recogni"e the e+ectiity of a foreign
judgment, #hi+h ,res%,,oses a +ase #hi+h #as alrea"/ trie" an" "e+i"e" %n"er orei.n la#. The
procedure in A.?. >o. 6)A11A16ASC does not apply in a petition to recogni"e a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citi"en of the foreign country.
25.Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749. Jan. 31, 1963
As e$plained in the arious authorities cited aboe, the national law mentioned in Article 15 of our Ciil
Code is the law on conQict of laws in the California Ciil Code, i.e., Article 345, which authori"es the
reference or return of the !uestion to the law of the testatorHs domicile. The conQict of laws rule in
California, Article 345, Ciil Code, precisely refers bac* the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot
and should not refer the case bac* to CaliforniaE such action would leae the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be li*e a football, tossed bac* and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citi"en and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conQict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
!uestion has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California proides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. ;;J/4) and ;34, Ciil Code of the Philippines, ma*es
natural children legally ac*nowledged forced heirs of the parent recogni"ing them.
#e therefore (nd that as the domicile of the deceased Mdward, a citi"en of California, is the Philippines, the
alidity of the proisions of his will depriing his ac*nowledged natural child, the appellant <M2M>, should
be goerned by the Philippine 2aw, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 345 of the Ciil Code of California, not by
the internal law of California..
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NOTES= There is no single American law goerning the alidity of testamentary proisions in the Lnited
States, each state of the Lnion haing its own priate law applicable to its citi"ens only and in force only
within the state. The Fnational lawG indicated in Article 15 of the Ciil Code aboe !uoted cannot,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the priate
law of the State of California.
26.Bellis vs. Bellis
Court ruled that proision in a foreignerHs will to the e+ect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and oid, for his national law cannot
be ignored in iew of those matters that Article 16 T now Article 15 T of the Ciil Code states said
national law should goern.
#here the testator was a citi"en of Te$as and domiciled in Te$as, the intrinsic alidity of his will should be
goerned by his national law. Since Te$as law does not re!uire legitimes, then his will, which depried his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is alid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the te$as
law, which is the national law of the deceased.
27.Miciano vs. Primo
&SSUE: #hether Tur*ish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Coseph @rimoHs estates.
HE'):
Though the last part of the second clause of the will e$pressly said that Fit be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine &slandG, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoeer, een should the testator otherwise proide. &mpossible conditions are further de(ned as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall goern in his testamentary
dispositions
28.Insular Govt vs. Frank
?r. Pran* being fully !uali(ed to enter into a contract at the place and time the contract was made, he
cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. Although
?r.Pran* was still a minor under Philippine laws, he was neertheless considered an adult under the laws of
the state of &llinois, the place where the contract was made. >o rule is better settled in law than that
matters bearing upon the e$ecution, interpretation and alidity of a contract are determined by the law of
the place where the contract is made. ?atters connected to its performance are regulated by the law
preailing at the place of its performance. ?atters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit,
admissibility of eidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought
Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract is goerned by national law, this is one
case not inoling real property which was decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law,
what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the le$ loci celebrationis. According to ConQict of
2aws writer Mdgardo Paras, Pran*Hs capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of the
place where the contract was entered into. &n the instant case whether it is the place where the contract
was made or Pran*Hs nationality, the result would be the same. <oweer, as suggested by the mentioned
author, for the conQicts rule in capacity in general, national law of the parties is controlling
29.Carpio vs. Soledad, Sept. 9, 2004
&n the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is
the principle *nown as % abuse of rights % under Article 13 of the Ciil Code. To (nd
e$istence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present= 1) there is legal right or dutyE ))
which is e$ercised in bad faithE :) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate e$ercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faithE but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitionerUs erbal reproach against respondent was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody *new that she brought such *ind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attac* respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely in!uisitie but out rightly accusatory.
30.Nikko Manila Hotel vs. Reyes, Feb. 28, 2005
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusiely in as*ing ?r. Keyes to leae the party. Plainti+
failed to establish any proof of illAmotie on the part of ?s. 2im who did all the necessary precautions to
ensure that ?r. Keyes will not be humiliated in re!uesting him to leae the party. Considering almost )6
years of e$perience in the hotel industry, ?s. 2im is e$perienced enough to *now how to handle such
matters. <ence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 13 and )6 of the
Ciil Code.
; | P a g e
31.Ardiente vs. Sps. Pastofde, July 17, 2013
disconnection caseA #hen a right is e$ercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 13 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. @ut while Article 13 lays down a rule of conduct for the goernment of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not proide a remedy for its iolation. .enerally, an action for
damages under either Article )6 or Article )1 would be proper.
32.Raul H. Sesbreno vs. CA, et. Als. , March 26, 2014 VECO CASE
THE CONST&TUT&ONA' *UARANTEE APP'&ES ON'Y &F THE SEARCH 0AS )ONE 1Y THE
*O2ERNMENT3 2ECO AN) &TS TEAM ARE NOT *O2ERNMENT A*ENTS3 NOT 1E&N* A*ENTS OF
THE STATE$ THEY )&) NOT HA2E TO F&RST O1TA&N A SEARCH 0ARRANT TO )O SO3
1UT 1A'&CHA A TEAM MEM1ER 0AS A PO'&CEMAN3 )&) H&S PRESENCE NOT MA4E THE SEARCH
AS A SEARCH 1Y *O2ERNMENT A*ENT5

NO3 H&S RO'E THERE 0AS NOT TO SEARCH 1UT ON'Y TO PRO2&)E SECUR&TY FOR THE TEAM3
33.TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, January 19, 2010
Hel"(R%lin.: >o, the decision of the CA did not err. Lnder the abuse of right principle found in Article 13
of the Ciil Code,

a person must, in the e$ercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. <e would be
liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles )6

and )1

of the Ciil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he su+ers because of
such abuse of right or duty.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Kos!ueta. Such
damages may be awarded when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plainti+s
anguish

in the cases speci(ed in Article ))13

of the Ciil Code.
34.California Clothing vs. Quinones, Oct. 23, 2013
Clearly, these statements are out rightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she
fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately too* the same without paying for it and
later hurriedly left the shop to eade payment.
Articles )6 and )1 of the Ciil Code which read=
4
Article )6. Mery person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Article )1. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals
or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
&n iew of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorneyUs fees. ?oral
damages may be awarded wheneer the defendantUs wrongful act or omission is the pro$imate cause of
the plainti+s physical su+ering, mental anguish, fright, serious an$iety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shoc*, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases speci(ed or analogous to those
proided in Article ))13 of the Ciil Code.
41
?oral damages are not a bonan"a. They are gien to ease
the defendantUs grief and su+ering. They should, thus, reasonably appro$imate the e$tent of hurt caused
and the graity of the wrong done.
4)
They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the
latter to obtain means, diersions, or amusements that will sere to alleiate the moral su+ering he has
undergone
35.Pantaleon vs. American express intl inc-aug. 26, 2010
. Des. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmM$ incurred delay, but
because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 11J6, led to the particular injuries under Article
))1J of the Ciil Code for which moral damages are remuneratie. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster V that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by
petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his seeral traeling companions V gae rise to
the moral shoc*, mental anguish, serious an$iety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by
Pantaleon, as concluded by the KTC.
36.Manzanal vs. illusorio-dec 6 2010
&SSLM= whether the complaint for damages (led by Kamon W. &lusorio /respondent) against petitioners
Bennis K. ?an"anal and @aguio Country Club Corporation /@CCC) states a cause of action.
The law, therefore, recogni"es a primordial limitation on all rightsE that in their e$ercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 13 must be obsered. A right, though by itself legal because recogni"ed
or granted by law as such, may neertheless become the source of some illegality. #hen a right is
3 | P a g e
e$ercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 13 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. @ut while Article 13 lays down a rule of conduct for the goernment of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not proide a remedy for its iolation. .enerally, an action for
damages under Article )6 or Article )1 would be proper.
>o cause of Action.
37.Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, Oct. 16, 2009
38.Sps. Hing v. Choachuy-July 26, 2013
/1) whether there is a iolation of petitionersH right to priacy,
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to priacy is enshrined in our Constitution
44
and in our laws. &t is de(ned as Fthe right to be free from
unwarranted e$ploitation of oneHs person or from intrusion into oneHs priate actiities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a personHs ordinary sensibilities.G
4,
&t is the right of an indiidual Fto be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to lie without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public
is not necessarily concerned.G
45
Simply put, the right to priacy is Fthe right to be let alone.G
Article )5/1) of the Ciil Code, on the other hand, protects an indiidualHs right to priacy and proides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other indiiduals. &t states=
Art. )5. Mery person shall respect the dignity, personality, priacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal o+ense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, preention and other relief
/1) Prying into the priacy of anotherHs residenceE
$ $ $ $
This proision recogni"es that a manHs house is his castle, where his right to priacy cannot be denied or
een restricted by others. &t includes Fany act of intrusion into, peeping or peering in!uisitiely into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter.G
43
The phrase Fprying into the priacy of anotherHs
residence,G howeer, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to priacy. As elucidated by Ciil
law e$pert Arturo ?. Tolentino=
'ur Code speci(cally mentions Fprying into the priacy of anotherHs residence.G This does not mean,
howeer, that only the residence is entitled to priacy, because the law coers also Fsimilar acts.G A
-%siness o6+e is entitle" to the same ,ri!a+/ #hen the ,%-li+ is e7+l%"e" there rom an" onl/
s%+h in"i!i"%als as are allo#e" to enter ma/ +ome in. $ $ $
,6
/mphasis supplied)
The reasonable expectation of privacy test is used to determine whether there is a violation
of the right to privacy
/1) #hether, by his conduct, the indiidual has e$hibited an e$pectation of priacyE and
/)) this e$pectation is one that society recogni"es as reasonable.G Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or e$tend an indiidualHs Freasonable e$pectation of priacy.G
,:

<ence, the reasonableness of a personHs e$pectation of priacy must be determined on a caseAtoAcase
basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by NrespondentsO of a reoling camera, een if it were mounted on their building, iolated the
right of priacy of NpetitionersO, who are the owners of the adjacent lot.
FThe owner of a thing cannot ma*e use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.G
,,
39. Tenchavez vs. Escano, 17 SCRA 674
Ciil Code of the Philippines does not admit diorce. Philippine courts cannot gie recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute diorce between Pilipino citi"ens because it would be a iolation of the Ciil Code.
Such grant would arise to discrimination in faor of rich citi"ens who can a+ord diorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Mscano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchae". &n the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchae" and Mscano are still
married. A foreign diorce between Pilipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the diorcee entitled to alidity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
inalid diorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
40. Lagon vs Ca-March 18, 2005
16 | P a g e
>o, the interference of 2agon was with a legal justi(cation /in furtherance of a personal (nancial interest)
and without bad faith.
RAT&O:
Elements o Tort%o%s &ntereren+e #ith +ontra+t%al relations /!o "in# $un v. %&)=
1. M$istence of a alid contract
). Wnowledge on the part of the third person of the e$istence of the contract
:. &nterference of the third person without legal justi(cation or e$cuse
To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must hae acted with malice or must hae been
drien by purely impious reasons to injure the plainti+.
Men assuming that priate respondent was able to proe the renewal of his lease contract with @ai Tonina
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to proe malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing
the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was neer established. This case is one of
damnum abs'ue in(uria or damage without injury.
&n8%r/A legal inasion of a legal right
)ama.eA the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury
1P& Car" Cor, !s CA= There can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a
iolation of a legal duty.
41.LACSON vs. SAN JOSE-LACSON
Was the assailed compromise a#reement)and the (ud#ment o* the %+I #rounded on said a#reement)
con*ormable to law? DMSTbut only as far as the separation of property of spouses and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, in accordance with Article 131 of the Ciil Code. The spouses did not appear to
hae any creditors who would hae been prejudiced by their arrangement. At the time of the decision the
spouses had been separated (e years and so the propriety of seering their (nancial and proprietary
interests was manifest. /<oweer, the Court maintained that approing the separation of property and
dissolution of conjugal partnership did not amount to recognition or legali"ation of de *acto separation.)
As to the custody of the children, they were all below J years of age at the time of the agreement and so
the CA was correct in awarding the custody to the mother. The Court was also Floath to uphold the
coupleHs agreement regarding the custody of the childrenG, citing rights of the children to proper care not
anchored on the solely on the whims of his or her parents. Courts must decide (tness of parents for
custody.
42.Illusorio vs. Illusorio-Bildner, July 19, 2001)
A writ of habeas corpus e$tends to all cases of illegal con(nement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must
an illegal and inoluntary depriation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
e+ectie not merely nominal or moral.
Midence showed that there was no actual and e+ectie detention or depriation of PotencianoHs liberty that would
justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was ;5 years of age and under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. <e still has the capacity to discern his actions. #ith his full mental capacity
haing the right of choice, he may not be the subject of isitation rights against his free choice. 'therwise, he will
be depried of his right to priacy.
The case at bar does not inole the right of a parent to isit a minor child but the right of a wife to isit a
husband. &n any eent, that the husband refuses to see his wife for priate reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the e$ercise of his right.
43. Goitia vs. Campus-rueda-November 2, 1916
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Articles 44, 4,, and 4; of this law read=
AKT. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
AKT. 4,. The husband must lie with and protect his wife. /The second paragraph deals with the management of the
wifeUs property.)
AKT. 4;. The wife must obey her husband, lie with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
>otwithstanding the proisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause reliee her from this duty
when the husband remoes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 14: and 143 of the Ciil Code are as follows=
AKT. 14:. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole e$tent speci(ed in the preceding
article.
1. The consorts.
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
AKT. /143) 43. The person obliged to gie support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that
may be ($ed or by receiing and maintaining in his own home the person haing the right to the same.
Article 1,) of the Ciil Code gies the instances when the obligation to gie support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to lie with her husband is not one of them.
11 | P a g e
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the e$press or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of
the husbandE an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such ital concern to the state itself that the laws will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driing his wife to see* protection in the parental home.
44.Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)
HE'): Des. .ashem is liable to pay for damages in faor of ?arilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article )1 of the Ciil Code which proides=
&ny person who wil*ully causes loss or in(ury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, #ood
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter *or the dama#e.
@reach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. &n this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by .ashem that constitutes a iolation of Article )1 of the Ciil Code. <is promise of marrying
?arilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into se$ual congress. As found by the trial court, ?arilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a irgin before she met .ashem. She would not hae surrendered
herself to .ashem had .ashem not promised to marry her. .ashemHs blatant disregard of Pilipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Pilipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and een ta*ing adantage of the
opportunity to study here he is e$pected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article )1 of the Ciil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article )1 was meant to e$pand the concepts of torts and !uasi
delict. &t is meant to coer situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly
coered by e$isting laws. &t was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to speci(cally enumerate and punish in the statute boo*s V such as the
absence of a law penali"ing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court howeer agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and
there was carnal *nowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recoered /presence of moral or
criminal seduction), M$cept if there was mutual lustE or if e$penses were made because of the promise
/e$penses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recoered.
45.Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 , December 26, 1964)
&SSUE:
&s breach of promise to marry an actionable wrongI
HE'):
The e$tent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article )1 of the
Ciil Code proides that Fany person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
@ut to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to wal* out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemni"ed, is !uite di+erent. This is palpably and unjusti(ably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article )1 of the Ciil Code.
#hen a breach to marry is actionable under Article )1 of the Ciil Code, moral damages may be awarded under
Article ))13/16) of the said Code. M$emplary damages may also be awarded under Article )):) of said Code where
it is proen that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, rec*less and oppressie manner.
46.Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)
&SSUE: #hether or not moral damages are recoerable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HE'): >o. @reach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its
award of damages on Article ))13 of the Ciil Code which says in part that F?oral damages may be
recoered fromX /:) Seduction, $$$XG <oweer, it must be noted that the FSeductionG being
contemplated in the said Ciil Code proision is the same FSeductionG being contemplated in Article ::J
and ::; of the Keised Penal Code. Such FseductionG is not present in this case.
Purther, it cannot be said that Prancisco morally seduced /in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad gien the
circumstances of this case. Soledad was 16 years older than Prancisco. Soledad had a better job
e$perience and a better job oerall than Prancisco who was a mere apprentice. Purther still, it was
admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Prancisco and that she wanted to bind Fby
haing a fruit of their engagement een before they had the bene(t of clergy.G
TA4E NOTE:
Lnder Article :;; of the Keised Penal Code,
the elements of sim,le se"%+tion are as follows=
1. That the o+ended party is oer 1) and under 1; years of ageE
). That she must be of good reputation, single or widowE
:. That the o+ender has se$ual intercourse with herE and
4. That it is committed by means of deceit.