BINALAY VS.

MANALO
FACTS: Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2
diferent people (the latters daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were
later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside the
Cagayan River, which, due to fooding, would place a portion of the land underwater
during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days, however, the land
would be dried up for the entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of the
land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was
then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.
The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain
point to form two braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts
through Lot 307, and is fooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed portion, on
the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during
the rainy season while the island/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the
forks becomes dry and perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary
depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled
Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern
branch of the rivers fork.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged
portion of the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the
Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other edges of the
lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip during the summer.
Manalo fled 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he fled a
complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial
court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be
considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when the land
dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the
ruling in Govt of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually
inappropriate because the subject matter in this case was a lake so that the defnition
of a bed was diferent.]
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
RULING: No. The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy
rains that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the
rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property of
public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identifed by Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed
portion as a river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both
sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was called
Rio Muerte de Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the civil
code states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word river includes the
running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually owned that part of
the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is
difcult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been brought about by
accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfed. These are:
1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast). The
accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT,
the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite it across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep
may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action like fooding. The steep slopes could
not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.
CUREG VS IAC
FACTS: On November 1982, repondents fled a complaint for quieting of title and
damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners Carniyan with the RTC of
Isabela. The trial court has issued a TRO. The complaint allege that respondents are the
legal and/or the forced heirs by the late Domingo Gerardo, being the only issue of the
Francisco Gerardo who died of outbreak together with his predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fde claim of
ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their
"motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela.
On September 1982, an extra-judicial partition with voluntary reconveyance was
executed for the motherland. already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about
three (3) hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan
River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the
frst week of October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their
"motherland" together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by
defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to do so.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-
existent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a
piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco
Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject land" is an accretion to
their registered land and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the
"accretion" for many years now.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners own the subject land or accretion.
RULING: Yes, The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged
"motherland" claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an
alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to
Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the efects of the current of the waters.
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four
thousand fve hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said
land is approximately fve and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of
petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward
movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande
v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the
operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.
GRANDE v. CA
FACTS: The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their
deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In
the early 1930s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for
registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the
northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and
an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The
Grandes fled an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were
in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until
1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs,
however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and
pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the
riparian owners?
RULING: Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the
adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing
that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only
specifes a specifc portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and
are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that
they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses,
as opposed to the Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs only
entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the
land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the
possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not
the New Civil Code, which only took efect in 1950.
FERNANDEZ VS TANADA
FACTS: An application for registration dated December 1967, fled with the court of frst
instance of Cebu. Juan Borromeo, respondent, ask the court to declare that he is the
absolute owner of the lot situated at Barrio Pook, Talisay, Cebu. Respondent base his
claim of ownership on article 457 of the civil code. Alleging that the land sought to be
registered was form of accretion.
On March 1968, petitoners herein opposed the application on the grounds that article
457 could not be invoked, the disputed area having been formed by action of the sea
and not by river currents, there being no river in the vicinity; (b) that it was the
oppositors who occupied the said land openly and publicly and not respondent; and (c)
respondent Juan Borromeo is an alien, not qualifed to own real properties in the
Philippines.
In an order dated 28 July 1969, the LRC ruled that the petitioners-oppositors have no
interest over the subject land, thereby dismissing the opposition fled by them for lack
of legal basis. However, the said order was set aside after a Motion for Reconsideration
was fled by said petitioners-oppositors. 2 In an order dated 3 December 1969, the
aforesaid order of 28 July 1969 was revived, directing further the demolition of the 11
huts in the premises built by the herein petitioners-oppositors.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 457 can be invoked by the respondent?
RULING: No, If it be true that the lot sought to be registered "was formed by accretion
which it gradually received from the efects of the current of the waters fowing on the
river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant" (now private
respondent Juan Borromeo) (Application, Annex "A" of Petition, paragraph 3), then title
to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Borromeos petition to the Registration
Court "to declare him the owner of the lot is in efect a request for confrmation of the
title already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the application.
DE BUYSER VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: Plaintif-appellant is the registered owner of Lot No. 4217 of the Surigao
Cadastre, which borders the Surigao Strait. Contiguous to said lot is a parcel of land
which was formed by accretion from the sea, the subject- matter of this controversy.
Defendants Ignacio Tandayag and his wife Candida Tandayag have been occupying this
foreshore land under a Revocable Permit issued by the Director of Lands. For the use
and occupation thereof, said spouses paid the Bureau of Lands the amount of P6.50
annually. They have a house on said lot, which plaintif alleged had been purchased by
the Tandayags from one Francisco Macalinao, a former lessee of the plaintif.
Claiming ownership of the said land, plaintif fled an action against the spouses
Tandayag in the Court of First Instance of Surigao to recover possession of this land as
well as rents in arrears for a period of six years. The complaint was subsequently
amended to implead the Director of Land as defendant, allegedly for having illegally
issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintif own the subject land.
RULING: No, The plaintif's claim of ownership over the land in question is bereft of
legal basis. Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and,
therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside
the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative
branch of the government.
In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintif invokes Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 which provides:
Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain, when
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof.
Plaintif's reliance on the above article is quite misplaced. The true construction of the
cited provision is that the State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only
when they are no longer needed for the purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar,
the trial court found that plaintif's evidence failed to prove that the land in question is
no longer needed by the government, or that the essential conditions for such grant
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters, exists.
REPUBLIC VS CA
FACTS: On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus.
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de
Jesus fled his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan
Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio
de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an
aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales
Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for
military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom
portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will
continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identifed as Lot 1176-B-2, the
very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85
withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staf, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was
amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the
same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment
was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered
the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a
tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City
of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of
agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao,
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares.
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and
declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the
following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and
reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the
administration of the Director of Hospital.
7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First
Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the
strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant
Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration on the ground that his father, Eugenio de
Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award
issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise fled his opposition to the registration on the claim
that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of
Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central,
City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment
of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Medical Center owned the disputed lot.
RULING: Yes, Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a
portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President
Magsaysay legally efected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufcient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee
simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus,
Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving
public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging
to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." It would
be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical
Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion
and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when
the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the
Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infrmity. It proceeds from the
recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable
lands of the public domain for a specifc public use or service. section 64 (e) of the
Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other
disposition and for specifc public uses for service, any land belonging to the private
domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. the land reserved "shall be used for the specifc purposes directed by such
executive order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land
Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts
of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the
Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public beneft.