Ethnic Nationalism and Income Distribution

in Malaysia
SHANTI P. CHAKRAVARTY and
ABDUL- HAKI M ROSLAN
The need for the social inclusion of all ethnic groups is highlighted in
discussions on development. That is an important point, but this paper
urges caution about placing an exclusive focus on ethnicity in the
formulation of policy. This argument is illustrated by way of an
examination of the income distribution policies promulgated in
Malaysia to improve the economic conditions of the Malay community
after a series of race riots in 1969.
I NTRODUCTI ON
Economic exclusionbyidentiable ethnic or religious groups is not conducive tothe
social cohesion needed for the development of a civil society. It is recognized in the
literature on development that a necessary condition for social cohesion is that no
group should feel excluded in the distribution of income and wealth. However, it is
important to keep a clear focus on the secular problems of income distribution even
in the formulation of policy to reduce income differences between ethnic groups.
Policies aimed at correcting imbalances that are perceived purely in terms of group
identity may detract fromthe wider economic objective of reducing the disparity in
the distribution of income within the whole of society. We examine the origin of the
New Economic Policy of 1971 in Malaysia to illustrate the above point.
Malaysia is a classic example of the problems that are highlighted in a recent
book by Chua [2003]. She argues that the imposition of a market economy in a
feudal society where ethnic identity is strong can result in racial hatred. Markets
are often introduced in feudal economies by market-dominant minorities, and
Chua cites numerous examples: the Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia, the
British in Zimbabwe, and the Indians in East Africa and Fiji.
1
The prediction of
racial tension that is implicit in Chuas thesis is borne out by our evidence from
Malaysia. Similar evidence can also be found in earlier literature, for example
The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, June 2005, pp.270288
ISSN 0957-8811 print/ISSN 1743-9728 online
DOI: 10.1080/09578810500130906 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
S.P. Chakravarty is a Professor at the School of Business, University of Wales, Bangor, Gwynedd
LL57 2DG, UK; Email: abs024@bangor.ac.uk. A.H. Roslan is an Associate Professor at the Faculty
of Economics, Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 UUM Sintok, Kedah Darul Aman, Malaysia. We
are grateful to Yener Altunbas, Alvaro Angeriz, David Hojman, R. Ross Mackay, M. Mustafa, the
editors of this journal and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Support from the British
Council (Grant ARC 1184) to one of the authors (SPC) is also gratefully acknowledged.
on Burma after World War I, leading up to the time of independence in 1948.
2
The novelty and the strength of the case made by Chua lie in the fact that she
provides evidence in support of her thesis from many countries and from different
time periods. She demonstrates that laissez-faire economies where visibly
identiable minorities control a disproportionate share of visible wealth are also
economies that are characterized by racial tension. She argues that the
introduction of democracy, implementation of immediate elections with
universal franchise [Chua, 2003:14] in combination with free markets can only
exacerbate ethnic hatred and global instability, a phrase which is also the
subtitle of her book.
The wide ranging coverage of evidence in support of her argument provides a
unique strength to the case against implanting a market economy dominated by
minorities on a feudal landscape. Paradoxically, this sweeping tour through
countries and time periods is also a weakness of the policy conclusions that might
be drawn from Chua. There are different circumstances in different countries that
cannot be ignored.
3
The fact that inter-group inequality amongst visibly
identiable groups may be prominently visible does not preclude the presence of
considerable intra-group inequality fuelling discontent. Chua is right to draw
attention to inter-group inequality, but a better understanding of the discontent in
societies that she describes entails a sharper focus also on intra-group inequality.
That is the underlying argument in our paper.
The causes of poverty for a particular group may not entirely or even
necessarily lie in the prosperity enjoyed by another group. The picture of the
distribution of income that is sometimes drawn from inter-ethnic differences is
rarely complete and sometimes misleading as a basis for the formulation of
distributional policy.
4
The problem of poverty and inequality may be rooted in
aspects of economic policy that affect all ethnic groups. We shine the spotlight on
a particular country at a particular period of time to illustrate our argument.
A major economic problem at hand in Malaysia at the time of independence
was the prevalence of poverty, especially in the rural areas, and economic
inequality. There were special circumstances in Malaysia. These circumstances
ensured that the frustrations of the poor were not articulated in terms of a demand
for a larger share of the national output. Instead, there was demand for the
increase in the share of the output accruing to the ethnic Malay community,
the bulk of whom also happened to be poor. The Malays were called the
Bumipeteras,
5
sons of the soil, in the rhetoric against those who were perceived
as having arrived in the wake of colonial rule, especially the descendants of those
who came from western China in the nineteenth century.
6
Many amongst the rich were of Chinese origin and the bulk of the poor were
from the Malay community. Both the apologists and the critics of British rule
continued to analyze social relations in Malaysia in the period leading up to
independence in terms of ethnic stereotypes. Those who admired and also those
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 271
who denigrated the British Empire often described the Empire only within a racist
framework. Richard Allens sympathetic account of British rule appears to
converge in one respect with the critical analysis of the colonial legacy by
Dr Mahathir Mohammed, who would become the prime minister representing the
aspirations of the Malay nationalists. Both maintain that the economic success of
the Chinese community was a problem in that the Chinese were a superior race.
Allen summarizes Dr Mahathir Mohammeds view, a remarkably insulting view
about the Malays, that the latter are an inferior race [Allen, 1968: 253]:
Britain should have foreseen the obvious danger to the easy-going Malays
of introducing into their midst a specially gifted and industrious race which
had to succeed to survive.
Foreign economic advisers such as Just Faaland from the Harvard Development
Advisory Service encouraged the Malay nationalist politicians after indepen-
dence to continue to analyze the plight of the Malay community largely in ethnic
terms.
7
However, economic policy in the period immediately following
independence continued undisturbed along the laissez-faire route, as it had
before independence. There was little attempt at re-distributing income and
wealth towards the economically dispossessed. The race riots that occurred in
May 1969 ignited a debate about the failure of economic policy since
independence to ameliorate the conditions of the poor and to arrest the widening
dispersion in the distribution of income. The political rhetoric informing
government policy, the New Economic Policy of 1971 (NEP), designed to redress
the above concerns focused entirely on ethnic differences in income.
We make two points here. The premise on which the New Economic Policy
was based missed out a subtle but important development the rise in intra-
ethnic inequality (see, e.g. the Gini coefcients reported in Table 2) that also
needed to be addressed. For example, the Shorrocks index of inequality barely
declined for the Malay households between 1976/77 and 1988/89, while the
index registered substantial decline for the Chinese and Indian households (see
Table 6). Likewise, in recent years, the mean income for the middle 40 per cent of
the households in comparison with the top 20 per cent has risen faster for the
Chinese than for the Malays.
8
The second point concerns the interpretation of the income distribution gures
in formulating a political response to the 1969 race riots. It is understandable that
the trends in income distribution after independence in 1957 (see Inequality and
Poverty: 195770) might have drawn attention to inter-ethnic differences. What
is not excusable is the failure of policymakers after the riots to take a closer look
at the considerable intra-ethnic differences that had emerged.
The paper is organized as follows. The Idea of Malaysia section which follows
contains a discussion of the historical background of the ethnic divisions in
Malaysia. Inequality and Poverty: 195770 outlines the trends in poverty and
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 272
inequality in Malaysia after independence in 1957 until 1970. The idea is to explain
why income distribution might have been viewed in ethnic terms at the time of the
promulgation of the NewEconomic Policy. This section also suggests an alternative
interpretation that did not place exclusive focus on ethnicity of this data. Aspects of
the New Economic Policy of 1971 outlines the salient features of the NEP and its
outcome. Using the Malaysian Family Life Survey data, the next section examines
the evolution of inequality and poverty between the two survey periods, 1976/77 and
1988/89. The nal section concludes.
THE I DEA OF MALAYSI A
Malaysian politics has been dominated by the question of the priority of claims to
the output of the economy since before independence from British rule in 1957.
The constitution bequeathed by the departing rulers accepted the Malay
nationalist proposition of prior claims to property by the Malay ethnic group. The
constitution granted special rights to the Malay community, under the ethnic
bargain over independence.
9
However, economic policies pursued by the British
and continued by the post-independent government led by Tunku Abdul Rahman,
during the st decade after independence, remained laissez-faire.
During the period of British rule in Malaysia, new economic activities began
to emerge. Mines were dug and rubber plantations were developed. Workers
came from India and China. The newcomers from India were mostly indentured
labourers. The Chinese came of their own accord. They were more numerous and
the descendants of some among them amassed large fortunes. While the Chinese
and also the Indians became engaged in a wide range of economic activities, they
were still largely segregated from each other and from the Malay community by
occupation and location at the time of independence from British rule in 1957.
10
The new state of Malaysia comprised three different ethnic groups, separated by
occupation and geography.
11
The coastal and urban areas where the Chinese came to live prospered as modern
industryandcommerce was locatedthere. The Indianindenturedlabourers were sent
to work in these new sectors of the economy. The newcomers lived in urban areas
and the Malays lived mainly in rural areas. The urban-educated people had better
opportunities to learn English, the language of newcommerce and industry and that
of the colonial rulers. The newcomers were disproportionately dominant in the
professions when the British departed. The representation of the Malay community
in the modern sectors of the economy and also in the professions was limited.
12
The
rural population remained poor, and thus poverty was more widespread among
the Bumiputera community. They mostly lived off the land, in the countryside. The
Malay nationalist ideology seized on the ethnic differences.
The Britishrulers hadalsoplayedonthe ethnic differences, andsegregatedliving
and occupational patterns helped to reinforce ethnic stereotypes,
13
discouraging
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 273
the formation of coalitions among the poor across ethnic divisions. Self-appointed
leaders of the subject communities emerged to conduct dialogue with the colonial
masters on behalf of their respective communities. These leaders subscribed to the
notion, as did the members of the imperial administration, that there were coherent
interests based purely on ethnic identity.
14
Residential segregation that developed ensured that children from different
communities emerged from school equipped with different marketable skills. They
attended different types of schools [Shastri, 1993: 3]. Most secondary and tertiary
education was available only through the medium of English, the language of the
more lucrative sectors of economic activity. There was less opportunity for the rural
Malays to send children to English medium schools because these were generally
located in urban areas. Knowledge of English was highly valued in the employment
market, especially in the professions. English was the language of modern
commerce and also of the civil service, and the opportunities for upward mobility
were especially curtailed for the Malay community. Less than ve per cent of the
registered professionals came from the Bumiputera community in 1970. They held
only 2.4 per cent of the capital (at par value) of limited liability companies [Gomez
and Jomo, 1997]. Bumiputeras remained mostly conned to agriculture [Malaysia,
1991]. Their stake in the modern commercial sector was also small.
The NEP addressed the need to remove the segregation of the Bumiputeras in
poorly paid jobs by providing them with the opportunity to participate in wider
walks of life.
15
A sense of national identity among the economically dispossessed
of the Bumiputeras was forged by constraining the participation of the
descendants of immigrants who arrived during British rule in the economic
sphere of activity [Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981: 668].
16
For ethnic
nationalism to mean anything, it must exclude people and dene the terms for
inclusion [Berlin, 1998: 590]:
By nationalism, I mean something more denite, ideologically important
and dangerous: namely the conviction, in the rst place, that men belong to
a particular human group, and that the way of the group differs from that of
the others; that the characters of the individuals who compose the group are
shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, those of the group, dened
in terms of common territory, customs, laws, memories, beliefs, language,
artistic and religious expression, social institutions, ways of life, to which
some add heredity, kinship, racial characteristic; and that it is these factors
which shape human beings, their purposes and their values.
I NEQUALI TY AND POVERTY: 1957 70
The previous section outlines how the issue of income distribution came
to be perceived as a question of inter-ethnic inequality in Malaysia. In this
section, we explain how this perception was further reinforced by the trends in
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 274
the distribution of income after independence, especially between 1957 and 1969,
culminating in race riots. We then explain why this perception was incomplete, in
that there was already evidence of the emergence of intra-ethnic inequality. This
development failed to get noticed in the formulation of the NEP.
Anger was directed at the fact that inter-group inequality, especially between
the Malay and Chinese populations, had increased between the time of
independence and 1970 (see Table 1). The disparity ratio reported below is the
ratio of mean income between ethnic groups.
Another reasonfor the focus oninter-ethnic income disparity was that the bulk of
the poor were Bumiputeras. They were inthe majority and the majority of themwere
poor. About half the population had income belowthe governments poverty datum
line at the timeof independence, but more than70per cent of Malayhouseholds were
classiedas poor. The gure dropped toonly66per cent in1970, more thana decade
after independence. There was greater poverty among the Malay households than
among households in the Chinese and Indian communities. In the urban areas, only
the Malay households witnessed an increase in poverty between the period 1957/58
and 1970 [Ikemoto, 1985]. It is understandable that poverty alleviation programs
should focus on the Malay community. The headcount ratio of poverty among the
Malays was the highest among all the ethnic groups.
There is, however, another aspect of the above story that begins to unfold if
we look at the data in Ikemoto [1985] more closely. The headcount measure of
poverty declined for the Malays, increased for the Indians, and remained roughly
the same for the Chinese households. Poverty had increased in the rural areas for
both the Indian and Chinese communities, but not for the Malays.
Between1957and1970, over a periodof 13years, the richgenerallygainedmore
thanthe poor (Table 2). The meanmonthlyhouseholdincome inreal terms increased
byonly26per cent, but the share of the poorest 40per cent of the populationfell from
15.9 to 11.6 per cent. The share of income accruing to the poorest 40 per cent
declined by about 8.8 per cent.
17
This fall was especially sharp between 1967/68 and
1970, after the recession of 1968. Inequality increased, and the Gini coefcient rose
from0.412 to0.513 [Perumal, 1989]. If the data are brokendown between urban and
rural households, we nd that inequality increased more in the rural areas than
TABLE 1
DISPARITY RATIO BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
1957/58 1967/68 1970
ChineseMalay 2.16 2.14 2.25
IndianMalay 1.71 1.60 1.75
ChineseIndian 1.27 1.34 1.29
Source: Calculated from Table 2 below.
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 275
in urban areas. The rural population was predominantly Malay and inequality
worsened amongst them.
18
The gap between the rich and the poor widened within each ethnic group and
in the population as a whole. The fact remains that inequality worsened among
the Bumiputeras more than it increased among the Chinese (see Table 2), but the
perception of injustice focused only on the distribution between ethnic groups.
This was the background to the 1971 New Economic Policy.
Let us reect on the data presented in Table 2, calculating within-group shares of
income. The poor had fared relatively badly during the rst decade following
independence. The Malay poor had fared the worst, the share of the bottom 40 per
cent of the population has declined from 19.5 to 12.7 per cent of the total income
accruing to the Malay community. The top 20 per cent of the population did better.
19
The British rulers followed a laissez-faire economic policy. Post-colonial
Malaysia continued along the same capitalist path until the distributive tensions
generated by the vagaries of the market began to create civil unrest. The poor,
who might have expected better after the departure of their colonial masters, were
becoming restless. Then there was a recession in 1968. The government either
could do little or chose to do little to counter the recession quickly [Snodgrass,
1980], and the poor vented their frustrations in race riots. The questions that
needed to be asked about poverty and inequality were the following. Why did
TABLE 2
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
1957/58 1967/68 1970
Malay
Mean income, RM per month in 1959 prices 134 154 170
Median income, RM per month in 1959 prices 108 113 119
Gini coefcient 0.342 0.400 0.466
Percentage share of top 20% 42.5 48.2 52.5
Percentage share of middle 40% 38.0 34.8 34.8
Percentage share of bottom 40% 19.5 17.2 12.7
Chinese
Mean income, RM per month in 1959 prices 288 329 390
Median income, RM per month in 1959 prices 214 246 265
Gini coefcient 0.374 0.391 0.455
Percentage share of top 20% 45.8 46.7 52.6
Percentage share of middle 40% 36.2 36.3 33.5
Percentage share of bottom 40% 18.0 17.0 13.9
Indian
Mean income, RM per month in 1959 prices 228 245 300
Median income, RM per month in 1959 prices 228 180 192
Gini coefcient 0.347 0.403 0.463
Percentage share of top 20% 43.7 48.1 54.2
Percentage share of middle 40% 36.6 35.6 31.5
Percentage share of bottom 40% 19.7 16.3 14.3
Source: Perumal [1989] and Snodgrass [1980].
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 276
the fraction of the population that lived in poverty at the time of independence not
fall? Why did inequality in the distribution of income continue to persist? The
answers might have pointed to the vagaries of the market, and how the markets
might have highlighted the existing inter-ethnic differences. Instead the focus in
the New Economic Policy of 1971 was placed exclusively on ethnicity.
20
There was indeed a pronounced inter-ethnic imbalance in the distribution of
income. This difference was just as pronounced also in the distribution
of employment across the lucrative sectors of industry and commerce at the start
of the NEP in 1971. The poor were poor perhaps because they were engaged in
activities that were poorly rewarded by the market in the laissez-faire system that
characterized the rst decade after independence. Adifferent twist was placedonthe
story by the Malay nationalist political leaders. They told the ethnic Malay
community, most of whom were poor, that the market rewards were biased against
them because of who they were, and not what they were. Being a Bumiputera, in
itself, was a handicap in the labor market
ASPECTS OF THE NEW ECONOMI C POLI CY OF 1971
It is important to note that the two questions of what they were and who they
were in the labor markets cannot be viewed in complete isolation from each
other. The reason is that the geographic and occupational segregation, as
described in The Idea of Malaysia, limited opportunities for participation by the
Bumiputeras in the professions, the civil service, and also in industry and urban
commerce. A laudable consequence of the NEP was the increase in educational
opportunities that now became available to children living in the rural areas.
These achievements of the NEP need to be recognized, but our point is that
TABLE 3
SHARE (%) OF AN ETHNIC GROUP IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS
Bumiputera Chinese Indian
1970 1995 2000 1970 1995 2000 1970 1995 2000
Professional
and technical
46.9 64.3 63.9 39.5 26.2 25.8 10.8 7.3 7.6
Administrative
and managerial
24.1 36.1 37.0 62.2 54.7 52.3 7.8 5.1 5.5
Clerical
and related
35.4 57.2 56.8 38.6 34.4 32.9 17.2 7.7 8.6
Sales and related 26.7 36.2 37.3 58.4 51.9 49.8 11.1 6.5 6.8
Services 44.3 58.2 57.7 26.8 22.8 21.8 14.6 8.7 8.5
Agriculture 72.0 63.1 61.2 13.8 12.9 10.3 9.7 7.5 6.9
Production 34.2 44.8 44.7 39.6 35.0 33.8 9.6 10.3 10.0
Source: Rajakrishnan [1993: 224, Table 4]; Malaysia [1996: 823, Table 33]; Malaysia [2001: 67,
Table 38].
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 277
the political discourse was impoverished by the narcissistic obsession of ethnic
differences.
21
The success of the NEP in broadening the participation of the Malay
community in the economy is illustrated in Table 3 below.
22
Much of the gain was
already made by 1990, and the rate of progress slowed down thereafter.
Rapid economic growth witnessed since the inception of NEP was
accompanied by three types of structural change. The rst was the ethnic
composition of employment; the second was the composition of the output and
the third was the rise of capital ownership among the Malays. Between 1970 and
1990, the contribution of agriculture declined from 29.0 per cent to a mere 13.5
per cent of the GDP. The increase in the share of manufacturing exactly mirrors
the decrease in the share of agriculture [Kheng, 1994].
One of the goals of wider participation was the transfer of the ownership of
capital to the Malays. As we have noted before, only 2.4 per cent of the share
capital in limited companies was owned by members of the Bumiputera
community at the start of the NEP in 1970. This was increased to about a fth of the
total share capital at par value, but only a few could benet.
23
However, a larger
section of the Malay community enjoyed the fruits of the other aspects of the
outcome of the NEP. The record of reducing poverty was enviable (see Table 4
below), and it has remained so to this day. There was also substantial reduction in
inter-ethnic inequality (see Table 5).
The difculties for the NEP lie in its inability to appreciate issues arising out
of intra-ethnic distributional imbalance, especially among the Bumiputera
community, that existed at the time the NEP was rst promulgated and that
remained inadequately addressed even as the NEP registered success in opening
up new economic opportunities for the Bumiputeras. The Gini coefcient among
the Malays increased from 0.466 to 0.494 between 1970 and 1976, and managed
TABLE 4
POVERTY REDUCTIONS: TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF THE NEP
1970 1990 2000
Target of NEP Achievement of NEP
Incidence of poverty (Peninsular Malaysia)
Overall percentage 49.3 16.7 15.0 5.3
Rural 58.7 23.0 19.3 8.0
Urban 21.3 9.1 7.3 3.0
Ethnic group
Bumiputera 65.0 20.8 n.a.
Chinese 26.0 5.7 n.a.
Indian 39.0 8.0 n.a.
Others 44.8 18.0 n.a.
Source: Malaysia [1991, 1996]; MAPEN II [2001: 18, Table 1.3].
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 278
to come down only to 0.477 by 1987.
24
After two decades under the NEP, the
Malays were no longer a homogeneous rural population, if they ever were, and
cross-cutting cleavages [Rae and Taylor, 1970] could not continue to be ignored.
The prime minister pleaded [Mahathir, 1998: 334] with critics of NEP that
judgment about the equitableness [of government policy] was not to be between
individuals, but between communities.
The following section examines the Malaysian Family Life Survey data to
identify the factors contributing to intra-group income inequality.
An understanding of these factors is essential if redistribution policy is to free
itself from the straitjacket of Bumiputera versus Non-Bumiputera thinking
articulated by Mahathir Mohammed [1998].
THE MALAYSI AN FAMI LY LI FE SURVEY ( MFLS)
Data that are now placed in the public domain by the Malaysian government on
household income are not adequate for the analysis of factors contributing to
inequality and poverty. The Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS), conducted
by the Rand Corporation, provides additional information needed to cast light on
these issues.
The MFLS gathered information on all income received by the household
cash and non-cash income, which included the value of home-produced goods
and services for their own consumption. Income deriving from agricultural
production, ownership of animals, ownership of other businesses and monetary
rewards for services performed was recorded. The value of gifts from non-
household members (e.g., through the Islamic system of charitable donation,
zakat), receipt of monies through inheritance or dowries, and income from
insurance, pensions (including various retirement programs) and interests were
noted. Income received from renting rooms, houses or land and income deriving
otherwise from ownership of land and the possession of durable goods were all
added to the total income of a household. The data are converted into per capita
income to account for household size. Household income refers to total annual
income received by the household from the above sources as listed in Table 6.
TABLE 5
INCOME DISPARITY RATIO BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS, 1970 99
1970 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999
ChineseMalay 2.25 2.28 2.13 1.76 1.65 1.74 1.78 1.81 1.83 1.74
Indian-Malay 1.75 1.56 1.51 1.28 1.25 1.29 1.29 1.35 1.42 1.36
Chinese-Indian 1.29 1.46 1.41 1.37 1.31 1.35 n.a 1.34 n.a. 1.27
Source: Authors own calculations, supplemented by Shari [2000, Table 4, p.121]. Figures for 1997
are taken from MAPEN II [2001: 185, Table 2.53], whereas gures for 1999 are calculated
from data in Malaysia [2001: 61, Table 34].
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 279
T
A
B
L
E
6
M
F
L
S
D
A
T
A
:
T
H
E
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
O
F
H
O
U
S
E
H
O
L
D
I
N
C
O
M
E
(
%
)
P
a
i
d
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
S
e
l
f
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
R
e
n
t
,
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
&
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
&
Z
a
k
a
t
R
e
m
i
t
t
a
n
c
e
s
I
n
h
e
r
i
t
a
n
c
e
,
D
o
w
r
i
e
s
&
G
i
f
t
s
H
o
m
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
&
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
O
t
h
e
r
s
T
o
t
a
l
1
9
7
6
/
7
7
M
a
l
a
y
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
6
6
.
0
1
2
9
.
8
5
0
.
6
0
0
.
1
3
0
.
0
1
0
.
7
1
0
.
2
8
2
.
4
1
0
.
0
1
1
0
0
.
0
0
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
5
1
.
0
3
4
1
.
9
1
1
.
6
1
0
.
1
3
0
.
0
2
0
.
9
0
0
.
1
3
3
.
6
7
0
.
6
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
I
n
d
i
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
7
5
.
5
2
2
1
.
6
7
1
.
1
7
0
.
1
3
0
.
0
1
1
.
1
1
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
5
0
.
0
4
1
0
0
.
0
0
1
9
8
8
/
8
9
M
a
l
a
y
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
6
0
.
7
4
2
4
.
2
9
2
.
7
5
2
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
4
.
2
7
0
.
7
2
3
.
1
0
2
.
0
6
1
0
0
.
0
0
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
5
7
.
6
7
2
8
.
5
8
3
.
8
4
1
.
4
4
0
.
0
0
6
.
1
3
0
.
3
9
1
.
9
3
0
.
0
3
1
0
0
.
0
0
I
n
d
i
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
6
8
.
0
1
1
5
.
0
8
2
.
0
1
7
.
3
6
0
.
0
0
5
.
1
2
1
.
1
6
1
.
2
2
0
.
0
6
1
0
0
.
0
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
s

c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
n
F
a
m
i
l
y
L
i
f
e
S
u
r
v
e
y
d
a
t
a
.
A glance at Table 6 reveals that, at the initial survey period, the contribution
of employment income in the Malay households was greater than that in the
Chinese households. The contribution of self-employment income was lower. By
1988/89, the second survey period, the average percentage of the total income
derived by Malay families from the above sources came to resemble closer the
gures for the Chinese households. Income from rent (including interest and
dividends), pensions and remittances increased as a percentage of the total
income for all communities. Increases in remittance income perhaps reect
greater labour mobility from rural to urban areas that is associated with economic
growth. While it would be expected that investment income should rise for the
Malays with the emphasis in NEP on the transfer of ownership to this community,
it is interesting to note that the contribution from this source of income to the total
income for the Chinese and Indian households also went up. The benets did not
accrue evenly, and the contribution to the total income inequality of the category
of income described as Rent, Interest and Dividends went up (see Table 7).
The contribution to inequality of these different sources of income employment
income, self-employment income etc. is examined using Shorrocks decompo-
sition of an inequality index by sources of income [Shorrocks, 1980, 1982].
25
The Shorrocks index of inequality for the two survey years is reported and
decomposed by sources of income in Table 7. The total index, I, is reported and
percentage contributions to this index of each of the sources of income listed in that
table are shown. The row sum of the contributions, excluding the last column, is
equal to 100. We notice that, for each ethnic group, the two biggest contributors to
income inequality were income from employment and income from self-
employment in both the survey years. In the second survey period, contribution of
income fromemployment to total inequality of income was roughly the same for the
Chinese as it was for the Malay community. There is nothing surprising in this fact.
Variations in the income from labour market activities are a major factor
contributing to income inequality in other countries as well. See, for example, the
paper by Fields [1979] on Columbia, and Adams [1994] on Pakistan.
However, the data reveal a feature of the consequence of the governments
exclusive focus on inter-group inequality that is interesting. The inequality index
for the Malay community did not decline between these two periods. The
Shorrocks index rose from 1.16 to 1.57 between 1976/77 and 1988/89 for the
Malay community, but it decreased from 1.93 to 0.92 for the Chinese. It also
declined for the Indian community.
Consider Table 8 below. All groups have seen their income rise during the 7th
Plan Period, and inequality has decreased for all but the Indians. But there are two
interesting features of this data. The ratio of the mean income for the middle 40
per cent to the top 20 per cent of the households has risen faster for the Chinese
than for the Malays. For the Chinese, this ratio has increased from 0.352 to 0.374
between the years 1995 and 1999. The corresponding change in the ratio for
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 281
T
A
B
L
E
7
M
F
L
S
D
A
T
A
:
C
O
N
T
R
I
B
U
T
I
O
N
(
%
)
O
F
D
I
F
F
E
R
E
N
T
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
O
F
I
N
C
O
M
E
T
O
T
H
E
S
H
O
R
R
O
C
K
S
I
N
D
E
X
O
F
I
N
E
Q
U
A
L
I
T
Y
P
a
i
d
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
S
e
l
f
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
R
e
n
t
,
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
&
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
&
Z
a
k
a
t
R
e
m
i
t
t
a
n
c
e
s
I
n
h
e
r
i
t
a
n
c
e
,
D
o
w
r
i
e
s
&
G
i
f
t
s
H
o
m
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
&
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
O
t
h
e
r
s
T
o
t
a
l
1
9
7
6
/
7
7
M
a
l
a
y
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

1
.
1
6
4
5
7
4
.
0
4
2
2
.
5
6
0
.
5
3
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
1
0
.
7
4
1
.
7
9
0
.
0
1
1
0
0
.
0
0
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

1
.
9
5
3
4
2
7
.
4
5
6
9
.
9
6
1
.
1
6
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
0
1
1
.
2
8
0
.
1
5
1
0
0
.
0
0
I
n
d
i
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

3
.
3
8
5
5
2
2
.
0
0
7
6
.
5
9
1
.
2
9
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
1
9
8
8
/
8
9
M
a
l
a
y
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

1
.
5
7
7
2
5
1
.
4
8
3
3
.
8
7
6
.
8
6
0
.
7
9
0
.
0
2
3
.
1
5
0
.
1
7
1
.
7
5
1
.
9
1
1
0
0
.
0
0
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

0
.
9
1
8
9
5
5
.
7
3
3
0
.
6
4
7
.
7
7
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
0
3
.
6
9
0
.
0
6
1
.
7
3
2
0
.
0
2
1
0
0
.
0
0
I
n
d
i
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
h
o
r
r
o
c
k
s
I
n
d
e
x
o
f
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
I

0
.
5
8
7
7
5
4
.
2
7
3
0
.
1
8
3
.
0
1
1
0
.
1
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
9
8
0
.
7
4
0
.
6
5
0
.
0
3
1
0
0
.
0
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
s

c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
u
s
i
n
g
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
n
F
a
m
i
l
y
L
i
f
e
S
u
r
v
e
y
d
a
t
a
.
the Bumiputera community is 0.367 to 0.373.
26
The second interesting feature of
this data is that a different problem has begun to emerge. Inequality has
worsened, measured by the above ratios, in the rural areas.
The ratio of the mean income accruing to the top 20 per cent to bottom 40 per
cent of the rural households has gone up from 6.12 to 6.16. The increase is even
more pronounced if we consider the ratio of the mean income accruing to the top
20 per cent to the middle 40 per cent. This ratio has gone up from 2.55 in 1995 to
2.62 in 1999. The share of the total income accruing to the richest 20 per cent of
the households has increased faster than that of other groups in the rural areas
during the second half of the 1990s.
The praise that has been justiably heaped on Malaysias poverty reduction
programs requires a qualication because of its failure to address the issue of
intra-group inequality.
CONCLUSI ON
The New Economic Policy was formulated in 1971 within the context of an ethnic
idea of nationality. The assumption was that Bumiputeras were a distinct ethnic
group and they shared a coherent economic interest different from that of the
Chinese and the Indians.
27
Poverty among the Bumiputeras was high and the inter-
ethnic measures of income inequality between the Bumiputeras and the other two
communities were also pronounced. Income and wealth distribution came to be
viewed purely in an ethnic context. We explained in The Idea of Malaysia how this
viewmight have been reinforced by trends in income distribution between 1957 and
1970, but we have argued that the trends also contained evidence of increasing
within-group inequality. This fact remained unacknowledged in the design of the
TABLE 8
MEAN MONTHLY GROSS HOUSEHOLD
INCOME (RM) BY INCOME
1995 1999
Ethnic Group 1995 1999 Top
20%
Middle
40%
Bottom
40%
Top
20%
Middle
40%
Bottom
40%
Bumiputera 1604 1984 3986 1461 572 4855 1810 742
Chinese 2890 3456 7270 2560 1062 8470 3168 1271
Indians 2140 2702 5100 1954 868 6456 2460 1092
Others 1284 1371 3106 1131 539 3242 1204 616
MALAYSIA 2020 2472 5202 1777 693 6268 2204 865
Urban 2589 3103 6474 2323 942 7580 2844 1155
Rural 1326 1718 3153 1235 515 4124 1577 670
Source: Malaysia [2001: 6162, tables 34 and 35].
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 283
NEP, which concentrated solely on reducing the inter-group measure of inequality,
especially that between the Chinese and the Malays. The very success of the NEP in
opening up opportunities for the Malays in all spheres of economic life renders even
more absurd the idea of a coherent economic interest along ethnic lines, and within-
group inequality is now placed in sharper focus.
We have provided evidence for the above claimfromthe Malaysian Family Life
Survey conducted in 1988/89. Detailed information about income distribution for
the 1990s is not yet available to examine the subtleties of intra-group inequality.
Subsequent data are available only at a higher level of aggregation, about the mean
income levels.
28
Consider two ratios. The rst is the ratio of the mean income of the
top 20to the middle 40per cent of the population. The second is the ratio of the mean
income of the top 20 to the bottom 40 per cent of the population. These ratios have
declined for all ethnic groups, suggesting that within group inequality, at least as
measured by these ratios, has declined. However, the decline has been slower for the
Malays than for the Chinese.
The market opportunities have expanded for the Bumiputeras, and the market
rewards through employment and self-employment now contribute similarly to the
total income for both the Bumiputera and the Chinese communities.
29
Income
inequality has a pronounced secular dimension, rooted in the operation of the
markets, but onlythe ethnic dimension has informedpolicysince 1971. Newsources
of inequality have begun to emerge in the rural areas. These sources have to be
recognized and examined. Since a greater fraction of the Malay households still live
in rural areas, the trends reported in Table 8 may indicate a widening of income
inequality among the Malays living in the rural areas. The data are not sufciently
detailed to make denite pronouncements about intra-group inequality among the
Malay households, but it is an issue that needs to be examined. Dispersion in the
distribution of employment income has also to be addressed, if the maintenance of
social cohesion by reducing income inequality is to remain an objective of policy in
Malaysia.
30
These challenges entail a recognition of the need to develop taxation and
social securitypolicies, as is done insocial democratic countries of the industrialized
world, with a clear focus on the economics of exclusion rather than the ethnicity of
economic exclusion. Economic policy cannot remain imprisoned by the obsession
with ethnic differences.
NOTES
1. She also talks about the Jews in Russia, but the context is far too different from the one we are
concerned with here in this paper on Malaysia. The case of the British in Zimbabwe is also
different from that of the Chinese in Malaysia in that there was a legally-sanctioned policy of
racial exclusion in Zimbabwe. The situation in Zimbabwe is better captured by Segal [1967], in
his analysis of imperialism. He forecast that a race war was probable: The economic may well be
the dominant cause; but the racial may become the dominant identication [Segal, 1967:10].
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 284
2. Chua glosses over this period, and concentrates instead on the rise of the Chinese business houses
since the 1960s: . . .a new market-dominant minority has taken their place, far wealthier than the
Indians ever were [Chua, 2003: 23].
3. For example, Chua refers to the market dominant Chinese community that has emerged in
Burma under the military junta since the 1960s. There is a big difference between the anti-Indian
sentiments during the inter-war years and any anti-Chinese sentiments that might be unleashed if
and when the current ruling junta falls from power. See, for example, Chakravarti [1971] about
the plight of the Indians in Burma during the inter-war years.
4. This is not an argument against afrmative action, but an argument for a policy that is exclusively
focused on afrmative action.
5. The word Bumiputera translates as son of the soil, and thus confers a prior claimto the wealth of
the nation. The word generates a connotation of occupation of the land from time immemorial.
It is interesting to note, however, that the word itself derives from the Sanskrit words Bhumi
(earth) and Putra (son). The claim to eternal possession of the land is thus compromised by a
language which indicates arrival of ancestors at some earlier time from a distant land. This irony
appears to have escaped attention. The nation state of Malaysia consists of the Malay Peninsula
and the islands of Sabah and Sarawak. The communities descended from pre-colonial people
are not all called Malays, but they are regarded as Bumipateras in law. Since this paper
concerns developments in Peninsular Malaysia, the words Bumiputera and Malay will be used
interchangeably.
6. There was a perception, even decades after their rst arrival and at the time of independence in
1957, that the descendants of the newcomers would return to the homelands of their ancestors,
China and India, after accumulating enough savings [Gomez and Jomo, 1997:11]. It is only the
Bumiputeras who would continue to live for ever, especially in peninsular Malaysia. It was
forgotten that the Malay Peninsula stood at a thoroughfare of human movements in Asia over
centuries. Waves of immigrants, including those from China, must have settled in the peninsula
well before the British arrived as colonial rulers.
7. See Faaland et al. [1990] for an explanation of Faalands views.
8. See Table 8 for data on the mean income of different income groups, broken down by ethnic
groups, for the years 1995 and 1999.
9. Article 89 of the constitution empowered the government to declare Malay reservations
over common land. Article 153 specied reservations for the Bumipuetras of positions in the
public service and of scholarships, exhibitions and other educational or training privileges. . .
However, all pre-existing property rights are honoured. It was agreed that in return for the
acceptance by the non-Bumiputeras of the political primacy of the Bumiputeras, the Bumiputeras
recognized full citizenship rights and a voice in the government of the non-Bumiputeras
[Snodgrass, 1980: 457].
10. Also see Jomo [1989, 1991 and 1998] for details.
11. The groups are Bumiputeras, Chinese and Indians.
12. See Von der Mehden [1975] for the urbanrural distribution by ethnic groups.
13. It appears that religious differences were sidelined. Political parties along the ethnic divide were
formed after the re-occupation of Malaysia following the defeat of Japan in World War II.
Important among them were United Malay National Organsation (UMNO), Malaya Indian
Congress (MIC) and Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). UMNO and MCA formed a coalition
in the 1952 municipal elections. MIC later joined the coalition. The Islamicists were isolated.
In the 1955 Federal Legislative Council Election, held in 1955 immediately prior to
independence, the coalition bagged 52 out of the 53 seats in the Council. The Islamicists
(Pan Malayan Islamic Party) gained only one seat.
14. This is true also elsewhere in the erstwhile British Empire in the East. For example, the Whyte
Committee (Burma Reforms Committee) recommended representation based on communal
identity in government advisory bodies. Sir P.P. Ginwala, a self-appointed (rather government-
selected) Indian member of the Committee said: I feel that my community has put forward and in
my opinion established on the evidence an overwhelming case for communal representation pure
and simple, quoted in Chakravarti [1971: 113]. Sir Ginwala, a rich businessman, had little in
common with the Indian labourers on whose behalf he claimed to speak.
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 285
15. This was a laudable goal of policy which was also successful in reaching the goal of reducing
social exclusion by increasing educational opportunities to children in the rural areas. However,
one of the goals of wider participation was the transfer of the ownership of capital on ethnic
grounds. The problem of identifying the ethnicity of owners and the problem of selecting the
beneciaries among the intended community, the Malay community, were not properly
anticipated, leading to charges of crony capitalism. This point is not pursued here because it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
16. An imagined community [Anderson, 1983] of Bumiputeras comprising Malaysia began to take
shape. This is not much different from the intellectual thrust of nationalist movements elsewhere
[Hobsbawm, 1993].
17. The index of real output rose from 100 to 126. By applying the share accruing to the bottom 40
per cent, we nd that their income declined from 15.9 in 1957 to 14.6 in 1970. This was a decline
of eight per cent.
18. Ikemoto [1985] breaks down the rural and urban households into three ethnic groups, and
calculates the relevant Gini coefcients. He then demonstrates that within-group inequality
worsened most for the Bumiputeras, in both the rural and urban areas.
19. We can calculate from the data in Table 2 that, for the Malay community, the ratio of the share of
the total income accruing to the bottom 40 per cent to the top 20 per cent of the population was
0.459 in 1957/58. That is, the total income accruing to the poorest 40 per cent of the Malay
population was slightly less than half (about 45.9 per cent) of the total income accruing to the top
20 per cent of that community. By 1970, this share had fallen to only a quarter (24.2 per cent).
The corresponding drop for the Chinese was from 39.3 to 26.4 per cent. For the Indian
community, the fall was from 45.1 to 26.4 per cent.
20. It might be noted that nationalism, with its emphasis on exclusion, has been a resurgent
phenomenon of the twentieth century [Berlin, 1991].
21. The expression is a paraphrase of Freuds observation about the narcissism of minor
differences, quoted in Judt [1994: 44].
22. A breakdown of the data by the ethnic distribution of registered professional can be constructed
from data published in Jomo [1991: 498, Table 6]; Malaysia [1996: 84, Table 3.4]; MAPEN II
[2001: 197, Table 2.60] and Malaysia [2001: 69, Table39]. The picture is the same. Much of the
gain for the Bumiputeras was already made by 1990.
23. Milne [1992] examines the distribution of benets through privatisation programmes in the
ASEAN states, including Malaysia. See also Jomo [1989], and Bowie [1988].
24. Source: (i) Snodgrass [1980]; (ii) Shari and Zin [1990]; (iii) Malaysia [1991, 1996]. The data
beyond 1990 are less readily available presumably because the government has become
concerned about criticism about intra-Malay dispersion in income. However, a glimpse of the
developments during the 1990s is given in the conlusion.
25. There are different measures of inequality. We use the Shorrocks index because it allows
for an examination of the contribution of different sources of income to the dispersion in the
total income. Suppose that household income arises from two sources, wages and dividends.
Then the Shorrocks index of inequality in the distribution of the total income among households
can be shown to be the sum of two components, inequality that can be attributed to the
wage distribution and inequality that can be attributed to the distribution of dividends among
households..
26. Another way of looking at the data is to note that the above ratio has gone up by 6.2 per cent for
the Chinese but only 1.7 per cent for the Malays.
27. The idea of belonging entails the creation of myths. For examples, see Hobsbawm [1993]. Even
the word Bumiputera is has roots in the language of a distant land (see note 5).
28. There are considerable limits to what can be gleaned about income distribution, but especially
about poverty, by looking at mean income data. For example, an increase in the mean income of
the poor, say those at the bottom 20 per cent of the distributional ladder, does not tell us whether
extreme poverty has also decreased. For example, there has been considerable reduction in
poverty among families with children in the UK in recent years. However, a closer examination
of the Family Resources Survey data suggests that mostly the poor who were near the poverty
datum line have beneted [see Angeriz and Chakravrty, 2003].
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 286
29. See Table 6 for the sources of income in 1988/89, the latest year for which we have detailed
survey data on household income, for different ethnic groups.
30. The policy prescriptions in Chua [2003: 27880] are inadequate in that they perpetuate the
obsession with race at the expense of the wider picture. She suggests that the market-dominant
minorities should learn from recent example of a number of wealthy businesspeople in the
United States, who, in several highly publicized gestures, have donated tens of millions of dollars
toward scholarship funds for inner-city children [Chua, 2003: 285]. This is naive at best and
misleading at worst. In the absence of a moral stand against racism, whether directed against the
rich or the poor, the policy becomes incoherent. It also becomes ineffective. The assimilated Jews
in Germany, notwithstanding their contribution to philanthropy by many of their counterparts,
were not spared by the Nazi regime. The point to ram home, whether in Africa or in Asia or in any
other place, is that poverty and inequality are caused by economic structures, even if the
identication appears to be racial. To recognize this identication may be important, but to base
redistribution policy on that identication alone is to abandon the goal of economic equality to
placate racism.
REFERENCES
Adams, R.H., 1994, Non-FarmIncome and Inequality in Rural Pakistan: A Decomposition Analysis,
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.11033.
Allen, Richard, 1968, Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect, London: Oxford University Press.
Anderson, B., 1983, Imagined Communities: Reection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
London: Verso.
A.N. Angeriz and S.P. Chakravarty, 2003, Counting the Poor, Swansea: Welsh Economy and Labour
Market Research, University of Wales, Discussion Paper 20032007
Berlin, Isiah, 1998, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, London: Pimlico.
Berlin, Isiah, 1991, Two Concepts of Nationalism, The New York Review of Books, 21 Nov.
Bowie, A., 1988, Redistribution with Growth? The Dilemmas of State-Sponsored Economic
Development in Malaysia, Journal of Developing Societies, Vol.4, pp.5266.
Chakravarti, N.R., 1971, The Indian Minority in Burma, London: Oxford University Press.
Chua, Amy, 2003, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and
Global Instability, New York: Doubleday.
Faaland, Just, J.R. Parkinson and Rais Saniman, 1990, Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysias New
Economic Policy, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in association with Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Bergen.
Fields, G.S., 1979, Income Inequality in Urban Columbia: A Decomposition Analysis, Review of
Income and Wealth, Vol.25, pp.32741.
Gomez, E.T. and K.S. Jomo, 1997, Malaysias Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Prots,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobsbawm, Eric, 1993, The New Threats to History, New York Review of Books, 16 Dec., pp.624.
Ikemoto, Yukio, 1985, Income Distribution in Malaysia: 195780, The Developing Economies,
Vol.23, No.4, pp.34767.
Jomo, K.S., 1989, Malaysias New Economic Policy and National Unity, Third World Quarterly,
Vol.11, No.4, pp.3653.
Jomo, K.S., 1991, Whither Malaysias New Economic Policy?, Pacic Affairs, Vol.63, No.4,
pp.46999.
Jomo, K.S., 1998, Malaysian Debacle: Whose Fault?, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.22,
pp.70722.
Judt, Tony, 1994, The New Old Nationalism, The New York Review of Books, Vol.XLI, No.10
(26 May), pp.4451.
Kheng, K.S., 1994, Malaysia to 2003: From Redistribution to Growth, London: The Economist
Intelligence Unit.
Mahathir, Mohamad, 1998, The Way Forward, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Malaysia, 1991, The Second Outline Perspective Plan 19912000, Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan
Nasional Malaysia Berhad (National Printing Department).
I NCOME DI STRI BUTI ON I N MALAYSI A 287
Malaysia, 1996, Seventh Malaysia Plan 19962000, Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
Malaysia, 2001, Eight Malaysia Plan 20012005, Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia
Berhad (National Printing Department).
MAPEN II, 2001, Laporan Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara Kedua (Report of the Second
National Economic Consultative Council), Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia
Berhad.
Milne, R.S., 1992, Privatization in the ASEAN States: Who Gets What, Why, and with What Effect?,
Pacic Affairs, Vol.65, No.1 (Spring), pp.729.
Perumal, M., 1989, Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Malaysia, 19571984, Singapore
Economic Review, Vol.34, No.2, pp.3346.
Rae, D.W. and M. Taylor, 1970, The Analysis of Political Cleavages, New Haven, CT and London:
Yale University Press.
Rajakrishnan, R., 1993, Racial Inequality and Social Reconstruction in Malaysia, Journal of Asian
and African Studies, Vol.28, No.3/4, pp.21729.
Segal, Ronald, 1967, The Race War, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Shari, I., 2000, Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Malaysia, 197195, Journal of the Asia
Pacic Economy, Vol.5, No.1/2, pp.11224.
Shari, I. and R.H.M. Zin, 1990, The Patterns and Trends of Income Distribution in Malaysia,
19701987, Singapore Economic Review, Vol.35, No.1, pp.10223.
Shastri, A., 1993, Preferential Policies in Malaysia, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case
No. 458, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
Washington DC
Shorrocks, A.F., 1980, The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures, Econometrica,
Vol.48, No.3, pp.61325.
Shorrocks, A.F., 1982, Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components, Econometrica, Vol.50,
No.1, pp.193211.
Siddique, S. and L. Suryadinata, 1981, Bumiputera and Pribumi: Economic Nationalism (Indiginism)
in Malyasia and Indonesia, Pacic Affairs, Vol.54, No.4 (Winter), pp.66287.
Snodgrass, D.R., 1980, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press.
Von der Mehden, F.R., 1975, Communalism, Industrial Policy, and Income Distribution in Malaysia,
Asian Survey, pp.24761.
THE EUROPEAN J OURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 288