Restitution of Conjugal Rights

Every society has certain norms and rules which have led to the development of key
concepts such as usage and custom. Marriage as an important institution has been
recognized in the personal laws of all the religions. With the passage of time, the
complexities increased with areas such as divorce, judicial separation and conjugal
rights came up in personal law and it became necessary to codify the laws relating to
marriage in India.
The institution of Marriage is often regarded as a primary and basic institution in this
society of ours. An individuals existence in the society is guided by institutions
which are often regarded as established forms of procedure characteristic of group
activity. Later on, a marriage between two individuals creates a set of rights and
obligations between the parties involved. These rights may be called as conjugal
rights. The word conjugal in its essence means of relating to marriage or to
married persons and their relationships.
The fundamental rule of matrimonial law that one spouse is at liberty to the society
and comfort of the other spouse, forms the foundation of the right to bring a suit for
the restitution of conjugal rights. The court has the duty of granting a decree for
restitution in the cases where either spouse has abandoned or withdrawn from the
society of the other.
A decree of restitution of conjugal rights implies that the guilty party is ordered to live
with the aggrieved party. Restitution of conjugal rights is the only remedy which
could be used by the deserted spouse against the other. A husband or wife can file a
petition for restoration of their rights to cohabit with the other spouse. But the
execution of the decree of restitution of conjugal rights is very difficult. The court
though is competent to pass a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, but it is
powerless to have its specific performance by any law. The non-compliance of the
issued decree results to constructive destruction on the part of the erring spouse. At
present as per the provisions available under the Indian personal laws, the aggrieved
party move a petition for a decree of divorce after one year from the date of the
passing of the decree and the competent court can pass a decree of divorce in favour
of the aggrieved party. The decree of restitution of conjugal rights can be enforced by
the attachment of property, and if the party complained against still does not comply,
the Court may also punish him or her for contempt of court. But under no
circumstances the court can force the erring spouse to consummate marriage. Decree
of restitution of conjugal rights could be passed in case of valid marriages only.
This remedy is available to Hindus under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
to Muslims under general law, to Christians under Section 32 and 33 of the Indian
Divorce Act, 1869, to Parsis under Section 36 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act,
1936 and to persons married according to the provisions of the Special Marriage Act,
Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
The provisions for restitution of conjugal rights are identical in Section 22 the Special
Marriage Act, 1954 and Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It is as follows:
Section 9 of HMA, 1955
The restitution of conjugal rights is one of the reliefs that are provided to the spouses
in distress in the institution of marriage by law. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides for the restitution of the conjugal
rights. The section of the Act says:
When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from
the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the District
Court, for the restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the
truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the
application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights
accordingly.
EXPLANATION: Where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse
for the withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be
on the person who has withdrawn from the society.
To sum up, under all personal law, the requirements of the provision of restitution of
conjugal rights are the following:
The withdrawal by the respondent from the society of the petitioner.
The withdrawal is without any reasonable cause or excuse or lawful ground.
There should be no other legal ground for refusal of the relief.
The court should be satisfied about the truth of the statement made in the
petition.
Enforcement of the Restitution Decree
The execution of decree is as per the Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908, whereby, if a respondent has failed to obey such a decree, the court may, in the
execution of the same, attach the property of the respondent, and if the respondent
fails to comply to the decree within a year then the court may even sell the property
and award such compensation to the petitioner as it thinks fit. Rule 33 provides
another mode of execution in cases where the petitioner is wife and the respondent is
husband. In such cases if the decree is not obeyed by the respondent within the
specified time, he shall make such periodical payments to the petitioner as the court
thinks fit.
One of the important implications of section 9 is that it provides an opportunity to an
aggrieved party to apply for maintenance under Section 25. Maintenance can also be
obtained by the party in case when the action is pending under Section 24. Hence, a
wife who doesnt want a judicial separation or disruption of marriage can attain
maintenance from her husband without filing a suit for the same under the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Another important implication of the section
is that it provides a ground for divorce under Section 13(1A) on a condition that there
has been no restitution of conjugal rights between them for a period of one year or
more after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights
A petition for restitution of conjugal rights is maintainable only when there is a valid
marriage. In Ranjana kejriwal v.Vinod Kumar Kejriwal (AIR 1997 Bom 380), the
petitioner wife alleged that the husband was already married and had suppressed the
fact from her. The Court held that the petition for restitution of conjugal rights is not
maintainable since there is no legal marriage.
Reasonable Excuse: Defence to a Restitution Petition
In Sushila Bai v. Prem Narayan, the husband deserted his wife and thereafter was
totally unresponsive towards her. This behaviour was held sufficient to show that he
had withdrawn from the society of his wife, and therefore the wifes petition for
restitution of conjugal rights was allowed. The defence to this principle lies in the
concept of a reasonable excuse. If the respondent has withdrawn from the society of
his spouse for a valid reason, it is a complete defence to a restitution petition. (For
other case see Class Notes)
Constitutional validity of Section 9
The constitutional validity of the provision has time and again been questioned and
challenged. The question of constitutional validity of S.9 for the first time came up in
came up in the case of T Sareeta v Venkatasubbiah (AIR 1983 AP 356) where the
husband had himself asked the Court to pass a decree of restitution of conjugal rights
and after completion of a year he filed a petition for divorce on the ground that the
decree has not been complied to. The wife challenged the constitutional validity of S.9
of the Act. Justice Chaudhary of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held S. 9 to be
savage and barbarous remedy violating the right to privacy and human dignity
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, hence void. Justice Choudhary of the
held the Section 9 ultra vires since it offended Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Hence, according to the learned judge, Section 9 was constitutionally void. Any
statutory provision that abridged the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution
would have to be declared void in terms of Article 13 of the Constitution. According
to the said learned judge, Article 21 guaranteed right to life and personal liberty
against the State action. Formulated in simple negative terms, its range of operation
positively forbidding the State from depriving any person of his life or personal liberty
except according to the procedure established by law was of far-reaching dimensions
and of overwhelming constitutional significance. Learned judge observed that a
decree for restitution of conjugal rights constituted the grossest form of violation of
any individual right to privacy. According to the learned judge, it denied the woman
her free choice whether, when and how her body was to become the vehicle for the
procreation of another human being. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights
deprived, according to the learned judge, a woman of control over her choice as and
when and by whom the various parts of her body should be allowed to be sensed. The
woman loses her control over her most intimate decisions. The learned judge therefore
was of the view that the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 21 was flagrantly
violated by a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned judge was of the
view that a wife who was keeping away from her husband because of permanent or
even temporary estrangement cannot be forced, without violating her right to privacy
to bear a child by her husband. During a time when she was probably contemplating
an action for divorce, the use and enforcement of Section 9 of the said Act against the
estranged wife could irretrievably alter her position by bringing about forcible
conception permanently ruining her mind, body and life and everything connected
with it. The learned judge was therefore clearly of the view that Section 9 of the said
Act violated Article 21 of the Constitution. He referred to the Scarman Commission's
report in England recommending its abolition. The learned judge was also of the view
that Section 9 of the said Act, promoted no legitimate public purpose based on any
conception of the general good. It did not therefore sub-serve any social good. Section
9 of the said Act was, therefore, held to be arbitrary and void as offending Article 14
of the Constitution.
The above view of the learned single judge of Andhra Pradesh was dissented from in
Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh, [A.I.R. 1984 Del. 66.] by Delhi High Court.
In this case, the learned judge of the Delhi High Court expressed the view that Section
9 of the said Act was not violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The
learned judge noted that the object of restitution decree was to bring about
cohabitation between the estranged parties so that they could live together in the
matrimonial home in amity. The leading idea of Section 9 was to preserve the
marriage. From the definition of cohabitation and consortium, it appeared to the
learned judge that sexual intercourse was one of the elements that went to make up the
marriage, but that was not the summum bonum ("the highest good"). The courts do
not and cannot enforce sexual intercourse. Sexual relations constituted an important
element in the conception of marriage, but it was also true that these did not constitute
its whole content nor could the remaining aspects of matrimonial consortium be said
to be wholly unsubstantial or of trivial character. The remedy of restitution aimed at
cohabitation and consortium and not merely at sexual intercourse. The learned judge
expressed the view that the restitution decree did not enforce sexual intercourse. It was
a fallacy to hold that the restitution of conjugal rights constituted "the starkest form of
governmental invasion" of "marital privacy".
In Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (AIR 1984 SC 1562) the court observed that, the
object of the section is to bring about cohabitation between estranged parties so that
they can live together. That in the privacy of home and married life neither Article 21
nor Article 14 has any place.
In this case, the wife petitioned for restitution of conjugal rights. She was married in
1975 and had given birth to two daughters during her brief married life. She was
turned out of her matrimonial house in 1977 and subsequently filed a petition to which
she was granted an interim maintenance by the Court. The husband later filed a
consent memo for the passing of the decree and the decree of restitution of conjugal
rights was accordingly passed in favour of the wife. One year later, the husband
applied for a divorce under Section 13 (1-A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the
ground that he and his wife had lived separately during the one year period. The
question of cohabitation arose where in the spouses stayed together for a period of two
days after the decree was passed.
It was submitted that the ground for divorce was unjustified and the husband was
getting away with his wrongs. This argument was based on the principles of natural
law, i.e. justice, equity and good conscience. It was further argued that the concerned
section, that is Section 9 of the H.M.A. violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The Honble Court under Justice Sabyasachi Mukhatji observed:
We are unable to accept the position that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is
violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Hindu Marriage is a
sacrament and the object of section 9 is to offer an inducement for the husband and
wife to live together in harmony. If such differences may arise as in this case, it may
be a valid ground for divorce after a period of one year. Hence Section 9s validity is
upheld.
A very important feature of restitution of conjugal rights to be emphasized is that it is
a remedy is aimed at preserving the marriage and not at disrupting it as in the case of
divorce or judicial separation. It serves to aid prevention of the breakup of marriage,
thus is a means of saving the marriage. So the restitution of conjugal rights remedy
tries in promoting reconciliation between the parties and maintenance of matrimonial.
It tries to protect the society from denigrating. But the final decision is that of the
parties whether to obey the decree of restitution of conjugal rights and to continue
with the matrimony or not.

It is suggested to go through the class notes also.