2014. Idealistic Studies, Volume 43, Issues 1 & 2. ISSN 0046-8541. pp.

2740
DOI: 10.5840/idstudies20145133
SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
Geoffrey Gorham
Abstract: When McTaggart puts Spinoza on his short list of philoso-
phers who considered time unreal, he is falling in line with a reading
of Spinozas philosophy of time advanced by contemporaneous British
Idealists and by Hegel. The idealists understood that there is much at
stake concerning the ontological status of Spinozistic time. If time is
essential to motion then temporal idealism entails that nearly every-
thingapart from God conceived sub specie aeternitatisis imaginary.
I argue that although time is indeed imaginaryin a sense no one
doubts as Spinoza saysthere is no good reason to infer that bodies,
the infnite modes, and conatus are imaginary in the same sense. To avoid
this confation, we need to follow Spinoza (who follows Descartes) in
carefully distinguishing between tempus and duratio. Duration is not
only real; it has all the structure needed to ground Spinozistic motion,
bodies and conatus.
I. Introduction
In the introduction to his groundbreaking 1908 article The Unreality of
Time, the British Idealist J. M. E. McTaggart includes Spinoza on his short
list of philosophers who have treated time as unreal.
1
Without defending this
interpretation, McTaggart acknowledges that he is falling in line with the
idealist reading of Spinozas philosophy of time earlier advanced by Hegel
and others.
2
In Faith and Knowledge, for example, Hegel comments that ev-
ery line of Spinozas system makes the proposition that time and succession
are mere appearances so utterly trivial that not the slightest trace of novelty
and paradox is to be seen in it.
3
This reading of Spinoza is also common
among McTaggarts contemporaries within the school of British Idealism.
Thus, Joachim characterizes limited temporal duration as our mutilation of
eternal actuality.
4
And the idealist reading has persisted among infuential
twentieth-century scholars like Hallett and Wolfson, and even in recent, very
circumspect, commentators like Schliesser, who asserts about Spinozistic
time and duration: these imaginings should not be thought to belong to the
fundamental ontology of the world.
5
Notwithstanding the strong measure of opportunism in Hegels Eleatic
reconstruction of Spinozas metaphysics, there is no shortage of texts, early
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 28
and late, that prima facie support the ideality of Spinozistic time.
6
In the
Metaphysical Thoughts (1663) Spinoza emphasizes that time is not an af-
fection of things but a mere mode of thinking (G I, 24; C 105). A private letter
from the same year underscores and broadens this doctrine: measure, time
and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of the imagination
(Letter 12; G IV, 56; C 203). And the imaginary origin of time is confrmed
in the Ethics: no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we
imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or
with the same speed (1P44schol: C 480).
As the idealists understood, there is a good deal at stake concerning the
ontological status of Spinozistic time. If, as Spinoza himself asserts,
7
time
is an essential component of motion, then temporal idealism entails that
nearly everythingapart from God conceived sub specie aeternitatasis
imaginary. For motion and rest (including the scalar speed) account for
both the individuation (2L1; C 458459) and the identity of bodies (2def7; C
447).
8
Motion, and hence time, are further implicated above the level of fnite
modes. When Spinoza is asked for an example of an eternal and infnite
mode that follows immediately from the absolute nature of God (1P21; C
429) he offers motion and rest (Letter 64; G IV, 278). Time is also involved
in the key notion of conatus, by which each thing perseveres in its being.
Spinoza explains that conatus involves an indefnite time since a thing will
always continue to exist by the same power by which it now exists unless it
is destroyed by an external cause (3P8dem: C 499). Consequently, timeat
least indeterminate timeis connected to the actual essences of things since
the striving by which things persevere is nothing but the actual essence of
the thing (3P7; C 499).
This temporal saturation of the created realm will be welcomed by the
idealist as reinforcing their wholesale acosmism: things in time, and time
itself are nothing.
9
I would like to argue, to the contrary, that although time
is indeed imaginary in a certain sensea sense no one doubts as Spinoza
saysthere is no good reason to infer that such fundamental features of the
world as bodies, the infnite modes, and conatus are imaginary in this same
sense. To avoid this confation, we need to follow Spinoza (who follows
Descartes) in carefully distinguishing between time (tempus) and duration
(duratio). Duration, I will argue, is not only real; it has all the structure needed
to ground Spinozistic motion, infnite modes and conatus. In particular, it
is inherently successive. This restores the mundane reality of modes while
highlighting the unique and timeless being of God. For Spinozas version of
divine eternity excludes both time and duration and thereby eliminates any
analogy between the limited and successive existence of created things and
the limitless and necessary existence of God. But, contrary to Hegel, this
does not reduce created things to nothing; rather, it reinforces the Cartesian
doctrine that their distinctive way of being is successive duration.
29 SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
II. Time as Modus Cogitandi: The 1663 Texts
Spinozas earliest discussion of time is presented in the metaphysical
thoughts (Cogitata Metaphysica [CM]) which he appended to his 1663
synthetic exposition of Descartess Principles of Philosophy (Descartes
Principiorum Philosophiae [DPP]).
10
An early chapter of Part One, On Time
and Duration, follows directly upon treatments of the kinds of being, the
distinction between essence and existence, and the modal categories. Clearly,
Spinoza considers it important to clarify the ontology of time, as one of the
principal questions that arise in the general part of metaphysics (S 94; G
I, 233). He frst defnes eternity as the attribute under which we conceive
the infnite existence of God, but postpones discussion until later. Next, he
defnes duration [duratio] as the attribute under which we conceive the
existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality [rerum
creatarum existentiam prout in sua actualitate perseverant existantiam] (S
104; G I, 244). So conceived, he notes, duration is distinct only in reason from
the total existence of a thing since as much as you take away from the thing
so much necessarily you take away from its existence (S 104105; G I, 244).
As for time, in order that duration my be determined, we compare it with
other things that have a fxed and determinate motion, and this comparison is
called time [tempus] (S 105; G I, 244). Such clock time, he emphasizes, is
not an affection of things [rerum] ... but rather a mode of thinking [modus
cogitatndi] that we use to explicate duration (ibid.).
Spinozas treatment clearly derives from Descartess. In the Principles
of Philosophy, Descartes too holds that duration is an attribute under which
we conceive a thing insofar as it perseveres in existence [sub quo concipimus
rem istam, quantenus esse perseverat] (AT 8A 26; CSM 1 211). And as
such, he holds that a thing is distinguished only in reason from its duration
since if a substance ceases to endure then it ceases to be (AT 8A 34; CSM
1 214). Descartes characterizes tempus in nearly the same terms as Spinoza
later will: in order to measure the duration of all things, we compare their
duration with the greatest and most regular motions ... and this duration we
call time (AT 8A 27; CSM 1 212). This comparison adds nothing real to
duration except a mode of thought (ibid).
Both models emphasize an ontological divide between duration and time:
the former is intrinsic to things and not really different from their existence;
the latter is a convenient measure or comparison and not really distinct from
human thought. Descartes fags this divide in his heading for the relevant
section of the Principles: Some attributes are in things and others in our
thought; what duration and time are (AT 8A 27: CSM 1 212). And he con-
cludes the section emphasizing that time adds nothing to duration except a
mode of thought (ibid.). Likewise, in the opening chapter of CM, Spinoza
lists tempus among the modes of thinking for explicating a thing by de-
termining it in comparison with another thing (S 95; G I, 234). Later, he
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 30
makes it even clearer that while time depends on human thought duration
depends only on created things:
Time is the measure of duration, or rather, is nothing but a mode of thinking.
Consequently it presupposes not just any created thing whatever, but par-
ticularly thinking men. As for duration, it ceases when created things cease
to exist and begins when created things begin to exist. (S 129; G I, 169)
Duration may also be compared with the third temporal notion, the eternity
of God. Neither duration nor eternity are mere modes of thinking but rather
attributes under which we conceive existence (created and uncreated things re-
spectively).
11
Yet, unlike eternity, duration is conceived as longer and shorter
(major & minor) and as if (quasi) composed of parts. Moreover, duration
is an attribute of existence only, not of essence (S 105; G I, 244), Later in
CM Spinoza repeats these contrasts between duration and eternity, but drops
the qualifcation that we conceive of duration merely as if composed of
parts. Rather, he says it is precisely because in eternity there are no parts, nor
any before and after (nihil prius nec posterius), that we can never attribute
duration to God without destroying the true conception we have of him (S
111; G I, 251). So in CM duration occupies an ontological middle-ground
between time and eternity: it is has a successive structure, with parts before
and after, like time, but is a real attribute, like eternity.
Since the aims of DPP, and to a much lesser extent CM, are expository, it
is not always clear when Spinozas agreements with Descartes are sincere.
When it comes to time, we fortunately have a detailed independent and con-
temporaneous discussion which confrms the Cartesian philosophy of time
set out in CM. In the 1663 Letter on the Infnite to Ludwig Meyer (who
composed the preface to the DPP), Spinoza uses his triad eternity, duration
and time to explain the different ways in which things can be infnite. Sub-
stances are infnite by nature or defnition, which means that they cannot be
conceived as not existing and their existence cannot be divided into parts or
conceived as greater or lesser. This is eternity. In contrast, the existence of
modes can be so conceived without destroying at the same time the concept
we have of them (G IV, 55, 5-12; C 202). This is duration. There are two
ways the duration of modes can be infnite: (i) by the force of the cause in
which they inhere and (ii) because they cannot be equated with any number
though they can be conceived to be greater or lesser (G IV 61, 1-7; C 205).
By (i) he seems to mean that the duration of modes is infnite insofar as it
fows from things eternal (G IV 56, 16-17; C 203). By (ii), which he also
labels indefnite, he seems to mean that duration is infnite insofar as it can
be assigned no specifc number, either because it is continuous or because it is
infnite in extent.
12
Finally, Spinoza maintains that time arises by abstracting
from substance quantity, which itself is conceived in two ways: superfcially
with the imagination (which is easy) vs. as it is in itself with the intellect
(which is diffcult). The easy way of abstracting produces time:
31 SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
From the fact that when we conceive quantity abstracted from substance,
and separate duration from the way it fows from eternal things, we can
determine them as we please, there arise time and measureTime to
determine Duration and Measure to determine Quantity, in such a way
that, so far as possible, we imagine them easily. Again, from the fact that
we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself and reduce
them to classes so that as far as possible we imagine them easily, arises
Number by which we determine these affections. (G IV, 56, 15-19; C 203)
Spinoza emphasizes that time, so conceived, cannot be infnite. For it
makes duration easily quantifable by dividing it into parts and assigning
them a defnite, i.e., fnite, number: neither number nor measure not time
(since they are only aids of the imagination) can be infnite. For otherwise
Number would not be number, nor Measure measure nor Time time (G IV,
58, 16-18; C 204).
Those who forget number, measure, and time are merely fnite products
of the imagination inevitably entangle themselves in the most absurd absur-
dities (G IV, 57, 12; C 203).
13
For example, when someone has conceived
Duration abstractly, and by confusing it with time begun to divide it into parts,
he will never be able to understand how an hour can pass. The abstracter
runs into a Zeno problemif an hour is to pass, it will be necessary for half
of it to pass frst, and then half of the remainder... (G IV 58, 4-8; C 203).
The source of the diffculty is not taking duration to have parts for, as already
noted, it is the very nature of duration that we conceive it as greater or less
and divide it into parts. Rather, it is the attempt to numerically quantify these
parts. The abstracter either continues to subtract half the remaining time,
and in this way never reach the end of the hour or misguidedly assumes
that duration is composed of discrete moments: but composing duration of
moments is the same as composing number merely by adding noughts (G
IV 58, 9-5; C 204). Either way, the problem is not that duration has parts but
that we imaginatively quantify and count them. The true Mathematicians, on
the contrary, do not assume that such things exceed every number because
of the multiplicity of their parts, but because the nature of the thing cannot
admit number without a manifest contradiction (G IV 59, 14; C 204). So,
as in CM, duration has a rich structure that is infnite both in in relation to
its cause, and inherently in extent and division; the trouble begins when we
confate this structure with discrete numerical abstractions, confusing the
duration of things with marks on a clock.
14
III. Time and Duration in the Ethics
We come to the account of time and duration in the Ethics by way of the
analogous notion of extension, which is treated in much more detail. Gueroult
has noted how in Letter 12 the infnity of duration is presented under a double
aspect: insofar as it fows from absolutely partless eternity and insofar as
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 32
its has parts that are numberless.
15
A corresponding ambivalence about exten-
sion is prominent in the Ethics. In the famous scholium to proposition 15,
where Spinoza attempts to reconcile the extendedness and indivisibility of
God, he repeats nearly verbatim the Letter 12 distinction between quantity as
conceived in the imagination (divisible) vs. the intellect (indivisible). But he
adds an additional point, at most only implicit in Letter 12, that since matter
is everywhere the same its parts are distinguished only by its affections i.e.,
modally but not really (1P15s, V; C 423424). As Spinoza explains in CM,
two (non-substances) are modally distinct when although either mode may
be conceived without the help of the other, nevertheless neither mode may
be conceived without the help of the substance whose modes they are (G I,
257; S 118), Since Spinoza, like nearly all seventeenth-century philosophers,
treats space and time symmetrically it is worth formulating the corresponding
doctrine for duration. This would be that although my duration or continu-
ance in existence today can be conceived apart from my duration tomorrow,
neither can be conceived apart from me. This fts well with another indirect
point Spinoza makes against the real divisibility of extension in 1P15, which
is that opponents of the vacuum (plenists) cannot admit such division: for
if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct,
then why could not one part be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with
one another as before? (1P15s, IV; C 423). The temporal analogue would
presumably be that although we can think of the different parts of duration
independently there can never be a real gap in duration itself. In any event,
both points suggest that extension and duration can have intrinsic parts but
not parts that are really distinct or discrete.
The treatment of duration and time themselves in the Ethics is essentially
the same as in earlier texts although Spinoza more thoroughly explains why
we impose the latter upon the former. Duration is the existence of something
conceived as a certain species of quantity (2P45s; C 482) and specifcally
defned as an indefnite continuation of existing (2Def5; C 447). The quantity
of a things continued existence is indefnite in itself because it cannot at all
be determined through the very nature of the existing thing (ibid. See also
1P24c; C 431). Nor is the extent of a fnite things duration determined by its
effcient cause which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, and does
not take it away(2Def5; C 447). Rather our duration depends on our place in
the infnite common order of nature of which we have are mostly ignorant.
So we have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of our
body (2P30; C 471) much less other fnite things (2P31; C 472). In the face
of such inadequacy, time is the means by which the imagination represents
the past and future durations of things. It is a conventional measure of dura-
tion derived by comparing the regular motions of bodies: we imagine time,
from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others,
or more quickly, or with the same speed (2P44schol; C 480). So time takes
33 SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
indeterminate duration and reduces it to determinate, measurable parts.
16
For
example, the actual existence of the human body, i.e., a lifespan, is explained
by duration and can be defned by time (5P23dem). In this way the Letter 12
parallel between duration/time and extension/measure is retained. For in his
1P15s diatribe against those who fear attributing extension to God, he insists
that fgure and measure are superfcial means by which the imagination
attempts to limit the quantity of extension (1P15s: II 57, 9-11; II 58, 25-26;
II 59 20-25; C 420424).
17
Nevertheless, imaginary time fails to represent
real durations adequately. Unlike in Letter 12, however, the problem is not
so much that time relies on numerical abstraction as that the imagination is
unreliable in itself. Thus, since the imagination depends on sense experience,
it will represent the durations of things only uncertainly, i.e., contingently
(2P44s; C 481) and represent present things as disproportionately good or
evil in comparison with past or future things (4P62s; C 582).
As noted above, duration is crucial to Spinozas mature doctrine of cona-
tus or the striving by which things persevere in their being, which he says
constitutes the actual essence of any fnite thing (3P7; C 499). As we have
seen, Spinozas original defnition of duration is in fact perseverance in ex-
istence (S 104; G I, 244). Furthermore, the striving of conatus must involve
indefnite rather than fnite time (tempus indefnitum) (3P8; C 499). Such
indefnite existence is just what constitutes duration in the Ethics (2Def5; C
447) and distinguishes it from measured time (G IV, 58; C 203). Indeed he
goes on to specify that the human mind strives to persevere for an indefnite
duration (indefnata quadam duratione) (3P9; C 499). Spinoza derives the
conatus doctrine from the proposition that no thing can be destroyed except
by an external cause (3P4; C 498). There is a corresponding perseverance
or inertia in motion and rest: a body in motion moves until it has been
determined by another body to rest; and a body at rest also remains at rest
until it is determined to motion by another (2L3; C 459). So the defnite time
and speed of a motion is not determined by its nature, but only from external
causes, just as the defnite duration of a thing is not known simply from its
essence (2def5; C 447; see also 1P24c; C 431), but only from the common
order of Nature (2P30; C 471). What is known is simply that minds and
bodies successively endure, whether in motion or rest.
IV. Duration and Eternity
The nature of Spinozistic duration can be further clarifed by comparison
with eternity. As already noted CM strongly separated divine eternity from
the duration of created things. Because Gods existence is his essence, and
duration cannot in any way pertain to the essences of things,
18
it follows
that duration is not attributed to God:
Since duration is conceived as being greater or less, or as composed of
parts, it follows clearly that no duration can be ascribed to God. For since
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 34
his being is eternal, i.e., in it there can be nothing which is before or after,
we can never ascribe duration to him without at the same time destroying
the true concept we have of God. (G I, 250, 31-251,3; S 111. See also G
I, 269 13-15; S 129)
In radically separating eternity from duration, Spinoza deviates from the
traditional conception of eternity as a non-successive species of duration. On
this conception, God persists or endures but not with parts of his duration
arranged before and after; rather his duration is permanent, simultane-
ously whole, or all at once.
19
Spinoza is adamant that to avoid attributing
any duration to God, we say that he is eternal (G I, 250 10-12; S 111). He
seems to have Descartes in mind in saying that those who attribute duration
to God assume that he is as it were continuously created by himself (ibid.),
for Descartes ventures this doctrine in the First Replies to the Meditations
(AT 7 109; CSM 2, 7879). Spinozas insistence on an absolutely duration-
less model of divine eternitywhich is to be attributed to God alone, not
to any created thing even thought its duration is without beginning or end
(G I, 252, 18-9; S 112113)underscores his commitment to the inherent
structure of duration itself: greater or less, composed of parts, and successive
(before and after).
Spinozas concern to avoid attributing duration to God is evident in his
exposition of Descartess philosophy in the DPP. For instance, although he
otherwise faithfully represents Descartess several proofs of Gods existence,
he conspicuously omits the premise of the second causal proof that even if
I had always existed I still could not preserve myself given the nature of
time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent (AT 8A 13; CSM
I 200; cf. AT 7 49; CSM 2 33). Spinozas critical exposition of the proof
makes it instead depend entirely on the assumption that if I was self-created
I would have given myself every perfection. Apparently, he did want the
proof to depend on Gods relation to temporal parts. Similarly, Descartess
own proof of the law of rectilinear motion turns crucially, though somewhat
obscurely, on the assumption that God preserves motion in the precise form
in which it is occurring at the very moment he preserves it, without taking
account of the motion which was occurring a little earlier (AT 8A64; CSM
I 242). But Spinozas even more puzzling reconstruction proceeds entirely
from the nature of motion which supposedly excludes from consideration
any duration that can be conceived as greater than another duration (G I,
204; S 65). Spinoza himself concedes that it may be diffcult to see why this
does not exclude curvilinear motion as much as rectilinear. So he contents
himself with the assurance that motion in a straight line, since it is simplest,
is contained in the essence or defnition of motion. (G I, 205; S 65)
20
These
amendments to Descartess offcial proofs illustrate Spinozas reluctance
to associate God in any way with the successive duration of created things.
In the Ethics, eternity is again conceived as the sort of existence which
35 SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
follows simply from a things defnition or essence, and which cannot be
explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without
beginning or end (1def8; C 409).
21
This seems to be true with respect to the
notorious doctrine of the eternity of the human mind after the destruction
of the body: We do not attribute to the human mind any duration that can
be defned by time except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the
body, . . . however since whatever is conceived, with a certain necessity,
through Gods essence itself, is nevertheless something, this something
that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal (5P23;
C 607). In the scholium to this same proposition Spinoza reminds us that
eternity can neither be defned by time nor have any relation to time (ibid.;
cf. 5P29dem; C 609).
22
The reason for this is straightforward in the case of
God, from whose defnition it follows he exists and therefore he is eternal
(1P19dem; C 428), which means that for God there is neither when, nor
before nor after (1P33s2; C 437).
The durationless nature of divine eternity thus confrms the inherently suc-
cessive structure of the duration from which God is removed. Nevertheless, in
spite of his eternity, God produces the successive duration of singular things
, i.e., their beginnings and subsequent fnite perseverance in existence, via
the infnite chain of fnite causes (1P24c; C 431; 1P28; C 432433). While
these fnite modes have a determinate existence, and hence duration, Spi-
noza also mentions things which follow from the absolute nature of any of
Gods attributesthe so-called infnite modesand he labels these eternal
(1P21; C 429; 1P28dem; C 432). This might seem problematic given I have
suggested that the infnite mode (of extension) endures. However, it is clear
that Spinoza does not conceive of the infnite modes as eternal in the strictly
durationless way of God. For his specifc claim is that these things have
always (semper) had to exist (1P21; C 429) which suggests that they are
sempiternal, i.e., endlessly enduring.
23
Indeed, Spinoza sometimes stipulates
that he intends ab aeterno with just this sense: here we mean nothing other
than duration without any beginning (G I, 270; S 130). Furthermore his spe-
cifc demonstration against the determinate existence or duration of infnite
modes proceeds by reductio on the assumption that at some time it does
not exist or will not exist (1P21; C 430). Such a reductio can establish only
that infnite modes are sempiternal, not the much stronger view that they are
durationless.
24
Most importantly, and as noted above, when Spinoza is pushed
in correspondence for an example of an infnite mode, he offers motion and
rest (G IV, 278). But while motion/rest might well be from eternity in the
sense of having endured forever, it is hard to see how they could be absolutely
removed from duration and succession. The same is true of Spinozas example
of the other sort of infnite modes, the so-called mediate ones, which fol-
low from an attribute of God as it is modifed by a modifcation (2P22: C
430). Spinoza cites the whole face of the universe (G IV, 278) and refers
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 36
his correspondent to 2P13L7 for details. But that lemma defends the identity
of bodies of arbitrary size, despite moving or resting as a whole, so long as
they maintain the same mutual communication of motion among its parts. In
this way, the whole of nature is one individual whose parts, i.e., all bodies,
vary in infnite ways without any change in the whole individual (2P13L7;
C 462). While this infnite mode of extension is unchanging in a sense, it is
hard see how to exempt it from duration and succession.
25
V. Conclusion
Weve established that Spinoza consistently embraces an ontological distinc-
tion (derived from Descartes)
26
between duration, which is a real attribute of
created things, and time, which is a merely imaginary, quantitative measure
of duration. Bodies and organisms, conceived under the attribute of extension,
persist by maintaining various motion/rest connections among their parts,
interact according to deterministic laws of motion and collision, and gener-
ally persevere in their being, though only for a fxed time given their place in
the common order of nature.
27
While our measures and estimations of these
processes depend on temporal conventions imposed by us, and hence can
never attain the degreee of adequacy in our knowledge of things conceived sub
specie aeternitatis (5P29; C 609610), what they measure is a consequence
of the successive persistence of things themselves not our imagination. So
Spinozas insistence on the inherently successive duration of the fnite and
infnite modes allows him to sustain a realistic and mechanistic conception of
the natural world essentially in line with the new philosophy of his time
contrary to the main idealist versions of Spinozismdespite his monistic
conception of substance and his general suspicion of mathematical abstraction.
Macalester College
Notes
Thanks to my colleague Martin Gunderson and my student Samuel Eklund for very helpful
discussion and criticism. And thanks to Macalester College for supporting my collabora-
tion with Sam through a Student-Faculty Summer Research grant.
1. McTaggart 1908: 457. Originally published in Mind 17 (1908): 457473.
2. McTaggart notes that the two most important movements (excluding those which
are as yet merely critical) are those which look to Hegel and to Mr. Bradley. And both
these schools deny the reality of time (ibid.). See Parkinson 1977 and Franks 2005 on
Spinozism in German Idealism.
3. Hegel 1977: 106.
4. Joachim 1901: 121. See also Caird 1888: 219; Joachim 1901: 120122; Alexander
1921: 21.
5. Schliesser 2012: 441. Cf. Hallett 1930: 714; Wolfson 1934: 352.
37 SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME
6. On this, see Parkinson 1977 and, more recently, Melamed 2010.
7. There can be no motion from one place to another that does not require a time
than which there could always be an even shorter time (S, 60; G I, 197).
8. Cf. 2L3def; C 460.
9. Hegel 1977: 106.
10. Although CM shows the strong infuence of Descartes, they clearly represent
Spinozas own considered views. See the introduction to CM by S. Barone and L. Rice
(S xxvii-xxx).
11. G I, 244. S, 104. On the intimate relation between duration and existence for
Spinoza, see Wolfson 1934: 343354. Contrary to Wolfson, however, duration is not a
mode of existence (354) but an attribute, as Descartes, and Spinoza himself, says (G
IV, 278).
12. To illustrate continuous infnity, he invokes a geometrical example involving
inscribed, non-concentric circles. The upshot is that different parts of the non-overlapping
area contain numerous unequal spaces each of which contain variations that exceed
every number (G IV, 60, 2; C 204). To illustrate uncountably infnite extent he notes
the absurdity of someone who wishes to determine all the motions there have been by
reducing them and their duration to a defnite number and time (G IV, 60, 12; C 204).
13. For a critical discussion of Spinozas negative attitude to number, see Bennett
1984: 46. For a more sympathetic treatment, see Gueroult 1973.
14. Recently, Schmaltz has provided a detailed discussion of temporality in CM and
Letter 12, consistent in most respects with the analysis offered here. Schmaltz, however,
is primarily concerned with the nature of eternity rather than the distinction between time
and duration. See also Schliesser, forthcoming.
15. Gueroult 1973: 186.
16. Cf. Bennett 1984: 47; Hallett 1930: 5; Wolfson (1934: 358) and Bennett are
among the few commentators to have given serious attention to the duration/time distinc-
tion in Spinoza.
17. See also 4d6, where Spinoza observes that we are in the same way limited in our
ability to distinctly imagine large spatial and temporal intervals, and 5P29s, where he
notes that we conceive things as actual in relation to time and place (5P29s: C 610).
18. Spinoza is here conceiving of essences as independent of existing things: for no
one will ever say that the essence of a circle or a triangle, insofar as it is an eternal truth, has
endured (G I 250, 28-30; C 316). In terms he will later employ, the formal essences of
things do not endure even if the actual essences do. Thus, there are formal essences even
for non-existent things which exist only as comprehended in Gods attributes and not as
insofar as they are said to have duration (2P8c; C 452). On the other hand, conatus itself,
which is a form of duration, is nothing but the actual essence of the thing (3P8; C 499).
19. See, for example, Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1, 10, 1-4 ; Suarez, Disputationes
Metaphysicae 50, sec. 3.
20. For an illuminating discussion of Spinozas treatment of this law, see Gabbey 2006.
21. Despite such direct assertions, a number of prominent scholars have maintained
that Spinozistic eternity is merely endless duration or time (i.e., sempiternity) at least in
IDEALISTIC STUDIES 38
the Ethics. See Kneale 1973, Donagan 1973, Bennett 1984: 48. For the (more common)
view that eternity is strictly opposed to duration and time see Joachim 1901: 295298,
Hallett 1930, Wolfson 1934: 369, Alexander 1921: 22, Hardin 1977, Steinberg 1981,
and Schmaltz Forthcoming. The last two commentators argue forcefully that Spinozas
conception of eternity is unchanged from the earlier works through the Ethics.
22. Since this doctrine is only indirectly related to the duration/time distinction I
will not enter the long and complex discussion of its meaning and coherence. Good
recent contributions to this discussion are Kneale 1973, Donagan 1973, Hardin 1977,
Steinberg 1981, Bennett 1984, Parchment 2000, Garber 2005, Garrett 2009, and Schmaltz
Forthcoming.
23. See also 1P17s; C 426. Donagan 1973: 245, Bennett 1984: 205. Both Gueroult
(1973: 184185) and Schmaltz (Forthcoming: 12) suggest, plausibly, that the infnite modes
of the Ethics correspond to the things which have no bounds, not by the force of its es-
sence, but by the force of its cause (G IV 53, 2-3; C 201). For the historical background
of sempiternal vs. timeless eternity, in relation to Spinoza, see Wolfson 1934: 358369
and Kneale 1973.
24. This point is emphasized by Schmaltz in his recent, compelling case for the mere
sempiternality of the infnite modes (Forthcoming: 16-17).
25. Alexander 1921: 33; Donagan 1973: 245246; Schmaltz Forthcoming: 1218.
For opposing views, see Hallett 1930: 8388 and Hardin 1977: 130132.
26. Wolfson (1934: 353) is one of the few scholars to have noted the Cartesian origin
of Spinozas philosophy of time. Surprisingly, he goes on to assert: Essentially, thus,
time and duration, according to Spinoza, are the same (ibid.).
27. A parallel project would be pursued under the attribute of thought: minds would
persevere in their being by sustaining psychological and causal relations like memory and
desire, for a fxed time insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is
explained by duration and defned by time (5P23d; C 607).
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