THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs.

GREGORIO PERFECTO
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
Ponente: Malcolm, J.

Facts:
On August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered
that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office.

Mr. Gregorio Perfecto editor of the newspaper La Nacion published an article concerning the
Philippine Senate and its members and was accused of violating the aticle 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code.

However, the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code. Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256.

The Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is also abrogated by the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty over the Philippines and because it is inconsistent with democratic
principles of government.


Issue:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force.

Ruling:
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the
spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out
by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the
protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands.


The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such
respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to
occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.


BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
Facts:
In 1963, Macariola and her sisters from her fathers second marriage had a dispute over their
inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after
determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter,
the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties.
The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that
he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The
decision became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge
Asuncion in 1965.


On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a
judge on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was
involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against
Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.

Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the
project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were
insignificant portions of the parcels of land.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

Ruling:
No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the
property in 1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the
property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who
then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a dummy of
Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what
she got were insignificant portions of the land. The Supreme Court however admonished Judge
Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions.
PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
Ponente: Martinez, J.

Facts:
On May 18, 1995, eleven members of Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies in Metro Manila were slain by elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group. On media expose however, it was alleged that what actually transpired was a summary
execution. The office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder charged as principals before the Sandiganbayan. This information was amended
after re-investigation and petitioner herein was charged as accessory.

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.

The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by
the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson joined by others also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case
Ruling:
The amendment in RA no 8249 that in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said RA 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Court, as the case may
be in pursuant to BP 129. The previous law vests jurisdiction in the RTC where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27. The term principal was deleted so that under the
amendment, if an accomplice belongs to Salary grade 27, then jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan even if
none of the principals belong to a lower salary grade. The amendment was applied retroactively.
Action of the Court when determined that is had no jurisdiction
1. Under its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court, even the Court of Appeals may properly refer the case to the
court of proper jurisdiction.
2. Courts of the 1 and 2 level are without authority to order the transfer. If the courts believe that it has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to simply dismissing the case.




JAIME HERNANDEZ vs. DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manila
and CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of Mania
G.R. No. L-19272, January 25, 1967
Ponente: Sanchez, J.

Facts:
Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with the Manila city fiscal against
Finance Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant)
for violating RPC Art. 216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act 626
*which provides for the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution) or
RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

The complaint involved Hernandezs alleged shareholdings in University of the East, Bicol Electric Co.,
Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said
corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
Hernandezs incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscals office.

After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal of Manila Carlos Gonzales
(respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statute
was pending before the SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against
Hernandez). The fiscal granted the motion.

Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds that (a)violation of Article VII,
Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be
prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of
Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration denied.

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and prohibition praying for preliminary
injunction to restrain the fiscals office from continuing the investigation.

The CFI dismissed the petition


Issue:
Whether or not the Manila fiscal be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges against
Hernandez.








Ruling:
By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are empowered to
investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is
the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office.
The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate
promptly and file the case of as speedily.
A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by
court prohibition or injunction.
However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it was necessary: (a) for the orderly administration
of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to affordadequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because thestatute relied upon is
unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of Constitution Art VIIsec.
11(2): a fine of not than P5000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. Where an offense is wholly committed outside the
territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.
Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive
confines of another province. Otherwise, they would be overreaching the territorial limits
of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach upon powers and prerogatives of fiscals of
the province.
Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential
components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner
was head of a department: Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of
department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested
in the corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act
officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his
office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an
essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under
the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained
of.
Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly provided the penalsanction
for violating its provisions.



Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan
On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later
sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised
before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The
Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier
General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief
Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as
it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan
has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.
HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law
by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established
precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under
R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents.
Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is
why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4
and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are
one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).




Case 1
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion
and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a
determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or
political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American
Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
"Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co.
vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs
[1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict
with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be
of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that
the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that
they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the
Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they
are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon
a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to
the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of
that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain
doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article
referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this
provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs.
Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear
or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by
proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But President McKinley,
in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of
the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been
taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court
in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful
consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles
of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the
appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems
vs. U.S., supra.)

Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the
Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith,
are hereby repealed. . . ."
the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria

Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for
individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.)
But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no
matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's
Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the
later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse,
or insults by writing.
"Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the
offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister
of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in
authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

Case 2
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or
acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which
he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and
responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even
if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not
from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which
he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and
the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of
the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be
recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and
elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates
the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express
assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the
prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror
shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United
States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242),
Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered
by the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
Art 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888) of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce
was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by
virtue of cession, 1898).
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar,
the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.
As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers
against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to
be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions;
and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People
vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service
Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the
members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department
..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the
corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other
personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and
rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote
him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation
of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,
1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because
to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the
Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with
practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in
determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor
of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase
a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a
member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

CASE 3
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal
accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the
equivalent of at least SG 27.
RA 7975 (AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED)
Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Republic Act No. 8249 February 5, 1997
AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;



"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of
the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues
properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.
"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order
on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.
"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in
the Rules of Court.
"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of
the Rules of the Court.
"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions,
is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal."
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49
Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Definition of Civil Law
Civil Law branch of law which has for its double purposes that organization of the family and regulation of property.
Mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority, and obedience among the members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests.
Four concepts:
1. It was equivalent to the national law or the law applicable to the individuals of each particular city exclusively
2. It was used to distinguish that body of law composed of plebiscites, imperial constitutions and others from the jus honorarium or
pretorium
3. It was understood to mean the law applicable to the citizens of rome, as distinguished from that applicable to foreignersor the jus
gentium
4. Used to designate the opinionsof authorized jurisconsults.

Commercial Law it is the branch of private law governing acts of commerce (business intercourse) and/or the juridical relations arising from
such commercial acts. Principal chac: Uniform universal equitable customary progressive.




















Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 573
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation
and Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter, Longest Force) to render security services at its
premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private
respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.

According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with
Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the
services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to
terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the
employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners shipyard.

On September 2, 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both
Longest Force and petitioner, before the Labor Arbiter.

For its part, Longest Force filed a cross-claim against the petitioner. Longest Force admitted that
it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the premises of
petitioner from October 16, 1993 to April 30, 1995, rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said
period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in
the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner alleging that the service fee
paid by the latter to it was way below the PNPSOSIA and PADPAO rate, thus, contrary to the
mandatory and prohibitive laws because the right to proper compensation and benefits provided
under the existing labor laws cannot be waived nor compromised.

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no
employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out
that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had
already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be
dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest Force had benefited from the contract,
it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal.

The labor Arbiter decided that respondents Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc.
and Mariveles Shipyard Corporation jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of
complainants representing underpayment of wages and overtime pay.

Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC in NLRC NCR. The labor tribunal, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the NLRC. The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
NLRC judgment for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, denied due course to the petition and dismissed it
outright.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is jointly and severally liable with Longest Force

Ruling:
Yes, Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles
106,107 and 109 of the Labor Code. When the petitioner contracted with Longest Force, petitioner
became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107. Following Article
106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes
jointly and severally liable for the guards wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure
compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security
agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the
indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the
agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with
labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by
claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract
with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of
workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are
considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null.
Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus, employers
cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or
subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.

















Labor code
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another
person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance
with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to
such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor
to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make
appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations
within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the
employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this
Code.
In such cases labor-only contracting, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent
of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter
were directly employed by him.
ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
ART. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any
violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under
this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.















DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948
Ponente: Tuason, J.
Facts:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record
of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order
that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with
their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The
motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First
Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked
him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.