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PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1953 February
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence Phil. Rep. Vol. 92
G.R. No. L-6266, Rodriguez et
al. v. Gella et al., 92 Phil. 603
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
FEBRUARY 2, 1953
G.R. No. L-6266
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
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Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel,
Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P.
Vivo for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous
occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already
passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved
on December 16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a
result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency." Five members held that the Act ceased to be
operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress
convened in special session) according to Chief Justice Moran.
Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in effect
concluded that the powers delegated to the President had been
withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon by the Congress
or on which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability
to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating
house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948)
regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation FUNDS for the operation of the Government from
July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds
for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared
null and void for having been issued after Commonwealth Act
No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted
legislation on the same subjects.
MORE or less the same considerations that influenced our
pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are and should be controlling
in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to
invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on
November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the
second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
[[1]]
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earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in
times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly
the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of
war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to
INVEST the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing
the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary
to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly
intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that
the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality,
since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter
ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This
eventuality has in fact taken place when the President
disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers
Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or
either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite
duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in palpable
repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant
thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed
in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic
will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President
and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend
that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,
would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while
Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be the law."
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense
that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested
that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that
the powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the
last world war which factually involved the Philippines when
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941.
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of
the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the
National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war
could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is
confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon:
"When it became evident that we were completely helpless
against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to
open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into
history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding
faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United
States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the President of
the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine
Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." When
President Quezon said "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant
such factual war as that then raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that
[[2]]
[[3]]
"since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal,
but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of
war and who have not received any relief for the loss and
destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency
created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being still
existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the
DEBT moratorium should be continued in force in a modified
form." It is important to remember that Republic Act No. 342
in which this declaration was made bore the approval of the
President. INDEED, the latter in his speech delivered on July 4,
1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the
Republic) faces today are incidental passing rains artificially
created by seasonal partisanship, very common among
democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the
thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," an
admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are
not the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of
the legislative department on the alleged existence of
emergency, reference may be had to House Bill No. 727,
hereinbefore referred to, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of
which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of
powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national
emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and
in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished
from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-
effect of war or from natural causes such as widespread
earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the
typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did
not result from the last world war but were and could not have
been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is
available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the
people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress
[[4]]
without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any
emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called
attention to an impending emergency that may be brought about
by present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to
the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in
defense of democracy and freedom and for the preservation of
our Republic. The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be
attributed to the war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought
between Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied Powers
on the other; and indications are that in the next world war, if
any, the communist countries will be aligned against the
democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy
declared in section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be granted
as often as emergencies contemplated in the Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still
technically at war with Japan pending the ratification of the
peace treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual
war. In the second place, the last world war was between the
United States and Japan, the Philippines being involved only
because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third
place, the United States had already signed the peace treaty with
Japan, and the Philippines has become an independent country
since July 4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is
inconsistent with the claim that the emergency powers are non-
existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the
Bill had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially
because this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary
majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen
and Senators and on House Resolution No. 99, urging the
President to release and appropriate funds for essential and
urgent public works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas.
It is enough to state, in reply, that the said petition and
resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill
No. 727 formally passed by two chambers of the Congress. If faith
can be accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more
reason for accepting the solemn declarations of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that
insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act
on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the
President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos.
545 and 546 must be declared as having no LEGAL anchorage. We
can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since
liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds
for the operation of the Government, public works, and many
others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task
the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the
President. If the President had ceased to have powers with
regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of
special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly
what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No.
671 expressly limited the power of the President to that
continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the
Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by
executive orders make new appropriations. The specific power
"to continue in force LAWS and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the
general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem
necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers
under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and
overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President
should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of
speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the
people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a
government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In
line with such primordial objective, our Government is
democratic in form and based on the system of separation of
powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to
abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared
to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in
disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the
legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative
in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and
slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to
concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for
obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had
the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of
legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times
of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to
the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone
must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not
create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the
nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials
and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby
declared null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist
from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the
public funds set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
"All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills . . . shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
[[1]]
[[2]]
made by law." The authority or power to appropriate
government funds to be spent for public purposes is lodged
exclusively in the Congress because it is purely and essentially a
legislative function. The legislative power to appropriate
government funds for public purposes lodged exclusively in the
Congress may, however, be delegated to the President "in times
of war or other national emergency," "for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe," "to carry out a
declared national policy." This constitutional provision has no
counterpart in the Constitution of the United States of America
and in those patterned after it. Under this provision of the
Constitution several emergency powers acts, notably Com. Acts
Nos. 600 and 671, were passed. Being a deviation from the
principle of separation of powers the delegation of legislative
powers authorized by the Constitution may validly be made only
by adhering strictly to its spirit and letter. Pursuant thereto the
legislative authority or power to be granted or delegated to the
President by the Congress must be "in times of war or other
national emergency" and "for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe," and the Congress has to
pass a law for that purpose. The reason why the Constitution is
silent on or does not provide for the manner the delegation of
legislative powers may be withdrawn, revoked or ended, is
because if it is for a limited period it lapses at the end of the
period and because if the war or other national emergency which
prompted it ceases the delegation of legislative powers ceases
also ipso facto. A law which delegates such powers to the
President for an indefinite period would be unconstitutional
because it is against the express provision of the Constitution. It
would be an abdication of legislative powers. If the law which
delegates legislative powers does not fix or provide for a period
of time within or during which the President may exercise them
and there is dispute or doubt as to whether the national
emergency which prompted the Congress to pass the law
delegating legislative powers to the President continues or has
ceased, such dispute or doubt may be determined in an
appropriate case by the courts. Another way of terminating such
delegation is by the Congress itself which made the delegation.
[[2]]
[[3]]
[[4]]
To withdraw, terminate or revoke the delegation of legislative
powers to the President a concurrent resolution would be
sufficient. The concurrence of the President is superfluous and
unnecessary, for if it be required then the law which delegated
legislative powers to him would suffer from a fatal defect, vice,
or infirmity which would render such delegation
unconstitutional for lack of time limitation prescribed and
ordained by the Constitution.
It is claimed that just as the delegation of legislative powers to
the President is to be made by means of a law which requires the
concurrence of the President, so the withdrawal, termination or
revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him must also
be with his concurrence and approval. The reason for the
requirements that a law be passed to make the delegation of
legislative powers valid and effective is the fact that whereas the
Congress may deem it wise and expedient to make the
delegation, the President may hold a different view. In other
words, he has to concur and accept the powers delegated to him
by the Congress. But when it comes to withdrawal, termination
or revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him his
concurrence or consent is not necessary. The absence of
constitutional provision on how it should be done and carried
out is not due to an oversight or to an intention of the members
of the Constitutional Convention to require the concurrence of
the President to make there vocation valid and effective,
because, as heretofore stated, if such concurrence be required to
make the revocation valid and effective, the law which delegated
legislative powers to the President would or might offend against
the very provision of the Constitution which requires and
ordains that such delegation be for a limited period of time only,
and because the refusal to concur in by a President bent on or
inclined to continue exercising legislative powers delegated to
him would result in a delegation of legislative powers, at least
during his incumbency or tenure of office, regardless of whether
the reason or reasons for the grant of the authority to exercise
such legislative powers have ceased to exist.
[[5]]
It is contended, however, that in withdrawing, terminating or
revoking the legislative powers delegated to the President the
Congress did so by passing a bill evincing its intention to have his
assent, which he refused to give, and for that reason the
revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him was
ineffective for lack of such concurrence. To determine what the
Congress intended when it passed the bill repealing the
Emergency Powers Acts the Senate approved it unanimously
form must give way to substance. If the contention that in
passing the bill repealing the Emergency Powers Acts the
Congress intended to have the concurrence of the President be
upheld, such a construction would render the bill contradictory
in itself, because in the explanatory notes of H. No. 692
introduced by Congressman Roy and H. No. 727 by Congressman
Zosa, upon which the consolidated bill passed is based, it is
declared "that war had long ended," that "the need for the grant
of such unusual powers to the President has disappeared," and
that for that reason the Congress repealed all Emergency Powers
Acts. The congress could not have meant or intended to
subordinate its opinion or judgment that the war had ended and
that the national emergency had ceased to exist to that of the
President, the legislative and not the executive being the
department of the Government exclusively clothed or vested
with the authority and power to make such a declaration. In
passing the bill the Congress committed a mistake in the matter
of form but not of substance because the latter is there in the
explanatory note of the bill passed by both houses, to wit: "that
war had long ended," that "the need for the grant of such
unusual powers to the President has disappeared," and that for
that reason it repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts. After the
Congress had made that declaration the President could no
longer exercise the legislative powers delegated to him. It was a
complete and absolute revocation of the delegation of such
powers. His veto of the bill could not and did not have the effect
of reviving or continuing the delegation of legislative powers
which had been revoked by the Congress, the only constitutional
body empowered and authorized to make the revocation.
For this reasons I am of the opinion that Executive Orders No.
545 and 546 which appropriate government funds for public
works and relief for the victims of typhoons in some provinces of
the Republic are of no validity and legal effect because the
President no longer had the authority to issue such executive
orders under the Emergency Powers Act which had been
withdrawn or revoked by the Congress. The writ of prohibition
prayed for should be granted.
BENGZON, J., concurring:
I have signed the majority opinion. But I also agree to the above
views of Mr. Justice Padilla.
Labrador, J., concurs.
REYES, J., concurring:
It being repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution to let
Commonwealth Act No. 671 degenerate into a grant in perpetuity
of legislative powers to the Executive, and taking House Bill No.
727, approved by the Congress but vetoed by the President, as a
for-the-record pronouncement on the part of the legislative
branch of the Government that the emergency which impelled it
to delegate, through the said COMMONWEALTH ACT, legislative
powers to the President had already ceased, so that there was no
longer any need for the exercise of those delegated powers, and,
lastly, considering that said Act does not have to be repealed by
another Act because, as an emergency measure, it repeals itself
with the cessation of the emergency, I concur in this opinion of
Mr. Justice Padilla.
JUGO, J., concurring:
In addition to the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Paras and
Associate Justice Padilla, I would like to make a few brief
remarks:
Section 26 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provides as
follows:
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which is entitled "An
Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency as a Result of War
Involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to
Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency,"
reads as follows:
The existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines,
makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency.
Section 2 of said Commonwealth Act No. 671 invoking section 26,
Article VI, of the Constitution above-quoted, authorized the
President during the existence of the emergency caused by said
war to promulgate rules and regulations, etc.
Executive Order No. 545, dated November 10, 1952, appropriating
funds for urgent and essential public works, states in its
preamble, in justification of said order, that the Congress in its
last special session had failed to appraise funds for the
immediate repairs and reconstruction of certain public buildings
and public works, damages by the recent typhoons, floods, and
other calamities.
Executive Order No. 564, dated November 10, 1952, also declared
as its cause that the Congress had failed in its last special session
to provide funds for relief to the victims of the recent typhoons,
floods, draughts, earthquakes, etc.
It will be seen that the authority given by the Constitution to the
Congress to delegate certain legislative powers to the President
was for a limited time. This was naturally so, because an
emergency cannot be of a long, unlimited or indefinite duration,
for otherwise it would not be an emergency.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941.
Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 were issued on November 10,
1952; that is, almost eleven years from the DATE Commonwealth
Act No. 671 was enacted. It is hard to conceive of an emergency
which has lasted almost eleven years.
The emergency contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
not same emergency invoked in said executive orders, for,
whereas Commonwealth Act No. 671 refers to the emergency
created by the existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe involving the Philippines, the
executive order above-mentioned deal with the damages
wrought by the recent typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, etc., and the failure of the Congress to provide funds
for the repair and reconstruction of damaged buildings and
public works and the relief of the victims. The recent typhoons,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc. and the failure of the
Congress to provide for them have nothing to do with the war
mentioned in said Commonwealth Act No. 671 and are not the
consequences of said war.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
With the majority I agree that Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546,
the first appropriating P37,850,500 for urgent and essential
public works, the second appropriating P11,367,600 for relief
are invalid, for the same reasons given by me in dissenting
opinion in cases G.R. No. L-2044, L-2756, and L-3054-56
commonly called the "Emergency Cases of 1949", namely, that
the legislature had already withdrawn from the realm of
presidential legislation or regulation under the emergency
powers to delegate by Commonwealth Act No. 671, the power to
[[*]] [[*]] [[*]]
appropriate funds for the expenses of the Government and for
other purposes.
To me, however, the more important point involved in the
present case is not the validity of the two executive orders but
rather the question of whether or not Commonwealth Act No.
671 is still has emergency powers under said Act. And the parties
herein, not excluding the Chief Executive and the Legislature, it
is to be presumed, want this point definitely settled. So, I
proposed to devote the considerations in this modest dissenting
opinion to this matter. The majority opinion states that in the
emergency cases of 1949, five members of this tribunal held that
Commonwealth Act 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice Padilla
concurred in that opinion. With the concurrence of Mr. Justice
Torres in my concurring and dissenting opinion I also held that
Commonwealth Act. 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice Bengzon in
his dissenting opinion in those emergency cases said that
although he was favorably impressed by the reasons set forth by
Mr. Justice Reyes and particular point the existence or non-
existence of the emergency powers of the President. So that even
if we do not include Mr. Justice Bengzon, we can correctly say
that four justices voted in those emergency cases in favor of the
existence of emergency powers of the President.
In those emergency cases of 1949 I prepared a more or less
extensive opinion in support of the theory that Commonwealth
Act No. 671 was still in force. I wish to embody said opinion in
the present opinion by reference, without prejudice to
reproducing portions of the same.
I agree with the majority that Commonwealth Act 671 was to be
in force only for a limited period of time, otherwise be
unconstitutional; and that limited period was co-extensive with
the existence of the emergency. But I emphatically disagree with
the majority when it says:
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of
the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the
National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of
war would prevent it from holding its next regular session.
As regards the majority's view that emergency Act 671 because
due to war delegated by Commonwealth Act 671 because due to
emergency the National Assembly would be unable to hold its
regular session, I discussed and I hope I refused this theory in my
dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases and I take the
liberty of quoting a pertinent portion thereof:
I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though
incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative
powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the
Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency
but also because although it could and does actually meet,
whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position
and able to cope with the problems brought about by and
raising from the emergency, problems which require urgent
and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more
quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members
of the Legislature, especially when they are divided into
Legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency,
much as we in democratic countries dislike the system or
idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator,
transportations which ordinarily belong to a council or
board or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain
limitations to one single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the
legislature is in session, the legislature woke up one morning
to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported foods,
fuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture
and industry, etc., because of a monopoly, hoarding,
injurious speculations, manipulations, private controls and
profiteering, or that there were widespread lockouts and
strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or
rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life
security of the necessary legislation in order to cope with the
situation and pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are all familiar with the practice and routine of enacting
laws. A bill is introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to
the corresponding committee, it is studied by said
committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the
committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces
amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or
shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion,
and possible amendment by all the members; it is finally
voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it
undergoes the same process; and if it is finally approved by
both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief
Executive for his study and approval or veto. All this may
consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily,
many bills finally approved by Congress could be sent to the
President for approval or veto only after adjournment of the
legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact that
in some cases for lack of time or due to disagreement among
the legislators or between the two houses of Congress,
important pieces of legislations like the annual
appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation
founds for the elections to be held in November, 1949,
contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in
the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the
Election Code etc., have not been passed by Congress in its
last session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one
hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary process of
legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the
necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to
be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may have
become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond
legislations or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be
like locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect, The Philippine National Assembly
delegated its legislative powers because of the existence of a
state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During
it second special session of that year, it promulgated the
following laws: (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and
500).
At that time, September, 1939, the second world war was
only in Europe, quite far from the Philippines and had just
begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being
involved in the war. In fact, the Philippines did not get
involved in the war until more than two years, in December,
1941. The National Assembly was then free to meet either in
regular or special sessions to enact legislation to meet the
emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January, 1940
lasting 100 days, excluding the several special sessions held
during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated
legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article
VI of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to
the theory of the majority opinion, the legislature delegated
legislative powers to the President even when it could meet
and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative
powers to the President, the Assembly in its fourth special
session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this
practice and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600
delegating additional and more extensive legislative powers
to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far
away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of
involving the Philippines, and the legislature was still free to
meet as in fact it met again in regular session in January,
1941. During its regular session begun that month and year,
instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers
delegated to the President, because according to the theory
of the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the
Assembly allowed them to continue by passing
Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from
supporting the view of the President only because it could
not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
As to the proposition in the majority opinion that the emergency
terminated with the war. I am afraid the majority confuses war
with emergency. They are two different and separate things and
events. Even the Constitution (Article VI, section 26) which for
purposes of reference is reproduced below, considers war and
emergency as separate and distinct:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy.
There maybe a national emergency without war. And so, when
on the occasion of a war, a national emergency ensues and is
recognized and declared by Congress, said emergency may
continue even if and when the war that started it is ended. War
may and generally create an emergency, but the emergency thus
created does not necessarily end with the war. A war may last
only several weeks or months but with the use of the modern
weapons of warfare it may cause such devastation, desolation
and national suffering and collapse not only economically but
socially and morally that the resulting emergency may last for
years. A destructive flood, tornado, tidal wave or volcanic
eruption may last only minutes or hours but the destruction that
it leaves in its wake may take weeks, months or years to repair,
and the emergency thereby created may last that long.
To bolster its contention the majority cites President Quezon's
book "The Good Fight" pp. 204-205, wherein he speaks in time of
war. I am afraid the citation proves nothing. He merely said that
the delegation was made in time of war. He did not say or mean
that the powers thus delegated were to be exercised only during
the war. The main thing to be considered and which calls for the
exercise of the powers delegated is the emergency, not the war
that merely started or caused it. Commonwealth Act 671 itself in
its section 2 says that the President will exercise his emergency
powers during the existence of the emergency. It does not say during
the existence of the war.
President Quezon is hardly the authority that the majority
should quote to support its theory that emergency powers are
given to the Chief Executive just because due to the emergency,
the Legislature is unable to meet. It was President Quezon who
was given emergency powers as early as 1939 under
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500 when the war was
still far away in Europe and we were not yet involved and the
National Assembly could still meet and actually did meet several
times in two years, 1940 and 1941, in regular and special sessions,
and during those two years when the National Assembly was
holding its sessions, he was exercising his emergency powers and
enacting legislation by means of Executive Orders. Evidently, he
did not see any incompatibility in the grant and exercise of
emergency powers with the ability of the Legislature to meet and
in actually holding session, this, all contrary to the majority's
contention.
Hostilities incident to the last Pacific war have long ended since
1945; it does not however necessarily mean that the emergency
resulting from said war has ceased and that the disruption of
trade dislocation of the economy of the country, the destruction
of public and private property, the breakdown in honesty and
morality and the collapse of peace and order, all resulting from
that war have disappeared, and that everything has returned to
normalcy. In support of its theory that the emergency has ceased
the majority makes reference to Republic Act 342 wherein it is
stated that conditions have gradually returned to normal. But
this same law clearly says that the emergency created by the last
war as regards war sufferers who have not received any relief for
the loss or destruction resulting from the war, still exists and so
postpones payment of their debts or monetary obligations
contracted before the war, for a period of eight (8) years from
and after the settlement of their war damage claims by the
United States-Philippine War Damage Commission. In other
words, the Congress of the Philippines believes that at least as
regards war sufferers, the emergency resulting from the last war
still exists, and will exists not only up to the time that their war
damage claims are paid but for a period of eight years thereafter.
This hardly supports the majority's theory that everything is
normal, and that there no longer is any emergency because the
war has long ended.
In connection with this question of whether or not there is still
an emergency resulting from the last war and whether or not
things and conditions have returned to normal, I permit myself
to reproduce a portion of my dissenting opinion in the 1949
emergency cases:
The last logical question that one will naturally ask is: has
the emergency resulting from the war passed or does it still
exists? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the
existence of the emergency is, in my opinion, the test and
the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671. The
existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from
the war is question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining
among the people and in the country and perhaps even near
and around it. It is a highly controversial question on which
people may honestly differ. There are those who in all good
faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to
normal; that the people have now enough to eat, sometime
even more than they had before the war; that people
nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and
clothed and transported and better compensated for their
labor, and that the President himself in his speeches, chats
and messages had assured the public that normal times have
returned, that the problem of peace and order had been
solved, that the finances of the Government and the national
economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food
supply. It is, therefore, claimed that there is no longer any
emergency resulting from the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the
opposite camp that conditions are still far from normal; that
the picture painted by the President in cheerful and
reassuring colors is based on over optimism and, as to be
expected, calculated to show in bold relief the achievements
of the administration, and so should be considered with
some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than
before the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle
because of the farmers fear of or interference by dissidents;
that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as
shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnappings, lootings and
killing and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in
the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the
Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers
and men could provide complete protection to life and
property was adequate in all respects to enforce peace and
order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men,
provided with modern weapons and equipment and with the
aid of thousands of civilian guards and of the Philippine
Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order
problem; that the dissidents who are well-organized, armed
and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes
openly defy and engage the armed Government forces; that
as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose and in the
hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly
regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and
ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the
barrio folk in Central Luzon and now, even in provinces
bordering Central Luzon whose parents and relatives had
been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been
outraged by the same elements, whose homes had been
looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected
to constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their
homes and their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated
in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and
privation, it is said that it would be difficult to convince
these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and
that there is no longer emergency resulting from the war. To
further support the claim of the existence of an emergency,
the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in
Central Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked.
And it is asserted that all this is a result of the war.
To the above are those who claim and will add that since 1949 up
to the present time, although rehabilitation progressed
substantially, there are still many people who have not achieved
rehabilitation. The economy of the country is still far from what
it was before the war. It is being bolstered temporarily by the
millions of pesos being received by war veterans, their widows
and children in the form of pensions or insurance; by the
millions being spent by the Mutual Security Agent (MSA) in the
Philippines to rehabilitate agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.;
by the millions being sent here by the United States in war
materials, equipment, etc. in relation with the United States
military aid to the Philippines, and with the enforcement of the
Import Control, Exchange Control and other laws all of a
temporary nature intended to temper and minimize the financial
and economic crisis which otherwise would overwhelm the
country. The coastwise trade is being maintained with ships
originally built for and used during the war, converted
provisionally into inter-island freight and passenger boats; and
land transportation specially in the centers of population like
Manila is operated in great measure with vehicles (used jeeps)
obtained from the Surplus Property Commission. Everything is
on a provisional basis. What will happen after these boats and
motor vehicles wear out and become junk? Could they be readily
replaced by their owners or operators? Sunken boats will clutter
the harbors of the country particularly Manila Bay, constituting
a menace to NAVIGATION. Squatters in great number are still a
problem, claiming that they have nowhere to go to live.
Government and private buildings, and churches are still ruins,
tenanted by squatters. Intramuros, the Walled City, in the very
City of Manila is a living example of non-rehabilitation, with the
hundreds and thousands of owners of lots therein either
financially unable to reconstruct or prohibited from rebuilding
until the Government has completed its plan about its
reconstruction.
The War Damage Commission has paid war damage claims, it is
true, but only a portion of the amounts of the claims; and with
prices as they are and the low purchasing power of the peso,
complete rehabilitation of war sufferers and substantial repair of
the war damage is impossible. The country is claiming
reparations from Japan in the amount of eight (8) billion dollars.
It is not known if Japan can or will ever pay them and when. That
is why the legislature in Republic Act 342 wisely postponed
payment of debts and monetary obligations of sufferers, not up
to the payment of their war damage claims, but eight years
thereafter, realizing perhaps that the amounts paid for war
damage claims are inadequate to achieve complete
rehabilitation. So the Legislature says that as to these war
sufferers, the emergency still exists. And who has not suffered
damage during the last war?
We have not yet completely risen from the low level into which
we had sunk during and immediately after the war, in public and
private morality, decency, honesty and personal integrity as
witnessed by the more or less rampant misappropriations and
defalcations by public officials, corruption and malfeasance,
bribery, ten percentage, guerrilla recognition and veterans
benefits rackets, dynamite fishing, etc.
When the President makes his inspections, especially in the
troubled area, he is escorted by contingents of fully armed
soldiers, sometimes with machine guns and tanks. High officials
of the Government using low plate numbers of their cars, use
high plate numbers called "security plate numbers" when
travelling in the provinces to minimize the danger hold-ups and
attacks by dissidents who are said to be after the high
government officials. People are advised not to travel at night
over certain provincial highways even national roads.
Peace and order still leaves much to be desired. In 1949 when the
emergency cases were decided, five justices held the opinion that
there no longer was any emergency. But conditions of peace and
order actually worsened thereafter. There was an uprising or
rebellion in Batangas by Medrano and his men after November,
1949, and it is said that unable to cope with the uprising and
bring the rebels to justice the Government was compelled to
offer them amnesty. Since 1949 the HUKS and the communists
became stronger, in fact became so strong that they actually
threatened the existence of the Government which was forced to
increase its army and wage campaigns not only in the field but
also in centers of population where it was able to arrest and
prosecute those whom it claims to be high officials of the
POLITBURO. In Sulu, the Government waged an intensive
campaign against Kamlon and his men spending several million
pesos and losing quite a number of soldiers and officers, with no
decisive result, and it was only after Kamlon and his men had
been promised executive clemency that they surrendered to the
authorities, stood trial, were convicted and promptly pardoned.
Some of Kamlon's relatives with their followers are said to be
still in the mountains and forests and refuse to surrender unless
offered the same conditions. Not long ago several hundred
Chinese said to be dangerous communists were rounded up in
several towns and cities in the Philippines. About two or three
weeks ago, according to the papers the army authorities said that
up to that time they had through confiscation, capture,
surrender and purchase, been able to collect about 40,000 loose
firearms but that there still remained about 100,000 more to be
accounted for. The other day the Provincial Commander of Lanao
said that he is faced with the problem of eliminating or capturing
ten outlaw bands in the province with about 700 followers, The
hold-ups, massacres, raids and ambushes in different provinces,
even near Manila have not ceased. As long as over 100,000 loose
firearms are still in the hands of lawless or irresponsible persons,
there can be no complete peace and order in the country. Before
the war about 5,000 Constabulary soldiers and officers with an
appropriation of about three million pesos was able to maintain
peace and order throughout the country. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines including the Constabulary of the country in 1949
numbered 37,000. Realizing that this number was unable to
maintain peace and order it was increased substantially so that
in 1952, it went up to 56,000 men and officers with an
appropriation of over P151,000,000, an amount by far larger than
the appropriation for the Department of Public Schools which
gives instruction and education to school children and students.
With the help of thousands of temporary and special policemen,
civilian guards and commandos the army and the constabulary
are still battling dissidents, communists and bandits. Hundreds
and thousands of families from Central Luzon, particularly
Pampanga are still marooned in Manila, Baguio and other centers
of population, unable and afraid to return to their homes, and a
number of them more fearless and optimistic, who thought that
peace and order in Central Luzon had been restored, returned to
their homes there but were kidnapped and liquidate. Farmers
harvesting rice in some barrios in Central Luzon have to be
guarded by the armed forces so as not to be molested by the
dissidents. Only yesterday the papers carried the news that
14,000 soldiers and officers have started an intensive campaign
in Central and Southern Luzon against lawless elements. All this,
many people still honestly believe.
Considering all this, one may well doubt that peace and order in
the country has gone back to normal, and that there is no longer
any emergency. And this emergency clearly is the result of the
last war. The HUKS movement was born during that war and the
hundreds of thousands of loose firearms were also released and
distributed indiscriminately during that war. Lawlessness and
banditry always follow a war, and it takes several years
thereafter to restore peace and order. In the face of all the
foregoing which may regard as facts and realities, the majority
without any data in the form of evidence received at a hearing or
trial, but based perhaps on judicial notice and personal
knowledge and observation holds that everything has gone back
to normal and that no longer is any emergency.
Personally, I cannot say that the emergency resulting from the
last war still exists, but neither am I prepared to say that it no
longer exists. It is such a controversial question upon which
people may not and could honestly differ. There are authorities
to the effect that the existence or non-existence of an emergency
calling for the exercise of emergency powers is a political
question which can be decided only by the political department,
and that the courts are not called upon, neither are they
authorized to pass upon the question. This was one of the views
maintained in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Alex. Reyes concurred in by Mr. Justice Padilla in the 1949
emergency cases. But assuming for a moment that this court had
the authority to pass upon this point and to bind the executive
and legislative department with is finding, I believe that we have
no data or evidence on which to base our finding. If the findings
of courts on questions of facts are given authority or binding
effect it is because those findings are based on facts established
during the hearing by means of evidence adduced by both
parties who given the right to present, cross-examine and
impeach witnesses, object to questions and object to the
admission of evidence in general. In the present case no such
hearing or trial for the reception of evidence was ever had.
Consequently, in my opinion we are not warranted in finding
that there still exist or there no longer exists any emergency
resulting from the last Pacific War.
It is the Legislature that granted or delegated the emergency
powers or the Chief Executive to whom the delegation was made
that decide whether or not the emergency continues. There has
been lack of agreement between the two departments on this
point since the last session of the Legislature. While the
President up to a few weeks ago has been exercising his
emergency still existed, because Commonwealth Act 671
provides that he may exercise those powers only during the
emergency, the Legislature has passed House Bill No. 727 in an
attempt to withdraw said emergency powers on the theory that
the emergency has ceased. To end and definitely settle this
disagreement, we are called upon to render decision.
In my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases I held that
the President still had the emergency powers delegated to him
under Commonwealth Act 671. Three justices of this court held
that same view as I did excluding one Justice who was favorably
impressed with that view though he preferred not to vote
directly upon it. Today, tho it seems in the tribunal, I am the lone
dissenter on this proposition and so mine is reduced so to speak
to the "voice in the wilderness," I still maintain the same view,
and there is reason to believe that there are many others who
subscribe to the same opinion. The Legislature in passing during
its last session House Bill No. 727 repealing the latest
Commonwealth Acts including Commonwealth Act No. 671,
delegating emergency powers to the Chief Executive, must have
believed and been satisfied that the President still had those
emergency powers otherwise, there would have been no need of
going to all the trouble and the tedious process of approving a
bill withdrawing said powers from him. There would have been
no necessity for the Legislature to repeal a law which it believed
to be no longer operative. There is no reason or point in
withdrawing something that is not there or that no longer exists.
In previous sessions of the Legislature after Liberation there had
been talk or move to enact legislation withdrawing said
emergency powers by presumably the atmosphere was not
favorable or the necessary votes to pass the corresponding
measure was not available. It was in the last session of the
Legislature that a bill was finally approved by both House of
Congress. The Chief Executive, however, vetoed it and it was not
repassed over his veto. In spite of this, did the Legislature
succeed in withdrawing his emergency powers? The majority
through a process of interpretation which to me, is strained and
unwarranted, voted in the affirmative. I disagree. We should not
forget that in House Bill No. 727 the Legislature was not only
expressing its wish and desire to withdraw the emergency
powers of the President. It wanted to repeal the law or laws
delegating said emergency powers. A law can be repealed only by
another law. Consequently, since House Bill No 727 did not
become a law because of the veto of the President, it could not
repeal the law or laws which it sought to abrogate.
I agree with the majority and also with Mr. Justice Padilla that
the emergency powers delegated to the President could be
withdrawn by means of a mere concurrent resolution. It is true
that to delegate emergency powers under section 26, Art. VI of
the Constitution, a law is necessary. It is because the Constitution
expressly says so. Moreover, it is not only convenient but equally
necessary that a law should be passed for that purpose in whose
approval the Chief Executive takes part, because after all he is
the one to whom the delegation is made and who would later
exercise the powers so delegated. If he believes that there is no
emergency or that even if there were, it is not of sufficient
magnitude and seriousness as to call for the delegation and the
exercise of emergency powers, he may veto the bill of delegation
and that would be the end of it. It is far from likely that the bill
would be repassed over his veto because it would be futile and
pointless to make delegation of powers to an unwilling delegate
who later would decline and refuse to exercise them. But if he
approves the bill of delegation and it becomes a law then the
delegation is complete, successful and effective for the exercise
of the powers by the President would be assured. Not so with the
withdrawal of the powers delegated. The Constitution does not
say or require a law for such withdrawal and it may be
withdrawn at any time even when the emergency which
motivated said delegation still exists. In such a case, the
Legislature is the sole judge as to the necessity and advisability of
the continuance or cessation of the exercise of emergency
powers by its delegate, the President.
But how did the Legislature go about his attempt to withdraw the
President's emergency powers? It had the choice of approving a
mere concurrent resolution or passing a bill. Both houses of the
Legislature are graced with the presence of constitutional
lawyers and legal luminaries for whom I have great respect. They
must have known that a concurrent resolution was sufficient for
the purpose. Atty. Recto, counsel for the petitioners and member
of the Senate knew it and in his oral argument before this
Tribunal, he said that the Legislature merely made a mistake
because it could have just as well approved a concurrent
resolution instead of passing a regular bill.
But to me, it is highly possible and not improbable that the
Legislature knowing that it could withdraw the President's
emergency powers by means of a concurrent resolution or by
means of a law, deliberately and intentionally chose the latter for
reasons of its own. The mistake committed by the Legislature if
any was that perhaps it believed that the Chief Executive would
not veto the bill; but veto it, he did and I am afraid the
Legislature has to abide by the consequences. The Legislature
knew that in passing the bill and in submitting it to the Chief
Executive as required by the Constitution, it had to be approved
by him either with his signature or by letting it become a law
without any action on his part. He may also veto it. This was a
hazard and a risk which the Legislature assumed and of which it
must have been perfectly aware. But they are willing to take the
risk. Another possible reason why the Legislature chose to pass a
bill instead of a mere concurrent resolution was that it sought
and wanted the intervention and participation of the Chief
Executive himself in the withdrawal of the emergency powers so
that he would also share in the credit and the responsibility for
said withdrawal. If he approved the bill there would be complete
understanding between the two departments of the Government,
and no hard feelings. Another reason not entirely improbable is
that the decision to withdraw the emergency powers from the
Chief Executive was a compromise arrangement between the two
parties in the Legislature. We must remember that our
government is run on the basis of the party system. The
President at present happens to be the head of one of the two
major parties in the Legislature. His party is in the minority in
the Senate by two or three votes but is in the majority by quite a
number of votes in the lower house. It is not conceivable that his
party men in the two houses consented and agreed to have the
emergency powers withdrawn provided that the Chief Executive
consented to and approved of it. And so, they agreed to pass the
bill for this purpose, but that they would not agree to concurrent
resolution where the Chief Executive would be ignored and his
emergency powers summarily withdrawn without consultation
and without his approval. This last view is in some measure
supported and borne out by the attitude of the Legislature when
the House bill No. 727 was vetoed. The members of Congress
knew that the remedy was to override his veto if they wanted to.
The Senate approved the bill unanimously and judging from that
unanimity, at least in the upper house the 2/3 votes necessary to
override the veto was available. But the fact is that the
Legislature did not only fail to override the veto but it did not
even make any attempt whatsoever to repass it over the
President's veto. Added to this, it was a fact that, and this is by no
means unimportant, in the month of September, 1952, that is,
about two months after the veto of the bill, about sixty-seven
Congressman and two Senators filed a petition addressed to the
President in which they not only recognized the existence of his
emergency powers but even asked him to exercise the same for
the purpose of releasing funds for public works projects.
Excluding the two Senators, the signers constituted more than
the majority of the membership of the lower house. In other
words, after the veto of the bill and after a failure whether
intentionally or otherwise of the Legislative to override the veto,
the majority of all the members of the lower house believed that
Congress failed to withdraw the President's emergency powers
and consequently, believed that he still had those powers, and
was even requested to exercise the same. And on November 8,
1952, the lower house of the Legislature passed Resolution No. 99
strongly urging the President to exercise his emergency powers
and authorize the expenditure of funds for the relief to provinces
visited by typhoons and floods and other calamities and for other
urgent essential public works projects. This official action of the
Lower House shows that one of the two Houses of Congress
officially believes that the emergency powers of the President
had not been withdrawn. One view of this action or inaction of
the Legislature on the veto was that it could not get the 2/3 votes
in both houses to override the veto because some members who
voted in favor of the House Bill No. 727, particularly members of
the party of the Chief Executive vetoing the bill and so either
approved the stand taken by him or acquiesced in it and took it
in good grace and let the matter rest, at least for the time being.
In the foregoing considerations on this point are true or could
have been true, then there would absolutely be no reason or
warrant for the majority's interpreting and considering House
Bill No. 727 as a concurrent resolution sufficient to repeal the
several laws mentioned in the bill and withdraw the emergency
powers of the President. In effect, the majority decided to think
for the Legislature and to do for the latter what it failed or
perhaps did not want to do, namely, to withdraw the emergency
powers by means of a concurrent resolution. I repeat that both
houses of Congress with the legal talent and constitutional
authorities, not only among its distinguished members but also
among its legal experts and assistants, did neither wish nor
intend to approve a mere concurrent resolution but deliberately
and intentionally chose to pass a bill, House Bill No. 727 with
full realization of the possibilities and chances of its approval or
rejection by the Chief Executive to whom it was submitted.
Under these circumstances, the action of the majority is
practically telling the Legislature what it should have one and in
finally doing it for said Legislature in order to most easily
achieve its purpose or wish might be regarded by some as not
only unwarranted but officious and uncalled for.
In view of the foregoing reasons, I beg to disagree with the
majority.
Footnotes
Emergency Powers Cases, decided on August 26, 1949, 45 Off.
Gaz., pp. 4411-4478.
Emergency Powers Cases, supra, opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason,
quoting the following from Corwin, President: Office and Powers,
1948 ed., p. 160: "It is generally agreed that the maxim that the
legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least
that the legislature may not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view
of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the
line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I
urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the
consent of the delegate; . . . ."
The Good Fight, pp. 204-205.
Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
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Sec. 18, Art. VI, of the Constitution; see also sec. 19(1), sec.
20(2) (3), Art. VI, of the Constitution.
Sec. 23(2), Art. VI, of the Constitution.
Sec. 26, Art. VI, of the Constitution.
Com. Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600, 620, and 671.
"In the current practice, concurrent resolution have been
developed as a means of expressing fact, principles, opinions and
purposes of the two houses." (2 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, 3d Ed., 265.)
84 Phil., 368.
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