This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Taylor and Francis makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. The authors' views are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor and Francis. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, systematic supply, or distribution to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Descrição original:
Título original
Moral Minds- How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Taylor and Francis makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. The authors' views are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor and Francis. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, systematic supply, or distribution to anyone is expressly forbidden.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Taylor and Francis makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. The authors' views are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor and Francis. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, systematic supply, or distribution to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Moral Education Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjme20 Moral minds: how nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong Helen Haste a
b a University of Bath , UK b Harvard Graduate School of Education , 613 Larsen Hall, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA Published online: 11 Aug 2009. To cite this article: Helen Haste (2009) Moral minds: how nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, Journal of Moral Education, 38:3, 380-382, DOI: 10.1080/03057240903101689 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057240903101689 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions 380 Book reviews Why should moral educators concern themselves with emotion and emotion regu- lation? Emotion is foundational to cognition, when it is disordered so is cognition. Aristotle emphasised the need to cultivate ones moral sensibilities (emotions and cognitions), shaping ones dispositions for morality. However, if a person has been formed physiologically from experience with a reactive stress response, it will be much harder for her to cultivate other-focused moral dispositions. The personal distress that arises during interpersonal conflict will more likely dominate her atten- tion and self-regulatory resources. It may be the case that the moral educator will need to facilitate emotion regulation as part of the educative process (e.g. meditation, deep breathing). References Chrousos, G. P. & Gold, P. W. (1992) The concepts of stress and stress system disorders: over- view of physical and behavioral homeostasis, Journal of the American Medical Association, 267, 12441252. Narvaez, D. (2008) Triune ethics: the neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities, New Ideas in Psychology, 26, 95119. Narvaez, D. & Vaydich, J. (2008) Moral development and behaviour under the spotlight of the neurobiological sciences, Journal of Moral Education, 37(3), 289313. Jenny L. Vaydich, Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA. Email: jvaydich@nd.edu and Darcia Narvaez, Depart- ment of Psychology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556, USA. Email: dnarvaez@nd.edu 2009, Jenny L. Vaydich DOI: 10.1080/03057240903101671 Moral minds: how nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong Marc D. Hauser, 2006 New York, Harper Collins $27.95 (hbk), 489 pp. ISBN 10 0 06 078070 3 Rich is an adjective often applied by reviewers to books that are full of exciting ideas in progress, but could do with a strong editorial hand. This book is rich. Hauser attempts to generate the argument for a universal moral grammar based on evolu- tionary arguments for the origin of morality. He brings in primate studies (in which he is a recognised expert), current arguments on moral emotion, attacks on the D o w n l o a d e d
b y
[ D a l i l a
V i c e n t e ]
a t
1 6 : 2 7
0 5
N o v e m b e r
2 0 1 3
Book reviews 381 Kantian tradition that forefronts moral reasoning, material from neuroscience, the development of theory of mind and anthropological data. In nearly 500 pages, it is not surprising that he has some real nuggets of insight, some over-generalisations and speculations and some lapses of scholarship. This is an interesting time in moral psychology. It has been largely dominated for 50 years by a model of moral functioning that derives from a Kantian perspective and which concentrates almost wholly on reasoning. This had its own universal moral grammar; the universal principles that underpinned reasoning. Haidts 2001 paper challenged the focus on reason and reprised the debates between Kant and Hume; moral emotion is immediate and so primary; reasoning depends on reflection. This is a worthy issue for good research and the field is opening up. However, it is muddied by another contemporary enthusiasm, the search for evolutionary explana- tions. For reasons that continue to baffle me, it appears that pursuing evolutionary explanations is seen as more scientific than careful research on actual current human responses and behaviours. The argument, in Hausers book and elsewhere, seems to be that because emotion is such an immediate response, it must be hardwired and, ergo, it must be rooted in evolutionary survival mechanisms. For some this means sexual selection, for others, including Hauser, the explanation lies in social exchange and group cooperation. Therefore, moral emotions arise from territoriality and dominance imperatives and from breaking the norms that govern these. This seems a speculative leap. Finding evolutionary explanations is an exciting and valid activity, but it is too often an extrap- olation either from contemporary primates or contemporary hunter-gatherer societ- ies, both of which are products of the same long evolutionary process as ourselves; they are not our ancestors. A widely used research tool in the field of moral emotion, much cited by Hauser, is the trolley problem. This was originally invented by the philosopher Philippa Foot (1967) as a thought experiment to explore impossible dilemmas. It has been hijacked as a quick way to measure emotion, because people respond very swiftly with the right answerto allow the fewest people to die. However, first, this seems to be as much a moral intuition as an emotion. Second, it is presented as being evolu- tionary evidence about humans not liking to kill each other. Talking about killing is a common moral discussion point but killing other humans is rare, except in war, when humans can become quite enthusiastic about killing out-group members. Also many trolley problem researchers extrapolate from patterns of yes-no answers rather than exploring either the reasoning, or even reflections on the emotions, behind the responses. I consider a major scholarly lapse to be Hausers treatment of the Piaget-Kohlberg tradition. Many people working within this tradition warmly welcome the inclusion of emotion into moral theory. However, Hauser begins by claiming that his account shifts the burden of evidence from a philosophy of morality to a science of morality (p. 2). This seems a most curious put-down of 70 years of rigorous research on the development of moral reasoning. The clue lies in the bibliography; despite 16 index references to Kohlberg and nine to Piaget, Hauser cites just one publication of D o w n l o a d e d
b y
[ D a l i l a
V i c e n t e ]
a t
1 6 : 2 7
0 5
N o v e m b e r
2 0 1 3
382 Book reviews Kohlbergs and two of Piagets. He could also have walked 400 metres from his office and spent an afternoon in the Kohlberg archive, acquainting himself with the actual original research. As it is, he presents rather a caricature of both the theory and the data. He also claims that neither Kohlberg nor Piaget explained how stage develop- ment took place. In trying to unpack this odd statement, given the large amount of data on stage transition, I concluded that Hauser has little understanding of cognitive developmental theory and is trying to apply a social learning theory, or possibly maturation. There are many fine insights and thoughts-in-progress in this otherwise undisci- plined book; some of Hausers colleagues who are experts in human psychology are developing them with rigour and sophistication. I wish them well; the field needs excellent research that integrates emotion and reason in our understanding of moral- ity and the contemporary human mind. References Foot, P. (1967) The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect, Oxford Reviews, 5(1), 515. Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgement, Psychological Review, 108, 814834. Helen Haste, University of Bath, UK; Harvard Graduate School of Education, 613 Larsen Hall, Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Email: helhaste @aol.com 2009, Helen Haste DOI: 10.1080/03057240903101689 Resentments virtue: Jean Amry and the refusal to forgive, with a foreword by Jeffrie Murphy Thomas Brudholm, 2008 Philadelphia, Temple University Press $51.50 (hbk), 235 pp. ISBN 1592135668 In the foreword of Thomas Brudholms study on the moral power to resist (Jean Amry), Jeffrie Murphy writes that we live in a time in which the virtue of forgiveness is at risk of becoming distorted and cheapened by various movements that advocate it in a hasty and uncritical way (p. ix). An analysis of the legitimation and morality of unforgiveness (p. xii), Brudholms book represents a counterpoint to such D o w n l o a d e d
The Pragmatic Philosophy of John Dewey – Premium Collection: 20+ Books in One Volume: Critical Expositions on the Nature of Truth, Ethics & Morality by the Renowned Philosopher, Psychologist & Educational Reformer of 20th Century