AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition
already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or
coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation
of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the
sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the
date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which
have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute
copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may
be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost
his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the
order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which
case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives
in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate
for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote
cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the
electorate on the matter of the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number
of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy
shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to
the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the
list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same
salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in
the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General
Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes
of its information campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.


FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to
participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR)
filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed two letters to the Director of the Comelec's Law
Department requesting a list of that groups' nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees' names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales' basic disclosure request. Comelec's reason for keeping the
names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in
the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to
disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman
Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously
determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or
the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE: 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named
in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified? 2.
Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 3. Whether
respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named
therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-
list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual
determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In
certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal's evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere
in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously
with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. COMELEC's basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the
nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis
of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election.
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups
named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public,
or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. The people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern"
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of
the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao
del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the
COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress.
He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,
are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman
holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not
equivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our
Constitution, we have this chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with
the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle
with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being
held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the
moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application
to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression
clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of
a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other
grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not
suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor
of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially
been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures
of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during
which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond
the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
Republic Act No. 6645 December 28, 1987
AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of
the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication,
stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however, that if within the said
period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due
distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in
turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many
conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public
markets, and in the municipal buildings.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 28, 1987.
Political Law Vacancy in the Legislature
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill
the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of
the 1973 Constitution which provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen
months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be
held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired
term. COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the
instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.
HELD: The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters decision, orders
or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: Any
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. There is in this case no decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as
provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or
authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would
entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to
play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would
seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies
would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the
legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is
more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the
regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former ActingAuditor General of the Philippines
and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of theSpeaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10)
ofthe Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.


Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?


Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single
unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized
by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural,
thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular,
when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.
Ligot v Mathay
FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials
and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof
took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired
on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as
amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the
basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected
officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the
same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during
his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such
increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00
per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be
a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason
that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional
provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from
receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, ex-
Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.
Martinez v. Morfe

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional
provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer
or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in
case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor. For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities
of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed
against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations
against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General,
on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the
ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption
from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code
would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their
vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the
utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it
would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator
or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the
fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused
by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt
at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to
say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners
cannot claim their claim to immunity.

***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason exists
when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether
defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the
public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution.
Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have
had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup
dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under
their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet
such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez
then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said
that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and
for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The publication of the
said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to
Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners
include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
Political Law Immunity
Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the
ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not
require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so
he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of
Garcia as the then President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of
the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does
not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
135 SCRA 431 Political Law Congress Singularity of Office/Position
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984.
In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza
took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the
lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He
argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of
the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than
one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume
the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against
BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.


Political Law Appearance in Court
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly
counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on
25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a
conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with
each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing
that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative
body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for
Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a
counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Puyat then moved to question the Commissioners action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC
case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still
barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after
the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could
not likewise be done indirectly.

Political Law Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the
next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent
demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however,
together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece.
Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled
Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the
session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be
placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so
made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech.
Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President.
This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC
to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The
answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the
USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a
majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are
willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that
there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two
are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of
senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of
24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was
no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that
any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the
Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos
persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the
Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling
is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has
been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the
Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to
actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity,
or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the
member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the
use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of
the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National
Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to
require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor
was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate
at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Mabanag

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to
election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except
in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not
considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing
amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same
time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution
was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said
resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the
Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.
*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be
a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal
then into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both
the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190
as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do
what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.


Political Law J ournal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily
in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are
both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank
of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum
establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in
same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that
urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to
Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that
this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by
the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of
foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea
formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms
urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea
formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the
floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and
formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea
formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress
itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the
enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Political Law Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former
Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner
but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post.
Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a
city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city
can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated
upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as
officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of
the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his
case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was
signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then
bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to
look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast
in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not
of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being
confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.

Political Law Journal When to be Consulted
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under
authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with
this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with
the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and
Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the
this said law passed the 3
rd
reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which
referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator
Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for
deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter
approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later
found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to
the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto.
It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the
Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they
affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.
HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and
other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into
the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As
done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures
therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into
law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended
by the law-making body.

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso.
Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed
that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being
one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of
wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons
and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material
to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the
Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at
12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.


Political Law Separation of Powers
Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4
th
District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party.
Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the
winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura
Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This
resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET.
Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion?
HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the
legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality
and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be
recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted
either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or
the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two
coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In
here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the
tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc
won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET
did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district
of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married
in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up
in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application
for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years
old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices
of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here.
He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of
his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father
as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
Coseteng
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA,
wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA)
and House Tribunal a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and
later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House
majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with
Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs
(considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of
respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their
election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority
(LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She
further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from
the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the proportional representation clause in Art VI of
the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the
Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question
but because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House,
comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left
the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced
Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member
Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in
the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her
party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected
by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution
conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

HRETs Composition Rounding Off
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the
CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more
than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat.
In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

Political Law Transfer of Funds
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister
of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of
1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of
the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one
department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities
this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the
President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP
Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He
said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the
main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a
new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN G.R. No. L-10202
March 27, 1917 FACTS: The Municipality of Cardona alleged that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act
authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces
and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the
Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 1748
is "unconstitutional" on the ground that it confers on the Governor-General legislative authority? HELD: No, it is not
unconstitutional. The delegation of the power referred to on the Governor-General does not involve an abdication of
legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes
the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities,
and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less rapid change both in development
and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a
detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act
applicable so far as it touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of
Legislation When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the
Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the
biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained
in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to
testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise
refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his
allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an
inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of
the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of
Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to
a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not
the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of
this case.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department
of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions
of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.
Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan
[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-
petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong
Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of
Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of
Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz
informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of
Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President
Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the
Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more
than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three
years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor
and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral
representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13)
informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1)
information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all
counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan
acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused,
elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has
qualified.
Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral
representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB
Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned
shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the
president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their
tenure is president of their respective association and federation .
x x x x
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday
of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in
accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did
not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office.
Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover
capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring
that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying
that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to
positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public
officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is
usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for
that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the
office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and
qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy
his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is
proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption
against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or
administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully
authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a
vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord
84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of
the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
Gancayco, J.

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D. No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D.
1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the
1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Issue:

Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution?

Held:

No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as
by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws
by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or
in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific
public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present.

Political Law Veto Power of the President
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts
General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for
appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the
pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided means in Article 2 of the
Civil Code
With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same
as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme
Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of
the government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall
immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise provided pertains
to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.
Read full text here.

95 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour Constitutionality
of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing
matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the
senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts
and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others
who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus
made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No.
464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in aid of
legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe
De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that
it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
intoexecutive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party List System;
Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to
3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case ofVeterans Federation
Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast
for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat,
must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share
of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the
HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there
shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220
district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for
party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is
not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-
lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2%
are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats
as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a
seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for
party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for
party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation
for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the
party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from
having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution
or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of
the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of
the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system.