ARTICLE III

(BILL OF RIGHTS)
- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,
February 1, 200!- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for
their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions
of pesos if forced [to] relocate. Ho"e#er, ba$e% o& '(e ()erar*(y
o+ *o&$')'u')o&a,,y -ro'e*'e% r).('$, '(e r).(' 'o ,)+e e&/oy$
-re*e%e&*e o#er '(e r).(' 'o -ro-er'y. The reason is obvious: life
is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local
government unit] L!"s e#ercise of police po$er clashes $ith a
fe$ individuals" right to property, the former should prevail,%.
- Car,o$ Su-er%ru. Cor-. #$. 0S10,e' a,., GR No. 166232, 4u&e
23, 2005 (E6-a&%e% Se&)or C)')7e&$ A*' o+ 200)8 When
conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bo$ to the primacy of police po$er because property
rights, though sheltered by due process clause, must yield to the
general $elfare.
- 9ra$ue.) #$. :AL, I&*., 565 SCRA 2658 &n the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
constitution cannot be invo'ed. The (ill of )ights is not meant to
be invo'ed against acts of private individuals.

- :ro*e%ura, 0ue :ro*e$$- (anco Espa*ol-+ilipino vs. ,alanca
Sera&o #$ NLRC, 2 SCRA 225- -ue process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government po$ers. I' %oe$ &o'
a--,y 'o '(e e6er*)$e o+ -r)#a'e -o"er, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor .ode.
- C(a#e7 #$. Ro;u,o, 21 SCRA 52- The license to carry firearm
is neither a property nor a property right. /either does it create a
vested right. 0 permit to carry a firearm outside of one"s residence
maybe revo'ed at anytime.
- <<0A #$. Gar)&, GR No. 1020, A-r), 15, 20058 0 license to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege
granted by the 1tate, $hich may be suspended or revo'ed by the
1tate in the e#ercise of police po$er.
- <er*ury 0ru. Cor-. #$. Serra&o, <ar*( 10, 2006- &n
dismissing an employee, the employer must serve the employee
t$o notices: 234 the first to inform the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for $hich the employer see's his dismissal, and
254 the second to inform the employee of his employer"s decision
to terminate him. The first notice must state that the employer
see's dismissal for the act or omission charged against the
employee, other$ise, the notice does not comply $ith the rules.
- <a*)a$ #$. <a*)a$, Se-'e;ber , 200- -enial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act ta'en by $hatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.
- E$'ra%a #$. 0e$)er'o, A-r), , 2001- 0lleged violations of the
right to impartiality due to adverse publicity must be substantiated
by proof of actual pre6udice.
- A,auya #$. CO<ELEC, 789 1.)0 :;5- due process is satisfied
even if there $as no oral argument if a party $as able to file
pleadings.
- INSTANCES 1HEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSAR9 :
3. When administrative agencies are e#ercising their <uasi-
legislative functions=
5. 0batement of nuisance per se=
7. ranting by courts of provisional remedies=
;. ,reventive suspension= 2.o. >s. (arbers4
9. )emoval of temporary employees in the government service=
?. &ssuance of $arrants of distraint and@or levy by the (&)
.ommissioner=
:. .ancellation of passport of a person charged $ith a crime=
A. &ssuance of se<uestration orders
8. Budicial order $hich prevents an accused from traveling abroad
3C.1uspension of ban'"s operations by the Donetary (oard upon a
prima facie finding of li<uidity problems in such ban'.
33. E#tradition proceedings 2[evaluation stage]- 1ec of Bustice vs.
Lantion= .uevas vs. DunoE, 5CCC4
35.)einvestigation 2criminal cases4
A&. T)bay #$. CIR, A%;)&)$'ra')#e 0ue :ro*e$$
E=ua, :ro'e*')o& o+ '(e La"
- Tr),,a&e$ I> #$. :);e&'e,, GR No. 153!15, 4u&e 25, 200!
Election to .ongress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
la$ enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions $hich lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- :eo-,e #$. 4a,o$/o$ , 75; 1.)0 ?A8, Election to the position of a
.ongressman is not reasonable classification in criminal la$
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions $hich lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- ?SA #$. :uru.a&a&, Se-'e;ber , 20028 The position of
.ongressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal la$
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions $hich lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
La$ful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
la$ and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
- Far)@a$ #$. E6e*u')#e Se*re'ary , ;3: 1.)0 9C7, -ecember 3C,
5CC7, 1ubstantive distinctions e#ist bet$een elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the people $hile the latter hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.
- Au)&'o #$. CO<ELEC, 0e*e;ber 1, 2003 - The .ourt held
that there $as no valid 6ustification to treat appointive officials
differently from the elective ones. F&n considering persons holding
appointive positions ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their .o.s, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the la$ unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction bet$een those $ho hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not 6ustify such
differential treatment,% the .ourt said.
- The .ourt further said that the challenged provision also suffers
from the infirmity of being overbroad for the follo$ing reasons:
+irst, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
posts $ithout distinction as to $hether they occupy high positions
in government or not. The .ourt said for a government utility
$or'er, $ho $ill also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he
files his .o. for 5C3C elections, to use his position in the
government to $ield influence in the political $orld $as
unimaginable.
- 1econd, the provision $as directed to the activity of see'ing any
and all public offices, $hether they be partisan or non-partisan in
character, $hether they be in the national, municipal, or barangay
level. .ongress has not sho$n a compelling state interest to restrict
the fundamental right involved on such a s$eeping scale,
Se*')o& 28 ?&rea$o&ab,e $ear*(e$ B $e)7ure$
- T(e r).(' 'o $e*ur)'y o+ a -er$o&8 (Se*re'ary o+ Na')o&a,
0e+e&$e #$. <a&a,o, GR No. 1!030!, O*'ober 5, 200!)8is a
gurarantee of protection of one"s rights by the government. &n the
conte#t of the $rit of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees
of the right to life and liberty under 0rt. &&&, 1ec. 3 of the 38A:
constitution and the right to security of person 2as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity4 under
0rt. &&&, 1ec. 5.
- :ROBABLE CA?SE- )ead: 1tone Gill vs. -io'no= Lim vs.
+eli#= Webb vs. de Leon= )oan vs. onEales= ,apa vs. Dago=
0niag vs. .HDELE..
- 0e, Ro$ar)o #$. :eo-,e, <ay 1, 20018 1eiEure of evidence in
-,a)& #)e" )$ /u$')+)e% o&,y "(e&:
3. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid $arrantless arrest
in $hich the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties=
5. the evidence $as inadvertently discovered by the police $ho
had the right to be there $here they are=
7. the evidence must be immediately apparent= and
;. plain vie$ 6ustified the seiEure $ithout further search
conducted.
- <a&a,),) #$. CA, 2!0 SCRA 200- The follo$ing are valid
$arrantless searches and seiEures:
3. 1earch incidental to la$ful arrest 2,, vs. Tiu Won .hua, ;C9
1.)0 5AC= ,, vs. Estella, 789 1.)0 9974=
5. search of a moving vehicle 2,, vs. Tampis, ;C: 1.)0 9A54=
7. seiEure in plain vie$ 2:: #$. Go, ;33 1.)0 A3, The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps $as not apparent and established
until after they have been turned over to the .hinese embassy
and the (ureau of &mmigration for verification. Gence, not
considered as evidence in plain vie$4=
;. customs search 2Sa,#a%or #$. ::, Buly 39, 5CC94=
9. $aiver by the accused2 3. right to be $aived e#ists= 5. person
$aiving has 'no$ledge of such right, actually or constructively=
and 7. he@she has actual intention to relin<uish the right.4
S),a()$ I&'C, Ho'e, #$. So,u'a, Feb. 20, 2006D >a,%e7 #$.
:eo-,e, 5! SCRA 611)8 &t is the 1tate $hich has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent $as obtained and that it $as freely and voluntarily
given.
?. stop I fris' 2limited protective search4= Terry Sear*( E (Terry
#$, O()o, 136!D <a,a*a' #$ CA, 0e*. 1, 1335) it is a stop of a
person by la$ enforcement officer based upon Freasonable
suspicion% that a person may have been engaged in criminal
activity, $hereas an arrest re<uires Fprobable cause% that a
suspect committed a criminal offense.
:. 0rmed conflict 2$ar time4
A. .hec' points 2limited to visual search= ,, vs. Esca*o, ) /o.
358:9?-9A, Banuary 5A, 5CCC4=
8. E#igent and emergency circumstances 2:: #$. 0e Gra*)a, 577
1.)0 :3?4, $here a $arrantless search $as allo$ed $here
there $as a prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an
ongoing coup=
3C..onduct of F0rea Target Jone% and F1aturation -rives% in the
e#ercise of military po$ers of the ,resident 2Gua&7o& #$.
>),,a, 3A3 1.)0 ?574=
33. )outine 0irport 1ecurity ,rocedure 2:: #$. Su7uF), Hctober
57, 5CC7= ,, vs. Bohnson, ) /o. 37AAA3, -ecember 3A,
5CCC4.
1ARRANTLESS ARREST
HOT :?RS?IT8 Re=u)$)'e$G
3. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be
continuous from the time of the commission of the offense
to the time of the arrest.
5. There must be no supervening event $hich brea's the
continuity of the chase.
- La%,a%HBe,'ra&, e' a,. #$. Go&7a,e$H>e,a$*o, 4u&e 1, 20058
&n<uest proceedings are proper only $hen the accused has been
la$fully arrested $ithout $arrant.
- :: #$. %e,a Cru7, 551 SCRA 2638 arre$' )& +,a.ra&'e %e,)*'o 'o
be a#a),e%, '(e +o,,o")&. re=u)$)'e$ ;u$' *o&*urG 234 the person
to be arrested must e#ecute an overt act indicating that he has 6ust
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a
crime. 254 such commission of a crime must be done in the
presence and $ithin the vie$ of the arresting officer.
- :: #$. 0e, Ro$ar)o, 05 SCRA 520, There must be a large
measure of immediacy bet$een the time of the offense $as
committed and the time of the $arrantless arrest. &f there $as an
appreaciable lapse of time bet$een the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a $arrant of arrest must be secured.
- :a%),,a #$. CA, 263 SCRA 202, When the la$ spea's of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited
to actually seeing the commission of the crime. T(e re=u)re;e&'
o+ '(e ,a" )$ *o;-,)e% "(ere '(e arre$')&. o++)*er "a$ ")'()& a&
ear$(o' +ro; '(e $*e&e although he did not personally $itness the
commission of the crime.
- :: #$. <ar')&, 387 1.)0 9:, The (ill of )ights is protection
against the 1tate. T(e -ro'e*')o& a.a)&$' u&rea$o&ab,e $ear*(e$
a&% $e)7ure$ *a&&o' be e6'e&%e% 'o a*'$ *o;;)''e% by -r)#a'e
)&%)#)%ua,$ so as to bring it $ithin the ambit of alleged unla$ful
intrusion by the government. )ight applies only against the
government and agencies tas'ed $ith the enforcement of the la$.
- Hnly a 6udge may validly issue a $arrant- EK.E,T: (y
administrative authorities 2.&-= (H.4 only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of la$.
- 4a*F$o& #$. <a*a,)&o, /ovember 5;, 5CC7- the .ommissioner of
the &mmigration can issue a $arrant of arrest against a foreigner
$ho has been ordered to be deported.
- SCATTER SHOT 1ARRANT- is a $arrant having been issued
to more than one offense.
- :RECISE AN0 <IN?TE 0ETAIL AS TO THE :LACE TO
BE SEARCHE0 AN0 THINGS OR :ERSONS TO BE
SEIIE0 NOT REA?IRE0- the constitution does not re<uire that
the things to be seiEed must be described in precise and minute
detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities= TECHNICAL 0ESCRI:TION IS NOT
REA?IRE08 &t is only necessary that there be reasonable
certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seiEed so that the $arrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. THE TEST as $ould be as to $hat is to be
ta'en, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer e#ecuting the
$arrant. >ALLE4O >S. CA, 225 SCRA 65!, A-r), 12, 2002.

Se*')o& - :r)#a*y o+ *o;;u&)*a')o& B *orre$-o&%e&*e-
- I& '(e ;a''er o+ -e')')o& +or (abea$ *or-u$ o+ Ca-'. G. A,e/a&o,
e' a,. #$. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160532, Au.u$' 25, 20058 The letters
alleged to have been read by the &10+, authorities $ere not
confidential letters bet$een the detainees and their la$yers. The
petitioner $ho received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Daestrecampo $as merely acting as the detainees" personal courier
and not as their counsel $hen he received the letters for mailing.
&n the present case, since the letters $ere not confidential
communication bet$een the detainees and their la$yers, the
officials of the &10+, -etention .enter could read the letters. &f
the letters are mar'ed confidential communication bet$een the
detainees and their la$yers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees. T(a' a ,a" )$ re=u)re% be+ore a&
e6e*u')#e o++)*er *ou,% )&'ru%e o& a *)')7e&C$ -r)#a*y r).('$ )$ a
.uara&'ee '(a' )$ a#a),ab,e o&,y 'o '(e -ub,)* a' ,ar.e bu' &o' 'o
-er$o&$ "(o are %e'a)&e% or );-r)$o&e%. The right to privacy of
those detained is sub6ect to 1ection ; of )0 :;7A, as $ell as to the
limitations inherent in la$ful detention or imprisonment. By '(e
#ery +a*' o+ '(e)r %e'e&')o&, -re8'r)a, %e'a)&ee$ a&% *o&#)*'e%
-r)$o&er$ (a#e a %);)&)$(e% e6-e*'a')o& o+ -r)#a*y r).('$.
- Ro6a$ #$. Iu7uarre.e), 4u&e 12, 20058 To prevent liability from
attaching on account of his letter, he invo'es his rights to free
speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these
rights $ill not, ho$ever, free him from liability. 0s already stated,
his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the 6udiciary. The ma'ing of
contemptuous statements directed against the .ourt is not an
e#ercise of free speech= rather, it is an abuse of such right.
!n$arranted attac's on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the e#ercise of said right cannot be
used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect '(ere+or and confidence therein. +ree e#pression must not
be used as a vehicle to satisfy one"s irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this .ourt and its magistrates.
- R).(' 'o :r)#a*y E Re I..y ArroyoC$ r).(' 'o -r)#a*y ( '(e r).('
'o be ,e' a,o&e) Rea%G :: #$. <o,)&a, e' a,., 8 r).(' 'o -r)#a*y
;ay be "a)#e% by '(e %e+e&%a&').
(asisG &t is e#pressly recogniEed in 1ection 7234 of the (ill of
)ights:Hther facets of the right to privacy are protected in
various provisions of the (ill of )ights, viE: 1ections3= 5= ?=
A= and 3:. Jones of privacy are li'e$ise recogniEed and
protected in our la$s. The .ivil .ode provides that L[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other personsL and
punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. &t also holds
a public officer or employee or any private individual liable
for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recogniEes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The )evised ,enal .ode ma'es a
crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of
trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to d$elling. &nvasion
of privacy is an offense in special la$s li'e the 0nti-
Wiretapping La$, the 1ecrecy of (an' -eposit 0ct and the
&ntellectual ,roperty .ode. The )ules of .ourt on privileged
communication li'e$ise recogniEe the privacy of certain
information. 2Hple vs. Torres, Buly 57, 388A.
- &n the matter of petition for habeas corpus of .amilo 1abio,
Hctober 3:, 5CC?8 I& e#a,ua')&. a *,a); +or #)o,a')o& o+ '(e
r).(' 'o -r)#a*y, a court must determine $hether a person has
e#hibited a reasonable e#pectation of privacy and, if so, $hether
that e#pectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
- S4S #$. 0a&.erou$ 0ru.$ Boar% a&% :0EA, GR No. 155!50,
No#e;ber , 200!8 1upreme .ourt %e*,are% a$ u&*o&$')'u')o&a,
'(e -ro#)$)o&$ o+ RA 3165 re=u)r)&. ;a&%a'ory %ru. 'e$')&. o+
*a&%)%a'e$ +or -ub,)* o++)*e a&% -er$o&$ a**u$e% o+ *r);e$.
Go$ever, the 1upreme .ourt upheld the constitutionality of the
said )0 insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary
school students, as $ell as for officials and employees of public
and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at
least minimiEe illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual"s privacy interest under the premises.
- Rea%G Ayer :ro%u*')o&$ #$. Ca-u,o&.8 The right of privacy or
the right to be let alone is &o' a& ab$o,u'e r).(' "(ere '(e -er$o&
)$ a -ub,)* +).ure and the )&+or;a')o& $ou.(' 'o be e,)*)'e% +ro;
(); or 'o be -ub,)$(e% abou' (); *o&$')'u'e ;a''er$ o+ a -ub,)*
*(ara*'er.
- Iu,ue'a #$. CA, 25 SCRA 6338 T(e o&,y e6*e-')o& 'o '(e
-ro()b)')o& )& '(e *o&$')'u')o& )$ )+ '(ere )$ a J,a"+u, or%er
+ro; a *our' or "(e& -ub,)* $a+e'y or or%er re=u)re$
o'(er")$e, a$ -re$*r)be% by ,a"K.
- Re,a'e 'o e;a),$ a&% o'(er "ay$ o+ *o;;u&)*a')o&.
- RA 2200 (A&')81)re'a--)&. A*')80 violation of the 0nti Wire
Tapping La$ 2).0. ;5CC4 $hich prohibits not only the
unauthoriEed taping of private conversations, but also: 2a4 the
possession of such tapes $ith the 'no$ledge of their nature as
illegal $iretaps= 2b4 the replaying of the tapes to any person= and
2c4 to communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in
$riting, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential 6ail
term, if convicted, ranges from si# months to si# years.
- Ar'$. 230, 231, 232 a&% 233 o+ '(e Re#)$e% :e&a, Co%e
- RA No. 352 (Hu;a& Se*ur)'y A*')8 The provisions of )0
;5CC to the contrary not$ithstanding, a police or la$
enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a
$ritten order of the .ourt of 0ppeals, listen to intercept, and
record, $ith the use of any mode, form, 'ind or type of
electronic or other surveillance e<uipment or intercepting and
trac'ing devices, or $ith the use of any other suitable $ays
and means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion or spo'en or $ritten $ords bet$een
members of a 6udicially declared and outla$ed terrorist
organiEation, association, or group of persons or any person
charged $ith or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. :ro#)%e%, '(a' $ur#e),,a&*e,
)&'er*e-')o& a&% re*or%)&. o+ *o;;u&)*a')o&$ be'"ee&
,a"yer$ a&% *,)e&'$, %o*'or$ a&% -a')e&'$, /our&a,)$'$ a&%
'(e)r $our*e$ a&% *o&+)%e&')a, bu$)&e$$ *orre$-o&%e&*e
$(a,, &o' be au'(or)7e%.
Se*')o& 2- Free%o; o+ e6-re$$)o&-
- Baya& #$ Er;)'a, A-r), 25, 2006 - The provisions of (.,.
/o. AAC practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reye$ #. Ba.a'$)&.

2.). /o. L-?97??, /ovember 8, 38A7,
359 1.)0 997, 9?84
A. (y $ay of a summary. The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place $here and the time when it $ill
ta'e place. &f it $ere a private place, only
the consent of the o$ner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is re<uired. 1uch
application should be filed $ell ahead in time
to enable the public official concerned to
appraise $hether there may be valid
ob6ections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. &t is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. &f he is of the vie$ that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
$hether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can
have recourse to the proper 6udicial
authority.






B.:. No. !!0



1E.. ;. Permit when required and when
not required.-- 0 $ritten permit shall be
re<uired for any person or persons to
organiEe and hold a public assembly in a
public place. Go$ever, no permit shall be
re<uired if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom par' duly
established by la$ or ordinance or in
private property, in $hich case only the
consent of the o$ner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is re<uired, or in the
campus of a government-o$ned and
operated educational institution $hich shall
be sub6ect to the rules and regulations of
said educational institution. ,olitical
meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by la$ are
not covered by this 0ct.

1E.. 9. Application requirements.-- 0ll
applications for a permit shall comply $ith
the follo$ing guidelines:
2a4 The applications shall be in $riting
and shall include the names of the leaders
or organiEers= the purpose of such public
assembly= the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity= and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems to
be used.
2b4 The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant under
1ection A hereof.
2c4 The application shall be filed $ith the
office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in $hose 6urisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five
294 $or'ing days before the scheduled
public assembly.
2d4 !pon receipt of the application,
$hich must be duly ac'no$ledged in
$riting, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately
be posted at a conspicuous place in the city
or municipal building.

1E.. ?. Action to be taken on the
application. M
2a4 &t shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly $ill create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public
health.
2b4 The mayor or any official acting in
his behalf shall act on the application
$ithin t$o 254 $or'ing days from the date
the application $as filed, failing $hich, the
permit shall be deemed granted. 1hould for
any reason the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application shall be
posted by the applicant on the premises of
the office of the mayor and shall be deemed
to have been filed.
2c4 &f the mayor is of the vie$ that there
is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil $arranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant $ho must
be heard on the matter.
2d4 The action on the permit shall be in
$riting and served on the applica[nt] $ithin
t$enty-four hours.
2e4 &f the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of la$.
2f4 &n case suit is brought before the
Detropolitan Trial .ourt, the Dunicipal
Trial .ourt, the Dunicipal .ircuit Trial
.ourt, the )egional Trial .ourt, or the
&ntermediate 0ppellate .ourt, its decisions
may be appealed to the appropriate court
$ithin forty-eight 2;A4 hours after receipt of
the same. /o appeal bond and record on
appeal shall be re<uired. 0 decision
granting such permit or modifying it in
terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately e#ecutory.
2g4 0ll cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided $ithin t$enty-four
25;4 hours from date of filing. .ases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
the e#ecutive 6udge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the ne#t in ran'.
2h4 &n all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the 1upreme .ourt.
2i4 Telegraphic appeals to be follo$ed by
formal appeals are hereby allo$ed.

- &t is very clear, therefore, that B.:. No. !!0 )$ &o' a& ab$o,u'e ba&
o+ -ub,)* a$$e;b,)e$ bu' a re$'r)*')o& '(a' $);-,y re.u,a'e$ '(e
');e, -,a*e a&% ;a&&er o+ '(e a$$e;b,)e$.
- &n sum, the 1upreme .ourt reiterates its basic policy of upholding
the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
e#pression and freedom of assembly. &n several policy addresses,
.hief Bustice 0rtemio >. ,anganiban has repeatedly vo$ed to
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. Ge
said that Fin cases involving liberty, the scales of 6ustice should
$eigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginaliEed, the dispossessed and the $ea'.
&ndeed, la$s and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to
the courts $ith a heavy presumption against their validity. These
la$s and actions are sub6ected to heightened scrutiny.%
- +or this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struc' do$n as a
dar'ness that shrouds freedom. &t merely confuses our people and
is used by some police agents to 6ustify abuses. Hn the other hand,
B.:. No. !!0 *a&&o' be *o&%e;&e% a$ u&*o&$')'u')o&a,D )' %oe$
&o' *ur'a), or u&%u,y re$'r)*' +ree%o;$D )' ;ere,y re.u,a'e$ '(e
u$e o+ -ub,)* -,a*e$ a$ 'o '(e ');e, -,a*e a&% ;a&&er o+
a$$e;b,)e$. Far +ro; be)&. )&$)%)ou$, J;a6);u; 'o,era&*eK )$
+or '(e be&e+)' o+ ra,,y)$'$, &o' '(e .o#er&;e&'. T(e %e,e.a')o&
'o '(e ;ayor$ o+ '(e -o"er 'o )$$ue ra,,y J-er;)'$K )$ #a,)%
be*au$e )' )$ $ub/e*' 'o '(e *o&$')'u')o&a,,y8$ou&% J*,ear a&%
-re$e&' %a&.erK $'a&%ar%.
- IB: #. A')e&7a , GR No. 155221, February 22, 20108 0tienEa
gravely abused his discretion $hen he did not immediately inform
the &(, $hich should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that
may $arrant the changing of the venue under (, AAC, the Public
Assembly Act. &t found that 0tienEa failed to indicate ho$ he had
arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of
a clear and present danger test $hich is an indispensable condition
to such modification. F/othing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, $hich Nblan'"
denial or modification $ould, $hen granted imprimatur as the
appellate court $ould have it, render illusory any 6udicial scrutiny
thereto,%
- So*)a, 1ea'(er S'a')o&$ #$. CO<ELEC, <ay 5, 20018 Election
surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of e#pression as
they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters
as regards to a candidate"s popularity, <ualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the
voter"s preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period.
- T(e -ro()b)')o& );-o$e% by Se*')o& 5.2 o+ RA 3006 (Fa)r
E,e*')o& A*') )$ )&#a,)% be*au$eG 34 it imposes prior restraint on
the freedom of e#pression= 54 it is a direct and total suppression of
a category of e#pression even though such suppression is only for
a limited period= and 74 the government interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of
freedom of e#pression.
0 TESTS o+ >a,)% Go#er&;e&' I&'er+ere&*eG
3. .lear I ,resent -anger
5. (alancing of &nterests
7. -angerous Tendency )ule
- Co&'e&' ba$e% a&% *o&'e&' &eu'ra, re.u,a')o&$8
)egulations of speech may either be content-based 2the
sub6ect of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated4
and content-neutral 2it regulates only the conduct associated
$ith speech, such as the time, place and manner4. To pass
constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must
$(o" '(a' '(e .o#er&;e&' (a$ a *o;-e,)&. or o#er)%)&.
)&'ere$' )& '(e $ub/e*' re.u,a')o&. 0 content neutral
restriction, on the other hand, need only sho$ an important
government interest, as long as it leaves open alternative
channels of communication.
- C(a#e7 #$. Se*re'ary Go&7a,e$, GR No. 16!!, February
15, 200!- The acts of the 1ecretary of Bustice and the /T. in
$arning television stations against playing the Farci tapes%
under pain of revocation of their licenses, $ere content-based
restrictions and should be sub6ected to the Fclear and present
and danger test%.
- Ne"$ou&%$ Broa%*a$')&. Ne'"orF, I&*., e' a,. #$. 0y, e'
a,., GR No. 150250HGR No. 153211, A-r), 2, 2003- The
immediate implication of the application of the Fstrict
scrutiny% test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of the government to prove that their actions do not
infringe upon petitioners" constitutional rights. 0s content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling
reason to infringe the right to free e#pression.
- ABS8CBN #$. CO<ELEC, 2 SCRA !11 (2000)8 The
prohibition of publication of e#it poll or electoral survey
$ould be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively
prevents the use of e#it poll data not only for election day
pro6ections, but also for long term research.
- <TRCB #$. ABS8CBN, e' a,., 4a&uary 15, 20058 ,.-. /o.
38A? gives petitioner Fthe po$er to screen, revie$ and
e#amine Fall television programs,% emphasiEing the phrase
Fall television programs%. Thus, when the law says
all television programs, the word all covers
all television programs, whether religious, public
afairs, news documentary, etc. The principle
assumes that the legislative body made no
qualifcation in the use of general word or
expression. t then follows that since The Inside
Story is a television program, it is within the
!urisdiction of the "T#$% over which it has power
of review.
- Sor)a&o #. La.uar%)a, GR No. 1625!5D Sor)a&o #. <TRCB
GR No. 16566, A-r), 23, 20038The 1upreme .ourt said
that 1oriano"s Fstatement can be treated as obscene, at least
$ith respect to the average child,% and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan
has earlier been given a F% rating for general vie$ership.
T(e Su-re;e Cour' $a)% '(e <TRCB $u$-e&$)o& "a$
,);)'e% o&,y 'o '(e $(o" Ang Dating Daan, &o' Sor)a&o, a$
'(e <TRCB J;ay &o' $u$-e&% 'e,e#)$)o& -er$o&a,)')e$, +or
$u*( "ou,% be beyo&% )'$ /ur)$%)*')o&.K
- Bor/a, #$. CA, 01 SCRA 1, &n order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. &t must also be sho$n that a third
party could identify him as the ob6ect of the libelous article.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and 6ustifiable motive
for ma'ing it is sho$n, e#cept in the follo$ing:
3. private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty=
5. a fair and true report, made in good faith,
$ithout remar's, of any 6udicial, legislative
or other official proceeding $hich are not
confidential in nature including any
statement made therein or act performed by
public officer.
- 0 privileged communication may either be absolutely
privileged 2those $hich are not actionable or even if author
acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of .ongress therein
or any committee thereof4 or <ualified privileged 2those
containing defamatory imputations $hich are not actionable
unless found to have been made $ithout good intention or
6ustifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and
true reports $ithout any comments@remar's4.
- Fa)r *o;;e&'ar)e$ o& ;a''er$ o+ -ub,)* )&'ere$' are
-r)#),e.e% a&% *o&$')'u'e a #a,)% %e+e&$e )& a& a*')o& +or
,)be, or $,a&%er. T(e %o*'r)&e o+ +a)r *o;;e&' ;ea&$ '(a'
"(),e )& .e&era, e#ery %)$*re%)'ab,e );-u'a')o& -ub,)*,y
;a%e )$ %ee;e% +a,$e, be*au$e e#ery ;a& )$ -re$u;e%
)&&o*e&' u&'), ()$ .u),' )$ /u%)*)a,,y -ro#e%.
Se*')o& 58 Free%o; o+ Re,).)o&8
- Ebra,)&a. #$. 0)#. Su-er)&'e&%e&' o+ S*(oo,$ o+ Cebu, 213
SCRA 256 - members of Behovah"s $itnesses may validly
refuse participating in flag ceremonies 2singing the national
anthem, saluting the flag, etc.4 on account of their religious
beliefs.
- I.,e$)a &) Cr)$'o #$. CA, 253 SCRA 523- The e#ercise of
religious freedom can be regulated $hen it $ill bring about
clear and present danger of a substantive evil $hich the 1tate
has a duty to prevent. Go$ever, criticism on certain catholic
tenets and dogmas does not constitute clear and present
danger.
- To,e&')&o #$. Se*. o+ F)&a&*e, 25 SCRA 60 M +reedom of
religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable
sales and use ta# on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organiEation. +or the purpose of defraying cost of
registration.
- I$,a;)* 0aC"a( Cou&*), o+ '(e :(),)--)&e$ #$. E6e*u')#e
Se*re'ary, 205 SCRA 235- .lassifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards are dra$n
from the Our"an and &slamic beliefs. (y giving the Hffice of
the Duslim 0ffairs e#clusive po$er to classify food products
as halal, E. H. /o. ;? encroached on the religious freedom of
Duslim organiEation to interpret $hat food products are fit
for Duslim consumption. The 1tate has in effect forced
Duslim to accept its o$n interpretation of the Our"an and
1unnah on halal food.
- Taru* #$. B)$(o- %e,a Cru7, e' a,., GR No. 122!01, <ar*(
10, 20058 The e#pulsion@e#communication of members of a
religious institution@organiEation is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, and the la$s and canons, of said
institution@organiEation.
Se*')o& 68 Liberty of abode I )ight to travel-
- )ead: >illavicencio vs. Lu'ban= Danotoc vs. .0= 1ilverio vs
.0- )elate to suspension of deployment of H+Ws to 10)s
infected countries. &n relation to bail 2Danotoc vs. .0=
1antiago vs. >as<ueE4- #a,)% re$'r)*')o& o& ()$ r).(' 'o
'ra#e,.
- <ar*o$ #$. Sa&%).a&baya&, GR No. 11512, Au.u$' 3,
13358 The person"s right to travel is sub6ect to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the
system of 6ustice. Whether the accused should be permitted to
leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter
addressed to the court"s discretion. 2Pap vs. .0, ) /o.
3;3958, Bune ?, 5CC34.
- Ar'. 1 (2), ?&)#er$a, 0e*,ara')o& o+ Hu;a& R).('$-
provides that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his o$n, and to return to his country.
- Ar'. 12 (2), Co#e&a&' o& C)#), a&% :o,)')*a, R).('$-
provides that noone shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his o$n country.
Se*')o& 5- )ight to &nformation
- C(a#e7 #$. :ub,)* E$'a'e$ Au'(or)'y, 4u,y 3, 20028 The
constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is
consummated. The information, ho$ever, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recogniEed e#ceptions li'ed privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
0 Le.a7-) #$. CSCD >a,;o&'e #$. Be,;o&'eD BARA #$.
1 CO<ELEC
- Ber%)& #$. <a$*ar)&a$, 526 SCTA 5328 While access to
official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated.
Se*')o& !8 )ight to form !nions of public sector
- !nited ,epsi .ola 1upervisory !nion vs. Laguesma, 5AA
1.)0 39- .ongress, via 0rt. 359 of the Labor .ode, validly
prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to
stri'e does form an integral part of the )ight to 0ssociation.
Se*')o& 3- E#propriation
- Re-ub,)* #$. G)&.oyo&, 0e*e;ber 13, 2005- )ule ?: outlines the
procedure under $hich eminent domain may be e#ercised by the
overnment. Pet by no means does it serve at present as the
solitary guideline through $hich the 1tate may e#propriate private
property. +or e#ample, 1ection 38 of the Local overnment .ode
governs as to the e#ercise by local government units of the po$er
of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. 0nd then there
is )ep. 0ct /o. A8:;, $hich covers e#propriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure pro6ects.
- )ep. 0ct /o. A8:;, $hich provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property o$ner than )ule ?:, inescapably applies
in instances $hen the national government e#propriates property
Ffor national government infrastructure pro6ects%.
- Re-ub,)* #$. Ho,y Tr)&)'y Rea,'y 0e#e,o-;e&' Cor-., 551
SCRA 0- There are at least t$o crucial differences bet$een the
respective procedure under )0 /o. A8:; and )ule ?:. !nder the
statute, the government is re<uired to ma'e immediate payment to
the property o$ner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to
a $rit of possession, $hereas )ule ?:, the government is re<uired
only to ma'e an initial deposit $ith an authoriEed government
depositary, and )ule ?: prescribes that the initial deposit be
e<uivalent to the assessed value of the property for purpose of
ta#ation, unli'e )0 A8:; $hich provides, as the relevant standard
for initial compensation, the mar'et value of the property as stated
in the ta# declaration or the current relevant Eonal value of the (&),
$hichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and@or
structures using the replacement cost method.
- ATO #$. To&.oy, 551 SCRA 208 the right of the previous o$ners
$ho $ere able to prove the commitment of the government to
allo$ them to repurchase their land.
- A$)aC$ E;er.)&. 0ra.o& Cor-. #$. 0OTC, 552 SCRA 538 The
1tate, through e#propriation proceedings may ta'e private property
even if, admittedly, it $ill transfer this property again to another
private party as long as there is public purpose to the ta'ing.
- T)o&.$o& #$. NHA, 55! SCRA 56- Where the initial ta'ing of a
property sub6ect to e#propriation $as by virtue of a la$ $hich $as
subse<uently declared unconstitutional, 6ust compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier ta'ing.
- <C10 #$. 4. L)&. a&% So&$ Co., I&*., GR No. 1553!, A-r),
16, 2003 8 +or D.W- to e#ercise its po$er of eminent domain,
t$o re<uirements should be met, namely: first, its board of
directors passed a resolution authoriEing the e#propriation, and
second, the e#ercise of the po$er of eminent domain $as sub6ected
to revie$ by the LW!0.
- Re-ub,)* #$. L);, 4u&e 23, 2005- 1ection 8, 0rticle &&& of the
.onstitution is not a grant but a ,);)'a')o& of po$er. This limiting
function is in 'eeping $ith the philosophy of the (ill of )ights
against the arbitrary e#ercise of governmental po$ers to the
detriment of the individual"s rights. iven this function, the
provision should therefore be $'r)*',y interpreted against the
e#propriator, the government, and ,)bera,,y in favor of the property
o$ner.
- While the prevailing doctrine is that Fthe non-payment of 6ust
compensation does not entitle the private lando$ner to recover
possession of the e#propriated lots, ho$ever, in cases $here the
government failed to pay 6ust compensation ")'()& +)#e (5) year$
+ro; '(e +)&a,)'y o+ '(e /u%.;e&' )& '(e e6-ro-r)a')o&
-ro*ee%)&.$, the o$ners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance $ith the
principle that Fthe government cannot 'eep the property and
dishonor the 6udgment.% To be sure, the five-year period limitation
$ill encourage the government to pay 6ust compensation
punctually. This is in 'eeping $ith 6ustice and e<uity. 0fter all, it
is the duty of the government, $henever it ta'es property from
private persons against their $ill, to facilitate the payment of 6ust
compensation.
- Local government units possessed the delegated po$er of eminent
domain, $ub/e*' 'o /u%)*)a, re#)e" 2.ity of Danila vs. .hinese
.ommunity4.
- 0ny property o$ned by a municipal corporation in its -r)#a'e
*a-a*)'y (-a'r);o&)a,), )& a&y e6-ro-r)a')o& -ro*ee%)&., ;u$'
be -a)% /u$' *o;-e&$a')o&. &f the property o$ned is public or
other$ise held in trust then no compensation need be paid 2.ity of
(aguio vs. /0W0104.
- To set 6ust compensation is a 6udicial prerogative 2E,J0 vs.
-ulay4.
- The .ourt said that the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of par'ing fees from persons $ho use the mall par'ing
facilities has no basis in the National Building ode or its
implementing rules and regulations. I' a%%e% '(a' '(e S'a'e a,$o
*a&&o' );-o$e '(e $a;e -ro()b)')o& by .e&era,,y )&#oF)&.
-o,)*e -o"er, $)&*e $a)% -ro()b)')o& a;ou&'$ 'o a 'aF)&. o+
re$-o&%e&'$C -ro-er'y ")'(ou' -ay;e&' o+ /u$' *o;-e&$a')o&.
2GR No. 155056, O++)*e o+ '(e So,)*)'or Ge&era, #. Aya,a La&%
I&*or-ora'e%, Se-'e;ber 1!, 20034
- C;$r. o+ IR #$. Ce&'ra, Lu7o& 0ru. Cor-., GR No. 12!512,
4u&e 26, 2006, C;$r. o+ IR #$. B)*o,a&%)a 0ru. Cor-., GR No.
12!0!, 4u,y 21, 2006 E The ta# credit given to commercial
establishments for the discount en6oyed by senior citiEens pursuant
to )0 :;75 is a form of 6ust compensation for private property
ta'en by the 1tate for public use, since the privilege en6oyed by
senior citiEens does not come directly from the 1tate, but from
private establishments concerned.
- ,ublic use does not mean use by the public. 0s long as the purpose
of the ta'ing is public, then po$er of eminent domain comes into
play. &t is inconse<uential that private entities may benefit as long
as in the end, public interest is served 20rdona vs. )eyes4.
- )eyes v. /ational Gousing 0uthority, 789 1.)0 ;8;, TaF)&. o+
-ro-er'y +or $o*)a,)7e% (ou$)&. )$ +or -ub,)* u$e.
- La&%$ +or $o*)a,)7e% (ou$)&. are to be ac<uired n the follo$ing
order: 34 government lands= 54 alienable lands of the public
domain= 74 unregistered or abandoned or idle lands= ;4 lands $ithin
the declared areas for priority development, Eonal improvement
program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites $hich have
not yet been ac<uired= 94 (L&11 sites $hich have not yet been
ac<uired= and ?4 privately-o$ned lands 2.ity of Dandaluyong vs.
0guilar, 79C1.)0 ;A: 5CC34.
Se*')o& 108 /on-impairment clause
- There is no impairment in the imposition of the >0T against real
estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition.
The contract clause is not a limitation on the e#ercise of the 1tate"s
po$er of ta#ation save only $here a ta# e#emption has been
granted for a valid consideration. 2Tolentino vs. 1ec. of +inance4
- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on 6udicial acts
that impair contract. 2anEon vs. &nserto, 357 1.)0 3794
Se*')o&$ 11 B 12 M .ustodial &nvestigation )ights
- )ead: Diranda vs. 0riEona, amboa vs. .ruE, Escobedo vs.
&llinois.
- A--,)e$ 'o -re,);)&ary )&#e$').a')o&, ,, vs. 1unga, 788 1.)0
?5;
- :: #$. >a,,e/o, <ay 3, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a la$yer
need not challenge all the <uestions being propounded to his client.
The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as $ould
lead the accused to admit something false. &ndeed counsel $(ou,%
&o' -re#e&' a& a**u$e% +ro; +ree,y a&% #o,u&'ar),y 'e,,)&. '(e
'ru'(.
- ,, vs. -omantay, 7C: 1.)0 3- )0 :;7A has e#tended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in $hich an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been Finvited% for
<uestioning.
- ,, vs. arcia, ;CC 1.)0 558, 0 confession made to a private
person is admission in evidence.
- ,, vs. LoEada, ;C? 1.)0 ;8;, 0n un$ritten confession is
inadmissible.
- 0 party in an administrative in<uiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel 2A;-o&. #$. CSC, 56 SCRA 23).
- :ere7 #$. :eo-,e, 522 SCRA 52- While investigations by an
administrative body may at times be a'in to a criminal proceeding,
a party in an administrative in<uiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
respondent"s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated $ith counsel.
Se*')o& 1- (ail
- Where the accused $as originally charged $ith a capital offense
but later convicted of non-capital and $hich he appeals, ba),
*a&&o' be .ra&'e% a$ a ;a''er r).(' (Obo$a #$. CA, 266 SCRA
2!1).
- The constitutional right to ba), )$ a#a),ab,e o&,y )& *r);)&a,
-ro*ee%)&.$. The right is &o' a#a),ab,e )& e6'ra%)')o&
-ro*ee%)&.$ that are not criminal in nature. &n the absence of any
provision in the constitution, the la$ or the treaty, adopting the
practice of not granting bail, as a general rule, $ould be a step
to$ards deterring fugitives from coming to the ,hilippines to hide
from or evade their prosecutors.
- /ot$ithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in
e#tradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an
e#ception, only upon a clear and convincing sho$ing: 34 that, once
granted bail, the applicant $ill not be a flight ris' or a danger to
the community= and 54 that there e#ist special, humanitarian and
compelling reasons 2ov"t. of !10 vs. ,urganan, 1eptember 5;,
5CC54.
- Go#er&;e&' o+ Ho&.Fo&. S-e*)a, A%;)&)$'ra'or Re.)o& #$.
4u%.e O,a,)a, 4r., A-r), 13, 2005 M ,otential e#traditee may be
granted bail on the basis of Fclear and convincing evidence% that
the person is not a flight ris' and $ill abide $ith all the orders and
processes of the e#tradition court.
Se*')o& 12- )ights of accused
3. ,resumption of innocence- as against presumption of la$.
5. The right to be heard
- The vagueness doctrine merely re<uires reasonable degree of
certainty for the la$ to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical e#actitude 2 Estrada vs
- . -esierto, /ovember 38, 5CC34.
- -espite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused
appellant may not be sentenced to death under )0 :?98 due
to the failure of the information to allege relationship to the
victim. &t $ould be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, conse<uently, a
denial of due process 2,, vs. 1andoval, 7;A 1.)0 ;:?4.
- 0 person sub6ect of an e6'ra%)')o& re=ue$' +ro; a&o'(er
$o#ere).& S'a'e )$ bere+' o+ '(e r).(' 'o &o')*e a&% (ear)&.
%ur)&. '(e e#a,ua')o& $'a.e o+ '(e e6'ra%)')o& -ro*e$$. 0n
e#tradition proceeding is sui generis. &t is not criminal
proceeding $hich $ill call into operations all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the (ill of )ights. T(e e6'ra%)'eeC$
r).(' 'o &o')*e a&% (ear)&. )$ -re$e&' o&,y "(e& '(e
-e')')o& +or e6'ra%)')o& )$ +),e% )& *our'- it is only then $hen
he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him
21ecretary of Bustice vs. Lantion, 7;7 1.)0 7::, 5CCC4.

7. )ight to public trial
- 0 public trial is not synonymous $ith publiciEed trial= it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those $ho $ish
to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves $ith
decorum and observe trial 21ec of Bustice vs. Estrada, Bune
58, 5CC34.
;. )ight to face to face confrontation
- The absence of cross-e#amination by the defense due to the
supervening death of plaintiff@$itness does not necessarily
render the deceased"s testimony inadmissible. Where no fault
can be attributed to plaintiff@$itness, it $ould be a harsh
measure to stri'e out all that has been obtained in the direct
e#amination 2,, vs. /arca, 5:9 1.)0 ?8?4.
Se*')o& 16- 1peedy disposition
- Where the case for violation of the 0nti-raft La$ $as
pending for preliminary investigation $ith the Hffice of the
Tanodbayan for 7 years and it is indicated that the case is of
simple nature and $as prosecuted for political reasons, it is
held that there $as violation of the accused"s right to speedy
disposition of case. )ight to speedy disposition e#tends to
preliminary investigations. 2Tatad vs. 1andiganbayan, 398
1.)0 :C4.
Se*')o& 15- 0gainst 1elf-incrimination
- The right against self-incrimination is a#a),ab,e )&
a%;)&)$'ra')#e (ear)&.$ $hen the nature of the penalty is
penal in nature 2li'e forfeiture of property or dismissal from
employment4 and the hearing parta'es the nature of criminal
proceeding 2.abal vs. Qapunan, ? 1.)0 3C984.
- 0pplicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the
,o$$ o+ '(e -r)#),e.e 'o -ra*')*e ;e%)*a, -ro+e$$)o& 2,ascual
vs. (oard of Dedical E#aminers, 4.
- S'a&%ar% C(ar'ere% Ba&F #$. Se&a'e Co;;)''ee o&
Ba&F$, 521 SCRA 2568 The right against self incrimination
is e#tended in an administrative investigations that parta'e of
the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The
privilege has consistently been held to e#tend to all
proceedings sanctioned by la$= and all cases in $hich
punishment is sought to be visited upon a $itness, $hether a
party of not.
- The right against self-incrimination is %e+ea'e% by '(e -ub,)*
&a'ure o+ %o*u;e&'$ sought to be accessed 20lmonte vs.
>as<ueE4.
- &n the recent case of :EO:LE #$. 9ATAR, G.R. No.
150222, <ay 13, 2002, the 1upreme .ourt affirmed the
admissibility and probative value of -/0 2deo#yribonucleic
acid4. .iting the first ever 1upreme .ourt decision on the
admissibility of -/0 evidence, i.e., ,eople v. >alle6o, .).
/o. 3;;?9?, 8 Day 5CC5, 7A5 1.)0 385, 5C8, the .ourt, in
Patar, held that in assessing the probative value of -/0
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the follo$ing
factors: Fho$ the samples $ere collected, ho$ they $ere
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure follo$ed in analyEing the samples, $hether the
proper standards and procedures $ere follo$ed in conducting
the tests, and the <ualification of the analyst $ho conducted
the tests%.
- &n Patar, in an attempt to e#clude the -/0 evidence, the
appellant contended Fthat the blood sample ta'en from him as
$ell as the -/0 tests $ere conducted in violation of his right
to remain silent as $ell as his right against self-incrimination
under 1ecs. 35 and 3: of 0rt. &&& of the .onstitution%.
- The .ourt re6ected the argument. &t held that Fthe 'ernel of
the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion%, citing 0lih v. .astro, .). /o. ?8;C3, 57 Bune
38A:, 393 1.)0 5:8. &t held that Fthe right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of e#tracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt% and that Fit
does not apply $here the evidence sought to be e#cluded is
not an incrimination but as part of ob6ect evidence%.
- .iting ,eople v. )ondero, .). /o. 359?A:, 8 -ecember
3888, 75C 1.)0 7A7, the .ourt held that Falthough accused-
appellant insisted that hair samples $ere forcibly ta'en from
him and submitted to the /ational (ureau of &nvestigation for
forensic e#amination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for $hat is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature ac<uired from the accused under duress.%
- Gence, according to the .ourt, Fa person may be compelled to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
-/0, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved%. &t
cited ,eople v. allarde, .). /o. 377C59, 5: +ebruary 5CCC,
759 1.)0 A79, $here immediately after the incident, Fthe
police authorities too' pictures of the accused $ithout the
presence of counsel%. &n that case, the .ourt ruled that Fthere
$as no violation of the right against self-incrimination%. &t
further stated that Fthe accused may be compelled to submit
to a physical e#amination to determine his involvement in an
offense of $hich he is accused%.
Se*')o& 1! E &nvoluntary servitude: 20rticle 5:5 of the )evised
,enal .ode4
E#ceptions:3. ,unishment for a crime=
5.service in defense of the state
7.naval enlistment
;. posse comitatus
9.return to $or' order
?. patria potestas
Se*')o& 138 -eath penalty
- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There $as no
total abolition of the death penalty. The .on.om had deemed
it proper for .ongress to determine its reimposition because
of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. 2,, v,
Echegaray, 5?: 1.)0 ?A54.
Se*')o& 208 /on-imprisonment for -ebt
- The civil liability from a crime is not Fdebt% $ithin the
purvie$ of the constitutional provision against imprisonment
for non payment of Fdebt%.
- >ergara vs. edorio, ;C5 1.)0 95C- -ebt, as used in the
.onstitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. .learly, the non -ay;e&' o+ re&'a,$ )$
*o#ere% by '(e *o&$')'u')o&a, .uara&'ee a.a)&$'
);-r)$o&;e&'.
Se*')o& 21- -ouble Beopardy
- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada $as
not concluded as a series of events prompted the 1enate to
declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he $as neither
ac<uitted nor $as the impeachment proceeding dismissed
$ithout his e#press consent. /either $as there conviction@ &t
follo$s then that the claim of double 6eopardy must fail.
2Estrada vs. -esierto, 0pril 7, 5CC34.
- !nder 1ec. A, )ule 33: of the )ules of .ourt, a provisional
dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one
year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
e#ceeding si# years or a lapse of t$o years for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than si# years.
- +or this rule to bar the subse<uent filing of a similar case
against the accused, the follo$ing must be established: 34 the
provisional dismissal had e#press consent of the accused= 54
the provisional dismissal $as ordered by the court after notice
to the offended party= 74 the 3 yr. or 5-yr. period to revive had
lapsed= ;4 there is no 6ustification to file a subse<uent case
beyond the period of one or t$o years. (:: #$. La*$o&, <ay
2!, 2002).
- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide $as not a
6udgment of conviction. &t merely approved the agreement
bet$een the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the
accused and the condition attached to it. 2,, vs. )omero, 788
1.)0 7A?4
Se*')o& 22- E# post facto la$@bill of attainder
- RA !223, an act $hich further defines the 6urisdiction of the
1andiganbayan, is not penal la$ but a substantive la$ on
6urisdiction $hose retroactive application is constitutional
2Lacson vs. E#ec. 1ecretary, 7C3 1.)0 58A4.
- Na$)8>),,ar #$. :eo-,e, 551 SCRA 2028 0 la$ can never be
considered e#-post facto la$ as long as it operates
prospectively since its stricture $ould cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.
- The prohibition of e# post facto la$s and bill of attainder
a--,)e$ 'o *our' %o*'r)&e$ pursuant to the ma#im Flegis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet%- the interpretation placed upon
the $ritten la$ by a competent court has the force of la$ 2 ::
#$. 4ab)&a,, 55 SCRA 6024.
- The la$ ma'ing the use of an unlicensed firearm a <ualifying
circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. 2,, vs.
,atoc, 78A 1.)0 ?54.
- )e -/0 tests conducted by the prosecution against accused
being unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto $as
tantamount to the application of an e#-post facto la$-
-escribing the argument as specious, the 1upreme .ourt held
F&o e68-o$' +a*'o ,a" "a$ )&#o,#e% )& '(e *a$e a' bar%. &t
added that Fthe science of -/0 typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the )ules of .ourt%. Whereas, Fan e#-post
facto la$ referred primarily to a <uestion of la$, -/0
profiling re<uires a factual determination of the probative
$eight of the evidence presented%. 2,, vs. Patar, Day 38,
5CC;4