Article VII: Executive Department

Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 1989; MR, 178 SCRA, 1989
Facts: Petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin
the implementation of the President Aquinos decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty
of abode. Nor, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Ruling: YES. It is part of the RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT.

The President has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national
interest.

The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

Hence, the order given by the President is justified.
Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990
FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to benefit
from capital goods or services in the event of sales, lease or disposition of Philippine Government-owned
properties in Japan. However, petitioners challenged the order as unconstitutional since there was no
explicit enactment from the Congress as to the sales, lease or disposition of the properties.
ISSUE: Whether the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell
the properties.
RULING: NO. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Also, the nature of the Roppongi lot as
property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government
and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the
commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it
from being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the President to convey
valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
Facts: During the impeachment trial for then President Estrada spearheaded by his alleged receipt of
millions of pesos of jueteng money, he issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the
same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President
shall be the Acting President. However, filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer of writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the ombudsman from conducting further proceedings filed against him
until his term as president expires.
Issues: Whether the petitioner resigned as President which would result to his inability to invoke
immunity from suit.
Held: Petitioner has resigned. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. Whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20,
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted through the actions he had taken as well as the statements he made. Hence, he cannot invoke
immunity from suit because he is no longer the president.
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 186450, December 13, 2011
FACTS: James Balao was abducted by unidentified men allegedly on account of his being an
activist/political leanings. Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to
protect Jamess life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering
the respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist
from further inflicting harm upon his person. Respondents countered that President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is immune from suit and should thus be dropped as party-respondent. RTC denied respondents
counter stating that a petition for a writ of amparo is not by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,]
vexing or annoying court case from which she should be shielded.
ISSUE: Whether the presidents immunity from suit is applicable to petitions for writ of amparo.
RULING: YES. The Court held that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential
immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As president, then President
Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed.
Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission
violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. There is no law or sound factual
basis for the RTC to deprive the President of her Constitutionally-enshrined Immunity from suit.
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, November 15, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner was a victim of torture and abduction by the military. After his release, he was still
under surveillance by suspicious men. Fearing for his life, he filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo and habeas data which were granted. Among the respondents was then pres. GMA. The CA
dropped GMA as respondent reasoning that she is immune from suit. The CA further contended that
GMA had no command responsibility hence, she cannot be held accountable.
ISSUE: Whether PGMA is immune from suit and whether she has command responsibility over the acts
of her subordinate, hence, making her accountable for the injuries sustained by herein petitioner.
RULING: GMA is immune from suit. Well-settled in this jurisdiction is that immunity from suit can be
invoked in petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

On the issue of command responsibility, the Court found that The president, being the commander-in-
chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior
within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. However, the Court ruled that petitioner
failed to prove that GMA is accountable. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of
evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even
a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or
security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 1988
FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. He averred that Cory cannot
file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention
on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president
would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in
court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Is the filing of a complaint by the President tantamount to waiving her presidential immunity
from suit so that another person, like Beltran in this case, may raise as a defense the said immunity to
prevent the case from proceeding against him?
RULING: NO. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: The Committee of the Senate invited various officials of the Executive Department to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on issues pertaining the railway project (North Rail Project),
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of the military in so-called
Gloria Gate Scandal.

President issued E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Section 3 of said law
requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By
the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. 170516, July 16 2008
FACTS: JPEPA, a mega treaty, is a comprehensive plan for opening of markets in goods and services as
well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. The Committee on Trade and Commerce,
chaired by Sen. Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee
heard Governments rosy projection on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views
of environmental and trade activists who raised their very serious concerns about the country being turned
into Japans toxic waste basket.

Petitioners, as congress persons, citizens and taxpayers, requested Respondents to submit to them the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). They emphasizes that the
refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of
public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their
right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision
making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege, that diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege.
ISSUE: Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege?
HELD: An essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Further, the President is the sole
organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. Into the field of negotiations the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress is in itself powerless to invade it.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exceptions. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater
national interest.

The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access
to information. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege,
should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as
invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008
Facts: Romulo Neri disclosed that he was offered P200 Million Pesos in Bribe by a certain Benjamin
Abalos, when he was invited by the Respondent Committee of the Senate to shed light on the issue
pertaining the National Broadband Project, which was awarded to ZTE, a Chinese company. He referred
the matter to the President, where he was instructed not to accept the bribe. When he was later probed on
the issue, he refused to answer and invoked principle of executive privilege. The three questions are: (1)
Whether the President followed up the NBN Project? (2) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? And
(3) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project the project after being told about the
alleged bribe?

The Senate Committees issued a Subpeona Ad Testificandum to Neri to compel him to attend to another
hearing which the latter refused to attend on the belief that the questions to be asked were already covered
by the executive privilege. Neris testimony that his communication with the President is information that
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China. Neri still did not appear before the
Committee which prompted the latter to a cause of action to order his arrest and detention until such time
petitioner is compelled to appear and give his testimony.
Issue: Whether executive privilege clearly covers the three questions being asked by the Senate?
Held: Executive privilege clearly covers the three questions being contested by Senate because it clearly
denotes information or communication discussed about between petitioner and the President. The heads
of the different departments may, in their own capacity, appear before any committee only with the
consent of the President because each department is an extension of the President in exercising her policy
making power and power to enter into executive agreements.

The type of executive privilege claimed here was presidential communication privilege. Presidential
communication is presumptively privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever
challenges it, must show good and valid reasons related to the public welfare. The Court ruled that the
Senate failed to controvert the presumption. Thus the Chief Justice commented that executive privilege
was established by guesswork.
Valid Exercise
Pontejos v. Ombudsman -483 SCRA 83 [2006]
Facts:
Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an Affidavit/Complaint before the Ombudsman
against Emmanuel T. Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial (regional director) and Carmencita R. Atos
(legal staff), all of them officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and Roderick
Ngo, a private individual.
Aquino accused Pontejos and Atos of conspiring to exact money in exchange for a favorable
decision of a case against Roderick Ngo then pending in the HLURB. He further averred that Pontejos
acted as his counsel during the time when the latter was the hearing officer of the case. Moreover, Atos
allegedly received P10,000 in check, which was part of the consideration for a favorable decision.

The Overall Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa,
direct bribery and illegal practice of profession in violation of RA 6713. He then, recommended the filing
of criminal cases for estafa and direct bribery with the RTC.

Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto issued a Resolution extending immunity to Atos on the
condition that she would appear and testify against Pontejos in accordance with the Affidavits she
submitted during the preliminary investigation. The Resolution noted that Atos testimony was extremely
necessary to prove the offenses charged against Pontejos and that the available evidence showed that,
being a mere clerk, she did not appear to be the most guilty.

Issue: Whether the power to grant immunity from prosecution is executive or judicial in nature.
Ruling:
The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. It is the
prosecution that could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a case against an accused. The
prosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimony
against another.

As stated earlier, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function.
Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact that an individual had not been previously charged or
included in an information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a witness.


(Not part of the decision: this was taken from the footnotes)
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretionthe discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.

Banda v. Ermita 618 SCRA 499 [2012]
Facts:
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285
1
which provided, among others, the creation of
the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National Printing
Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city
and municipal governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine
Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.

President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive
Order No. 378, in turn, provide:
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies
and instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the government over standard and
accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing
of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1987.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive
powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President
Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates
petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
Issue: Whether there was a valid exercise of executive power.
Ruling:
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 378 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue.
The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 378. It is an
exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.
Invalid Exercise
Review Center v. Ermita 583 SCRA 42 [2009]
Facts:
On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing
Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that
handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among the
examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the
PRCs Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board
Examinations.

On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise
the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.

On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno),
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).

In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner),
an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish
independent review centers.

Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
Ruling:
1
st
issue: The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers
and similar entities.

The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a program
or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills
of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations
given by the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by
individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.

A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course
is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. A
reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an
examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review
course is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required to
take or pass an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis
or dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x of
higher learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.

2
nd
issue: Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through
the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within
the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities
which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Biraogo v. Truth Commission -637 SCRA 78 [2010]
Facts:
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body
to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is
a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Issue: Whether there was a valid exercise of executive power in the creation of the Phil. Truth
Commission
Ruling:
There was a valid exercise of executive power, however EO 1 violated the equal protection
clause.

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of
laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the
Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes
does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed.

However, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of
it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Such a classification must not be based
on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be
brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.
Prov. Of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
Facts: The Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain which pertains to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 regarding to
have a Bangsamoro Homeland. Before the signing, Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the
respondents to disclose and furnish it with completer and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to
hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A
subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court issued a
TRO, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD. The BJE seeks to grant the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral
lands of the Bangsamoro
Issue: Whether the guarantee made by the President regarding the statehood and independence of the
territories under BJE is under executive power?
Held: The President has executive power regarding issues on the peace of process with the MILF but the
guarantying of the statehood and independence of territories under the BJE thru the signing of the MOA
AD shall only be authorized by the Constituent Power vested only in Congress, Constitutional
Convention or the people themselves.

Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way
that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on
the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already
a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
Facts: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the President
involving the GAA of 1994. After the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners now contest
the constitutionality of the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA for AFP and DPWH
and the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH and NHA.
Issue: Whether the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
Ruling: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the
President without vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to &
have direct relation with debt service. They are appropriate provisions and cannot be vetoed without
vetoing the entire item/appropriation; VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &
creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges
vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in
pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of
roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. without vetoing
the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subject of road
maintenance & cannot be vetoed without vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.

Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equipment AFP modernization, prior approval of
Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any
provision blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be
subject of a separate law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such power
pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to
existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to
repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652
FACTS: The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-
complaint charging Petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and 6 other persons
with the crime of Rape with Homicide. The DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial and recommending that an Information be filed against Petitioners and their co-
respondents. Petitioners contend that the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
ISSUE: W/N the DOJ intruded judicial prerogative in excluding Jessica Alfaro as an accused.
HELD: The court held that it is within the executive powers that the DOJ can exclude certain people from
being prosecuted in cases, in this situation as part of the plea bargain Jessica Alfaro in exchange of her
testimony she was excluded from being tried on the case.
Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate, through its various Senate Committees, conducted
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The invitation was sent for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing
on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, is
valid and constitutional
HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefore.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.
It is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information from the courts, the Congressman
and ultimately the public. Types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would
subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process by
which government decisions are reached.
Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, September 4, 2008
Facts: On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Section 2. Qualifications
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Fornier petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired through the Philippine Bill, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 3. Vice President
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in
the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
Section 4. Election and Canvass
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
In a taxpayers suit, Atty. Macalintal questioned the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act .
Issue: Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate
the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
Ruling: Yes, it does. Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the
presidency and the vice-presidency.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution
to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law which obligates the Board of Canvassers to
transmit to the Commission the Certificates of Canvass clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall
be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or,
as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and
vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority
given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives
but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Lopez v. Senate and House, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004
Facts: The case is a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress. It created a Joint Committee that would preliminary
canvass the votes of the candidates for president and vice-president in the May 2004 election.
Issue: W/N the Congress committed grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: NO, IT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

COURT JURISDICTION. The court has jurisdiction following the principle that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the initiatory proceedings, like the complaint or petition. The court
deemed that the petition provide sufficient allegations of violation of the Constitution.

SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII expressly provides that Congress has the power to promulgate its
rules for canvassing the certificates. (Congressional prerogative)
Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004
FACTS: petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections.

Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving
the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters
and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress."
ISSUE: Whether the "the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, since
the final adjournment of its sessions was on June 11,2004
RULING :No. Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office
of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that
"[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth
Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment
of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that
of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress
convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its
functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board
until it has accomplished its purposes.
Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010
FACTS Atty. Macalintal , questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,[2] Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,
he chafes at the creation of a purportedly separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,
a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioners averment
is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005
PET Rules),[3] specifically:
(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices are designated as Chairman and Members, respectively;
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation
of paragraph 7, section 4 of article vii of the 1987 constitution.
RULING: No The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is no other than the Supreme Court itself.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have
affirmed on numerous occasions.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special
electoral court.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the
Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
FACTS: on June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the
National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-
placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July
23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on
the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the
Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004
elections.

In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the
proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an
election protest, since no such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election
protest is personal and non-transmissible.
ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the
latters protest case?
RULING: NO. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express
enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going
election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by
the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the
legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.[8] This rule allows substitution by a
legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear
before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section
16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.[9] Thus,
we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant
dies during the pendency of the protest
Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005
FACTS: In a Resolution the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed the jurisdiction over the
protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee Noli L. de Castro for its outright
dismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and
preservation of the ballot boxes and election documents subject of the protest.

Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV)
and certificates of canvass (COC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the tribunal has the power to correct manifest errors in the election returns or
certificates of canvass.
RULING: Yes. The validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the
Tribunals jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to
correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.
[12]
There is no necessity, in our view, to amend the PET
Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its constitutional function.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress
that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient
for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61
of the PET Rules.
[17]
Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the
Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-
making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996
FACTS: After Fidel Ramos was declared elected President, defeated candidate Miriam Defensor Santiago
filed an election protest with the Supreme Court. Subsequently however, while the case was pending, she
ran for office of Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator.
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective
memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995. The Protestant
answers this issue in the negative. she asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the term
of the contested office has expired
]
thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot,
under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,
[5]
be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest.
ISSUE: Whether the election protest continues or is declared moot?
RULING: Protestants Candidacy for senator in the May 1995 elections, her election to said office e and
her actual assumption and discharge of the office combined to constitute a supervening fact that rendered
moot and academic her present protest.
IN ASSUMING THE OFFICE OF SENATOR, THE PROTESTANT HAS EFFECTIVELY
ABAN-DONED OR WITHDRAWN HER ELECTION PROTEST, THEREBY MAKING IT
MOOT.
In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest,
or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or
withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public
policy and public interest implications In sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it
must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to
commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election
[16]
and to end at noon of 30
June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign,
she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed
her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the
office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she
was elected.
Section 5. Oath
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take
the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Section 6. Official Residence; Salary
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source.
Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the Presidency
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen
and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled,
the Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or
a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.
Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the Presidency
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to
the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
FACTS: In 1998 elections Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
was elected Vice president. In 2000, longtime friend of petitioner, ChavitSingson, went on air and
accused petitioner of receiving millions from jueteng lords. Many more accusations revolving around this
issue were echoed which brought about the resignation of several advisers and the later defect from the
ruling coalition (LapianngMasang Pilipino) of the Senate president, house speaker and 47 representatives.
In Nov. 13, 2000 Articles of Impeachment were transmitted to the Senate; Impeachment process began on
Nov. 20, 2000. In January 16, by a vote of 11-10, the senator judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope containing evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 Billion in a secret bank account.
On the same day, public prosecutors resigned. On Jan. 18, EDSA II began calling for petitioners
resignation, rallies calling for the same exploded in various parts of the country. Petitioner agreed to
holding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. He called up Secretary Angara
and requested him to cooperate to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. On Jan. 20, 2000,
negotiations began for the petitioners resignation, he the released a statement acknowledging Arroyos
Oath-taking as President and saying he will be leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. On the same day he sent a letter to both the House Speaker and
the Senate President saying he is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is sworn in as President. Both Houses of Congress then issue separate resolutions
recognizing her presidency. Sen. TeofistoGuingona is nominated by Pres. Arroyo as her Vice-president.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Estrada has not resigned and is a president on leave while Arroyo is
Acting President
RULING: To resolve the issue we look at the element necessary to prove resignation: that there must be
an intent to resign and it must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The proposal for a snap elections for
President in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up
the presidency at that time. When he called up Sec. Angara he requested for help for a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power; resignation is implied by such an act. Another indication was his final
statement before leaving Malacanang, here he acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as president. Angaras
diary shows reaction of petitioner that he only wanted a five-day transition period and after he clears his
name he was to go since he was tired. In the diary Angara noted he used the words ayoko na, words of
resignation. In sum, the court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. (therefore the office of the President was vacant and GMAs
assumption into office was justified)

The judgment that Estrada resigned was based on two statements (saying he will be leaving the
Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation and the letter saying
he is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office) of Estrada just before he left Malacanang and
on the diary of Angara Published in the Inquirer.

On MR the same was denied for the following reason: We did not stop with the contemporaneous
events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his
final statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After
analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonment
of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. These are overt acts which leave no doubt to
the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the
claim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at
half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.
Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001
Note: Lozano vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146631 is consolidated herein.

READ Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, and April 3, 2001 for FACTS.
In GR No. 146528, the Petition asks the SC to enjoin ESTRADA from exercising the powers and
authority of the President under the Constitution and to yield the Presidency to his constitutional
successor, ARROYO.
In GR No. 146549, Petitioner prays that the SC declare that the occupation of the Office of the
President of the Philippines by VP ARROYO is constitutional and legal with the full support of the
Filipino people and other foreign countries.
In GR No. 146579 the Petition asks the Court to issue a definitive ruling on whether or not ESTRADA
is still the President and, hence exempt from all criminal suits.
In GR No. 146631, the Petition prays that the proclamation and oath-taking of ARROYO be declared
null and void or that she be declared acting President and President ESTRADA, President-on-leave.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitions have merit
HELD: NONE. Petitioners prayed for and all the petitions are for Declaratory Relief which the SC does
not have Original Jurisdiction. Aside from the lack of jurisdiction, Petitioners did not sufficiently allege,
much less shown, that respondent or anyone else "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty," to entitle them to the writ of mandamus.

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and personal injury as
a result of President Arroyos oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozanos alleged interest as a taxpayer
is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition: nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and
declare Estrada as "President-on-leave."
Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice Presidency
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article
V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Section 11. Incapacity of the President
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising
the powers and duties of his office.
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108, 2001
FACTS: During the postponement of the Impeachment Court, ESTRADA's Cabinet members and
political allies resigned, EDSA II occurred, and the people demanded ESTRADA's resignation.
On the morning of 20 January 2001, ESTRADA sent the Senate President and the House Speaker
signed letters which states: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution,
I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
Senate President and House Speaker Drafted and Signed a Joint Statement of Support favoring
Macapagal-Arroyo.
At 12 noon of 20 January 2001, Chief Justice Davide administered the Oath to VP Macapagal-Arroyo
as President.
The SC Resolution dated 22 January 2001: SC confirmed Chief Justice Davide's administration of the
Oath of Office to VP Macapagal-Arroyo.
House Resolution dated 24 January 2001: the House of Rep supported Macapagal-Arroyo's as
President and her Assumption into office.
Both Houses of the Congress issued their respective Resolutions: Confirming Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo's Nomination of Guingona as VP.
In a Senate Resolution: Impeachment Court is Functus Officio and has been terminated.
Both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Macapagal-Arroyo as
President.
Several complaints were filed against ESTRADA before the Ombudsman DESIERTO.
ESTRADA's counsels filed with SC for Writ of Quo Warranto against Macapagal-Arroyo.
ARGUMENT OF ESTRADA'S COUNSEL: The Macapagal-Arroyo has no power to adjudge the
inability of ESTRADA to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency because it is Congress has
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII
ISSUE 1: Whether the Congress determined that the President is incapable of his functions in the manner
provided for in section 11 of Article VII.
ISSUE 2: Whether the SC has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of Petitioner Estrada
and thereafter revise the decision Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
HELD: (1) Congress IMPLICITLY BUT CLEARLY determined the President's inability. With
respect to Sec. 11, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the irrefutable facts show both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the de jure President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of ESTRADA is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
ESTRADAs claim of temporary inability.

(2) NO, because of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. The Court cannot pass upon ESTRADAs
claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by
this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. PETITION DISMISSED.
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001 (MR)
ARGUMENT OF ESTRADA'S COUNSEL: The SC misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article
VII, of the Constitution in that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of
opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority
of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that
his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet.
ISSUE: Whether the Congress complied with Sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution.
HELD: There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the
declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-
President assumes the presidency. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable
opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. Nevertheless, It cannot
be strictly maintain that the Senate President and House Speaker recognized Arroyo as the
constitutional successor to the presidency post facto.

The letters sent to them in the morning and before the Administration of the oath to the Macapagal-
Arroyo. Before the Administration of the Oath, the Senate President and the House Speaker drafted and
signed a joint statement supporting Macapagal-Arroyo. THIS A PRIORI RECOGNITION. Then, it was
followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this
recognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied
recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic.

Sec. 11 of Art. VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office. In case of inability to govern, sec. of Art. VII gives the Congress the power to
adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED.
Section 12. Serious Illness of the President
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall
not be denied access to the President during such illness.
Section 13. Prohibitions
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 1991
Civil Liberties Union assails the CONSTITUTIONALITY of Pres. Cory Aquino's E.O. No. 284:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1
hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 284 is Constitutional.
HELD: UNCONSTITIONAL.
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family, a class by itself, is all-embracing
and covers both public and private office or employment. While all other appointive officials in the
civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Sec. 13, Art. VII of 1987 Constitution: These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President
and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
GENERAL RULE for all elective and appointive public Official: Sec. 7, Art. I-XB of the 1987
Constitution is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees
EXCEPTION:Section 13, Art. VII is applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354, 1989
DOROMAL is a former commissioner of the PCGG. He is part of Doromal International Trading
Corp. (DITC), a family corporation.
While being a commissioner, a complaint was filed against him before the Ombudsman for violating
Sec. 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon clearance and approval of the Ombudsman, Special Prosecutor filed an amended information
before the Sandiganbayan:
x x x did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which
company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by
law and the constitution.
DOROMAL filed a motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan since there was no preliminary
investigation. And, the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess
any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the DOROMAL after he became a PCGG
Commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether a document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a
PCGG Commissioner is necessary to show participation.
HELD: No, because he has indirect interest in the family corporation.
The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of the accused as part of the application to bid is
not a sine qua non" for he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is
absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution because DITC remained a family
corporation in which accused has at least an indirect interest.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION GRANTED FOR OTHER GROUNDS:
NO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND PERIOD SUSPENSION EXCEEDED WHAT IS
ALLOWED BY LAW.
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
FLORES ET. AL.; TAXPAYER'S SUIT; assailed the CONSTITUTIONALITY of R.A. No. 7227,
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992:
Sec. 13, par. (d): (d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager
as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who
shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
There are no other persons nominated for the same posts.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: The SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Secretary,
where the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in
Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required
by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
ISSUE: Whether Respondent Mayor is prohibited from holding the SBMA posts.
HELD: Respondent Mayor is PROHIBITED, the office is de facto and NOT EX OFFICIO. Sec.
13, par. (d) of R.A. No. 7227 is UNCONSTITIONAL.
R.A. No. 7227: The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative
intent to make the subject positions as ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
"appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Mayor is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
Citing Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Secretary, any and all per diems, allowances and other
emoluments which may have been received by respondent Mayor pursuant to his appointment may be
retained by him.
PETITION PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004
BITONIO was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.
BITONIO represent the Secretary of Labor as a member of Board of Directors to the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
BITONIO was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to
1997.
COA disallowed the payment of per diems to BITONIO pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling in
Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Secretary.
BITONIO'S ARGUMENT: the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union
vs. Exec. Secretary which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their
Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary
and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether COA correctly disallowed BITONIO's per diems.
HELD: COA is CORRECT. The BITONIOs presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue
of his capacity as REPRESENTATIVE of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition
likewise applies to BITONIO who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme
Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board
to have a better right as his principal.
PETITIONED DISMISSED.
Public Interest Group v. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and took his oath of office and during his tenure Elma was appointed Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) and took his oath of office but he waived any remuneration that he
may receive as CPLC. The two appointments then were separate. Petitioners now question these
concurrent appointments for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the said concurrent appointments are sanctioned by the Constitution.
RULING: NO. Although the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary respondent Elma, could not be appointed concurrently to the
offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-
officio capacity (there was separate appointments), and the primary functions of one office do not require
an appointment to the other post (PCGG Chairman- involves recovery of ill-gotten wealth versus PCLL-
review and/or drafting of legal orders referred by the President). Moreover, even if the appointments in
question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still
prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the
incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC
(respondent Elma as PCLL will be required to give his legal opinion and review his own actions as
PCGG Chairman).
Prohibition against holding another Office of Employment
Fune v. Ermita -612 SCRA 308 [2010]
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Bautista was
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department.
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary.
Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants to hold any other office or employment.

Petitioner points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does
not apply to those positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not
ex-officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary, as can be gleaned from the provisions of its charter.

Petitioner further contends that even if Bautistas appointment or designation as OIC of
MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing
constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in Achacoso v. Macaraig. Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions thereto. And since a
temporary designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. In effect, the
temporary appointment/designation can effectively circumvent the prohibition.

Issue: Whether the positions held by Bautista are incompatible.
Ruling:
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not
receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that
her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her
office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Enrique U. Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, GR 15655657, 04 December
2011 (reiterate CLU)
FACTS: RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001/EPIRA) was enacted with the goal of
restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation
(NPC). The DOE Secretary promulgated the IRR. Then a resolution was promulgated by the National
Power Board of Directors (NPB created under the EPIRA). All these led to the termination of the
employees of NPC with separation benefits. Petitioner, one of the terminated employees, now argues that
some sections of the EPIRA are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in that members of the Cabinet are designated to the NPB.
ISSUE: WON, the EPIRA provisions in question are unconstitutional: NO!
RULING: Reiterate CLU (Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec.): The prohibition does not apply to posts
occupied by the Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. These are just
designations of additional functions and duties.

Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved
appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.
Section 14-15. Appointment by Acting President
Temporary Appointment
Atty. Elias Omar Sana v. Career Executive Service Board, GR 192296, 15 November 2011
FACTS: PGMA issued EO 883 granting the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) III or
higher to officers and employees who are lawyers in legal departments and those who finished graduate
programs or masters degree during the constitutional ban on midnight appointment. The CESB
recommended 13 officials including three members of the CESB who signed CESB Resolution No. 870.
This was approved by PGMA. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of EO 883 as it is violative
of the said ban. Later EO 3 of Pres. Nonoy revoked EO 883 and Reso 870.
ISSUE: WON, there is violation of Section 15, Article VIII: MOOT!
RULING: There is no existing jurisprudence regarding the issue.

The issue is moot because of EO 3 and the exceptions to decide moot cases is not extant. The question
whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official amounts to an appointment for
purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds no
certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the appointments-ban
period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
Section 14. Appointments of Acting President
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15. Prohibited Appointments
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
FACTS: During the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the,
Constitution (appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election=for buying
votes AND "midnight" appointments=for partisan consideration), two judges of two RTCs were
appointed by the President on March 30, 1998. The President justified the appointment in view of
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. Said appointments are being questioned.
ISSUE: Whether Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution will not lie against Section 15,
Article VII of the same Constitution.
RULING: YES. Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution as general provisions are subject
to the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution as a particular provision. The
exception (except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety) under Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution will
not not also lie. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest,
there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for
the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban the prevention of vote-buying and
similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of
some cases (the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases).
De la Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de
Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of
the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees on the allegation that their appointments
were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition in Article VII, Sect. 15 applies to appointments made by local officials.
RULING: NO. It only applies to the appointments made by the President or Acting President or
presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010 and May 1, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Petitioners commenced special civil actions for
certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list
of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice based on Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, Constitution and that the prohibition on appointment by the President under
Section 15, Article VII, Constitution is not applicable. The Supreme Court ruled on March 17, 2010 in
favor of the petitioners. Hence, this is a MR.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition on Presidential appointment under Section 15, Article VII, Constitution
is not applicable to the presidential appointment to the Judiciary.
RULING: YES. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. Moreover, the
usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall establishes a definite mandate to the President.
Although Valenzuela case came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot
be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Stare decisis means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of
imperative authority unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority.

Ban on presidential appointment does not apply to judiciary

Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927
FACTS: Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Then the Governor-General issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President
and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the
Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of
state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House
Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton
Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. This election is now being contested.
ISSUE: Whether the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members
of NCC.
RULING: NO. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially
executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To
extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to
appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however
notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within
the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999
FACTS: Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit were competing for the vacant position in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Although, Bermudez (the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor) was a recommendee of then
Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Quiaoit was appointed by President Ramos to the said vacancy.
Bermudez now challenge the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that his appointment lacks
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987.
ISSUE: Whether the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides the phrase: upon the
recommendation of the Secretary means that recommendation of the DOJ Secretary is indispensable on
whom to appoint.
RULING: NO. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to
his judgment. Moreover, the President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well
disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of
discretionary authority. Hence, the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary is a mere advise,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
upon the party to whom it is made.
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Under said
provision, for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.

Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under the following
constitutional and statutory provision: Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts.
Issue: Whether or not there is a legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
Ruling: When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same
time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred
on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the
appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when
the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the
power of appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, theproviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible,i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom
to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all
and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 1260, 1989
Facts: On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on December
22, 1988.

The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting
for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA. Bautista refused to be placed under
CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.
s
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive
office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post.
Issue: Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
Ruling: The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the
Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16,
Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA,
several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are
to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of
CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of
CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day
she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 1987
Facts: In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Ruling: It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to
the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that
sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could
take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. suspended the oath taking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the
Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Sectoral Representatives needs to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, section 5, art. Vi may be filled
by appointment by the president by express provision of section 7, art. Xviii of the constitution, it is
indubitable that sectoral representatives to the house of representatives are among the other officers
whose appointments are vested in the president in this constitution, referred to in the first sentence of
section 16, art. Vii whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the commission on appointments.
Deles' appointment was made pursuant to art. Vii, section 16, p.2 which gives the president the power to
make appointments during the recess of the congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the commission on appointments or until the
next adjournment of the congress. The records show that deles appointment was made on april 6, 1988
or while congress was in recess; hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of section 16, art. Vii in the
appointment extended to her.
Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, 1992
Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442)
was approved. It provides in Section 13, The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and
other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the
NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the
appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.

Thus, petitioner Peter Calderon files a petition for the prohibition because, he insists that in the case at
bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents chairman and members of the
National Labor Relations Commision (NLRC)a without submitting them to the CA for
confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of such appointments. He further contends that in Section 16, Art VII, of the Constitution,
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission of Appointments of the officers
appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of the Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code
transgresses (goes beyond the limits; violates) Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments by the President to government offices.
Ruling: No. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in
Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman
and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the
extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:

1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.
Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local
Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Pertinent provisions of the
said Act read:
The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior
officers down to the rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments:

Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued
by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police
who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.
Impleaded in the case is the former Secretary of Budget and Management Salvador M. Enriquez III, who
approved and effected the disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of subject police officers.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Ruling: It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Facts: on March 22,2001 Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years
and all expiring on February 2, 2008, However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments. On June 1, 2001, September 6, 2001 they were again reappointed and took their oaths
of office for the second and third time.
Issue: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption
of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution;
Held: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Appointments disapproved by the Congress cannot be renewed due to violation of Section1(2), Article IX
of the constitution, but an appointee who was by-passed or not acted upon absent the decision of the
Commission of Appointments disapproval the President is free to renew such appointment.
Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13
Facts: on June 25, 1966 Pres. Marcos issued E.O. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines
(CCP), on October 5, 1972 PD 15 was issued making CCP a non-municipal corp. On Dec. 22, 1998
Pres. Estrada appointed seven new trustees in the CCP replacing Endriga and the others whose term
ends on July 26, 1999. They are now alleging that section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies may only
be field up by the Majority vote of the trustees, even if there is only one member left and only when
the entire board is vacant where the President may be able to fill up the vacancies.
Issue: W/N the president has the Power to replace the board of trustees of the CCP
Held: Yes, The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments
constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Every government office, entity, or agency
must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the
independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise,
such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP
does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit.
Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under
the Office of the President. The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's
control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the
"President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the
President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts: while Congress was in session President Arroyo appointed acting Secretaries in different agencies,
Eventually when the congress went on recess the President thru Executive Secretary Ermita issued ad
interim appointments to the same people for their respective agencies. Petitioners senators filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued. They assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
Issue: whether the President needs approval of the Commission on Appointments for appointing acting
secretaries.
Held: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere
with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of
its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:

xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is
confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the
Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an
agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Facts: on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. Since allowing the incumbent
public officials to extend their term is in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. And since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
The president then appointed OICs to take over the local government in an interim manner.
Issue: W/N the president may appoint OICs for the ARMM
Held: Yes. the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the third group that the President is allowed to appoint are
those whom the President may be authorized by law; as the Presidents authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153. And what RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This power
is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. hence the appointment of the
OICs is not violative of the constitution.

Section 17. Power of Control
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967
Facts: Jose Pao and petitioner are both applying for purchase of an agricultural land recently released
by the government, the director of lands ruled in favor of the petitioner to be the rightful purchaser of the
property. Upon denial of the appeal of the respondent, the secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources awarded the land to the petitioner. Upon appeal to the President the Executive Secretary Juan
Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of
Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would
be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that
the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao,
with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to
actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying
this portion." It may be well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the
Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.
Issue: W/N the president may alter decision of the secretary of Agriculture and natural resources.
Held: yes, The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power
to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness
of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control
simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr 197 SCRA 771
FACTS: The National Power Corporation was created by CA 120. In 1949, it was given tax exemption by
RA 358. NPC was further strengthened by RA 6395 in 1971. In 1984, PD 1931 was passed removing the
tax exemption of NPC and other GOCCs. There was a reservation, however, that the president or the
Minister of Finance upon recommendation by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board may restore or modify
the exemption. In 1985, the tax exemption was revived. It was again removed in 1987 by virtue of EO 93
w/c again provided that upon FIRB recommendation it can again be restored. In the same year, FIRB
resolved to restore the exemption. The same was approved by Cory through exec sec Macaraig acting
as her alter ego. Maceda opined the FIRB resolution averring that the power granted to the FIRB is
an undue delegation of legislative power. His claim was strengthened by Opinion 77 issued by DOJ
Secretary Ordoez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Opinion 77 can be given credence.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is no undue delegation of legislative power. First of all, since the NPC is a
GOCC and is non-profit it can be exempt from taxation. Also, Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Sec Ordoez
was overruled by Macaraig. This action by Macaraig is valid because the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute
given by a department secretary pursuant to the presidents control power.
Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976
Facts: Roque and Facun had occupied the same parcel of land. The District Land Officer ordered the
land to be awarded to Roque but the Director of Lands later reversed the order in favor of Facun.
The reason behind the reversal was that the assigned Public Land Inspector reported that Facun filed the
needed documents in 1939 before Roque while the latter submitted his sales application in 1948.
Furthermore, the lower court found that the District Land Officers order is not final and executory. The
Assistant Executive Secretary, as authorize by the Chief Executive, also approved the Director of
Lands reversal and thus, reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Roque objected to the order of the Director of Lands, claiming that it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion for carelessly relying on the report and recommendation of a Public Land Inspector
and such reversal violates Land Administrative Order No. 6. He also asserted that the Assistant
Executive Secretary cannot reverse the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources decision.
Issue: Can the Assistant Executive Secretary, as authorized by the Chief Executive, reverse the decision
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the approval of the Director of Lands order?
Ruling: Yes. This is an exercise of a qualified political agent. The Assistant Executive Secretary can
do so in behalf of the Chief Executive who has the right to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in place of such officers. This is an exercise of Assistant Executive
Secretary as an agent of the Chief Executive; hence the exercise of his official duty is also the action of
the Chief Executive or in this case the Prime Minister as stated in the Art. IX of the 1973 Constitution;

Section 11. The Prime Minister shall have control of all ministries.
Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619, 1963
Facts: An administrative action is filed against Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco. President
Ramon Magsaysay immediately formed an investigative committee and eventually he received the report
recommending that Ang-Angco will be suspended without pay. After the suspension, Secretary
Hernandez reinstated Ang-Angco to his office but the administrative action against him remained
pending until the death of Magsaysay on March 17 1957. In 1960 February 12, Executive Secretary
Nolan Castillo, by the authority of President Carlos Garcia, rendered a decision on the
administrative action finding Ang-Angco guilty and hence, he was removed from office. Ang-
Angco, as a civil servant, contended that the Executive Secretary violated due process of law since the
Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals must preside over the case.
Executive Secretary Castillo argued that he is doing his duty in behalf of the President who has the power
of direct action in administrative cases involving executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Issue: Can the Executive Secretary, by the authority of the President, directly decide on an administrative
case and remove a civil servant without violation his rights?
Ruling: No. The President can set aside and substitute the judgment but not directly decide
administrative cases and that the removal is done according to due process. Art. VII Sec. 10 of the
1935 Constitution states that

1. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise
general provision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.

Such control involved modifying or reversing an officers judgment or action provided that there is
already a judgment or action. Furthermore, the President cannot arbitrarily remove anyone from office
without due process since he must take care that the laws be faithfully executed as may be provided by
law. In the above-mentioned facts, arbitrarily removing a civil servant violates Art. XII of the 1935
Constitution stating that

Section 4. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.

Therefore, the Executive Secretary, even authorized by the President, cannot provide decisions when it is
absent and remove the civil servant.
NAMARCO v. Arca 29 SCRA 648, 1969
Facts: Private respondent Juan T. Arive was the Manager of the Traffic Storage Department
of the NAMARCO. He was found guilty for violating an office memorandum and was
ordered dismissed from service by a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAMARCO.
Arive filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Then, Arive appealed
from the decision of the NAMARCO to the Office of the President. After getting the records of
the case, then Executive Secretary Ramon A. Diaz, acting for the President, handed down a
decision setting aside the resolution of NAMARCO dismissing Arive, reinstating Juan T. Arive to
his former position. The General Manager of NAMARCO, in a letter addressed to the President,
asked for a reconsideration of the decision ordering Arives reinstatement and contended that the
Office of the President had no jurisdiction to review any decision of the NAMARCO Board
removing, suspending, or otherwise disciplining any of it subordinate employees, because the
NAMARCO charter does not provide for an appeal to any governmental body.
Issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the authority to reverse the decision of
the Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive.
Ruling: The Court held that the Presidents authority t o review and reverse the decision of the
NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to
order his reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of the President over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our governmental set up, corporations
owned or controlled by the government partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices
shall be responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions shall be
exercised. Petition dismissed.
Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135, 1994
Facts: Then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon had on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void
for non compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City
of Manila, the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. The
court also declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because its
vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provisions therein conferring
on the President only the power of supervision over local governments. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowers the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them?
Ruling: The Court reversed the decision of the lower court. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance, and if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with
his own version of what the Code should be.
Joson v. Torres 290 SCRA 279, 1998
Facts: Private respondents, the Vice Governor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija, filed with the Office of the President a letter of complaint
charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged
that while they were at the session hall, petitioner barged in the hall, and angrily kicked the
door and chairs in the hall and uttered threatening words at them and that several armed men
were behind the petitioner. This incident was an offshoot of the resistance of the Sanggunian to a
pending legislative measure regarding the loan application of the provincial government.
Upon receipt of the complaint, then President Ramos instructed then Secretary of Interior and
Local Government Robert Barbers to take the necessary action. On recommendation of
Secretary Barbers, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the
President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior and Local Government performed a function that
is vested in the President.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the power of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government to
investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. This doctrine is
corollary to the control power of the President.
Dadole v. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002
Facts: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision and resolution, dated
September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the monthly additional
allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City.
Issue:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the President?
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that:
2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local
Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government
officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of
honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in
municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions:
a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;
b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the
implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget;
c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A.
7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and
d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in
accordance with R.A. 7160.
3
" (italics supplied)
Ruling: We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. By constitutional fiat, local government units are
subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units.
Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of
local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations.
DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003
Facts: This case started when Regional Executive Director of the DENR for Region XII, Israel C.
Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices
from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. This Memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H.
Cerilles, which provided for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units
in the Regional and Field Offices.
Issue: WON the Regional Executive Director of the DENR in compliance with order of the DENR
secretary to transfer offices is valid
Ruling: Yes. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize
the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR
by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The action of the Secretary of the DENR exercising the Presidents power to reorganize is
presumed to be the action of the President.
Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
Facts: Petitioner Ruben Villaluz was appointed as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. Later
on Congressman Roces sent a letter to the President informing the latter about the inefficiency of
petitioner and recommended that the petitioner be replaced. The Executive Secretary then
suspended petitioner and a investigating committee was formed to obviously investigate the alleged
irregular acts of petitioner. The result of the investigation led the President to issue an admin order which
removed petitioner from office. Petitioner then sought for a reconsideration and when it was denied he
elevated this case directly before the SC. Petitioner contends among other things that the President has
no jurisdiction to remove him (It may sound weird but this is really what the petitioner raised as one of
his defenses).
Issue: WON the President has the power to remove petitioner
Ruling: Yes, because the petitioner is a presidential appointee and since the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint then petitioners removal is justified.

power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers
and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not
belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.
Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
FACTS: President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate
from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control include the power to organize executive offices
HELD: It has been held, moreover that the express grant of the power of control to the President justifies
an executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive action to carry out the reorganization
of an executive office under a broad authority of law. Reorganization can involve the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or even abolition of positions by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions.

Clearly, EO 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not
seize any legislative prerogative in issuing EO 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional
power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative
Code, recognized by other statutes and consistently affirmed by this court.
Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) filed
a complaint seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of
Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing EO no. 102.

The President issued EO No. 102 in pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, and RA No. 8522, also
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. EO 102 provided for structural changes and
redirected the functions and operations of the DOH. All personnel are hereby directed to report to
their new assignments on the said date pending processing of new appointments, required
clearances and other pertinent documents. All heads of offices or units in DOH are hereby directed to
facilitate in the implementation of EO 102 to include among others that transfer or movement or
personnel, properties, records and documents to appropriate office or unit and device other
necessary means to minimize disruption of office functions and delivery of health services.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has authority under Section 17, Article 7 of the Constitution to
effect a reorganization of a department under the executive branch.
RULING: The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of
Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control
under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Reorganization can involve the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices or even abolition
of positions by reason of economy or redundancy of function. While the power to abolish an office is
generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive
branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under the present laws. It has been held,
moreover, that the express grant of the power of control to the president justifies an executive action to
carry out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.
Orosa v. Roa, GR No. 14047, July 14, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Orosa filed a libel case against respondent Roa for defamation for his honor and
reputation, which stemmed from an article entitled Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa
written by Roa. In gist, the article delved on the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner
in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the
examinations or results thereof to enable his children to top at the same.

Respondent Roa denied the accusation and claimed that the article constitutes a fair and accurate report
on a matter of both public and social concern. The case filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
Pasig City Prosecutors Office. This led petitioner to appeal the case before the Department of Justice
and in acting on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor Zunio issued a resolution setting aside the findings of
dismissal of the Pasig city prosecutor and directing the latter to file an information for libel against
respondent. On the other hand, the respondent appealed this before the Secretary of Justice who then
reversed the resolution issued by Chief State Prosecutor Zunio and ordered the withdrawal of the
libel case against respondent. This led the petitioner to raise the issue before the CA which dismissed it
because the CA said that the DOJ is not one of those stated agencies in sec 1 rule 43 (rules on civil
procedure) which the CA can review.
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the Sec of Justice can be reviewed by the CA
RULING: The Sec of Justice is under the President. The power of review the order of the Sec of Justice
is lodged in the President. Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be
precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the
Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be
premature and precipitate;
7
subject to defined exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack
of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies. Notably, Section 1, supra,
of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the
fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before
any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
Phillips Seafood v. BOI, GR No. 175787, February 4, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
export of processed crabmeat and other seafood shit. They were registered with respondent Bureau of
Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion producer of soft shell crabs and other seafood products. It
was granted an Income Tax Holiday (ITH) for being located in a less-developed area in accordance with
Article 40 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as The Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.
However, when the Corporation transferred its plant location, BOI informed petitioner that, the
ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the period before petitioners transfer to a "not less-
developed area." Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its decision, but this
was denied by the same. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the President, which dismissed
petitioners appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and now before this Court,
questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the President. The petitioner argued that the
executive power of control over the acts of officials under the Office of the President is superior to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and that the review
by the Office of the President of the decisions of respondent BOI must be allowed; otherwise, the
Presidents constitutional power to review the decisions of department secretaries will be rendered
illusory if said decisions may be reviewed only by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the President, as Chief Executive, has the jurisdiction to decide upon the plaintiffs case?
Ruling: No, he does not. The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid
down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which has been defined as the "power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." Such "executive control" is
not absolute.
In the instant case, the denial of petitioners application for an ITH is not within the cases
where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the Office of the President such as in the
decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant provisions of
E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered enterprises or investors and government agencies, and
applications for registration under the investment priorities plan. That being the case, petitioner should
have elevated its appeal to the Court of Appeals according to Art. 50 of EO NO. 226.
The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding
degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions.

All the more in the matter of
appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject
to the Supreme Courts rule-making power.
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010
This contains two (2) consolidated petitions:
1. G.R. No. 192935 is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo)
assailing the unconstitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1; and
2. G.R. No. 193036 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr., in their
capacity as members of the House of Representatives, similarly bewailing the unconstitutionality
of E.O. No. 1.
On May 10, 2010, Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III was elected President of the Philippines. He issued
Executive Order NO. 1 that created the Philippine Truth Commission which provides that the
Commission:
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the
full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of
the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to
petitioner, such power cannot be presumed. Furthermore, they allege that the creation of a public office
lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government
On the other hand, the OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the
creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. It argues that the authority of
the President to create public offices has long been recognized. Accordingly, the Executive, just like the
other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to
assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions. This power, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President
under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue: Was the President justified to issue EO NO. 1 that created the Philippine Truth Commission that is
empowered to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration?
Ruling: Yes, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section
17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the
PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action.
However, EO NO. 1 was struck down because it was contrary to the equal protection of rights
clause.
Power of Control
Phillips v. BOI 578 SCRA 69 [2010]
FACTS: Petitioner Phillips Seafood Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the export of
processed crabmeat and other seafood products registered with the BOI. It was granted an Income Tax
Holiday (ITH) for six (6) years for operating in a less-developed area (Masbate). However, it transferred
to Roxas City. It filed applications for ITH with BOI but it was denied since its transfer to a not less-
developed area revoked its ITH. It appealed to the Office of the President but was dismissed due to lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner went to the CA questioning the dismissal arguing that the executive power of
control over the acts of officials under the Office of the President is superior to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals over decisions of quasi-judicial agencies under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUE: WON, Section 17, Article VII was violated: NO!
RULING: Article 82 of E.O. No. 226 creating the BOI is the catch-all provision allowing the appeal to
the courts from all other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O.
Under A.O. No. 18 a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal,
in this case EO 226.

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The power of control has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. Such executive control is not absolute. The definition of the structure of
the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and
supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the
Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the
instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rule-making
power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure
in all courts.
Angeles v. Gaite 605 SCRA 409 [2009]
FACTS: Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece (Maria Mercedes) and she also voluntarily
supported the latters half-brother (Michael) with whom petitioner later on had a falling out. Michael
then took Maria away from petitioner. Petitioner filed a case for child abuse against Michael. The
Investigating Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information although not all of the
accusations, this was denied by the Provincial Prosecutor. Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
acting for the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. MR was denied by DOJ
Secretary. Petition for Review before the Office of President was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration was denied anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a
petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of
Memorandum Circular No. 58 because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows
upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
ISSUE: WON, MC No. 58 is valid: YES!
RULING: The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long
been established in our jurisdiction.

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution (his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy) or law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
Boy Scout of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, GR 177131, 07 June 2011
FACTS: COA issued a resolution subjecting BSP under its audit jurisdiction pursuant to BSP v. NLRC
declaring BSP as a government-controlled corporation and regarded as a government instrumentality
under the 1987 Administrative Code. BSP now assails the COA resolution contending that Boy Scouts of
the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission is not applicable anymore because the aspect of
government ownership and control has been removed by Republic Act No. 7278.
ISSUE: WON, BSP is subject to COA jurisdiction: YES!
RULING: As an attached agency, the BSP enjoys operational autonomy, as long as policy and program
coordination is achieved by having at least one representative of government in its governing board,
which in the case of the BSP is the DECS Secretary. In this sense, the BSP is not under government
control or supervision and control. Still this characteristic does not make the attached chartered
agency a private corporation.

As presently constituted, the BSP still remains an instrumentality of the national government. It is a
public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the DECS pursuant to its Charter
and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or
controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law.
Section 18. Presidents Powers as Commander in Chief
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
Facts: While the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting for the presentation of its
candidates for the general elections, two hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight persons were killed and many
more injured. This was one of the numerous instances, presented later to the court, that posed danger in
public safety by the New People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
After careful evaluation of the information received by him, then President Marcos issued a
Presidential Proclamation NO. 889 that provides there has been and there is actually a state of
rebellion and that public safety which requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the
State. Furthermore, it proclaims that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended for the
persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes
of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes.
The Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were made by herein petitioners for warrantless arrests
and unlawful detention. Later, they made a cause of action questioning the validity of the Proclamation.
Issues:
1. Is Presidential Proclamation No. 889 suspending the writ of habeas corpus to maintain and secure
public safety in a state of rebellion valid?
2. Is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus subject to judicial review?
Ruling: I.Yes, it is. Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. For the suspension of the privilege of
the writ to be valid: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must
require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that
both conditions are present-making it a valid proclamation.

II. Yes, it is. The authority to determine whether or not the President has acted within the sphere allotted
to him by the Constitution is vested in the Judicial Department which is constitutionally supreme.In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the
power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to,
or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary
appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority
to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact
made in said decisions.
Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590
FACT: SGeb. Fabian Ver ordered various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force
Makabansa, to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in MM. The TFM raided some
places using defective warrants; they seized personal belongings of petitioners; they had been
interrogated in violation of their right to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and
intimidated. Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations of their constitutional rights. A
motion to dismiss was filed by defendants on claiming that plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inqui ry into the ci rcumstances of t heir detention i n the guise of a damage suit because
as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Issue: (with regard to Section 18) Whether the suspension of habeas corpus exercised within the power of
the President as Commander in chief bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitution.
Held: NO. CONSTITUTION IS STILL OPERATIVE.
There is no merit in respondents suggestion that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Moreover, their rights
and cause of action for damages are even explicitly recognized in PD 1755 (re: right of action for injury
arising from acts of public officer connected to Martial Law).
IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issue: (with regard to Section 18) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. NO
Held: Petition is DISMISSED as being without merit. The President has full discretion to call out the
military. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the President to
decide. He has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and in mass destruction
of property. The Court cannot overrule the Presidents wisdom; it can only determine whether or not he
has committed any abuse of discretion. Petitioner also has failed to show that the exercise of that
discretion was gravely abused.
Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10, 2001
Facts: On May 1, 2001, Malacaang was assaulted by a violent mob armed with explosives, firearms,
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons. President Arroyo immediately issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. The AFP and PNP were
ordered to suppress the rebellion through General Order no. 1. Thereby, warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters were affected. The state of rebellion was lifted on May 6, 2001. For fear of
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant, the petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue: (with regard to Section 18) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No.1 are
constitutional.
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the
power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion,
none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII.
Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10, 2001
Facts: On May 1, 2001, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued a Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there
was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region because of the fact that she was faced by an "angry
and violent mob armed with explosives, firearm, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly
weapons". She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in
the NCR. Warrantless arrest of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter
effected. The petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus with an urgent
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary investigation for
fear of imminent danger of being arrested without warrant. The petitioners assails the declaration of a
state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue hereof, as having
no basis both in fact and in law. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1 are constitutional. YES
Ruling: Yes, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that "the President shall be the
Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the phil. and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

The Constitution does not expressly prohibit the declaration of state of rebellion. President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners herein have supported their claim
that the President acted without factual basis.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Facts: Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the Philippines staged a
mutiny storming the Oakwood Premiers apartments in Makati City on July 27, 2003. In lieu of the said
mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and Gen. Order No.4, both declaring a state of
rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After negotiations with the soldiers to return to
their barracks, the President lifted the state of rebellion five days later. Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, in relation to Sec.18, Art.VII of the constitution claims that the
declaration of state of rebellion does not require the President to call the armed forces.
Issue: (with regard to Section 18) Whether a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out the
armed forces.
Held: Petition is Dismissed. NO. PRESIDENT DOES NOT NEED TO DECLARE STATE OF
REBELLION TO CALL OUT POWER. WHENEVER HE DEEMS IT NECESSARY, HE MAY CALL
OUT POWER. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to declare a
state of rebellion. Section 18, Art VII of the constitution indicates ...whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The
conditions Actual invasion or rebellion and Exercise of said power required ensuring public safety
must be present for the President to exercise the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare
martial law. However, it is not required in the calling out powers of the President.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 2006
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for
the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the
defections in the military; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she
issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards for the AFP and the PNP to suppress and
prevent of acts of lawless.
Immediately thereafter, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration and revoked permits to hold
rallies. Undeterred, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno and National Federation of
Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno, marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at EDSA
shrine. During the dispersal of the rallyists, police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist, and his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 are valid exercises of the Presidents
Powers as Commander in Chief.
HELD: YES. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the
AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
David v. Ermita, GR No. 171409, May 3, 2006
Facts: On February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency, and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5) setting the standards for the AFP and the PNP to suppress and prevent of acts of lawless.
Petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act
of raiding the Daily Tribuneoffices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also
claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
The next day, At around 12:20 in the early morning, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-
ups of the Saturday issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the calling-out power of the president include warrantless search and seizure.
HELD: NO. It does not authorize warrantless arrests. The president cannot validly order the taking
over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from
Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can
declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must
be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, April 15, 2006
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a
public hearing before the Senate Committee on Natito Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the
hearing due to a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless directed other officers from the
AFP who were invited to attend the hearing.
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator
that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the
hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified as to the conduct
of the 2004 elections.
On the very day of the hearing, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464,
enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her approval.
In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be
charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to
Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline.
Issue: Whether the president has control over the military.
Held: YES. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article
VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines xxx. Since the President is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces
she can demand obedience from the military officers. Military officers who disobey or ignore her
command can be subjected to court martial proceeding. The President as Commander in Chief may
prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry. A military officer who
disobeys the Presidents directive may be made to answer before a court martial.
Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228
Facts: The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then
President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,

placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the President's emergency powers.
Issue: Whether the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the President's emergency powers.
HELD: NO. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire
into the factual bases for the President's exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,

it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President's judgment.
Commander-in-Chief
Ampatuan v. DILG Sec, GR 190259, June 7, 2011 (A6, Sec 23(2)
Maguindanao Massacre.
Pres Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency."
Deployed AFP and PNP personnel.
Administrative Order No. 273-A: Pres Arroyo delegates supervision of ARMM to the DILG.
Ampatuan and others REASONED: President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no
critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers.
Solicitor General REASONED: President issued the Proc. 1946 pursuant to her "calling out"
power as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
ISSUE: Whether Proc. 1946 and A.O. No. 273-A are Constitutional.
HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, but
it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora: The Constitution entrusts to the President
the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence. EXCEPTION, grave abuse of discretion.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Deployment of AFP and PNP personnel is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood
under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency.
She did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave
to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans have armed supporters holding various elective positions
throughout ARMM.
Retaliatory movements and attacks of supporters are reported.

PETITION for PROHIBITION under Rule 65 DISMISSED.

Fortun v. Arroyo. GR 190293, 20 March 2012
Maguindanao Massacre.
See Ampatuan vs. Secretary of Interior and Local Government for Facts.
December 4, 2009: President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified
areas of the MILF.
December 6, 2009: President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
December 9, 2009: Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action.
HOWEVER, on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao.
ISSUE: Whether Proc. No. 1959 is constitutional.
HELD: MOOT and ACADEMIC.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented.
Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.
No petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; The President and the Congress jointly exercises
the power to proclaim martial law and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in
writing to Congress;
Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the
proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems
warranted.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through review of the
President's acts should the Supreme Court step-in as its final rampart.
It is a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the
hands of the Court.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation
or suspension within 24 hours, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the
Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can
annul the proclamation or the suspension.
If the 30 days given to the Court by the Constitution proves inadequate, the 30-day period
does not operate to divest the Court of its jurisdiction over the case.
DISMISSED; MOOT and ACADEMIC.

J. Carpio's Dissenting Opinion
Not Moot and Academic. Herein case falls under the exceptions.
Proc. 1959 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Lack of factual basis as required in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.
The term "rebellion" in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution has the same
meaning as the crime of "rebellion" defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Constitution did not define rebellion.
Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1959 expressly cites the Revised Penal Code
definition of rebellion.
In exercising the Commander-in-Chief powers under the Constitution, every President must
insure the existence of the elements of the crime of rebellion under the RPC, as amended.
Probable cause of the existence of rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for
a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.
The power of Congress is to revoke not to confirm or ratify, much less to approve, the
Presidents action declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It is a veto power, just as the power of the judiciary to review the Presidents action is
a veto power on the Executives action.
The Presidents power to declare martial law or suspend the writ is independent, separate, and
distinct from any constitutionally mandated act to be performed by either the Legislature or
the Judiciary.
It is neither joint nor sequential with Congress power to revoke the declaration or
suspension or to extend it upon the initiative of the President.
Congress inaction on the declaration or suspension is not determinative of the Courts
exercise of its review power under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
Even if Congress has not acted upon the Presidents declaration or suspension, the
Court may review the declaration or suspension in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen.
To hold that the power of this Court to review the Presidents declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ is sequential, or joint, with the review power of Congress is to make it
impossible for this Court to decide a case challenging the declaration or suspension "within
thirty days from its filing," as mandated by the Constitution.
The Constitution mandates that this Court "must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from [the] filing" of the case. Clearly, the Courts review power is neither
sequential nor joint with the review power of Congress.
Unlike the Court, Congress may not even do anything with the Presidents declaration or suspension and
merely allow it to lapse after 60 days.
Section 19. Executive Clemency
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 PHIL 34
FACTS: Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment. Despite this,
Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and 1937 even served as
municipal president. On August 22, 1938 the Election Code was approved, which had a provision that
disqualifies Santos from voting, having been declared by final judgment guilty of a crime against
property. He was later given an absolute pardon by the President that restored his full civil and
political rights except his right to hold public office was limited only to positions which involved no
money or property responsibility.

Cristobal argued that the pardoning power does not extend to the enjoyment of political rights, for
that would allow the President to encroach on the powers of the legislature, in effect exempting some
people from the effects of the law. Cristobal said the pardoning power of the Executive does not apply to
legislative prohibitions and would amount to an unlawful exercise of the Executive of a legislative
function. The lower court argued that the pardon given Santos excluded him from the disqualification
created by the New Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether the absolute pardon given by the president allows the person pardoned to be a registered
voter.
HELD: YES. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but, removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction
without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after
the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar after it restores the
respondent of full civil and political rights.
Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844, 1991
FACTS: Mariano Ocampo was convicted of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and
imposed a penalty of suspension for 90 days. Ocampo was then granted executive clemency and resumed
office without any notification made to the incumbent vice governor Llamas. Petitioner vice governor
then assails the power of the president to grant executive clemency on administrative cases.
ISSUE: Whether the executive clemency applies to administrative cases.
HELD: YES. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If those already adjudged
guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be
extended the same benefit.
People v. Salle 250 SCRA 581, 1995
Facts: Respondent Mengote and Salle were found guilty by the RTC and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They filed their Notice of Appeal. Salle and Mengote were granted conditional
pardons but they have yet to withdraw their appeal. The OSG maintained that the conditional pardon
granted to respondent is unenforceable in view of the judgment of final conviction having yet to achieve
finality in light of the appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether the conditional pardon is enforceable in view of the appeal
Held: No. The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the limitations on the pardoning power
of the President. Thus:

It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by
the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such
power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is "
final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except
where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation,
thereby waiving his right to appeal. 12 Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has
not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the
appellant.

We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if
one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the
appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his
appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as
the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement.
Drilon v. CA, 202 SCRA 378, 1991
Facts: Private respondents were charged with double murder by Military Commission No. 34. Paredes
was acquitted while Ganzon served his sentence. He actually served 6 years of his sentence then placed
under house arrest. With the changing of the administration, they were both investigated anew to be tried
by the civil courts but the CA ordered its desistance. Ganzon claimed that he was granted absolute pardon
by President Marcos; hence, he can no longer be tried anew.
Issue: Whether Ganzon was actually granted a presidential pardon
Held: Yes. As we indicated, Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a
result of his conviction but was released in 1978 and put under so-called house arrest (although then
President Marcos never apparently carried this out seriously as Ganzon was free apparently, to move in
and out of his residence). The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin developments six-
year service of sentence and subsequent release are significant, since if then President Marcos
ordered Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos, unavoidably
commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years (give or take a few days), although as a condition,
Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court is of the opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had
been commuted, he, Ganzon, has therefore served his sentence and if he has served his sentence
fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases decreed, be made to "complete the
service of [his] sentence."

Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Cha the "pardoning power" of the President (that is,
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures 17) is final and
unappealable 18 so is commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. 19 It
extinguishes criminal liability partially, 20 and has the effe changing the penalty 21 to a lesser one.22

The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a specific form. It
is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 with terms or conditions, except that
he should remain under house arrest.

The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever
"pardon" the former President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he
was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house arrest but as we said, not as a
continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during martial
rule. The question of whether or not he should continue to remain under house arrest is also a moot
question as we noted, 28 and arrests except upon lawful judicial orders are no longer possible.
Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272, 1987
Facts: Petitioner was found guilty of the crime of estafa. He was granted a conditional pardon with the
condition that he will not violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines which he accepted. The Board of
Pardons and Parole informed the President of several pending cases involving the petitioner to which his
conditional pardon was revoked and arrested accordingly.
Issue: Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
Held: No. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of
the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal
law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his
undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes
of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we
here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict
granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by
final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged
to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for
which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted
with a constitutional vice.
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, 1989
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of documents. While her
MR was pending, she was extended an absolute pardon which she accepted. The Finance Ministry
granted her request to be restored to her previous post as assistant city treasurer but declared that it should
not be earlier than the date her absolute pardon was granted and her civil liability should continue.
Petitioner contended that the absolute pardon operated to wipe out her crime. The Office of the President,
thru respondent, declared there be no automatic reinstatement based on the absolute pardon.
Issue: Whether an absolute pardon operates as to entitle a public officer to reinstatement without need of a
new appointment
Held: No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement
with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering
her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should
be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Sabello v. Department of Education, GR No. 87687, December 26, 1989
Facts: Petitioner was a HS principal. The President of the Philippines gave some aid during his campaign
to a barrio, a part of which was allotted for teachers salaries. Petitioners only part was being authorized
to withdraw the fund and deposited the same with the City Treasurers Office in the name of the school. A
case for violation of RA 3019 was filed which convicted petitioner to a one year sentence and
disqualification to hold public office. He was extended an absolute pardon thereby restoring him to full
civil and political rights. He claimed reinstatement but was appointed as a classroom teacher. Petitioner is
financially battered.
Issue: Whether the absolute pardon operates as to merit reappointment
Held: Yes. As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former
position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if
the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the
requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.

In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute disqualification from office or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic
reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.

As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity
dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that
of a mere classroom teacher.
People v. Salle, Jr GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995
-this is just a repetition of the above case.-
Garcia v. COA, 226 SCRA 356, 1993
Facts: Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. Petitioner was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground
of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications for the loss of several telegraph poles.

A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
The trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. Consequently, petitioner
sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. Petitioner's
request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to
the President of the Philippines for executive clemency.

Acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the
Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of
the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency to petitioner.

Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries. This was denied
by the COA on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.
Issue: whether he is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.
Ruling: Yes. The clemency granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive
pardon. Although the very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness.
Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because
the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

However if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and
makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged.
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party
from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. virtual law library

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of
the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages.
Petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his
unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with
have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the
charges against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to
entitle him to back wages.
Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan 19, 1999
Facts: Supreme Court temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. It is the submission of public
respondents that:

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that
sphere of executive authority;

The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an
end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.

Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge
looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial
review.

Public respondent contends that decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." Public respondents
cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of all the members of the Congress.
Issue: Whether or not the Court encroached on the powers of the executive department.
Ruling: No. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts.

The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can
at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of
such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life.
Section 20. Foreign Loans
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall,
within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, October 13, 2005
Facts: the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank
Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on the Financing
Program which respondents characterized as a multi-option financing package. The Program
was scheduled to be executed on 24 July 1992 by respondents in behalf of the Republic. Nonetheless,
petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program respondents had already
implemented its buyback component, the Philippines bought back P1.26 billion of external debts
pursuant to the Program.

Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the countrys foreign creditors
consisting of two debt-relief options. The first option was a cash buyback of portions of the
Philippine foreign debt at a discount. The second option allowed creditors to convert existing
Philippine debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities.

Petitioners object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program as
beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. The
provision states that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic. It is
claimed that the buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither loans nor
guarantees, and hence beyond the power of the President to execute. Even assuming
constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into
these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents.
Issue: Whether the said program is void for being unconstitutional and whether may be exercised only by
the president
Rulings: The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to
contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of
loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. This
Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers
of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a
sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of
judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act.

The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, we note that
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for
Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.

Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to
incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President.
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the
doctrine of qualified political agency.

The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
Section 21. Foreign Relations: Senate Concurrence in International Agreements
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 PHIL 1030, 1959
Facts: The central issue in this case concerns the validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950)
whereby the Phil. Govt. undertook to return to the US Govt. in ten annual installments, a total of
$35 M dollars advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the
Philippines. The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term is used in the Constitution. The agreement
was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. It must be noted that a treaty is not the only form
that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of treaty making power to the Executive and
the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt. over international relations.
Issue: Whether or not Romulo-Snyder Agreement is not valid on the ground that in was not concurred
with the requisite of two-thirds vote of the majority of the members of Congress.
Ruling: Executive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without
the concurrence of the Senate. From the point of view of international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as
the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between an
executive agreement and a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance.

Nature of Executive Agreements:

There are 2 classes:
(1) Agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of
or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements, and

(2) Agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or Congressional-Executive
Agreements. The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for
precisely on Sept. 18, 1946, Congress specifically authorized the President to obtain such
indebtedness w/ the Government of the US, its agencies or instrumentalities. Even assuming,
arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-
Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category. This
2nd category usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of
citizens.
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
Facts: An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a
search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action
Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO
(World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly
recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government and to prohibit respondent judge
from further proceedings in the matter.

Respondents COSAC officers filed justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge
the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner on the ground that they
"contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner and the
only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant."
Petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine
Government and the World Health Organization.

Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal
inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption
from taxation and customs duties.

Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioner Verstuyft has in this Court been joined by the World Health
Organization (WHO) itself in full assertion of petitioner Verstuyft's being entitled "to all privileges and
immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international
law" under section 24 of the Host Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
Ruling: Yes. The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that
petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court
summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked
for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed
free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully
imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The
Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is trrthen the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction."
Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora, 343 SCRA 449, 2000
Facts: In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. The
Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.

On July 18, 1997, the US panel met with the Philippine panel to negotiate possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA stipulated the transfer and management of US military
personnel. President Ramos approved the VFA.

President Estrada, through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA and acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. Such was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members.
Issue: Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by not complying with the conditions provided in Section 25 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling: The Senate acted within the Constitutional mandate. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a)
it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

VFA is clearly a treaty since international agreement is binding as a treaty as provided by
international laws. Moreover, concurrence of the Senate is complied pursuant Section 21 of Article
VII. However, the provision requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. Finally, the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. The names or titles of
international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in
by the Senate.

While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the
instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be
related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more
specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -
thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in
isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 2005
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal
Court which "shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."
1
The
Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.
3
Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
4
Petitioners filed the instant petition to
compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
Ruling: Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate
and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound
under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the
state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the
representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State.
By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of
such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and
ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the
same. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only
to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
20
Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it.
21
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in
its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly,
22
such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
23
The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute
to the Senate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Facts: Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations
involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty,
1
a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and
the United States in 1951. Petitioners argue that the Philippines and the United States signed the Mutual
Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of
each country only in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor. The Solicitor General claims
that there is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant suit, it is
said, is to obtain an interpretation of the VFA. The Solicitor General asks that we accord due deference
to the executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA, considering the
President's monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine
armed forces.
Issue: Whether the Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement.
Ruling: After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the
word .'activities" arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties
a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for
purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques
of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school
houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that .'Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history
and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the V FA support the conclusion that combat-
related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
That is not the end of the matter, though. Granted that "Balikatan 02-1" is permitted under the terms of
the VFA, what may US forces legitimately do in furtherance of their aim to provide advice, assistance and
training in the global effort against terrorism? Differently phrased, may American troops actually engage
in combat in Philippine territory? The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I
stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." In our
considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the V FA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice
to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, GR No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000
Facts: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country." On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution
No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Pending evaluation of
the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1,
1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner denied the
foregoing requests arguing that it finds premature to furnish private respondent with copies of the
extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by
this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the
provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between
the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the
procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence.
Issue: Whether respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition
Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
Ruling: In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of
the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this
decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Facts: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of
the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue: Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
against them.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Baker v.
Carr
39
remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme
Court explained that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
In Taada v. Cuenco,
40
we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."It is quite
apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious
embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to
be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible
where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials. x x x
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Facts: This petition
1
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify
the Non-Surrender Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and
the United States of America (USA). Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No.
BFO-028-03
7
dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note
adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to
protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
8
It is reflective of the increasing
pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003,
similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries. In
response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law,
the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate. In this proceeding, petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that
it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence,
contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.
Ruling: Senate Concurrence Not Required. Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation."
32
International agreements may be in the form of (1)
treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that
are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal
and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. Petitioner parlays the notion that
the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate. The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international
agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the
propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of
international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties
intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective
interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of
the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement
each labor under the pacta sunt servanda
42
principle.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No costs.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis
of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time.