Asian Democracy Review Volume 2 (2013)

Asian
Democracy
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VOLUME 2 2013
VOLUME 2 2013
Asian Democracy Review

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1 Editors Note
Perlita M. Frago-Marasigan
ARTICLE
5 Democracy of the Desired: Everyday Politics
and Political Aspiration in the Contemporary Thai Countryside
Jakkrit Sangkhamanee
COUNTRY REPORTS
39 Democracy in South Korea, 2012
Junghoon Kim, Hyungchul Kim, Seoungwon Lee, Yooseok Oh,
Dongchoon Kim, Youngpyo Seo, Sangchul Yoon, Kyunghee Choi,
Hyunyun Cho, Heeyeon Cho
61 Asian Democracy Index 2012 Indonesia:
Liberalization Minus Equality
Anton Pradjasto, Anna Margret, Dirga Ardiansa,
Christina Dwi Susanti, Irwansyah, Inggrid Silitonga, Mia Novitasari,
Sri Budi Eko Wardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, Yolanda Panjaitan
81 The Asian Democracy Index for Malaysia 2012: Authoritarian
and Ineffectual Government despite Formal Democratic Institutions
Andrew Aeria, Tan Seng Keat
123 Regressing, Stagnant, or Progressing?
The 2012 Asian Democracy Index in the Philippines
Miguel Paolo P. Reyes, Clarinda Lusterio Berja,
Erika M. Rey-Saturay
RESEARCH NOTE
159 Methodological Achievements and Limits
of the Asian Democracy Index
Clarinda Lusterio Berja
Asian
Democracy
EDITORIAL BOARD
Melinda Quintos de Jesus (Executive Director, Center for Media Freedom and
Responsibility) Zanaa Jurmed (Chief Executive Officer, Citizens Alliance Fund)
Prajak Kongkirati (Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Thammasat University)
Seong-Hoon Anselmo Lee (Executive Director, Korea Human Rights Foundation,
Asia Democracy Network) Firoze Manji (Head, Council for the Development of Social
Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Documentation and Information Centre)
Ahmad Mohiuddin (Community Development Library, Bangladesh) Massaki
Ohashi (Professor, Keisen University and Chairperson, Japan NGO Center for International
Cooperation) Sushil Phakurel (Chairperson, Alliance for Social Dialogue)
Mohammad Sabur (Secretary General, Asia Resource Foundation) Ichal Supriadi
(Executive Director, Asian Network for Free Elections) Lawrence Surendra (Senior
Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research)
EDITORS
Heeyeon Cho
Andrew Aeria
MANAGING EDITORS
Kwangkun Lee
Miguel Paolo P. Reyes
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS
Joshua Hans B. Baquiran
Gumamela Celes C. Bejarin
Asian Democracy Review (ISSN 2244-5633) is the annual peer-reviewed journal of
the Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index, a network of research institutes and
independent researchers working on the development of the Asian Democracy Index. Apart
from the yearly country reports on the conduct of Asian Democracy Index surveys, the journal
publishes scholarly papers on democracy and democratization processes in Asia. This work
was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean
Government (NRF-2011-413-B00009).
Review
1 Editors Note
ARTICLE
5 Democracy of the Desired: Everyday Politics
and Political Aspiration in the Contemporary Thai Countryside
Jakkrit Sangkhamanee
COUNTRY REPORTS
39 Democracy in South Korea, 2012
Junghoon Kim, Hyungchul Kim, Seoungwon Lee, Yooseok Oh,
Dongchoon Kim, Youngpyo Seo, Sangchul Yoon, Kyunghee Choi,
Hyunyun Cho, Heeyeon Cho
61 Asian Democracy Index 2012 Indonesia:
Anton Pradjasto, Anna Margret, Dirga Ardiansa,
Christina Dwi Susanti, Irwansyah, Inggrid Silitonga, Mia Novitasari,
Sri Budi EkoWardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, Yolanda Panjaitan
81 The Asian Democracy Index for Malaysia 2012: Authoritarian
and Ineffectual Government despite Formal Democratic Institutions
Andrew Aeria, Tan Seng Keat
123 Regressing, Stagnant, or Progressing?
The 2012 Asian Democracy Index in the Philippines
Miguel Paolo P. Reyes, Clarinda Lusterio Berja,
Erika M. Rey-Saturay
RESEARCH NOTE
159 Methodological Achievements and Limits of the
Asian Democracy Index
Clarinda Lusterio Berja
Asian Democracy Review
VOLUME 2 2013
Crossing Democracies in Asia
PERLITA M. FRAGO-MARASIGAN
For scholars of the transition paradigm like Guillermo ODonnell, Juan
Linz, and Samuel Huntington, post-authoritarian regimes have no other
alternative but to democratize first and to consolidate later. For a time
being, these regimes enter a stage of transition before eventually reaching
the threshold of democracy. The transitory realm is transcended with
the institutionalization of free, fair, and competitive elections and the
institutionalization of the rule of law that allows for the regular functioning
of democracy and its processes. Democracy must necessarily be achieved
through elections at a minimum, and substantively through imbibing it
as the only game in town at the most.
1
All these imply that regimes
move in a democratic direction.
2

Unfortunately, Asian democracies often fall short of these Western
expectations. As Mark Beeson maintains, democracies in some parts of
Asia are either yet to arrive or are partially realized.
3
As a result, Asian
democracies are sometimes called by different names: new democracies,
semi-democracies, electoral democracies or delegative democracies, to cite
a few. Fareed Zakaria (1997) referred to a democracy that falls short of
the Western liberal democratic prescription as an illiberal democracy
that is, democracy sans entrenched constitutional freedoms.
4
On the other
hand, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2002) have coined the term
competitive authoritarianism to refer to regimes that fall short of
democracy and also fall short of full-scale authoritarianism.
5
This
recent conceptualization basically ends the illusion of hybrid regimes ever
becoming democratic at alla notion which is outside of the purview of
this journal. Whether or not these regimes actually find their way to
establishing more mature forms of democracy will not preclude other
researchers from finding ways of characterizing degrees and qualities of
democracies.
____________________________________________________________
Perlita M. Frago-Marasigan is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science,
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman and deputy
director of the Third World Studies Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy,
University of the Philippines-Diliman.

ASIAN DEMOCRACY REVIEW Vol. 2 (2013): 1-4 ISSN 2244-5633
2 EDITORS NOTE

Many of these Asian regimes blend democratic and authoritarian
techniques in the way they govern. Hence, the value of studying different
cases cannot be overemphasized. Attempts to test the validity of measures
that strive to approximate democratic realities in different Asian countries
must therefore be developed, continued, and sustained.
The first issue of the Asian Democracy Review, which was published
in 2012, has seen the debut of yet another alternative to the resolute way of
looking at Asian democracy and of measuring its quality of democratization.
The Asian Democracy Index (ADI) was the device developed by the
Consortium for the Asian Development Index (CADI) to measure the
quality of democracy in Asia.
The ADI provides a systematic way of looking at the Asian world.
The ADI was created with the aim of establishing a benchmark that can
aid scholars in their comparison and analysis of democracies, primarily in
Asia.
6
But as stated in the ADI guidebook, the index was not made for
Asia alone. It would later on be interesting to see its applicability to and
usefulness in other democratic countries even outside of Asia.
Based on the CADI framework, democracy is defined as a
continuing process toward an idealthat is, a process of de-
monopolization.
7
Hence democracy, seen from this framework, is dynamic.
As such, it cannot assume any definite form. It is a variable phenomenon.
In his article entitled Democracy of the Desired: Everyday Politics
and Political Aspiration of Contemporary Thai Countryside, Jakkrit
Sangkhamanee brings to fore the value of everyday politics. The article
shows how praxis can change the theoretical landscape of rural political
dynamics by looking at dynamics of everyday politics and the emerging
forms of desires that transcend the rural-urban and local-national di-
vides (Jakkrit, p.6). Jakkrit presents the new perspective that in
consideration of the improved economic status and the knowledge base of
rural voters, vote buying may not necessarily be a cultural aberration or a
consequence of poverty and of patronage politics.
In this issue, the validity of the ADI as an instrument to measure
Asian democracy is tested a second time in Indonesia, the Philippines,
and South Korea. The results of the ADI pilot test in Malaysia are also
included herein. With new developments and challenges in 2012, would
the studies reap the same results as the 2011 surveys?
Democracy in South Korea 2012, by Junghoon Kim, Hyungchul
Kim, Seoungwon Lee, Yooseok Oh, Dongchoon Kim, Youngpyo Seo,
Sangchul Yoon, Kyunghee Choi, Hyunyun Cho, and Heeyeon Cho,
reaffirms the findings of the 2011 South Korean report. Their study further
FRAGO-MARASIGAN 3

shows the observations that equalization continues to lag behind progress
in liberalization and that there are persisting gaps in the spheres of politics,
economy, and civil society. This study also indicates continued improvement
in the area of procedural institutionalization. The authors, however, noted
the existence of a democratic deficit that exists in Korea due to exclusive
and monopolistic tendencies that continue to permeate the said spheres.
In Asian Democracy Index 2012 Indonesia: Liberalization Minus
Equality, Anton Pradjasto, Anna Margret, Dirga Ardiansa, Christina
Dwi Susanti, Irwansyah, Inggrid Silitonga, Mia Novitasari, Sri Budi Eko
Wardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, and Yolanda Panjaitan report an increase in
the Asian Democracy Index from 4.99 in 2011 to 5.27 in 2012. However,
the authors do not find any significant change in the condition of
democratization/de-monopolization in Indonesia (p.68). Like the other
cases in this volume, the index score of liberalization is higher compared
to the index score of equalization. These findings may be attributed to the
low extent of de-monopolization in the economic sphere.
In their country report, entitled The Asian Democracy Index for
Malaysia 2012: Authoritarian and Ineffectual Government despite Formal
Democratic Institutions, Andrew Aeria and Tan Seng Keat express their
reservation that their pilot study might have produced inconclusive results
due to the limited sample size. Their study, however, shows that in 2012,
democracy in Malaysia continued to be monopolized by a powerful elite.
Miguel Paolo P. Reyes, Clarinda Lusterio-Berja, and Erika M. Rey-
Saturay, in their study entitled Regressing, Stagnant, or Progressing?
The 2012 CADI Asian Democracy Index Survey in the Philippines,
state that despite the nearly-doubled (p.126) sample size, the team
experienced a 44 percent refusal rate (p.128). Findings show that in
2012, the Philippines scored an ADI of 4.84 (p.129). Their study also
includes a gamut of insights on a number of contextual factors that can add
color to democracy in the country and that can explain the said ADI score.
These include insights on violencestate-related or otherwiseand general
dissatisfaction with the performance of government, among other things.
Finally, Clarinda Lusterio Berjas Methodological Achievements
and Limits of the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) talks about the upside
and downside of using the ADI as a measure of the quality of democracy.
According to the author, the challenge of democratization in Asia is its
persisting instability; Berja notes that even countries that were considered
success cases of democratic consolidation [in Asia] experience conflict and
crises (Berja, p.159). The author discusses methodological shortcomings in
analyzing moving targets like Asian democracies, presents improvements
4 EDITORS NOTE

to address these weaknesses, and provides further recommendations to
maximize the use of the ADI.
Notes
1. Having elections as a minimal definition of democracy was taken from the work of
Samuel Huntington (1991, 9). The famous phrase when democracy becomes the
only game in town was taken from Przeworski 1991, 26.
2. Levitsky and Way 2002, 52.
3. Beeson 2014.
4. Zakaria 1997.
5. Levitsky and Way 2002, 53.
6. CADI 2012, 36.
7. CADI 2012, 39.
References
Beeson, Mark. 2014. Asian Democracy: An Oxymoron. The Conversation, January 16.
http://theconversation.com/asian-democracy-still-an-oxymoron-22089. Accessed on
May 26, 2014.
CADI (Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index). 2012. The Asian Democracy
Index: A Guide. Asian Democracy Review 1:36-87.
Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman, Oklahoma and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2202. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism"
Journal of Democracy 13(2):51-65.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs November/
December 1997. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53577/fareed-zakaria/the-rise
-of-illiberal-democracy. Accessed on May 28, 2014.
____________________________________________________________
Jakkrit Sangkhamanee is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.


Democracy of the Desired:
Everyday Politics and Political Aspiration
in the Contemporary Thai Countryside
JAKKRIT SANGKHAMANEE
ABSTRACT
Using ethnographic case study of the Community of Desire, a village in the Northeast
of Thailand, this study seeks to understand political dynamics and praxis in rural politics
in order to explain the shift in rural Thailands political landscape. I argue that the recent
transformation in Thailands rural society shows that it is better to consider rural trajectory
as a politics of "agrarian desires" rather than a kind of diversified apprehension and resistance.
These agrarian desires have been part of the ongoing transformation in rural society where
communities and individuals are better engaged, and seek more to engage, with state
development, market economy, and multiplicity of social connections in different scales.
By looking at the dynamics and the emerging forms of politics and desires that transcend
the rural-urban and local-national divides, I argue that the rural political agency has been
transforming, at least over the past few decades, as demonstrated through the mundane
expression of everyday politics. This transitionwhat I term the politics of desire and
entitlementtakes place as rural peoples ideal and praxis have ceased to be satisfied by
self-subsistence and traditional patron-client relations. This pivotal transition in rural
Thailand is a result of the diversification of economic activities and social relations in the
rural community. Amidst these changes, politics has turned into an important instrument
in securing opportunities for self and community improvement. I discuss these findings
and challenge the dual tracks that dominate the studies on Thailands rural political agency.

Introduction
This study seeks to understand political dynamics and praxis in rural politics
in order to explain the shift in rural Thailands political landscape. In the
broader context of Southeast Asia, rural transformation during the past
several decades has created numerous forms of political expressions where
individuals and communities struggle for their betterment and for the
opportunities that modern society has to offer. Turner and Caouette
(2009) argue that these transformations, in many parts of the region, have
led to agrarian angsts against unjust consequences of such transitions,
6 DEMOCRACY OF THE DESIRED

creating different forms of rural resistance. However, I argue that the
recent transformation in Thailands rural society shows that it is better to
consider rural trajectory as a politics of agrarian desires rather than a kind
of diversified apprehension and resistance. These agrarian desires have been
part of the ongoing transformation in rural society where communities and
individuals are better engagedand seek greater engagementwith state
development, market economy, and multiplicity of social connections in
different scales.
Although I am reluctant to look at these rural expressions from a
resistance perspective, I concur with Turner and Caouette (2009) that
rural political expressions are multi -scalar, dynamic, and context-
contingent, as well as agency-based. In this article, I focus on contemporary
Thailands rural political agency by looking at the dynamics of everyday
politics and the emerging forms of desires that transcend the rural-urban
and local-national divides. I first explore the transitions in rural societies,
including political expressions of the rural people directly related to politics
and election, along with other electioneering activities which may at first
glance seem irrelevant to rural elections. Without a doubt the issue of
election in Thailand, especially in the rural areas, has attracted great inter-
est and generated an astounding number of studies as well as an array of
recommendations and arguments over the years. However, the cultural
perspective from an ethnographic case study in the Northeast of Thailand
will prove to be quite a departure from the majority of previous researches
on politics and election. In this paper, I discuss these findings and challenge
the dual tracks that dominate the studies on Thailands rural political agency.
Culture in Political Landscape
My argument is, in part, inspired by an intriguing argument presented by
Chua Beng Huat and Pitch Pongsawat in Elections as Popular Culture
in Asia (Huat 2007a). In that books introduction, Chua contends that
the informed choice model of elections is an attempt to separate the
political sphere and its activities from the larger cultural environment in
which elections take place. In this light, other electioneering activities that
deviate from an ideal and desired forms of election, such as vote-buying
and violence, become an anomalya fraudulent and undesirable act that
should be eliminated from politics. That is because they interfere with an
individuals voting decision-making leading one to make an irrational
choice. For many political scientists, the ideal and desired type of election,
in which a rational voting decision occurs, is when the public chooses the
JAKKRIT 7

best candidates to govern the country for a certain period of time until
the next election. For these people, Haut concludes, election is ultimately
supposed to be a set of universalistic practices that are carried out in a
similar, orderly manner everywhere in the world (Chua 2007b, 2-3). To
illustrate this point, Haut provides an example of an election process that has
been described by Anderson (1996, 14) as a specific and simultaneously
peculiar activity:
[O]ne joins a queue of people whom one does not typically
know, to take a turn to enter a solitary space, where one pulls
levers or marks pieces of paper, and then leaves the site with the
same calm discretion with which one enters itwithout questions
being asked. It is almost the only political act imaginabl e in
perfect solitude, and it is completely symbolic. It is thus almost the
polar opposite of all other forms of personal political participation.
Insofar as it has general meaning, it acquires this meaning only
by mathematical aggregation.
In Chuas view, the desire of conventional political scientists to separate a
universalized politics of election from its cultural context is practically
unrealizable. Election at its core concerns the masses, is participatory,
and involves mobilization of people and support. Therefore, it is not pos-
sible to study election in isolation of the cultural context to which other
agents belong. Rather, one must consider election in terms of local cul-
tural practices (Chua 2007b, 3) in order to understand how election in
each place and each case is evaluated by voters, and how elections serve as
a reflection of voters desires.
Meanwhile, Pitch Pongsawats Middle-class Ironic Electoral Cultural
Practices in Thailand (2007), an article published in a book edited by
Chua, is a study of the 2006 national election in Thailand and its aftermath
among the middle class. In the article, the election is observed through
Pitchs examination of the campaigns launched by the Election Commission
on voting for good candidates, election regulations, understanding of
democracy, and roles of the press and online expression. Reinforcing
Chuas argument, Pitch makes a case that conventional views on election,
if used, will not yield satisfactory results or new insights into Thailands
current transition and development of democracy because, according to
these views, ones voting behavior stands for the sum of an individual
political decision.


On the other hand, there are election pundits pushing for an economics-
based approach to investigate the voting behaviors of each group or class
through historical, political, and economic structures. What is missing in
their methodology is an explanation of how these structures have been
reproduced or expressed in politics and election. To overcome these
shortcomings, Pitch proposes that we see election as popular cultural
practices where the main focus is shifted to observing how people in that
particular society practice and live during the election process (Pitch
2007, 95). In other words, he is pointing to a need to surpass what he
calls crude western ethno-centric behavioralism and crude economic
structural determination explanation by adopting a new outlook and
viewing election through the lens of popular cultural practices, where
agents will receive more consideration (Pitch 2007, 98).
But what are popular cultural practices as well as the relations
between election and popular cultural perspective and factors? Citing the
cultural theory developed by the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies,
Pitch suggests that
[Ordinary people] are not political and/or cultural dupes, nor
merely bearers of structural forces that structurally interpolate
them. Elections thus become popular cultural practices that peo-
ple act out and fight with various forces that try to fix certain
meanings, worldviews, and power relation upon them, on the one
hand, and somehow unintentionally and actively reproduce the
whole complex structure of dominance, on the other. (Pitch
2007, 98)
In this regard, Pitch is pointing out that election is an interactive
space in which different forces or power-holders come into contact and
fight. However, power, both the structural forces and those wielded by
authoritative figures in the political systemfor example, the state
and government officials, politicians, the election commission, the
press, political capital, local influences and the middle classdoes not
hold absolute authority over the construction of meanings or configuration of
relationships between these figures and voters. Voters, seen as agents,
have the capacity to act out and negotiate with various forces interfering
in an election. Clearly, the fixing of power and relationships does not
only take place during election campaigns and voting periods, but also
includes mundane cultural occurrences in ordinary peoples everyday life.
The cultural practices may occur when voters intentionally get involved in
JAKKRIT 9

configuring the relationships and the overarching structures or may take place
beyond the control and intent of these agents. So far, the incorporation of
these untidy and complex relations and dynamic structures as the context
of politics and election into an analysis has drawn little attention from
political scientists and political enthusiasts. One of the reasons for this
may be that the concept resists being neatly summed up and developed
into a hypothesis and an established theory. At the same time, the collection of
numerical evidence or development of a model for universal election will
prove to be a challenging task. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the study
of cultural practices in politics and election cannot only be done by
observing voters during a short specific period of time. The expression of
popular cultural practices appear in the most ordinary, everyday level of
existence and are interwoven into other aspects of cultural practices, from
identity and social outlook to notions of justice, as well as pursuit of
opportunities and self-development in accordance with each individuals
aspirations and desires.
If we consider politics (in the broad and narrow sense of the word)
and election as a form of structure and technique that shapes the way people
live in society, politics and election cannot be separated from the local
cultural context in which they are situated. As such, the study of changes
in the landscape of Thai politics becomes an exploration of practices and
reconfigurations of cultural relationships that influence peoples perceptions
and attitude toward the political landscape and the benefits, opportunities,
or channels available to them within the political landscape. From this
perspective, the goal of studying politics and election will not be to create
a structure of relations or produce explanations or techniques that look the
same from every angle. Rather, we will seek to understand within each
contingence how agents choose to utilize, strategize, and reorganize various
forces in the political structure and during elections. Certainly, this is the
time for us to leave behind old narratives of politics and move beyond
attempts to suppress and universalize the understanding of election and
good representatives. More importantly, we should overcome the
propensity to reduce election to apolitical and acultural practices of
individuals. Dynamic and unpredictable, the political landscape and
elections in popular cultural praxis occurs in everyday contexts of localized
relations and are anything but objectively given relations.


Urban Myths and the Great Divide of Rural Politics
One of the urban myths that act as a major obstacle to understanding
Thailands political transformation over the past several years is the myth
about vote buying. The widespread vote buying in rural areas is seen as
being a malicious disease that has impaired the maturation of democracy
in Thailand. To this day newspapers and other media continue to perpetuate
the well-worn narrative of villagers readily selling their votesas if their
political rights are the last possession they haveto trade for a small
amount of cash that will sustain their life for a few more days. Likewise,
when asked to explain the root causes of widespread and rampant vote
buying, state officials, scholars, independent organizations such as the
Election Commission, or any concerned persons involved in the elections
and polls often resort to a superficial interpretation. They blame vote buying
on rural poverty, inertia, gullibility in the face of politicians and power,
and dependence on patronage (see LoGerfo 1996 and Suchit 1996). One
example is an interview with Somchai Srisuttiyakorn, now a key member
of the Election Commission of Thailand, which appeared in the Thairath
newspaper on 20 June 2011:
For people in rural areas, such a small amount of money is
considered valuable because normally they do not have a job or
any incomes. They stay home, raise their grandchildren, and just
wait for their children who work in the city to send money
homeIf they are given money, even 100-200 Baht, they will
accept it. Its better than receiving nothing.
This discourse has remained constant and permeated the press and
public consciousness, particularly when explaining rural peoples participation
in politics during recent years. Over time it has practically been used as a
cautionary tale of stupidity, poverty, and pain of rural voters (Prajak 2009)
and has served as reassurance to the Thai middle class who continue to
perceive themselves as being democratically superior in comparison to their
rural counterparts (LoGerfo 1996). This myth, which originated from the
rural vote-buying narrative, has gone on to undermine the value of rural
votes as well as create a perception about rural people being democratically
immoral, easily manipulated by political parties, and maneuvered into
participating in political movements.
1
However, the adoption of this
superficial viewof no money, no votes or rural gullibilitywill only
weaken our understanding of localized politics and prevent us from fully
grasping all aspects of cultural politics in rural areas.
JAKKRIT 11

Here, a case study from the Community of Desire, a village in the
Northeast of Thailand, is employed to depict everyday politics in rural
areas in which the mechanism and relations are far too complex to be
studied through the scope of electoral analysis alone. In addition, as a
response to a substantial body of research conducted in the field of rural
politicswhich focuses on analyzing the political agency of rural people
through social movements, particularly in relation to government resource
management and the effects of state development projectsI argue that
everyday politics is one of the key approaches that should be taken seriously
in the analysis of the shift and transformation in the political consciousness
and literacy of rural people, as well as the arguments of rural peoples
political praxis today.
I argue that the rural political agency has been transforming, at least
over the past few decades, as demonstrated through the mundane expression
of everyday politics. This transitionwhat I term the politics of desire
and entitlementtakes place as rural peoples ideal and praxis have
ceased to be satisfied by self-subsistence and traditional patron-client
relations. While in the past, traditional patron-client relations had provided
security and social safety nets for farmers who faced many risks in subsistence
farming, politics in rural areas has undergone a drastic transformation.
This is evidenced by livelihood activities and the development of rural
people in recent years. These changes in political expression can be found
in rural peoples voting behaviors, the reconfiguration of self in the process of
vote buying, and the display of personal preference for different political
party policies. The pivotal transition in rural Thailand is a result of
diversification of economic activities and social relations in the rural
community. Amidst these changes, politics has turned into an important
instrument in securing opportunities for self and community improvement.
In other words, political expression of rural people over the past few decades
has become a reflection of recognition, of entitlement, and benefits to
which they aspire. In a time when rural places have been modernized to
be no different from any other places in the globalized world, my aim is to
seek to enhance our understanding of rural peoples political praxis by
bringing an additional perspective focusing on desire and aspiration,
2
and
adding new layers to the existing conversation that has so far been monopo-
lized by the two ultimate points of analysis: elections and social movements.

Dual-Track Studies on Thailands Rural Politics:
Election and Social Movement
In most studies on Thailands rural politics, the political agency of rural
people is often seen through their participation in the parliamentary-based
electoral system and social relations tied to representative democracy.
Examples of this group of works can be found in numerous studies on
election. These range either from a broad overview of the electoral process
beginning with assessing government performance prior to election, po-
litical parties, campaign issues and canvassing, vote buying and voting,
and election results and formation of a new government (Murray 1996)
or studies on social capital and corruption (Calahan 2005a, Pasuk and
Sungsidh 1994), vote-buying (Calahan 2005b, Calahan and McCargo
1996), and vote-canvassing networks (Anyarat 2010). In some cases they
go back much further to explore issues such as the patron-client system
(Amara and Preecha 2000), leadership, identity, and networks of politicians
(Nishizaki 2001, Ockey 1996 and 2004, Pasuk and Baker 2009). In
addition, later works include those that perceive rural voters as an electoral
support base (Anek 2009) or part of mafia/local mobster networks
(Viengrat 2003, Ockey 2004, Robertson Jr. 1996, Sombat 2000). There
have also been attempts to understand changes in rural areas brought
about by decentralization (Viengrat 2008), migrant workers and migration
(Keyes 2010), and transformations in community economy and farm
industry (Rigg 1998). More recent studies focus on changes in rural
Thailand in the populist and post-Thaksin era through observing shifts in
rural perceptions, e.g., from traveling experiences and reception of
information (Pattana 2011), participation in the Red Shirt movement
(Chairat 2010, Naruemon and McCargo 2011, Sopranzetti 2012a), to
much more recent analyses about renewed interest in the unwaning
populist policy during the latest election.
Principally conducted by political scientists, rural sociologists, and
political anthropologists,
3
most of these works attempt to establish
connections within the scope of electoral politics, leaping back and
forth from social relations to institutions to structures, searching for clues
and explanations. Despite their efforts to diversify their analysis and find
different ways to situate rural people in the political context, one common
denominator remains unchanged: their use of social relations formed
around the electoral system as the basis to identify and figure out factors that,
for instance, can influence candidates chances, affect policy development
among political parties, explain vote buying, and determine the legitimacy of
elected government. In simpler terms, these studies, while looking at
JAKKRIT 13

dynamism of rural socioeconomic factors in political relations, are still
based on their locus of a structure-based, electoral kind of politics.
Following their analyses of socioeconomic factors surrounding
electoral politics has led these studies of representative democracy to
reach two different conclusions. The first group, other than insisting on
rural backwardness and attributing Thailands democratic stagnation to
the rural areas, calls into question the maturity of rural voters, deeming
their votes illegitimate. In their view, the rural electorate is uneducated or
that the votes cast are simply being traded in exchange for short-term
benefits, either as part of money politics or the patron-client system. One
prominent work in this group is by Anek Laothamatas (2009). In his
work, the political divide in Thailand is explained as a tale of two
democracies between the urban middle class, who are policy-based voters,
and the rural people, who are the electoral base. In addition to producing
and setting in motion one prevailing argument used to explain Thailands
political phenomenon in recent decades, from these studies emerged the
view that vote-buying and patron-client system in rural areas are the ma-
jor stumbling block to political reforms in Thailand. Nonetheless, neither
two democracies nor money politics in rural Thailand are completely
new or unique phenomena. Anek points out that patron-client relations
and vote-buying in rural areas are closely linked to the patron-client system
developed in the traditional agricultural society, and continue to interact
and fight with other new phenomena, which are the by-product of
Thailands transition to a modern industrialized society (Anek 2009,
23). The proposition of interaction, coined by Anek, is an interesting
point that touches on the shift in consciousness and political praxis in
modern rural society. Regrettably, he did not venture to clarify what he
meant by new phenomena and how the interaction led to the shift in
rural consciousness.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the coin are groups of academics
who attempt to provide a new outlook by emphasizing the complexity of
the election process and political participation in rural areas. Rather than
seeing the rural electorate as being politically backward, they argue that
rural election and political participation are too complex to be seen from a
point of view of the middle class that is set on condemning rural people
for selling their votes. Recent studies in this latter group suggest that
there is a need to utilize the knowledge base in cultures as well as consider
economic changes and transformation of rural livelihoods and consumption
in order to investigate how the political identity and self-perception of
rural people in relation to other groups in society have been influenced by

these factors (Apichart et al. 2010, Askew 2008, Connors 2007, Ockey
2004).
Therefore, apart from focusing on the rural electorate at national and
local polls, the studies in this group also return to re-examine the classic
argument about rural vote buying and challenge the concept of two
democracies (see Anyarat 2010). Along with new suggestions about villagers
interest in political party policies, the most recent argument that has been
put forth by this group is the issue of improved economic status in rural
areas and global villagers. As a whole, we may classify this group as the
school of new agrarian transformation (Apichart et al. 2010, Keyes
2010, Pattana 2011). Recurring themes from their recent works demonstrate
an attempt to reclaim legitimacy of the rural votes and acknowledge rising
levels of political participation among rural populations to being on par
with their urban counterparts. Underscoring rural enthusiasm and
participation in politics, this group of works attempt to develop new
explanations for rural Thailand and its new social class that is growing out
of its agrarian roots, and for rural peoples political participation, which
has moved into the same economic and social spheres occupied by the
urban middle class. This interpretation is different from the first groups
argument of urban-rural political polarization and the great two de-
mocracies divide.
Despite new developments and compelling arguments generated by
this group of works, their explanations for political enthusiasm among
rural villagers are not a far cry from those maintained by the previous
group. Both of their analyses on rural peoples political expression is
restricted to the sphere of parliamentary-based, electoral politics. In
addition to these two schools of rural politics, there is another group that
views politics as being untied and not limited to representative democracy
and election. For this group, politics exists in every space in which allocation
of power and resources is in conflict and disagreement or when uses of
authority are considered illegitimate and affect the lives of the general
public, particularly the rural poor. The conflicts, arising from abuse of
state authority, become the main trigger prompting rural villagers to demand
and exercise their political rights by protesting against public policies or
the implementation of those policies that cause disruption to their
community, natural resources, and community culture. On the whole,
villagers demonstrations are counted as part of civil politics, and their
political expression as a new social process/movement born to fight back
against use of power, policy, and especially state development projects that
upset their livelihoods, economy, resources, and socio-cultural relations
JAKKRIT 15

(Chairat 2002, Pasuk et al. 2002, Prapas 2009). In part, this type of
portrayal of rural civic awareness may have been fueled by the involvement of
academics and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, particularly
the groups who are supportive of community cultures and rights; and
vocal in issues such as land, forests, rivers, and agriculture (Chatthip
2010, Prapas 1998, Yos 2003, Anan 2001).
According to studies done by these academics and development
organizations, it is the effects of state development projects on rural
communities that bring about rural adjustment and new modes of
negotiation/struggle in the forms of farmers networks, networks of the
poor, or groups of people affected by development initiatives, for example.
One of the strategies adopted by these groups and networks in calling for
justice is public demonstrations,
4
which, apart from being held in the areas
affected by the development, also spread to provincial halls, the streets,
and outside parliament. Furthermore, in addition to making demands,
picketing, or submitting a letter to responsible agencies, there are
cultural demonstrations such as forest ordination, performance of a
river life extending ceremony, and other land rites and rituals designed to
represent the villagers bonds with resource bases and community culture.
In this sense, the villagerss expression of their political identity through
demonstration is altogether physical, verbal, and symbolic (Chairat 2002,
Prapas 2009, Somchai 2006, Missingham 2003). It is worth noting that
in most studies about demonstrations of rural villagers, the relationship
between the villagers and authority of the state is often portrayed as hostile
and adversarial, showing state interventions invading and crushing peoples
rights, cultures, and traditional moral economy. In this way, if the villagers
do not stand up and push back, the ultimate result may be the eventual
collapse of local community and ruralness. Put simply, according to this
second groups view, a very important clue to help in the unraveling of
rural Thai politics and its development is the understanding of villagers
political expression or civil politics.
To briefly summarize what I have discussed thus far, previous studies of
rural peoples political expression over the years can be categorized into
two factions, with the first group directing their attention to representative
politics and the second group adopting a civil politics standpoint. For the
first group, their main argument centers on whether rural people have the
capacity to be competent members in an electoral democracy and which
social, economic, and political factors are obstacles or key to rural Thailand's
progression to the desired state of representative democracy. The rural
areas, in this regard, become merely a part that is latched onto the state

and capitalism, marching alongside government-led economic and political
development and policy. Throughout the years, there is hardly any discussion
that focuses on rural electorate voting no and rejecting government. As
such, the arguments produced by this group remain anchored in and
restricted to an analysis of rural election in the framework of institutional
politics. Meanwhile, the proposed argument from the second group,
whose view is based on civil politics, indicates that the political movement
of rural people, more often than not, is a crusade against state authority and
impotent representative democracy. The second group perceives rural
society to be more tied to and dependent on ecological resources and
customary social order rather than on patron-client relationships between
rural people and politicians, and influential local businesses. In seeing
rural areas as a harmonious and stable village society, outside forces
specifically, the state, corrupted politicians, and vicious capitalism
become threats that will annihilate subsistence agriculture and community
stability. In this respect, the underlying objective of rural peoples political
expression is then to safeguard their community rights from external
interventions.
The Concept of Everyday Political Praxis
By and large, both types of studies on rural politics discussed above are
extremely valuable to developing an understanding of social phenomena
and rural politics in Thailand. In these scholarly works, the dynamic nature
of rural political agency is addressed and acknowledged through monitoring
and analyzing the constantly changing economic, political, and social
dynamics in rural areas. However, due to their inclination to view rural
community and rural people as one being co-existing in harmony and
sharing one voice in expressing their political views and praxes, these
studies come to see rural society as free from any internal conflict.
Conversely, the argument proposed here is that at present, the political
life of rural people has already transcended the boundary of representative
and civil politics, rendering them both insufficient and inadequate. As
such, in addition to observing significant political milestones such as
elections and social movements, occurrences in the everyday life of rural
people must also be considered.
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, a political scientist whose academic
interest is in peasant society in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines
and Vietnam (2002, 2005), has suggested that we take into account the
mundane and informal political phenomena in rural society instead of
JAKKRIT 17

simply concentrating on official politics and advocacy politics. By
politics, Kerkvliet is referring to Harold Lasswells (1958) pithy
definition of the wordit is about who gets what, when, and how. In
other words, politics revolves around the control, allocation, production,
and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying those activi-
ties (Kerkvliet 2009, 227). When using this definition as a theoretical
base for political analysis we will immediately grasp that politics is indeed
everywhere and is not tied to any public institution, government or political
grouping. As previously discussed, studies on electoral and advocacy politics
are generally fixated on who gets what, when, and how in activities that are
related to the state and its policy, politicians, eligible electorate, development
organizations, and other interest groups. In the battle for political power
and influence, changes and transformation in rural peoples political roles
and their relations to rationality, ways of life and aspiration may have, at
times, gone unnoticed or may not be recognized or understood.
5

Kerkvliets framework of everyday politics focuses on how people
embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules
regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and
doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are
rarely organized or direct (Kerkvliet 2009, 232). Put another way, the
study of everyday politics zeroes in on other praxis that occurs outside the
political structure and come in many forms other than interest groups
being backed by development organizations or civil networks. Everyday
political praxis includes seemingly uninteresting or mundane behaviors,
which at times even agents who perform them may not be consciously
aware. From support and compliance, adjustment, modification, or
avoidance, to everyday resistance such as hostility, resentment, ridicule,
gossiping, or being uncooperativethese are only a few examples of the
many modes and outcomes of everyday political praxis (Scott 1985,
Walker 2008).
Despite receiving little attention from political scientistsnot to
mention very unlikely to be featured or discussed by newspapers or other
types of media where coverage on rural politics remains dominated by the
subject of vote buyingthere are at least two benefits from observing the
everyday political praxis of rural people. First, it shows that rural villagers
do not readily accept or succumb to exploitation, subordination,
authoritarianism, or any lack they are experiencing.
6
Instead, they always
attempt to negotiate, create options, and configure new relationships,
defining who should get what, when, and how, or how resources should
be produced, allocated, and used (Kerkvliet 2009, 234). Second, this

approach may serve as a path to decoding the desire/aspiration and
politics of desire and entitlement of the rural people. In the next section,
the concept of rural desire and entitlement will be further explored
through the eyes of the villagers living in the Community of Desire to
illustrate how everyday politics can serve as a portrait of rural peoples
political agency.
I chose the Community of Desire as my case study for three reasons.
First of all, it is a typical rural community in Thailand in terms of economy.
Most rural communities in Thailand are now middle-income communities
(Walker 2012). The people in the Community of Desire are largely farmers,
but they have also diversified their incomes based on multiple economic
activities both in and outside agriculture. This is similar to other rural
communities in Thailand, where market economy and state-based develop-
ment have been part of the livelihood for the past few decades.
Secondly, the Community of Desire is a rural space where the
political ideologies are multi-faceted and the domination of NGOs
anti-development discourse is not well at work. Here, the villagers are
exposed to different opinions in terms of government policies, political
parries, as well as having different criteria in electing candidates for political
positions at different levels. The complexity of political opinion is also not
dominated by the narrow ideology of some advocacy NGOs in the country,
which see state development as an intrusion to community culture and
resilience. In other words, we can observe a wide range of political expression
in the community where there is no single paradigm dominating the voice
of the others.
And lastly, while I will not claim that the Community of Desire can
represent every rural community in Thailand, it can be a good mirror,
reflecting and making criticism toward the urban-based discourse and
mainstream political science studies that look at rural politics based
crudely on behavioural aspects of the rural populace. What the Community
of Desire can offer here, which is not different from others rural communities
in Thailand, is a case study for showing how everyday politics and political
aspirations have played a key role in shaping local political cultures, political
institutions, as well as electoral based policies at the national levels.
The Modern Thai Rural Capitalism
Since the mid-1980s, the mode of production in the Community of Desire
has been influenced by the arrival of new commercial crops. Villagers
who in the past mainly grew rice and a few other commercial crops such
JAKKRIT 19

as jute, cassava, peanut, eucalyptus and cornbegan to try planting rubber.
Although there were some villagers who had moved to the south to work
in rubber plantations during the early 1980s, the purpose of such journeys
was to become laborers rather than farm entrepreneurs in commercial
agriculture themselves. After spending some years tapping rubber trees in
the South, Uncle Somsri and Aunt Banjong were one of the first people
in the village who brought back rubber seedlings and started rubber
planting in the Community of Desire. At that time they each bought 400
seedlings for 25 satang a piece. Within a few years, they realized that
returns from rubber farming were good and the risks lower than other
cash crops in rotation. Still, these pioneers of rubber farming were saddled
with high costs because they could not sell their rubber to the local market-
place. With only a small number of growers in the community, the rubber
farmers had little negotiating power and limited access to obtain technical
support from the government.
In 1996, the Office of the Rubber Plantation Supporting Fund
(ORPSF) was set up in Ubon Ratchathani province. Projects to support
rubber cultivation were launched and implemented in many areas of
Ubon Ratchathani as well as the neighboring provinces. During that
time, there were many villagers who heard the news about the supporting
fund while listening to a radio program hosted by ajarn Thaworn, a provincial
agriculture academic. Uncle Wan, one of farmers in the Community of
Desire, who had an interest in starting rubber farming, recounted his feeling
at that time:
I knew that Uncle Somsri and Uncle Kamphao had gone on a
study tour to see how rubber was tapped and traded. They made
it into raw sheets and sold each one for 18 Baht and I thought,
ah, thats 30,000-40,000 Baht per batch. I was already wavering.
When I heard ajarn Thaworn announce on the radio that anyone
who had 5-10 rai
7
of unused plots could apply for rubber plantation
aid, I leapt on my bike and rushed to see him. The ajarn asked if
I wanted to grow rubber and I asked him to help take me to the
Office [ORPSF] and inquired about where it was. Then he said
hed take me there and that was what he did.
Uncle Wan is an example of rural villagers bursting with desire and
aspiration, always willing to take chances, and likes to learn and acquire
new knowledge. When he arrived at ORPSF. an official told him to
prepare and get all the required documents for the aid application, as well

as help spread the news and persuade other villagers to form a group in
order to apply for the support:
He told me to go back home, get seven to eight persons to sign
up, and come in groups because the agency required us to work
together as a team. And when they handed out seedlings, funds,
and fertilizers, they wanted to do it in one day. I brought the
project document home and started asking people around. They
just laughed and said that why would anyone want to grow rubber.
Where would they sell it [they asked,] and then they brought up
Uncle Somsris case. He was selling his for 10-20 Baht a kilo.
The other villagers said that there wasnt a market for rubber
and I replied, whatever, itd get better. Of course, that last part
I was saying it to myself. Still, I begged them saying that we just
needed five to seven to make up a team like when they were looking
for people to grow eucalyptus. Back then it was the eucalyptus
boom so people just wondered why would they ever want to grow
rubber since eucalyptus buyers were knocking on their doors
everyday. Fortunately, I was able to convince eight people to join
me and we went straight to the Office.
In 1997, in addition to his 50-rai rice farm, Uncle Wan started
growing rubber on his land and the total number of his ORPSF rubber
group was thirteen. In 2002, rubber prices had gone up to 30-40 Baht.
More farmers in the village became interested in rubber cultivation. By
that time Uncle Wan was already in his fifth year of rubber planting and
was approached by the head of Ubon Ratchathanis ORPSF to be the
leader of the rubber group, and sent to learn rubber cultivation and
production methods from seedling, breeding to budding, and fertilizer
application in the province as well as in Bangkok and other provinces in
the southern and eastern regions. The new farming techniques captured
Uncle Wans attention and he tried to write down everything he learned.
He brought the training materials home and pored over them again and
again. In the past, whenever Uncle Wan encountered a problem about
rubber planting, he would ride his motorcycle to the city center to seek
advice directly from the ORPSF head or any officials there.
It had been fifteen years since Uncle Wan first began growing rubber.
The experiences and knowledge he had gained from his own rubber farming
and attending trainings in many places prompted the village abbot to ask him
to host a radio show at the station housed at the village temple. On the
JAKKRIT 21

radio show Uncle Wan was to play music and share his knowledge with other
farmers about rubber farming. During a few of his earlier broadcasts there
were some hiccups as Uncle Wan was still not used to speaking on air. Later,
to inspire his audience, he started telling his personal journey as well as
his stories of determination and willpower to learn and take chances in
rubber farming. Soon, more listeners began phoning in to ask questions and
discuss problems about rubber farming with Uncle Wan. This motivated
him to keep searching for answers and applying his own experiences to
respond to his audiences inquiries. Apart from being broadcasted on the
community radio station, Uncle Wans show could also be listened to
online, which meant that the audience of his show was not limited to only
local listeners in the community. Uncle Wan revealed that he had received
calls from farmers in Kanchanaburi and Taiwan. These listeners were
laborers who had left home for work but hoped that one day they could
return to their hometown and grow rubber to generate income for themselves
and their families. His radio programs popularity grew and finally attracted
a number of sponsors who wanted to help fund the show:
Now, we have sponsors like Thai Kanueng Sangkaphant, which
sells all kinds of monk supply, some farm produce stores, and a
couple of fungicide, organic and bio fertilizer shops. A police
captain in another district also came to meet me in person after
listening to the show. He comes every month to give me 1,000
Baht as sponsorship. A few building material businesses and
even silk stores are also the shows sponsors.
Uncle Wan is the epitome of the modern rural farmer. He has
turned to cash croppinggrowing rubberand joined a state agencys
project with ORPSF. He started a network of rubber planters, hosts a
community radio show, and has built a base of support among state officials
and local businesses. All of this reflects how odern rural villagers choose
to place themselves where they can draw support and benefits from other
actors surrounding them. Forging connections serves as a significant
political practice that makes it possible for villagers to link and make use
of multiple channels of social and economic power as well as capital to
raise their quality of life. In one respect, some scholars may consider the
connections of these social and economic power and capital networks as a
kind of patronage or dependency (Amara and Preecha 2000), and
ultimately mark it a major obstacle to the development of democracy in
rural Thailand. However, I would argue that the practice is a way of making
an investment and building social capital. Without a doubt, by connecting

oneself to the system or rules, villagers are tying themselves to the state,
the market, and multiple patrons that essentially can pose risks, require
reciprocation, and may lead to forsaking their traditional resource base.
An example of this would be converting rice farms to rubber plantation
and shifting from subsistence farming to cash crop production. Nevertheless,
connecting oneself to sources of power and investment in this mode of
production is a thought-out deliberate practice that at its core underscores
calculation, struggle, and most certainly desire and aspiration.
As we come to consider this common practice a type of social investment,
what follows is an understanding that rural villagers would have an
expectation, a product of their investment and risk management in
choosing to attach themselves to these different actors. This expectation is
the key ingredient in transforming political landscapes and relationships
in rural society. Surely, structural economic and social changes in past
decades have truly helped to accommodate the construction of new rural
identities (Apichart at al 2011, Pitch 2003, Walker 2012, Yos 2003) but
at ground level, certain movements are often overlooked in the dominant
discourse by political scientists. Each actor has an expectation of each
other in the increasingly overlapping plane of relationships. The dynamics
is local but at the same time has transcended beyond it. Ultimately, these
expectations become major determinants of political changes. Aspects of
desire and expectation are projected and expressed differently at different
levels of authorities and political relationships. One of the forms taken is
reflected in their different expectations placed upon the candidates standing
for different elections at the local, district, and national levels (Jakkrit
2011).
Hidden Desire in Capital and Everyday Politics
As the communitys livelihoods transformed over recent years, Uncle
Wan, was keen to express his desire and the expectation he had of other
actors in his community. Nowadays, in addition to rubber, Uncle Wan
continues to grow rice and cashew as well as host the community radio
program on rubber cultivation. He is also a rubber doctor, working
with ORPSF as a trainer to help other rubber-growing farmers who live
in different areas. With increasing commitments, Uncle Wan wished to
buy a pickup truck so that he could travel for work and transport ribbed
rubber sheets faster and more conveniently. He described the day he went
to buy the pickup truck at a car dealer in the city center of Ubon
Ratchathani province:
JAKKRIT 23

I rode my bike to the dealer. I was wearing shorts that day. The
salesmen teased me and said, Uncle, what are you doing here?
because they saw me wearing shorts and a faded black long-
sleeved shirt. They must have thought that Im just a poor
farmer. Then one of them said, Old man, are you here to buy a
truck or what? Go park over there. Over there. That was what
one of them said. So I parked my bike. But that guy just sat there
near the trucks on display, he didnt bother to ask me why I was
there. Then another salesman came. He walked by and grabbed
my arm to ask me why I was there, if I planned to buy a truck,
and if I was being serious. I told him to show me the models and
colors they had. Even then he still didnt believe me and I had to
repeat myself again that yes, I was there because I wanted to get
a truck. Finally, he began showing me around. The first truck he
showed me was [an] Isuzu Platinum, the second one was [an]
Isuzu something but I didnt like the color and then there was
another one, [a] Highlander.
Contented after having inquired all the truck specifications, prices,
promotions, and payment options, Uncle Wan decided to get the
Isuzu D-max model from the salesperson.
I said Id get that one and he put a red license plate on the truck.
Just then my daughter called to ask if I had already seen the
trucks. I told her that I already did and she replied that she was
at the bank, not far from the dealer. All that time the first salesman
kept eyeing me, probably still wondering if this old man was
really going to buy the truck. The moment he saw my son, my
daughter, and son-in-law walking in that salesman dashed right
to them and said, Sis, are you here to buy a truck or to pay the
monthly installment? When my daughter answered that shes
there to get a truck, he said, Oh, Let me help you with that,
Sis, and kept touching her arm. So my daughter told him that
her Uncle had already reserved one, just a short while ago. He
then asked her which one she meant and she pointed right at me.
That guy was stunned. The one that took care of me got the
commission but that other guy who totally ignored me had to sit
and watch from afar. Talk about bad luck at nine in the morning.
The indignation, resentment, and dissatisfaction with this kind of
treatment as well as social rejection Uncle Wan experienced from the
interaction on that day served as a critical catalyst in building up bitterness

and exasperation and leading to the recognition of his entitlement in modern
Thai political society. Put another way, everyday politics of the modern
rural Thais is no longer the politics of resistance or struggle against state
authority (Walker 2012). Neither does it oppose commercial farming, the
market, capitalism, nor creeping technological advances. Rather, it has
turned into a politics of securing recognition and access to sources of
capital and power, and expectation for equal treatment warranted to any
individual in a democratic society. The structural change and a rise in
levels of incomes and livelihood diversification in rural areas in addition
to Uncle Wans ability to link himself to different entities of power
from state agencies to local capitalists as well as the media and wider net-
work of farmershas played a part in shaping the worldview, perception,
self identity and new needs in rural society. Still, everyday politics is not
limited to structures, channels, and responses concerning physical needs.
It is a politics of relationships and how relationships are managed in order
to secure wider social recognition in society.
Uncle Wans story is an example that clearly illustrates the social friction
between the urban middle class and rural villagers who are able to improve
their livelihoods and standard of living in pursuit of opportunities and
means to improve their lives. The confidence in ones potential for self
development and the need to be socially recognized and respected are the
crux of everyday politicsit is what is yearned by rural people. Being
recognized for ones potential and showing and receiving respect and social
acceptance carries a much larger implication and is not only concerned with
construction of identity, self positioning, and relationships in modern society.
More importantly, it is the beginning of the political recognition of the
rural. Social expression that exemplifies or is the manifestation of political
recognition remains a seldom-discussed issue. One reason for this is that
it is difficult to analyze and explain this particular issue by using any of
the popular frameworks in political science. In reality, an understanding the
link between the pursuit of political recognition and social practices is the
key to revealing one of the most crucial areas in rural political practices
vote buying, a practice that prevails in the rural Thai election system until
today.
Electoral Capitalism and Politics of Recognition/Entitlement
When politics is a pursuit driven by desire and aspiration, a study of politics
has to extend beyond investigating merely behaviorit must involve a
study of practice (Prajak 2009), examining how people in society
JAKKRIT 25

construct and give meanings to each of their actions. In an article by
Yukti (2012) on the relationship between money and election, he argues
that money is no longer a decisive factor that can determine rural elections
and proceeded to explain the new meaning of money in rural election,
which is quite a departure from the dominant discourse on vote buying.
Yukti challenges our understanding of vote buying and asks us to consider
money not to be a currency used in ordinary exchange or transaction, but a
gift, and simply one of the factors that is socially bounded, which at times
may not have the full power to buy villagers votes or support, and in
many cases is viewed to be of lesser value than community ties (Yukti
2012). In this essay, I would like to look at some of the issues raised by
Yukti and further explore his argument on the construction of meaning
and what money in election comes to represent in rural politics. However,
before delving into analysis, I would like us to revisit the Community of
Desire to hear from the voices of rural villagers and observe the cultural
context in which meanings are constructed.
Both before and during the July 2011 general election campaign,
villagers in the Community of Desire had been approached to attend
seminars organized by the political parties. In these seminars, villagers
listened to campaign policies and accomplishments, joined study tours in
other provinces, gathered information on community development, and
received travel allowances for various social functions held in important
venues or at fancy hotels in the province. In my interview with Mother
Buasai, a member of a housewives group, she said,
Since the beginning of the year, all the parties had started mobilizing
the mass and tapping into their networks to gain the upper hand.
For example, the Democrat Party focused on sufficiency
economy while Pheu Thai Party got ten to twenty villagers
from each village to join their training on organic farming.
Mostly, they would reach out to village headmen and their networks
of canvassers to help recruit attendees. We already had that
training on seedling propagation at the start of the year. Really, it
was just pretend. The training wasnt to help improve farming or
get real results. Its the type of training where they give us 300
Baht each for our ride home. Its all hidden and disguised.
Villagers of the Community of Desire were fully aware that while the
money they received was a gift to compensate for their time and travel
expenses, the true purpose of the activity was a veiled attempt of the
political parties to campaign via a new form of vote buying. Nevertheless,

an economic shift in the Community of Desire or the villagers political
perception, which has been completely altered by state administration in
the past decades, now frames their electoral decision making, i.e., as regards
which political party they would support. A shallow understanding of vote
buyingoften employed to make a sweeping conclusion that vote buying
is the only deciding factor in securing election victories in the northeast
cannot produce a full and accurate picture of rural people. As we can see
from the residents of the Community of Desire, to some degree, their
decisions to give trust and their votes for the representatives at different
levels of government were connected by the complex relationships and
underscored their concern with everyday security. By taking into account
all aspects of the issue, it can be said that this type of political decisions are
a reflection of rural peoples rationale, i.e., how they weigh the benefits,
rights, recognition, and opportunities to obtain access to resources in a
context that is beyond an occasional transaction or gift.
Besides participation in seminars and activities organized by the political
parties, another strategy to secure votes is giving cash to villagers through
canvassing networks. However, to assume that cash payment is an attempt of
mass vote buying would be an oversimplification, as money distribution in
the Community of Desire is not a blanket political strategy but a validation of
a system in which political recognition holds great value, as explained by one
of the canvassers:
Using flat rate vote buying is not really effective. Its easy because
you just have to check the number of eligible voters in a house
registration and multiply it with the amount set per person. For
example, if the rate is 300 Baht per person and there are three
members in the family thats 900 Baht in total. But here the
common practice of vote buying isnt like that. Canvassers have
to go through the area to find out who and how much should be
paid. Some households have the same number of eligible voters
but each would receive a different amount. Mostly, we give the
money to people we know personally and individually. But more
important, each canvasser may work for more than one politician
at the same time because he or she is well-connected.
Instead of winning votes in the Community of Desire, flat-rate vote
buying will likely cause more problems for the candidates as this form of
vote buying fails to acknowledge the status and value of individual villagers.
On the other hand, nonlinear-rate vote buying through networks of
canvassers who have personal relationships with the villagers is perceived
JAKKRIT 27

as an acknowledgement and recognition of each individual villager. The
money given to each person will need to be at a rate that the receiver is
satisfied with, a rate that may depend on personal economic and social
status, level of closeness, professional responsibility, as well as number of
family members. As most of the voters receive money from nearly all of
the candidates, an extremely crucial part to win over their support lies in
the canvassers calculation of a suitable rate for each person. For the
villagers to come to a decision they would not only consider the amount of
money they receive. More important is whether the money reflects
acceptance of the individual value and shows an understanding of the
villages social landscape.
Politically, the Community of Desire is relatively diverse and their
voting decisions at different electoral levels are hard to predict. Once,
during the Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) election ahead
of the general poll, a party was tipped to secure the highest votes in the
village. One of the two leading candidates in the TAO election was a
member of a large political party that since its inception had been the
most popular choice. The other leading candidate was a provincial politician
from a medium-sized party who was also a relative of a national politician.
This provincial election was very important for both parties as it served as
part of their efforts to vie for local support and gain control over a portion
of state officials, in preparation for the upcoming national election. As
such, both candidates strategy was to use their parties policies, which had
been popular and effective in the past, as well as give money to villagers
who attended seminars and meetings. Compared side by side, the candidate
from a large party appeared to have an edge over another candidate as
his party had a proven track record in winning over voters with its
crowd-pleasing populist policies as well as the fact that he offered more
seminar allowances200-300 Baht higher than his opponents rate. But
when the election result came, the exact opposite happened. The provincial
politician from the medium-sized party, which had a stronghold in the
province where the Community of Desire was situated, won the election.
The poll result did not surprise the villagers of the Community of Desire
because it accurately mirrored their desire to have a provincial representative
who had sound understanding of the locality as well as knew the specific
areas of development that needed attention at the provincial level. Below
is a comment from a fiery young man who lives in the Community of Desire
on the situation and what being the communitys representative (phuthan)
may entail:

I often say we have to think about who to vote for. The word,
phuthan means a person who represents our group. How can we
get someone who will understand and act in our interest? When they
become a [minister of parliament], they become our representative,
so we have to see who we can count on. Their canvassers may
hint to their people whether this or that candidate would come
and help when we have a problem or whether he or she will bring
in any projects to the community. You cant just elect someone
and later not even get a single development project. Or when
villagers visit them and they never open their door, do you still
think that you can rely on them? If I were a canvasser or a core
leader, Id say something like this, do what you want, run with
whoever you want to, but when its time to make the decision you
have to be yourself.
Meanwhile, politicians are drawn to the Community of Desire on a
regular basis because of its networks of relationships, especially the ties
to national and local politicians, canvassers, and villagers. Also, as the
community is home to an important temple that functions as the community
center, its location plays an important part in attracting streams of political
guests. Politicians at all levels would pay a visit to the temple, partly to
make merit and pay their respects, but at the same time they are also there
to build support as they mingle with the villagers. There is one national
politician who regularly visits the temple. He is one of its major patrons
and always gives his support whenever a religious ceremony is organized
either for the village or nearby communities. From their perspective, the
villagers have always felt close to this politician and hold great respect for
him, although in the national election this politician is not a member of
one of the larger political parties but in the single-member constituency
system. The residents will most likely give their votes to this candidate.
However, when they vote for a political party in the party list system, the
residents will mainly look at the partys policies and their performance.
The respect and recognition the villagers show to the previously
described politician through their votes reflects the value villagers place
on giving and gaining political recognition. This insight brings attention,
on one hand, to the change in rural peoples view on politics and illustrates
that their decisions are not entirely based on or tied to canvassing or the
requests from local leaders such as subdistrict headmen, teachers, village
headmen, or chief executives of the TAOs. On the other hand, the villagers
are taking an active part in politics in their everyday lifei.e., outside of
electionsas well, which underlines that they do not submit to the old-
fashioned rhetoric of vote selling and buying. In this light, to render
JAKKRIT 29

populist policies and stimulus promises designed to please rural electorate as
the only determinant of the rural voting decisions would be an inadequate set
of explanation that in its analysis excludes rural everyday political practices in
Thailand. As exemplified by the Community of Desire, any of the
determinants from networks of relationships between the politicians and
communities to the time period of valuation, mutual respect, candidates
sincerity, as well as close ties with the community, can be one of the
decisive factors in elections.
If money is not the deciding factor in vote buying, then why is cash
still being given to villagers, and why does the practice hold significance
until today? In the eyes of the Community of Desires villagers, the cash
they received from politicians either through canvassers or directly from
attending seminars with the political parties was not in an exchange of
each persons vote. To view it in this way means that we are using a political
behavior framework that concentrates on observing different behaviors in
politics rather than trying to develop a deeper understanding of the
underlying implications to analyze rural political practices and expression.
When cultural implications of political practices are left out, it is easy to
generalize and conclude that vote selling is a transaction for quick
benefits, comparable to any regular purchase. The stories from the villagers,
however, indicate otherwise. The money, in fact, has a symbolic function and
represents the recognition of each villagers existence and identity.
Rural political society today is no longer a traditional patron-client
society wherein clients would be satisfied with minimal provision of
fundamental security. The members in modern rural political society,
such as residents of the Community of Desire, yearn for recognition of
their existence, whether as friends, networks, group members, or house-
hold members, and want to be acknowledged that they are equal actors in
the political system. In this context, money is not a bribe that is devoid
of any socio-cultural meaning. It is an affirmation or a gift that
symbolizes the acknowledgement of the recipients existence and political
recognition by politicians, canvassers, or candidates in local elections.
An important question that should be asked is, why is cash payment
rarely seen in urban areas? One explanation for this absence is that urban
areas have always been a priority in state policy-making and administration.
Studies on government budget allocation for development have shown
that despite efficient budgeting and administration, rural areas have always
been overlooked (Walker 2012). The enduring imbalance in funding and
resource allocation between urban and rural areas has created negative
attitudes among the rural people who, for a very long time, have been

made to feel inferior and second rate in the eyes of the government and
public policies. In the past, the money and support for the community
festivities and family activities such as funerals and ordination may have
been considered to be a small return that villagers felt they were entitled
to get back from society. Getting a few hundred Baht during election period
may have had significant value when rural people were still living in poverty.
But villagers in modern rural society have grown into middle-income
farmers, landless laborers and local business entrepreneurs (Apichart et al.
2011, Jamaree et al. 2012, Walker 2012). Receiving a few hundred Baht
will not make any difference to their standard of living. And yet, the
practice persists and remains almost indispensable in rural politics
(Callahan and McCargo 1996) precisely because the perception of money
has been transformed from financial aid to poor villagers to a symbol that
represents an awareness of the rural votes and voters existence as well as
the recognition of their political agency.
In addition, rural society is a community that is deeply connected and
tied to different and overlapping networks of social relationshipsfrom
kinship systems to group members, dependence on production systems,
and reverence for temples together with resource allocationall of which
have a hand in establishing and shaping the context of rural communities
and how rural people make their political decisions. Interwoven with and
inseparable from the politics of the electoral system, these social relationships
are manifested in the existence of canvassing and cash payment where the
value of cash is more cultural than economic.
To be clear, in writing this article, it was not my intention to deem
whether circulation of money in these networks of relationships which we
loosely characterize as vote buying is right or wrong. What I am trying
to do is simply to point out that to make a blanket discourse and declare
that rural voters do not understand the concept of democracy or assume
that rural voters are either morally corrupted, myopic, poorly educated, or
easily manipulated and exploited by politicians because they accept money
is a an oversimplification that dismisses both the agency of the rural electorate
and the political meanings they give to money. Through a cultural
perspective, we will find that rural voters are in fact not different from
other (urban) voters. They look at a pool of politicians or representatives
and use multiple sets of criteria to decide who they will vote for. Rural
voters acceptance of a few hundred Baht or gifts and assistance from
politicians ahead of an election is only one of the steps in the long and vast
process of their deliberation of politicians and representatives. To develop
JAKKRIT 31

an accurate understanding of rural people as one of the actors in Thai
politics, we cannot afford to take shortcuts and look at vote buying in
exclusion from its connections to other relationships, as doing so would be
no different from studying political practices in a vacuum, completely
divorced from social and cultural contexts. Not only will this prevent us
from understanding rural peoples reasoning and desire, but it will also
lead to inadequate resolutions and misguided political reforms (see Callahan
2005a, 2005b).
Rural Aspiration and Changing Thailands Political Landscape
In tracing rural political expression from examining the transformation of
social, economic, and political relationship systems to exploring rural political
practices through elections, we are able to identify the following issues
that have arisen in our mapping of Thailands political landscape.
First, everyday politics of desire and aspiration has transcended the
system of politics that is tied to particular individuals based on personal
relations with politicians, village canvassers, local mafias, or even the leaders
of social/community movement. Rural everyday politics gives importance
to the study of villagers political practices that are related to villagers self
positioning to access resources and wide-ranging benefits from their
extensive and flexible networks of relationshipsa social phenomenon
that has been happening for generations (see also Walker 2012). Put simply,
current rural aspiration is a political expression that has not recently
emerged as a result of, say, Thaksin Shinawatra or other politicians, local
canvassers, or one leaders populist policies or social movement alone.
These structural political relationships based on individual attachment
are merely components of the rural networks of power and not the creator
or regulator of the everyday politics of local people. Most of the political
actors studied in conventional political sciencesuch as those attached
to electoral and social movement politicsare not the sole actors in the
networks of countless actors in rural Thai politics.
Second, structural economic change and capitalism in rural Thailand
are not the only factors that bring out rural peoples political desire. The
expression is a result of long-term economic and social interactions in
the dynamics of everyday life between rural people and other actors. The
interaction of everyday politics concerns the management of relationships
and social capital with new actors, the basis of which is not limited to
economic gains. Such activity is also connected to and overlapped with

the political desire to manage social landscape and other political units
including religion, media, state agencies, private capital, the masses, and
fellow villagers who possess different desires and benefits. It is true that
economic changes have been the contributing factor that increases rural
peoples opportunities to meet and interact with all kinds of actors.
Nevertheless, we cannot claim that desire, political expression, and awareness
of rights, policies and political participation, resulted solely from the recent
change in structural economy.
Third, through observing villagers everyday political practices, we
have found that determinants and meanings constructed in relation to
election are made in response to local aspiration. The machination of politics
to respond to local aspiration or engine of aspiration (Chairat 2012a,
2012b, 16) is deeply connected to economic and social status and desire/
aspiration of individuals whose livelihoods are not exclusively tied to the
farm sector or rural space. When elections are priced and their meaning
continuously redefined by actors who have different statuses and positions,
the villagers valuation system may consist of different sets of criteriaa
set for each level of politics. However, it is not possible to decode this
valuation system in order to create a formula that can explain which criteria or
determinants are applied and used in each level of elections. Rather, the
system functions as a response to the new form of relationships that I have
termed the politics of desire and entitlement (Jakkrit 2011), within which
villagers are well aware of opportunities and their entitlement in a countrys
economic liberalization and democratization processes. As a result of this
awareness, rural villagers have attached their power as voters to various
political systems simultaneously in their everyday life beyond elections.
Lastly, money in the electoral system has been redefined and its function
now exists outside of the traditional patron-client system. It is not simply
an exchange of voting rights and money; it has metamorphosed into a
social symbol that responds to the rural aspirationthe desire to be
recognized and for their entitlement to be acknowledged. To dismiss
everyday relationships and focus only on transactions of cash when analyzing
elections and considering money to be the one and only decisive factor in
deciding who to vote for is a colossal misunderstanding. Such understanding
turns a blind eye to the fact that money in the electoral system has been
given a cultural meaning by rural villagers. The rural villagers in their
current circumstances have other choices and sources of incomes, which
enable them to become much more secure, socially and economically. A
few hundred Baht received from politicians and canvassers will not
JAKKRIT 33

change or transform the rural electorates livelihoods and clearly will not
spur them to exchange their rights for money. Money, in cultural context,
is only a ticket to mutual recognition between politicians, canvassers, voters,
and villagers, a factor in relationships that will be developed and connected to
other forms of relationships during campaigning and election times as
well as beyond. Indeed, continuously growing and expanding everyday
relationships serves as the context of politics and the crux that determines
how well politicians, political parties, and policies respond to the dynamics
of rural aspiration.
Notes
1. One obvious example is the reaction of the Thai middle class who often regard rural
people in the Red Shirt movement as buffalos, uneducated, and for hire.
2. For a thorough study of the desires of rural migrants in urban setting of Bangkok,
see Sopranzetti 2012b.
3. For political anthropologists, the study of politics in terms of structures, party systems
and organized political activities poses immense limitations. Seen through the lens of
anthropology, politics often falls between two broad frameworks (Paley 2002). The
first is the study of political forms and activities, e.g., polls, political gathering, sourcing
of political news and information, and creation of political connections. The second
examines political imaginaries and the effects a cultural value system in a particular
society has on how its people manage social relations in addition to cooperation,
discord, conception, and acquisition of political ideology, as well as political struggle
(See Paley 2002).
4. An article by Pitch Pongsawat (2003) called The Relationship Between Economy
and Politics in the Transformation of Farm Society and Farmers Movement in
Present Thai Society: Critical Analysis (translated by Chanida Chitbandit, Kanokrat
Lertchusakul, and Chaithawat Tulathon) provides one of the most inclusive analyses
of the transformation of the farmers movement. Pitch points out that the farmers
movement is not limited to demonstrations and protests, but comes in many forms,
and is linked to socioeconomic factors. Nonetheless, the articles view of the farmers
movement remains mostly limited to focusing on the formation of the movement,
class belonging, or the movement as part of a broader social movement.
5. To further explore this idea, one important study that invites us to examine rural
rationality and cultural trends in relation to rural peoples political understanding and
expression is a work by Nidhi Eawsriwong (1991) and a study by Andrew
Walker (2008).
6. The middle-class perception of rural people as succumbing to immediate economic
benefits and the power and influence of local politicians, as well as their willingness
to sell their votes for a small amount of money, is clearly illustrated in the excerpted
paragraph on page 10.
7. Rai is a Thai measurement of land. One rai is roughly equal to 0.4 acre.

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Democracy in South Korea, 2012
JUNGHOON KIM, HYUNGCHUL KIM, SEOUNGWON LEE,
YOOSEOK OH, DONGCHOON KIM, YOUNGPYO SEO,
SANGCHUL YOON, KYUNGHEE CHOI, HYUNYUN CHO,
HEEYEON CHO
Introduction
In 2012, South Korea celebrated a quarter century of having made a visible
transition to democracy. Over the last twenty-five years, democracy in
Korea has evolved significantly in terms of its procedure. Citizens still
profess a high degree of confidence in democracy as the best political
arrangement. Yet worries have been rising over the state of democracy in
Korea since the Lee Myung-bak administration was inaugurated in 2008.
Although a democratic government is characterized by the continuing
responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens (Dahl 1971, 1) and must
guarantee the freedom of expression and communication among the
people as the fundamental precondition for its decisionmaking, the Lee
administration has been ignoring the peoples opinions and demands, thus
fuelling frequent political and social conflicts that mark Korean society
now. In particular, the administrations policy that curbs the freedom of
the press is now widely criticized as a representative symptom of basic
civil rights in peril. Furthermore, the Lee administrations penchant for
neoliberal economic policy has accelerated the erosion of the middle class
and economic bipolarization in Korea, radically weakening key socioeconomic
conditions for democracy.
This report contains an assessment of the current state of democracy
in Korea using the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) developed by the
Democracy and Social Movements Institute at Sungkonghoe University.
1

____________________________________________________________
Junghoon Kim, Hyungchul Kim, Yooseok Oh, Dongchoon Kim, Hyunyun Cho, and
Heeyeon Cho are all from the Democracy and Social Movements Institute of Sungkonghoe
University. Seoungwon Lee is Research Professor at Sogang Global Korean Study Initiative
in Sogang University. Youngpyo Seo is Assistant Professor of the Department of Sociology
in Jeju National University. Kyunghee Choi is from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
Sangchul Yoon is Professor of the Department of Sociology in Hanshin University

40 SOUTH KOREA COUNTRY REPORT 2012

In order to ensure the objectivity and validity of the assessment, a two-
track strategy was chosen. First, the experts to be surveyed were chosen
on the basis of their ideological affinities. The experts, in other words,
were grouped into the conservative (pro-government), moderate, and
progressive (anti-government) camps. By revealing the ideological differences
of the experts surveyed, the authors of this report hoped to make the
assessment more objective. Second, different groups of experts were
chosen to assess different fields of analysis. There were three different
expert groups for analyzing Korean democracy on three different dimensions:
politics, economy, and civil society.
A total of twenty-seven experts were included in this survey. The
twenty-seven experts were divided into three groups of nine. Each group
included three conservatives, three moderates, and three progressives. All
these experts were career academics and activists. More specifically, the
assessment of political and economic democracies was assigned to groups
of mostly professors and career researchers, while civil activists were
entrusted with the assessment of the civil society. The survey took place
via e-mail from early June to the end of July 2012.
Background Context of Democracy in Korea, 2012
Two major elections were scheduled in Korea in 2012: the nineteenth
general election of National Assembly members and the eighteenth
presidential election. 2012 was also the last year of President Lee
Myung-baks term. The assessment of the Lee administrations performance
over the last five years tends to be more negative than positive. The
emphasis it placed on the neoliberal approach to economic development
and pragmatism has intensified practices of exclusion across all sectors
of Korean society, whether politics, economy, or civil society. Political
and administrative power was concentrated in a handful of people who
are close to, or share similar backgrounds with President Lee, such as
Lee Sang-deuk, who is the Presidents brother; the alumni of Korea
University; his fellow congregants at Somang Church; and people from the
southeastern part of Korea known as Yeongnam. The shift to deregulation
in the economic sphere has fuelled the concentration of wealth and power
in chaebol and multinational conglomerates, further widening the gap
between the haves and have-nots. The increasing censorship over online
communications and the press has restricted the freedom of expression
and weakened the influence of civil society over the government.
The patterns of exclusion and monopolization noted across all the
domains of Korean society have made corruption run rampant among the
KIM, KIM, LEE, AND OTHERS 41

Presidents relatives and friends, weakened the macroscopic prospects of
the Korean economy, and intensified socioeconomic dichotomization.
These phenomena have served a serious blow to President Lees popularity
and accelerated the lame-duck process, threatening his governments ability
to do its job. The nineteenth general election, held on April 11, drew a
voter turnout of 54.3 percent, which is 8.2 percentage points higher than
the turnout for the eighteenth general election (see figure 1). However,
the governing party, Saenuri, won a landslide victory, while the opposition
forces led by the Democratic United Party lost bitterly.

Figure 1. Voter Turnout Rates Since Democratization

Source: National Election Commission (NEC) 2012.
2

As shown in table 1, the Saenuri Party won 127 district seats and
twenty-five proportional representative seats, claiming more than one-half
of the National Assembly. The Democratic United Party had a strong
campaign throughout, but was able to claim only a total of 127 seats in
total. The United Progressive Party won thirteen seats, becoming the
progressive party with the most seats in Korean history and securing its
position as the third major presence in the national legislature. The Liberty
Forward Party, a self-proclaimed representative of the Chungcheong
region, ended up winning only five seats. The nineteenth election on the
whole left the governing party intact and powerful and kept the opposition
forces small and fragmented. The protracted conflict between the two
factions led the nineteenth National Assembly to convene its first meeting
early in August, almost two months after the originally scheduled date on
May 30. The infuriating fights within the National Assembly have only
served to heighten the publics distrust of the legislative body.

Saenuri Un. Dem. Un. Prog. Lib. Fwd. Independent
District 127 106 7 3 3
Prop. Rep. 25 21 6 2

Total 152 127 13 5 3

News of rampant corruption among President Lees relatives and
friends started making headlines after the nineteenth general election.
The public suffered a radical decline in trust in the Lee administration as
a series of its key figures were arrested and indicted for practices of pervasive
corruption. These figures included Lee Sang-deuk, a former assemblyman
and the presidents brother and Choi Shi-jung, the commissioner of
Korea Broadcasting and Communication Commission.

Table 1. Number of Seats Won by Each Party in the Nineteenth General Election

Source: NEC 2012.

According to the 2011 Report on National Competitiveness released
by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, South Korea came in
tenth among the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in terms of gross domestic product (GDP),
eighth in terms of trade, and second in terms of economic growth rates,
actual and potential alike. Yet Korea managed to arrive at the twenty-sixth
position among the thirty-four member states in terms of GDP per capita.
It also topped the list of working hours, with each working Korean working
an average of 2,193 hours a year. The Gini coefficient and poverty rate,
both indicators of income inequality, placed Korea in the twenty-fourth
and twentieth positions, respectively, signifying that Korea is less egalitarian
than most of the other OECD states. Korea also came in sixth in terms of
the proportion of part-time or contract-based workers in the workforce
(19.24 percent), suggesting a severe distortion in its labor market.
In the meantime, broadcasters and members of the press went on a
series of strikes in their struggle to secure fairness and objectivity in news
reporting. Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), a state-owned
television network, saw the most intense and protracted labor strike as the
labor union resisted the new president of the corporation appointed by
President Lee. As these strikes illustrate, the Korean government has
critically incapacitated the press from serving its functions.


Saenuri Un. Dem. Un. Prog. Lib. Fwd. Independent
District 127 106 7 3 3
Prop. Rep. 25 21 6 2

Total 152 127 13 5 3

Figure 2: Main Indicators of Koreas Economic Performance
Source: No Cut News 2012.
3

Assessment
Index of Democracy in Korea, 2012
The survey showed that Korea scored 4.78 in the ADI in 2012, lower
than the 4.93 it scored in 2011. Breaking down this score revealed that
Korea scored highest (5.57) in the political dimension. The country
scored 4.81 and 3.87 in the dimensions of civil society and economy,
respectively. Table 2 shows how Korea fared in terms of the liberalization
and equalization of each field in 2012.

Table 2. Index of Democracy in Korea (2012)
Among the three fields, Korea scored better in terms of liberalization
(5.44), which is underpinned by autonomy and competition, compared to
equalization (4.13), which requires pluralization and solidarity. This
suggests that the ideal of equality still remains far from being materialized
in Korean democracy. In particular, Korea fared most poorly in terms of
equalization in the field of economy, reflecting the severe socioeconomic
bipolarization in Korean society.

Politics Economy Civil Society Total
Liberalization 6.33 4.57 5.41 5.44
Equalization 4.82 3.16 4.40 4.13
Index of Democracy 5.57 3.87 4.91 4.78


Liberalization Equalization
Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity
Politics 6.97 5.69 4.72 4.91
Economy 5.25 3.89 2.58 3.75
Civil Society 4.94 5.89 4.50 4.30
Mean 5.72 5.15 3.93 4.32

Figure 3. Comparing Liberalization and Equalization Scores (2011-2012)

The liberalization and equalization scores (6.33 and 4.82, respectively) in
politics in 2012 were lower than their counterparts in 2011 (6.60 and
5.11, respectively; see figure 3). The decline in the liberalization score
reflects a number of factors, including the drop in the guarantee of the
right to political participation, from 8.22 in 2011 to 7.11 in 2012; the
decline in acceptance of political dissent (by 0.34); and the deteriorating
status of the rule of law and electoral fairness. As for equalization, a
significant decline was noted in terms of system and degree of participation
with a score that dropped from 7 in 2011 to 4.44 in 2012. The level of
trust in the legislature and its representatives also dropped, along with the
level of trust in democracy. It is the decline in the last indicator that best
captures the declining state of the Korean democracy overall.
In the economic sphere, Koreas liberalization score showed a
marginal increase between 2011 and 2012, rising from 4.46 to 4.57.
Its equalization score, on the contrary, dropped drastically from 3.75
to 3.16. The most significant factor that contributed to this decline is
the poor state of pluralization in the Korean economy reflected by the
increasing monopolization of wealth and economic inequality. Korea
scored poorer than it did last year on the dimensions of pluralization,
with the survey respondents agreeing that there is a dramatic increase in
income and property inequality. As for solidarity, Korea also saw its scores
decline in terms of execution of social security nets and in terms of influence
of labor unions on policymaking.
Koreas score on the field of civil society increased slightly between
2011 and 2012, from 4.84 to 4.91. In 2011, Koreas score on the political
aspects of civil society was relatively low, while its score on the economic


Liberalization Equalization
Politics 6.97 5.69 4.72 4.91
Economy 5.25 3.89 2.58 3.75
Civil Society 4.94 5.89 4.50 4.30
Mean 5.72 5.15 3.93 4.32

aspects was relatively high. This pattern suggests that the growth of the power
of the Korean civil society has not kept up its pace with the development of
procedural democracy. Nevertheless, it also implies that Korean civil
society harbors a relatively great potential to lead the substantive development
of democracy. The decline in the liberalization of civil society reflects the
growing pressure that governmental organizations and the private sector
exert on civil society, the weakening roles and capabilities of voluntary
and nongovernmental organizations, and the lowering in social acceptance
as a whole. The relative rise in the equalization score, on the other hand,
reflects an overall improvement in terms of all aspects of equalization
except for the inequality of information.

Table 3. Korean Autonomy, Competition, Pluralization, and Solidarity in Three
Fields, 2012

Table 3 shows how Korea scored on the specific properties or sub-
principles of liberalization and equalization. As these scores illustrate,
Korea tends to score higher on the principle of autonomy, which is one of
the elements of liberalization. Koreas scores in terms of competition
also remains relatively high in the fields of politics and civil society. The
relatively low degree of competition in the economic field reflects generally
low degrees of transparency and fairness in corporate management and low
levels of accountability in government and corporations. Notwithstanding the
march of democracy elsewhere, political-economic alliance and corporate
management still remain immune to democratic rules and persist in
authoritarian practices.
Korea scored less than average (5.0) in terms of both pluralization
and solidarity in the political field, suggesting that the monopolistic exercise
of authority still remains the norm in Korea. Korea scored very poorly
2.58 and 3.75, respectivelyon pluralization and solidarity in economic
equalization. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the score on economic


pluralization, which is a measure of economic exclusion and inequality,
plummeted from 3.76 in 2011 to 2.58 in 2012. This suggests a dramatic
intensification of economic inequality in Korea over a period of only a
year. As for the civil society field, the state of pluralization has generally
weakened. In comparison, solidarity has generally increased. In other
words, affirmative action, participation in voluntary organizations, and the
influence of the civil society on policymaking have all improved. Meanwhile,
social inequality and exclusion continue to rise along with their economic
counterparts.
Types and Characteristics of Responses
Politics
Koreas democracy index in the field of politics dropped between 2011
and 2012, indicating either the stagnation or the regression of democracy
in Korean politics. It is important to understand how Korean politics
fared on each of the principles making up democracy. Table 4 shows that
Koreas score on autonomy, a factor of liberalization, rose by 0.11 points
between 2011 and 2012. At the same time, Koreas scores on competition,
another factor of liberalization, and on the subprinciples of equalization,
i.e., pluralization and solidarity, declined. The margin of difference in the
scores on solidarity (from 5.36 to 4.91) is especially noteworthy.

Table 4. Autonomy, Competition, Pluralization, and Solidarity in Korean Politics,
2011-2012
Some of the major changes noted in Koreas scores between 2011 and
2012 on the four subprinciples that make up political liberalization and
equalization were analyzed in detail. (A summary of the changes in rating
can be seen in table 5.) On one hand, the autonomy score rose between
2011 and 2012, thanks to the increases in the scores that Korea earned on
the political surveys question (Q) 1, Q2, and Q3 (i.e., on items concerning
the level of protection afforded to citizens against violence perpetrated by
Year

2011 6.86 5.83 4.86 5.36
2012 6.97 5.69 4.72 4.91


the state, the guarantee of civil liberties, and the freedom to form and
participate in assemblies, respectively). On the other hand, Koreas score
under questions like Q4 (acceptance of political dissent) lowered, reflecting
the physical coercion to which the Korean state resorted to in curtailing
the freedoms of expression and assembly in incidents like the protests
against the establishment of a naval base in Jeju, the renegotiation of the
Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement, and against the Four Rivers
Project. In other words, the scope of civil liberties and political rights
Koreans enjoy may have expanded between 2011 and 2012, but the
ideological bias of the ruling elite and the rejection of political dissent
continue to persist.
Koreas score in Q5 (the protection of citizens suffrage) also lowered.
Although Koreas score under this question was the highest in the previous
surveygetting a score of 8.22it drastically dropped to 7.11 in 2012.
The change reflects the perception not of any actual loss of the right to
vote and the right to run for office, but of the increasing hardline stance
of the government that refuses to hear the publics opinion in policymaking
decisions. The lower score on this item, in other words, reflects the single-
handed manner in which the Lee administration makes and enforces its
policy decisions. This unilateralism seems to render the right to vote and
the right to run for office less meaningful. Koreas score under Q7
(concentration of power in the nonelected elite) is also lower, mainly due
to the public perception that Lee Sang-deuk, the presidents brother, had
unduly meddled with governance by virtue of blood ties. Koreas scores under
Q8 and Q9 (the rule of law and electoral fairness, respectively), were also
lower. Thus, Korean democracy still lacks the institutional preconditions that
Robert Dahl has pointed out as necessary for democracy (1998).
As for pluralization, a principle of equalization, Korea scored higher in
2012 than it did in 2011 under Q12 and Q14 (dispersion of power in the
parliament and the democratization of state institutions, respectively). Yet its
score plummeted from 4.78 to 3.89 under Q13 (political representativeness).
Koreans, in other words, perceive the legislative body not as an assembly
adequately reflecting the diverse values and interests of the public, but as
a body catering to the needs and demands of only certain powerful
groups. A key problem lies in the electoral arrangement that decides the form
and shape of the legislature. Korea has a mixed-member majoritarian system
under which the first-past-the-post winner has a greater number of seats
to give out than the number of proportional representative seats. This
distorts the representation of interests and demands in the legislature, and
is responsible for the declining level of public trust in it.


Attribute Indicator / Question 2011 2012
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The level of the
performance of
state violence
1. How well do you think the citizens
are protected from the violence wielded
by government agencies in your
country?
6.56 6.89
Civil rights 2. How well do you think the citizens
freedom is protected in your country?
7.22 7.33
Freedom to
organize and act in
political groups
3. How much do you think the
freedom of assembly and activities of
political groups (parties and quasi-
political organizations) are protected in
your country?
7.11 7.44
Permission for
political opposition
opposition movements to the
government or governing groups and
the governing ideology are allowed in
your country?
6.56 6.22
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The expansion of
the universal
suffrage
5. How well do you think suffrage of
the citizens is protected in your
country?
8.22 7.11
Efficiency of the
state
6. How well do you think all
government agencies implement
government policies in your country?
4.33 5.00
The presence of
the non-elected
hereditary power
7. How much do you think non-
elected groups account for the political
power in your country?
4.00 3.78
The rule under
the laws
8. How well do you think the rule of
law is established in your country?
5.33 5.22
Electoral fairness 9. How fairly do you think elections
are conducted in your country?
7.78 7.67
Transparency 10. How transparent do you think the
operations of government agencies are
in your country?
5.33 5.33

Table 5. Indicators of Democracy in Korean Politics, 2011-2012

. . . . . . . . . . . .


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The level of the
performance of
state violence
1. How well do you think the citizens
are protected from the violence wielded
by government agencies in your
country?
6.56 6.89
Civil rights 2. How well do you think the citizens
freedom is protected in your country?
7.22 7.33
Freedom to
organize and act in
political groups
freedom of assembly and activities of
political groups (parties and quasi-
political organizations) are protected in
your country?
7.11 7.44
Permission for
political opposition
opposition movements to the
government or governing groups and
the governing ideology are allowed in
your country?
6.56 6.22
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The expansion of
the universal
suffrage
5. How well do you think suffrage of
the citizens is protected in your
country?
8.22 7.11
Efficiency of the
state
6. How well do you think all
government agencies implement
government policies in your country?
4.33 5.00
The presence of
the non-elected
hereditary power
7. How much do you think non-
elected groups account for the political
power in your country?
4.00 3.78
The rule under
the laws
8. How well do you think the rule of
law is established in your country?
5.33 5.22
Electoral fairness 9. How fairly do you think elections
are conducted in your country?
7.78 7.67
Transparency 10. How transparent do you think the
operations of government agencies are
in your country?
5.33 5.33

Table 5 (continued)
As for solidarity, Korea scored better in 2012 than it did in 2011 under
Q16 and Q17 (i.e., affirmative action for the marginalized and citizens
trust in democracy as a system, respectively). Yet Koreas score plummeted
by the biggest margin on the level or degree of participation, from 7.00 in
2011 to 4.44 in 2012. The drop reflects the increasing censorship over
political dissent, the increasing limitation on the routes of access to
policymaking, the single-handed and dogmatic hostile stance of the
Lee administration on communication, and the declining representativeness
of the legislature. The citizens distrust in the legislature is also evident in
Koreas low score under Q18, as the National Assembly increasingly
serves as an arena of uncompromising fights over factional interests, thus

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Independence
and checks and
balances between
state power
apparatuses
11. How well do you think
government agencies maintain checks
and balance?
5.11 5.11
Dispersion of
political power in
the parliament
12. How well do you think the power
within the legislature is distributed in
your country?
4.78 5.00
Political
representation
13. How well do you think the
Parliament or the legislature represent
various social groups in your country?
4.78 3.89
Democratization
of state institutions
14. How fairly and rationally do you
think government agencies are being
implemented in your country?
4.78 4.89
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Participation
system and degree
of participation
15. How actively do you think citizens
are participating in elections and other
political decision making processes in
your country?
7.00 4.44
Affirmative
action
16. How well do you think affirmative
actions are established and
implemented in your country?
4.33 4.44
The public
credibility of the
current democratic
institution
17. How much do you think the public
trust the government?
4.00 4.67
trust the Parliament/ Legislature?
4.11 3.78
trust Democracy?
7.33 7.22


failing to serve its function in engaging and satisfying the public interests
through policymaking.
In summary, political democracy, as defined by Dahl, remains
intact and active in Korea along with increasing political participation
and electoral competition. Yet it fails to carry adequate representativeness
and accountability. According to experts, this unreactive democracy
continues to dismay and frustrate the Korean public.
Economy
In 2012, same as in 2011, Korea performed poorly in the economic
field, with its overall score dropping from 4.10 to 3.87. While Koreas
performance somewhat improved on the subprinciples of liberalization, its
performance on the subprinciples of equalization significantly deteriorated. In
other words, Koreans are most dissatisfied with the state of democracy in
their economy. Increasing levels of economic inequality continues to
obstruct the task of consolidating democracy in Korea.
Table 6 shows Koreas scores on liberalization and equalization in the
economic field. The significant drop in the overall score on the economic
field reflects the greater margin by which Koreas equalization score fell
(from 3.71 to 3.17) than the margin by which its liberalization score rose
(from 4.46 to 4.51). The decline in economic democracy suggests that
Koreans have begun to feel the specific and actual effects of increasing
economic inequality. A more detailed comparison of the 2011 and 2012
ratings can be seen in table 7.

Table 6. Autonomy, Competition, Pluralization, and Solidarity in the Korean
Economy, 2011-2012
Koreas score on economic autonomy (Q4) has drastically decreased
from 5.89 in 2011 to 5.22 in 2012, reflecting the increasing influence of
foreign countries and foreign capital on the Korean economy. The
Environment and Labor Committee in the National Assembly held a
hearing on September 20, 2012 over the exhausting strike of workers of
the Ssangyong Motor Company. The hearing served to reveal the depth
Year

2011 5.19 3.72 3.78 3.65
2012 5.14 3.89 2.58 3.75


and magnitude of social disturbances that the increasing power of foreign
capital could wring. The hearing unearthed the fact that, in drafting
the accounting documents for Ssangyongupon request by Shanghai
Automobilea major accounting firm in Korea charged with the task
deliberately underappraised the values of the companys tangible assets so
as to support the withdrawal of its business operations and justify structural
readjustment. When Shanghai Automobile, Ssangyongs largest share-
holder, withdrew from Ssangyong in 2009, the highest priority for Korea
Development Bank and the Korean government, as Ssangyongs second-
largest shareholder, was to find another buyer as soon as possible to
normalize management. While the labor union continued to negotiate
with the legal manager over the scope of structural readjustment, the
police began to quell union activists with force, destroying any willingness
in union members to continue negotiations. The brutal ways the police
dealt with the strike that went on for seventy-six days were broadcasted
and reported worldwide. The incident culminated in the voluntary
resignation by 2,026 employees, the unpaid leaves of 461 employees,
and the dismissal of 159 employees. The result, in turn, led to the suicide
of some two dozen laid-off workers and their family members. The
Ssangyong strike vividly illustrates how transnational capital could threaten a
democratic state.
Notwithstanding the Lee administrations anti-union policy, Korea
scored higher under Q2 (protection of the right to work) in 2012 than it
did in 2011. This reflects a shift in the administrations policy from exclusion
only to the maintaining of the status quo. The Hope Bus Campaigns,
launched in 2011 response to the occupation of Crane No. 85 on the site
of the Yeongdo Plant of Hanjin Heavy Industries by Kim Jin-suk, a senior
executive of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, helped to raise
the publics awareness and criticism of layoffs. In September and December
of the same year, the Chungnam District Labor Committee and the
Busan District Labor Committee, respectively, ruled Hyundai Motor
Companys dismissal of its subcontracted workers as illegal. In February
2012, the Supreme Court also ruled that the company had illegally hired
internal subcontractors, hinting at a possible new resolve of the judiciary
to brake indiscriminate hiring of contract-based workers in Korea.
Yet Koreas score dropped with respect to competition, bespeaking
the persistence of unfairness in corporate competition. The relations
between conglomerates and smaller companies and between super chain
stores and smaller local markets and vendors still remain unfair by and
large. The widening gap between conglomerates and smaller companies
testifies that the Lee administrations flagrantly pro-business, neoliberal
Year

2011 5.19 3.72 3.78 3.65
2012 5.14 3.89 2.58 3.75


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Freedom/
autonomy of
economic activities
without political
intervention
1. How much influence do you think
the political power/elite have on the
operation of private companies in your
country?
4.78 5.22
Protection of
basic labor rights
2. How well do you think labor rights
are established in your country?
4.33 4.89
prohibition of forced labor and child
labor is observed in your country?
5.78 5.67
Autonomy of
decision making in
the policy of the
international
political economy
4. How independent do you think
decision making processes of the
central government is from foreign
countries and/or foreign capital in your
country?
5.89 5.22
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Economic
transparency
5. How transparent do you think the
corporate operations are in your
country?
4.22 4.33
Economic
fairness
6. How fair do you think the
competition between companies is in
your country?
3.67 3.44
Governments
accountability
7. How much effort do you think the
government is exerting to protect and
guarantee labor rights in your country?
3.56 4.11
Corporate
accountability
8. How well do you think private
companies protect/ guarantee labor
rights in your country?
3.44 3.67

economic policy did not have the trickle-down effect it seemed to promise.
Although the administration sought to tackle this problem by organizing
the Mutual Growth Committee in December 2012, its first chairman,
Jeong Un-chan, stepped down in March 2012, exhorting the government
and the business community to outgrow their authoritarian paradigm.
His resignation made the unfair practices perpetrated by conglomerates a
hot issue in public debates and made economic democratization the
central keyword in the presidential election campaigns of 2012.

Table 7. Indicators of Democracy in the Korean Economy, 2012

. . . . . . . . . . . .

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Freedom/
autonomy of
economic activities
without political
intervention
the political power/elite have on the
operation of private companies in your
country?
4.78 5.22
Protection of
basic labor rights
2. How well do you think labor rights
are established in your country?
4.33 4.89
prohibition of forced labor and child
labor is observed in your country?
5.78 5.67
Autonomy of
decision making in
the policy of the
international
political economy
4. How independent do you think
decision making processes of the
central government is from foreign
countries and/or foreign capital in your
country?
5.89 5.22
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Economic
transparency
5. How transparent do you think the
corporate operations are in your
country?
4.22 4.33
Economic
fairness
6. How fair do you think the
competition between companies is in
your country?
3.67 3.44
Governments
accountability
7. How much effort do you think the
government is exerting to protect and
guarantee labor rights in your country?
3.56 4.11
Corporate
accountability
8. How well do you think private
companies protect/ guarantee labor
rights in your country?
3.44 3.67

Table 7 (continued)
Koreas poor performance was especially prominent based on the
responses to all questions under economic pluralization, i.e., on economic
monopolization, regional disparities, income inequality, property inequality,
and employment inequality. Especially worrisome is Koreas deteriorating
performance as regards income inequality and property inequality. This

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Economic
monopoly
economy is dominated by certain
groups in your country?
3.13 2.78
Regional
inequality
10. How serious do you think the
economic disparities/ inequality are
between regions in your country?
4.67 3.22
Inequality of
income
11. How serious do you think the
income disparity is in your country?
4.22 2.11
Inequality of
asset
12. How serious do you think the asset
disparity is in your country?
3.00 1.89
Inequality of
employment
13. How serious do you think
discrimination is in the labor market in
your country?
3.78 2.89
S
o
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d
a
r
i
t
y

The social
security system
14. How well do you think support
systems for the poor are working in
your country?
4.56 4.22
15. How well do you think the social
insurance programs are operated in
your country?
4.89 5.22
The activity of
trade unions
16. How well-organized do you think
labor unions are in your country?
3.11 3.33
labor unions have on the policies of the
central government in your country?
4.00 3.67
18. How much do you think labor
unions participate in the management
process in your country?
2.11 2.11
Corporate
watch
19. How well do you think public
monitoring is carried out on the
corporate activities in your country?
3.44 3.89
Awareness of
reducing
inequality
20. How enthusiastic do you think the
general public is about improving the
economic inequality in your country?
3.88 3.78


indicates the intensification and structuralization of socioeconomic
dichotomization in Korea. Monopolization is especially evident in the
excessive economic power of chaebol, while pervasive property inequality
is apparent in the distorted distribution of house and property ownership.
Korea scored 3.75 in economic solidarity in 2012, which is slightly
higher than its score on the same subprinciple in 2011. Yet the score on
the social security system dropped due to the growth-centered economic
policy of the Lee administration. Another key indicator of Koreas
worsening economic democracy is the weakening influence of labor unions
on the central governments policymaking. This suggests that the policy
of withholding salaries from full-time union members (in effect since July
2010) and the policy of fostering multiple unionswith a single window
of communicationon each business site have effectively undermined
labor activism in Korea.
Civil Society
If we grant that civil society is the source of impetus for the progress of
democracy, the Korean one shows both failures and signs of hope. The
democratic potential of Korean civil society is affirmed in the relative
increase in the scores of the civil society component of the 2012 ADI survey.
Although the overall score of Koreas democracy dropped between 2011
and 2012, the scores on the civil society field showed some improvements,
suggesting an increase in activism and the vitality of civil movements.
Although Korea scored higher in 2012 than it did in 2011 under
almost all questions concerning civil society, it did show a slight decrease in
its liberalization score and a relatively significant increase in its equalization
score. An analysis of the factors of this difference is herein provided.
Table 8 shows that while Koreas score on autonomy has dropped
significantly, its score on competition has risen by comparison. Autonomy
in this context refers to the independence of the civil society from the state
and economy. Similarly, Koreas score on pluralization has somewhat
decreased. Meanwhile, its score in solidarity has increased dramatically.
The low score on pluralization stems from the rapidly changing perception of
the information gap. The high score on solidarity, meanwhile, reflects a
favorable assessment of the influence that nongovernmental organizations
wield on policy decisions. These two scores also seem to reflect the influence
of the elections. The increasing influence of social network services on

Year

2011 5.30 5.78 4.69 3.59
2012 4.94 5.89 4.50 4.30

politics and the election of Park Won-sun to the mayoralty of Seoul
appear to have induced these changes.
As can be seen in table 9, the most noteworthy factor of pluralization
is the information gap. This factor received a score of 7.22 in 2011 and
4.33 in 2012. It is the factor subjected to the greatest margin of decline,
which is all the more remarkable because all the other factors of pluralization
received higher scores in 2012 than they did in 2011. It was this drastic
fall in the information gap score that has served to bring down the overall
pluralization score. Accounting for this fall is the explosive sway that
social network services have come to wield in the recent elections. Korea is
one of the countries in the world with the widest distribution of high-
speed internet connections, thus the digital divide across class or generational
lines is relatively small in this country. The by-election for mayoralty in Seoul
in October 2011 has abruptly increased the role that the internet and
social service networks play in the popular perception. As the youth rush
excessively to online sources for news reports and opinions on the process
leading to the general election in 2012, intergenerational conflict began to
converge with the digital divide and the population is now divided
between those who actively use online networking and those who do not.
This digital divide along generational lines has begun to take on an
increasingly acute form, intensifying the negative perception of the
information gap.
Interestingly, a similar downward pattern is noted in the scores on
autonomy as well. While the score on the basic autonomy of members of
civil society (i.e., the basic human development and the satisfaction of
basic needs) somewhat rose between 2011 and 2012, the scores on the
pressure from pro-government organizations, the influence of corporations,
and citizens willingness for toleration plummeted.

Table 8. Autonomy, Competition, Pluralization and Solidarity in Korean
Civil Society, 2012


Attribute Question / Indicator 2011 2012
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A
u
t
o
n
o
m
y

Autonomy of
society from state
intervention
1. How free do you think citizens
social activities are from
government interference in your
country?
4.33 5.00
government organizations have on
society in your country?
6.11 4.11
Autonomy of
society from the
market
3. How much do you think private
companies have influence on society in
your country?
6.00 3.56
Autonomy of
social member
(basic needs and
basic human
development
level)
4. How much do you think citizens
basic needs are met in your country?
5.67 5.89
5. Aside from the basic needs stated in
question no. 4, how much do you think
special care is provided for vulnerable
people or minorities, such as children,
women, people with disabilities, and
immigrants in your country?
4.11 4.67
6. How much do you think citizens are
provided with education opportunities
in your country?
5.78 6.67
Tolerance 7. How much do you think citizens
respect different cultures, religions,
languages, races, nations, and ideas in
your country?
5.11 4.67
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o
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p
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t
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t
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o
n

Capability of
voluntary
association
NGOs have on society in your
country?
5.56 5.33
Public good of
voluntary
association
9. How well do you think NGOs
represent public interest in your
country?
6.56 6.56
Transparency of
voluntary
association
10. Do you think NGOs are
democratically operating in your
country?
5.22 6.11
Diversity of
voluntary
associations
11. Do you think NGOs well
represent different values and demands
of society in your country?
5.78 5.56

Table 9. Index of Democracy in Korean Civil Society, 2011-2012

. . . . . . . . . . . .


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A
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o
m
y

Autonomy of
society from state
intervention
1. How free do you think citizens
social activities are from
government interference in your
country?
4.33 5.00
government organizations have on
society in your country?
6.11 4.11
Autonomy of
society from the
market
3. How much do you think private
companies have influence on society in
your country?
6.00 3.56
Autonomy of
social member
(basic needs and
basic human
development
level)
4. How much do you think citizens
basic needs are met in your country?
5.67 5.89
5. Aside from the basic needs stated in
question no. 4, how much do you think
special care is provided for vulnerable
people or minorities, such as children,
women, people with disabilities, and
immigrants in your country?
4.11 4.67
6. How much do you think citizens are
provided with education opportunities
in your country?
5.78 6.67
Tolerance 7. How much do you think citizens
respect different cultures, religions,
languages, races, nations, and ideas in
your country?
5.11 4.67
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o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n

Capability of
voluntary
association
NGOs have on society in your
country?
5.56 5.33
Public good of
voluntary
association
9. How well do you think NGOs
represent public interest in your
country?
6.56 6.56
Transparency of
voluntary
association
10. Do you think NGOs are
democratically operating in your
country?
5.22 6.11
Diversity of
voluntary
associations
11. Do you think NGOs well
represent different values and demands
of society in your country?
5.78 5.56

Table 9 (continued)
Why did these score changes happen? First, conservative associations
and organizations that began to crop up under the previous Roh Moo-hyun
administration are now wielding considerable influence on civil society at
large in active interaction with the conservative Lee administration. Yet
according to the 2012 survey, a series of corruption scandals involving
these organizations and their key members reflected badly on the nature
of their power. Second, the score on the influence of corporations also
dropped because the Lee administrations pro-business policy continues
to deepen the sense of relative deprivation among ordinary people. This
sense of relative deprivation has gotten to a worrying point that even the
Lee administration has launched campaigns on fair society and mutual
growth. Third, the score on citizens willingness for tolerance has also
dropped significantly due to the extremely hostile behavior of conservative
organizations and associations that surfaced during the local and general
elections. Accompanying the increasing activism of these conservative
groups was the explosive popularity that the internet radio show called
Nakkomsu is enjoying among the more progressively oriented.

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Inequality of
public spheres
12. Do you think the media is fair
and just in your country?
2.75 3.78
Inequality of
culture and
information
13. How wide do you think the
information gap between citizens is in
your country?
7.22 4.33
Inequality of
interest relations
14. Do you think citizens have equal
access to cultural facilities and activities
in your country?
4.67 5.11
Inequality of
power
15. How equally do you think power is
distributed among people in your
country?
4.11 4.78
S
o
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d
a
r
i
t
y

Institutional
guarantee of
diversity and
affirmative actions
16. Do you think affirmative actions
are well established and operated in
your country?
3.11 3.89
Participation
and support of
social groups
17. How actively do you think citizens
are participating in NGO activities in
your country?
3.89 4.00
Governance of
the state and civil
society
NGOs have on government's policy
making processes in your country?
3.78 5.00


The scores on almost all indicators of solidarity increased, leaving
room for diverse interpretations. The chief of these interpretations is the
positive influence wielded by the election of Park Won-sun to the mayoralty
of Seoul. Park is a noted activist and an advocate who is known for
advocating for the powerless. The endorsement from Professor Ahn
Cheol-su, who himself briefly ran for the mayoral office and represents
the voice of the less politicized and non-elite moderate voters in urban
areas, played a decisive role in Parks victory in an election that centered
on whether or not to give free lunches to schoolchildren. These developments
seem to have improved the scores on affirmative action and the influence
of nongovernmental organizations.
Evaluation
The 2012 ADI Survey in Korea supports the following conclusions. First,
the relationship between liberalization and equalization, the two main pillars
of the ADI, remains more or less unchanged, with Korea scoring better
on the former than the latter. This suggests that democracy is still by and
large formal and procedural in Korea and has yet to make a progress into a
more non-exclusive version. Democracy in Korea, in other words, is still
shackled by exclusive and monopolistic practices in the fields of politics,
economy, and civil society, with wealth and power concentrated in a few
who are not subjected to effective checks and balances.
Second, the sizable gaps among the scores in politics, economy, and
civil society reflect the fact that while the institutionalization of democracy
is proceeding relatively uninterrupted in Korean politics, democracy has
until now failed to make itself the norm in the spheres of economic and
social activities. Korea, in other words, needs to reinforce its capability for
socioeconomic democracy for the consolidation of its democratic system
and culture.
Third, the decline in Koreas overall democracy score between 2011
and 2012 demonstrates that the development of democratic procedures
and forms in politics is not sufficient to offset the so-called democratic
deficit underpinned by the increasing restrictions on civil liberties, the
absence of checks and balances among state institutions, and the dearth of
accountability (Schedler 2006). Against the backdrop of the single-handed
and authoritarian approach taken by the Lee administration, the deterioration
of horizontal and vertical accountability, and the increasing concentration
of economic and political power, politics of reconciliation and compromise
has dissipated, leading to the current infirm state of Korean democracy.

Given all the symptoms, Koreas democracy can best be described as
merely delegative (ODonnell 1994).
Consolidation of democracy in Korea requires strong guarantees of basic
civil rights in politics, economy, and civil society, as well as dispersion
of power. Fair distribution of resources for power, in turn, requires
economic democratization and the empowerment of civil society as the
engine of democracy. Institutional measures are also needed to mitigate
political inequality stemming from socioeconomic bipolarization.
Note
1. See CADI (2012) for the composition and structure of the ADI.
2. The data in figure 1 and table 1 were taken from the Election Statistics System available
at the website of the National Election Commission (http://info.nec.go.kr/main/),
retrieved on August 11, 2012.
3. Data taken from the website of No Cut News (http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/
news/905015), accessed January 4, 2012.
References
Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
______. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
ODonnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy 5(1):55-69.
Schedler, Andreas ed. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
Competition. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

____________________________________________________________
Anton Pradjasto, Christina Dwi Susanti, and Inggrid Silitonga are from the Indonesian Centre
for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS). Anna Margret, Dirga Ardiansa,
Irwansyah, Mia Novitasari, Sri Budi Eko Wardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, and Yolanda
Panjaitan are from the Centre for Political Studies (PUSKAPOL), Department of Political
Science, Universitas Indonesia.


Asian Democracy Index 2012 Indonesia:
ANTON PRADJASTO, ANNA MARGRET, DIRGA ARDIANSA,
CHRISTINA DWI SUSANTI, IRWANSYAH, INGGRID SILITONGA,
MIA NOVITASARI, SRI BUDI EKO WARDANI, WAWAN
ICHWANUDDIN, YOLANDA PANJAITAN
Introduction
The issues of social welfare, economic disparity, and intergroup relations,
as well as more traditionally political issues were dominant in Indonesia
from mid-2011 to mid-2012. One reputable daily newspaper, for
example, reported an incident that represents a portrait of social welfare
and conditions related to the aspects of governance. The newspaper
reported that every one hour, two materal deaths occurred during
childbirth in Indonesia. The issue of maternal mortality remains one of
many social problems in Indonesia. In accordance with the Millennium
Development Goals, the country is targeting a maternal mortality rate of
102 per 100,000 live births in 2015. The target seems difficult to achieve
considering the fact that the latest data shows that the maternal mortality
rate is at 359 per 100,000 live births (2012).
1

Diversity, instead of becoming an advantage, is in fact often linked to
various acts of violence against religious minorities, groups of certain
sexual orientations like gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, and other
marginalized communities such as farmers and laborers. The destruction,
arson, and obstruction in administrative processes for the construction of
houses of worship in different regions continue to occur. Violence against
minority religious groups continues to increase, and some of the incidents
display the destruction of civil liberty in Indonesian community life. The
62 INDONESIAN COUNTRY REPORT 2012

conflicts as a result of the criminalization of Andi-Japin, a resident in an
indigenous community in Silat Hulu, Ketapang, and the criminalization
of labor in various places are examples of such violence. Violence against
journalists has also increased both in terms of number and degree.
In contrast, political contestation is getting increasingly visible as
illustrated in the general elections and local elections to elect heads of
regions. Similarly, in Indonesia, one will find the institutionalization of
horizontal accountability (between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the government), a multi-party system, the institutionalization
of local representation through the Local Representative Council, and a
system of direct election of the members of the executive and legislative
branches of government. Given the image of the institutionalization of
democracy so described, Indonesia is not only considered as the third
largest democracy in the worldfollowing the United States of America
and Indiait is also seen as the democratic country with the largest
Muslim population in the world.
Given the aforedescribed, there are at least three reasons why an
assessment of Indonesian democracy is necessary. First, the seemingly
contradictory situations described above become essential in helping us to
see to what extent the progress (or, more accurately, the decline) in the
process of democratization in Indonesia has taken place. There are a
number of main problems encountered in Indonesias ongoing
democratization. Larry Diamond, for example, views the process of
democratization in Indonesia not only as having taken place rapidly, but
also as a process faced with some potential setbacks, especially because of
the high rate of political violence in the country (2010). Therefore,
recognizing the problems and the potentials in the promotion of
democracy will help to prevent the relevant stakeholdersmainly the
democracy movementfrom having excessive worries about or causing
excessive optimism over democracy in Indonesia.
Second, as mentioned by a number of experts (e.g., Cho 2012)
democracy is a process that takes place continuously. Therefore, the
context becomes very important. As a country that was extensively
controlled for decades by an authoritarian governmentin which
business and political disloyalty was widespread and the country was
centralistically runit is important to closely observe Indonesias
transition toward democracy, while noting that the transition from
authoritarianism does not necessarily lead to the transition to democracy
and that achieving electoral democracy does not automatically result in
genuine political representativeness (ODonnell, in CADI 2012, 38).
PRADJASTO, MARGRET, ARDIANSA , AND OTHERS 63

Third, one crucial complaint against democracy in Indonesia that has
been embraced by the country in the past twelve years is its failure to
provide prosperity for its people. It is widely agreed that the real creation
of welfare is a material prerequisite for democracy (see Sen 1999 and
2009). Meanwhile, Indonesias democracy has become a mere momentary
instrument of the politico-economic elite. Regardless of the debates about
the conceptual link between democracy and prosperity, the important
question that needs to be answered is, to what extent and how beneficial is
the institutionalization of democracy for the prosperity of the people?
In this study, the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) was used to
evaluate and assess democracy in Indonesia. Using the ADIs
recommended methodology, critical issues concerning democracy in
Indonesia were revealed. Afterward, it was determined that there are some
continuing measures that could be undertaken to improve the quality of
democracy in Indonesia.
Overview of the Asian Democracy Index
To find out about the status of democracy of a country, experts
usually use general elections as one of the key measures. A country is
categorized as democratic when it has organized elections that are
transparent, fair, and competitive. Freedom House, for instance, uses
four basic criteria that a country must meet to be classifed as an electoral
democracy, namely: 1) a competitive multi-party system; 2) the exercise
of universal suffrage; 3) a voting/polling system that is confidential,
secure, and free of massive fraud; and 4) significant public access of
political parties to their voters (Freedom House 2012a). Based on the
measures set by Freedom House, since 1999, Indonesia has always
been classifiable as a free and democratic country.
Note that the category of electoral democracy is different from the
category of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is characterized by the
freedom to exercise the rights of individuals, the enforcement of law, and
the presence of various other preconditions for a free society. According
to Freedom House, of 119 countries that were categorized as electoral
democracies in 2009, as many as eighty-nine countries have met these
criteria, including Indonesia (2012b, 14-19). Therefore, as previously
mentioned, many have hailed Indonesia as the third largest democratic
country in the world.
However, it is uncertain whether the categories of electoral
democracy and liberal democracy have adequately reflected the quality of

democracy, especially regarding the transformation of the basic values of
democracy into the reality of life in particular communities. This matter is
relevant in the context of the transition to democracy in Indonesia, which
is still considered to have serious problems in terms of participation,
representation, and accountability. This situation is the background of the
increasingly skeptical view that democratization during the Reform Era/
post-New Order period (1998-present) has not yet been able to improve
the Indonesian peoples quality of life.
Related to the above-discussed matter is the question of
accountability, which is relevant due to the increasing rate of corruption in
Indonesia. In 2011, Indonesia ranked one hundred (out of 183) together
with eleven other countries in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
that was released by Transparency International.
2
The CPI ranges from 0
to 10; the smaller index number indicates the higher potential of
corruption in a country. In 2011, Indonesias CPI was 3.0. These figures
reflect how the problem of corruption exists not only at the central
government level, but also in the level of local governments. According to
data from the Ministry of Home Affairs that were compiled in November
2012,
3
a total of 474 officials in local governments faced legal problems:
ninety-five were suspects, forty-nine defendants, and 330 convicted
persons. As many as 280 of the 474 persons were heads of district or mayors.
The distant relation between democratization and welfare of the
people can be seen from the increasingly larger economic disparity during
the post-New Order period. In recent years, the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in Indonesia increased significantlyfrom USD 172.9 billion
2002, it became USD 850 billion in 2012. In the same period, GDP per
capita also increased from USD 933.00 to USD 4,000.00. However, this
increase in GDP per capita was followed by greater inequality among
different groups in Indonesian society. It was estimated that 20 percent of
the high-income groups controlled nearly half of the countrys revenues;
40 percent of low-income groups controlled only 16.85 percent. The gap
in revenue distribution between the top and bottom groups was bigger
when compared with the gap in the early years of the Reform Era, within
which the figures were 21.66 percent and 40.57 percent, respectively.
According to the data of the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics
(BPS),
4
the Gini index of Indonesia in the past few years has also
continued to increase, indicating a growth in inequality in the country. In
2011, the index reached 0.41, the highest during the Reform Era; in
1999, the number was 0.31.
The increasing disparity is also reflected in peoples expenditures.
According to data from the World Bank, based on average expenses, as

many as 55 percent of the Indonesian population can be categorized as
middle class, i.e., earning between USD 2.00 and USD 20.00 per day.
5

Those with expenses below USD 2.00 per day are classified as very poor
or very lower class, while those with expenditures between USD 2.00-
4.00 per day are considered to be lower-middle class; USD 4.00-10.00
are the middle-middle class; USD 10.00-20.00 are the upper-middle
class; and more than USD 20.00 are the upper class. However, closer
inspection of the average increase in the expenses made by each of the
classes in the past years reveals that the increase in expenses of the middle
-upper class is many times higher than that of the lower-middle class.
In fact, some preconditions of liberal democracy, as specified by
Freedom House, now face serious challenges in Indonesia (e.g., the
increasing social conflicts and intolerance against anothers religions and
beliefs). Based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, there were
ninety-three cases of social conflicts in 2010. In 2011, that number
declined to seventy-seven cases, but it increased again in 2012; until the
end of August 2012, the number of social conflict cases was eighty-nine.
6

In 2011, intolerance cases in violation of the freedom of religion were also
increasingly common. According to the Wahid Institute, in 2011, the
number of such cases reached 183, or an average of fifteen cases each
month16 percent more cases than in the previous year.
7

These facts suggest the need to reconsider the theories and concepts
of democracy and democratization that have been considered dominant,
especially if one aims to understand and analyze new democratic states. In
addition to re-examining the concept of democracy, an evaluation of
democracy in a country like Indonesia will need to utilize a new
intellectual framework to explain the phenomena/facts of new democracies
in the contemporary world. In light of this need, in 2010, the Centre for
Political Studies of Universitas Indonesia (PUSKAPOL UI) and the
Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS), in
collaboration with the Democracy and Social Movements Institute of
Sungkonghoe University and the Third World Studies Center of the
University of the Philippines, compiled an index that offers an alternative
approach to measuring democracythe Asian Democracy Index (ADI).
The ADI is a univariate measure of the concept of democracy. As
mentioned, the present research on democracy started with the
assumption that the study of developing democracies in Asia, especially in
Indonesia, requires a new framework so as to better explain the
complexity of the process of democratization in Asia. Here, that
framework is the redefinition of the notion of democracy as a process of

de-monopolization, i.e., as a process of power redistribution that takes
place in many institutions in the fields of politics, economy, and civil
society. This concept of democracy has two core principles, namely,
liberalization and equalization. Liberalization refers to the extent to which
various sectors are free and autonomous from authoritative political
power, or how free these sectors are to determine their own priorities
(CADI 2012, 44-45). This principle primarily depends on the extent of
the disintegration of the old forces from a monopoly. Equalization is a
measure of the extent to which minority groups gain access to resources
(CADI 2012, 45). Thus, equalization can also be seen as a process of the
transformation of power in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society.
Methodology
In 2012, PUSKAPOL UI and DEMOS were in their second year of
conducting the ADI project in Indonesia. The survey for that year was
conducted by interviewing fifty-four expert respondents using a
questionnaire that contains semi-closed questions as the measuring
instrument. The method used was the assessment of the opinion of these
experts on certain indicators of democracy, responses which are expressed
in ratings ranging from 0 to 10 and optional comments. The indicators/
questions that were asked to the experts were limited to those relevant to
their field of expertise. In connection with the method adopted, as can be
gleaned from table 1, and as will be discussed in detail later, the process of
determining the sample of respondents was also based on categories and
criteria that represent the spectra of the respondents positions and roles in
their community in addition to their specializations.
Concept Operationalization
As previously mentioned, the concept of democracy is redefined as a
process of de-monopolization that occurs in three fields, namely politics,
economy, and civil society. Thus, in ADI studies, the democracy index is
measured/obtained from the aggregate of scores of politics, economy, and
civil society indices.
Recall now that democratization as de-monopolization has two core
principles. These principles have two subprinciples/subvariables each.
Liberalization is measured via two subvariables, i.e., autonomy and
competition. Equalization, meanwhile, is measured using subvariables
called pluralization and solidarity. These subvariables and their field-
specific variants are discussed in detail in the analysis section of this paper.

Sampling Framework
The fifty-four respondents were determined via purposive sampling based
on the determination of categories and specific criteria to represent the
spectra of ideologies, positions, and roles of the respondents in their
respective communities. To reiterate, there are three areas of expertise:
politics, economy, and civil society. There are also three political positions
toward the government: pro-government, moderate, and anti-
government. Lastly, there are three community roles: academic,
practitioner, and policymaker.
The fifty-four respondents can be classified according to their areas
of expertise: eighteen were experts in politics, eighteen in economy, and
eighteen in civil society. Within each group, there are six representatives
per political position toward the government, which can be divided into
two per community role.

Table 1: Respondent Profile
Statistical Measure
The measure of index score was obtained using a measure of centrality,
using mean and median scores to ensure normalcy of data from the results
Position Community
Role
Field/Area Total
Politics Economy Civil
Society
Pro-
Government
Academic 2 2 2 6
Practitioner 2 2 2 6
Policymaker 2 2 2 6
Moderate Academic 2 2 2 6
Policymaker 2 2 2 6
Anti-
Government
Academic 2 2 2 6
Policymaker 2 2 2 6
Total 18 18 18 54


Liberalization Equalization Democracy
Index -
Indonesia
5.60 5.02
5.32 Autonomy Competition Pluralization Solidarity
5.41 5.79 4.65 5.34

of the respondents assessments of all question items. In addition, though not
detailed here, the t-test statistic was used to test the significance of changes in
scores between 2011 and 2012, i.e., by comparing mean scores in pairs for
each subprinciple/subvariable.
Some Notes for Improvement of the ADI Methodology
1. There is a need for a panel of experts, i.e., expert-
respondents with the same area of expertise, to ensure the
validity and reliability of the measure every year.
2. There is a need for a data collection method that is more
dynamic than just completing a questionnaire that contains
semi-closed questions. It is proposed that the assessment by
experts be carried out using more dynamic methods, such as
focus group discussions and the Delphi method.
3. There is a need to reconsider the weighting of variables that
are measured.
Overview of Research Findings
The aggregate score of the index of democracy for Indonesia in 2012 was
5.32. The breakdown of this score can be seen in table 2. Indonesias
ADI slightly increased from 2011; the overall score then was 4.99. The
increase, however, is not deemed significant; it remains a low score.
Both core principles of democracy had low index scores, though the
principle of liberalization had an index score which was slightly higher
(5.60) than the index score of equalization (5.02). In comparison with the
2011 scores, the increase in the score of equalization was more significant
than the increase in the score of liberalization. However, in general, as can
be gleaned from the figures in table 3, the condition of democratization/
de-monopolization in Indonesia did not experience significant changes
from 2011 to 2012.
Furthermore, the field index scores of liberalization were higher than
those of equalization in all three fields. Liberalization in politics had the
highest score (6.24) among all field liberalization scores, followed by civil
society liberalization (5.57), indicating that liberalization occurred mainly in
politics, then later in the field of civil society.

Liberalization Equalization Democracy
Index -
Indonesia
5.60 5.02
5.41 5.79 4.65 5.34

Table 2: General Overview of 2012 Indonesian ADI

The overall equalization score, which was lower in comparison with
the score of liberalization, was the result of averaging relatively low overall
pluralization and solidarity scores. The differences of the scores in the
indicators of both were not very significant. Similarly, the apparent
improvement in the 2012 equalization score from the 2011 score
was found to be not significant.
At 4.65, the index score of pluralization was the lowest subprinciple
score. Pluralization in the field of economy obtained the lowest field sub-
principle score. Meanwhile, the index score of solidarity was 5.34, which, like
the pluralization score, was also lower than the autonomy and competition
scores.

Table 3: Comparison of ADI Scores (Indonesia), 2011-2012

Year Liberalization Equalization Indonesian
ADI
2012 5.60 5.02 5.32
5.41 5.79 4.65 5.34
2011 5.48 4.50 4.99
5.44 5.51 4.19 4.81


The scores of the two core principles of de-monopolization in which
the score of liberalization was higher than that of equalization indicate
that the process of democracy in Indonesia still prioritizes the
liberalization over equalization or equality and the high score of
liberalization may not necessarily expand the equalization of citizens
access to resources and to power. It can be concluded that democracy in
Indonesia is an insecure position; in other words, the score can decline at
any time.
Compared with the assessment result of 2011, in 2012 there was not
any significant change. The score of liberalization was higher than that of
equalization, and the score was determined by the low score of
pluralization. Another change was on the quality of autonomy (from 5.48
to 5.41), which temporarily declined while others tended to improve.
An increase in the score indicates the increasing institutionalization of
political institutions and the adaptability of the political actors to these
changes. However, these are not immediately used for the benefits of the
public. This at the same time shows that the movement of democracy is
still more focused on the field of the state and government. In the mean-
time, the institutionalization in the field politics is not accompanied by the
institutionalization or establishment of a mechanism that can ensure the
fulfilment of economic and social rights of the citizens. This absence exists
in relationship between the national government and the local governments
as well as between the government and the citizens. The ruling regime
appears to have the tendency to escape from its responsibilities for fulfilling
the socioeconomic rights of its citizens. Similarly, socioeconomic
empowerment which enables the citizens to be independent is still far
from optimal.
Similarly, the same situation is also found in the field of civil society.
The presence of institutions such as the ombudsman and the Indonesian
Broadcasting Commission were not optimal yet in strengthening the
position of the civil society when facing the state and the business sector.
The civil society still directs its movements to the de-monopolization in
politics, while the attention to de-monopolization in the field of the
economy was found to be lacking. The de-monopolization in politics
alone is far from sufficient. Social and political liberalization does not
substantially determine the de-monopolization of other sources of power.
The score of competition in civil society was relatively high (6.42). It
is reflective of civil societys diversity of scope and the values civil society
fights for (good governance, human rights, gender equality, children,
sustainable environment, and social justice) in almost all of Indonesia.

The diversity of issues dealt with by civil society organizations represents
the diversity of interests existing in the community. Even if there are
problems related to diversity, such problems are likely to be caused by the
politicking of issues of diversity by the political and economic elites, as
well as weak equalization among the members of civil society. In
connection with this, cooptation of media by elite groups and groups that
control capital prevents public interests from being properly represented.
Thus, expectedly, civil society organizations (CSOs) are considered
relevant only in the discussion of issues that gain public attention, such as
corruption. Coupled with low public participation in CSOs, the
significance of the influence of these organizations was considered by the
2012 experts to be minimal, echoing the opinion of the 2011 experts.
In general, in the field of civil society, the activities of the society were
found to be autonomous from the states control and intervention. However,
a matter of concern was that the state (the government) had the tendency
to let some issues continue to exist while it was supposed to have taken
some actions to deal with these issues (e.g., the lack of action in solving
horizontal conflicts among different groups in the society). A result of
such ommissions is the increasingly dominant role played by the market
in the life of Indonesian civil society. Another matter of concern is the
states effort to resume the control of CSOs through the amendments to
the law on civil organizations.
Index in the Field of Politics
The score in the field of politics, at 6.16, was the highest score among all
field scores. The index in the field of politics was derived from the score
of political liberalization (6.24) and political equalization (6.07). A
summary of the scores in politics can be seen in table 3.
The political liberalization score was obtained by obtaining the average of
the political autonomy score, which was at 7.00, and a much lower
political competition score (5.74). The relatively high score of autonomy
was mainly the result of the collective rating in the freedom of assembly
and activity indicator, which was 8.17the highest of all indicator scores
in the three fields. In addition, freedom to stand as an opposition also
received a good rating from the respondents (7.61), offsetting the 6.6 civil
liberty rating. Freedom from violence of the state apparatus gained a
lower score (5.61) than all of the aforementioned. This indicates that the
authorities did not show that they are pro-society at the time of
socioeconomic conflicts.


Liberalization Equalization Score
6.24 6.07
7.00 5.74 6.35 5.86

Table 3: Index in the Field of Politics

In the political competition subvariable, the highest score was given
to the freedom to exercise voting rights during elections (7.94). A very
low score, however, was given to informal groups influence on politics
(3.44), indicating that these groups have a high amount of influence on
Indonesian politics. The organizing of fair elections got a score of 6.67,
while the effectiveness of the executives policy and the transparency of
the parliament, the executive, and the judiciary both gained a score of
5.50. The rule of law indicator gained a score of 5.39.
Political autonomy got a higher score than political competition
because the procedural aspect of the political factor was considered by the
experts to be good, although there were still substantial/fundamental
weaknesses such as the high influence of the informal groups (such as
religious groups, business sector and military) in the political process.
Political equalization gained a score of 6.16, which was the result of
obtaining the mean of the scores of all equalization indicators (both
pluralization and solidarity indicators). The indicators of pluralization consist
of the balance of power in parliament (6.89) and the checks and balances
between government agencies (6.33). State agencies were not considered to be
highly democratic in their operation (6.11) and the representation of social
groups in parliament was considered to be limited (6.06).
The political solidarity score was partly derived from the high score
of public confidence in democracy (6.89). The guarantee of political
participation of citizens was rated at 6.33. Affirmative action in the parliament
was considered to be limited, receiving only a 5.89. Public confidence in
the government also got a low score of 5.39. Public confidence in the
legislature received the lowest score (4.78) among the indicators of political
solidarity.
Civil liberty, while formally guaranteed, still receives threats of
violence by the government apparatus. This is apparent in the handling of
land-related conflicts and religious conflicts. In many land-related

6.24 6.07
7.00 5.74 6.35 5.86

conflicts, such as in Mesuji, Lampung, Sape Harbor in Bima, and Ogan
Komering Ilir in South Sumatera, there was violence perpetrated by the
state apparatus against farmers, fishermen, and laborers. Violence took
various forms, such as intimidation, criminalization, arrest, assault, and
homicide.
In addition, in some religious-based conflicts, the state does not take
any actions in favor of minority groups. In the case of violence against the
Ahmadiyah group, for instance, the attackers were only given light
punishments while the victims (members of Ahmadiyah) were tried on
charges of going against the law. In the case of the construction of
Yasmin Church in Bogor, the government of Bogor City revoked the
permit to build the church. This act sparked further violence perpetrated
by the public against the Churchs congregation.
Even though public trust in the process of democracy is high, the
distrust in the government agencies and the parliament is quite obvious.
This is partly because the function of representation is not carried out
optimally yet. The implementation of various government policies does
not provide the results that can be directly enjoyed by society. In addition,
a lot of other problems such as poor health infrastructure and high
maternal and child mortality rates have not been dealt with seriously.
The poor quality of the performance of representative state institutions
has made the peoples distrust of the government higher. The function of
legislature does not run optimally and it is visible from the limited number of
laws and regulations that are passed as well as the limitation of the laws in
terms of substances. These laws and regulations thus fail to answer the
demands of the public. In addition, cases of corruption involving
members of the central parliament and the local parliaments were
extensively covered by the mass media. Many members of the local
parliaments in various provinces and districts/cities are and have been
investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission.
It should also be noted that the middle class, members of which have
relatively good resources to support their political participation, appears to
feel reluctant to take part in politics. In non-political issues
(environment and lifestyle, among others), they are willing to play an
active role, but not in decidedly political issues. Participation by the
middle class is substantial during elections. In the process of
policymaking and oversight of government performance, however, middle
class participation is very limited.

Index in the Field of Economy
As in 2011, the index score for the field of economy was the lowest among
the three field index scores. The scores obtained in the principles of
liberalization and equalization in the field of economy were also lower
than those found in the fields of politics and civil society. Table 4 summarizes
the scores in the economy field.

Table 4: Index in the Field of Economy
The index score of economic equalization was much lower than the
index score of economic liberalization, meaning economic autonomy and
economic competition were still at a better state than economic
pluralization and economic solidarity. The economic pluralization
subprinciple had the lowest score out of all field subprinciple scores; at
2.69, it is also much lower than the other economic subvariable scores,
which are all greater than or equal to 4.5. The low score obtained by eco-
nomic pluralization occurred as a result of very low scores for most of that
field subprinciples indicators: monopolization of economy by a specific
group (2.25), interregional disparity (2.63), income disparity (2.38), and
disparity in assets (2.06). The highest score within the same set of
indicators was for inequality and discrimination in employment (4.00).
High though it is, this index score reflects the poor quality of
pluralization of power in the field of economy, which is reflective of
obvious economic disparity.
Equalization in the field of economy was also made up of the economic
solidarity subvariable, which obtained a score of 4.83. The indicator with
the best score within this subvariable was the condition of political
influence of workers unions, which received a 6.00, which was enough to
offset the score of participation of the unions in economic solidarity
(4.63). Other indicators with middling scores were organized unions
(5.44) and public awareness of economic inequality (5.00). Protection of
4.66 3.91
4.5 4.95 2.69 4.83


the poor (4.38), social insurance (4.44), and societys supervision of
companies (3.69) all received markedly lower scores than the other
indicators in the economic solidarity set. All in all, economic solidarity
scores seemed to be due to the disparity between the power of companies
and that of social groups. The 2012 index showed the existence of political
power of workers unions, which counterbalanced the power of the
monopolists of the Indonesian economy.
Just like in 2011, liberalization from the monopolists of economic
power (4.66) remained far behind compared with liberalization in the
field of civil society (5.57) and liberalization in the field of politics (6.24).
The low economic liberalization score was partly due to low economic
autonomy scores, particularly the scores for the condition of child workers
indicator (3.44) and the independence of the government from the
foreign capital indicator (3.89). Such results show the strong influence of
foreign capital in the economy, inhibiting the de-monopolization of
economic power. The vulnerability of the very weak groups in society,
such as child workers, is another characteristic of Indonesian society that
negatively impacted the de-monopolization of economic power in the
country.
The highest-scoring subvariable score in the field of economy was
achieved by the competition variable. The highest-scoring indicator under
this subvariable was the one concerned with how well private companies
provide protection of rights of workers, which appears to be connected
with the high score obtained by the political influence of workers unions
indicator under the solidarity subvariable. Meanwhile, other indicators
obtained scores that were not much different from each other and were
equally low: the governments protection for workers (4.75), transparency
of large companies (4.63), and, lowest of all, fairness of economic
activities (4.25).
Democracy as partly the de-monopolization of economic power in
2012 may correspond with some of the facts about the Indonesian
economy. The countrys economy enjoyed rapid, quite high economic
growth (about 6 percent) while the European and North American
countries have been affected by a severe economic crisis since 2008.
Growth, however, appears to be driven by the inequality of power
relations among economic actors. As previously mentioned, economic
disparity, as indicated by the Gini ratio coefficient index, has continuously
increased since 2009.
Business people and companies are not seen as transparent regarding
a wide range of their policies and practices, especially in economic
activities that exploit the weak bargaining power of the various marginalized
4.66 3.91
4.5 4.95 2.69 4.83


community groups. Groups such as child workers remain in existence
despite the fact that Indonesian has been enjoying its economic growth.
Interestingly, the workers have started to gain political power, which helps
to reduce the disparity in the bargaining position of production actors in
economic activities. The political power of the workers was marked by
their success in pushing continuous wage increases at the local level in the
past few years, via activities such as a lengthy strike of Papua Freeport
workers and the success of movements for preventing the increase in the
price of fuel-based oil.
Index in the Field of Civil Society
The total score of de-monopolization in the field of civil society was 5.44,
a 0.35 increase from the 2011 score (5.09). The breakdown of the 2012
civil society score can be seen in table 5.

Table 5: Index in the Field of Civil Society
Equalization in the field of civil society had a low score. There was no
significant difference between the scores of civil society equalizations two
variables, namely, pluralization (5.00) and solidarity (5.47). This score
was affected by persistent inequality in terms of the opportunity to obtain
information and the access to cultural activities and facilities. Meanwhile,
access to cultural activities and facilities was given relatively high marks
because the public was seen to have had equal access to cultural activities
and facilities.
Regarding the subvariables of civil society liberalization, civil society
competition (6.42) scored higher than civil society autonomy (4.86). The
relatively high score of competition was mainly contributed to by the
perceived diversity of nongovernmental organizations (7.28), though the
accountability of those organizations was given a low score (5.83).
5.57 5.20
4.86 6.42 5.00 5.47


Tolerance among NGOs could be said to be low (5.83), as indicated by
the score for the indicator concerning how democratically NGOs have
been run. Meanwhile, the low score of civil society autonomy was affected
by the strong influence of the market on society (2.44) despite the fact
that current peoples activities were considered free from the
governments intervention (7.39).
Even though in general the peoples activities were found by the
respondents to be free from the states control and intervention, as previously
mentioned, the state in fact fails to fulfill the duties it has concerning society,
such as solving horizontal conflicts. As a result of such failures, the
market takes on these duties.
Regarding Indonesian social diversity, the historical roots of
Indonesian society promote tolerance toward acculturation of diverse
cultures even though the potential for intolerance remains in existence. In
addition, the diversity of Indonesian society is visible through the
diversity of issues that are dealt with by CSOs such as children, women,
human rights, good governance, anti-corruption, environment, among
many others. This diversity of issues shows the diversity of interest groups
in society. Diverse though they are, they still have to deal with (internal)
accountability and democratization issues. Lastly, as mentioned before, if
there are problems as regards diversity, such problems are largely due to
the politicking of the elite.
According to the respondents, the media has been relatively objective
in exploring and spreading information. However, the media has been co-
opted by the interests of the elite and capital, making it difficult to voice
the interests of the public, thus becoming less instrumental for expressing
public interests. It is not surprising that the governments radio and
television networks have not functioned as the media that serve public
interests.
On the matter of affirmative action in Indonesia, there have been
some affirmative actions for womens groups. Examples of these are the
30 percent quota for female representation in parliament and the law on
domestic violence.
CSOs have impacted the decision-making process, although only in a
few specific issues, such as anti-corruption. Regardless of what successes
CSOs have achieved, public participation in CSOs were found by the
respondents to remain weak. This has resulted in the less grounded
CSOs, which are politically estranged and are socially disconnected.
To review, in the field of civil society, liberalization (5.49) was viewed
as being better than equalization (5.06). In this field, freedom was
viewed to be largely artificial, since it has yet to be substantively
5.57 5.20
4.86 6.42 5.00 5.47


utilized to de-monopolize sources of economic, political, information-
related, symbolic, and social powers. Civil society was found to be complacent
with freedom and does not want to use that freedom to achieve anything
more substantial than it had already achieved.
Conclusions
The following summarizes the findings discussed above, serving as this
papers conclusion:
The index score in the field of politics (6.16) was the highest compared
with the index scores in the two other fields, i.e., economy (4.26) and
civil society (5.43).
In the field of politics, the score of the autonomy subvariable was the
highest (7.00); the three other political subvariables received the following
scores: competition 5.74, pluralization 6.35, and solidarity 5.86.
Political autonomy is considered relatively good since the structures,
procedures, and institutions for the implementation and/or protection
of civil liberty and political freedom are already in place.
Political pluralization is also considered good. There is an indication
of the diversity in representation and participation in formal political
institutions (e.g., the parliaments and other state agencies) in Indonesia.
Political solidarity is relatively low because of low trust in the government
and in parliament in particular. In addition, the representation of
marginalized groups and women is also considered low.
Political competition received the lowest marks due to the perceived
high dominance of economic, religious, and political dynasties, and
the authority of the judiciary, which is not seen as independent.
The economic subprinciple scores are the lowest of all the field sub-
principle scores.
The economic pluralization score is the lowest subprinciple score of
all. This was a consequence of perceived economic monopoly
committed by certain groups, a large income disparity, disparity in
terms of assets, and the disparity among regions.
In the field civil society, of the four subvariables measured, the score
of autonomy is the lowest. The indicators under this subvariable
include the dominating influence of the private sector/market on the
society. In addition, the services provided to vulnerable groups and
minorities were found to be inadequate. Such results also indicate
that the respondents think that there is minimal government
intervention in the private sector/market.


Civil society competition is assessed as the best of all the subvariables
in the civil society field. This evaluation was primarily due to the
indicator concerning the diversity of NGOs/CSOs in terms of their
presence in various areas and the scope of the issues and values that
they deal with.
Under civil society solidarity, the indicator that obtained the lowest
score is the absence of affirmative policy for marginalized groups.
This fiurtehr suggests that discriminatory practices are still
widespread in Indonesia, which is a major hindrance in the
development of democracy in the country.
Notes
1. This figure came from the results of the Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey
conducted in 2012. In 2007, the maternal mortality rate was recorded at around 230
per 100,000 live births.
2. For details, go to http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results.
3. Visit the Ministrys website (http://www.kemendagri.go.id/) for details (largely in
Bahasa).
4. Further information can be found at the BPS website (http://www.bps.go.id/).
5. The World Bank Indonesia data bank can be viewed at http://data.worldbank.org/
country/indonesia.
6. Again, visit the Ministrys website (http://www.kemendagri.go.id/) for details.
7. For details, go to http://www.wahidinstitute.org/wi-id/.
References
Cho, Heeyeon. 2012. Democratization as De-monopolization and Its Different Trajectories:
No Democratic Consolidation without De-monopolization. Asian Democracy Review
1:4-35.
Diamond, Larry. 2010. Indonesias Place in Global Democracy. In Aspinall, Edward and
Marcus Mietzner eds., Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions
and Society, 53-74. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Freedom House. 2012a. Methodology. Freedom House website. http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology.
. 2012b. Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global
Repercussions Selected Data from Freedom Houses Annual Survey on Political
Rights and Civil Liberties. Freedom House website. http://www.freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf.
Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Random House.
. 2011. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press.

____________________________________________________________
Andrew Aeria is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations,
Faculty of Social Sciences, University Malaysia Sarawak. Tan Seng Keat is Research Manager
at Merdeka Centre, Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia.


The Asian Democracy Index for Malaysia
2012: Authoritarian and Ineffectual
Government despite Formal Democratic
Institutions
ANDREW AERIA AND TAN SENG KEAT
Introduction
In early 2012, at the invitation of the Consortium for the Asian Democracy
Index (CADI), the authors of this report joined CADIs multi-country
project to survey democracy in the region, particularly in Malaysia, using
the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) method. Led by the Democracy and
Social Movements Institute (DaSMI) of Sungkonghoe University,
Korea, the Malaysia component of CADI was thus part of a larger regional
collaboration to develop an alternative index that better reflected the
quality of democracy in Asia.
Being new to the projectwith no prior knowledge of the appropriateness
of the survey instrument and having limited fundsthe Malaysian
CADI team could only conduct a pilot ADI study, which canvassed the
views of a small sample of citizen professionals throughout the country.
Consequently, the results cannot be regarded as anything but exploratory
in nature. It was a first step in testing and refining the survey instrument
so as to make the instrument more consistent and useful when appraising
the quality of democracy in a region of great diversity. After all, not only
is Asia diverse in terms of ethnicities, languages, religions and cultures
but not all countries share the same political, economic, or social systems
and levels of democratic governance. Hence, any effort to evaluate the
quality of democracy in Asia would require a survey tool and methods of
analysis that would allow for equivalent and consistent comparisons. As
82 MALAYSIAN COUNTRY REPORT 2012

well, the project aimed to look beyond the formal institutions and procedural
laws of democracy so as to evaluate the underlying quality of our democratic
societies given our desire to develop a somewhat more nuanced appreciation
of democracy. This was also to distinguish ourselves from the hitherto
better known surveys and indexes frequently quoted in academic and
public discourses presently like the Freedom House Index,
1
the Asia
Barometer,
2
the Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index,
3
and
the Democracy Ranking.
4
This report thus represents the findings of the pilot ADI survey
conducted from June to July 2012. It is divided into three key sections,
the first laying out the socio-economic and political context of Malaysia in
2012 before discussing the survey methods. After presenting our findings, we
then conclude by evaluating the robustness of our survey approach in
capturing the quality of democracy in the country.
Malaysia in 2012
In the Twelfth General Election of 2008, a large section of the countrys
electorate shifted their support from that of the hitherto governing coalition,
the Barisan Nasional (BN) to that of the fledgling opposition coalition,
the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). BN lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority
for the first time since 1969, itself an indicator of the deep-rooted desire
for change and reforms in the political and socioeconomic fabric of the
country (Khoo 2008; Thomas 2008).
The ensuing four years, until the period when this survey was run,
was a period of intense sociopolitical competition with both BN and PR
jostling to win the hearts and minds of the electorate and thus consolidate
their respective political positions.
Soon after the 2008 general election, Prime Minister Najib Abdul
Razak and the BN federal government orchestrated a palace coup in the
state of Perak which saw the collapse of the PR state government after
three PR state assemblymen defected to BN. A serious constitutional
crisis ensued after the Sultan (as Constitutional Head of the State of
Perak) refused to dissolve the state assembly to pave the way for new state
elections despite being advised so by the PR Chief Minister. Instead,
BN was invited by the Sultan to form a new state government. As well,
there were numerous defections of PR members of parliament (MPs) to
BN after the 2008 General Election. Collectively, these defections and the
palace coup seriously sullied the democratic fabric of the country (Jalleh
2009; Rasiah 2009; Chan 2010).
AERIA AND TAN 83

As well, between 2008 and 2011, there were a total of sixteen by-
elections throughout the country. There was also a state election in Sarawak.
Despite the election system being heavily biased in favor of the ruling BN
party (Lim 2011), all these electoral contests were keenly contested by
both the BN and PR which ensured that the country remained in a
heightened state of electioneering (McDonald 2012). Largely in response
to numerous electoral abuses perpetrated by the caretaker BN government
during the 2008 General Election and subsequent by-election contests, a
loose coalition of sixty-two nongovernment organisations (NGOs) that
called themselves the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (or Bersih
2.0) led a series of large demonstrations throughout the country in pursuit
of genuine electoral reforms and democracy (Aeria 2012; Sreenevasan
2013).
It was also at this time that Perkasa, an ethno-religious supremacist
group, emerged to champion Malay-Muslim rights in the country, pulling
the country toward the political far right in the process. Among the core
issues raised by Perkasa were the constitutional supremacy of Malay
special rights and privileges within government economic policy and
exclusivity of Islam within the country (Loh 2010).
As well, despite the repeal of the notorious Internal Security Act in
September 2011 that allowed for indefinite detention without trial, the
human rights situation in the country did not improve. Deaths in custody
and cases of police impunity all continued to occur with worrying regularity.
The Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission
(IPCMC), one of 125 recommendations made by a Royal Commission
investigating police mismanagement and abuse of power in 2004, remained
unimplemented (SUARAM 2013). Similarly, public security did not
improve with the incidence of crime rising unabated (SUARAM 2012).
Cumulatively, all these incidents and frequent by-election contests
meant that economics, politics, and civil society in Malaysia remained in a
heightened state of flux and ferment when the Malaysian team ran the
CADI survey in August 2012.
Our Survey Method
Financial constraints saw the Malaysian team survey thirty-five adult
Malaysian professionals from all over the country. Of these, sixteen were
female and nineteen were male. Their age groups varied from twenty to
above fifty with respondents coming from the following age groups, as
shown in table 1.

Ethnicity Number % of
Respondents
% of National
Population
Variance
(in %)
Chinese 21 60 24.1 +35.9
Malay 6 17.1 54.8 -37.7
Other
Bumiputera

2

5.7

13

-7.3
Indian 5 14.3 7.3 +7.0
Other Minorities 1 2.9 0.9 +2.0
Total 35 100 100 n.a.

Age Cohort (Years) Number
Under 20 1
20-29 9
30-39 12
40-49 10
50 and Above 3
Total 35

Table 1. Ages of Survey Respondents

Table 2 shows the ethnic breakdown of the respondents in the sam-
ple. Unfortunately, given the need to conduct the survey on short notice,
we were unable to match the profile of our respondents to the demo-
graphic profile of the national population. Hence, we ended up having a
less than ideal profile of respondents with less non-Malay/Bumiputera
respondents in our sample size than we would have liked. As shown in
table 2, this is indicated by the high levels of variance.

Table 2. Ethnic Background of Respondents

Given that the respondents were all professionals who had university
degrees and college diplomas, the survey sample was biased toward an
urban population from the cities of Penang, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Petaling
Jaya, Johor, Kuching and Kota Kinabalu. There were no respondents from
any rural areas within the sample.
The survey was administered via e-mail. Respondents were mailed
the survey and given a period of two weeks to complete the questionnaires.
Also, since the survey language used was English, the respondents who
ultimately responded to the questionnaires were those who were fluent
in English.
AERIA AND TAN 85

Ethnicity Number % of
Respondents
% of National
Population
Variance
(in %)
Chinese 21 60 24.1 +35.9
Malay 6 17.1 54.8 -37.7
Other
Bumiputera

2

5.7

13

-7.3
Indian 5 14.3 7.3 +7.0
Other Minorities 1 2.9 0.9 +2.0
Total 35 100 100 n.a.

Age Cohort (Years) Number
Under 20 1
20-29 9
30-39 12
40-49 10
50 and Above 3
Total 35

The CADI survey covered three broad areas of focus, namely,
perceptions about politics, economics and civil society. There are a total of
fifty-eight questions: nineteen questions are about the countrys politics,
twenty questions about the economy, and nineteen questions on the area
of civil society.
Survey Results
Perception about Politics in Malaysia
Our survey found that 71 percent of the respondents thought they were
victimized by government violence (see table 3). A similar number (72
percent) thought that their citizen freedoms were less than protected by
the government. This figure rises to 92 percent if the mid-range responses
are taken into account, with only 9 percent of respondents citing confidence
in government protection of their citizen freedoms (see table 4). On the
issue of freedom of assembly, 74 percent of those polled opined that
political groups and their activities lacked freedom of assembly (see table
5). When it came to the issue of opposition movements, 77 percent of the
respondents concluded that opposition groups and their ideologies were
controlled by the government (see table 6). On the issue of suffrage, 57
percent of respondents considered that their vote was less than or not
protected, with the figure rising to 69 percent if the mid-point of the survey
scale is taken into consideration (see table 7).
Policy implementation and execution by government agencies was
also viewed as generally ineffective by 61 percent of respondents; this figure
rises to 84 percent if the mid-point of the survey scale is considered (see
table 8). Upon examining the influence of non-elected officials upon politics,
52 percent were convinced that such officials played a role in Malaysian
politics. This figure rises to 78 percent when the survey scale mid-point is
added, suggesting that more than two-thirds of those polled were convinced
that hereditary and feudal issues played a big role in the countrys politics
(see table 9).
Consequently, it was no surprise to find that 75 percent of those
polled considered the rule of law weak and ineffective in Malaysia (see
table 10). Such results were similarly reflected in the 82 percent who
thought that the conduct of elections were less than fair or unfair (see table
11). As well, 87 percent did not think there was transparency in government
or in its agencies in the conduct of public affairs (see table 12). This result

was corroborated by a similarly large percentage (82 percent) of respon-
dents who, on being asked about how well government maintains checks
and balances, replied that there was a serious lack of institutional inde-
pendence and accountability by government (see table 13).
Much of this was likely due to the high level of control exercised by the
governing majority party upon parliament. 88 percent of the respondents
held the view that parliamentary power was largely monopolized by the
majority party, thus making proceedings of the legislature undemocratic
(see table 14). Resultantly, many respondents (77 percent) did not think
parliament was representative of their own constituents, the electorate,
and social groups (see table 15). Unsurprisingly, 85 percent of respondents
did not view the implementation and operation of government policies as
being fair and rational. Put differently, government policy implementation
was generally viewed as being authoritarian and more selective than
participatory (see table 16) despite the fact that citizens generally participate
in elections and other political decision-making processes. However, 48
percent of respondents in the negative, 29 percent positive, and 23 percent
in the mid-point suggests a view that although citizens have access to
electoral participation and political decision-making, the view is skewed
toward less participation rather than more (see table 17).
Regarding the issue of political affirmative action, respondents were
largely of the view that little political affirmative action existed to
champion the cause of marginal groups (see table 18).
5
In other words, a
majority (74 percent) viewed that marginal groups were less represented
or even unrepresented in the countrys policies.
6
When it comes to trust in
the government, most respondents (69 percent) articulated less or a
complete lack of trust, while a further 29 percent only had moderate trust
in government (see table 19). When the same question was posed with
regard to parliament, 61 percent said that there was less trust or a
complete lack of trust in the said institution. Consequently, more people
trusted parliament than the government/executive (see table 20 in relation
to table 19). And yet, when the question of trust was posed again, this
time for democracy, 61 percent indicated their trust in democracy as a
system of governance, with a further 31 percent expressing moderate trust
in democracy (see table 21). In other words, although respondents had
high trust in democracy as a system of governance, they viewed the
government in a poor light, while parliament only came off slightly better
than the government/executive.
AERIA AND TAN 87

Perception of Control within the Malaysian Economy
On the issue of monopolies within the economy, our poll found that 82
percent of our respondents thought that the countrys political power
elites had extensive control over the operation of private companies, with
only 17 percent thinking that control was balanced towards others (see
table 22). Labor rights were perceived by 86 percent of our respondents
to be weak and not institutionally guaranteed, while a mere 15 percent
thought that labor rights were more robust (see table 23). When asked
about forced child labor, responses were varied, with 57 percent thinking
child rights were strongly or fully guaranteed, 21 percent thinking it
poorly guaranteed, and a further 21 percent thinking it moderate (see
table 24).
On the question of central government independence from foreign
influences, most respondents took a middle-of-the-road perspective, with
39 percent saying that the central government was independent or fully
independent and 36 percent saying otherwise. The remaining 24 percent
took a middle position (see table 25). The view of respondents changed
slightly when asked about transparency of corporate affairs in the country.
A majority (54 percent) thought that corporate affairs were less than or
not transparent, 22 percent thought the opposite, and 25 percent took a
middle position (see table 26). However, on the issue of fair competition
among private enterprises, a large majority of those polled (76 percent)
thought that competition was deeply lacking or that monopolies prevailed.
Only 9 percent thought that private enterprises were competitive, while
15 percent took a middle position (see table 27).
The earlier view of weak labor rights was further corroborated when
in response to the question of whether or not the government protected or
guaranteed labor rights, 57 percent of respondents thought labor was
tightly restricted and thus labourers did not enjoy many rights. Only 15
percent thought otherwise, while 28 percent gave middle-position responses
(see table 28). That majority view is reinforced by the fact that 72 percent
of respondents thought that corporate control of labor was tightly restricted.
Only 18 percent thought that private companies protected labor rights
(see table 29).
This perception of tight control by private companies was also reflected
by the perception of the said companies control of the economy; 94 percent of
respondents thought that private companies had an overwhelming monopo-
listic influence over the economy (see table 30). In terms of regional
equality, there was an overwhelming perception (83 percent) that there
were grave imbalances with very serious regional economic disparities in

the country (see table 31). This imbalance was also reflected in a near
total perception (98 percent) among respondents that income disparity
was deeply skewed in the country (see table 32), seconded by the fact that
all respondents polled thought that asset disparity was deeply unequal (see
table 33).
When the respondents were polled on the issue of labor market
discrimination, the afore-described view of deep inequality and unfairness
continued. All respondents thought that discrimination within the labor
market was very serious between regular and irregular labor (see table
34). Unsurprisingly, given such skewed inequalities and tight controls of
labor by private enterprise, 57 percent of respondents thought that the
support systems for the poor were very weak or non-existent, 20 percent
thought that they were satisfactory, and 23 percent took a middle view
(see table 35). Likewise, just over half (51 percent) of those polled held
negative views about social insurance programs; while they existed, the
view was that things generally could be better. The rest held middling or
only slightly positive views about these programs (see table 36).
To the question about how well-organized labor is, respondents
thought that labor was generally organized (54 percent replied in and
around the middle point) although many were of the opinion that labor
unions did not function very well (43 percent) (see table 37). Consequently,
it was no surprise when some respondents indicated that labor unions only
had limited or no influence (39 percent) over government policy, while 57
percent indicated their belief that labor unions have a less than satisfactory
or middling influence over government policy (see table 38). This view
was also corroborated by the perception of a lack of labor union involvement
with corporate management74 percent of replies indicated such was the
case. Only 12 percent thought labor unions had some involvement or
influence in corporate management, while 13 percent gave middling
responses to the question in the matter (see table 39).
According to the respondents, public monitoring of corporate activities
was also very weak. 68 percent of replies indicated very little and/or weak
monitoring of private enterprises by consumer and environmental groups,
while 32 percent gave middle or more positive replies (see table 40). All
these views were in contrast to the desire of the respondents to see Malaysia
achieve economic equality. 52 percent believed that the public desired to
improve economic equality, 41 percent were not so enthusiastic about
such a development taking place, while 9 percent gave midpoint answers.
However, when the overall pattern of responses is viewed, it is evident
that more wanted equality and a reduction of inequality (see table 41).
AERIA AND TAN 89

Perceptions about the Robustness of Civil Society
A series of nineteen questions about the status of civil society were posed
to the respondents. This is one question more than what was in the ADI
civil society questionnaires used by other teams because we felt that in
Malaysia, it was necessary to divide the question on media fairness into one
about mainstream/traditional media and another on Internet/online media.
On the question of how free citizens social activities are from
government interference, 71 percent noted that there were deep government
controls over media, culture, and civil society groups in the country (see
table 42). Consequently, 87 percent thought that government had an
inordinate amount of influence, being overbearing over society (see table
43). On the other hand, when it came to the question of corporate influence
over society, 74 percent thought that private companies had more influence
over society (see table 44).
On the issue of whether or not the basic needs of citizens are met in
the country, responses indicated that generally this was so, although a
sense of deprivation exists (see table 45). However, when the same question
was refined to refer to vulnerable groups and minorities like children, women,
the disabled, and immigrants, a substantial number of responses (83 per-
cent) indicated that such groups were largely neglected in Malaysia, with
the country not conforming to basic international conventions (see table
46). Taking a more sectoral view, generally, respondents thought that there
was sufficient educational opportunities accorded to citizens, although
significant neglect existed; many people are still marginalized as far as
education is concerned (see table 47). On the issue of respect for different
cultures, religion, languages, races, nations and ideas, respondents generally
articulated the view that there was generally significant acceptance and respect
for various social/political/cultural groups, but there are equal levels of
intolerance (see table 48).
The influence of NGOs in Malaysian society is also moderate to low,
according to the respondents (see table 49). Still, although with limited
influence, NGOs continue to punch beyond their weight, so to speak,
since the respondents viewed NGOs as having an above average importance
in representing the public interest (see table 50). The experts think that
NGOs are regarded well by the public as being institutionally committed to
democracy (see table 51). Unfortunately, citizen participation in NGOs is
perceived as being moderate to low (82 percent), indicating a general level of
apathy toward civil society involvement by the general populace (see table 59).
This is largely reflected by the fact that most respondents thought NGOs do
not have much or even no influence over government policy in the country

(see table 60). Still, NGOs are generally well regarded in terms of being
representative of social diversity, although about a third of those polled felt
that they represented narrow interests (see table 52).
When asked about the media, an overwhelming number of those
polled (92 percent) thought that the mainstream media was unfair and
unjust in its coverage of the news (see table 53). In contrast, 75 percent
thought that the Internet media was more balanced and even-handed in
its coverage of the news and public views (see table 54). This divergence
between the mainstream and internet media rightly reflected the large
information gap between citizens; 84 percent of respondents held the view
that there was a moderate to large information gap in society (see table 55).
When asked if citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and
activities, the responses were varied, with unequal access being perceived
to be more evident than equal access (see table 56). Power distribution
among the people was also seen as very unequal, with elites monopolizing
power to a large extent in the minds of an overwhelming 90 percent of
respondents (see table 57). Affirmative action programmes were also
viewed by 85 percent of respondents as being poorly implemented or non-
existent in the country (see table 58).
7

Conclusion
The questionnaires were lengthy and designed to take less than an hour
each. However, during the administering of the questionnaires, they were
found to be quite detailed and challenging for many respondents who
found the concepts unfamiliar. Thus, respondents needed time to reflect
on the questions asked. Indeed, one respondent found the questions difficult
(even threatening not to complete the survey as it reminded him of school
exams!). Consequently, most respondents took over an hour to complete
the questionnaires. Generally, we received the following feedback from
our respondents: 1) the questionnaires were too long; and 2) some concepts
are challenging and drained the mental energy of respondents who had to
figure out not only complex issues but also answers along a detailed
Likert scale of 0-10.
Nevertheless, our pilot poll of the Asian Democracy Index revealed that
Malaysia in 2012on the eve of what promised to be a keenly contested
general electionwas dominated by a small but extremely powerful elite
in politics and the economy. Civil society was weak, given the monopoly
control exerted by the political-economic elite upon various facets of civil
society life, especially the mass media, which constrains the sharing of
information and knowledge of current affairs in society. The limited reach
AERIA AND TAN 91

of the Internet media in a developing country like Malaysia further limited
the dispersion of information, consequently of power. Thus, despite the
impending repeal of various oppressive laws like the Internal Security Act
as promised by the governing Barisan Nasional government, the reality
within society was that of continued domination of society by elites. In
other words, democracy remained constrained by the concentration of
power in politics, economics, and society. Malaysia in 2012 had a more
authoritarian character despite its public facade of democracy. Government
was also viewed as more ineffectual than efficient or effective.
But such conclusions have a major caveat. Apart from detailed issues
about the questionnaires and specific questions that arose via respondents
feedback, the Malaysia team had serious reservations about the size of the
sample. Normally, a sample size of 1000 persons is about the right size to
derive an accurate reflection of a nations outlook toward an issue. Given
that the Malaysian CADI survey only managed to survey thirty-five persons
on account of serious budgetary limitations, the reality is that there exists a
major impediment in generalizing the survey results. Such a tiny sample
(even if it is of professional, white-collared graduates) does not constitute
a significant, representative, or reliable indicator of national sentiment
toward democracy. In other words, the findings of this particular survey
cannot be referred to as being a representative or reliable indicator of the
state of democracy in Malaysia in 2012. However, its value derives from
being able to put forward a completely different and more analytical
perspective of democracy from that of the usual legal and normative
definitions. Indeed, the analytical perspective utilized in this survey,
namely democracy as dispersion of political, economic, and social power
complements the legal-normative approach and has potential to be used as
an organizing and campaigning tool to further advance the cause of
democracy beyond academic circles.
Notes
1. More details of the Freedom House Index can be found here: http://
www.freedomhouse.org.
2. Further details of the Asia Barometer Index can be found here http://
www.asianbarometer.org.
3. Details of the Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index can be found here:
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex12.
4. Democracy Rankings index of democracy can be found here: http://
democracyranking.org.
5. This particular result is problematic and even likely inaccurate as political affirmative
actions are very prevalent and visible within Malaysia. We discuss this point
subsequently when we evaluate the methodological robustness of the survey instrument in
a later section.

6. Although the responses are not incorrect, there was likely some confusion in the
respondents understanding of this question. Since 1970, Malaysia has advocated a
major political affirmative action program, namely the New Economic Policy (NEP).
Via policy interventions, the NEP seeks to eradicate poverty among poor Malay and
indigenous (Bumiputera) peoples of the country; to develop an entrepreneurial
class of Bumiputera businesses, and to re-allocate wealth concentrations by assisting the
Bumiputera corporate community to gain 30 percent of the countrys corporate wealth.
In this particular question however, political affirmative action referred to the political
rights of minorities; specifically, quotas for women and people with disabilities.
7. As in endnote 6, though the responses to this point are not incorrect, there was likely
some confusion in the respondents understanding of this question. The NEP has
benefitted members of the Malay/Bumiputera community more than other communities.
Consequently, there is considerable antipathy towards the NEP amongst non-
Malay/Bumiputeras. Given that our sample was ethnically skewed, there is a real
likelihood that the responses to this question are imbalanced.
References
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Malaysia. In From Unity to Multiplicities. Social Movement Transformation and
Democratization in Asia, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Hur Song Woo, and Andrew Aeria,
331-349. Petaling Jaya: SIRD.
Chan N.H. 2010. Perak A State of Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Loyarburok Publications
and SIRD.
Jalleh, Martin. 2009. One Perak! Aliran Monthly, June. http://aliran.com/aliran-
monthly/2009/2009-4/one-perak/.
Khoo Boo Teik. 2008. The Long 2008. Aliran Monthly, January. http://aliran.com/
aliran-monthly/2008/200810/the-long-2008/.
Lim Teck Ghee. 2011. Academic Consensus on Unfair Elections. Aliran Monthly,
August. http://aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2011-issues/2011-6/academic-consensus-on-
unfair-elections/.
Loh, Debra. 2010. The Real Deal with Perkasa. The NutGraph, March 16. http://
www.thenutgraph.com/real-deal-perkasa/.
Rasiah, Rani. 2009. Thoughts on the Perak Power Grab. Aliran Monthly, May. http://
aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2009/2009-3/thoughts-on-the-perak-power-grab/.
Sreenevasan, Ambiga. 2013. Will Elections in Malaysia be Free or Fair? Aljazeera,
May 4. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/201342982454925143.html.
SUARAM (Suara Rakyat Malaysia). 2012. Malaysia Civil & Political Rights Report
2012: Overview. Petaling Jaya: SUARAM. http://www.suaram.net/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Malaysia-HRR-Overview-2012.pdf.
. 2013. Stop More Deaths! Stop State Violence! Nothing Less Than the
IPCMC! SUARAM website, June 11. http://www.suaram.net/?p=5638.
Thomas, Tommy. 2008. 2008: Crossing the Rubicon. Aliran Monthly, April. http://
aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2008/2008-2/election-2008-crossing-the-rubicon/.
McDonald, Hamish. 2012. Najib's Malaysia still stuck in the murk. The Sydney
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najibs-malaysia-still-stuck-in-the-murk-20120504-1y3z9.html.

AERIA AND TAN 93

Appendix: Responses of Malaysian Experts
Politics

Table 3: Government Violence
Q1: How well are citizens protected from the violence wielded by
government agencies in the country?
Most respondents feel victimized by government violence (comment by
researchers).

Full
Control
Middle
Full
Freedom
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11% 11% 11%
32%
14%
4%
7%
4%
7%
0% 0%

Table 4: Protection of Citizen Freedoms
Q2: How well is citizens freedom protected in the country?
71 percent of those polled feel that their freedoms are less than protected.

Table 5: Freedom of Assembly
Q3: How much is freedom of assembly and activities of political groups
(parties and quasi-political organizations) protected in the country?
About 75 percent of those polled feel political groups lack freedom of assembly.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6%
9%
14%
23%
20% 20%
6%
3%
0% 0% 0%
Full
Control
Middle
Full
Freedom
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
17%
6% 6%
31%
14%
9%
17%
0% 0% 0% 0%
Full
Control
Middle
Full
Freedom
AERIA AND TAN 95

Table 6: Opposition Movements
Q4: To what extent are movements opposed to the government or
governing groups and the governing ideology allowed in the country?
78 percent feel opposition groups and ideologies are heavily controlled by
the government.

Table 7: Suffrage
Q5: How well is suffrage (of citizens) protected in the country?
Generally, respondents feel that suffrage is less than or not protected.

Full
Control
Middle
Full
Freedom
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
3%
29%
23%
11% 11%
9%
3%
0% 0% 0%
Full
Control
Middle
Full
Freedom
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6%
3%
15%
18%
15%
12%
21%
3%
6%
3%
0%

Table 8: Implementation of Government Policy
Q6: How well do all government agencies implement government policies in
the country?
According to the respondents, policy implementation and execution by
government agencies are generally ineffective.

Table 9: Non-elected officials Influence on Politics
Q7: How much do non-elected groups account for political power in
the country?
According to the respondents, political monopoly of unelected officials
leans toward hereditary/feudal controls.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9% 9%
6%
26%
11%
23%
17%
0% 0% 0% 0%
Fully
Ineffective
Middle
Fully
Effective
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
0%
6% 6%
9%
26%
6%
9%
23%
11%
3%
None Middle
Fully
Occupied
AERIA AND TAN 97

Table 10: Rule of Law
Q8: How well is the rule of law established in the country?
Rule of law is seen as generally weak or ineffective.

Table 11: Fair Elections
Q9: Are elections conducted fairly in the country?
According to the respondents, elections are largely conducted less than
fairly or unfairly.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9% 9%
11%
26%
20%
3%
17%
3% 3%
0% 0%
Full
Ineffective
Middle
Fully
Established
Full
Unfair
Middle
Fully
Fair
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
14%
29%
17%
11%
3%
9%
3% 3%
0% 0%

Table 12: Government Transparency
Q10: How transparent are the operation of government agencies in
the country?
Most of the respondents think that government agencies and operations
lack transparency.

Table 13: Checks and Balances in Government
Q11: How well do government agencies maintain checks and balances?
Generally, the experts responses suggest a serious lack of institutional
independence of and accountability by government.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
34%
20%
14%
3%
11%
0%
6%
0% 0% 0%
Very
Subjugated
Middle
Very
Independent
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
21%
24% 24%
15%
3%
6%
3%
6%
0% 0% 0%
Fully
Non-
transparent
Middle
Fully
Transparent
AERIA AND TAN 99

Table 14: Legislative Power Distribution
Q12: How well is power within the legislature distributed in the country?
According to the respondents, power is largely monopolised by the majority
party, thus, the legislature is undemocratic.

Table 15: Parliamentary Representation
Q13: How well does parliament or the legislature represent various social
groups in the country?
Parliament is generally unrepresentative of the electorate and social groups,
said the respondents.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
17%
14%
20%
31%
6% 6%
3% 3%
0% 0% 0%
Very
Monopolized
Middle
Fully
Distributed
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
17%
23%
17%
9%
11%
6%
3% 3%
0% 0%
Very
Closed
Middle
Fully
Represen-
tative

Table 16: Fair and Rational Policy Implementation
Q14: Do government agencies operate and implement policies fairly and
rationally in the country?
According to the respondents, government policy implementation is generally
more authoritarian and selective than participatory.

Table 17: Citizen Participation in Elections and Decision Making
Q15: How actively do citizens participate in elections and other political
decision-making processes in the country?
Citizens generally have access to participation but such access is skewed
toward less rather than more.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14%
11%
23%
26%
11%
6%
3%
0%
6%
0% 0%
Very
Authoritarian
Middle
Very
Democratic
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3% 3%
17%
11%
14%
23%
17%
6%
3% 3%
0%
None Middle Very
Partici-
patory
AERIA AND TAN 101

Table 18: Political Affirmative Action
Q16: How well established and implemented are political affirmative
actions in the country?
The results generally lean toward less or non-existent implementation,
thus marginalized groups are under- or unrepresented.

Table 19: Public Trust in Government
Q17: Does the public trust the government?
According to the respondents, majority of the public have less trust in or
fully distrust government.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12%
9%
29%
18%
6%
21%
6%
0% 0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Fully
Implemen -
ted
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
9%
23%
6%
20% 20%
9%
3%
0% 0% 0%
Full
Distrust
Middle
Full
Trust

Table 20: Public Trust in Parliament
Q18: Does the public trust the parliament/legislature?
According to the respondents, the public has more distrust than trust for
parliament.

Table 21: Public Trust in Democracy
Q19: Does the public trust democracy?
According to the respondents, there is still a lot of trust that democracy
works.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6%
9%
20% 20%
6%
17%
11%
6%
3% 3%
0%
Full
Distrust
Middle
Full
Trust
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
6%
0%
3%
14%
17%
9%
23%
17%
9%
3%
Full
Distrust
Middle
Full
Trust
AERIA AND TAN 103

Economy
Table 22: Influence of Political Power Elite
Q1: How much influence do the political power elite have on the operation
of private companies in the country?
According to the respondents, the said elites have large/extensive influence
over the economy.
Table 23: Labor Rights
Q2: Are labor rights well established in the country?
Labor rights are seen to be weak and not institutionally guaranteed.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9%
3%
21%
12%
15%
26%
0%
12%
3%
0% 0%
None
Middle
Fully
Guaranteed
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9%
3%
21%
12%
15%
26%
0%
12%
3%
0% 0%
None
Middle
Fully
Guaranteed

Table 24: Forced and Child Labor
Q3: Is Forced Labor and Child Labor Prohibited in the Country?
According to the respondents, both are legally guaranteed but in various
degrees.

Table 25: Central Government Independence from Foreign Influence
Q4: How independent are central government decision-making processes
from foreign countries and/or foreign capital influences in the country?
Generally, the respondents see the condition of this matter as middle of
the road.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0%
9%
6% 6%
21%
9% 9%
12%
18%
9%
None
Middle
Fully
Guaranteed
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3% 3% 3%
12%
15%
24%
21%
3%
12%
3%
0%
Fully
Subordinated
Middle
Fully
Independent
AERIA AND TAN 105

Table 26: Transparency of Corporate Operations
Q5: How transparent are corporate operations in the country?
The respondents see corporate operations in Malaysia as less than to non-
transparent.

Table 27: Private Enterprise Competition
Q6: How fair is competition between companies in the country?
The respondents generally see competition as lacking unfair given the
existence of monopolies.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9%
13% 13%
6%
13%
25%
13%
3% 3% 3%
0%
Fully
Non-
transparent
Middle
Fully
Transparent
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9%
3%
26%
29%
9%
15%
3%
6%
0% 0% 0%
Fully
Unfair
Middle
Fully
Fair

Table 28: Protection of Labor Rights
Q7: How much effort does the government exert to protect and guarantee
labor rights in the country?
According to the respondents, labor is highly restricted (labourers have
few rights or are unprotected).

Table 29: Corporate Protection of Labor Rights
Q8: How well do private companies protect/guarantee labor rights in the
country?
The respondents think that labor rights are generally less protected in
Malaysia and have tight restrictions.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
16%
9%
13%
16%
28%
9%
0%
3% 3%
0%
Fully
Restriction
Middle
Fully
Protection
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
15% 15% 15%
24%
12% 12%
3% 3%
0% 0%
Fully
Restriction
Middle
Fully
Protection
AERIA AND TAN 107

Table 30: Economic Monopolies and Domination
Q9: To what extent is the economy dominated by certain groups in the
country?
According to experts, there are high levels of domination by monopolies
and favored conglomerates.

Table 31: Regional Economic Inequalities
Q10: How serious are the economic disparities/inequalities between regions
in the country?
According to the respondents, regional disparities are highly skewed.

Very
Distributive
Middle
Fully
Dominated/
Monopolized
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0%
3% 3%
0%
14%
29%
31%
6%
14%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0% 0%
9% 9%
6%
29%
17%
20%
11%
None Middle Very
Serious

Table 32: Income Disparity
Q11: How serious is income disparity in the country?
The respondents said that income inequalities are highly skewed.

Table 33: Asset Disparity
Q12: How serious is asset disparity in the country?
The respondents said that asset disparity is highly skewed.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
11% 11%
20%
31%
14%
11%
None Middle
Very
Serious
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
9%
12%
15%
32%
15%
18%
None Middle
Very
Serious
AERIA AND TAN 109

Table 34: Labor Market Discrimination
Q13: How serious is labor market discrimination in the country?
Discrimination is very serious between regular and irregular labor,
according to the respondents.

Table 35: Support Systems for the Poor
Q14: How well established are support system for the poor in the country?
There are less than satisfactory support systems available for the poor,
according to the respondents.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
18%
21%
30%
15%
9%
6%
None Middle
Very
Serious
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
6%
14%
23%
11%
23%
11%
9%
0% 0% 0%
None
Middle
Fully
Guaran-
teed

Table 36: Social Insurance Programs
Q15: How well do social insurance programs operate in the country?
Generally, the experts said that social welfare programs exist, but they
could be improved.

Table 37: Organized Labor Unions
Q16: How well organized are labor unions in the country?
Labor unions are generally well organized but are not functioning well,
according to the experts.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
6%
9%
21%
12%
32%
15%
3%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Fully
Guaranteed
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9%
3%
22%
9%
19%
16%
19%
3%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Fully
Organized
AERIA AND TAN 111

Table 38: Influence of Labor Unions on Government
Q17: How much influence do labor unions have on the policies of central
government in the country?
According to the experts, labor unions have less than satisfactory to
limited influence on the central government.

Table 39: Labor Union Participation in Corporate Management
Q18: How participatory are labor unions in the management process of
the country?
The experts said that labor unions are largely non-participatory, with
limited influence in corporate management of private enterprises.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12%
0%
15%
12%
21%
15%
21%
3%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Very
Much
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
13%
6%
29%
10%
16%
13%
6%
3% 3%
0% 0%
None Middle
Full
Participation

Table 40: Public Monitoring of Corporate Activities
Q19: Is there any public monitoring of corporate activities in the country?
Generally, according to the experts, there is very little/weak monitoring of
private enterprises by consumer and environmental groups in Malaysia.

Table 41: Public Enthusiasm toward Economic Equality
Q20: How enthusiastic is the general public about improving economic
inequality in the country?
According to the respondents, those who are keen on improving economic
equality and reducing inequality outnumber those who are not.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
6%
17%
14%
20%
17%
6%
3%
6%
0% 0%
None Middle
Full
Participation
None Middle
Full
Active
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0%
9%
23%
9% 9%
29%
14%
6%
0%
3%
AERIA AND TAN 113

Civil Society
Table 42: Freedom from Government Interference
Q1: How free are citizens social activities from government interference
in the country?
There are deep controls over media, culture, and civil society groups, said
the respondents.

Table 43: Influence of Government Organizations upon Society
Q2: How much influence do government organizations have on society in
the country?
The respondents think that such organizations have very heavy to
overbearing influence.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
6%
26%
14% 14%
23%
6%
0% 0% 0% 0%
Fully
Controlled
Middle
Fully
Free
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0% 0%
3%
0%
12%
9%
24% 24%
18%
12%
None Middle
Very
High

Table 44: Corporate Influence on Society
Q3: How much influence do private companies have on society in the
country?
They have more influence rather than less, said the respondents.
Table 45: Basic Needs of Citizens
Q4: To what extent are the basic needs of citizens met in the country?
According to the respondents, such needs are generally met, but a
sense of deprivation exists.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3% 3%
9%
6% 6%
20% 20%
14% 14%
3% 3%
None Middle
Very
High
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
6%
3%
17%
9%
20% 20%
23%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle Fully Satisfied
AERIA AND TAN 115

Table 46: Special Care for Vulnerable Groups
Q5: Aside from the basic needs as stated in Q4, to what extent is special care
provided for vulnerable people or minorities, such as children, women, people
with disabilities, and immigrants in the country?
These groups, according to the experts, are largely neglected, which is not
in fulfillment of international standards.

Table 47: Educational Opportunities
Q6: Are citizens provided with sufficient educational opportunities in the
country?
Access is seen to be generally satisfactory, but with significant marginalization.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6%
11%
20% 20%
26%
11%
6%
0% 0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Fully
Satisfied
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3% 3%
9%
3%
12%
29%
21%
9%
6%
3% 3%
None Middle
Fully
Satisfied

Table 48: Respect for Others
Q7: Do citizens respect different cultures, religions, languages, races, nations,
and ideas in the country?
In Malaysia, said the experts, there is significance acceptance and respect
but with equal levels of intolerance.

Table 49: NGO Influence on Society
Q8: How much influence do NGOs have on society in the country?
NGOs have moderate to weak influence on society, according to the experts.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0%
17%
14%
11% 11%
14%
17%
9%
6%
0%
None Middle
Fully
Respecting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
6%
9%
11%
20% 20% 20%
14%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Very
High
AERIA AND TAN 117

Table 50: Public Interests Representation by NGOs
Q9: How well do NGOs represent the public interest in the country?
There is above average quality of representing public interest among
NGOs, according to the respondents.

Table 51: Are NGOs Democratic?
Q10: Do NGOs operate democratically in the country?
They are seen as generally democratic.

Fully
Private
Middle
Fully Public
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
6% 6%
0%
17%
26%
20%
17%
6%
3%
0%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 0%
9%
3%
6%
43%
14%
20%
6%
0% 0%
Non-
democratic
Middle Fully
Democratic

Table 52: NGO Representation of Diversity
Q11: Do NGOs represent the diverse and different values and demands
of society effectively in the country?
The experts said that NGOs are generally representative of diverse values
and demands, although a perception of narrow causes exists.

Table 53: Fair and Just Mainstream Media
Q12: Is the mainstream media fair and just in the country?
It is deeply unfair and unjust in presenting news and views, according to
the respondents.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
0%
6%
12% 12%
21%
24%
9%
6%
3%
6%
Very Biased
and Narrow
Middle
Very
Diverse
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
26%
34%
20%
3%
9%
6%
3%
0% 0% 0% 0%
Very
Unfair
Middle
Very
Fair
AERIA AND TAN 119

Table 54: Fair and Just Internet Media
Q13: Is the Internet media fair and just in the country?
The Internet media is generally even-handed treatment of news and
views, according to the experts.

Table 55: Information Gap among Citizens
Q14: How wide is the information gap between citizens in the country?
The experts think that there is a significant gap, reflecting deeply unequal
access.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
3%
9%
0%
13%
28%
16%
19%
6% 6%
0%
Very
Unfair
Middle
Very
Fair
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3%
6%
3% 3% 3%
17%
9%
20%
23%
6%
9%
Very
Narrow/
Equal
Middle
Very
Wide/
Negative

Table 56: Access to Cultural Facilities and Activities
Q15: Do citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and activities in
the country?
They have variable access, said the experts, but such access is more
unequal than equal.

Table 57: Distribution of Power among People
Q16: Is power distributed equally among people in the country?
Power is largely monopolized by elite interests, said the respondents.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
9%
20%
9%
6%
26%
14%
6% 6%
3% 3%
Very
Unequal
Middle
Very
Equal
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
23%
6%
23%
20%
9% 9%
3%
0%
3%
6%
0%
Very
Monopolized
Middle
Very
Distributed
AERIA AND TAN 121

Table 58: Affirmative Action Programs
Q17: Are affirmative action programs well established and operational in
the country?
According to the experts, in Malaysia, such programs are poorly established
(low to non-operational).

Table 59: Citizen Participation in NGOs
Q18: How actively do citizens participate in NGO activities in the country?
Citizens are seen to be generally apathetic or have low levels of participation.

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
21%
12%
15% 15%
21%
9%
0%
3%
0% 0%
3%
None Middle
Fully
Active
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0%
11%
20%
17%
14%
23%
9%
6%
0% 0% 0%
None Middle
Fully
Active

Table 60: NGO Influence over Government Policy
Q19: How influential are NGOs on government policymaking processes in
the country?
NGOs are seen to have largely weak to no influence over policymaking in
Malaysia.

None Middle
Fully
Influential
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11%
6%
11%
20%
23%
11% 11%
6%
0% 0% 0%
Regressing, Stagnant, or Progressing?
The 2012 CADI Asian Democracy Index
Survey in the Philippines
MIGUEL PAOLO P. REYES, CLARINDA LUSTERIO BERJA,
ERIKA M. REY-SATURAY
Introduction
Eventful is an appropriate descriptor for the year 2012 in the Philippines.
Among the events that generated the most headlines in that year were
those tied to the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Corona had been in proverbial hot water since the beginning of his term
in May 2010, as he was a judicially upheld midnight appointee of the
current presidents unpopular predecessor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In the
stifling political climate emerging from incendiary exchanges between Corona
and Arroyos successor, Benigno Aquino III (Holmes 2012, 85-86), in
December 2011, an overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives
voted to impeach the chief justice on the grounds of betrayal of public trust,
the culpable violation of the constitution, and graft and corruption (Holmes
2012, 86). In accordance with the 1987 Constitution, the Senate thus
constituted itself as an impeachment court to try the chief justice. After a
trial that lasted five months, in May 2012, Corona was impeached for
betrayal of public trust, manifested by his failure to disclose the entirety of
his wealth in his government-mandated Statement of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth.
2012 is also memorable because of the heated debatesinside and
outside the houses of Congressabout what eventually became the
____________________________________________________________
Miguel Paolo P. Reyes is university research associate at the Third World Studies Center,
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
Clarinda Lusterio Berja is assistant professor at the Political Science Program of the Department
of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines-Manila.
Erika M. Rey-Saturay is a Master of Arts in Anthropology candidate at the Department
of Anthropology, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines
-Diliman.

124 PHILIPPINE COUNTRY REPORT 2012

Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, nicknamed the
RH Law, which enshrined in law the states sponsorship of all legal and
effective means of contraception. Unsurprisingly, before it was enacted in
December 2012, what was then called the RH Bill caused relations between
the influential Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and Pro-RH
elected officialsincluding President Aquinoto be far from harmonious.
Apart from health care, another basic service that was significantly reshaped
in 2012 was education; 2012 saw the full implementation of the K-
12 (Kindergarten to Grade 12) system of basic education in the Philippines.
Previously, the vast majority of Philippine schoolchildren were expected
to obtain a high school diploma after finishing ten years of basic education,
which the state was constitutionally mandated to provide without charge.
Starting in 2012, two more years of schooling were added to state-
supported basic education in the Philippines.
Besides the RH law, a standout in 2012s list of landmark Philippine
legislation is the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act, touted
to be the first such law in Asia (San Pedro and Dalangin-Fernandez
2012). It penalizes any form of deprivation of liberty by government
authorities or their agents who thereafter keep silent about their reprehensible
act, or conceal the fate of the person they caused to be disappeared (San
Pedro and Dalangin-Fernandez 2012).
In the economic front, 2012 was the year when the Philippiness
gross domestic product grew by 6.4 percent, prompting Knight Frank
and Citi Private Wealth to declare that the Philippines will likely become
the sixth fastest growing economy in the world between 2010-2050
(Garcia 2012; Ordinario 2012). Our economist-by-training president
trumpeted this apparent gain in his 2012 State of the Nation Address
(Aquino 2012). Of interest to those who monitor industry monopolization
was the near-sale of GMA-7, one of the largest television networks in the
Philippines, to Mediaquest Holdings, Inc. The sale would have made
that media conglomerate the owner of two of the three major television
networks in the country. Mediaquest is owned by the Beneficial Trust
Fund of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT);
local business tycoon Manny Pangilinan is PLDTs chairman of the
board and managing director of PLDTs controlling stockholder, First
Pacific Co., Ltd. Over a year before the Mediaquest-GMA-7 negotiations
fell through in October 2012, PLDT already owned two of the three cellular
telecommunications companies in the Philippines.

REYES, BERJA, REY-SATURAY 125

Lastly, as 2012 came to a close, the state reported that eight public-
private partnership projects were rolled out within the year; two other
PPP projects had already been awarded earlier that year (Manila
Times, in PPP Center 2012). These massive service and infrastructure
projects are but the first of many that were planned to be undertaken
during the Aquino administration (Manila Times, in PPP Center 2012).
These ostensibly terrain-altering events aside, even a cursory glance
at local news articles in 2012 will reveal that many of the deficiencies
that our 2011 ADI pilot survey respondents believed to be embedded in
Philippine society persisted throughout 2012. Thus, in a year that seems to
verify the clich, the more things change, the more they stay the same,
our team gamely carried out our annual task of conducting a CADI ADI
survey.
Methodology
Sample Selection and Respondent Profile
As in 2011, the Philippine research team made a long list of experts in the
fields of politics, the economy, and civil society. There is no complete
listing of experts on the three fields that is availabl e. To come up with
the sample for the survey, the researchers put together lists of experts by
sector from the Third World Studies Center. The experts were all invited
to participate in the survey. They were given a week to confirm their
participation and another week to accomplish the questionnaire.
Within each field, there were experts from the academe; nongovernmental/
civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs); and the private sector, members
of which are not affiliated with the government or any academic institution,
nor are primarily identified with NGOs/CSOs. The experts were categorized
according to their ideological leanings; the experts were designated by mem-
bers of the research team as either (extreme) left-left leaning (L-LL) or
(extreme) right-right leaning (R-RL). As we explained in our 2011 report,
In classifying whether a respondent is L-LL or R-RL, the research
team made the following assumptions: 1) those who are known (by
their reputations, publications, etc.) to exhibit critical or dissenting
opinions against the Philippine government and its policies, and are
at the same time avowedly supportive of socialist socioeconomic
policies are classified as left-left leaning; 2) those who have
worked for the Philippine government, either in the bureaucracy or

Field Affiliation NO. of L-LL NO. of R-RL
Politics Academe 3 3
NGO/CSO 2 3
Private Sector 3 1
Economy Academe 3 3
NGO/CSO 3 1
Private Sector 2 3
Civil Society Academe 3 2
NGO/CSO 3 3
Private Sector 2 3
24 22

as consultants, and/or subscribe to the governments neoliberal
socioeconomic policies are classified as right-right leaning
(Reyes, Berja, and Socrates 2012, 138).
Some of the reactors and audience members of the last Asian Democracy
Index conference, held on August 30-31, 2012 at the University of the
Philippines-Diliman, did not take kindly to this division. Some stated that
an individual may have varying ideological stances on different issues
stances which themselves may be dynamicwhile others asked why we
did not include a centrist tendency. We were by then unable to address
their concerns regarding our binary ideological division, as to do so would
entail a significant alteration of our nearly-completed survey rounds ex-
perimental design. We will discuss our response to their comments in a
future paper.
For 2012, our sample size is forty-sixnearly double our 2011 sample
and with a more even distribution among L-LL and R-RL respondents in all
levels than in the previous year. The sample was selected using multistage
stratified sampling. To come up with this sample, we first drew up a long
list of potential respondents. Then, the long list was divided into three
groups based on the three institutional affiliation categories. Next, potential
respondents were classified according to their field of specialization and
ideological leaning. We tried to make sure that at any given time during
data collection, six experts per institutional affiliationthree L-LL and
three R-RLfor each field were either being invited to participate in the
project, had agreed to participate in the project, or had submitted a filled-
out survey form. While this meant that the ideal number of respondents
was fifty-four, due to time and resource constraints and other data collection
difficulties described below, we had to stop at respondent forty-six. The
complete respondent profile according to field of expertise, institutional
affiliation, and ideological leanings can be found in table 1.
Geographic Coverage
We tried to include experts from the countrys three major island
groupsLuzon, Visayas, and Mindanaoalthough at the time of data
collection, most of the respondents were based in Manila, the national
capital in Luzon. As with the 2011 survey, the research team made sure
that at least two experts in each of the fields of expertise were rooted in
and were strongly identified with localities in Visayas and Mindanao.


Field Affiliation NO. of L-LL NO. of R-RL
Politics Academe 3 3
NGO/CSO 2 3
Private Sector 3 1
Economy Academe 3 3
NGO/CSO 3 1
Private Sector 2 3
Civil Society Academe 3 2
NGO/CSO 3 3
Private Sector 2 3
24 22

Table 1. Respondent Profile

Data Collection
Our data collection instruments were the same questionnaires we used in
2011a questionnaire each for politics, economy, and civil society, all of
which were designed to be self-administered. While most of the respondents
did use the instruments as intended, we conducted face-to-face interviews
with two respondents who preferred to answer the survey through interview.
Apart from those two, potential respondents received their questionnaires by
email or in hard copy. Potential respondents were given, on average, one
week to return the accomplished instrument given to them. Most of them
were given a deadline extension if they failed to submit on time.
As before, all experts were asked to indicate their responses to questions
in the survey instruments using a scale of 0-10. Their ratings may describe
their level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction about a certain situation, or their
estimate of a level of influence and control, among others. They were also
asked to give explanatory comments to their ratings if they wished.
Detailed descriptions followed each query, giving examples and suggesting
data sources to help ensure rating reliability. In this study, an expert is
broadly defined as an individual in a more or less favorable position to
know the facts." The assumption is that they would incorporate their
personal knowledge and experience in their ratings. The data sources
cited by the experts were used by the researchers to verify the ratings given.


Schedule of Data Collection and Analysis
Members of the project staff completed the first long list of potential
respondents in late May 2012. Data collection began in late May 2012
and ended in late September 2012. Data processing of the completed data
set took place from September 2012 to October 2013. Analysis was
protracted largely due to insufficiency of personnel, the conduct of the
2013 survey, and other intervening tasks.
Difficulties in Data Collection
Over one hundred invitations to potential respondents were sent out. The
refusal rate (reflecting both actual and constructive refusals) was 44 percent,
lower than 2011s 64 percent. Contributing to this decrease in refusals is
the fact that 56 percent of 2011s respondents agreed to take part in the
survey again. The attachment of an information sheet describing the 2011
survey results may have also made the invited more willing to exert effort
in answering the surveys. Most of those who refused to/withdrew from
participating in the survey stated that they did not have or no longer have
the time to participate. Others said that they did not think they were the
right people to take part in the project.
Analytical Method
The method of analysis used here is in accordance with the method
delineated in the latest version of the ADI Guidebook (2012), which is
cited in the analysis section of this report.
Results of the 2012 CADI ADI Survey in the Philippines
Indices of Democracy
Table 2 summarizes the estimates derived from the results of the 2012
CADI ADI survey in the Philippines.
The succeeding discussion describes in detail the ratings and/or the
explanatory comments of the respondents (i.e., respondent assessments of
Philippine democratization at the indicator level) classified under the
ADI attributes per field. Thereafter, analysis at the ADI subprinciple and
principle levels will be shown.

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Politics
The Level of Performance of State Violence
Regarding their responses to the item corresponding to this attribute, the
respondents of the politics survey had varying interpretations of who
commits undue violence (either the state as a complex or isolated
security forces), though there was a consensus that acts classifiable as
undue violence include unlawful imprisonment and extrajudicial killings.
Most of the respondents who gave a score higher than 5 agreed that there
are sufficient legal mechanisms to challenge those who commit human
rights violations. However, they did not contradict the other respondents
who said that these protective laws are poorly implemented, and a culture
of impunity reigns in the country. One respondent noted that there is
some improvement in the governments human rights protection record
after the Arroyo administration ended, while another said that human
rights violations under the current administration are on the rise.
Civil Rights
The high scorers of the politics surveys second item (rating: 7-8) who
gave comments (6 out of 8) all agreed that institutional guarantees,
primarily in the form of the Constitutions Bill of Rights, exist. Nevertheless,
these high scorers acknowledged that there are still violations of basic
freedoms in places that the law is barely (if at all) respected (e.g., warlord-
run localities) and that certain groups are vulnerable to human rights
violations (e.g., journalists). One respondent, who gave a low score of 4,
stated that rampant human rights violations make it difficult to believe
that these freedoms are actually guaranteed. This respondent believed that
the poor delivery of basic goods and services also restricts the guarantee of
these freedoms.
Freedom to Organize and Act in Political Groups
Majority of the respondents for the item under this attribute gave a high
score (8-9). Three gave a score ranging from 5-6. One respondent believed
that the Philippines may have the highest degree of freedom of assembly.
Another concurs, believing that there may even be excessive freedom of
assembly. Most of the others agree with the former, adding that citizens
have sufficient freedom to form political parties (though their ideological
diversity/representativeness remains questionable). The two who gave low

scores stated that these freedoms are on paper only. One of them
believed that the freedoms in question do not exist in the rural provinces.
Permission for Political Opposition
There were scores across the entire scale for item four, with both extreme
scores coming from L-LL respondents. Similar to the first item, divergences
in responses are partly attributable to varying interpretations of what
opposition movements mean. Most of those who gave a high score
believed that the Philippines has an abundance of political opposition
movements; the state engages with debates with all organized or represented
sectors, save for secessionists and armed subversives. Those who gave
middle to moderately high scores agreed that opposition exists, but their
diversity is suspect. The two who gave comments seem to agree that
opposition refers to those who are putting themselves at risk to oppose
the state, or what one of these respondents referred to as the progressive
opposition. There thus appears to be a consensus among the respondents that
anti-government opposition has poor standing in the Philippine political arena.
The Expansion of Universal Suffrage
One-fourth of the respondents gave a score of 10 for the item under this
attribute, agreeing that all who are allowed to vote can freely exercise their
right to vote in the Philippines. One of these respondents, however, echoed
what many of the other respondents saw fit to highlightelections in the
Philippines are plagued with violence, cheating, and the like. As one respon-
dent stated, while voter turnout has been high, [quality] of engagement
however is low. Only two of the respondents gave low scoresneither
explained their ratings. Those who gave middle to moderately high
scores gave a variety of explanations for their ratings, e.g., economic
(the resources necessary to launch an election campaign, thus making
it impossible for someone truly of the people to run for public office),
political (again, unbridled vote-buying by the powers that be), and
downright criminal (electoral fraud). While only indirectly related to the
items concerns, most of the respondents seemed incapable of discussing
Philippine elections without mentioning its historical lack of integrity.
Efficiency of the State
For the item under state efficiency, the majority of respondents gave a
score in the 3-6 range, indicating a general dissatisfaction with the way the

government in general is implementing its policies. The comments support
this interpretationadjectives such as uneven, inefficient, even
dismal were used by the respondents to characterize how the government
goes about its executive functions. One respondent mentioned that the
bureaucracy is exceedingly complex. Another stated that there is a
culture of patronage that is deeply entrenched in Philippine society.
Others appeared to synthesize these comments, finding that government
inefficiency can be rooted in both procedural inadequacies and corruption.
Those who gave higher scores than the others believed that the current
administration is a genuinely reform-oriented one.
The Presence of Non-Elected Hereditary Power
With the exception of one respondent, all of the respondents gave scores
of 5 and below for the political surveys seventh item. Four believed that
non-elected groups virtually (or, in the case of one, actually) monopolize
political power in the Philippines. The respondents said that political
power holders in the Philippines who do not overtly throw their hat into
the political arena include religious groups and business families. The sole
respondent who said that political power is wielded wholly by non-elected
groups substantiated his score by stating that even elected officials are
affiliated/belong to these non-elected groups. This was seconded by an
expert who gave a 1. The said expert believed that the political system in
the Philippines is akin to an aristocracy, if not a plutocracy. A respondent
who agreed with the latter two but gave a rating of 5 problematized the
elected/non-elected dichotomy, stating what most of the experts agreed
uponthe distribution of political power (or lack thereof) is influenced
primarily by the multifaceted Philippine elite, a complex that includes
political dynasties, the wealthy, and those with backing from the United
States.
The Rule of Law
None of the respondents were inclined to state that the rule of law is well-
established in the Philippines. Nevertheless, evidence of the rule of law in
the Philippines, according to one respondent, is the recent impeachment
of the Chief Justice Corona. A respondent who answered the survey before
the impeachment echoed this sentiment. However, this one incident
stands behind the weak implementation of the constitutional republics
laws. Corruption of the judiciary is one reason why four experts believed

that the rule of law has yet to flourish in the Philippines. All of the
respondents agreed that the marginalized have poor access to justice.
Electoral Fairness
The respondent agreed that elections in the Philippines were generally
fair, but they are subject to manipulation by the elite, who are capable of
playing dirty to ensure that they secure elective posts. One respondent
believed that this was tied to a lack of transparency and accountability on
campaign activities of candidates. A couple of respondents talked about
institutionalized winnability, wherein the likelihood of ones success in
winning an election lies largely on ones popularity, party affiliation, and/
or membership in a political dynasty (all of which are determinants of how
well one can attract financial backing), not on ones platform. In rural
areas, according to one respondent, the politics of guns, goons, and gold
and familial ties still predominate.
Transparency
All but two gave scores ranging from 1-6. The two who gave high scores and
commentsone from the L-LL side and one from the R-RL side
highlighted laws and executive issuances that mandate government
transparency. However, many of the other respondents raised the continuing
failure of Congress to pass the Freedom of Information Bill. Again, some of
the respondents found it necessary to downplay the existence of formal
guarantees in light of their poor implementation.
Independence and Checks and Balances among State Power
Apparatuses
The impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona was a major issue discussed
by the respondents in the item under this attribute. Nevertheless, most of
them did not allow their opinion of the trial to primarily influence their
scores. Although the Philippines does have a tripartite division of government
to assure checks and balances, some respondents pointed out that there are
activities by one branch of government that are not (effectively) monitored by
the other branches (e.g., the utilization of intelligence funds).


Dispersion of Political Power in Parliament
Most of the respondents who gave comments on the item under this
attribute agreed that there are virtually no ideologically differentiated
parties in the Philippinesindeed, political turncoatism was found by
some of them to be popular among Philippine politicians. According to
them, save for a few party list groups, a Philippine political party usually
revolves around particular personalities, the most influential among whom
is the incumbent chief executive. Such comments served to justify mostly
low ratings; the sole high rating came from a left-leaning respondent who
belived that [members] of the minority still get to be members of important
committees.
Political Representation
Only one respondent said that minorities were fairly well-represented, but
with the caveatechoed by the other respondentsthat a groups
representation in Congress does not translate to that group having a
significant influence on Congresss legislative agenda. There was no
gulf between the responses of left-leaning and right-leaning respondents,
with two relatively high scorersan L-LL and an R-RL respondent
(faintly) praising the existence of party list groups, the success of which
they nevertheless downplayed due to the party list systems distortion by
traditional political elites.
Democratization of State Institutions
According to the respondents, public consultation by the executive and
legislative branches of government do take place, though one L-LL
respondent believed that consultation is limited and another believed that
the voice of the people is only listened to by the government when
accompanied by protest actions. Two respondents from the academe
wondered why the item under this attribute correlated the fairness and
rationality of decisions made by the government with the democratization
of state institutions; they gave scores similar to that of the majority, i.e.,
near the middle of a 2-8 range.
Participation System and Degree of Participation
High scores for the item under this attribute came from two respondents
from election watchdogs. Many noted or emphasized that political participation

by the citizenry is typically limited to participation in electionswhich
may be the reason why two respondents in the left-leaning column gave
unexplained low scores (a 1 and a 2).
Affirmative Action
The majority of respondents from NGOs/CSOs gave middle high-high
scores (6-8), while most of the other respondentssave for one who gave
an unexplained 9gave scores in the low-middle high range, 77.78 percent
of whom gave a score below 5. The low scores seem to be the result of the
respondents belief that state-enforced affirmative action, as explained in
the description for the item under this attribute (e.g., allocated seats in the
legislature for women and people with disabilities), does not/no longer
exists in the Philippines. For the high scorers, the party list system, laws
such as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, and certain admission policies
of elite public schools, are among the existing manifestations of affirmative
action in the Philippines.
The Public Credibility of the Current Democratic Institution
The two items under this attribute were concerned with public trust for
the government as a whole and the legislature. Ratings for the former
were in the 2-7 range (mean: 5.67) while ratings for the latter were in the 3-6
range (mean: 4.67). Nearly half of the respondents justified their relatively
higher ratings for the first item by mentioning the trust ratings of President
Aquino, which some noted were lower than in previous years but remained
fairly high. Many of the respondents said that they gave relatively lower
scores for the second item because the Philippine Congress, as a whole,
has (long) been seen as a privileged body populated largely by corrupt
politicians.
The Public Credibility of a Democratic Institution and the Public Attitude to
Democratic Participation
Only one respondent gave a low score (a 4) for the item under this attribute.
She gave no explanation for her score. One respondent gave a 5, giving
the opinion that since democracy refers to procedural democracy in our
collective psyche, it may not be seen as necessarily the most desirable system
by the majority of citizens who are more concerned with concrete desirables
such as jobs and justice. This was seconded by another respondent, who
said that preference for democracy appears to be common among the

middle class, but members of the lower class tend to prefer paternalism or
a Singapore-style state. Apart from one other respondent who gave an
unexplained 6, all the other respondents gave a score between 7-10. Thus,
majority of the respondents believe that democracy is still the preferred
type of system by the Philippine citizenry.
Economy
Freedom/Autonomy of Economic Activities from Political Intervention
Five of the fifteen respondents of the economy survey believed that private
companies in the Philippines conduct their day-to-day business largely
without government intervention; their recoded ratings range from 6-8
for the item corresponding to this attribute. All of the other respondents
gave a rating ranging from 1-4 after recoding,
1
indicating their belief that
political elites are in collusion with economic elites, resulting in the abundance
of monopolies/duopolies in the retail and service sector and the dominance
of elite players in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Many of
the respondents stated that such control extends to the local government
unit (LGU) level, where traditional elites hold sway over both politics and
business.
Protection of Basic Labor Rights
The economy survey respondents were divided in their responses to the
first item under this attribute. Most of the left-leaning respondents gave a
score between 1-4, indicating their belief that labor rights are generally
poorly established in the Philippines, despite the existence of a Labor
Code and similar legislation. According to some respondents, these laws
are very weak or are poorly implemented; monitoring mechanisms to
ensure the proper implementation of such laws do not function because of
resource constraints. Those who disagreed cited the features of the countrys
labor laws that do appear to be functional (e.g., a mandated bias toward
laborers, especially of small and medium enterprises). As regards the second
item under protection of basic labor rights, all except one of the left-leaning
respondents believed that forced and child labor remains rampant in the
Philippines, giving scores ranging from 2-4. In contrast, only one respondent
from the right-leaning camp gave a score lower than 5, noting that
unscrupulous employers do get away with murder if they bribe certain
authorities. The egregious existence of child workers was highlighted by

many of the experts, with some from both the left-leaning and right-leaning
groups stating that this is more prevalent in rural, agricultural areas,
where farming remains a family affair.
Autonomy of the Decision-making Process for the Formation of International
Political Economy Policy
A few right-leaning respondents gave a score between 6-9 for the item under
this attribute, indicating their belief that Philippine economic policy is (fairly)
free from foreign influence. Only two of the eight left-leaning respondents
saw fit to give a score of fivethe scores of the other members of the L-LL
group were in the 0-3 range, scores that were mirrored only by two R-RL
respondents. Many of these low scorers believed that the Philippines is utterly
dependent on foreign capital, either from the United States or the countrys
neighbors in Asia. Two left-leaning respondents believe that the Philippine
state is beholden to foreign transnational companies and multilateral financial
institutions.
Economic Transparency
Most of the respondents think that rules to ensure transparency and
economic competition are poorly implemented in the Philippines. One
respondent went so far as to say that corporate transparency is non-
existent in the country. An outlier, however, believed that corporate
transparency is high thanks to the growing number of [companies
listed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC] and the
campaign of SEC. Other respondents drew attention to the existence of
non-listed companies, the filial ties that protect members of the dominant
family-owned companies from scrutiny, and what they claim to be various
forms of financial misrepresentation by SEC-listed companies, e.g., to
inflate their value.
Economic Fairness
While the range of scores given by the respondents for the item under this
attribute is from 1-8, the average score is 3.87. Most respondents gave low
scores because they perceived key Philippine industries to be dominated by
monopolies, which make for what one respondent described as an uneven
playing field. Two respondents brought up the lack of anti-trust laws in the
Philippines. One of the respondents diverged with the majoritys negative
view of industry monopoly; he believed that even tycoons compete fiercely
and for the betterment of consumers.

Governments Accountability
Generally, for the item under this labor-focused attribute, the left-leaning
respondents gave lower scores than the right-leaning respondents. Two of
the high scorers from the latter group thought that the government effectively
protects labor rights in the Philippinesone went so far as to say that it
was over-protected. Both believed that the minimum wage system is
detrimental to Philippine laborone claimed that it is responsible for a
largely unregulated informal sector, the other says that there would be more
gainful employment if minimum wage is abandoned in favor of non-wage
benefits. Many of the other respondents said that labor contractualization is
prevalent in the country, making many members of the labor force prone
to various forms of abuse by their employers. Some of the respondents
nevertheless believed that labor protection is improving under the Aquino
administration.
Corporate Accountability
In response to the item under this labor-focused attribute, a majority of
the respondents believed that there are loopholes in laws and regulations
that allow companies to circumvent the protection of labor rights because
of their orientation toward profit maximization. One respondent noted
that there is no institutionalized penalty or real significant reward
for companies to take labor rights seriously. Others mentioned labor
contractualization again, tying it to business process outsourcing (BPO);
a number of respondents noted that BPO companiesreferred to by one
respondent as the so-called savior of the Philippine economyhave
poor policies regarding the protection of labor rights. One respondent
noted that non-skilled laborers have a particularly precarious status in the
Philippines.
Economic Monopoly
After recoding, none of the respondents gave a score higher than 5 for the
item under this attribute, showing that all of the respondents thought that
the Philippine economy is dominated by particular groups, specifically
tycoons (including mainland Chinese businessmen or taipans) and local
and foreign conglomerates. Some respondents said that there is high foreign
concentration in key industries. A couple of L-LL respondents perceive this
condition to be detrimental to the Philippine economy since these economic

elites have traditionally exhibited profit-focused/rent-seeking behavior. While
most agreed with the aforementioned two or reported this condition with an
objective tone, one R-RL respondent believed that the tycoons themselves
compete.
Regional Inequality
Again, after recoding, none of the respondents gave a score higher than 5
for the item under this attributein fact, the average rating is a very low
1.76. According to many respondents, economic inequality in low-
income regions is more pronounced than in high-income regions. One
respondent noted that the poverty level in some provinces in Mindanao
[is] worse than in a country like Bangladesh. Two respondents cited the
current nationwide Gini coefficient of 0.45, which is indicative of the
countrys proximity to a state of high inequality.
Inequality of Income
Ratings after recoding for the item on income inequality range from 0-4,
reflecting a consensus among the respondents that very few control
resources in the Philippines.
Inequality of Asset
Since asset is herein construed to refer primarily to property/real estate,
and, as shown above, income inequality is high in the Philippines, the
respondents gave ratings ranging from 0-3 (after recoding) for the item
under this attribute. Many respondents cited the limited success of land
reform as a key reason for this conditionmany farmers are landless,
observed one respondent. Another respondent tied this condition to his
observation that about 80% of the population is unbanked.
Inequality of Employment
Most of the respondents gave scores ranging from 5-7 for the item on
employment inequality. In their comments, the respondents are in agreement
that discrimination of workers by age, gender, religion, marital status,
ethnicity, and region of origin, among others, exists in the Philippines, but
few of the respondents saw labor discrimination as particularly serious.
L-LL and R-RL respondents alike thought that labor opportunities in

the Philippines are generally available to a wide variety of Philippine
citizens, though one respondent believed that foreign multinationals are
(naturally) biased toward foreign executives in terms of salaries.
The Social Security System
Generally, the respondents believed that the social support system in
the Philippines is weak and lacking despite government programs
such as the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, though some
respondents thought that support for the poor is improving under the
current dispensation. Respondents perceived allocations for basic social
services to be largely insufficient. Lastly, they thought that the social
insurance provided by the government is limited and issues of corruption
beset the Social Security System (for private sector employees) and the
Government Service Insurance System. They generally believed that the
states social insurance programs only cover a small portion of the country's
population.
The Activity of Trade Unions
This attribute has three items. For the first item, dealing with labor union
organization, five of the fifteen respondents stated that labor unions
trade unions in particularwere very well organized. One respondent
noted that there were many committed, full time labor organizers. The
others disagreed with the aforementioned five, believing that many in the
large informal sector were by and large not organized. Interestingly, three
R-RL respondentsa high scorer and two low scorersmentioned that
only about 10 percent of Philippine laborers were organized. For the second
item, concerned with labor union influence on the policies of the central
government, the majority of respondents stated that labor unions are
represented in government, but generally have little influence on national
government policies. The two outlying high scorers did not give comments.
Those who did mention party list groups concerned with laborers as one
of the few, largely unheeded voices of Philippine labor in government.
For the third item, focused on labor union influence on management
processes, most of the respondents stated that participation of labor unions
is limited in large companies. An odd-man out gave a high score, stating
that labor unions participate actively in company management processes,
though he said that [whether] they affect decisions as a minority in the
wage boards and in politics is another issue.

Corporate Watch
For the item under this attribute, scores range from 0-8, higher on average
among L-LL respondents than R-RL respondents. Civil society in the
Philippines may be dynamic in all fronts, as noted by one respondent,
but many other respondents think that both the Philippine state and civil
societyin the eyes of several respondents, represented in this context by
consumer welfare groupsfail to effectively monitor corporate activity.
Awareness of Reducing Inequality
Majority of the respondents gave middle-high scores for the item concerned
with the general publics enthusiasm about reducing economic inequality in
the Philippines, mostly due to Philippine civil society. Those who disagreed
with this majorityfrom both sides of the ideological dividestated that
the general public is in fact by and large apathetic, with few of them
supporting mass movements dedicated to poverty reduction and the like.
However, high scorers and low scorers generally agreed that educating
the publice.g., by making the fundamentals of economics comprehensible
to the laymanis needed to increase the Philippine publics awareness
and participation in economic inequality reduction.
Civil Society
Autonomy of Society from State Intervention
For the first item of the civil society survey, on government interference
in social activities, the respondents gave scores ranging from 3-10. One
right-leaning respondent said that members of his CSO circle were free in
designing development projects. Five respondents (three L-LL and two
R-RL) connected the item to the constraints on media freedom. They
attributed the said constraints to various factors such as the pressures
imposed on media by various social groups and events such as extrajudicial
killings committed by private citizens and/or informal actors such as private
armies. The private ownership of media outfits was also identified as a factor
influencing media freedom. While the respondents generally recognized the
government's lack of direct hand on limiting media freedom, they cite
government responsibility from its inaction and weak law enforcement
that serve as context for these events.

The phenomena of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
not only of media people, but also of organization leaders who oppose
government-sponsored projectswere also raised by four experts (one L-LL
and three R-RL) as a means of government interference in citizen's social
activities. Interestingly, mention of such gross human rights violations was
not always complemented by a low score. Only the left-leaning respondent
gave a score of 1, while the other three gave scores greater than 5. One of
the right-leaning respondents described the country's level of freedom
from government interference as close to fully free, except for the extralegal
disappearances.
In the second item in the civil society survey, regarding the social
influence of government organizations, respondents scores range from 0-8
after recoding. Some of the respondents, in their comments, did not directly
state how much they think government-sponsored NGOs influence society.
Their comments were largely descriptions of the observed state of
government-NGO partnership in the implementation of government tasks
and projects. Clearly, however, the respondents generally agreed on the
existence of government-sponsored NGOs and/or NGOs working with
the government. Some right-leaning respondents said that these NGOs have
minimal influence or less influence than independent NGOs. A left-leaning
respondent stated that there may be exertions of control through NGOs
sponsored by individual politicians. However, the said expert clarified
that whatever control these NGOs might have were mitigated by militant
organizations.
Autonomy of Society from the Market
The item attached to this attribute generally received low scores (after
recoding) across sectors and political leanings, with 2 as the median, 0 as
the lowest score, and 6 as the highest score. The respondents seemed to
agree on the significant influence of private companies on media, government
institutions, and to some extent, NGOs. Five respondents (three left-leaning
and two right-leaning) emphasized how private corporations influence
media or public opinion through their financial capacity to advertise and
pay to communicate their interests and through the ownership of media
outfits. A respondent elaborated on how companies utilize their financial
power to use the military and police against the people and to exact favors
from politicians whom they supported during elections. Despite this, all
respondents qualified that independence still exists among NGOs as a
whole. One respondent even claimed that companies influence on media

and the government are counterbalanced by NGOs and independent
educational institutions.
Autonomy of Social Members
The first item attached to this attribute, pertaining to the provision of citizens
basic needs, generally garnered low scores. Most respondents supported
their answers with various manifestations and indications of poverty. Others
criticized the governments lack of concrete, effective and/or appropriate
strategies to combat poverty. Only a right-leaning respondent praised the
current government program, mentioning the CCT program, which
according to her would take some time to have an impact.
The second item attached to this attribute, concerned with special care
for vulnerable individuals, attained low to moderate ratings. A left-leaning
respondent, who gave a 1, did not believe that the government could provide
such special care given the government's inability to care for the lower classes
as a whole. Four right-leaning respondents recognized the presence of
laws and/or programs for such special care but cited the lack of/poor
implementation of these laws. On the other hand, a left-leaning respondent
acknowledged government pronouncements and mechanisms to address the
needs of vulnerable sectors but qualified that results are still wanting. Another
left-leaning respondent called attention to a disconnect in government formal
pronouncements and real actions, adding that government poverty alleviation
program are at best palliative or dole out.
The last item attached to this attribute, related to education, received
moderate to high ratings. Many respondents identified the provision of
free basic education as a significant education opportunity for Philippine
citizens. Many of them, however, criticized the poor and deteriorating
quality of basic public education, as manifested in low teaching quality and
poor educational facilities. In addition, some cited how poverty indirectly
reduced access to education. Furthermore, a respondent criticized the
current internationalization orientation of basic education, particularly
the K-12 program.
Tolerance
Item seven of the civil society survey received generally moderate to high
scores. Most of the respondents who commented seemed to agree that
Philippine citizens are generally open and tolerant of other ethnicities and

religions with some exceptions. Some of the cultures or cultural values
some respondents classified as poorly tolerated were: Moro or Muslim
culture, atheism, divorce, and reproductive health.
Capability of Voluntary Association
The respondents seemed to agree that NGOs are influential, but differ in
their perceived extent of influence. On one hand, some respondents
highlighted the NGO movement's strong political influence, in terms of
policies, protest movements, and how NGOs serve to fill the inadequacies
of the government. On the other hand, respondents cited the NGOs limited
reach, lack of financial self-sufficiency, and vulnerability to decrease in
funding support as factors limiting their influence.
Public Good of Voluntary Association
Many of the respondents who gave comments seemed to agree that the
NGOs in the country generally represent public interest. However, they
pointed out the existence of NGOs that do not serve public interest such
as government-run or business-operated NGOs. One respondent also
mentioned fly-by-night NGOs that exist to defraud funders.
Transparency of Voluntary Associations
The foci of respondents comments for the item under this attribute
differ. One respondent noted NGOs observance of basic require-
ments to assure transparency. Another mentioned the lack of oversight
features in some NGOs in the context of expanding operations. Two
respondents credited the principled nature of NGOs in ensuring democratic
operations.
Diversity of Voluntary Associations
Many of the respondents who commented viewed Philippine NGOs as
diverse. However, one respondent saw the NGO movement as dominated
by left-leaning groups. Another one gave a low score on the basis of his
belief that NGOs do not have the capacity to draw general donations for
worthy causes.


Inequality of Public Spheres
Most of the respondents gave scores higher than 5, which may be a
reflection of a generally positive view of media fairness. However, their
critical comments of the media are very much related. In particular, they
criticized how the media reflects the views and vested interests of individual
media practitioners or of media outfit owners, who in turn are allied with
other private entities. They also believed that corporate medias dependence
on advertising and commercial ratings negatively affect the level of
consideration for public interest. Some respondents also mentioned how
particular religious groups own and control television or radio stations.
Inequality of Information
Comments revolved around two main issues: 1) the differential access to
sources of information, particularly to mass media; and 2) the quality and
completeness of information accessed. Most of the comments lean toward
the first. Some respondents thought that people generally have access to
mass media, such as the radio. They pointed out that access differs depending
on the type of media and the geographical location of the population (urban
versus rural).
Inequality of Culture
For the item under this attribute, the respondents seemed to agree that the
few cultural facilities and activities that exist are limited in terms of access.
According to some of the respondents, cultural education is supposedly not a
government priority and various officially supported cultural activities are
class-specific in terms of access and appeal.
Inequality of Power
The respondents generally agreed that a wide gap exists between the rich
and the poor in the country, or that a powerful elite exists, in the form of
political dynasties, business elites, and the church, to name a few. Aside
from purely class-based differences, the respondents said that opportunities
also differ between citizens in rural and urban communities.
Institutional Guarantee of Diversity and Affirmative Actions
Scores for the item attached to this attribute range from 1-9. Some
respondents went so far as to state that affirmative action programs are

virtually non-existent in the Philippines. Divided though they were in
scores, the respondents generally believed that (the few) affirmative action
programs that exist have (excellent) legal basis, but are poorly implemented.
Participation and Support of Social Groups
Respondents differed on the item attached to this attribute. One respondent
believed that there is high citizen awareness and participation in NGO
activities, but donations from people are low. Another observed that
there is significant people's participation in NGO activities, but
mostly among the middle class. She added that people from the grassroots
participate when participation is economically beneficial for them. Some
of the respondents contended that NGOs still have limited reach and
operations. Moreover, these respondents believed that NGO support
is weakening.
Governance of the State and Civil Society
There seemed to be a general agreement among the respondents that
NGOs are actively exerting effort to influence policies. Many of the
respondents pointed out that actual NGO influence depends on factors
usually related to government structures and the subjective openness and
accommodation by officials. In addition, one respondent observed that
NGOs are more influential at the national level than at the local level.
Analysis
In our last country report, the CADI method of analysis, limited to
description and comparison of the sub-components/indicators of democracy)
was applied. We will do so again here, for as we stated before, we will
have to conduct the study several times before we are able to determine
whether the CADI way of looking at the causal or correlative relations
among the political, economic, and civil society fields is applicable in the
Philippines.
3

According to the latest version of the ADI Guidebook, if a country
has a high political democracy index but low economic democracy index,
the country has a weak democratic foundation [and if] a country has a
low political democracy index but a high civil society democracy index,
the country has a great potential to further develop its democracy (CADI
2012, 86). Included herein as figure 1 is an illustration by Heeyeon

Choprincipally responsible for ADIs theoretical framethat supports
these statements by showing the interrelatedness of political, economic,
and social monopolies.

Based on Chos diagram, removing the legal guarantees of social
monopolization will contribute to political de-monopolization, but
without removing the legal guarantees of economic de-monopolization,
the material base of a particular polity will be kept under elite control,
which will significantly diminish the effectivity of the aforedescribed
sociopolitical de-monopolization effort. In the ADI survey instrument,
this interrelationship is clearly manifested in purposefully redundant
indicators and attributes across all the fields.
The Cho/CADI framework thus presumes that monopolization in
one field has a gravitational pull on the others, e.g., if among the
political, economic, and civil society fields, a field has a significantly
lower level of de-monopolization than the remaining fields, then a major
hindrance to further democratization across all the fields is the high degree
Social
monopoly
(discrimination)

Provision of
material base
Provision of division line
for exclusion
Legal guarantee
Provision of
material base
Political
monopoly
(exclusion)

Economic
monopoly
(inequality)

Legal guarantee
Provision of
division line for
inequality
Figure 1: Relation among the Political, Economic, and Social Monopolies

Source: Cho 2012, 17

of monopolization in the odd field. An inverse situatione.g., a field has a
significantly higher score than two fields with low scoresis possible, but
in accordance with Cho and CADIs formulae, a high-scoring outlier
among the fields should have a much higher score if the scores in the
remaining fields were also significantly higher.

Figure 2: Autonomy in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines 2012)

Figure 3: Competition in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines
2012)

Figures 2-6 clearly show that the economic field received the lowest
scores across all subprinciples. As explained above, the scores for political
and civil society autonomy would most likely be significantly higher were
it not for economic autonomys low scorethe extent of economic power-
holder influence on Philippine decision-makers and lobbyists cannot be
deemed insignificant. High civil society competition may suggest low
popular support of discriminatory practices across all the fields, but this
situation coexists with elite monopolization of political and economic
power, indicating low politico-economic competitiveness of the majority.
The fact that economy received the lowest score in pluralizationa very
low one at thatshows us that the unjust distribution of material wealth
and resources is the most under-addressed among the countrys chief ills,
undermining any achievement toward the equalization of political and
socio-cultural capital in the country. The fact that economic solidarity

obtained a score of 4.30noticeably lower than the 5.85 and 5.10 of
political and civil society solidarity, respectivelyshows us that there
seems to be less effort to engage the citizenry through civil society in
helping to de-monopolize the economic sphere than in the other two spheres.

Figure 4: Pluralization in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines
2012)

Figure 5: Solidarity in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines 2012)

Moving on to the principle level, the 2012 version of the ADI
guidebook states that [a] high liberalization index represents that the
country has established institutional and procedural democracy to some
extent and a high equalization index means that the country has established
a strong democratic foundation and has great potential to democratize
further (CADI 2012, 86). Thus, the fact that economic liberalization
received the only score below 5.0 suggests that at the level of government
and nongovernment power-holders, economic inequality elimination
measures are either the most insufficient or the worst implemented.
As can be gleaned from the respondents comments, many of the
aforementioned problems in the economic sphere can be addressed by
solutions that will directly or indirectly lead to progress in democratization in
all fields, e.g., better implementation of de-monopolization laws and policies
and direct infusion of public resources toward particular inequality
elimination projects. This has been said repeatedly by others who study

Index 2011 rating 2012 rating
Freedom House
Freedom in the World
3.0 (Partly
Free)
3.0 (Partly
Free)

Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index
6.12
(Flawed
Democracy)
6.3
(Flawed
Democracy)
Human Development Index .651
(medium)
.654
(medium)

Philippine democratization. A singular contribution of the CADI ADI
remains the indexs ability to show where NGOs/CSOs and the citizenry
at large are lacking in terms of intensity of palliative/curative action. Based
on our 2012 data, we reiterate our claim in 2011 that the Philippine citizenry
must be made more concerned with ways to eradicate unjust wealth
and resource distribution in all levels of society; those who vigilantl y
fight for the protection of political and civil rights should fight just as
vigilantly for the protection of socioeconomic rights.

Figure 6: Summary of Field Subprinciple Scores

The next section deals with this papers titular queryis Philippine
democratization regressing, stagnant, or progressing? Are the gains of
activists for political, economic, and social de-monopolization between 2011
and 2012 outweighed by their losses? To ascertain this, we will first briefly
compare our findings with the findings of other studies conducted in 2012
about democracy/democratization/de-monopolization in the Philippines.
Afterward, we will compare the results of the 2012 survey with the results of
the 2011 survey.
Comparison with Related Studies Published in 2011-2012
Table 3 gives a summary of the ratings garnered by the Philippines
from 2011-2012 in various indices of democracy as well as the Human
Development Index.
Overall, the findings of the 2012 CADI ADI concur with the findings
of some of the recent studies on Philippine democratization produced by
local and foreign researchers, both the broad kind and those that focus on
particular fields. The scores given by Freedom House to the Philippines
after a multi-method research process for their two indicators of

Index 2011 rating 2012 rating
Freedom House
Freedom in the World
3.0 (Partly
Free)
3.0 (Partly
Free)

Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index
6.12
(Flawed
Democracy)
6.3
(Flawed
Democracy)
Human Development Index .651
(medium)
.654
(medium)

freedom, Political Rights and Civil Liberties, have both remained at 3.0
since 2011 (Freedom House 2011, 2012). After conducting a specialist
survey, the European Intelligence Unit (EIU) still considers the Philippines
among the worlds flawed democracies (which ranks above what EIU
calls hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes) as the countrys overall
democracy scoreobtained after aggregating the scores it received in EIUs
five indicators of (political) democracy
2
is still below the minimum score
needed to be considered a full democracy. Lastly, from 2011 to 2012,
the aggregate of the scores given by the United Nations Development
Program to the Philippines in their numerous multi-field indicators of
human development increased by a negligible .54 percent, indicating that
from 2011 to 2012, the [advancement] of the richness of human
life (Amartya Sen, quoted in UNDP 2013a) in the Philippines stalled at
the medium level.

Table 3: Freedom, Democracy, and Human Development Index Ratings of the
Philippines, 2011-2012

Sources: EIU (2011, 5), (2012, 5); Freedom House 2011, 2012; DRA 2012;
and UNDP 2013
Comparison with the Findings of the 2011 Survey
Figures 7-9 reveal slight change in the ratings from 2011 to 2012 across
all sectors. The graphs generally show decline in ratings in 2012 compared to
2011. For the experts in politics, mean rating in autonomy registered the
highest decline of 1.4 points, while the other subprinciple indicators
revealed an even smaller decrease in rating, as shown in figure 7. Compared
to politics, lower scores were given by experts in economy in all subpriniciple
indicators. Pluralism registered the lowest mean rating among the four
subprinciple indicators, as shown in figure 8. This mean rating is also

lowest across all sectors. Figure 9 reveals that mean rating in competition
is highest among the other subprinciple indicators in the civil society sector.
The ratings given by the experts in this sector is relatively lower than that
of politics and slightly higher that of the economy.

Figure 7. Comparison of Responses in Politics, 2011-2012

Figure 8. Comparison of Responses in Economy, 2011-2012


Figure 9. Comparison of Responses in Civil Society, 2011-2012

Both the 2011 and 2012 data are ratings given by a random sample
of experts in three sectors namely, politics, economy and civil society, and
with either left or right political leaning. To test whether the differences in
the ratings are statistically significant, t-tests were conducted, for each sector,
comparing mean ratings of the four subprinciples, given in 2011 and 2012.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the t-tests indicating that the differences
observed in the 2011 and 2012 ratings are statistically insignificant. This
implies that the differences observed here may not be necessarily true if
we have the entire population. Larger sample size would more likely yield
significant results.
Comparison of ratings provided by experts who participated in both
surveys were also made to control for random differences of sample. This
also addresses the limitation of the sampling frame of nationwide population
of political, economic, and civil society expertsa population that is very
difficult to determine.
The responses from these 2011-2012 panelists at all levels of analysis
are easy to compare directly. The 2011-2012 panel has fifteen members
four political experts, five economic experts, and six civil society experts.
The total number of right leaning and left leaning experts is eight and
seven, respectively.
Most of the panelists (66.67 percent) gave, on average, a higher score
than they did in 2011. The 2011-2012 average difference in mean scores
per panel respondent per field is 0.65 for the political experts, 0.55 for the
economic experts, 0.30 for the civil society experts. In the political and
economic field, the subprinciple scores of the experts increased except in

Politics Economy Civil society
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Autonomy -1.4 0.174 -0.6 0.614 0.5 0.413
Competition -0.2 0.766 -0.3 0.764 -0.5 0.359
Pluralism -0.4 0.369 -0.3 0.505 0.2 0.667
Solidarity -0.6 0.558 -0.5 0.643 0.1 0.903

autonomy. The scores of the civil society experts for autonomy and
pluralization increased, while their scores for competition and solidarity
decreased.

Table 4. Mean Difference of Subprinciple Scores and T-test P-Values, by Sector,
2011-2012 (All Respondents)

These changes, however, are clearly miniscule; the panelists seem to
think that there is no change in the state of Philippine democratization
from 2011 to 2012. This is validated by a comparison of the comments
from the two sets of responses. Based on the comments, the panelists
generally did not perceive any major change in the state of Philippine
democratization. Some of the respondents even asked us to refer to the
comments they gave for the 2011 survey for the explanation for their 2012
ratings. This further suggests that the minor changes in scores among the
panelists do not reflect a general perception that democratization in the
Philippines is either improving or regressingmost of the panel respondents
believe that the status of Philippine democratization has hardly changed
in the span of a year.
Conclusion
There were no notable polarizing events in the Philippines just before and
during the data collection timeframe of the 2011 survey, save for a number of
Aquino-versus-Arroyo actions resulting, among others, in the suicide of a
key Arroyo military man-turned-cabinet secretary and the termination
of the careers of two major Arroyo-affiliated public officials (Holmes
2012, 82-84). Most of the respondents predominantly talked about the
perennial problems of the Philippines in their comments. Others discussed
the successes and failings of President Aquino, who had been in office for
a little over a year. A few also mentioned the landmark events of the last
two years, such as the 2010 elections and the 2009 massacre of dozens of
journalists and relatives of a candidate for elective office in Maguindanao
province.

Politics Economy Civil society
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Mean
Difference
p-
value
Autonomy -1.4 0.174 -0.6 0.614 0.5 0.413
Competition -0.2 0.766 -0.3 0.764 -0.5 0.359
Pluralism -0.4 0.369 -0.3 0.505 0.2 0.667
Solidarity -0.6 0.558 -0.5 0.643 0.1 0.903

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As previously stated, 2012 was a particularly eventful year, full of
divisive events. However, only the economic respondents appear to be
sharply divided at the indicator level, even though the readily observable
direct impacts of 2012s polarizing events (e.g., the RH Bill debates, the
chief justices impeachment) are largely on the political and civil society
spheres. Such a result is unsurprisingthe significant difference between
the L-LL and R-RL economic specialists is a natural consequence of
categorizing the respondents based primarily on the Philippine socialist
and liberal market-advocate cleavage. Moreover, regardless of political
leaning or institutional affiliation, most of the respondents implicitly
stated that democratization is hampered by systemic problems, which
can only be solved by making changes at the structural level. Among
the primary variables for consideration at that level is the relationship
of political institutions and private enterprises. A camp that calls for
significant government interventionverging on controlin industry,
agriculture, and services will naturally come into conflict with a camp that
calls for the government to (strictly) adopt a laissez faire politico-
economic policy. All of the respondents also recognize that these changes
need not/should not be initiated by the government alone.
Drafting this paper took several months. In the earliest version, written
well before the May 2013 local-legislative elections, the following paragraph
can be found in the papers conclusion:
When this report is publicly disseminated, the 2013 Philippine
local-legislative elections will have ended. The Sixteenth Congress
will begin in the middle of the term of President Aquino, a
member of the landed elite and currently the most prominent
member of the Aquino political dynasty. Before the election,
much talk has been made about political dynasties, given how the
likeliest members of the Philippine Senate, according to public
preference surveys and historical trends, will be members of
families that have been in politics for generations (Curato 2012).
In the field of economics, growth without development seems
to ring truer than ever in the Philippines; poverty will remain
prevalent. Mergers of large companies are expected to continue,
further concentrating wealth among entrenched elites. Lastly,
certain civil society groups appear to be becoming more and
more intertwined with both political and economic power holders, as
is typical during an election season. Promises from politicians of
improving the quality of life of the marginalized will abound, but
hardly any of these promises, if any, will be fulfilled.

As it turns out, virtually all of these predictions came true. If the
2011-2012 ADI survey results are to be viewed at face value, such lack of
any progressive developments in 2013 seems inevitable, what with the
countrys institutional and cultural flaws (or, to use a more neutral adjective,
peculiarities). As with last year, however, the points of convergence among
experts from various political leanings and institutional affiliations point to
possible means of multi-sector collaboration to ensure that the comprehensive
de-monopolization of power continues, helping the Philippines on the path
to achieving as close to a state of democracy as possible. Determining the
correlations or causal relationships among the fields of politics, economy,
and civil society with precision may be beyond the scope of this study, but
in highlighting the relative neglect of liberalization and equalization in the
field of economics, advocates of democracy in the Philippinesboth state
and non-stateare asked to examine whether or not they are pooling
resources toward causes that may already be either overrepresented or are
dealt with only at a superficial level.

Acknowledgements:

Many thanks to the reactors of the 2012 ADI conference (namely Professor
Felipe Miranda, Mr. Bonojit Hussain, Dr. Temario Rivera, Dr. Edna
Estifania Co, and Professor Malaya Ronas) for their insightful comments
and suggestions on how to better validate and analyse our findings. We
are also grateful to the UP Third World Studies Center and the Social
Sciences and Philosophy Research Foundation for providing support for
the conduct of the 2012 survey and the 2012 ADI conference.
Notes
1. See notes 5-11 in Reyes, Berja and Socrates 2012, 179 for an explanation of rating recoding.
2. The timeframe should probably between one democratically elected administration to
another, probably between the first, agenda-setting state-of-the-nation address of one
president and after the passage of the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Such a time frame seems ideal because 1) the conduct of successive regular elections is
seen as a hallmark of a procedural democracy (Henry B. Mayo, quoted in Miranda et
al. 2011, 11), and 2) a particular administrations national policies and a particular
congresss legislative agendaalready observable by the time the states budget for
the following year is finalized via the GAAreflect not only the interests of political
elites, but also changes in the degree of economic power-holder lobbying and citizen
participation in policymaking and lawmaking processes. Moreover, the diversity of
sectoral party lists that are elected into congress may also serve as an indicator of
representativeness of civil society in the countrys bastions of power.
3. These five are electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political
participation, political culture, and civil liberties (EIU 2012, 1).

References
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www.gov.ph/2012/07/23/english-translation-benigno-s-aquino-iii-third-state-of-the-
nation-address-july-23-2012/.
Cho, Heeyeon. 2012. Democratization as De-monopolization and Its Different Trajectories:
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Curato, Nicole. 2012. The Philippine Senates Exclusive Genetic Make-up. ABS-
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Human Development Report website. http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev.

Methodological Achievements and Limits
of the Asian Democracy Index
CLARINDA LUSTERIO BERJA
Introduction
There is growing popular dissatisfaction with democracy in many parts of
the world. In Asia, even countries that were considered success cases of
democratic transition and democratic consolidation experience conflict and
crises. There is empirical evidence that shows how economic development
affects the survival of democracy, but not the transition from dictatorship
to democracy (Przeworski et al. 1997, 2000). In South Korea, democracy
has delivered political, social, and economic goods. Other democracies
however grapple with the challenge of upholding democracy due to lapses
in the delivery of economic goods to its poor population. This is true in
the case of Thailand and the Philippines. Although these are considered
as temporary reversals in the democratic consolidation discourse, the
threat of a return to non-democratic government is real when a democratic
regime fails to provide people with a basic standard of living. If economic
development increases the likelihood of democratic survival, how does
democracy impact on poverty and inequality?
The literature implies that redistributive reforms reduce poverty.
In countries where reforms are thoroughly being carried out, the political
power of the minority who might oppose other poverty reduction measures
has been significantly reduced. This was observed even in the Philippines
and Brazil, which are considered as having undergone only partial reform,
where new possibilities for the mobilization and organization of rural poor
people and their allies have been created (Putzel 1999; Houtzager 1999).
This paper aims to show a clear understanding of the quality of
democracy in selected countries in Asia, and identify where these countries
converge and diverge in terms of their experiences under democratic
____________________________________________________________
Clarinda Lusterio Berja is an assistant professor at the Political Science Program of the
Department of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines
-Manila.

160 ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITS OF ADI

regimes. This discussion will then feed into an assessment of the feasibility of
the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) of the Consortium for the Asian
Democracy Index (CADI) as a tool for making cross-country comparisons of
democratization.
CADI proposed a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding
the process of democratization. The framework applies a postcolonialist
perspective in studying Third World democratization, drawing from the
experiences of South Korea and other Asian countries rather than
existing Western theories of democratic transition and consolidation (Cho
2012, 5). It proposes a theoretical framework that focuses on three
dimensions of democracy: dispersion of power, democracy as a formation
out of various social and class struggles, and democracy as being society-
centric. To examine the quality of democracy, it specifies the following
propositions:
1. Democracy is power sharing. It is not just elections, the rule
of law, or the guarantee of basic human rights.
2. Democracy is a historical formation that continuously
recreates itself out of various social and class struggles. It is
not a political system.
3. Democracy is a relational phenomenon of politics, economics,
and society. It is not merely a political phenomenon. Politics
in a democracy should allow formerly excluded diverse
political groups in a dictatorial regime to re-emerge (CADI
2012, 39).
CADI takes on the post-monopoly democratic perspective that
views democracy as a continuing process of breaking away from power
and resource monopolies and democratization as the dissolution of
monopoly complexes. It opines that democratization is to be understood
as a long process of de-monopolization and that there are relational
dynamics within and between the fields of politics, economy, and civil
society (Cho 2012, depicted in figure 1).
CADI Data and Methodology
CADI initially consisted of member-teams from South Korea, Indonesia,
and the Philippines. To generate empirical data on the quality of democracy
in these countries, surveys of country experts in the fields of politics,
economy, and civil society were conducted. A separate survey questionnaire
BERJA 161

was developed for each field. The CADI Guidebook (2012) specifies a
total of fifty-seven indicators of democracynineteen indicators in the
field of politics, eighteen indicators in the field of economy, and twenty
indicators in the field of civil society. These indicators measure up two
core principlesliberalization and equalization. As defined in the CADI
Guidebook:
Liberalization is a process to restore the autonomy of each field
of a society by de-integrating the monopoly-complex, and to realize
self-legislation. Thus, liberalization is a principle used to measure
the level of liberalization from monopoly and regulation over
certain fields. In this sense, it is a principle to measure how
monopoly of resources is de-integrated in a procedural level.
[Liberalization] is divided into two subsidiary categories of
autonomy and ability of competition/accountability.The
process of democratization involves the transformation in the
relations of power in each field of politics, economy, and civil
society. We call this transformation of relations equalization. The
degree of equalization shows how much the quality of democracy
has developed. It is a principle used to evaluate how much agents
Social
monopoly
(discrimination)

Provision of
material base
Provision of division line
for exclusion
Legal guarantee
Provision of
material base
Political
monopoly
(exclusion)

Economic
monopoly
(inequality)

Legal guarantee
Provision of
division line for
inequality
Figure 1: Relationship among Political, Economic, and Social Monopolies

Source: Cho 2012, 17

achieve in terms of gaining actual resources within a certain system.
That is, it is the actual degree of resource access. Equalization is
also divided into two subsidiary categories: pluralization and
solidarity/consequential equality (CADI 2012, 44-45).
The first round of pilot surveys were conducted in South Korea,
Indonesia, and the Philippines in 2011. Every country had a target sample
of twenty-seven experts per country and nine experts from each field. This
was followed by two other surveys in 2012 (including Malaysia) and 2013
(including India). Table 1 shows the target sample of key experts by field,
sector, and political leaning
1
in the Philippines in 2012, which is double
the size of the 2011 survey.
As shown in the country papers published in this issue and the rest of
this paper, the Consortium has employed a combination of innovative
approaches in developing the index. These and the successful conduct of
surveys are considered as the significant achievements of CADI.
Statistical Reliability Tests and Qualitative Responses
as Descriptives
Using Philippine data, statistical tests of reliability were conducted
herein to determine the consistency of indicators used in measuring
the sub-principles of autonomy, competition, pluralization, and solidarity.
The inter-item correlations or the Chronbachs Alpha obtained were
of acceptable standard, usually 0.7 or higher. Aside from this, inter-
rater reliability tests were conducted. Inter-rater reliability
2
is a measure
used to examine the agreement between two people (raters/observers) on the
assignment of categories of a categorical variable. It is an important measure
in determining how well an implementation of a coding or measurement
system works. Results of the reliability tests likewise reveal intra-class
correlation coefficients of 0.7 or higher. This implies that the raters were
consistent in the ratings that they provided despite differences in political
leaning. The results of the said inter-item and inter-rater reliability tests of
items included in the subprinciples in three fieldspolitics, economy and
civil societyare summarized in table 4.
Interestingly, larger discrepancies are observed in the mean ratings given
to political autonomy compared to economic pluralization. However, inter-
item and inter-rater reliability tests in both subprinciples of democracy
show similar results. Both imply that differences in the metrics are not due to
the raters differences alone. Such results also imply unidimensionality, i.e.,
BERJA 163

Politics Economic Civil Society
Academic 3 Left,
3 Right
3 Left,
3 Right
3 Left,
3 Right

Nongovernmental/
Civil Society
Organization

3 Left,
3 Right

3 Left,
3 Right

3 Left,
3 Right

Private

3 Left,
3 Right

3 Left,
3 Right

3 Left,
3 Right

TOTAL 18 18 18

component indicators of the subprinciples are measuring the same thing
as indicated by the high inter-item correlations.

Table 1:Target Sample of Key Experts by Field, Sector, and Political Leaning,
Philippines 2012

Tables 2 and 3 include qualitative comments given by experts to
explain their ratings in 2012. The political autonomy mean ratings range
from 4.96 to 7.33. Economic pluralization mean ratings, meanwhile, are
lower and the range is wider (1.39 to 4.87). Qualitative comments that
provide explanation to the ratings are also included in the said tables.
The intra-class reliability tests using absolute agreement of raters
ratings (Fleiss 1981) reveal that mean ratings are not affected by raters
differences. Two-thirds of the indicators show substantial or very high
agreement of experts ratings. Economic pluralization and social autonomy
indicated moderate agreement among experts, social competition registered a
fair rating, and social pluralization showed only slight agreement. Raters
disagreements in social competition and pluralization might be due to the
involvement of former members of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in government.
Data gathered from the surveys have been presented as country
reports at CADIs annual conferences to determine configurations of
different democracy indicators. However, to date, between-country
comparisons of estimates cannot yet be made since some aspects of the
ADI methodology have not yet been standardized (i.e., classification and
selection of experts to be included in the survey varies by country).
However, target sample sizes in all countries are within a common range.

Table 2: Political Autonomy Ratings and Comments, Philippines 2012
Enhancing the ADI Framework and Methodology
Since the ADI is at its development stage, a series of roundtable discussions
and public forums were conducted in Seoul, Jakarta, and Manila to generate
comments on the theoretical bases and framework of the study as well as
its methodology. During the 2012 CADI conference in Manila, academic
experts in the fields of political science and public administration gave
commentaries on the ADI. According to Ronas, the ADIs de-
monopolization and equalization indices capture the characteristics of
formally democratizing polities within an economic and social environment of
severe equity problem (2012, 218). On the other hand, Miranda (2012)
and Rivera (2012) raised questions about conceptual definitions, selection
of experts, index construction, and validation.
Analyses of 2012 CADI survey data reveal progress in some aspects
of democratization, which supports Ronas assertion. Figures 1, 2, and 3
detail the component (subprinciple) scores in South Korea, the Philippines,
and Indonesia, respectively. All show the same shape of democracy
the political autonomy index score is highest and the economic pluralization
score is lowest in all three countries. This is possibly a result of significant
liberalization of politics; however, this has been accompanied by low
Political Autonomy Qualitative Comments Mean
Rating
Q1:
Degree of state violence

Extrajudicial killings remain a
problem due to laxity of rule of law

4.96
Q2:
Civil liberties

Need to be more responsive to
demands of citizenry (e.g. right to
shelter)

6.67
Q3:
Freedom to organize
political groups and
undertake political action
Still constrained by requirement to get
permit to conduct rally from LGU
There is cynicism about the quality of
groups formed

7.33
Q4:
Degree of freedom
for political opposition.

Opposition is generally allowed in law
and in fact, but government still resort
to violence to regulate militant
opposition groups, Lack of party
loyalty in Congress due to financial
constraints

7.08

BERJA 165

Political Autonomy Qualitative Comments Mean
Rating
Q1:
Degree of state violence

Extrajudicial killings remain a
problem due to laxity of rule of law

4.96
Q2:
Civil liberties

Need to be more responsive to
demands of citizenry (e.g. right to
shelter)

6.67
Q3:
Freedom to organize
political groups and
undertake political action
Still constrained by requirement to get
permit to conduct rally from LGU
There is cynicism about the quality of
groups formed

7.33
Q4:
Degree of freedom
for political opposition.

Opposition is generally allowed in law
and in fact, but government still resort
to violence to regulate militant
opposition groups, Lack of party
loyalty in Congress due to financial
constraints

7.08

equalization in the economic sphere. CADI defines economic pluralization
as the fair distribution of economic resources leading to both economic
and socio-political democratization; it is measured using the following
five attributes: economic monopoly, regional disparity, income
inequality, asset disparity, and employment inequality (CADI
2012, 65).

Table 3: Economic Pluralization Ratings and Comments, Philippines 2012

Given the afore-discussed, the research identified several limitations
and issues to be addressed by CADI in order to enhance the ADI.

Economic Pluralization Qualitative Comments Mean
Rating
Q9:
Economic monopoly

Dominant groups monopolize the
economy, Competition is only among
the tycoons

2.22
Q10:
Regional disparity
Reinforced since government spend
more for urbanized regions and almost
neglect of other regions. Here, the
Cotabato provinces in Mindanao were
cited as examples.

1.78
Q11:
Income inequality

Serious concern, Gini index still at
0.44

1.39
Q12:
Asset disparity

large and increasing number of
informal settlers in urban areas,
agrarian reform and land distribution
is almost total failure, farmers resorted
to sharecropping and abandonment of
their agricultural lands

1.39
[range:
0-4]
Q13:
Employment inequality

discrimination when it comes to hiring
of Muslims, and some other religious
[groups,] although this is not
comparable to racial discrimination in
countries such as Australia, Japan, and
even US and Europe
4.87
[range:
0 to 8]


Domain Agreement Interpretation*
Political
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.839
.749
.798
.687

Almost perfect
Substantial
Substantial
Substantial
Economic
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.673
.853
.590
.751

Substantial
Almost perfect
Moderate
Substantial
Civil Society
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.489
.313
.208
.733

Moderate
Fair
Slight agreement
Substantial

Table 4: Inter-rater Reliability Tests of Items in Domains of Politics, Economy,
and Civil Society per Subprinciple of Democracy, Philippines 2012

*Note: Interpretation of Cohens Kappa Measure of Inter-rater Reliability
(Vierra and Garrett 2005, 362):
<0 Less than chance agreement .41-.60 Moderate
.01-.20 Slight agreement .61 -.80 Substantial
.21-.40 Fair .81-.99 Almost perfect agreement
Cross-country Interpretation of Scores and Analysis
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the distance of the subprinciples from the ideal
(a rating of 10). However, if one wishes to explain the location of the
scores, it has to be linked with other variables. This makes standardization
of scores an important concern. The 2011 Philippine country report
earlier raised questions about experts/raters bias since it was observed
that in some variables, the ratings given by those who are left leaning and
right leaning are found in opposite poles.
Country teams also vary in terms interpretation of scores. For instance,
in the Philippines, on a scale of 0 to 10, it interprets the scores in relation
to the perfect score of 10. The focus is on the question, how far are we
from being de-monopolized? On the other hand, Indonesia looks at the
score vis--vis the middle score of 5. One approach that can be considered
is to define a typology of democracies (or level of de-monopolization of
BERJA 167

Domain Agreement Interpretation*
Political
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.839
.749
.798
.687

Almost perfect
Substantial
Substantial
Substantial
Economic
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.673
.853
.590
.751

Substantial
Almost perfect
Moderate
Substantial
Civil Society
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity

.489
.313
.208
.733

Moderate
Fair
Slight agreement
Substantial

0
2
4
6
8
10
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity
Political
Economic
Social

0
2
4
6
8
10
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity
Political
Economic
Social
societies) based on ADI values, similar to what the Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) devised. The EIU democracy typology consists of the
following:

1. Full democracies scores of 8 to 10
2. Flawed democracies score of 6 to 7.9
3. Hybrid regimes scores of 4 to 5.9
4. Authoritarian regimes scores below 4 (EIU 2012, 27-28).

Figure 1: South Korean Democratization Subprinciple Scores, 2012

Figure 2: Philippine Democratization Subprinciple Scores, 2012


0
2
4
6
8
10
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity
Political
Economic
Social
Figure 4: Indonesian Democratization Subprinciple Scores, 2012

Researchers Verification of Expert Ratings
The CADI researchers consider that experts are part of the societal
debate. Experts may not be neutral, but they play an important role in
how problems are defined. They have descriptive and explanatory
knowledge of democratization processes in their respective fields.
In CADI surveys in the Philippines, most experts have been providing
explanatory commentaries to substantiate the numerical scores that they
gave. The researchers have also been verifying the experts ratings using
available official and other credible data during data analysis. However, the
current methodology retains experts ratings even if ratings are inconsistent
with verified data. The unverified ratings are also included in the calculation
of the index. Related to this issue of data verification are issues of how
experts are selected and how the explanatory commentaries should be
processed, analyzed, and interpreted.
Delphi Technique of Validating Ratings
The Philippine CADI team planned to employ the Delphi technique of
validating ratings given by experts. The Delphi technique is a qualitative
method for obtaining consensus among a group of experts (Charlton,
2007).
3
The researchers sought to identify where opinions of experts
converge despite differences in political leaning. Unfortunately, there
were reservations on the part of some of the experts to defend the ratings
that they gave in a round table discussion set-up. Other modes of doing
the Delphi technique will be explored in future survey rounds.
BERJA 169

0
2
4
6
8
10
Autonomy
Competition
Pluralization
Solidarity
Political
Economic
Social
Matching Results of Expert Surveys with Public Opinion Surveys
Another way to validate the data is to match it with a public survey data.
There is a whole range of data sets that can be used to assess democracy.
These include regular world surveys conducted in selected countries. Figure
5 is the schematic diagram used by Norris (2011) to summarize the methods
and measurements used in assessing democracy.

Figure 5: Methods and Measurements used in Assessing Democracy
Source: Norris 2011, 182

Taking off from Norris, public and elite evaluations of democracies
may be used to identify patterns and estimate levels of democracy. These
may also be complemented by official statistics. There are also indices that
use a combination of data sources. For instance, the Economist Intelligence
Units Index of Democracy uses public opinion surveys, mainly the World
Values Survey (WVS) in addition to experts assessments. The EIU gathers
data on political participation and political culture as well as some data on
civil liberties and functioning of government from the WVS. They also
make use of the Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Asian Barometer,
Latin American Barometer, Afrobarometer, and other national surveys.
In the case of countries for which survey results are missing, survey
results for similar countries and expert assessment are used to fill in gaps.
This approach has its advantages, but it raises questions of legitimacy,
especially when the results do not coincide. Where perceptions differ,


which source provides the most legitimate, useful, valid, and reliable
benchmarks for both scholars and practitioners? While elite evaluations
are considered to be more factual, they can also be flawed like public
evaluations. Norris (2011) mentions that when the WVS Wave 5 (2005
2007) data about cognitive judgments on the meaning of democracy were
analyzed, substantial agreement about principles and procedures underlying
democracy were found. Data provided evidence to show that longer historical
experience of democratic governance significantly strengthens an enlightened
knowledge of democratic procedures, evaluations of democratic performance,
and democratic values in each society. Further, she asserted, [the] most
prudent strategy is to compare the results of alternative indicators at both
mass and elite levels, including those available from cross-national public
opinion surveys, to see if the findings remain robust and consistent
irrespective of the specific measures (Norris 2009).
Selection and Categorization of Experts
Another methodological issue that needs to be addressed is the criteria for
selecting the experts, as well as the related matter of the categorization of
experts. Is it necessary to categorize experts when all of them are experts?
Is it necessary to have a random sample when all of them are experts? In
the Philippines, there was an attempt to also represent the countrys three
big island groups (Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) since political,
economic, and social context in those areas are different. In the past
assessment of the CADI, the issue of standardization was raised. While
there was a suggestion that CADI must have common criteria for selecting
and categorizing experts who will participate in the study, the member
countries decided to proceed with their current categorization. This now
raises the question: would the index be different if CADI teams use
conservative, moderate, progressive/pro-government, moderate or anti-
government/left or right as respondent categories?
Increasing the Sample Size
As previously discussed, since the 2012 CADI survey, the target sample
size was doubled (from twenty-seven to fifty-four) to address the earlier
concerns about robustness of estimates. For instance, the Varieties of
Democracy Index have 1,300 country experts for six varieties of democracy
or roughly a sample size of 216. Given this, should CADI ADI teams
further increase the sample size so that each sector would have thirty
BERJA 171

respondents? The larger target sample size would also be beneficial if
CADI ADI teams have three categories of political orientation of experts;
there would be ten conservatives, ten moderates, and ten progressives or
thirty experts for each of the sub-fields, or a total of ninety experts.
Weighting of Indicators
The issue of index construction concerns weighting of indicators and the
level and rules of aggregation. The current method derives the composite
index by taking the mean scores for each subprinciple from fifty-seven
questionnaire items. The index of the two main components (liberalization
and equalization) are also the average of the subprinciples. What weights
to assign to indicators should be addressed by the theoretical assumptions
underlying the ADI. The robustness of the index depends largely on the
quality of conceptualization, as also pointed out by Miranda (2011). He
argued that the legitimacy of measuring instruments and the usefulness
of their measurements critically depend on the quality of conceptualization of
democracy, its attributes and its corresponding components and operational
variables (Adcock and Collier 2001; Bailey 1973; Bogaards 2010 and
2007; Bohlen 1990; Collier and Adcock 1999; Knutsen 2010; Munck
2009; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Wetzel 2002; Van Hanen 2000, cited
in Miranda et al. 2011).
Applicability of Questions in Different Countries
CADIs research not only shows that each country is at different stages of
democratization. The Consortium also learned that many of the questions
that appear in ADI survey questionnaires are, for example, more applicable
to South Korea than India. Some questions need to be reframed and
restated to capture the specificities of countries. For instance, there are
differences in the use of the term NGO, civil society, and peoples movement.
Questions about corruption mostly refer to control of the private sector/
businessthey do not include land grabbing and water grabbing, which
are pressing issues in rural and, to a certain extent, urban poor areas.
Another aspect that is important that ADI questionnaires do not
consider now are questions about online media and social networking,
which are new spaces for civil society. For example, in Thailand, even the
likes in Facebook are now being monitored.

Frequency of Survey Data Collection
In terms of data collection, the challenge, particularly in the case of the
Philippines, is keeping the interest of experts in participating in the survey.
In the recent 2013 survey, some of the experts were no longer keen on
answering the questionnaire. The respondents think that there has been
no significant change within a one-year span. Thus, the researchers suggest
that the survey be conducted every three years, coinciding with the holding
of the national elections. Then, the pool of experts could be expanded and
more detailed responses from them could be generated.
Way Forward: Dissemination of ADI
Increased dissemination activities would popularize the ADI, increasing the
possibility of it being used not only in the academe but also by governments.
Aside from the publications in Asian Democracy Review, the outputs of
CADI research can be disseminated in different (international) forums,
conferences, and lectures in order to generate more ideas in enhancing the
ADI. Such dissemination will also improve CADIs institutional linkages.
More in-depth analyses of the data, cross-country comparisons and
correlational studies that could link ADI to human rights, human security,
and human development would improve ADI. It is hoped that these will
be done not only by CADIs members, but also by non-member researchers
or scholars as well.
Notes
1. The Philippine team classified respondents into (extreme) left-left leaning (herein
simply called left or left leaning) and (extreme) right-right leaning (herein simply
called right or right leaning). The former are those who are known (by their
reputations, publications, etc.) to exhibit critical or dissenting opinions against the
Philippine government and its policies, and are at the same time avowedly supportive
of socialist socioeconomic policies, while the latter are those who have worked for
the Philippine government, either in the bureaucracy or as consultants, and/or subscribe
to the governments neoliberal socioeconomic policies (Reyes, Berja, and Socrates
2012, 138).
2. Huck (2012) describes Cohens Kappa as a statistical measure of inter-rater
reliability, which ranges generally from 0 to 1.0 (although negative numbers are
possible) where large numbers mean better reliability, values near or less than zero
suggest that agreement is attributable to chance alone.
3. Specifically, the team was exploring focus Delphi, seeking views of disparate groups
likely to be affected by some policy; and normative Delphi, gathering experts opinions
on defined issues to achieve consensus (e.g., to set goals and objectives) (Charlton
2007). According to Charlton, the essential element in the Delphi process is
BERJA 173

anonymity of participants when giving their [opinion, which] alleviates problems
that could be caused by domination of the group by only a few participants (2007).
References
Charlton, John R. H. 2007. Delphi Technique. In The SAGE Encyclopedia of
Social Science Research Methods, edited by Lewis Beck, Michael S., Alan Bryman,
and Tim Futing Liao, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589. New York:
Sage Publications, Inc.
Cheibub, Jos Antonio. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Cho, Heeyeon. 2012. Democratization as De-monopolization and its Different Trajectories:
1:4-34.
EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). 2012. Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a
Standstill. http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf.
Fleiss, Joseph L. 2003. The Measurement of Interrater Agreement. In Statistical
Methods for Rates and Proportions 2nd ed., by Joseph L. Fleiss, Bruce Levin, and
Myunghee Cho Paik, 212-304. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Huck, Schuyler W. 2012. Reading Statistics and Research. Boston: Pearson Education.
Miranda, Felipe B. 2011. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy. In Chasing the
Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, by Felipe B. Miranda, Malaya C. Ronas,
Temario C. Rivera, and Ronald D. Holmes, 1-45. Quezon City: Commission on Human
Rights, Philippines.
Miranda, Felipe B., Malaya C. Ronas, Temario C. Rivera, and Ronald D. Holmes. 2011.
Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy. Quezon City: Commission on
Human Rights, Philippines.
Norris, Pippa. 2009. Democracy Audits and Governmental Indicators. Paper presented
at the American Political Science Association Conference, University of California,
Berkeley, October 30-31.
. 2011. Measuring Governance. In The SAGE Handbook of Governance,
edited by Mark Bevir, 179-199. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. Modernization: Theories and Facts.
World Politics 49(3):155-8.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi.
2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Reyes, Miguel Paolo, Clarinda Lusterio Berja, and Ma. Celine Anastasia Socrates. 2012.
The CADI Asian Democracy Index: 2011 Country Report The Philippines.
Asian Democracy Review 1:134-180.
Viera, Anthony J. and Joanne M. Garrett. 2005. Understanding Interobserver Agreement:
The Kappa Statistic. Family Medicine 37(5):360-3.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Asian Democracy Review would like to thank the following for serving as
reviewers for this issue:
Maria Ela L. Atienza
(University of the Philippines-Diliman)
Eun Hong Park

(Sungkonghoe University)
Yeongmi Yun
(Pyeongtaek University)
COVER PHOTO: Bangkok - November 11: The Democrats are on the
March at Democr[acy Monument], image courtesy of Sira Anamwong /
FreeDigitalPhotos.net
Notes for Contributors
Full-length article submissions will undergo preliminary screening (including
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is 1) on a subject matter within the purview of the journal, 2) adheres to
common norms of academic attribution, and 3) possesses the expected
attributes of a research paper (e.g., a clearly stated research problem, a clearly
discussed theoretical framework and methodology), it will undergo double-
blind peer review.
Ful l -l ength arti cl e submi ssi ons are recommended to be 6, 000-
8,000 words in length and should include an abstract of no more than 150
words and 4-6 keywords. A brief biographical note about the author(s) should
also be included. We request that papers submitted follow the sixteenth
edition of the Chicago Manual of Style. Copyright of published articles
belong to the authors and Asian Democracy Review. Authors should submit
articles as Microsoft Word (.doc/.docx) attachments by email to
keewlee@skhu.ac.kr.

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