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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE,
P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
1
dated 20 June 2000
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H.
Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation
and recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery of agents
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees
2
against Urban Bank and herein petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch
62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the
Contract of Agency
3
allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform
such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks
property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
4
arguing that
they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following
documents: 1) a Letter
5
dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter
6

dated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter
7
dated 9
December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a
Memorandum
8
dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an
attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the
petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit
9

with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.
10
He claimed that said documents were falsified
because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.
11
Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as
evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
In a Resolution
12
dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment
of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents
were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the
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respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were
mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were
used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer
and in their Pre-Trial Brief.
13
Subsequently, the corresponding Informations
14
were filed with the MTCC,
Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter,
Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants
15
for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.
16
Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance
of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they
claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since
no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge
merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the information be
quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a
director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal
cases should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a
prejudicial question.
In an Order
17
dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground
that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the
first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the
validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the
civil case was not a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal
proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to
constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing
and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.
18
They,
likewise, questioned the courts conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to
assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
19
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an
Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating
prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the
complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
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Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and
not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not
show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and
dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order
to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?
20

On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become
moot and academic when the latter posted bail and were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO
21
enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any
manner with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending
before, or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were
already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted
bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled
date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of
the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto.
22

As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:
23

It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other
words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its
decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved
the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her
motion for partial reconsideration.1avvphi1
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Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.
24
On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of
their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them,
there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals
or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we have returned
in People v. Red
25
stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and
Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time
when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the
number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer
necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the
summary examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is
clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact
that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the
summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708,
page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac,
Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13,
General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural
aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the
instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to pursue the
criminal cases to trial.
The procedural aspect:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-
affidavits and were not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of
Atty. Pea was filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and
9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.
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Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such
number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor,
the procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take
appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second paragraph of
Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall
in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in
the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day.
26
The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months
27
of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure,
28
the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the
ordinary rules. In such instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only crimes cognizable by the
RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in
court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose
the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint,
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable
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cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient
reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, after having been sworn in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of Bago City entitled "Atty.
Magdaleno M. Pea v. Urban Bank, et al" Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank,
namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim
Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the
"bank") in ridding a certain parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of
the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex "A".
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which is attached as Annex "B"),
Answer dated 28 October 1996 (Annex "C"), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex "D") filed
by the bank and the respondent members of the board, the said respondents used as evidence the
following documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for
Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy of which is attached as Annex "E"), which states:
December 19, 1994
Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which you purchased
from Isabela Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994.
In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to deliver to you the full
and actual possession and control of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from
any obstruction or impediment to the free use and occupancy of the property and to prevent the former
tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of
the property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Pea likewise as its
authorized representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property
and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the abovementioned purposes.
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or expenses that may be
incurred relative to the exercise by Atty. Pea of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of
Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be
answerable by Isabela Sugar Company.
Very truly yours,
Isabela Sugar Company
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By:
HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of
ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached as annex "F", which states:
December 7, 1994
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
From: MARILYN G. ONG
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take charge of
inspecting the tenants would like to request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners. Can
you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "G", which states:
December 9, 1994
Atty. Ted Borlongan
URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear Mr. Borlongan
I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately as the tenants are
questioning authority of the people who are helping us to take possession of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex "H", which states:
MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
Director
From: Enrique C. Montilla III
President
Date: 20 November 1994
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the corporation situated at
Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon
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the expiration of the contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose, you
are authorized to engage the services of security guards to protect the property against intruders. You
may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect the said
property of the corporation. In addition, you may take whatever steps or measures are necessary to
ensure our continued possession of the property.
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III
President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the aforestated documents as
evidence in the civil case knowing that the same are falsified. They used thae said documents to justify
their refusal to pay my agents fees, to my damage and prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E") is a falsified document, in that the person who supposedly
executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their
signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it appear that
Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders, officers, employees
or representatives of ISC. In the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC and
Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President of plaintiff
was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the Minutes of the
Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as
Annex "I". On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the transaction is
attached as Annex "J".
7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and athe letter dated 9
December 1994 allegedly written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a
stockholder of ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his signature thereon
was merely forged by respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and
Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the
crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.(underlining ours)
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA
It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and
identified "the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De
Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr." However, in the
accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included
among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board. And there was no explanation
in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was included. Moreover, as
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can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were
inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own,
considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in
the administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a
criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well.
Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to
determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would
be a dereliction of duty.
29

Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation
30
dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board
of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754
without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact that the City Prosecutor, as
previously discussed, did not carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not charge Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners,
including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member
of the board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent person
may have been included in the complaint. In the Order
31
dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion
to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or
which do not appear on the face of the information because said motion is hypothethical admission of the
facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it was at the expense of
liberty. This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to personally
determine the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) x x x.
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(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed directly with
the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be
observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in
writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be
seized."
32
Interpreting the words "personal determination," we said in Soliven v. Makasiar
33
that it does
not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and
investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the
prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the
constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely
on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on
the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
34
He should
even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances warrant.
35

An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of
persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.
36

Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear abdication
of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all
of the petitioners. The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the
bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than prosecution.
37

On this ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule, criminal
prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions which, as summarized in
Brocka v. Enrile,
38
are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
39

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
40

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
41

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
42

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
43

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
44

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g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;
45

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
46

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
47
and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
48

The substantive aspect:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction of
Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article
172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.
49

The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the
offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the
Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which were the documents contained in the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as attachments to the
complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings
of ISCI during the election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.
50
Based on these
documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable cause
for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued
the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs
the facts and circumstances without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has
no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by
the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would
justify conviction.
51

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,
52
the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is
to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.
53

We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-
affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn
Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures therein; and
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that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.
54
He further claimed that Enrique Montillas
signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.
55
These averments
are mere assertions which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of
warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of
herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the time of the execution of the
documents. Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was familiar
with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged. What Atty.
Pea actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI and
that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no
indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against
hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
56
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.
57

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that herein
petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad,
neither of the two made the representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It was only
Atty. Pea who asserted that the two made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a
stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And, there was neither
allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way.lawphil Moreover, even
if Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she signed were
falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors
function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings.
58
Considering,
however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable
cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez
59
as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is apropos:
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain
of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is
no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided
in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears
repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights.
So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the
prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint
against the petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June
2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
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dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros
Occidental, Bago City, is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and
6686.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180109 July 26, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH "JOJO" V. GREY, FRANCIS B. GREY, and COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU CITY,
EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the nullification of the Court of
Appeals (CA) (Cebu City-Eighteenth Division) Resolution
1
dated March 13, 2007, Decision
2
dated May 8,
2007, and Resolution
3
dated October 8, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558, entitled "Mayor Joseph Jojo V.
Grey and Francis B. Grey v. Hon. Roberto A. Navidad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calbayog City, Branch 32, and the People of the Philippines."
On December 11, 2006, an Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former
Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando
Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by other supporting documents and a
motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
4

Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 41
Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal
found the prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime charged. She directed
the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence that would show that accused were the
assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped in the commission of the crime charged.
5

The prosecution then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and a motion for the inhibition of
Judge Bandal.
6
The judge inhibited herself but denied the motion for reconsideration.
7

Thereafter, the provincial prosecutor filed a petition for change of venue before this Court, attaching
thereto a letter from the victims wife expressing fear for her life and that of the other witnesses.
8

The Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution dated January 4, 2007, dismissed the petition for review and
respondents counter charge of perjury. He found no error to warrant the modification or reversal of the
prosecutors resolution. The Secretary of Justice ruled that the evidence adduced against respondents
was sufficient to establish probable cause for the offense charged. Respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 30, 2007.
9

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Subsequently, the prosecution withdrew their motion for change of venue before this Court, citing
financial difficulties in bringing witnesses to Manila.
10
Respondents opposed the motion and prayed that
all proceedings be suspended until after the May 14, 2007 elections.
11

However, on February 19, 2007, respondents filed their own petition for change of venue before this
Court, alleging that the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto Navidad, was a pawn in
the political persecution being staged against them.
12
In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, this Court denied
the petition for lack of merit and directed Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.
13

Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable cause,
and, in an Order dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable cause was supported by the
evidence on record. He then issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one of their co-
accused.
14

Respondents filed a Petition
15
for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, alleging that Judge Navidad
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order, and seeking a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the filing of the murder
charges against them on the basis of perjured statements coming from their political opponents
supporters "smacks of political harassment at its foulest form."
16
Respondents pointed out that the
criminal complaint was filed barely two months after Joseph Grey declared his intentions to challenge
incumbent Congressman Reynaldo S. Uy, a former ally, in the May 2007 congressional elections.
Likewise, respondents claimed that one of the witnesses, Urien Moloboco, who executed an affidavit
before the Provincial Prosecutor, was the subject of an Alias Warrant of Arrest for murder issued by the
RTC of Gandara, Samar on June 26, 2006, and, hence, was a fugitive from the law at the time of the filing
of the criminal complaint against respondents. Respondents maintain that the fact that Moloboco was not
arrested when he executed his affidavit before the prosecutor, spoke of the power and clout of the
witness protectors.
17

The CA Eighteenth Division issued a TRO on March 13, 2007.
18
After oral arguments, the CA issued a
Decision
19
dated May 8, 2007, making the TRO permanent, ordering that warrants of arrest be set aside,
and dismissing the criminal case without prejudice.
The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally
determine the existence of probable cause.
20
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did
Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him and the personal justification
for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution of
the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the
Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing
warrants of arrest.
21

Moreover, the CA also ruled that the Information was not supported by the allegations in the submitted
affidavits.
22
It pointed out that the Information charged respondents as principals by direct participation,
but the complaint-affidavit and supporting affidavits uniformly alleged that respondents were not at the
scene of the shooting.
23
The CA further found that the allegations in the complaint-affidavit and supporting
affidavits were insufficient to establish probable cause. It said that there was nothing in the affidavits to
show acts that would support the prosecutions theory that respondents were also charged as principals
by conspiracy.
24

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs May 8, 2007 Decision was denied in a Resolution
dated October 8, 2007.
25
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that respondents committed forum shopping, which would warrant the outright dismissal
of their petition below. Petitioner alleges that respondents petition for change of venue before this Court
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and their petition for prohibition before the CA actually involve the same subject matter, parties, and
issues that of enjoining Judge Navidad from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case against
them.
26
Moreover, these two proceedings have resulted in conflicting decisions, with this Court resolving
to proceed with the case and with the CA enjoining the same.
27

Petitioner also argues against the CAs ruling that Judge Navidad failed to personally determine the
existence of probable cause. It said that although the judge adopted the findings of the prosecutors as to
the sufficiency of evidence constituting probable cause, the language of the Order clearly reflects that the
judge himself personally examined the records and found that there was probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest.
28
Moreover, the judge was correct in finding probable cause based on the sworn
statements of the witnesses submitted to the court.
29
Petitioner avers that the CA disregarded the fact
that the Information alleged conspiracy.
30
In any case, petitioner asserts that a perceived defect in the
Information is not jurisdictional as the same may be amended anytime before arraignment or with leave of
court after arraignment.
31

Petitioner also claims that respondents had not shown any clear and unmistakable right to the relief they
sought. It said that there are more than enough plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to
respondents. Their constitutional rights are amply protected in the enforcement of the warrants of arrest.
They can likewise apply for bail or move to quash the allegedly defective Information.
32

Petitioner also argues that this Court has laid down the rule that criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined,
and any exception to this rule must be convincingly established.
33
On the other hand, the comparative
injury to the People in permanently enjoining a criminal case is beyond any of respondents speculative
claim of injury.
Thus, petitioner is praying that the CAs May 8, 2007 Decision and October 8, 2007 Resolution be
reversed and set aside, and the writ of injunction be dissolved.
34

In their Comment, respondents assert that the trial court issued its February 20, 2007 Order in gross
violation of the Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
35
Respondents claim that the trial
courts violation is evident in the "indecent haste" with which it issued the Order and Warrants of Arrest,
and in its own admission in the Order itself.
36
Respondents also maintain that the trial court acted
whimsically, capriciously, and with grave abuse of discretion when it concluded that there was probable
cause to issue warrants of arrest against respondents.
37
Respondents likewise assert that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the finding of Judge Bandal, who first heard the
case.
38

The petition is impressed with merit.
Initially, we decide the issue of forum shopping raised by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that respondents committed forum shopping when it filed a petition for change of
venue before this Court and a petition for prohibition before the CA.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in
one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
39

Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
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preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
40

The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause
of action.
41

A reexamination of the two actions in this case, in light of the foregoing jurisprudence, is in order.
In the petition for change of venue filed on February 19, 2007, respondents prayed for the transfer of the
criminal case to any court in Metro Manila,
42
alleging that the prosecution was politically motivated and
designed to hamper the plan of respondent Joseph Grey to run for a congressional seat in the May 2007
elections.
43
They contended that "it would be extremely pernicious to the interest of justice if trial of this
case and (of) the other two cases are held in Samar, especially in the City of Calbayog, where the said
(Congressman) Reynaldo Uy is a resident and absolutely wields power."
44
They also asked the Court to
hold the proceedings in abeyance until after the May 14, 2007 elections.
In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, the Court denied the petition for transfer of venue for lack of merit. It
also directed Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.
45

On March 5, 2007, while their petition for change of venue was pending before this Court, respondents
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They prayed, first, for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction to prohibit Judge Navidad from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 4916 and from
causing the implementation of the warrants of arrest against respondents; and second, for the Court to
set aside Judge Navidads February 20, 2007 Order and the corresponding warrants he issued.
46
The
TRO was granted on March 13, 2007, and the CA Decision making the same injunction permanent and
setting aside the warrants of arrest was promulgated on May 8, 2007, a few days before the May 14,
2007 elections.
The CA correctly ruled that respondents were not guilty of forum shopping when they filed the two
actions. Respondents raised different issues and sought different reliefs in the two actions, although both
were grounded on the same set of facts.
The issue in the petition for change of venue is whether the trial of the case was to be moved to another
court in light of respondents allegations that the same was being used as a tool for their political
persecution. On the other hand, the issue in the petition for certiorari before the CA was whether Judge
Navidad gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order and the warrants for
respondents arrest.
Thus, this Courts Resolution would not have amounted to res judicata that would bar the petition for
certiorari before the CA.
We now resolve the substantive issues.
Respondents, in their petition before the CA, questioned the alleged lack of personal determination of
probable cause by Judge Navidad in issuing the warrants for their arrest.
Judge Navidads Order reads:
In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the purpose of determining
the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest,
the Court perforce, made a very careful and meticulous and (sic) review not only of the records but also
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the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the sworn statements/affidavits of Mario Abella,
Uriendo Moloboco and Edgar Pellina.
47

The language of the Order clearly shows that the judge made his own personal determination of the
existence of probable cause by examining not only the prosecutors report but also his supporting
evidence, consisting mainly of the sworn statements of the prosecutions witnesses.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
48

The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by Article III,
Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In Soliven v. Makasiar,
49
the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily
require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may
disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus,
in Soliven, we said:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
50

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on
the report of the investigating prosecutor.
51
This means that the judge should consider not only the report
of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the
counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the
filing of the Information.
52

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause.
53
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided
that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
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Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the same.
A perusal of the assailed Order bears out this fact.
It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge Navidad
to determine that "the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to challenge the
charge of Murder which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of Perjury."
54
Likewise,
his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no
circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions.
55
Thus, he concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for the issuance of warrants
of arrest, was not correct.
56

These statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional
mandate for personal determination of probable cause before issuing the warrants of arrest.
The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine
that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
57

However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this rule, among
which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano,
et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano, supra; Fortun v.
Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto v.
Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); x x x
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga v. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438)[;
and]
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[k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953).
58

Respondents insisted that political persecution by their political rivals was the underlying reason for the
filing of criminal charges against them, and used this as basis for asking the appellate court to stop the
proceedings in the trial court.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political motives may
have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this Court has also ruled
that any allegation that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a
criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support the charges.
59

In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him,
determined that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution,
based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file the
criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
To establish political harassment, respondents must prove that the public prosecutor, not just the private
complainant, acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no
other purpose than to place respondents in contempt and disrepute.
60
It must be shown that the
complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases.
61

Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify
the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently
established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof.
62
1avvphi1
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived
political persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any evidence of such a
grand design. They have not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that could have impelled
the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the
way each of them did. In short, respondents are holding tenuously only on the hope that this Court will
take them at their word and grant the relief they pray for. This Court, however, cannot anchor its ruling on
mere allegations.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth.
63
If, as respondents claim, there
is no evidence of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be granted. Thereafter, the
credibility of the prosecutions and the accuseds respective evidence may be tested during the trial. It is
only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents will be determined. Whether the criminal prosecution
was merely a tool for harassment or whether the prosecutions evidence can pass the strict standards set
by the law and withstand the exacting scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial of the case.
The criminal Information in this case was filed four years ago and trial has yet to begin. The victims kin,
indeed, all the parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will amount to an injustice.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 8, 2007 and
Resolution dated October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the Permanent Injunction is hereby DISSOLVED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog
City, Samar, dated February 20, 2007, is hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Calbayog
City, Samar, is DIRECTED to proceed with hearing, and to decide Criminal Case No. 4916 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184761 September 8, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JULIUS GADIANA y REPOLLO, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Julius Gadiana y Repollo (appellant) was convicted of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15 under what appears to be a form Information
1
reading:
The undersigned Prosecutor II of the City of Cebu accuses Julius Gadiana y Repollo, for Violation of Sec.
11, Art. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2004, at about 3:40 P.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, x x x, with deliberate intent, did then and
there have in his/her possession and under his/her control the following:
A Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic packets of white crystalline substance with a total net weight
of 0.09 grams.
locally known as SHABU, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous drug/s, without being
authorized by law.
2

CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL RECOMMENDED: P200.000
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2004.
JESUS P. FELICIANO
Prosecutor II, Cebu City
3

(underscoring in the original)
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated "that the Forensic Officer Jude Daniel Mendoza will testify, and
affirm and confirm his findings and conclusion within the four corners of his forensic report" with the
clarification that what was admitted was the "existence but not the source"
4
of the two sachets.
Lone prosecution witness PO1 Julius Busico (PO1 Busico) adopted as his testimony at the witness stand
the February 9, 2004 Joint Affidavit
5
which he and PO3 Joseph Dinauanao (PO3 Dinauanao) executed. In
the Joint Affidavit, the police officers related the following version:
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At about 3:40 P.M. on February 7, 2004, while PO1 Busico, along with PO3 Dinauanao, PO2 Erwin
Ferrer, and three other police officers, was conducting saturation drive at Sitio San Roque, Barangay
Mambaling, Cebu City, he chanced upon appellant holding two small plastic sachets containing crystalline
substances which he was about to place inside his pocket.
6
1avvphi1
The policemen, identifying themselves as such, apprehended appellant at once, confiscated the two
sachets from his right hand, brought him with the confiscated sachets to their office, and turned over the
sachets to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service which found them positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
7

PO1 Busico added the following details at the witness stand:
PROSEC. AGAN:
Q After you recovered these [two plastic sachets] from the possession of the accused, what did you do?
A We submitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Q Can you still recall who prepared the letter request for laboratory examination?
A PO2 Erwin Ferrer.
Q If shown to you would you be able to identify it?
A Yes.
Q Are you referring to this letter request dated February 17 [sic], 2004?
A Yes.
PROSEC. AGAN:
We request, your Honor, that the letter request be marked as our exhibit C.
COURT:
Mark it.
PROSEC. AGAN:
Who brought the letter request to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A PO2 Erwin Ferrer.
Q Do you know the result of the laboratory examination?
A. Yes.
Q What was the result?
A Positive.
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PROSEC. AGAN:
We request, your Honor, that Chemistry Report No. D-241-2004 be marked as our Exhibit D.
COURT:
Mark it.
PROSEC. AGAN:
Q Do you affirm and confirm to the truthfulness of the contents [of the] joint affidavit?
A Yes maam.
8
(underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the accusation, gave the following version:
While he was, on the date and time in question, walking along an alley in Sitio Tromar, Mambaling, Cebu
City (where his house is situated) on his way to Sitio Paglaum where he used to stand by,
9
after three of
the six above-named policemen passed by him, the fourth, prosecution witness PO1 Busico, uttered "This
is the one, this is the one. This is very obvious."
10
PO1 Busico at once held his arms and dipped into his
(appellants) pocket
11
upon which he (appellant) suggested that he (appellant) would just be the one to do
it,
12
thereby catching the policemans ire. He was at once handcuffed by PO1 Busico who is familiar to
him as he always saw him "every Friday afternoon [when he and company went] roving there."
Appellant specifically denied the claim of PO1 Busico that he was holding two plastic packs of shabu
which he was about to pocket.
By Decision of October 12, 2005, Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City convicted appellant
as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Julius Gadiana y Repollo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY OR PRISION MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM AND TO PAY A FINE OF THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS together with all accessory penalties provided for by law. The physical evidence is
hereby forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
13

In convicting appellant, the trial court gave a one-paragraph ratiocination, viz.
With the bare and lame denials of the accused, abjectly uncorroborated and without substantiation, apart
from his self-serving attempt at extenuation as against the positive testimony of the arresting police officer
who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, there being no showing
of malicious motive to testify against the accused, it is the Courts view that the State has successfully
discharged its prosecutory function by sufficiently showing the concurrence of the elements of the offense
charged.
14
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the appellate court, by Decision of April 30, 2008,
15
affirmed that of the trial courts but
modified the penalty, holding that the nomenclature and periods of the penalties under the Revised Penal
Code should not have been used by the trial court in the determination thereof as it (the trial court) should
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have been guided by the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus the appellate court
disposed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 12, 2005 of the RTC of Cebu City, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-68618 convicting accused-appellant Julius Gadiana y Repollo for violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A. 9165, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
16
(underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present appeal.
Appellant maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As reflected above, the trial court credited the "positive" version of PO1 Busico in light of the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his official duties and absent a showing of malice.
Recall, however, that during the pre-trial, the "existence but not the source" of the two sachets was
stipulated on by the parties. It was thus incumbent on the prosecution to prove the chain of custody rule.
Chain of custody establishes the identity of the subject substance.
17
It requires that testimony be
presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item is seized up to the time it is offered in
evidence.
18
When nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated is the same specimen
examined and established to be prohibited drug,
19
there can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug.
Except for the charge sheet
20
prepared against appellant which stated that evidence consisted of "two (2)
heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing shabu with markings JGR-1 and JGR-2," nowhere in the
record is a showing that the marking was done in the presence of appellant or his representatives or that
a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Non-compliance with the above-quoted requirements does not of course necessarily render void and
invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs, provided that there are justifiable grounds to warrant
exception therefrom.
21
The prosecution must, therefore, explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses
22
and must show that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved.
23

In their Joint Affidavit
24
which served as part of PO1 Busicos testimony, he and PO3 Joseph merely
stated that they brought appellant, together with the confiscated evidence, to their office for proper
documentation and filing of appropriate charges. No statement was made that the allegedly seized
sachets were the same sachets which were subject of the letter-request for laboratory examination
prepared and brought to the Crime Laboratory by PO2 Ferrer per PO1 Busico.
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The general rule is that the trial courts findings, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings are entitled to great respect as, among other things,
it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.
25

During his brief testimony earlier quoted, aside from confirming the contents of the Joint Affidavit he
executed with PO3 Dinauanao which served as his direct testimony, PO1 Busico declared that PO2
Edwin Ferrer prepared and brought the letter-request for laboratory examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. On pages 6-7 of the Records which appear to be a segment of the police blotter reflecting the
arrest on February 7, 2004 of appellant, appears the following information:
A/Taken: Evidence . . . submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Received by: SPO1 Abundio C. Cabahug, PNP
Not only was PO1 Busicos testimony that Ferrer prepared the letter-request for laboratory examination
hearsay as he did not claim having seen PO3 Dinauanao actually prepare it. The transcripts of
stenographic notes do not show that the trial court tested the credibility of witness PO1 Busico and of his
testimony. The trial courts conviction of appellant upon its above-quoted one-paragraph ratiocination,
which was affirmed by the appellate court, does not thus merit this Courts affirmance.1avvphi1
Parenthetically, appellants arrest, not to mention resulting confiscation of the alleged confiscation of the
plastic sachets of crystalline substances in his possession, leaves nagging doubts on its validity in light of
the fact that what PO1 Busico merely saw was appellants placing of the plastic sachets in his pocket
which, without more, does not justify his warrantless arrest under the Rules.
26

WHEREFORE, the April 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant, Julius Gadiana y Repollo, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith implement this decision and to
INFORM this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of action taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be forwarded to the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Director, and the Director
General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, for information and guidance. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180452 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN,
AND RAYMOND S. TAN, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
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The Case
This is an appeal from the January 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00485 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua
Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan, which affirmed the April 1, 2004 Decision in Criminal
Case No. Q-01-99437 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103 in Quezon City. The RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
(RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Facts
An Information indicted accused-appellants of the following:
That on or about the 24th day of August 2000, at Barangay Bignay II, Municipality of Sariaya, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver and distribute, without authority of law, on board an
L-300 Mitsubishi van, bearing Plate No. UBU 827, and have in their possession, custody, and control,
without the corresponding license or prescription, twenty-five (25) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, each containing: 2.954 grams,
2.901 grams, 2.926 grams, 2.820 grams, 2.977 grams, 2.568 grams, 2.870 grams, 2.941 grams, 2.903
grams, 2.991 grams, 2.924 grams, 2.872 grams, 2.958 grams, 2.972 grams, 2.837 grams, 2.908 grams,
2.929 grams, 2.932 grams, 2.899 grams, 2.933 grams, 2.938 grams, 2.943 grams, 2.955 grams, 2.938
grams and 2.918 grams, respectively, with a total weight of 72.707 kilos, and one hundred forty seven
(147) self-sealing transparent plastic bags likewise containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),
also a regulated drug, with a total weight of 291.350 kilos, or with a grand total weight of 364.057 kilos.
That the above acts were committed by a syndicate with the use of two (2) motor vehicles, namely: L-300
Mitsubishi Van bearing Plate No. UBU 827 and a Nissan Sentra Exalta car without Plate Number.
Contrary to law.
1

As summarized in the appealed CA decision, the facts are as follows:
On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information
from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya,
Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a
team in coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team
then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50
meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white
van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan
(Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed
further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were
then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172
confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed
against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
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Accused-appellants all maintained their innocence and presented the following defenses:
(1) Accused-appellant Hwan testified that he was planning to buy cheap goods at Villa Vicenta
Resort on August 24, 2000, when he saw a van full of bihon at the resort and inquired if it was for
sale. He went to relieve himself 15 meters away from the van. A group of police officers arrested
him upon his return.
(2) Accused-appellant Tan testified that he was a businessman collecting a debt in Lucena City
on August 24, 2000. He was at a restaurant with his driver when three persons identified
themselves as police officers and forcibly brought him inside a car. He was handcuffed,
blindfolded, and badly beaten. He was later brought to a beach and was ordered to hold some
bags while being photographed with five Chinese-looking men he saw for the first time. A tricycle
driver, Ricky Pineda, corroborated his story by testifying that he saw Tan being forced into a white
Nissan car on August 24, 2000.
(3) Accused-appellant Ng Yik Bun (Bun) testified that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on
August 22, 2000. On August 24, 2000, he was at a beach with some companions when four
armed men arrested them. He was made to pose next to some plastic bags along with other
accused-appellants, whom he did not personally know. He was then charged with illegal
possession of drugs at the police station. A friend of his, accused-appellant Kwok Wai Cheng
(Cheng), corroborated his story.
(4) Accused-appellant Kan Shun Min (Min) testified that he arrived in the Philippines on July 1,
2000 for business and pleasure. On August 24, 2000, he checked into a beach resort. While
walking there, he was suddenly accosted by four or five men who poked guns at him. He was
brought to a cottage where he saw some unfamiliar Chinese-looking individuals. He likewise
testified that he was made to take out white packages from a van while being photographed. His
friend, accused-appellant Chang Chaun Shi (Shi), corroborated his story.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the six (6) accused namely Ng Yik Bun,
Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan (some also
known by other names), GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16 of RA 6425, as
amended and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a
fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) each.
The shabu involved in this case and their accompanying paraphernalia are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law, now RA 9165. The two (2) vehicles are forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
2

In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan
raised the lone issue of: whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest
despite the absence of a warrant.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Hwan sought an acquittal on the basis of the following
submissions:
I
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The trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the
accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless
arrest as held in the case of People vs. [Cuizon].
II
The trial court violated Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when it heard the case at bench on June 26, 2001 at the chemistry division
of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City without the presence of both the herein
accused-appellant and his counsel de parte.
III
The trial court erred when it issued and dictated in open hearing a verbal order denying accuseds formal
"Motion to Suppress Illegally Procured Evidence" upon a [ratiocination] that is manifestly contrary to law
[and] jurisprudence set in the Cuizon case, supra.
IV
The trial court erred when with lack of the desired circumspection, it sweepingly ruled the admission in
evidence the 731 exhibits listed in the prosecutions 43-page formal offer of evidence over the itemized
written objections of the defense in a terse verbal order (bereft of reason for the denial of the raised
objections) dictated in open hearing which reads: "All the exhibits of the prosecution are hereby admitted.
The court believes that as far as the evidence submitted goes, these exhibits of the prosecution
consisting of several plastic bags of shabu were not yet shown to be the fruit of a poisonous plant." x x x
V
The trial court also erred in admitting the prosecutions photographs (Exhibit "K" and "M," inclusive of their
sub-markings), the photographer who took the shots not having taken the witness stand to declare, as
required by the rules, the circumstances under which the photographs were taken.
VI
The trial court erred when it tried and applied the provisions of R.A. 9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, in the instant case even though [the] crime charged took place on 24 August 2000.
VII
The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
3

The appellate court found accused-appellants contentions unmeritorious as it consequently affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that, contrary to accused-appellants assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of
the contraband was made. The CA held that accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified
their arrests and the seizure of the contraband. The CA agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of
the situation meant that the buy-bust team had no time to secure a search warrant. Moreover, the CA
also found that the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained under
the plain view doctrine.
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The CA debunked accused-appellant Hwans arguments in seriatim. First, the CA ruled that People v.
Cuizon
4
was not applicable to the instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers
immediately acted on the information they had received about an ongoing shipment of drugs.
Second, the CA also noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively waived his right to be present during
the inspection of exhibits and hearing, for the manifestation made by the prosecution that accused-
appellant Hwan waived his right to be present was never raised in issue before the trial court.
And third, the CA found accused-appellant Hwans other arguments untenable. It held that the trial court
correctly admitted Exhibits "K" and "M" even if the photographer was not presented as a witness. The CA
based its ruling on Sison v. People,
5
which held that photographs can be identified either by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. It agreed
with the Solicitor General that accused-appellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court
under RA 6425 and not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the RTC Decision. The CA likewise
dismissed the argument that conspiracy was not proved by the prosecution, noting that the evidence
presented established that accused-appellants were performing "their respective task[s] with the objective
of loading the plastic bags of shabu into an L-300 van."
6

The CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,
in Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
7

On February 18, 2008, the Court, acting on the appeal of accused-appellants, required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.
On March 27, 2008, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan filed their Supplemental Brief on
the sole issue that:
THERE WAS NO VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE OF A WARRANT
On June 4, 2008, accused-appellant Hwan filed his Supplemental Brief, raising the following errors,
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS
RULE 115 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN IT CONDUCTED A
HEARING ON JUNE 26, 2001 AT THE CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY IN
CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF BOTH THE HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL IN SUCH VITAL [PROCEEDINGS].
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS VALID THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEIZURE
AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-CONCURRENCE
OF THE REQUISITE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS ARREST.
Essentially, accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the
seizure and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no
evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the
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search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any
evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
Accused-appellant Hwan additionally claims that he was deliberately excluded when the trial court
conducted a hearing on June 26, 2001 to identify 172 bags of shabu for trial purposes. He asserts that no
formal notice of the hearing was sent to him or his counsel, to his prejudice.
The Courts Ruling
On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of Rights under the present
Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.
8
In the instant case, contrary to accused-
appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police
officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police
officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3)
they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the
six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.
The following exchange between Capt. Ibon and the prosecutor sheds light on the participation of all six
accused-appellants:
Q: Upon arriving at Villa Vicenta Resort in Brgy. Bignay II, [in] what specific area [did] you position
yourselves?
A: Initially we [were] about three hundred meters away from Villa Vicenta Resort, then we walked
[stealthily] so as not to [be] [spotted] until we were about fifty meters sir.
Q: So you [positioned] yourself about fifty meters away from the point of Villa Vicenta Resort?
A: From the actual location we saw about six personnel walking together loading contraband.
Q: You said you [were] about fifty meters away from these six persons who were loading
contraband, is that what you mean?
A: Yes sir.
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Q: In that place where you [positioned] yourself, could you tell us, what was the lighting condition
in the place where you positioned yourselves?
A: It was totally dark in our place sir.
Q: How about the position of the six persons who were loading contraband?
A: They were well-lighted sir.
Q: Why do you say that they are well-lighted?
A: There were several [fluorescent] lamps sir.
Q: Where?
A: One search light placed near where they were loading the shipment sir.
Q: How about the other?
A: About two fluorescent lamps at the house near the six persons your honor.
COURT: Are these portable lamps:
A: Fixed lamps your honor.
Q: Where else?
A: Another at the right corner[.] There was also somewhat a multi-purpose house and it [was]
well-lighted your honor.
Q: This is a resort and that multi-purpose house that you are referring to are the cottages of the
resort?
A: Yes your honor.
FISCAL: You said you saw six persons who were loading goods[.] In what vehicle [were they]
transferring those things?
A: Into [an] L-300 van sir.
Q: What is the color of the van?
A: White sir.
Q: What did you see that these six persons [were] loading?
A: We saw [them] holding white plastic with white substance your honor.
Q: What container [were they] loading?
A: Actually there were several checkered bags and other plastic [bags] sir.
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219

Q: How [were] they loading these bags?
A: [Manually] your honor.
Q: Will you please describe how they [were] loading it, Mr. Witness?
A: Actually the plastic bags [some were] repacked [into] checkered [bags] while others [were]
loading inside the checkered bag sir.
Q: Did they put that on their shoulder or what?
A: Holding and holding [sic] sir.
Q: Nobody carrying [it] on their back?
A: Nobody sir.
x x x x
Q: You said you saw these six persons, will you please look around this courtroom and tell us if
these six persons that you are referring to are present?
COURT: Considering that there are many persons inside this courtroom, will you please stand up
and please [tap] the shoulder of these six persons?
x x x x
INTERPRETER: Witness tapped the [shoulders] of six male persons inside the courtroom.
x x x x
FISCAL: May we manifest your honor that when these six persons stood up when their names
[were] called on the basis [of] what [was] written [on] the information [were] once tapped on their
shoulder by this witness.
The last question I have [is] how long you stayed in this position watching these six persons
loading those [products] in the L-300 van?
A: Ten to fifteen minutes sir.
Q: Within that period could you tell us what transpired?
A: I called Major Tabo to inform [him of] what I saw, I called Major Tabo through the hand-held
radio sir.
Q: What was the reply of major Tabo with respect to your information?
A: He directed me to get closer to these six persons and find out if really the contraband is shabu
that was first reported sir.
Q: So did you in fact go closer?
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A: Yes sir.
Q: How [close] were you [to] the six persons at the time?
A: When we were closing [in] somebody noticed us and they were surprised, I immediately
shouted "Freeze, dont move, we are Filipino soldiers," we further identified [ourselves] sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the six persons when you shouted those words?
A: They [froze] sir.
x x x x
Q: When you went closer and they [froze], what happened?
A: I asked them who among them are English-speaking?
Q: What was the reply given to you?
A: Somebody replied "tagalog lang."
Q: Who was that person who replied "tagalog lang?"
A: Chua Shilou Hwan sir.
Q: Will you please [identify] for us who answered that in [T]agalog?
COURT: Please [tap] his shoulder.
A: This man sir.
COURT: Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who identified himself as Chua Shilou Hwan.
CHUA SHILOU HWAN: Opo.
FISCAL: After answering you [with] "tagalog lang," what happened?
A: I further asked them "Ano ang dala ninyo?"
Q: What was the reply?
A: Chua Shilou Hwan said shabu.
Q: So [what] did you do next?
A: I asked them who is their leader, sir.
Q: What was the reply?
A: He told me it was Raymond Tan, sir.
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Q: Is he inside this courtroom now?
A: Yes sir.
COURT: Please tap [his] shoulder.
WITNESS: This man sir.
COURT: Ikaw ba Raymond Tan?
INTERPRETER: A man stood and [nodded] his head.
x x x x
FISCAL: Now after they [froze], what did you do?
A: I inspected the contraband and I found these bags and I immediately called Major Tabo and
informed [him of] the matter sir.
Q: How many bags were you able to confiscate in the scene?
A: All in all 172 your honor.
Q: That 172, one of them is the bag in front of you [which] you identified earlier?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you saw that bag could you tell us what particular [contents] attracted you upon seeing
these bags?
A: It was marked by the members (interrupted).
Q: No what attracted you?
A: Something crystalline white sir.
Q: Are you referring to all the bags?
A: All the bags sir.
9
x x x
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants
were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily
mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of
accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of
loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amendedis valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance,
or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense
is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
10
In the instant case, it can plausibly be
argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in
the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by
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the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting
officers. And to write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court
notes, as it has consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their
objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.
11

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the
said drug.
12
Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals caught
loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs
without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in
flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of
accused-appellants.
13
There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was
needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of a frame-
up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in
contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-
appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa
Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the police
officers to act like they were loading bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different
tale and claims he was arrested inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who
could have corroborated their version of events were not presented in court. The only witness
presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated Tans alone, was not found by
the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the trial courts finding that the police
officers testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not
disturb the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.
14
We find no reason to deviate
from this rule in the instant case.
On the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for accused-appellant Hwan to claim a
violation of his right to examine the witnesses against him. The records show the following
exchange on June 26, 2001:
FISCAL LUGTO:
I would like to manifes[t] that Atty. Agoot, counsel of accused Chua Shilou Hwan, waived his right
to be present for todays trial for purposes of identification of the alleged shabu.
ATTY SAVELLANO:
[Are] we made to understand that this hearing is for identification of shabu only?
FISCAL LUGTO:
Yes despite the testimony of the Forensic Chemist, this is for continuation with the direct
testimony for purposes of identification which was confiscated or seized by the joint operation of
the Military and the PNP at Sariaya, Quezon.
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For the record, this [is] for the continuation of the direct testimony of Forensic Chemist Mary Jean
Geronimo.
15

As the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel were not present when the forensic
chemist testified. The prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accused-appellant Hwan
waived his right to be present at that hearing. Yet Hwan did not question this before the trial court. No
evidence of deliberate exclusion was shown. If no notice of hearing were made upon him and his counsel,
they should have brought this in issue at the trial, not at the late stage on appeal.1avvphi1
All told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must be affirmed. The trial courts
determination as to the credibility of witnesses and its findings of fact should be accorded great weight
and respect more so when affirmed by the appellate court. To reiterate, a look at the records shows no
facts of substance and value that have been overlooked, which, if considered, might affect the outcome of
the instant appeal. Deference to the trial courts findings must be made as it was in the position to easily
detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.
16

Penalty Imposed
Accused-appellants were each sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
PhP 5,000,000. This is within the range provided by RA 6425, as amended.
17
We, therefore, affirm the
penalty imposed on accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accused-
appellants Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and
Raymond S. Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425, as amended, is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision
1
promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming
the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) Judgment
2
in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-
132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were
charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:
In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:
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That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain
the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him
of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the
amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber
Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00)
was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.
3

In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain
the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him
of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the
amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber
Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00)
was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.
4

In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain
NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of extorting
ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and
P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between
and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.
5

The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.
6
Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996.
Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea. This
prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson),
Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan),
Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are
summarized as follows:
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby
Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan).
Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While
waiting for Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San
Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a tomboy on board,
suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of
hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the vehicle
ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police
uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while
Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision,
Paraaque.
7

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225

While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary
of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car
undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked
inside the comfort room.
8

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking him
if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was dropped off
earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the
car when she roamed around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police
officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30
a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts. When
Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them
that he has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million.
9

Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He
asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employers telephone number. She feigned
ignorance of those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new employee.
10
Sarge
informed Nimfa that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa
chose to stay with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again
sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in Merville
Subdivision.
11

Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President
Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson
(Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals
to rescue Jepsons sons and arrest the kidnappers.
12

At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million.
13
That night, Nimfa
was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one of them as
appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office sometime in the first week of
December 1993.
14

On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to
negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant
because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred
times during a span of two to four years.
15

On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million
in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.
16
Appellant asked Jepson to bring
the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson
and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off.
17

At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they
would be released that afternoon.
18
At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and
proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag
and put it on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the
bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. Later,
appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons
and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately
went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station.
19

P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other
police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the Maranao
Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off.
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He took a total of 24 shots.
20
He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial
Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
21

P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati
on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off. He witnessed the pay-off and
identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of
Jepson.
22

P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat
and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the
primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children and helper. His group was assigned at
Fort Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been
waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims were
released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45
p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their
direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in
Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it
and immediately approached the vehicle.
23

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant.
Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue
appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was
found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to
Camp Crame for questioning.
24

At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa
went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag
containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and
Jepson was asked to identify them.
25

A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag.
26
It was found out that a portion of the
ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the
possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in
Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him
under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the
house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized
property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt.
27

Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were
detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23 December 1993, it came to her
knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was
reversed so that it could only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she
personally caused the door knob to be installed.
28

The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr.
Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).
Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989
as the importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens
and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security
agency in July 1993. He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total
borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had
met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him coffee.
29

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227

In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the
house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial
payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested appellant
to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed. He actively
participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a
lower ransom of P1.5 Million.
On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to
the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to
accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further
instructions. Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once
instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to proceed
to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to
meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car trunk and
leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepsons car and put it inside his car trunk and
proceeded to Shell Gasoline station.
30
Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepsons
children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him. They then decided to
go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who
were cursing him because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were
many policemen stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his
office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10) meters
away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and
two other men alight from the car and were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with
their firearms.
31

Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who
appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw appellant arrive at the office with
Macias.
32

Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the
medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been sustained
during the scuffle.
33

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant and
Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even served as guarantor of some of the
obligations of appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed
a case against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually
acquitted.
34

While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally
extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
35

On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion
perpetua for three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He should pay
private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.
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The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan
Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of Corrections, National
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing
soonest as to when the said official took custody of the accused.
36

The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the
elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo,
37
this Court in a
Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.
38

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial
Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in convicting
Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
39

A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22
December 2006. Hence, this appeal.
On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25
October 2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no
longer filing a Supplemental Brief.
40
Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorneys Office as
counsel de oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the
arguments in the appellants brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.
41

Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the
following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the disturbing whispers of
doubt replete in the prosecutions theory.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz testimony notwithstanding the
incredibility of her story.
III. The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official functions over the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused uyboco.
IV. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez notwithstanding his
displayed propensity for untruthfulness.
V. The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented against the accused-
appellant since they were procured in violation of his constitutional rights.
VI. The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by accused-appellant
from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where nimfa celiz and her wards were allegedly
detained.
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VII. The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated in the abduction of
jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single evidence on record supports the same.
VIII. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that abduction, an important
element of the crime, was never established against him.
IX. The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom without discussing
the participation of accused macias considering that the charge was for conspiracy.
42

The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in
the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration
of his detention is immaterial.
43

We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the
prosecution, thus:
1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;
2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco,
referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private complainant Jepson
Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their
maid or "yaya" Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December
20, 1993. The three victims were on board Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepsons driver
Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its
path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver
Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential
Security Group. Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to a house in
Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were illegally detained from
December 20 to 23, 1993.
x x x x
3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal. Their
detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private individual whose mind
and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion for
personal gain;
x x x x
5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents
of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge amount of money, a gun,
and pieces of jewelry x x x.
44

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These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecutions witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the
victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom ransom was
extorted.
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and
detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:
A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.
x x x x
A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2)
children and myself, Sir.
x x x x
A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.
x x x x
Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?
A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next?
A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley,
Sir.
x x x x
Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: What?
A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was a
stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.
Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?
A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side,
sir.
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Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?
A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?
x x x x
A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at
Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacaang, Sir.
x x x x
Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?
A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: Then what followed next?
A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was
the one who drove, Sir.
x x x x
A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passengers
side, Sir.
x x x x
Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?
A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight
as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.
x x x x
A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.
Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened?
A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.
Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?
A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.
x x x x
Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?
A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.
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Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of
the money, thus:
A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the one
continuing the conversation, Sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for
my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?
A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.
Q: What followed?
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x.
x x x x
Q: And after that what followed?
A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.
Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.
Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?
A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.
Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.
Q: How about the other balance?
A: My jewelry, Sir.
46

x x x x
Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and the
bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.
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Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?
A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.
Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?
A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the
Magallanes Commercial Center.
Q: Where did you place that bag?
A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House.
x x x x
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock
the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?
A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car
Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.
Q: And then, what did you do?
A: I followed his instruction.
Q: And what followed next?
A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store
already.
Q: And what was your answer?
A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards
the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: And?
A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: Did you comply with that instruction?
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A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.
Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that
Colt Mirage?
A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of the
supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.
Q: And what followed thereafter?
A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the
Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.
47

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies,
untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.
Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated
that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m.
while appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw
Macias and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the
number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and during the direct examination that
Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was
incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because
she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias and
appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her.
Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity.
48
The
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:
The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the
reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of the
testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the decision
appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz
testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed.
The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or tied
up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the crime. Besides, familiarity with the
victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact at
times even facilitated its commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house
where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are
made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the
incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions.
Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies
to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims.
49

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Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant
owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of
downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would
address appellant as "Ernie." Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost
certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant claims that
Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against him boils down to money.
Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line of business as that of appellant, which
is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate competition and possibly procure all contracts
from the PNP and considering his brothers close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson
crafted and executed a frame up of appellant.
And the Court of Appeals had this to say:
For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to
apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves children is, by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise, the police operatives call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that
said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official
duties and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up.
Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which
evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon the
prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the
prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had other
witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of other
witnesses cannot be taken against the same.
50

Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense
of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
51

We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to
the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both
witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them.
As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.
52
While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be
in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid
and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during
the trial as the basis of his decision.
53

Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecutions theory, thus:
If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M x x x
as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom money using his own car
registered in his sons name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its contents?
Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face
x x x. Why would he go back to his family residence x x x with the ransom money still intact in the trunk of
his car?
If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were they
not tied x x x?
x x x x
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If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of
the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his own name? x x x
Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an
established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated
checks are incriminating evidence.
x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x x
Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment? Why did they not apply for a warrant
of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the
kidnapper?
Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the
kidnappers x x x.
54

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman
negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.
If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions
that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced due to aggressive
bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because he could not
trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because
he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did not cover his face
in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant went back to his
family residence because he never thought that Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of
the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant
to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to escape; that appellant
never thought that the police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed a different
strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a
warrant would be futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the
crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and
the kidnappers.
However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of
endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard evidence takes
precedence. On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that
kidnapping occurred and that appellant is the author thereof.
Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument
that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated in the operation.
Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue
the kidnap victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to
record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview made by a reporter for a television
network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of appellants alleged negotiations for
the ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped conversations do exist.
Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of
P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped
conversations. The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the
non-production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not
semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of proof of motive on
the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on the credibility of the
apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-
up.
55

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Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a
warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
56

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in
Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime
of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was
then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass
by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes.
57

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to
personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such
search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police
to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within
the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
58
Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to
search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
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Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the abduction
of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted. In a related argument,
appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellants
participation was not sufficiently established.
The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:
The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the
Dichaves children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said house at
the time when Celiz and the Dichaves children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the
contrary, Uybocos presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of the
ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the balance of the ransom
payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several
unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom.
x x x x
x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep which
waylaid the Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of kidnapping for ransom
considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the victims were kept, is
misplaced.lawph!l
Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the
performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom
payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of
their nefarious plan.
59

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was not
present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained, oftentimes
giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson. The
conspiracy was likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and other
John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in the abduction stage,
he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
60

Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and
93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom,
and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the
RTC, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.