TORTS Reviewer

TORTS and QUASI-DELICTS REVIEWER
Aaron Valdez
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
Persons Responsible

32: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the rights listed in the said Article
is liable for damages. Not only public officers but also private individuals can incur civil liability
for violation of rights enumerated therein. It is not the actor alone who must answer for damages
but also the person indirectly responsible has to answer for the injury caused to the aggrieved
party. If the defendant is a judge, 32 provides that the responsibility under the article is not
demandable unless his act/omission constitutes a violation of the RPC or other Penal Code.

Malice or Bad Faith not Required
In Silahis v. Soluta, the Court ruled it is not necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith; otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is
the effective protection of individual rights. In Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, the Court also held that
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another may be
validly sued for damages under 32 even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
The Code Commission also said that it is not necessary that there should be malice or bad faith,
as to make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of 32, the effective protection of
individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. The object of the Article is to put an end
to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

Nature of Acts Covered
It is necessary that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff, and that such
right must be one of those listed under 32. 32 also provides that whether or not the defendants
act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages and for other reliefs, which will proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

Rationale for 32
The Court in Aberca v. Ver provided that the purpose of 32 is to protect the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Chief J ustice Claudio Teehankee provided
that when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot
be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power.

Are the instigators of an unreasonable search and seizure liable under Art 32?
YES. In MHP Garments v. CA, the Court held the instigators of the raid also liable, citing 32. It
held that an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another, thus it is not the actor alone who must answer for
damages under 32. The person indirectly responsible also has to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party. The Court found that MHP instigated the raid and that their
employee actively participated in the raid, by standing by and assenting thereto.

Is trampling upon another persons right against illegal search and seizures a ground to
recover under 32?
YES. In Silahis v. Soluta, the Court held that constitutional rights, like the rights to be secure in
ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a
lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to
abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. The
Court also held it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted
with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices there is a violation of the constitutional right of the
plaintiff. The Court rejected the argument that property rights justified the search of the union
office because the respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise
the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Which between Art. 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrati ve
Code is the more specific law?
Art. 32 InVinzons-Chato v. Fortune, the Court cited the statements of the Code Commission.
Dean Bocobo provided that the very nature of Art. 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It
is not necessary that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat
the main purpose of 32, the effective protection of individual rights. The object of the Article is to
put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. If its scope were limited, it would practically
nullify the object of the article. The clear intention of the legislature was to create a distinct cause
of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or
intent of the defendant. Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Admin Code, provides for the liability
of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements to make them liable for
damages, yet the subject thereof is general, acts done in the performance of official duties,
without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official
concerned. Art. 32 provides for a particular specie of an act that may give rise to an action for
damages against a public officer, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.

What is the doctrinal infirmity of Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune (2008)?
(1) In the decision, J ustice Nachura provided that there are two different types of duties:
duties to the public and duties to individuals. This is wrong because 32 does not
discriminate between the types of public officers nor the types of their duties.
(2) Nachura also said that if what is involved is a duty owed to the public, the public officer
has no liability to the injured individual. This is inaccurate since public officers would
be exempt from liability simply on the basis that they owe duties to the public. The
provision does not provide this exception and is anathema to the intent behind the
provision. This is worse than the good faith defense than the framers did not allow. A
public officer who violates an individuals rights in bad faith can escape liability on the
pretext that he owes duties to the public and is therefore beyond the scope of 32.
(3) Nachura provided an exception: when the complaining individual suffers a particular or
special injury on account f the public officers improper performance or non-
performance of his public duty. This is wrong because while injury is admittedly a
requirement to entitle one to an award for damages under 32, it is a general rule in
every case. To say an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for
damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it
results in a particular wrong or injury to the former would be tantamount to
transforming a general rule into an exception to a general rule that does not exist.
Such fiction would create an illusion it is possible for a public officer to violate
constitutional rights without being liable for damages on the pretext that his duty is
owed to the public in general.
(4) The Court held that the rule-making power of the Commissioner is a duty owed to all.
This is wrong because the particular act complained of was directed towards a specific
person. When a public officers acts are directed to a specific person, she has a duty
to that person to act accordingly.
(5) The Court held that because Fortune did not have a cause of action because there
was no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is no delict or wrongful act or
omission. This is wrong because though Fortune did not pay additional tax, it was only
because it sought judicial relief. Fortune incurred judicial costs.
(6) Nachura said that if there is a remedy available to the injured and that such remedy is
taken, there is no violation of a right to due process. This is flimsy because should the
violator of a constitutional right evade liability because the injured party has a remedy?
The Court compared an action under 32 with a Bivens action, which is wrong because
(a) the discussion on the Bivens action may be considered as obiter dictum because it
had made a ruling on the propriety of dismissal of the complaint; (b) applying US case
law on a statute not identical nor connected to 32 to interpret the application of the
latter is obviously not proper; (c) reliance on US common law as an aid to
interpretations was certainly not called for, considering that what is involved is a clear
civil code provision with an established legislative intent and settled jurisprudence.

Aaron Valdez
(7) Nachura interpreted the action as a suit against the State when it was filed against
Vinzons-Chato in her personal capacity.
MOST IMPT: Court seemed to have required bad faith. At closer inspection, it would seem that
what the Court found fault in was not the non-allegation of bad faith but the failure to allege any
injury on the part of Fortune. Had Fortune alleged bad faith, it would also be a conclusion of law,
not unless they could point to specific facts supporting such allegation of bad faith. Even so, the
Courts argument for granting the MTD would still stand because there is still no allegation of a
specific injury on the part of Fortune. The problem was the non-allegation of any injury suffered
by Fortune. It was a pro hac vice in this case that the Court may have required an allegation of
bad faith.

DEFAMATION, FRAUD, and PHYSICAL INJURIES

33: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

In general
The Court has described the civil action under 33 as arising ex-delicto (Madeja v. Caro) which
means it is an action based on an obligation created by or arising from a crime (People v.
Garcia). If the actions listed under 33 are considered torts, then it is an example of torts that are
also necessarily crimes.

Why are these crimes characterized as such?
In Madeja v. Caro, the Court gave three reasons to justify this characterization.
(1) It s ex-delicto nature is manifest from the provision, which uses the expressions
criminal actionand criminal prosecution
(2) Comment of Code Commission: The underlying purpose of the principle under
consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by
him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. In many of the cases referred to in
the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but there is a civil aspect to the
crime where the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has
suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which
peculiarly affects him.
(3) Tolentino: 33 creates an exception to this rule that the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately. 33 provides for a
civil action which may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has
been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated.
Result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the criminal action.
An action based on 33 requires proving the elements of the crime in the context of a civil action.
Even if the accused is acquitted in the criminal action, a civil action based on 33 for the same act
can still prosper.

Defamation

In general: is the offense of injuring a persons character, fame, or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will, or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about
the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name of reputation of
anything another or tends to bring him into disrespute. It is an invasion of a relational interest
since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff. (MVRS Publications v. Islamic DaWah)

How does one construe utterances as defamatory?
In Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle, the Court held that the words used should be construed
in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally
be understood by persons hearing or reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense. In MVRS Publications v. Islamic Dawah, the court also held that
words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by
itself.

Libel
353: A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonour, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.

In GMA Network v. Bustos, the Court held that the elements of libel are as follows:
(1) An allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another
(2) A publication of the imputation;
(3) Identity of the person defamed;
(4) Malice/ill will
Publication: Libel is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made
known or brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its author and the
offended party (Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle)

What is the doctrine of fair comment?
Borjal et al v. CA provides that the doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, when
the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be reasonable inferred
from the facts.

How does one infer libel from a published work?
In Arafiles v. Phil Journalist, the Court held that it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to
contain libellous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. Whether or not it is libellous
depends upon the scope, spirit, and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. A publication
claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. The whole of the article must be
considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The headlines
of the newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.

Should journalists be held to account for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words?
NO. In the case of Quisumbing v. Lopez, the Court held that newspapers should be given
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important
role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to
race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words.

Should declarations made against a large class of people provide a cause of action in
cases of libel?

Aaron Valdez
NO. In MVRS Publications v. Islamic Dawah, the Court held that declarations made about a
large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual.
Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of
free speech and expression, as well of the press, under the Bill of Rights. The Court cited
Newsweek Inc. V. IAC, where it said that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed
at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in
the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him.

In this case, the Court found that there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly
injured by the article, and because the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, the
respondents did not have individual causes of action. Respondents must have a cause of action
in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.

The Court held that if the group is a very large one, then the alleged libellous statement is
considered to have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all
mankind. It also ruled that the Muslim community is too vast to readily ascertain who among the
Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the inference as indeterminate
and generic as a similar attack on Catholics or other religious groups.

Will the courts regard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher in libel
cases?
NO. In Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle, citing US v. Sotto, the Court held that any subtle or
ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account will be disregarded.
The whole question being the effect of the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and
they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late
to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication.

What constitutes malice in libel cases?
In Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle, the Court held that malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks
not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

Are publications which point discreditable imputations against pri vate persons
actionable?
YES. In Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle, the Court, citing Peoples Journal v. Theonen, held that
a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither
a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for
injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest. In contrast, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence of the issues involved. They invite attention and comment.

What are absolutel y pri vileged communications?
The ff are APCs:
(1) Official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties
(2) Allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in their pleadings or
motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings
(3) Answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them

What are qualifiedl y pri vileged communications?
The ff are QPCs:
(1) Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral, or social duty
(2) Fair and true reports made in good faith, free of comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature
(3) Fair commentaries on matters of public interest
These are still actionable if actual malice is proven. In these communications, the law merely
raises a PF presumption in favour of the occasion.

FRAUD
Does estafa fall under fraud in 33?
YES. In Prudential Bank v. IAC, the Court held that estafa falls under fraud.

Can there be a separate ci vil action in cases based on BP 22?
NO. In the case of Heirs of Simon v. Elvin Chan, the Court held that according to Circular No.
57-97, the criminal action for a violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with BP 22 cases
as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for AD, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his
credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate
cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried.

BP 22 Estafa
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the
reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon reasons
delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Offended party may opt to reserve his right to
file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to
33

PHYSICAL INJURIES

Does the term bodil y injuries also cover death?
YES. In Caradang v. Santiago, the Court explained that defamation and fraud are used in their
ordinary sense in 33 because there are no specific provisions in the RPC using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein; thus, defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the PH but in their generic sense. This
means that physical injuries could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the RPC because it is difficult to believe the Code Commission would have used terms in the
same article, some in their general and another in its technical sense.
IN OTHER WORDS: physical injury =bodily injury
If the intent was to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by complainant similar to
the civil action for assault and battery, civil action should lie whether the offense committed is
that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death (supra).

Does physical injuries cover acts committed through criminal negligence?
NO. In Corpus v. Paje, the Court held that criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in 33 which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action of an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. In Bonite v. Zosa, the
Court held that 33 assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed,
thereby excluding acts committed via negligence.

In Capuno v. Pepsi Cola, the Court held that physical injuriesin 33 includes bodily injuries
causing death. Interestingly in this case, the Court characterized the case as one for QD and
applied the four-year prescriptive period for such actions. It did not discuss 2176 but 33, which is
not a quasi-delict.

Will 33 appl y in cases of physical injuries committed through criminal negligence?
NO. In Corpus v. Paje, the Court held that since the collision was a case of pure accident and
was based upon the criminal negligence of which Paje was acquitted, the acquittal constituted a
bar to the civil action for damages. Criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned
in 33 which authorizes the institution of an ICA. The Court cited Dyogi v. Yatco, where it held

Aaron Valdez
that physical injuries used in33 includes in homicide. The charge against Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and not for homicide and physical injuries. The law penalizes
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. As reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in 33, there is no ICA for damages that may
be instituted in connection with said offense.

HOWEVER, in Madeja v. Caro, the Court held that the crime of physical injuries is used in a
generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the RPC and therefore includes
PI, consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. The Court rules that this case was not
authoritative because of 11 justices, only 9 took part in the decision and four of them merely
concurred in the result.

ALSO

HOWEVER, Justice Capistrano commented on Dyogi, saying that if physical injuries included
homicide or murder, the reason for the law ceases, because a dead person can no longer
personally, through his lawyer, institute an ICA for damages. He also said that the crime of
homicide and the crime of injuries are separately treated in different chapters of the RPC.

Will an ICA for damages under 29 be deemed barred by the heirs failure in the criminal
action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their acti ve participation
in the prosecution of such criminal action?
NO. In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, the Court held that the claimants were not barred from
instituting an ICA because the dismissal of the criminal action was based on the ground of guilt
not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence.

In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, did 33 appl y because of the presence of physical injuries
committed through criminal negligence?
NO. In this case, the Court held that 33 assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries
intentionally committed. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in 33,
no ICA for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted
under said article, and thus 33 was not applicable.

Does a charge of a crime for homicide also entitle the injured party to an action for
damages under 33?
YES. In the case of Dulay v. CA, the Court held that the injured party may recover under 33
because, in accordance with its ruling in the case of Marcia v. CA, the Court rules that physical
injuries in 33 had already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. The term
includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.

Neglect of duty
34: A member of a city or municipal police force shall be primarily liable for damages if he
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property. The
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible. The civil action shall be independent of any
criminal proceedings and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Catch-All Independent Ci vil Action
35: A person may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender when the
following conditions are met:
(1) The person claiming to be injured by a criminal offense charges another with the same
(2) There is no independent civil action granted in this Code or any special law for such
criminal offense
(3) The judge finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or
the prosecuting attorney fails to institute criminal proceedings.

HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS
ABUSE of RIGHTS
19: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith; commonly referred to as
embodying the principle of abuse of rights; creates a duty or obligation, and that it pertains not
only to the exercise of rights but also to the performance of duties

Also known as no harm principle, abuse of rights, good faith principle, the cardinal rule on
human conduct, principle of good dealings (when coupled with 20)

What is the rationale behind this principle?
In UE v. Jader, the Court held that in civilized society, men must be able to assume that others
will do them no intended injury...and that those with whom they deal in the general course of
society will act in good faith.

To which acts does the rule apply?
In the case of Globe Mackay v. CA, the Court held that the principle sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. The law recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in 19 must be observed.

What is the purpose of 19?
In UE v. Jader, the Court held that the purpose of 19 is to expand the concept of torts by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.

What is the effect of 19?
In Globe Mackay v. CA, the Court held through 19, a right, though itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
This happens when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, the Court held that 19 precludes the defense of damnum absque injuria,
which states that the legitimate exercise of a persons right, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable injury. DAI does not apply when there is an abuse
of a persons right. The Court held similarly in Globe Mackay that the principle finds no
application in this case; even granting petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias
from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable.

Can 19 stand on its own?
NO. In Globe Mackay v. CA, the Court held that 19 is a mere declaration of principle and must
be implemented b by 20 or 21. While 19 enumerates the standards of conduct, 21 provides the
remedy for the person injured by the wilful act, an action for damages.

YES. In UE v Jader, the Court granted damages based on 10 without ruling on whether 20 or 21
had been proved.

What are the elements of 19?
In several cases, the Court has listed the ff:
(1) A legal right or duty;
(2) Exercised in BF;
(3) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Does the court always adhere to these elements?
NO. In UE v. Jader, to these elements in determining whether there has been an abuse of rights.
The principle may be invoked if it is proven that a right or duty was exercised in bad faith,

Aaron Valdez
regardless of whether it was for the sole intent of injuring another. It is the absence of good faith
which is essential for the application of this principle.

What is good faith?
According to Sea Commercial v. CA, good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious.

What is bad faith?
According to Andrade v. CA, bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent of ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.

Does an imputation of guilt without basis and a pattern of harassment during the
dismissal of an employee amount to an abuse of right?
YES. In Globe Mackay v. CA, the Court held that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, the employer is liable for damages to the
employee.

Must the act complained of be intentional?
YES. In Albenson v. CA, the Court held that a right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.

If a school fails to seasonabl y inform their students of their academic status prior to
graduation, are they liable under 19?
YES. In UE v. Jader, the Court held UE liable as it failed to inform J ader of his failure in a
subject, despite allowing him to graduate. UEs liability arose from the failure to promptly inform
J ader of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing he had satisfied
all requirements for the course.

Are artificial persons also subject to the standards set by 19?
YES. In Pantaleon v. AMEX, the Court held that all persons, whether artificial or natural, are
required, in the exercise of rights and performance of obligations, to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

ILLEGAL ACTS
20: Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

In Garcia v. Salvador, the Court held that 20 provides legal basis for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.
This was incorporated by the Code commission to provide relief to a person who suffers
damages because another has violated some legal provision.

In Garcia v. Salvador, the Court held that the violation for a statutory duty is negligence. Where
the law imposes upon a person to do something, his omission or non-performance will render
him liable to whoever may be injured thereby. In this case, Garcia failed to observe Sec. 2 of RA
4688 or the Clinical Laboratory Law and several sections of a DOH Administrative Order.

ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
21: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In Velayo v. Shell, the Court held that 21 seeks to provide a legal remedy for moral wrongs
which may not be covered by existing statues. It quoted the Code Commission that the
legislators vouchsafed an adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. In Baksh v. CA, the
Court held that 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in statute books.

Does 21 appl y to...
...public or social humiliation? YES (Wassmer v. Velez)
Moral seduction? YES (Tanjanco v. CA)
Oppressi ve dismissal? YES (Quisaba v. Sta Ines; Globe Mackay v. CA)
Malicious prosecution? YES (Que v. IAC)

What is the basis of 21?
According to Velayo v. Shell, morality is the foundation of law and that human conscience can
serve as a constant basis of legal rules. Every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from
those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. 21 is intended to
prevent a situation where a person suffers damage or loss at the hands of another but has no
legal remedy because the situation is not covered by any law.

What must the plaintiff prove in order to successfull y prosecute an action under 21?
21 provides that a person becomes liable if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. The text requires a plaintiff to
prove the existence of intent and the manner by which the defendant carries out such intent.

In Albenson v CA, the court has provided three elements for actions based on 21:
(1) A legal act
(2) Contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
(3) Intent to injure
The text of the provision however does not require that the act be legal. If legal acts performed in
a manner contrary to morals can be the basis for an award of damages, illegal acts performed in
the same manner should likewise give rise to damages.

Heart Balm Suit
Is a mere breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
NO. In Wassmer v. Velez, however the Court said that the extent to which acts not contrary to
law may be perpetrated with impunity was not limitless because of 21. It was not merely a case
of mere breach of promise to marry; Velez was ordered to pay damages because he exhibited
behavior that was contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. It may be said that the
Court awarded damages because of the public humiliation suffered by Wassmer and her family.

Moral Seduction
What is the essence of moral seduction?
In Tanjanco v. CA, the Court held that the essential feature of seduction is the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence. The Court cited Am J ur, saying that the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury, and a mere proof of intercourse
is insufficient to warrant a recovery. It is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. In the case, the Court found repetitive sexual activity, holding that
such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. There was voluntariness and mutual
passion.

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CASISPRUDENCE: It may be said there was seduction the first time carnal knowledge was
obtained and perhaps up to the first few times this was repeated. Successive trysts over a period
of time should not serve to ratify the initial deceit committed by the defendant; otherwise, there
would be a perverse incentive on the part of the seducer to increase the frequency of his
enticement to reduce possibility of being charged for damages under 21. It is not enough to
prove the elements of 21 but also the element of deceit/enticement/superior power/abuse of
confidence.

When a promise to marry causes a woman to gi ve herself in sexual congress to a man, is
that a viable cause of action under 21?
YES. In Baksh v. CA, the Court held that where a mans promise to marry is the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise
becomes the proximate cause of giving herself unto sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to 21 because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

Baksh test:
(1) Promise was the proximate cause
(2) Lack of intent to fulfil the promise on the part of the defendant
CASISPRUDENCE: It is problematic to anchor such a cause of action on 21 because under the
said article, the act complained of need not be the PC of the injury. 21 is not a QD, therefore
causation is not a requirement.

Public Humiliation
Can a betrayal of trust and shame inflicted upon famil y members be the grounds of an
action under 21?
YES. In Pe v. Pe, the Court held Alfonso Pe liable under 21 because he deliberately succeeded
in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her, which
caused her and her family public humiliation. This case is peculiar because the plaintiffs were
the family members, and not the person allegedly seduced.

Is a false accusation of shoplifting done in a manner offensi ve to the dignity and
defamatory to the character and honesty of another person a cause of action under 21?
YES. In Grand Union v. Espino, the Court held that defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to
plaintiff in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. It is said that it is against
morals, good customs, and public policy to humiliate, embarrass, and degrade the dignity of a
person.

Is falsel y accusing someone of stealing a ground for a cause of action under 21?
YES. In Carpio v. Valmonte (missing jewelry), the Court held that Carpios verbal reproach
against Valmonte was certainly uncalled for, considering that by her own account, nobody knew
she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. Petitioner had the right to
ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof she
was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which by any standard or principle of law
impermissible. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose but to prejudice respondent.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
21: One of the provisions of the CC identified by the Court that may serve as the statutory basis
for a suit for damages by a person injured by malicious prosecution. Because of clear
similarities, it may be said PhilJ ur adopted common law rules on malicious prosecution.

Under common law
MP: a form of misuse of legal procedure, the other forms being wrongful civil proceedings and
abuse of process
Four elements of MP under common law:
(1) Criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff;
(2) Termination of the proceeding in favour of the accused;
(3) Absence of probable cause for the proceeding
(4) Malice or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offended to justice

Criminal Proceeding Instituted by the Defendant Against the Plaintiff
Proceeding alleged to be maliciously instituted must be (1) criminal in character and (2) must
have been commenced. The proceeding is deemed to have commenced once there has been
official actionwhich sets the law in motion.

Termination of the Proceeding in Favor of the Accused
On the merits; not merely a procedural victory

Absence of PC for the Proceeding
Absence of probable cause is what makes MP difficult to sustain. Under common law, PC is not
proven even if there is malice.
PC: A reasonable ground for belief in the guilt of the party charged; judged by appearances to
the defendant at that time he initiates prosecution, not by facts discovered later.

Malice or a Primary Purpose Other Than that of Bringing an Offended to Justice
Malice present if defendant acted chiefly to give vent of motives of ill will or where his primary
purpose was merely something other than the social one of bringing an offender to justice; also
present if the defendant uses the prosecution of obtaining any private advantage.

Under Philippine Law
Definition
Malicious prosecution/denuncia falsa: persecution through the misuse or abuse of judicial
processes; the institution and pursuit of legal proceedings for the purpose of harassing,
annoying, vexing, or injuring an innocent person (Villanueva v. UCPB)

In Magbanua v. Junsay, the Court defined MP as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding
in favour of the defendant therein. In this case, the Court has noted that the term has been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant
despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.

Are disbarment proceedings included within the ambit of a malicious prosecution suit?
YES. In Ponce v. Legaspi, the Court held that a disbarment proceeding is without doubt, judicial
in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution.
The Court explained that the foundation of an action for MP is an original proceeding, judicial in
character.

In Buchanan v. Esteban, the Court had already considered an unfounded civil suit as a possible
basis for the award of damages. The Court in this case held there is no distinction between
actions for criminal prosecutions and civil suits. Both classes require substantially the same
essentials. In a malicious prosecution, even if the act complained of does not constitute a crime,
there can still be probable cause behind the commission of a civil wrong. The gravamen of
malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the
deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.

What are the statutory bases for MP?
It is not clear. In Ventura v. Bernabe, the Court noted the absence of any specific provision on
MP in the chapter on human relations. In Drilon v. CA, Albenson v. CA, and Ponce v. Legaspi,
the Court held that the statutory bases for a civil action for damages for MP are 19, 20, 21, 26,

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29, 32, 33, 35, 2217, and 2219(8). In Bayani v. Panay Electric, the list was shortened to 19, 21,
and 35. It cannot be 2176, because it is impossible to commit negligently.

Elements
In several cases, the elements were as follows:
(1) Fact of prosecution or that the prosecution did occur and that defendant was himself
the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement;
(2) Action finally terminated with an acquittal
(3) In bringing the action, prosecutor acted without probable cause
(4) Prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister
motive
Simpler form:
(1) Prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant
(2) Termination of prosecution in acquittal
(3) Absence of probable cause
(4) Prosecution motivated by malice
Simplest form:
(1) Malice
(2) Absence of probable cause
Prosecution of plaintiff by defendant
Does mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution make one liable for
MP?
NO. In the case of Lagman v. IAC, the Court held that the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution for generally, it is
the government or representative of the State that takes charge of the prosecution of the
offense.

Action terminated with an acquittal
Does the Court consider the termination of the action via an acquittal if the complaint was
dismissed by the fiscal?
YES. In Manila Gas v. CA, the Court found that the filing of a complaint for Qualified Theft was
MP even if the complaint was dismissed by the investigating fiscal.
NO. In Que v. IAC, the mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscals office did not
create a cause of action because the proceeding therein did not involve an exhaustive
examination of the elements of malicious prosecution.

Does dismissal at the level of the Secretary of Justice constitute an acquittal for
purposes of malicious prosecution?
YES. In Bayani v. Panay electric, the Court ruled that the element of final termination of the
action resulting in an acquittal was absent at the time the action for damages was filed because
the dismissal of the complaint lodged with the Secretary of J ustice was dismissed two years
after the action for damages and injunction.

What is probable cause?
In Albenson v. CA, the Court held that probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstance as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.

Does an acquittal prove the absence of probable cause?
NO. In Villanueva v. UCPB, the Court held that an acquittal by itself does not necessarily prove
the absence of probable cause in the criminal information or complaint.

Does the presence of PC signify, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice?
YES. In Drilon v. CA, the Court held that the presence of probable cause signify the absence of
malice.
NO. In Buchanan v. Esteban, the Court held that malice alone does not make one liable for MP,
where PC is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought for the mere purpose of
vexing, harassing, and injuring his adversary. Malice and want of PC must both exist in order to
justify the action. The Court has also held in Sps. Chua v. CA that in MP cases, malice and lack
of PC must both be clearly shown to justify an award of damages based on MP.

What is malice?
In Magbanua v. Junsay, the Court held that malice is the deliberate initiation of an action with the
knowledge that the charges were false and groundless. In Drilon v. CA, the Court held that
malice is a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.

Does the fact that the fiscal filed the information preclude the presence of malice?
NO. In Ventura v. Bernabe, the Court held that the fact that the fiscal filed the information does
not preclude the presence of malice. The determination of the issue of malice must always be
made to rest on all the attendant circumstances, including the possibility of the fiscal or judge
being somehow misled by the accusers evidence. In Villanueva v. UCPB, the Court held that
the complainant cannot escape liability merely on the ground that it was the fiscal who
prosecuted the proceedings in court.

HOWEVER, in Lagman v. IAC, the Court held that the fact that the fiscal filed a criminal case
goes to show that there was probable cause on the part of the person who submitted the case to
the authorities.

Does a failed action for estafa necessaril y gi ve a cause of action to file a suit for MP?
NO. In Que v. IAC, the Court held that failure in suit is not per se an actionable wrong; that
adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to
payment of MD, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty of a right to litigate.
Reliance in good faith to counsels advice given after a full and fair statement of all the facts to
the attorney, does not render the party liable for damages and that it is immaterial that the
attorneys advice is unsound or erroneous. Where there is no clear showing of malice on the part
of petitioner in filing the action, the worries and anxiety suffered by respondent are usually
caused to the party haled into a court as a defendant, and there is no sufficient justification for
awarding damages. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and
justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the
accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense.

Does a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus and a grant of bail constitute a termination
of the action contemplated under PhilJur to warrant the institution of a malicious
prosecution suit?
NO. In Drilon v. CA, the Court held that a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus and a grant of
bail does not constitute a termination of the action contemplated under PhilJ ur to warrant the
institution of an MP suit. In this case, none of the requisites for an MP suit have been alleged,
rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The
complaint failed to make any allegation that the prosecution acted without probable cause in
filing the criminal action.

Does an acquittal on the basis of insufficiency of evidence necessaril y gi ve the plaintiff a
cause of action to prosecute an MP suit?
NO. In Magbanua v. Junsay, the Court held that despite the dismissal of the case due to
insufficiency of evidence, the filing of the criminal case for robbery was not without probable
cause. In this case, Magbanua showed she admitted to receiving instructions from her co-
accused to facilitate the robbery. Even though said admission was inadmissible because it was
extracted under duress does not detract from the fact that based on Magbanuas admission,
there was reason for respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded. Regarding legal
malice, the Court held that it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal

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malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the
award of damages under 19 and 21.

Oppressi ve Dismissal
Does a dismissal, which was done anti-socially or oppressi vely, gi ve a ground or a cause
of action under 21?
YES. In Quisaba v. Sta Ines, the Court held that if the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, then the respondents violated 1701 of the C which prohibits acts of oppression by
either capital or labor against the other. The Court ruled that the case was intrinsically concerned
with a civil dispute and had to do with an alleged violation of Quisabas rights as a member of
society, and did not involve an existing employer-employee relation.

VIOLATION of HUMAN DIGNITY
26: Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbours and other persons. The ff and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly situation in life,
place of birth, physical defect ,or other personal condition

What is the essence of 26?
In Sps Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, the Court held that the essence of 26 is that every person is
entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind. The Court used 26 to
justify the award of ND for an action based on breach of contract.

Does using another mans home for an advertisement without his consent constitute a
violation of a right to pri vacy, actionable under 26?
YES. In St. Louis Realty v. CA, the Court awarded damages to a claimant whose house was
used in an advertisement without his consent. Arts. 2200, 2208, and 2219 sanctioned his claim
for damages. The claimants private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed and he
suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Does a filing of a complaint against the wrong party gi ve rise to liabili ty under 26?
YES. In Gregorio v. CA, the Court characterized it as an action for 2176 in relation to 26, as
compared to an action for MP. Upon filing of the action for BP 22, Gregorios rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when
they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. It was not an action for MP
because there was no allegation that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad
faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregoria.
The Court held that she was not entitled to moral damages, although she technically and
provisionally was, as a plaintiff for a suit based on 26 may be entitled to MD pursuant to
2219(10).

DERELICTION OF DUTY
27: Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken,

UNFAIR COMPETITION
28: Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

PERSONS SPECIFICALLY LIABLE
POSSESSOR/USER of ANIMALS
2183: The possessor/user of an animal is responsible for the damage which it may cause.
Responsibility remains even if the animal escapes or is lost. Responsibility ceases only (1) in
case damage should come from force majeure or (2) from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage
Can an injured person sue the user but not the possessor or vi ce versa in the event that
these are two different people?
YES. According to the literal import of the text, the injured party is allowed to choose to hold
either the user or possessor liable.
If the user and possessor of the animal are two different people, is the defense of the
negligence of the other a viable defense?
NO. If 2183 were a quasi-delict, it would fall under 2176, which renders the provision useless. In
Vestil v. IAC, the Court held that the provision is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause.

Does it matter if the animal was not under the control of the possessor/user at the time
the injury is caused?
NO. It does not matter if the animal was not under the control of the possessor/user at the time
the injury is caused because the rule provides that the responsibility does not cease even if the
animal escapes or is lost.

Does the rule appl y when the caretaker of the animal himself was injured?
NO. In Afialda v. Hisole, the Court held that 1905, from which 2183 was adopted, did not apply
where the caretaker of the animal himself was injured. The possessor of the animal cannot make
use of 2183 against the owner.

Can possession of the animal be determined by in whose house or estate the animal was
staying?
YES. In Vestil v. IAC, the Court determined the ownership of the dog whose bite was fatal to the
life of the child by ascertaining where the dog was housed, regardless of the ownership of the
dog or the house. The Court found that while it was true that the Vestils house was part of the
bigger estate, there was no doubt that petitioners at the time were the possessors of the dog.
Their own daughter was playing with the dog in the house when the dog bit the victim. The Court
also ruled whether or not the dog was tame or not had no bearing.

OWNER of MOTOR VEHICLES
2184: In MV mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence prevented the misfortune. If the owner was not
in the MV, the provisions of 2180 are applicable.

Must the proximate cause of the accident be the negligence of the dri ver?
YES. In Caedo v. Yu Khe Tai, the Court held that if the causative factor was the drivers
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The Court held that the rule was not new
because it was stated in Chapman v. Underwood, but it was formulated as law for the first time
in the Civil Code in 2184, a curious statement because the rule is substantive in nature and not
merely procedural. While legislature may codify judicial rulings, such rulings may not, on its own,
create substantive rights but merely interpret existing substantive rights.

Is the basis for such rule the concept of respondeat superior?
NO. In Caedo v. Yu Khe Tai, the Court held that the basis of the masters liability in civil law is
not respondeat superior but that of bonus pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him,
reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. This
means that the Court considers 2184 as a kind of vicarious liability. The negligence of the driver

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is not the negligence of the owner; the latter has his own separate negligence. Instead of the
presumption of negligence under 2180, under 2184, the plaintiff must prove the owner who was
in the car could have prevented the mishap in the exercise of diligence. This may be extremely
difficult to prove as the evidence of this would be testimonies of the person inside the car.

What is the standard of diligence required of car owners according to 2184?
In Caedo v. Yu Khe Tai, the Court held that car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible
standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The Court would have to look at the personal
circumstances of the owner. The test of whether the owner was negligent, within the meaning of
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in
order to avoid the accident.

If there was no sufficient time and opportunity for the car owner to correct the act of his
dri ver, is he liable?
NO. In Chapman v. Underwood, the Court held that 2184 applies unless the negligent acts of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile or
other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of
negligent acts, after he has had reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. If the driver, by a sudden act
of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally
therefor.

If a motor vehicle mishap suddenl y occurred with the car owner not being in a special
state of alert, will he be deemed liable under 2184?
NO. In Caedo v. Yu Khe Tai, the Court held that the negligence on the part of the owner, if any,
must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, in his failure to
detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but
also sufficient time to act upon it. In the case, there was no reason for the car owner to be in any
special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. In this Case,
the Courts statements seem to imply that there may be some instances when the owner needs
to be in a special state of alertness. It just so happens that such circumstances were not present
in this case.

Is there a standard that car owners must be held to under 2184?
YES. However, this standard must be subjective, as held by the Court in Caedo. Yu Khe Tai.
The Court held that car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part
of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not
necessarily so on the part of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped. The rest of
his negligence, within 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells
him he should do in order to avoid the accident. This does not mean that drivers can absolve
themselves from liability by simply saying they were not paying attention to what their driers
were doing, but rather, it seems that car owners are required to apply a certain degree of
diligence in supervising their drivers.

What is the difficulty in appl ying 2184?
The claimant must prove that the owner could have prevented the accident by the exercise of
due diligence. The only person who could testify to this would be the owner himself, the driver
and the passengers in the car. It is unlikely that any of these individuals would testify that the
owner was not diligent or could have prevented the accident.

PROVINCES, CITIES, and MUNICIPALITIES
2189: Provinces, cities, and municipalities are liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control and supervision.

The defense of due diligence of force majeure is absent from the provision, which implies that
absence of fault on the part of the local government unit concerned should not be a valid
defense. This implies that the provision contemplates a strict liability tort.

Is it necessary for the defecti ve road or street to belong to the province, city, or
municipality for liability to attach?
NO. In Guilatco v. Dagupan, the Court held that it is not necessary for the said road or street to
belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case, the Court
found that this control or supervision was provided for in the charter of Dagupan and was
exercised through the City Engineer. The charter indicated that the city had supervision and
control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole was located. The basis of liability of the
LGU is the fact that it has control and supervision over the defective public works. Whether or
not the LGU is negligent is irrelevant.

Is the negligence of the LGU relevant?
YES. In QC v. Dacara, the Court held that the negligence of the QC government was
responsible for the damages the Dacaras suffered. The Court here implied that a finding of
negligence is required for an action based on 2189. Ruling on the liability of the QC government
based on a finding of proximate cause implied 2189 is a quasi-delict. In determining damages,
the Court applied the rules applicable for QDs.

PROPRIETORS of BULDINGS
2190: The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the injury resulting from its total
or partial collapse, if it should be due to lack of necessary repairs. The plaintiff in a case based
on 2190 is required to prove:
(1) Total or partial collapse of a building or structure
(2) Defendant is the proprietor;
(3) Collapse was due to lack of necessary repairs.
The requirement of proof negligence is noticeably absent. It is not required that such disrepair
result from negligence. The lack of necessary repair may be intentional, but it will still be covered
by the provision. Even if the defendant proves lack of fault on his part or that he exercised due
diligence, the fact that there was still lack of necessary repairs would still make him liable as
proprietor. This provision is a strict liability provision.

2191: Proprietors are also responsible for injury caused:
(1) By explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and
the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and
adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways of lanes, if not caused by FM;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers, or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to the place.

2192: If the injury referred to in 2190 and 2191 should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in 1723, the third person suffering injury may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period fixed. In a
situation where 1723 applies, the proprietor is not the proper party to be sued.

ENGINEER/ARCHITECT of COLLAPSED BUILDING
1723: The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if a building collapses within 15 years from completion because of:
(1) A defect in those plans and specifications;

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(2) Due to defects in the ground.
The contractor is responsible for damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, as a result
of:
(1) Defects in the construction;
(2) The use of materials of inferior quality furnished by the contractor;
(3) Due to any violation of the terms of the contract.
However, the engineer/architect who supervised the construction is solidarily liable with the
contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of
action by reason of any defect.
An action based on 1723 must be brought within 10 years following the collapse of the building.

HEAD of FAMILY for THINGS THROWN or FALLING
2193: The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof is responsible for injury
caused by things thrown or falling from the same. If an object is thrown from the window of a
condominium unit and injures a person outside the building, the head of the family living in that
condominium unit will be responsible.

Can the rule appl y if the object thrown or falling emanates from a hotel room?
It depends. The Court would have to determine if a family staying in a hotel room would
constitute living in that hotel room for the purpose of 2193. Considering that the article penalizes
the head of a family living in a building or part thereof suggests that the article covers places of
residence of a longer-term nature. It may not cover situations where a family rents or leases on a
short-term basis. This rule was taken from 1910, and the only substantial change is that of
replacing house with building. The rule identifies who will be responsible for the injury without
requiring that such person be actually negligent. Neither is due diligence a defense. 2193
appears to be a strict liability tort.

OWNERS of ENTERPRISE/OTHER EMPLOYERS
1711: Owners of enterprises and other employers are obligated to pay compensation in cases of
death, injury, illness or disease suffered by their employee.

What does the phrase other employers include?
The Court has limited the application of other employers in 1711 to persons who belong to a
class analogous to owners of enterprisessuch as those operating a business or engaged in a
particular industry or trade, requiring its managers to contract services of labourers, workers,
and/or employees.

Is a teacher included within the category of other employers mentioned in 1711?
NO. The Court dismissed the complaint upon finding that Alarcon did not own any enterprise but
was merely a school teacher who needed a well. Alarcon did not fall under the category of other
employersmentioned in 1711. It explained that under the principle of ejusdem generis, other
employersmust be construed to refer to persons who belong to a class analogous to owners of
enterprisessuch as those operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or trade,
requiring its managers to contract the services of labourers, workers, and/or employees. 1711 is
part of Section 2 of Title VIII of the CC, which speaks of the principle of social justice and a fair
and just treatment by capital or management.

Situations Covered
Death or Injury
Liability of employers arises in case of death or injuries to their labourers, workmen, mechanics,
or other employees, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment. The injury referred to in the article contemplates physical injury although a case
could be made it should also cover psychological injury. The employer is liable even if the event
which caused the death or injury was purely accidental or due to a fortuitous event.
1712: If the death or injury was due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the
employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow workers intentional or malicious
act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable , unless it
should be shown the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the
plaintiffs fellow worker. When employees lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Illness/disease
Liability for illness or disease contracted by their employees arises if such illness or disease was
(1) caused by their employment or (2) as the result of the nature of the employment.

Defenses Available
When death or injury not caused by a fellow worker
(1) Employees own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness
(2) Employees lack of due care (reduction of damages)
When death or injury caused by fellow worker
1712: If the death or injury was due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the
employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow workers intentional or malicious
act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of
the plaintiffs fellow worker.
(1) Fellow workers intentional or malicious act, unless the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs fellow worker
(2) Employees lack of due care (reduction of damages)

MANUFACTURERS/PRODUCERS of PRODUCTS
2187: Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods are
liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. Implies that types of products
contemplated by the provision are manufactured or processed. Manufacturer or processor liable,
not vendor. Not sufficient the product causes death or injury. Only requires that death or injury
be caused by noxious or harmful substances used in the manufacture or processing of the
product. Does not require that manufacturer/processor knowingly or intentionally use the noxious
or harmful substance. Not a form of culpa contractual.

PERSONS WHO INTERFERE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
1314: Any person who induces another to violate his contract with another person shall be liable
for damages to the other contracting party. Court often cites common law authorities applying
this article.

The Common Law Doctrine
Tort liability may be imposed upon a defendant who intentionally and improperly interferes with
the plaintiffs rights under a contract with another person if the interference causes the plaintiff
(1) to lose a right under the contract; or (2) makes the contract rights more costly or less
valuable.

Liability only attaches if the defendant intended to interfere with the plaintiffs contractual
relations in the sense that:
(1) He acts with knowledge that interference will result;
(2) He acts with an improper purpose

Intent
Under common law, the basis of liability with interference with contract is intent. Negligent
interference is therefore not actionable. Intentional interference presupposes knowledge of the
plaintiffs contract or interest, or at least facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that such interest exists.

Improper Purpose

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Under common law, a defendant may intentionally interfere with the plaintiffs interest without
liability if there were (1) good grounds for the interference or; (2) that some kind of unacceptable
purpose was required in addition to the intent. Although improper interference was once
described as malicious it is now clear that no actual spite is required, leaving a rather broad and
undefined tort in which no specific conduct is proscribed and in which liability turns on the
purpose for which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be
considered improper in some undefined way.

HOWEVER, the defendant may not be liable if he had an impersonal or disinterested motive of a
laudable character, e.g. where defendant is trying to protect a person he is responsible for,
provided steps taken are not unreasonable in view of the harm threatened, and/or acts to protect
public interest.

As to the manner by which defendant interferes, the mere statement of existing facts or
assembling in such a way that the party persuaded recognizes it as a reason for breaking the
contract is not enough, so long as the defendant creates no added reason and exerts no other
influence or pressure by his conduct.

Under Philippine Jurisprudence
Would a mere right to compete justify interference with an existing contract?
NO. In Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court held that the mere right to compete could not justify in
intentionally inducing another to take away the first contracting partys contractual rights. No one
has a right to be protected against competition, but contracting parties have a right to be free
from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance, or annoyance. If disturbance or loss
comes as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.

What constitutes sufficient justification in a case for interference of contractual relations?
In Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court cited Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, where
it held that sufficient justification cannot simply be the fact that the interferer did not have
improper motives. Sufficient justification requires an actual superior or equal right, and a
misunderstanding of ones rights or lack of malice is not an excuse.

Must interference be malicious or that a profit moti ve be present in order to prosecute a
case for interference?
NO. In Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court, citing Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons,
held that US courts held that the presence of malice or a profit motive must be present to
prosecute a case for interference of contract. The Court however held that the absence of malice
did not absolve the interferers from liability for damages. The basis of appellants liability to
Gilchrist was based on unlawful acts, and was therefore anchored on a quasi-delict. The Court
pointed out that nothing in the provision for quasi-delicts requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage.
No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage
suffered.

When is the remedy of an injunction justified in cases of contractual interference?
In Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court cited Devesa v. Arbes, saying that an injunction is limited to
cases where there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, which will not be granted
while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in ordinary cases where material
and irreparable injury will be done, which cannot be compensated in damages. The identity of
the other party is not essential that an injunction might issue.

Why did the Court issue an injunction in this case?
The Court held that injunctions shall issue when no fair or reasonable redress can be had in a
court of law. The Court took notice of the case being novel, as the only contract which was
broken was that between Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of Gilchrist depended upon the
patronage of the public. The Court also took judicial notice of the general character of a
cinematograph or motion-picture theatre. Gilchrist faced the immediate prospect of diminished
profits by reason of the fact the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist
had counted upon as his feature film.

Will an injunction issue to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to
such contracts?
It depends. The Court held that courts in the US have usually granted such relief where the
profits of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite
number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort-
feasor that the latter was responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else obliging him
to institute individual suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of
suits. Continued interference may be ground for an injunction where injuries resulting will be
irreparable. Where there is a malicious interference with lawful and valid contracts a permanent
injunction will ordinarily issue without proof of express malice, though the remedy by injunction
cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the
violation of a contract.

What was so peculiar about Gilchrist?
The case did not involve an action for damages filed against a person who induced another to
break his contract. It was the alleged interferors who were seeking damages against the victim
of interference. The Court however has used this case as basis for the rules on actions referred
to as tort interference.

What are the elements of tort interference?
According to So Ping Bun v. CA, the Court held that the elements of tort interference were:
(1) Existence of a valid contract;
(2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract
(3) Interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse

What constitutes sufficient justification in So Ping Bun?
In this case, the Court held that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business
relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does
not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Some authorities believe that it is
not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded,
and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis,
such that wrongful and malicious motives are negative, for he acts in self-protection. It is
sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives.

How did the Court interpret Gilchrist in So Ping Bun?
The Court interpreted Cuddy to have held that where there was no malice in the interference of a
contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. This interpretation is inaccurate
because in Gilchrist, the Court held that malice is not required in order to be liable for
interference with contracts.

In the aspect of damages, the Court also rejected the award of damages in favour of Manuel
Tiong because in Gilchrist, it was difficult to or impossible to determine the extent of damage
and there was nothing on record to serve as basis thereof. In the cited case, damages were not
awarded not because it was difficult or impossible to determine but because claimants were not
entitled. It was the contract interferers who were seeking damages for the alleged invalid
injunction.

The court also held that the lack of malice precludes damages, though it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. In
this case, the legal liability consists of an injunction.

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What constitutes knowledge of the existence of a contract?
In Lagon v. CA, the Court held that while it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must
be nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a
complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract. In this
case, the Court found that Lagon had no knowledge of the lease contract because the title of the
property bore no encumbrances and neither did the registry of property have a record of the
same. Even if such knowledge were present, petitioner may be held liable only when there was
no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful
motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice
or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff.

What constitutes inducement in the case of contractual interference?
In Lagon v. CA, the Court held that to induce refers to situations where a person causes another
to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. In the case, there was no proof
that Lagon induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell him the properties in question.

How did this case interpret Gilchrist?
The Court held that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper
business interest. A financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious
interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

How did the case of Go v. CA interpret Gilchrist?
In this case, the Court held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and
the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Because petitioner took interest in the property
of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice in him. Lack of malice precludes damages but it does not relieve petitioner of
the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.

What was novel about this case?
In this case, the Court went into great lengths to justify the argument that there was malice in the
part of Go et al. The Court held that contractual interference may not be deemed malicious if
impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives; however, the attendant
circumstances demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial
interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero. Go et al clearly connived not only in
ensuring that Cordero would have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT
25 but also that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the
first SEACAT 25. The Court added another basis for the liability by characterizing it as a violation
of 19.

PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
2180: Liability for QD is demandable not only against the person who committed the act, but
also against the person responsible for the said actor. When the actor commits a QD, the PVL is
solidarily liable with him. Responsibility under the article ceases when the PVL prove they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

Why are persons vicariousl y liable responsible?
The Court held in Cangco v. Manila Railroad that PVLs are liable because of the moral
culpability for those under their absolute or limited control.

PVL Actor
Father, but in case of death, mother Minor children who live in their company
Guardians Minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company
Owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise
Employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on account of
their functions
Employers Employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry
State Special agent
Teachers or HEAT Pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody

PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parents
What is the basis of parental liability?
In Tamargo v. CA, parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the (1) instructing; (2)
controlling; and (3) disciplining of the child. Parental authority is based on parental authority. The
civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortuous
act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

221: Amended 2180; parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law

What diligence is required of parents?
In Libi v. IAC, the Court held that the diligence of a good father of a family is required by law in a
parent and child relationship. It consists of the instruction and supervision of the child.

Is the ci vil liability of parents for quasi -delicts of their minor children primary or
subsidiary?
Primary. In Libi v. IAC, the Court held that the civil liability of parents for QDs of their minor
children, as contemplated in 2180, is primary and not subsidiary. If 2194 were applied, the
persons responsible for the act or omission are solidarily liable.

Should adoption be gi ven a retroacti ve effect in case the unemancipated child incurs
liability?
NO. In Tamargo v. CA, the Court held that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the minor
incurred liability, so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when

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the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favour of the adopted child; but to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the adopting spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortuous act they could not have foreseen would be unfair and unconscionable.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arisen
since the minor was not subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

GUARDIANS
2180: Guardians are liable for QDs caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.

Other Persons Exercising Parental Authority
221: Persons exercising parental authority are civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by acts or omission of their minor children living in their company and under their parental
authority, subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

216: GR In default of parents or a judicially-appointed guardian, the following persons
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
a. Surviving grandparent
b. Oldest brother or sister, over 21 y/o, UNLESS unfit or disqualified
c. Childs actual custodian, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified
217: In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children, and other children
similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads
of childrens homes, orphanages, and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.

TEACHERS and SCHOOLS
Under the Ci vil Code
2180: Teachers of HEAT are liable for QDs caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody

What is the basis of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortuous acts of their
students?
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held that school heads and teachers stand, to a certain extent,
as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision of the conduct of the child. The governing principle is that the protective custody of
the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time, as well as to take necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
student themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

What does a schools custody over a student entail?
In Palisoc, the Court held that custody refers to the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are
in attendance in the school, including recess time, and that it is not required that for such liability
to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school.

In Amadora v. CA, the Court held that the student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

In Salvosa v. IAC, however, the Court held that the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective
and supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated by law.
Does 2180 apply to all schools?
YES. According to Amadora, the Court held that 2180 applies to all schools, academic and non-
academic. When the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student. In case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head who shall be held liable. (In Palisoc, the Court held that both head and teacher liable
for injury caused to a fellow pupil by a student in a non-academic institution). While the student
is under the custody of the academic institution, the teacher-in-charge must answer for his
students torts, in practically the same way the parents are responsible for the child when he is in
their custody. In this case, the Court defined the teacher-in-charge as the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.

Does the teacher need to be physicall y present in order to be liable?
NO. In Amadora, the Court held that the teacher need not be physically present and in a position
to prevent the injury because custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control
but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result
of such influence. The Court ruled that for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not
the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school
at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

Is it required that the offending student be of minority age for the teacher to be held
liable?
NO. In Amadora, the Court held that the offending student need not be of minority age because
the teacher is held answerable by law for the act of the student under him regardless of the
students age.

Are school heads and teachers liable for quasi-delicts committed during recess time?
YES. In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held that it becomes the teachers/HEATs obligation, as
well as the schools, to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole
time they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict wilfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.

In which case did the Court discriminate or compare academic and non-academic
institutions, and the respecti ve liabilities of the teachers/HEAT?
In Amadora v. CA, the Court held that where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student. In the case of EAT, it is the HEAT, and only he who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
students, except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. There was no substantial distinction, however, between the academic and
non-academic schools, insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The only
reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the HEAT exercised a closer
tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The distinction no longer obtains
at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades. 2180 however remains
unchanged.

Must the students be boarding with school authorities to satisfy the custody
requirements?
NO. In Amadora v. CA, the Court held that the student should be within the control and influence
of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. The Court posited that this
does not necessarily mean that such custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with
the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before commencement exercises. In view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the

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school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

When does schools custody over the student begin and end?
In Amadora v. CA, the Court held that it was too tenuous to argue that the student comes under
the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he
has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be
deemed ended upon the start of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term
papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.

It further held that as long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities
over the student continues. Even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates and his friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Art. 2180.

CASISPRUDENCE: This focus on Amadora was misplaced as what matters was whether the
offending pupil was still in the custody of the school, not Amadora.

What degree of diligence is required of the teacher-in-charge?
In Amadora v. CA, the Court held that it is not disposed to expect from the teacher the same
measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so should
be held to a greater accountability than the teacher.

In this case, none of the respondents were liable because none of them was the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student, although under 2180, the PVL is presumed negligent and it is
up to him to prove that he exercised due diligence to prevent the damage.

What is contemplated by the term recess ?
In the case of Salvosa v. IAC, the Court held that recesscontemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within the call of his mentor and
is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is
conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. The mere fact of being enrolled or
being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in
the protective and supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated by law. In this case, the
student responsible for the shooting was solely negligent because the Court found out he was
not in attendance in school.
HOWEVER, in this Case, the application of 2180 was erroneous as the Court used a provision
regarding the vicarious liability of teacher to determine the liability of a school.

Under the Family Code
218: The following have special parental authority over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody:
a. The school
b. School administrators;
c. Teachers;
d. The individual, entity, or institution engaged in child care.
The authority and responsibility of these persons apply to all authorized activities, whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity, or institution.

219: if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

Does the Court require proof of proximate causation to hold a school vicariously and
solidaril y liable for the quasi-delicts committed by the minors under its custody?
YES. In St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, the Court held that it must be shown that the injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. Since there was a failure to show that the
negligence of St. Marys was the proximate cause of the death of the victim, St. Marys was not
liable. The Court considered the liability of parents under 219 a quasi-delict, which required a
finding that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the injury.

In SJC v. Miranda, the Court also applied proximate causation to determine whether the cause
of the accident which caused the injury to the injured minor was the sudden and unexpected
explosion of chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The Court found that the
proximate cause of J aysons injury was the concurrent failure of SJ C and Rosalinda Tabugo to
prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. SJ C
and Tabugo were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution, and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators, and teachers.

Can the Court appreciate contributory negligence of the student in ascertaining the
liability of a school?
YES. In SJC v. Miranda, the Court affirmed the finding of contributory negligence on the part of
the injured student after finding that the students were warned not to look into the heated test
tube before the compound had cooled off.

OWNERS/MANAGERS of ESTABLISHMENTS/EMPLOYERS

What is the basis of the liability of employers under the Ci vil Code?
The Court, in Cangco v. Manila Railroad, held that the basis of liability under 2180 for employers
is not that of respondeat superior but 2176. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands
of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself
guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all consequences of his imprudence. In
this jurisdiction, the employer is liable because of his own negligence.

The common law rule is that the negligence of the employee is imputed to the employer. It would
be wrong to say the liability of employers under 2180 is based on respondeat superior.

Distinguishing the 4
th
and 5
th
paragraph of 2180
2180(4): Owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are responsible for injuries
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions. The PVL is the owner or manager of an establishment/enterprise
and the person he is responsible for is his employee. In order for the employer to be responsible
for injuries caused by his employee, the injury must have been caused by the employee while he
was doing his job.

2180(5): Employers are liable for injuries committed by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

When applicable
Employer-Employee Relationship
What must first be established to hold the employer liable under 2180?

Aaron Valdez
In Castilex v. Vazquez, the court held that it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish the
employer-employee relationship. According to Sps Jayme v. Apostol, it cannot be assumed and
is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove relationship by preponderant evidence.

Must the defendant prove the employer-employee relationship?
NO. In Sps Jayme v. Apostol, the Court held that it is enough for the defendant to deny an
alleged employment relationship because he is under no obligation to prove the negative
averment.

Is the right of control over the person sufficient to justify an application of the doctrine of
vicarious liability?
NO. In Sps Jayme v. Apostol, the Court has ruled that in the absence of an E-E relationship, the
right of control over the person causing the injury is not sufficient by itself to justify an application
of the doctrine of VL.

Is a mayor vicariousl y liable for a mishap caused by a municipal pick-up truck?
NO. In Sps Jayme v. Apostol, the Court held that the mayor was not vicariously liable in this
case. It held that to sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established:
(1) The employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;
(2) The service to be rendered was in accordance with orders which the employer has the
authority to give at all times;
(3) The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him.
(4) The injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing
his functions

What is the four-fold test?
In Sps Jayme v. Apostol, the Court applied such test to rule whether it was the mayor or the
municipality of Koronadal who was the lawful employer of the driver at the time of the accident.
The four-fold test was listed as:
(1) The employers power of selection
(2) Payment of wages or other remuneration;
(3) Employers right to control the method of doing the work;
(4) Employers right of suspension or dismissal
The Court held that the mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the
passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to security guards assigned to
it does not itself render the client responsible as an employer. Another employee with the right to
control the injuring employee incurs no vicarious liability. No negligence may be imputed against
a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicles
operation. A public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious
basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation.
EXCEPTION: When the public official cooperates in the act.
Caveat: Most sources cited were authorities discussing imputed negligence in a relationship
based on respondeat superior.

Are hospitals vicariousl y liable for the negligent acts committed by doctors?
YES. In PSI v. Agana (2008), the Court took into account the development of the relationship
between hospitals and doctors. It said that though the medical practice strictly involves highly
developed and specialized knowledge, such that physician are generally free to exercise their
own skill and judgment in rendering medical services sans interference, modern hospitals are
increasingly taking an active role in supplying and regulating medical care to patients. An
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. The court held that PSI failed to adduce evidence showing it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of one of its doctors.

Is the control test necessary to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between hospital and doctor?
YES. In PSI v. Agana (2010), the Court cited Calamba Medical Center, Inc. V. NLRC where it
held that under the control test, an employment relationship exists between a physician and a
hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the
physician is to accomplish his task. Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-
employee relationship between the doctor and hospital under which the hospital could be held
vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established by
a preponderance of evidence. In the case, the Court found there was insufficient evidence PSI
exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and details of the specific
process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Navidad.
CASISPRUDENCE: A pro hac vice; it still need to be proven that the hospital is the employer of
a doctor; Ramos merely says its possible that a hospital can be liable as employer of a doctor

Within the Scope of Assigned Tasks
What else needs to be proven after establishing the employer-employee relationship?
In Castilex v. Vazquez, the Court held that in addition to an employer-employee relationship, the
plaintiff must also show that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when
the QD complained of was committed, in order to make the employer vicariously liable.

Does the employer need to prove his employee was not acting within the scope of his
assigned duties?
NO. In Castilex v. Vazquez, the Court held that the employer need not prove his employee was
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks; it was enough for the employer to deny his
employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

What does within the scope of his assigned tasks mean?
In Filamer v.IAC (1992), the Court held that for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of
an employer, the term includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage.

Can Courts rel y on an implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under 2180?
NO. In Filamer v. IAC (1992), the Court held that it cannot rely on an implementing rule on labor
to disregard the primary liability of an employer under 2180. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provision of the
Civil Code. In this case, however, the Court did not explain why Funtecha was an employee
based on applicbable rules.

Does any negligent act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage, make
the employer vicariousl y liable?
YES. In Filamer v. IAC (1992), the Court held the employer liable for Funtechas act of injuring
Potenciano Kapunan. In this case, the Court held that any act within the furtherance of an
employers interest can be the source of negligence. In addition to that, the Court found that the
President knew Funtecha was driving the jeep

Can employers availing of services via labor-only contracts escape liability under 2180?
NO. In NPC v. CA, the Court held that in labor-only contracting, an employer-employee
relationship between the principal employer and the employees of the labor-only contractor is
created. The principal employer is responsible to the employees of the labor only contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. It is axiomatic that any
person who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a
specified work or for the supply of manpower assumes responsibility over employees of the
latter.

Aaron Valdez

Can an implementing rule on labor be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability
under the substanti ve provisions of the Ci vil Code?
NO. In NPC v. CA, the Court, citing Filamer v. IAC, held that the present case does not deal with
a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged
employer, but a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent
acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. 2180 of the Civil Code and not
the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the labor onlycontractor.

Is a company liable in cases wherein the employee caused the injury to the plaintiff using
a company car or a company-issued vehicle?
It depends. In Castilex v. Vazquez, the Court held that no absolutely hard and fast rule can be
stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of an MV so as to fix liability
upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies
with each state of facts. The mere fact that the employee was using a service vehicle at the time
of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge the employer with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicles unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within
the course or scope of his employment.

What are the certain principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for
the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor
vehicle?
In Castile v. Vazquez, the Court cited the principles which cover three cases:
(1) Where the employee is using the employers vehicle in going to and from meals. In
such a case, the employee is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment
in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer, unless
there is evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an
employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the
performance of his duties
(2) Where the employee is using the employers vehicle in travelling to and from the place
of work; in the absence of some special benefit to the employer, the employee is not
acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers MV.
The special benefit may be in allowing the employee to spend more time at his actual
duties (special errand/roving commission rule). Employer however is not liable for
employees negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the
direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
(3) Where an employer loans his vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use
outside of regular working hours. The employer is generally not liable for the
employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned MV will be used by
the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental
benefit to the employer.
These principles are applicable in this jurisdiction, albeit based on respondeat superior, not BPF,
because whether or not the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer. It is
indispensable that the employee as acting in furtherance of his employers business or within the
scope of his assigned task.

Should the fourth paragraph appl y when the employer is engaged in some kind of
business or industry?
NO. In Castilex v. Vazquez, the Court held that the fifth paragraph shall apply, as it contains the
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry, a phrase which
should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task. It held that the Court has applied the 5
th
para to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operator and banks.

Is the mere fact of using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident sufficient to
charge an employer with liability?
NO. The mere fact that the employee was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not sufficient to charge Castilex with liability, UNLESS it appears he was operating the
vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. The employer is not liable for the
negligence of his employee where at the time of the incident, the employee has left the direct
route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.

If a case invol ves injuries caused by the use of a company car, does evidence of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees be enough to evade liability?
NO. In Valenzuela v. CA, the Court held that due diligence in the supervision of its employee
during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would not be enough. In this case, the
Court held that when a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee,
it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the
privilege reasonable and responsibly. The provision for the unlimited use of a company car
principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. In providing for a company car for business
use and/or for the purpose of furthering the companys image, a company owes responsibility to
the public to see to it the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited
use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.

Does a meeting between co-workers outside of the workplace provide a presumption that
the meeting is work-related?
NO, but in Valenzuela v. CA, the Court held that an allegation of a social visit with an officemate
in Paranaque could still give rise to the speculation that he and his officemate had just been from
a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work-related strategies.
The Court also required the defendant to prove he came from an employment-related
appointment, when in fact it should have been the claimants job to do so.

Presumption of negligence
Once the employee is found liable for a QD while acting within the scope of his assigned tasks,
his employer is disputably presumed negligent in the selection or supervision of the employee
(Lampesa v. De Vera). The presumption does not arise if the negligence of the employee is not
proven (Vallacar Transit v. Catubig). The employer has his own separate negligence, in stark
contrast with respondeat superior (Cangco v. Manila Railroad).

Rebuttal of Presumption
After plaintiff proves E-E relationship and the act complained of was within scope of assigned
tasks, it is necessary that the employer interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee (Castilex v. Vazquez). To rebut the presumption, the employer
must present adequate and convincing proof he exercised care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of his employees.

How does the employer prove due diligence in the selection of employees?
In Mercury Drug v. Huang, the Court held that the employer is required to examine his
employees as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.

How does the employer prove diligent supervision?
In Valenzuela v. CA, the Court held that diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of
employment. Evidence proving that the employer had exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough.

Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, is the employer
automaticall y liable?

Aaron Valdez
YES. In Lampesa v. De Vera, the Court held that once negligence on the part of the employee is
established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection
and/or supervision of said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present
adequate and convincing proof he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision
of his employees. In this case, the Court found the employer was satisfied by the mere
possession of a professional drivers license of his employee. The Court held the employer must
have carefully examined his employees records, qualifications, experiences, and records of
service.

What are employers supposed to look at to prove they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of its employees?
In Mercury Drug v. Huang, the Court held that an employer must examine employees as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. With regard to supervision, the employer should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

THE STATE
2180: The State is vicariously liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
official to whom the task done properly pertains caused the damage.

Is the State responsible for damages suffered by pri vate indi viduals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office?
NO. In Merritt v. Government, the Court held that the State is not responsible for damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the State in the organization of branches of the public service
and in the appointment of its agents. If a State agent discharging the functions of his office
causes the injury to the private individual, there is no presumption of negligence on the part of
the State.

What is the basis of liability under 2180(5)?
In Merritt, the Court held that in some cases, the State might by virtue of the principle set forth
in 1902 respond for all the damage occasioned to private parties by order or resolutions which
by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise
of its executive powers. 1902 is the article upon which 2176 was based.

What is a special agent?
In Merritt, the Court defined a special agent as one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept did not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration
and who in his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. In Sps Fontanilla v.
Maliaman, the Court held that if the agent is a public official, he must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said officials usual
government functions. If the agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-
governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be
held liable as such for its agents tort; if the government commissions a private individual for a
special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the
provision.
Three scenarios contemplated by Sps. Fontanilla v. Maliaman:
(1) If public official, liable if commissioned to do a task foreign to such officials usual
governmental functions
(2) If not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
State assumes role of ordinary employer and held liable for its agents tort
(3) If government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it acts
through a special agent within meaning of the provision
In the same case, the Court ruled that the liability of the government when it acts through a
special agent contemplates a situation where the government is acting in its public or
governmental aspects.

What are governmental and non-governmental aspects?
In Sps. Fontanilla v. Maliaman, the Court held that governmental functions and activities are
those which can be performed ONLY by the government, and hence State is immune from tort
liability. Non-governmental functions and activities are services which might as well be provided
by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it. These are also called
proprietary functions of the government. This test is ambiguous because it becomes nearly
impossible to apply where the government agency performs both governmental and non-
governmental functions. It would be simpler to apply if the nature of the functions performed by
the agent is not considered but only whether the agent is special.

Does consent of the State to be sued for a tort admit its liability to a claimant?
NO. In Merritt v. Government, the Court held that by consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not concede liability to plaintiff or create any cause of
action in his favour, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives
a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The Court cited Sipple v. State, saying that
the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants,
only by some force of some positive statute assuming such liability.

How does one determine, according to Merritt, if a government employee or official is
acting as a special agent?
The Court held that the State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of 1903. A special agent is
one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of his duties
of his office if he is a special official. The concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the active administration and who in his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and regulations. A special agent is an agent duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charge with some
administrative or technical officer who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility.

Would the negligence of a government agency employee who is not a special agent
create liability for the State?
NO. In Rosete v. Auditor General, the Court held that there being no showing that whatever
negligence may be imputed to the government agency in question would be determined whether
the negligent employee was a special agent. Because the erring employee in this case did not
act as special agents within the meaning of 1903, the State incurred no liability.

What did Justice Perfecto argue in his dissenting opinion in Rosete?
In Rosete, J . Perfecto held that ECA was a special agent within the meaning of 1903 of the
Code because it performed non-governmental function, and its employees were therefore within
the meaning of a special agent. He quoted 1903(5), saying that under the meaning of the
paragraph, the word official comprises all officials and employees o f the government who
exercise duties of their respective public offices. All others who are acting by commission of the
government belong to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies. He
posited the ECA was not a branch or office of the government, such as legislative bodies, the
executive offices, or the tribunals, but was an agency set up for specific purposes which were
not attainable through the official functions entrusted by law to the government or its branches. It
then was one of the groups of special agents created by the government for activities ordinarily

Aaron Valdez
ungovernmental in character, such as the PNP, NEDA, NACOCO, NTC, et al. The word
specialwas added to distinguish it from the regular or ordinary agent of government, which
refers to all officers and employees in the public service.

What are the two aspects of the liability of the State in Fontanilla v. Maliaman?
The Court held the liability of the State has two aspects, namely:
(1) Its public/governmental aspects where it is liable for tortuous acts of special agents
only
(2) Its private or business aspects where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer

What is the definition of a special agent in Fontanilla?
States agent
(1) If a public official, not only specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such
task must be foreign to said officials usual governmental functions
(2) If not a public official, is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions
(3) If a private individual acts for the State for a special governmental task, is acting as a
special agent within the meaning of the provision

What are governmental and proprietary functions?
In Fontanilla v. Maliaman(1989), the Court held that governmental functions and activities are
those which can be performed only by the government, and the State is immune from tort
liability. A proprietary function and service is one which might as well be provided by a private
corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it. In this case, the Court held the
NIA liable because it was an agency of the government exercising non-governmental functions
and held it liable for the tort of its agent under 2180(5).

Is the NIA an agency an agency exercising governmental or proprietary functions?
It is an agency exercising proprietary functions. InFontanilla v. Maliaman (1991), the Court cited
Justice Concepcions dissenting opinion in Angat River irrigation System v. Angat River
Workers Union, where he held that though the Angat System exercised a governmental function
because the nature of the powers and functions of said agency does not show it was intended to
bring any special corporate or pecuniary benefit to the government, an agency supplying water
at a price is engaged in trade and is liable first as a private company, and is therefore acting
under its proprietary power. He held in that opinion that irrigation districts in the US are identical
to irrigation systems in the Philippines, and that AmJ ur considers an irrigation district a public
quasi corporation organized to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land
within its limits.

In the second Fontanilla case, the Court cited Holderbaum v. Hidalgo Country Water
Improvement District, saying that a water improvement district is in no better position than a city
is when exercising its purely local powers and duties. Its general purposes are not essentially
public in nature, but are only incidentally so; those purposes may be likened to those of a city
which is operating a waterworks system, or an irrigation system. A water improvement district
can do nothing for the administration of the sovereign government, and that the purposes and
duties of such districts do not come within the definition of public rights, purposes, and duties
which would entitle the district to the exemption raised by common law as a protection to
corporations having a purely public purpose and performing essentially public duties.

It also cited NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated Unions, where it held that the NAWASA is not an
agency performing governmental functions but one which performs proprietary functions. The
functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional
functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole
and the goal is for the general interest of the society. I also cited Metropolitan Water District v.
Court of Industrial Relations, saying the business of furnishing water supply and sewerage
service may for all practical purposes be likened to an industry engaged in by coal companies,
gas companies, power plants, ice plants and the like. The Court held that while NIA was
essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a government-function
corporation. It also noted the fact the NIA was a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government and was not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions.

What did Justice Feliciano say in his dissent in Fontanilla?
(1) The laissez-faire concept of the state has been replaced by the welfare state, and that
governments are not restricted to basic and primitive functions of repelling invasion by
a foreign enemy et al but have undertaken private enterprise.
(2) Whether or not a GOCC or entity forms part of the Government, under the
Constitution, depends upon whether it is possessed of an original charter.
(3) State in 2180 refers to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. In Sec. 2 of
the RAC of 1987, the Government refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including
the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines.
Hence, it does not include agencies or instrumentalities or other entities which their
enabling laws have invested with juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
the RP
May a municipality or any LGU be liable for the torts of its employees in the discharge of
governmental functions?
NO. In Sps Jayme v Apostol, the Court held that a municipality may not be sued because it is an
agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and hence is immune from suit. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show the
defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or the cases
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. In this case however, it was not clear from the
facts how the Court determined the driver was performing governmental functions at the time.

Aaron Valdez
THE CAUSE
PROXIMATE
2176: Requires that it be proven the act or omission of the defendant be the cause of the injury.

J urisprudence requires that the injured party proves a connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and injury to the plaintiff. The negligence of the
defendant must be the cause and the injury to the plaintiff must be the effect (in Pilipinas Bank v.
CA, the Court explained the negligence of defendant and not why such negligence is the
proximate cause).

What is proximate cause?
In Bataclan v. Medina, the Court held that proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. It is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. This
definition requires the person responsible for the first event have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of act or omission that injury to some person might probably result.

In Mercury Drug v. Baking, the Court defined proximate cause as any cause that produces injury
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the
result would not have occurred otherwise.

In Pilipinas Bank v. CA, the Court held that proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or
some similar injury would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.

Based on all these definitions, the proximate cause must be necessary for the injury to occur
and the type of injury must be one that could be foreseen given the existence of the cause.

What was interesting about the case of Bataclan v. Medina?
The discussion on proximate cause in this case was irrelevant because the action was anchored
on the breach of contract of carriage. There was no issue as to the negligence of the common
carrier; the only issue was the degree of liability. If the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was the fire, Medina would only be responsible for physical injuries. If the proximate cause of
Bataclans death was the overturning of the bus, Medina would be liable for damages resulting
from the death of its passenger. The Court was not determining what the proximate cause was
but was determining whether the death of Bataclan was the proximate result of the overturning
of the bus.

Is the pharmacy liable for damages borne from the use of a sleeping pill if the pharmacist
dispensed the sleeping pill in place of medication for bl ood sugar?
YES. In Mercury Drug v. Baking, the Court held Mercury Drug liable after it dispensed Dormicum
instead of Diamicron. It defined proximate cause as any cause that produces injury in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

What was peculiar in the case of Mercury Drug v. Baking?
In that case, around three days had lapsed from the time of the negligent act determined by the
Court as proximate cause. It must be noted that the day of the accident was not the first time
Baking took the wrong pill. Presumably he must have felt drowsy the first two times as well. If so,
he was arguably negligent in driving, knowing that taking the medication made him drowsy.

Are banks liable in case their teller wrongly credits a clients deposit to another
depositors account after the teller failed to ascertain whether she was depositing in the
wrong account
YES. In Pilipinas Bank v. CA, the Court ruled that the proximate cause of the injury was the
negligence of Pilipinas Banks employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of Reyes in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first name. The Court held the teller should have
continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded
with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on
the totality of the person involved. The Court here however noted the quoted paragraph only
explains why the bank employee was negligent but not why this negligence was the proximate
cause.

CONCURRENT
Is proximate cause required to be the sole cause of the injury or can it concur with other
causes?
In Far Eastern v. CA, the Court held that the general rule is that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the
injury. This statement implies there is only one proximate cause, but may consist of two
negligent acts concurring with each other. The Court held that where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent.

Is concurrent negligence a defense to escape liability?
NO. In Far Eastern v. CA, the Court held that concurrent negligence is not a defense available to
any of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.

Does negligence in order to render a person liable need to be the sole cause of an injury?
NO. In Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, the Court held that as a general rule, negligence in order to
render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only of them, it being sufficient the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. The liability of one
actor is not affected by the negligence of another actor if both acts comprise the proximate
cause of the injury. The Courts statement implies that there is only one proximate cause, but it
may consist of several combined causes.

However, the Court subsequently said that where there are concurrent causes, recovery may be
had against any of the actors responsible for any of the causes, provided each cause is an
efficient cause. This is inconsistent with the earlier statement of the Court that each concurrent
cause is a component cause, not a group of causes from which any of the efficient causes may
be a ground for liability. There is a need to clarify the doctrine of concurrent cause. In order to be
a concurrent cause, is it sufficient that it combines with another cause to form a proximate cause
or must it independently be a proximate cause by itself.

How does one differentiate a concurrent cause from contributory negligence?
In Rakes, the Court held that a concurrent cause contributes to the accident itself while
contributory negligence contributes to the injury.

Aaron Valdez
Does arguing that a persons negligence is merely a concurrent cause absol ve one of
liability?
NO. The only exception is when the defendant argues his negligence concurs with that of the
plaintiff. If successful, it provides a complete defense because the plaintiffs own negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury.

REMOTE
It may be defined as a cause which would have been a proximate cause, had there been no
efficient intervening cause after it and prior to the injury. It is considered to only provide a
condition which made the injury possible, but it did not cause it.

Can a remote cause be held to be the basis of an action if there was an efficient
intervening cause?
NO. In Manila Electric v. Remoquillo, the Court held that a prior and remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. If an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. What determines the existence of a remote
cause is not the nature of such cause itself but whether or not there is an efficient intervening
cause.

Can the timing element be considered in deciding whether a cause is proximate and not
remote?
YES. In Gabeto v. Araneta, the Court held that the mere fact a prospective passenger interfered
with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner described would not make him liable for
the death of a another person who happened to have been rushed by the horse. The Court took
note of the appreciable interval time after the driver alighted the horse and before his horse
started his career up the street. The Court also took into consideration the control over the
animal, as the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal. The
driver was then held responsible for the casualty.

INTERVENING
An injury can result from the effect of two successive negligent acts committed by two different
actors. Philippine jurisprudence has adopted the common law concept of intervening causes to
determine the proximate cause between two successive negligent acts committed by two
different actors.

The test to determine if defendant is still liable despite an intervening cause is whether the
intervention of the later cause is a significant part of the risk involved in the defendants conduct,
or is so reasonably connected with it that the responsibility should not be terminated. If the
intervening cause is a significant part of or is reasonably connected with the risk created by the
defendant or is a FORSEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSE, the defendant is still liable.

What are Foreseeable Intervening Causes?
In Phoenix v. IAC, the Court held that if the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.

Prosser and Keeton held that the defendant is responsible for an FIC because such cause is
within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence. The only time the
defendant is not responsible is when he could not foresee any danger of direct injury or any risk
from an intervening cause.
Is a construction company liable for damages caused by its dump truck parked askew in
the highway at midnight?
YES. In Phoenix v. IAC, the Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the
negligence of the truck driver and the accident and respondents injuries. The collision of another
drivers car and the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers
negligence. The collision would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the street. The drivers
negligence was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. It was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver
had parked the dump truck.

TESTS TO DETERMINE PROXIMATE CAUSE
BUT FOR
Is the pre-eminent test in common law; an act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an
event if the particular event would have occurred without it. The test perfectly applies to the
Bataclan definition of a proximate cause. This test however is useless in cases involving multiple
defendants or professional misconduct because requiring definite proof would effectively
immunize culpable defendants because of the difficulty of proving causation.

The answer to the problem of multiple defendants appears to be the concept of concurrent
cause.

Sufficient Link
In Dy Teban v. Jose Ching, the Court relaxed the but for test, saying that the plaintiff must
establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must
not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a
natural and probable result of the act or omission. The sufficient link requirement essentially
requires some reasonable connection between the act or omission and the injury. It is not
required that it be shown that the injury would not have occurred without the act or omission
complained of.

In Dy Teban, the Court cited Bataclan in arguing that a necessary link must be established
between the act or omission and the damage or injury and that the damage or injury must be a
natural or probable result of the act or omission.

Substantial Factor
In Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, the Court held that if the actors conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.

Common law provides that the defendants cconduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. If a defendants conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiffs injury, he will not be absolved if other causes contributed to the
injury.

The problem with this test is that negligence is not a substance that can be measured. The test
presumes that a persons negligence can be distinguished and measured in comparison with
other factors or other negligent acts. This is not possible when there are multiple actors and
factors involved.

Mixed Considerations
In Dy Teban, the Court held that there is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate
cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. It
may be an admission that there really is no test to determine PC and the court can base its
determination on anything it sees fit. It is saying the Court can take any factor into consideration.

Aaron Valdez
Determining PC becomes a clear policy question on what the law and the courts consider as the
legal cause under a given set of facts.

Cause v. Condition
In Phoenix v. IAC, petitioners argued the truck drivers negligence was merely a passive and
static condition and that the other drivers negligence was an efficient intervening cause, and
therefore the other drivers negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of the truck driver. The Court held that in the US, it is
quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. Cause and
condition still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. It must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant
have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. In such
cases, it is not the distinction between cause and condition which is important but the nature of
the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

Last Clear Chance
History and Rationale
When was the doctrine first stated?
In Davies v. Mann, the Court held that the doctrine allows for recovery by a negligent plaintiff if
the defendant could have, by employing proper care, avoided the injury.

There are two explanations for the rule:
(1) If the defendant has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, then the plaintiffs
negligence is not the proximate cause. Problem with this explanation is that the
plaintiffs negligence may be a substantial and important cause of his own injury and it
cannot be said that the defendants negligence is not fully within the risk created by
the plaintiff.
(2) The latter negligence of the defendant involves a higher degree of fault. The idea is
that the defendants negligence is worse than that of the plaintiffs negligence,
because he knew the risk and yet did nothing about it. This is true if defendant was
aware of the plaintiffs helpless situation, but not when he was unaware.
Doctrine of discovered peril: the situation wherein defendant is aware of the plaintiffs helpless
condition, wherein defendants fault is considered as wilful or wanton misconduct.

REAL EXPLANATION: The fundamental dislike for the harshness of the contributory negligence
defense, where in contributory negligence of the plaintiff bars him from recovery. The rule allows
the plaintiff to recover despite his negligence.

Statement of the Rule
J urisprudence states the doctrine of LCC in two ways:
Effect on Plaintiffs Right to Recover
In PNR v. Brunty, the Court defined LCC as follows: the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, the Court held that LCC would that it would bar a
defense against liability sought by another.
In Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, the Court would place as a condition that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequence.
As a manner of establishing liability of defendant
In Picart v. Smith, the Court held that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
In Engada v. CA, the Court held that a person who has the LCC or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

In Lapanday v. Angala, the Court held that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof.

Application in this Jurisdiction
When was the doctrine of last clear chance first imported into Philippine Jurisprudence?
The doctrine of last fair chance was first imported into Philippine J urisprudence in the case of
Picart v. Smith, where the court used it as a means to determine which negligent act was the
proximate cause of the injury, despite the acts not being contemporaneous, because the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff but an appreciable
interval.

Why should the doctrine of LCC not appl y in this jurisdiction?
In Phoenix v. IAC, the Court questioned the applicability of the doctrine in this jurisdiction, saying
that it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way in to the CC of the
PH. It held that it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law LCC doctrine has to play in
a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, because of 2179. The Court said that if the
reason for the rule did not exist in this jurisdiction, there is no reason to apply the rule here.

Further, the Court held that the task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or
physics. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiffs and the defendants
negligent acts or omission is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and
the character and gravity pf the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community.

CASISPRUDENCE: It is perhaps in cases where the gravity of the negligent acts are relatively
equal where the doctrine of LCC may apply.

What was so peculiar about Glan v. IAC?
In this case, the Court held that the doctrine of last clear chance provides as valid and complete
a defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart
v. Smith. In this case, the Courts misgivings in Phoenix over the applicability of the doctrine in
this jurisdiction have not stopped the Court from applying the doctrine in subsequent cases.
While it may be accurate to say the original reason for the doctrine does not exist in this
jurisdiction, it may be employed as a test to determine the defendants liability to a negligent
plaintiff. In essence, it is a test to determine whether it is the negligence of the defendant that is
the proximate cause. The test would be if both plaintiff and defendant were negligent, the actor
who had the last fair chance of avoiding the harm would be deemed to have been responsible
for the proximate cause of the injury.

Has the Court used the LCC doctrine as a means to determine whether the negligent act
of the plaintiff or that of the defendant was the PC of the injury?
YES. In Canlas v. CA, the Court applied the doctrine of last clear chance, saying it cannot be
denied that the bank in the case had the LCC to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of
faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons
transacting with them.

In Lapanday v. Angala (pick-up vs crewcab), the Court used the doctrine when it found both
parties negligent. The Court held that the vehicle in the rear (crewcab) had full control of the
situation because he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him, the Court held the
driver of the crew cab negligent.

Aaron Valdez
In which cases does the doctrine not appl y?
The doctrine does not apply:
(1) Once the proximate cause of the injury has been established;
(2) Culpa contractual
(3) Defense of a common carrier against an injured passenger
(4) Where defendant had no opportunity to avoid injury/EMERGENCY RILE

Once the proximate cause has been established
In PNR v. Brunty, the Court held that the LCC doctrine does not apply once the PC of the injury
has been established.
EXCEPTION:
In Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA (Rommels Marketing), the Court still ruled on the issue
involving LCC even after the PC has been established. In this case, the Court ruled that the
negligence of the bank teller and the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of
its bank teller were the proximate cause of the loss suffered by RMC. The Court employed the
but for test to ascertain the proximate cause of the injury. Despite the determination of the PC,
the Court still applied the doctrine of LCC. It held that under the doctrine of LCC or the
supervening negligence/discovered peril, the bank was the culpable party. The doctrine in
essence states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It
held that the bank, through its teller had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client.

In this case, however, the Court in the end mitigated the damages awarded as if applying 2179
(contributory negligence).

In cases of culpa contractual
In Consolidated Bank v. CA, the Court held Solidbank liable for breach of contract due to
negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. In cases of culpa
contractual, neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid
the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear
chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does
not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.

Defense of a common carrier against an injured passenger
In Bustamante v. CA, the Court cited Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc v. IAC, where the Court
cited Anuran et al v. Buno, where it was ruled that the doctrine of LCC applies in a suit between
the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles but not where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations because it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the common carrier on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty
of negligence. Citing AmJ ur, the Court said that as between defendant, the doctrine cannot be
extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held
liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latters peril, and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.

Emergency Rule
In Pantranco v. Baesa, the Court held that for the doctrine of LCC to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that (1) the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of the peril; (2) or should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it. A motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is
generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side,
will return to his proper lane of traffic. The Court held that the doctrine can never apply where the
party charged in required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
In Engada v. CA, the Court found no convincing evidence to support the invocation of the
doctrine because it found the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the
emergency rule.

Can the doctrine be invoked in a criminal case?
YES. In Engada v. CA, the Court found no problem applying the doctrine of LCC to a criminal
case. This clashes with the doctrine in Genobiagon, where the Court ruled that contributory
negligence cannot be used as a defense in a criminal case.

Aaron Valdez

DEFENSES AGAINST THE CHARGE of NEGLIGENCE
2179 When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. Defendant can raise defense that plaintiff was negligent and that
plaintiffs negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.
It would seem based on this article that a plaintiff whose negligence is determined by the Court
to be the PC of the injury cannot recover even if defendants negligence is also or forms part of
the PC. In Bernardo v. Legaspi, the Court ruled that if the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his
own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the
determining causes thereof, he cannot recover.

Can an injured party recover from another negligent party if the accident was also due to
the lack of diligence from the injured party?
NO. In PLDT v. CA, the Court held that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but went to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precluded their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by the
spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo there was some alleged negligence on the
part of PLDT.

In this case, the Court also held that the presence of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident because the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of the excavations on the site. The spouses already knew of the presence of said
excavations, and it was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of
the spouses to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep. The
omission to perform a duty, such as placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the PC only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury.

Does a failure to compl y with a permit for the construction of a media agua qualify as a
concurrent cause or contributory negligence?
Such failure to compl y with a permit qualifies as contributory negligence onl y. In view of
the antecedents of Manila Electric v. Remoquillo, the Court held that the violation of the permit
for construction of the media agua was not the direct cause, but merely contributed to it. It held
the real cause of the accident/death was the reckless/negligent act of Magno himself. The Court
took into consideration his age, experience, and qualification to undertake such repairs. The
Court dismissed the complaint against Manila Electric. Such failure to comply with the permit,
according to Rakes v. Atlantic (CN v CC) qualifies as contributory negligence, a negligence
which adds to the occurrence of injury.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE of the PLAINTIFF
2179 provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff was only contributory and the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury was defendants lack of due care, plaintiff may recover damages.
The court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

2214: In QDs, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages he may
recover. The defendant may raise the defense that the plaintiff himself had contributory
negligence. This is not a complete defense because even with contributory negligence, the
plaintiff may still recover although not the amount he would have been entitled to had he not
been negligent.
NOTE: PC of the injury to plaintiff must be the negligence of the defendant. If PC of the injury
was the negligence of a 3
rd
party, plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant regardless of the
contributory negligence of the defendant.

Definition of Contributory negligence
What is contributory negligence?
In Rakes v. Atlantic, the Court defined contributory negligence as negligence that merely
contributes to plaintiffs injury but not to the principal occurrence.
What was the US law at the time of Rakes decision?
In M.H. Rakes v. The Atlantic, the Court held that a few American States have adopted the
doctrine of comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed
to his injury, provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant, while
some others have accepted the theory of proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff
in proportion to his responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication
establishes the principle in Am J ur that any negligence, however slight, on the part of the person
injured which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery.

The Court cited Grant Trunk Railway Co v. Ives, where it held that an action for such injury
cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the
want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured. This was in lieu of the strict US common
law rule, which appears to have grown out the original method of trial by jury, a method which
rendered difficult a nice balancing of responsibilities and which demanded an inflexible standard
as a safeguard against too ready sympathy for the injured. It precludes recovery of the plaintiff
who contributed to the negligence.

The Court held that distinction must be between the accident and the injury. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Court awarded damages less 50% of the original amount, which is odd, as it implies that both
parties were equally at fault.

Can the heirs of an employee who was not at his assigned station when the train derailed
and caused his death, recover?
YES. In the case of Ma-ao Sugar v. CA (caboose), the Court held that the employee was not
guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact he was not at his assigned station when the
train was derailed. It might have been a violation of company rules but it could not have directly
contributed to his injury. It said it was pure speculation to suppose he would not have been
injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed
because he chose to ride in the caboose.

Can the failure to carry safety gadgets and have a bike registered in violation of a 1948
municipal ordinance and the failure to have foot brakes on the bike by a biker amount to
contributory negligence in case of a collision?
NO. In the case of Anonuevo v. CA, the Court held that such acts did not amount to con tributary
negligence. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, though not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. IN a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

Does carrying a bamboo pole regularl y on a path where an electric wire fatall y dangled
constitute contributory negligence?
NO. In NPC v. Heirs of Casionan, the Court held that the sagging high tension wires were an
accident waiting to happen and that NPC could not excuse itself from its failure to properly
maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. It found no contributory negligence on
Casionans part.

The Court in this case defined contributory negligence as conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard

Aaron Valdez
which he is required to conform for his own protection. This is the worst definition of contributory
negligence as it sets a standard so high (contributes to the legal cause).
It also said that is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury. It explained that one way of determining the existence of CN is whether the partys act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger.

DISTINGUISHING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE from PROXIMATE CAUSE
In a slew of cases, the court has held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. The problem with this rule is that it can also be
used to describe the proximate cause of the injury. What is being described is negligence in
general and not contributory negligence in particular.

In several cases, the Court has employed a definition of contributory negligence which does not
distinguish it from PC:

In Sealoader Shipping v. Grand Cement, NPC v. Heirs of Casionan, PNR v. Brunty, the Court
defined CN as conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. This definition is problematic because legal cause can be the equivalent of proximate
cause. This definition would make contributory negligence indistinguishable from PC.

In NPC v. Heirs of Casionan and Ma-ao Sugar Centralv. CA, the Court held that CN is an act or
omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. This definition makes
contributory negligence part of the proximate cause. If the contributory negligence is a
concurrent cause then it is a proximate cause.

In PNR v. Brunty and Anonuevo v. CA, the Court held that to prove contributory negligence, it is
still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence. The second
sentence is confusing as it used the word proximate.

The guiding principle is still the Rakes distinction, which holds that negligence is only
contributory and not the PC if it contributes to the victims injuries and not to the principal
occurrence of the cause of his injuries.

Effect of Contributory Negligence
In Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, the Court held that the underlying precept on CN is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence, and that the defendant must thus be
held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

In Phoenix v. IAC, the Court noted that under common law, CN prevented any recovery at all by
a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiffs negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant.

What is the effect of CN to the award of damages?
In Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, the Court held that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences
of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence. The determination of mitigation of defendants liability varies
depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case, it was established that the
motorcycle driver (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the
Tamaraw; (3) drank beers; (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.

The Court reduced the damages by 50%, which may imply that the Castillons negligence was
equal to that of Lamberts.

Is the dri ver of a car that collided with a train guilty of contributory negligence?
YES. The factual antecedents parallel that of PNR v. Brunty.
The Court defined CN as conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.

How does one prove CN as stated in Brunty?
The Court held that to prove CN, it is still necessary to establish a CAUSAL LINK, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. This statement
implies there are at least two degrees of causality: one proximate and the other not proximate.
One way to interpret it is that the court was perhaps referring to remote cause. A remote cause
would have been the proximate cause had it not been for an efficient intervening cause. One
way of interpreting the Courts statement would be that for negligence to be contributory, the
negligence would have to be at least a remote cause.

It further held that in a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence. This refers to the CN
being proximate to the INJ URY, which is still consistent with the Rakes distinction because it
does not say proximate to the occurrence.

What was peculiar about PNR v. Brunty?
In the Case, though the Court ruled there was CN, the court could not mitigate liability because
the effect would have been to limit the recovery of the driver. Because the driver did not receive
damages (not a party to the suit), there is nothing to mitigate. Neither can the award to Brunty be
mitigated because there was no relationship between them that would impute the drivers
negligence to Brunty.

Is the defense of contributory negligence available in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence?
NO. In Gennobiagon v. CA (woman bumped the car lol), the Court held that the defense of CN is
not available in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence since once cannot allege
negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

FORTUITOUS EVENT
1174: Something which could not be foreseen or could be foreseen but is inevitable. Sometimes
equated with an act of God which the Court has defined in Nakpil & Sons v. CA as an accident
due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount
of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented.

Is it enough that FE should not have been foreseen or anticipated?
NO. In Sicam v. Jorge, the Court held that fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated but it must be impossible to foresee or avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

Is a robbery a fortuitous event?
YES, but onl y based upon the finding of negligence on the part of defendant, which made
the FE defense unavailable to him. According to Sicam v. Jorge, the Court held that the fact

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Sicam undertook measures against robbery meant robbery was foreseeable, foreseen, and
anticipated, and hence not an FE. This reasoning is wrong for three reasons:
(1) Definition of FE in 1174 is not limited to unforeseeable events but foreseeable and
inevitable or unavoidable events
(2) The act of taking measures against an event should not bar one from arguing the
event was fortuitous, otherwise FE such as a storm would cease to be fortuitous by
the mere fact one was diligent enough to guard it
(3) Under said reasoning, a diligent person who undertakes measures to guard against
effect of an FE is barred from using it as a defense while a negligent person who does
not undertake measures can claim the event is an FE
The Court however held that robbery per se is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the
possibility of negligence on the part of the petitioners. The Court quoted Co v. CA, where it held
that the fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from anothers rightful possession,
as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to an FE. To be considered as such,
carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of anothers property. It must be proved
and established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that
neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any participation.

It seems the Court confused the existence of an FE with the availability of the FE defense.

In this case, the Court found negligence on the part of Sicam, which made the FE defense
unavailable to him.

Defense and Exceptions
1174: General rule is no one is responsible for fortuitous events.
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) In cases expressly stated by law;
(2) When it is otherwise declared by stipulation;
(3) When the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk

Elements of Defense of FE
(1) Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human
will
(2) Impossible to foresee the event which constitutes caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) Occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for debtor to fulfil his obligation in
a normal manner
(4) Obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.
In Sicam v. Jorge, Nakpil & Sons v. CA, and Southeastern College v. CA, the Court held that in
order for an FE to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.

Does it matter whether the fortuitous event is the proximate cause and the persons
negligence is onl y contributory?
NO. In Sicam v. Jorge, the Court held that when a persons negligence concurs with an act of
God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was an FE.

Three Step Analysis
(1) Determine FE. Was there an extraordinary event, which could not be foreseen by the
parties or though foreseen, was inevitable?
(2) Determine if circumstance falls within any of 3 exceptions under 1174
(3) Establish if all essential requisites of an FE are present

Is a tire blow-out a case of FE?
YES. In Juntilla v. Fontanar, the Court held cited Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co,
which stated that a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old
and should not have been used at all. It also cited La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co v. De
Jesus, saying that there must be findings of any specific acts of negligence on the part of
defendants i the Court were to consider a tire blow-out as an FE. In this case, the Court found
specific acts of negligence on the part of Fontanar, as they were running at a very fast speed
and that the jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. No evidence was presented to
show the accident was due to adverse road conditions so that precautions were taken by the
jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.

Is a common carrier liable for an injury caused by a mechanical defect if the flaws were
discoverable?
YES. In Juntilla v. Fontanar, the Court cited Necesito v. Paras, saying that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance
purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been
discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances
was incumbent upon it.

Can the plaintiff avail of the fortuitous event defense if negligence were to be found on
the part of the plaintiff?
NO. In Southeastern College v. CA, the Court held that it is necessary that the plaintiff be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been
occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty
of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When the effect
is found to be partly the result of the participation of man, the whole occurrence is hereby
humanized.
CASISPRUDENCE: Negligence does not have to be previous or prior; it may be simultaneous
with or succeeding to the fortuitous event. Negligence need not be gross to bar the application of
the doctrine.
What was peculiar in this case was that considering it was SEC who was raising the defense of
FE, it had the duty to prove the defense was available, including the fact there was no
negligence on its part.

PLAINTIFFs ASSUMPTION of RISK
1174: A situation of assumption of risk is one of the three exceptions to the application of the
defense of FE. One who has assumed the risk of such an event cannot raise the defense of FE.

PhilJ ur appears to have adopted the common law concept of assumption of risk or volenti non fit
injuria.

Can the heirs of a caretaker of an animal who died while he was tending to such animals
recover damages?
NO. In Afialda v. Hisole, the Court ruled that being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.

Does the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria apply when the life or property of another is in
peril?
NO. In the case of Ilocos Norte v. CA, the Court held that the VNFI does not apply when:
(1) An emergency exists;
(2) Life or property of another is in peril
(3) A person seeks to rescue his endangered property.
The Court found that in this case, an emergency was at hand as the deceaseds property, a
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.

Does the act of taking an extension seat in the back of a jeepney amount to an
assumption of risk?

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The Court did not say. In Calalas v. CA, the Court held that taking an extension seat was not
an implied assumption of risk, saying it is akin to arguing that injuries to many victims of
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. The Court did not explain why
boarding such overloaded ferry was not an assumption of risk.
Does the doctrine avail when the cause of action is based on 19 and 21?
NO. In Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, the Court held that VNFI refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger. Even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under 19 and 21, were still under obligation to treat him
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. It seems the Court
established a counter-defense against the defense of assumption of risk, and that is when the
cause of action is based on 19 and 21.

Does the doctrine of VNFI avail when a purchaser using his card incurred anxi ety and
humiliation because the credit card company processed his purchase requests to the
detriment of his tour group?
YES. In Pantaleon v. Amex, the Court found that the doctrine was applicable in the case,
because the most basic rule when travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of
any delay because the schedule is very strict. Pantaleon was not a helpless victim in the
scenario as he could have unilaterally and at any time cancelled the sale so that the group could
go on with the city tour.

PRESCRIPTION
1146: Actions based on QDs must be instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins
from the day the QD is committed (Kramer v. CA).
In Paulan v. Sarabia, the Court ruled that an action for damages arising from the collision of two
trucks, the action being based on a QD, the four-year prescriptive period must be counted from
the day of the collision.
In Espanol v. Chairman, Phil. Veterans Administration, the Court held that the right of action
accrues when there exists a cause of action which consists of 3 elements, namely:
(a) A right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created
(b) An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right
(c) An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of
action has arisen.

PRESUMPTIONS of NEGLIGENCE
ROC Rule 131 Section 1: Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts
in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

IN MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS
Previous Violations
2184: A driver in an MV mishap is disputably presumed negligent if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.

Does the reason for the presumption still exist if the owner of the MV was not in the
vehicle at the time of the mishap?
YES. The first and last sentence of the article implies it cover situations when the owner of the
MV was in the vehicle at the time of the mishap. It could also be argued the reason for the
presumption is the PATTERN of the negligence of the driver.

Simultaneous Violations
2185 presumes that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The presumption arises of there is no proof to the
contrary.

Does a failure to observe a restriction indicated in a dri vers license point to negligence?
NO, it onl y provides an assumption. In Tison v. Sps. Pomasin, the Court, despite observing
that there was a restriction imposed on the drivers license, cited Sanitary Steam v. CA and held
that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic
regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that is substantially contributed thereto. It does not provide that such
negligence in violating a traffic regulation provides the proximate cause of the injury. The
pronouncements in Tison mean that despite the presumption of negligence arising from the
traffic regulation violation, the claimant must still prove that such negligence was the PC in order
to successfully claim for damages.

Must the claimant show that the violation of traffic and rules and regulations at the time
of the mishap contributed to the negligence or the proximate cause of the injury?
YES. In Sanitary Steam v. CA, the Court held the claimant has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. He must show the violation of that state was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or
that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
The Court pointed out that proving the violation of the traffic code was not enough. Such
violation must be the PC of the injury. It did not say the violation must be the proximate cause
before the presumption could arise.

Should 2185 appl y by analogy to non-motorized vehicles?
NO. In Anonuevo v. CA, Anonuevo hypothesised that 2185 should apply by analogy to all types
of vehicles, because modern-day travel is more complex than when the Code was enacted. He
suggested that at the time of the enactment of the Code, legislators must have seen only MVs
were of public concern that they have to be specifically mentioned, yet interaction of vehicles of
all types of nature has inescapably become a matter of public concern in this day and age. The
Court ruled that what Anonuevo sought for was to amend the explicit command of the legislature
as embodied in 2185. It held that at the time 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of
non-motorized vehicles and that a more pertinent basis of, which was the basis of the command
of the law, was the difference in the type of these vehicles, because a motorized vehicle
operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle. An MV is capable of
greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. 2185 was not formulated to
compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. The standards applicable to
motor vehicles are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

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POSSESSION of DANGEROUS WEAPONS and SUBSTANCES
2188 The defendant is presumed negligent if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons and substances, such as firearms and poison. Presumption does not arise
when possession or use of the dangerous weapon or substance is indispensable to his
occupation or business. It penalizes those who possess such dangerous items for reasons not
related to business or occupation.

COMMON CARRIERS
1735: A common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the
goods it is transporting are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence as required by 1733.

1734: The presumption does not arise if the loss, destruction, or deterioration o the goods was
due to the following causes:
(1) Floods, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing of containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority

1752: A presumption of negligence on the part of the common carrier arises even if there is an
agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR
What does res ipsa loquitur mean?
In PSI v. Agana, the Court held that the maxim translates to the thing or transaction speaks for
itself.
In a succeeding PSI case, the Court held that it means that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. The rule was used first in Africa v. Caltex.

Statement of the Rule
In a slew of cases, the Court stated the rule in as Where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant (or his servants), and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management (or control) used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care.

In PSI v. Agana, the Court stated the rule as such: Where the thing which caused the injury,
without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is
such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendants
want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish he has observed due care and
diligence.

Elements
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur unless someone is negligent
(PSI)
(2) The accident is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the person
sought to be made liable (PSI)
(3) Possibility of contributing conduct, which would make plaintiff responsible, is
eliminated (CAP v. Belfrant)
(4) Absence of explanation by defendant (PSI)

Nature of the Accident
What is the basis of res ipsa loquitur?
In Ramos v. CA, the Court held that the basis of RIL is that the very nature of certain types of
occurrences justifies an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury if there is no explanation from the person charged with
negligence. In CAP v. Belfrantl, the Court held that if the injury was caused by fire, it must not be
a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission.

Control Over the Cause
The injury must be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was
responsible. In Ramos v. CA, the Court held that of the three requisites, control over the
instrumentality that caused the injury is said to be the fundamental element and that such
element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In most cases, the
instrumentality causing the injury must be under the exclusive control of the person sought
liable.

EXCEPTION: In PSI v. Agana, the Court held that control and management is sufficient.

What are the requisites for the application of RIL?
In PSI v. Agana (2007), the Court held that they are as follows:
(1) Occurrence of an injury
(2) Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant
(3) Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care
(4) Absence of explanation by defendant
The respondents wanted to implicate Dr. Fuentes, the doctor responsible for the hysterectomy.
The Court found he was not to be responsible for damages because under the Captain of the
Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation. The control and management of the thing which caused
the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

No Contribution to the Injury from the Injured
It is not necessary that the plaintiff be completely inactive, but merely that there be evidence
removing the inference of the plaintiffs own responsibility. This element makes a medical
negligence case a prime candidate for the application of the rule because ordinarily, a patient is
rendered incapable of acting while under the care of a doctor.

Effect of Direct Evidence
When can RIL be invoked?
In Layugan v. IAC, the Court held that RIL can only be invoked when under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence of negligence or direct cause of the injury is absent and not readily
available. It applies to cases where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as
to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident. Once the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of
defendants liability can be reasonably made.

What is unusual about Layugan?
In Layugan, it was defendant who raised RIL as a defense, despite him having exclusive control
of the thing which caused the injury. Ordinarily, it is the plaintiff who invokes the doctrine to make
defendant liable because he does not have direct evidence of negligence on the part of
defendant.

Can RIL be used despite the presence of other evidence?
YES. In Ramos v. CA, the Court held that the rule allows the plaintiff to present enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, along with other proof of the accident. Prosser
and Keeton provide that the introduction of some evidence which tends to show specific acts of

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negligence on the part of the defendant but which does not purport to furnish a full and complete
explanation of the occurrence does not destroy the inferences which are consistent with the
evidence, and so does not deprive plaintiff of the benefit of RIL.

In Tan v. Jam Transit, the Court ruled that RIL applied in the case despite some pieces of
evidence available to plaintiff. It held that there was no direct evidence presented on the cause
of the accident, though the evidence presented can establish how the incident happened. The
evidence was also used to determine that the requisites of RIL were present.

In CAP v. Belfrantl, the Court also used the rule despite the presence of documents emanating
from the Bureau of Fire Protection that were presented as evidence as to the cause of fire,
holding that the fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence
but the outcome of a human act or omission.

Nature of the Rule
A procedural rule (Ramos v. CA), a rule of evidence not a rule of substantive law (Layugan), and
does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability (Ramos). It is merely
a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience (Ramos). It is a rule peculiar to the law of
negligence that recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence and relieves a plaintiff of the burden of
producing specific proof of negligence (Ramos).

Effect of the Rule
It does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party
charged (Layugan). It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of duty of due care. It does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence but is simply a step in the process of such proof.

The rule furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to
defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the
defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains (DM Consunji v. CA). The
effect of RIL is to create presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant.

The Court however applied RIL to a case to allow the testimony of a non-expert (Ramos).

Justification for the Rule
(1) Doctrine of common knowledge or the nature of occurrences.
(2) The person in charge of instrumentality ordinarily knows the cause of the injury.
Can RIL be used when necessary evidence is absent or not available to the claimant?
YES. In DM. Consunji v. CA, the Court held that one of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is
its necessity, i.e., the necessary evidence is not available. It used RIL to admit testimony of a
police officer as to the cause of the platform, which petitioners brushed off as mere opinion. RIL
furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to
defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the
defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.

Res Ipsa Loquitur vs Expert Testimony in Medical negligence Cases
In medical negligence cases, the Court has ruled that expert testimony is essential to establish
not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physicians conduct in the
treatment and care falls below such standard (Cruz v. CA). Because the causes of the injuries
involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has
been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.

Why is medical negligence proved better by providing expert testimony than relying on
res ipsa loquitur?
In Cruz v. CA, the Court held that for whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of
expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from
its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating. The Court held even if the inadequacy of the facilities and
untidiness of the clinic and other circumstances identified by the lower courts do indicate that
Cruz was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, there was no cogent
proof that any of these circumstances caused Umalis death. Cruz was acquitted based on the
absence of expert testimony regarding:
(1) The standard of care required
(2) The doctor did not apply the standard of care
(3) The cause of the injury.

In Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, the Court held that medical malpractice is a particular from of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally,
under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue a
claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action
caused injury to the patient. The determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach
thereof renders expert testimony essential. In this case, the Court dismissed the complaint
against Dr. Cayao-Lasam (D&C) because the patient herself omitted the diligence required by
the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. She failed to return for a follow-up
evaluation which brought about her own injury. Her omission was the proximate cause of her
own injury and not merely contributory negligence on her part.

Why is expert testimony required in medical cases?
In Lucas v. Tuano, the Court held that expert testimony is required in medical cases in order to:
(1) Establish the standard of care
(2) Prove the breach of duty
(3) Prove proximate causation.
The Court held that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same general neighbourhood and in the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon. The Court absolved Dr. Tuano because Lucas failed to
establish a standard of care and a breach of duty to exercise such standard of care. The critical
and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the
negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiffs injuries.

EXCEPTION: Ramos v. CA, where the Court held that when the doctrine of RIL is availed by
the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence.

When do medical malpractice cases find application for res ipsa loquitur?
In Ramos v. CA, the Court held that RIL has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as to
the cause of that harm. The application of RIL in medical negligence cases presents a question
of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as
a matter of law, permit a given inference.

What is the effect of appl ying RIL in medical negligence cases?
In the same case, the Court held that when RIL is availed of by plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of exert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of
physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable
by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. In cases where RIL is applicable, the Court is

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permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid
of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care.

When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care.

Does RIL appl y in all medical negligence cases?
NO. In Ramos v. CA, the Court held that it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence but is a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say,
as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction
must be made between the failure to secure results and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found.

It does not have application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of
a diagnosis or of a specific treatment. If the only showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished, RIL is not applicable. The real question is whether
or not in the process of the operation of any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of
the routine performance occurred, which, if unexplained, itself would reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.

It applies in cases such as:
(1) Leaving a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation
(2) Injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of
treatment
(3) Removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended
(4) Knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anaesthetic for the removal of his
tonsils
(5) Loss of an eye while patient was under influence of anaesthetic during or following an
operation for appendicitis
In the case, Erlinda suffered brain damage after going through cholecystectomy, an operation
performed on her gall bladder. In this case, the Court applied RIL in evaluating the competence
of the nurse to testify on what happened during the intubation process. The Court held that the
nurse, although not an anaesthesiologist, can testify upon matters which she is capable of
observing such as statements of acts of the physician and the surgeon, external appearances,
and manifest conditions which are observable by any one.

What was peculiar about Ramos?
In this case, the Court did not admit testimony of another doctor. It rejected another doctor
because she was not an authority in the field of anaesthesiology simply because she was not an
anaesthesiologist. This treatment of the doctor illustrates it is possible to require expert
testimony in a case covered by RIL.

NEGLIGENCE
1173: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of time, and of the place; absence of the diligence required

To determine whether or not a person has been negligent requires determination of:
(1) The diligence required of the actor under the circumstances
(2) Whether the actor has performed the diligence required

How is diligence defined in jurisprudence?
In BPI v. Suarez, the Court held that negligence is the omission to something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
This definition is derived from common law sources.

In Sealoader v. Grand Cement, the Court defined negligence as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. This definition came
from J udge Cooley.

In US v. Barias, the Court defined negligence as the want of care required by the circumstances.

In Corinthian Gardens v. Sps. Tanjanco, the Cout held that a negligent act is an inadvertent act
which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.

Determining the Diligence required

1173: What determines the diligence required are the following:
(1) Nature of the obligation
(2) Circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place
Circumstances would count age, expertise, and physical abilities and disabilities. Location and
time of incident are also factors to be considered.

What is the default diligence required?
The diligence required is that expected of a good father of a family, according to 1173.

In Sicam v. Jorge, the Court held that the diligence with which the law requires the individual at
all times to govern his conduct varies with (1) the nature of the situation in which he is placed
and (2) the importance of the act which he is to perform.

In Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, the Court held that the greater the danger, the greater the degree
of care required. Extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. The more imminent the danger,
the higher the degree of care demanded.

Does failure to put up safety features in a railway constitute negligence?
YES. In PNR v. Brunty, the Court held that negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
It is want of the care required of the circumstances.

This case provided a test of negligence: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? In this case, the Court found PNRs safety measures inadequate due to:
(a) Absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars;
(b) Inadequacy of the installed warning signs
(c) Lack of proper lighting within the area

Aaron Valdez
The Court held that the due diligence required of railroad companies, which requires duties in
the operation of trains and the maintenance of the crossings. Every corporation constructing or
operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public
road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, a sign with large and distinct
letter placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway.

Does running at a fast speed at an intersection, the absence of a flagman, and the
absence of reliable signalling device render a railroad company negligent in case of a
collision?
YES. In PNR v. CA, the Court held that negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. There is no hard and
fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the
circumstances.

The Court found that no flagman or guard to man the intersection was posted on the day of the
incident. The signage was neglected. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use
reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence.

The Court also held that the failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or
switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public,
even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device
or equipment be installed.

With regard to PNRs right-of-way in a railroad, the Court held that the obligation to bring to a full
stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any through streetonly accrues from
the time the said through streetor crossing is so designated and sign-posted. Every person or
motorist crossing a railroad track should use ordinary prudence and alertness to determine the
proximity of a train before attempting to cross. In effect, a higher degree of diligence is required
of motorists when they cross railroad tracks properly sign posted.

DEGREES of NEGLGIENCE
Degree of Negligence Definition
Slight Failure to use great care or the absence of
that degree of care or vigilance which persons
of extraordinary prudence and foresight are
accustomed to use
Ordinary Failure to use ordinary care
Gross Failure to even use slight care; very great
negligence, or want of even slight or scant
care; failure to exercise even that care which a
careless person would use

Such utter want of care as to raise a
presumption that the persons at fault must
have been conscious of the probable
consequences of their carelessness, and they
must have nevertheless been indifferent to the
danger of injury to the person or property of
others. Negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard for the safety of persons or property
(QC v. Dacara)

Negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with
a conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be affected
(Benguet Electric v. CA)
What is a test to determine whether an act committed was dangerous per se?
J urisprudence provides that in establishing whether an act was committed with gross negligence
is by determining whether the act was dangerous per se.

In Amedo v. Rio, the Court held that diving into the waters to retrieve a P2 bill was dangerous. In
this case, the wife of the deceased wished to recover from a company for her husbands death
under the WCA. The WCA provided that compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused
by notorious negligence. The Court explained the phrase notorious negligencehas been held
to be tantamount to gross negligence, which is defined as the want of even slight care and
diligence. GN is meant as such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in
fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness.

The Court had occasion to distinguish it from the case of Cuevo v. Barredo, where the Court
held that the act of an employee, who appeared to be a good swimmer, in saving or protecting a
property of the employer in obedience to his foreman, was an act from which the heirs of the
deceased could recover from. These acts being dangerous per se and the employee being
legally justified or supposed to perform either of them in the course of his employment, was
recoverable from, his act being obviously innocent. J umping into the sea is entirely different, the
danger which it entails being clear, potent, and obvious.

In Marinduque Iron Mines v. Mamador, the Court held that mere riding on a haulage truck or
stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per
se. Despite the violation of the employers prohibition against labourers riding the haulage truck,
the violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se but may
be an evidence of negligence. Even granting there was negligence, it surely was not notorious
negligence, which means the same thing as gross negligence, implying conscious indifference to
consequences, pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury,
in utter disregard of consequences.

In Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo, the Court held that gross negligence implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want
of even slight care. The Court held that failing to show up to perform a personal service without
considering the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii is negligence, but does not
amount to gross negligence. The Court took account into (1) the nature of the operation and (2)
the personal circumstances of the doctor. The Court also found other examples of situations
where the Court has found GN:
(1) Failure by the city government to provide a warning device at an excavations site
(2) Driving at full speed on a rainy day on a slippery road
(3) J ump-starting a bus in a busy section of the city, where the bus had to take a left turn
(4) Surreptitiously digging under a chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof
endangering the lives of people in worship.

STANDARD of CONDUCT

Importance of a Standard of Conduct
Necessary because the whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of
behavior
1173: standard of conduct corresponds to the level of diligence required under the
circumstances. Without a standard, it cannot be determined whether or not a person has been
negligent

Aaron Valdez
Fictitious person
Common Laws Reasonable Person
Civil Codes Good Father of a Famil y

Common Laws Reasonable Person
To provide a standard of conduct, common law created a fictitious person, sometimes called the
reasonable man of ordinary prudenceor a reasonable person, or a person of ordinary
prudence, or a person of reasonable prudence, or some other blend of reason and caution.
Whatever term used for this fictitious person, the actor is required to do what such person would
do under the circumstance.

It is supposed to be an objective standard.

Civil Laws Good Father of a Famil y
Phil Case Law equates reasonable person =Roman Laws discreet pater familias or bonus pater
familias
1173: Diligence of a good father of a family is the standard of conduct if the law or contract does
not provide otherwise. The Court has used this fictitious person to provide an objective standard
against which the actions of real persons are measured.

Does the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him determine the
existence of negligence?
YES. In Picart v. Smith, the Court held that the existence of negligence in a given case is
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him BUT
1173 provides that the diligence required corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. It
is reasonable to interpret that persons includes the alleged negligent actor. Therefore, under the
Civil Code, the personal circumstances of the actor must be taken into account. The court must
also consider the standard of a good father of a family with the same circumstances of the actor.
Picart was decided before the enactment of the current code and is thus, not controlling as to the
standard.

In Dy Teban v. Jose Ching, the Court held that the test of negligence is objective. We measure
the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same
situation. The standard does not require that the actor act according to the facts known to the
judge at the time of adjudication but according to what the actor knew at the time of the accident.
In Picart, the Court held that reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which
are before them or known to them. They can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger.

Does a decision to stay on the same course at the same speed, despite another motorist
having stopped on the wrong side of the road, be considered negligence?
YES. In Picart v. Smith, the Court held Picart was negligent because the control of the situation
had then passed entirely to the defendant and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop, or seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse.

The Court established a test to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, he is guilty of negligence. The Court made
reference to the ordinary prudent person of common law but added that the law here adopts the
standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. This
case is significant because the Court seemed to have equated the common law concept of
ordinary prudent person with the civil law concept of bonus paterfamilias.

The Court held that the standard of conduct must be external to the actor. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him and held that the law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man or ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The standard takes into account the information available to the actor. In so doing, the Court
appears to require that the actor be able to foresee the danger caused by his action in order to
be negligent. It said that reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Conduct is
said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

The Court established another test to determine negligence: Did the actor disregard the
foreseeable harm caused by his action?

What is peculiar about Picart?
In this case, the Court applied the common law concept of the ordinary prudent person, which
has its roots in common law; yet, the Court has applied the standard in cases after Picart, such
as Sicam v. Jorge and Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco.

In Sicam v. Jorge (pawnshop and robbers and stuff), the Court cited Cruz v. Gangan where it
was said that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

In Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco, the Court held that a negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstance, would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others ass to cause him not to do the act or to do it
in a more careful manner. In this case, the Court cited Fernando v. CA, which cited Picart v.
Smith to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case. It found CGAI negligent after
finding that CGAI was responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of
the construction of perimeter walls, and that the failure to prevent the encroachment of the
Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property, despite the inspection conducted, constitutes
negligence and contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

Based on Corinthian Gardens, it may be said that if one is given the authority to approve or
disapprove plans and designs, the requisite diligence is one which makes sure the said plans
are compliant with requirements.

Special Circumstances
Is there a greater degree of diligence on the part of dri vers of MVs in case of collisions
with bicycles?
YES. In Anonuevo v. CA, the Court held that because an automobile is capable of great speed,
greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, and beyond doubt is highly dangerous
when used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the
people who travel on such roads.

In Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, the Court held that a bicycle occupies a legal position that is at
least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway and the more will be required of a
motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical
advantages the automobile has over the bicycle. A motor vehicle poses a greater danger of
harm to a bicyclist than vice versa. While the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a
motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required
from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist. In this case however, the
Court seems to have based its ruling on the basis of preponderance of evidence, not on a higher
degree of diligence required of the driver as compared to the bicycle rider. There was testimony
in favour of the driver but the LC and the Courts in favour of the bike driver.

Aaron Valdez
Does possession or control of an instrumentality extremel y dangerous in character pose
a special circumstance in the degree of diligence required?
YES. In Pacis v. Morales, the Court held that a higher degree of care is required of someone
who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. A business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care. In this case however, the Court initially characterized the cause of action
as one based on 2180 in relation to 2176 or Morales vicarious liability as an employer, yet did
not discuss the negligence of Morales employee nor Morales negligence in the selection and
supervision of his employee. In this case the gun ship owner was held accountable for his own
negligence, not the negligence of his employee.

Children
Can children be found negligent and liable for quasi -delicts?
YES. Under 2180, parents or guardians may be held responsible for the negligent acts of their
children, thus the law recognizes that even children can be negligent.

When is a child considered negligent? What kind of diligence should be required of
them?

Absolute immunity
J. Cesar Sangco provides that there is an age at which no care can be required of a child, an
age at which the doctrine of contributory negligence has no application. The problem in this view
is determining the age when it applies. Should the age be the same for all children?

Age brackets
In Jarco Marketing v. CA, the Court held that in our jurisdiction...
Age <9 yrs, presumed to have acted without discernment, exempt from criminal liability
9 <age <15, same exemption, unless shown to have acted with discernment
Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict, and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child age <9y/o is by analogy and conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence, and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in a case of a child 9 <age <15 is a rebuttable one.

In Taylor v. Manila Electric, however, the Court held that the law fixed no arbitrary age at which a
minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts. It would be impracticable and impossible to do so. The age at
which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the
varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. The Court in this case
however did not discount the possibility of making use of age brackets.

Special characteristic of the child
In Railroad Company v. Stout, the Court held that the care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in such case by the
circumstances of the case. This effectively argues for a subjective standard, one that uses the
maturity and capacity of the allegedly negligent child to determine whether his actions were
negligent.

Measure acts of the child to average conduct of persons his age and experience
In Ylarde v. Aquino, the Court held that a minor should not be held to the same degree of care of
an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his
age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own
protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge, and experience under the same or similar circumstances. This is both an
objective and subjective standard; subjective because age is taken into consideration, objective
because he is compared to other children of similar age and experience. Similar to fictitious
person standard except the child is compared to a group while adult is measured against one
fictitious person.
Can a youth be said to have been free from fault when he wilfully and deliberately cut
open the detonating cap and placed a match to the contents, knowing that his action
would result in an explosion?
YES, if he acted with discernment. In Taylor v. Manila Electric, the Court used the age
brackets to method to ascertain the youths liability. It held that the care and caution required of
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by the circumstance of the case. The Court held David Taylor liable, taking note that he had
been to sea as a cabin boy and that he was able to earn P2.50/day as a mechanical draftsman
30 days after the injury was incurred. The Court held that he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act.

The Court added that the law fixed no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts.
Though it said that it was impossible and impracticable to do so because the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his
own acts and their consequences and that the age at which a minor to have such ability will
necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety acts which may be
done by him, the Court looked into the varying ages fixed by PH laws at which minors are
conclusively presumed to be capable to exercise certain rights and to incur certain
responsibilities.

Can a six year-old be capable of negligence?
NO. In Jarco Marketing v. CA, the Court held applied the age brackets method and applied the
conclusive presumption that favors children below 9 year-olds in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence (Sangco).

Can a 10 year-old be considered negligent and liable for his own death due to his own
reckless imprudence?
NO. In Ylarde v. Aquino, the Court held that Ylardes death was not caused by his own reckless
imprudence, because at that time, he was only 10 years old at the time of the incident, and is
expected to be playful and daring. He only did what any other 10-year old child would do in the
same situation. The Court added that the degree of care required to be exercised must vary
with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average
conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same
age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience under the same or similar circumstances.

Experts
In General
In Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, the Court held that those who undertake any work calling for
special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess
a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. Every man who offers his services to
another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses,
with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite,
if one offers his services he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions
are unfounded he commits a species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on his
public profession.

In Culion v. Philippine Motors, the Court held that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do. The acts or omissions of one representing himself as an expert will not be measured against

Aaron Valdez
an ordinary prudent person or a good father of a family but by a higher standard of diligence
expected of experts.

Would an engine backfire be chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of someone
who accepted such job despite such skill being outside his expertise?
YES. In Culion v. Philippine Motors, the Court held that the loss of the boat was chargeable to
the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be
followed by any disaster, but the repairs had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The Court
held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled
in the particular work he attempts to do. Quest did not use the skill that would have been
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.

Pharmacists
In US v. Pineda, the Court held that the profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill,
thus pharmacists are expected to be experts in dispensing the correct medicine. The
responsibility of the druggist to use care has been qualified care of a specially high degree, the
highest degree of care known to practical men. In Mercury v. De Leon, the Court held that
pharmacists were held to the highest degree of care and diligence.

Should the customer be held liable for injury caused by his failure to examine medication
dispensed to him?
NO. In US v. Barias, the Court held the rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and
sale of drugs. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser
anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound
which he can know nothing. It must be that the druggist warrants he will deliver the drug called
for. It is however unreasonable to apply this rule in situations where the packaging of the
medicine dispensed makes it clear the medicine given is not the one requested. Mistake is
negligence and care is no defense.

Is a druggist negligent if he dispenses a poisonous drug by mistake where a customer
calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy?
YES. In US v. Pineda, the Court held that instead of caveat emptor, caveat venditor applies, that
is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for
another, or even an innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain effect, in place of another
sent for and designed to produce a different effect. If he does, he cannot escape civil
responsibility, upon alleged pretexts that it was an accidental or innocent mistake.

The Court held that the responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as
ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical
men. The Court characterized such responsibility as the highest practicable degree of
prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business...the care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands.

The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the
vendee do not stand at an arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the
druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his
absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not
avail the purchaser anything.

Does the dispensation of ear drops in place of prescribed eye drops constitute
negligence on the part of the pharmacy?
YES. In Mercury v. De Leon, the Court held that Mercury Drug failed to exercise the highest
degree of diligence expected of them. The Court cited AmJur saying that this diligence demands
the highest degree of care known to practical men. A mistake in dispensing wrong drugs, under
the most favourable aspect of himself, is negligence, and such mistake cannot be countenanced
or tolerated, as it is a mistake of the gravest kind and of the most disastrous effect. One holding
himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by
those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care cannot be heard to say
his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively
is not gross negligence.

Medical Professionals
In Cruz v. CA, the Court ruled that doctors have a duty to use at least the same level of care that
any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.

In Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, the Court held that medical malpractice is a particular form of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally,
under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.

In Lucas v. Tuano, the Court held that a physician is under a duty to exercise that degree of
care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighbourhood and in the same
general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. The physician has the duty
to use at least the same level of care any other reasonably competent physician would use to
treat the condition under similar circumstances.

How does one successfull y pursue a medical negligence case?
In PSI v. Agana, the Court held that a patient must only prove that a health care provider/doctor
either (1) failed to do something which a reasonably HCP/doctor would have done or/he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and (2) such failure/action
caused injury to the patient.

In pursuing a case for reckless imprudence against a physician, how does one prove
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender?
In Cruz v. CA, the Court held that inexcusable lack of precaution is determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science.

The Court cited Rueda-Garcia v. Pascasio, holding that in accepting a case, a doctor represents
that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the
same field, and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of his patients.
He has the duty to use at least the same level of care any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. EXPERT TESTIMONY is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the physician and the physicians conduct
if the treatment and care falls below such standard.

Aaron Valdez
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

THE CONCEPT of a TORT

Tort in Common Law
Etymology
Tort: Latin tortus; twisted/crooked
Definition
Many definitions including (1) a violation of a duty imposed by law; (2) a wrong independent of
contract; (3) an act or omission giving rise to a civil remedy which is not an action of contract; (4)
a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages; (5) a breach of duty creating an obligation and giving rise to an
action for damages; (6) an injury inflicted otherwise than by a mere breach of contract; ones
disturbance of another in rights which the law has created

In common law it is often defined by what it is not. As Goldberg and Zipursky points out, to say
that torts are civil wrongs other than those arising from contract is to utter an unhelpful platitude.
It tells us nothing about why individuals in various instances called torts are entitled to damages.

Common Theme
There are many types of wrongs which fall within the rubric of torts, and this diversity makes it
extremely difficult to discover any general principle upon which they may all be based, unless it
is that injuries are to be compensated, and anti-social behavior is to be discouraged. Prosser
and Keeton say there is no such thing s a law of Tort, but only a law of particular unconnected
torts a set of pigeon-holes, each bearing a name, into which the act or omission of the
defendant must be fitted before the law will take cognizance of it and afford a remedy.

Seavey: However diverse may be the situations included within the field, there is a predominant
purpose which the law serves in actions of tort and that there are principles which run through
the entire subject, so that it is entitled to be regarded as a distinct branch of the law.

According to Seavey, HARM is the tort signature. The action is based upon the theory that one
person has caused harm to another. It differs from criminal law which directly vindicates the
interests of the state; from the law of contracts which gives sanction to promises; and from the
law of restitution, which seeks primarily to prevent unjust enrichment.

Tort Under Philippine Law
Existence of Philippine Tort Law

Is there tort under Philippine Law?
YES. Such inference may be assumed from
(1) Decisions of the Court using the term tort
(2) Its appearance in at least two (2) Philippine statutes
(3) Countless PH law books on T&D
(4) A course taught in PH law schools prior to the current Code

Jarencio: Presentation of the subject along the same lines as the American law on torts was
fundamentally erroneous in so far as the PH law on torts was concerned for the reason that the
basic legal provisions governing most legal wrongs which were known in American law on torts
on torts were found in 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. Teaching the law on torts along
the lines and patterns of American tort law created the belief and impression in the minds of
many students that the foundation of the law on torts in the PH was common and not civil law.
The effect of this error is the creation of a belief or impression that common law tort and PH tort
law of the same,

Relevant civil law on the matter consisted of 1902-1910 of the Civil Code; pertinent provisions
are now classified under the chapter in the Civil Code titled Quasi-Delicts.
Intent of the Framers
The intent of the Code Commission was to reject tort in favour of quasi-delictbecause the term
nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations, and is in harmony with the
nature of this kind of liability. It rejected culpa extra-contractual because it did not exclude quasi-
contractual or penal obligations. It also rejected Aquilian faultbecause it was thought
inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as Lex Aquilia.

The term tortwas rejected because the common law concept covered far more than what the
Commission envisioned. It seems that the original plan was to exclude intentional and malicious
acts from the coverage of the concept because these are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code.

Civil Code Text
Appears to reflect the intent of framers to reject tort; CC does not even mention tort

OCC does not make mention of the term. Garcia commented tortis not even found in Spanish
Law. Even ESP unis provide for no such subject as Torts. No proper translation of tort in
Spanish. Nearest translation is culpa extra contractual, which is its equivalent, not its
translation.

Tort actions under SP law were instituted under the guise of another name. Civil Code contains
various provisions relating to the law of torts. While 1902 says nothing about tort, in effect, it
gives the exact description of a tort.
1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
Such provision is identical to 2176. If Garcia is correct about 1902, it can be said first sentence
of 2176 provides the exact description of a tort. Thus it may be argued that even though the
OCC did not use the term tort, the provisions on culpa aquiliana comprise PH tort law. Assuming
this is correct, the same cannot be said of the current CC because of the Commissions express
rejection of the term.

HOWEVER, while it rejected tortin favour of quasi-delict, it did not completely reject the
concept of tort as evidenced by the CC provisions which seem to correspond to common law
torts.
(1) Aquino argues the CC as enacted deviated from the original plan
(2) CC as enacted and the Report of the Code Commission reveal and evident intent to
adopt the common law concept of tort and to incorporate the different, intentional, and
unintentional common law torts in the CC e.g. 19, 20, 21
(3) CC provides for ICA and violations of civil liberties, which correspond to common law
torts

Scope of PH Tort Law
Although tort is never used in the CC, tort as a concept is reflected in a number of CC
provisions, and are not limited to the chapter on QDs. The exact boundaries of PH Tort Law are
unclear.
Jarencio: There exists a twilight zone, where it is difficult to determine sometimes whether the
civil liability is based on a contract, on a tort, or on crime.
Nevertheless, it seems rules on QD would form part of PH Tort Law

Carpio: Quasi-delict is an area of tort law. While Carpio accepts tort and QD are two distinct
concepts coming from two different legal traditions, he considers QDs as forming one area of PH
tort law. Under this framework, a QD is a kind of tort, a subset, along with intentional torts and
strict liability torts.

Definition of Tort Under PH Law
Are there acceptable defi nitions of tort under PH Law?

Aaron Valdez
NO. Because there is no statutory definition for tort, one would have to look at jurisprudence for
a possible definition under PH law.

In Naguiat v. NLRC, the Court held that a tort consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law, or a breach of a legal duty. This is not valid because these
definitions are arguably obiter dicta. In this case, the Court looked for a jurisprudential definition
for corporate tort and found none.

In Liwayway VInzons-Chato v. Fortune, the Court stated that a tort is a wrong. It said that a
tortuous act is the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputations. This is not
completely accurate because there is a tort called abuse of right where the act is committed in
the exercise of a right or performance of a duty. In this case involving 32, the Court seems to say
that intent is not an element of tort. This is also not binding for being part of an obiter. It was not
necessary to characterize 32 to argue malice or bad faith was not necessary.

Elements of Tort
P&K says the elements of common law tort are:
(1) A duty/obligation recognized by law, requiring a person to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;
(2) Failure on the persons part to conform to the standard
(3) A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury;
(4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
These are not binding in our jurisdiction yet the Court has adopted these elements in a few
cases such as Garcia v. Salvador. In such case, the Court appears to be saying that these are
elements of an intentional tort under 20.

In Lucas v. Tuano, which was decided two years after Garcia, the Court held that the action was
anchored on 2176, so it seemed the Court was characterizing the action as a quasi-delict. The
Court however also enumerated the same four elements it cited in Garcia. In that case, the
Court appeared to have used the four elements to establish the existence of medical negligence
under 2176.

In Ocean Builders v. Sps. Cubacub, the Court enumerated three elements to successfully
prosecute an action anchored on tort:
(1) Duty
(2) Breach
(3) Injury and proximate causation
In this case, it is interesting that the Court characterized the action based on tort although at the
end of its decision, it stated that the company and Hao were not guilty of negligence. This is
interesting because negligence does not appear to be relevant in the context of the elements
identified by the Court nor in the violation of the legal provision. Regardless of whether the
provision was violated negligently or not, the violator would be liable for damages. Negligence
would only be relevant if action was based on QD.

Purpose of Tort Law
Jarencio: The unitary character of American Tort Law is found not in its doctrinal development
but in the broad notions of policy from which these doctrines derive and that it is in the social
rather than the legalistic basis of tort law that affords the unifying principles.
Thus, understanding the purpose of tort law may help in determining whether a particular cause
of action is a tort action or not.

The purpose of tort law is compensation of individuals for losses which they have suffered within
the scope of their legally recognized interests. Providing compensation for harm is perhaps the
most important purpose of tort law. However, while the primary purpose of tort is compensation,
the compensation itself can serve several purposes.

Hershovitz: torts serve a corrective justice purpose by requiring wrongdoers to repair the
wrongful losses they cause
P&K: torts also serve an economic purpose as it promotes efficiency by giving people incentives
to take account of costs they impose on others
Torts also provide a deterrent to harmful conduct.
Nevertheless, these effects all flow from the type of damages that may be awarded for a
particular type of tort and therefore do not result from the torts themselves. All that tort law does
is point to who is liable. Because loss/injuries are inevitable, the purpose of the law of torts is to
adjust these losses and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as a result
of the conduct of another.

CONCEPT of a QUASI-DELICT
Historical background
Commission agreed to use term quasi-delictfor those obligations which do not arise from law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses. As interpreted by the Code commission, the
term quasi-delictcorresponds to what is referred to in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual, or cuasi-delitos.

In Barredo v. Garcia, the Court reaffirmed that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the CC, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime.

The Court added the individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. It is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. Thus the concept of QD existed even under the OCC even though the express use of
the term is found in the Code.

Nature
1157: Obligations arise from:
(1) Law
(2) Contracts
(3) Quasi-contracts
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law
(5) Quasi-delicts
Therefore a quasi-delict is one of the five sources of obligation. 1157 was derived from 1089 of
the OCC. 1157 lists the same obligations except the terms quasi-delicts replaces obligations in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

Governing Provisions
1162: Obligations derived from QD are governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
Book IV of the Civil Code. Arts. 2176-2194.

Definition
2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Scope
Do quasi-delicts cover intentional Acts?
NO. According to 2176, it is clear that a cause of action based on QD requires the act or
omission be committed with negligence. There must have been no intent on the part of the
defendant to harm the plaintiff.

HOWEVER, there are divergent rulings which have raised the question whether a QD
contemplates intentional acts.

Aaron Valdez
Elcano v. Hill provides that the concept of culpa-aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. While the Court used
the term voluntaryand not intentional, the drift of the statement is that culpa aquiliana covers
criminal acts done with intent or negligence. In this case, the Court argued that not only can the
same act constitute a crime and a quasi-delict at the same time, it further pointed out that the
nature of such acts may be negligent or intentional.

The pitfall of this case is that the citation of this case was not for the purpose of ruling that a QD
can cover acts with criminal intent. The case was cited in Barredo as basis for ruling that the
same act can be both a criminal act and covered by 1902.

Why wont Elcano v. Hill hold water in arguing that a quasi -delict covers intentional acts?
Even assuming arguendo that the case serves as basis for saying that 1902 of the OCC covers
intentional criminal acts, it cannot be the basis of stating that 2176 of the NCC also covers
intentional criminal acts, because the intent of the framers and the text of the NCC imply
differently.

Further, the Court also explained the text of the NCC no longer uses the term not punishable by
law, which in its opinion, made it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana included acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
However, this should not be taken to mean that the deletion of this phrase does not necessarily
mean that it covers intentional criminal acts; it could simply mean that QDs can cover acts
committed through criminal negligence.

Another reason is that 2177 provided that responsibility for fault or negligence under 2176 is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. The Court in its defense cited J ustice BACOBO about construction that upholds the
spirit that giveth life rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should
be observed in applying the same. It is more congruent with the spirit of law, equity, and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress. Court defended its interpretation by echoing the
justification in Barredo that a contrary interpretation would kill the intent of the lawmaker.

Are there any other cases which argue that an intentional criminal act can be a quasi -
delict?
YES. In Andamo v. IAC, the Court held that 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence,
covers not only acts not punishable by lawbut also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. The Court however in this case did not explain nor
provide a legal basis for its statement. Perhaps this is because whether or not a QD covered
intentional acts was not an issue in this case but only whether it can proceed independently of a
criminal case for the same act.

Are there cases which limit quasi-delicts to negligent acts or omissions?
YES. In Baksh v. CA, the Court held that a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions
and excludes the notion of wilfulness or intent. Its basis was the general scheme of the PH legal
system envisioned by the Code Commission. It also answered one of the arguments against
limiting 2176 to negligent acts, which is that it would leave intentional injurious but non-criminal
acts without redress. To that argument, the case pointed to 21 to fill the alleged vacuum.

What is the difference between culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana under the Old
Code?
In Cangco v. Manila Railroad, the Court, citing Manresa, stated that the liability arising from
extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without wilful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. The quotation is
instructive because it shows the relationship between voluntary act or omission, wilful intent, and
negligence. Clearly a voluntary act is not the same as an act done with wilful intent, the former
merely referring to an act freely done or without compulsion while the latter referring to an act
done for the purpose of harm. A negligent act or omission may be a voluntary act but cannot be
an intentional act.

Damage to Property
Can there be a quasi -delict if no one is injured but property is damages?
YES. In Cinco v. Canonoy, the Court ruled that the concept of QD is so broad it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property. In this case however, the Court cited as basis a
page of its decision in Barredo v. Garcia, though the cited page said nothing in support of that
statement. Further, Barredo was decided prior to the enactment of 2176 so it is impossible for it
to have ruled on its scope.

The Court continued to rule that 2176 makes no distinction between damage to persons on the
one hand and damage to property on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the
harm done and reparation for the harm done. With respect to harm, it is plain that it includes
both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property
injuries.

HOWEVER, it cited as an example 2191(2), which may arguably be a strict liability tort, not a
quasi-delict, because it does not require fault or negligence in the said rule.

Elements:
Under 2176, the elements of a QD would be:
(1) Act or omission
(2) Damage to another
(3) Fault or negligence
(4) No pre-existing contractual relation
Under jurisprudence, the cases indicate three elements:
(1) Damage to plaintiff
(2) Negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant, or by some other person for whose
act the defendant must respond
(3) Connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by plaintiff

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT AND QUASI-DELICT
Distinct Concepts
How does one distinguish torts and quasi -delicts according to the author?
According to RJ C, for the purposes of discussion, torts under PH law are those causes of action
entitling a person to remedies, mainly in the form of damages, for the injury caused to him.
There are many purposes of torts and various provisions of the CC and special laws govern
each of them. What is considered as torts under PH law is similar but not necessarily identical
with common law torts.

For the same purpose, a QD is the concept defined under 2176 of the CC. It is a cause of action
whereby one who is injured by an act or omission of another, there being fault or negligence, is
entitled to an award of damages, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between
the parties.

While torts is a classification of several causes of action, a quasi-delict is a single cause of
action. While torts may include both negligent acts and acts with intent to harm, quasi-delicts
cover only negligent acts with no intent to harm.

Framework
It is possible the same act or omission may be considered either a tort or as a quasi-delict.
(1) A QD is a subset of torts negligent torts. Relationship may be represented by two
circles, with QD as a smaller circle completely within the larger circle of tort. This is
supported by the fact that Garcia said that 1902 describes what a tort is, which is
nearly identical to the first sentence of 2176.

Aaron Valdez
(2) Cases
Are there cases which support a cause of action on tort, but are actuall y based on QD?
YES. In BPI v. Lifetime, the Court stated the cause of action was based on tort and cited 2176
as legal basis. In Gregorio v. CA, the Court said the same thing when it referred to every tort
case filed under 2176. These statements could be taken to mean that 2176 defines one of the
causes of action can be considered a tort but not that tort is limited to what is described in 2176.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA, the Court said that QD, as defined in 2176 of the CC, is
homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.
Being homologous means that a quasi-delict is like a tort. This could be taken to mean that tort
and QD are two distinct albeit similar concepts.

HOWEVER it must be noted that what was being compared was quasi-delict and common law
tort and not tort as it is understood in PH law.

PH law tort would be considered as a classification of actions, which generally gives rise to an
action for damages as a result of injury caused to the plaintiff.

QUASI-DELICT and DELICT
Distinguishing QD from D
(1) 1157 lists QD and D as different sources of obligations
(2) Barredo v. Garcia: Authorities support the proposition that a QD or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the CC, with a substantivity all on its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. What this
means is that a Qd can stand on its own; whatever happens to the criminal action
does not affect the quasi-delictual action. The success of the quasi-delictual action
does not depend on the success of the criminal action. It is possible that these two
actions can arrive at different conclusions.
What are the differences between crimes and QDs?
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, QDs are only of private concern
(2) RPC punishes or corrects the criminal act; CC repairs damage by means of
indemnification
(3) Delicts are not as broad as QDs, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while QDs include ALL acts in which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes.
Observation as to (1): Interaction between members of the society is a public policy concern of
the state; QDs under 2180 are a public concern as they impact provisions of the Const itself
In 2180, relationships covered are a state interest. Perhaps what was meant by the statement
that a QD is a private concern is that in case of QDs, legal injury is suffered only by individuals
and not by the state while in crimes, legal injury is suffered both by the state and the individual.
In the case of QDs, only the private citizen injured has a cause of action while in the case of
crime, both private individual and state have a cause of action.

Observation as to (2): Some forms of damages are punitive in nature and do not merely repair
damages caused.

Observation as to (3): Many ways to commit a crime

Overlap between QD and D
Barredo v Garcia has explained that the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under RPC 100, or create an action for QD.

May the parents of a deceased child bring a separate ci vil action against the employer of
a taxi dri ver who had hit the child?
YES. In Barredo v. Garcia, the Court held that inasmuch as RPC 365 punishes not only reckless
but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under CC 1902 has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the confusion worse confounded.
A closer study however shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does
not destroy the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under RPC 100, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra contractual under CC 1902-1910.

The drivers negligence fell within the concept of 1902, but OCC 1093 appears to limit QD to
wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law. If act or omission punished by law
is a crime, strictly construing the rule would mean the act cannot be a QD. Because RPC 365
punishes not only simple imprudence or negligence, very few acts or omissions, if any, would fall
within fault or negligence under 1902.

The Court ruled this overlapping or concurrence in scope does not destroy the distinction
between crimes and QDs. The court ruled the same negligent act causing injury may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under RPC 100 or create an action for QD.

To justify its ruling, the Court
(1) Went into the history of QDs
(2) Tried to prove the distinctive nature of the QD is continued in the CC because 1089
identified it as one of the five sources of obligations
(3) Decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held the principle that a QD is a separate
and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability, and that an employer is, under 1903, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of hi employee
The Court held
(1) that if they were to hold that 1902 to 1910 of the CC refer only to fault or negligence
not punished by law, according to the literal import of 1093 of the CC, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in life.
(2) To find the accused guilty in a crim case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
defendant pay in damages.
(3) To hold there is only one way to make defendants liability effective (to sue driver and
exhaust his property first) would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. In construing the laws, courts
have endeavoured to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice
(4) To restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under Arts. 1902 et seq
of the CC to its full rigor. It re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy.
Does this problem in the overlap between QDs and Ds still exist?
NO. The problem pointed out in Barredo no longer exists under CC because the problematic
phrase - not punishable by law in 1093 of the OCC no longer exists in 1162 because of
Elcano v. Hill. In this case, the Court said, quoting J ustice Bacobo, that the said Code which was
enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term not punishable by lawthereby
making it clear the concept of CA includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. The Court also cited works of recognized civilians,
as well as Art. 2177, which provides that acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a QD or culpa aquiliana.

Can the parents of a child killed in an MV mishap invol ving a taxi dri ver recover despite
failing to reserve the ci vil aspect of the case?
YES. The Court held that an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:
(1) Civil liability ex delicto
(2) ICA
a. These not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony

Aaron Valdez
b. Where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action
The Court found the complaint sufficiently alleged the death of the couples minor son was
caused by the negligent act of the petitioners driver. It also ruled the petitioners themselves
were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to exercise the necessary diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. The Court also
noticed the spouses anchored their counter-claim to 2180, and that the defendants anchored
their defense on due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The Court viewed
the defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the spouses cause of
action as one for QD.

CULPA AQUILIANA and CULPA CONTRACTUAL
Distinguishing Culpa Aquiliana from Culpa Contractual
Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual
Negligent act or omission Source Exists independently of the
breach of voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when
entering into a contractual
relation
On plaintiff to prove
negligence/fault on the part of
defendant
Burden of Proof Mere existence of contract
and failure of compliance
Applies Applicability of Doctrine of
PC
Does not apply
Does not apply; due diligence
in selection and supervision
available
Defense of Employer for
Negligence of Employee
Does not apply

Source
What is the difference in source between culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual?
In Cangco v. Manila Railroad, the Court held that as to culpa aquiliana, the vinculum has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. It specifically held that the legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties,
mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all members of
society. The breach of these general duties whether due to wilful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.

The Court found that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
the sacks on the platform and that the sacks presence caused Cangco to fall as he alighted
from the train. It held that the foundation of the legal liability of Manila Railroad was the contract
of carriage, and the obligation to respond for the damage which Cangco had suffered arose from
the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of Manila Railroad to exercise due care in its
performance.

The Court also cited Rakes, where it held that the decision of this court was made to rest
squarely upon the proposition that 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute the breach of a contract.

Burden of Proof

What is the difference as to burden of proof with regard to CuAq and CuCon?
In Cangco, the Court held that when the source of the obligation is a negligent act or omission,
the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not, his action fails.
When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking and it is alleged plaintiff has failed or
refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or negligence on the part of defendant, or of his
servants or agents.
Because the case was hinged on culpa contractual, all plaintiff had to present were proof of the
contract and its non-performance. It quoted Manresa:
As a general rule...it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; on
the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and has been broken, it is not necessary for him to
prove negligence.

In culpa contractual, does mere proof of injury to plaintiff create a presumption of liability
on defendant?
YES. In Fores v. Miranda (jeep crashed into a wall), the Court held that the action for breach of
contract imposes on the defendant a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to plaintiff.
The plaintiff is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the defendant, or of his employees,
and the burden is placed on defendant to prove it was due to an unforeseen event or FM.

In a breach of contract, is defense of due diligence possible?
YES. In FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento, the Court held that unless the defendant can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of FE,
to excuse him from his ensuing liability, he is liable.

The Court held that mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance
justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The Court found GPS recognized the
existence of a contract of carriage and admitted the cargoes it had assumed to deliver have
been lost or damaged while in its custody.

As to the driver, the Court ruled that without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, he may not
himself be ordered to pay FGU. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or
their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position. Citing the axiom
res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, the Court said that such contract can neither favour
nor prejudice a third person. FGUs civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa
aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant to prove negligence or fault
on the part of defendant.

Applicability of Doctrine of Proximate Cause
Is the doctrine of proximate cause material to injuries sustained while riding a common
carrier?
NO. In Calalas v. CA, the Court held that the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for QD, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

Defense of Employer for Negligence of Employee
Is the defense of negligence of his employee available to defendant in an action for culpa
contractual?
NO. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad, the Court held it was not available because proof of the
employers negligence was not required in culpa contractual.
Is defense of negligence of his employee available to defendant in an action for culpa
aquiliana?
NO. The only viable defense is due diligence in the selection and supervision of his own
employees. Pointing to his employees as the culprits would not absolve employer under culpa
aquiliana as the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer would be established
and remain.

Aaron Valdez
Can a common carrier escape liability by proving it has exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees?
NO. In Fores v. Miranda, the Court held that if the defendant is a common carrier and sued on
the basis of a culpa contractual, it cannot, unlike in suits based on culpa aquiliana, escape
liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

Is there an intersection?
Can there be a quasi -delict when there is a contract between the parties?
YES. In Cangco, the Court held that the field of contractual and non-contractual obligations are
concentric. The mere fact a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from
extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists, the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Admittedly, non-contractual obligations include both delict and QD, but the statements made by
the Court here show that early as this case, the Court had accepted the possibility that a delict or
QD may exist even if there was a contract.
Thus, under the old Code, there seems to be no issue as to whether a culpa aquiliana could
exist along with a contract. The issue however is not as clear under the current Civil Code,
because of 2176.

What happens if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship?
(1) There is no QD and therefore no cause of action for damages based on QD
(2) Cause of action exists but it cannot be called a QD

Does jurisprudence offer a clear answer as to the question asking what happens if there
is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties yet damage to another was
caused?
NO.
In Fores v. Miranda, the Court held that the definition of QD in 2176 expressly precludes cases
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. In this case the Court
further held that the difference in conditions, defenses, and proof, as well as the codal concept
of QD as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex
contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of
contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. In this case however, although the term
tort was used, it is actually saying that an action for QD cannot simultaneously embody an action
for breach of contract.

In PSBA v. CA, the Court held that because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation...the rules on QD do not really govern. A perusal of 2176 shows that
obligations arising from QDs or tort arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract.

In Consolidated Bank v. CA, the Court held that the law on QD or culpa aquiliana is generally
applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties. The
language employed in this case is not as strict as in the previous cases as it admits of possible
exceptions to the general rule.

HOWEVER, in Air France v. Carrascoso, the Court held that the act that breaks the contract
may be a tort. The term tort is used and not quasi-delict. It should not be used as basis for
saying an action may be a breach of contract and quasi-delict at the same time, not unless tort
was meant to refer to a QD.

In Syquia v. CA, the Court held that a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does
not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana.

In Far East v. CA, the Court held that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract
that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a
pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.

In LRT v. Navidad, the Court held that a contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, 2194 can well apply.

In Fores v. Miranda, the Court affirmed the ruling except with regard to the award of MD. It
stated that That a breach of contract cannot be considered included in the description term
analogous cases used in 2219; not because 2200 specifically provides for damages that are
caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of QD in 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The Court
further held that The difference in conditions, defenses, and proof, as well as the codal concept
of QD as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex
contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of
contract as simultaneously embodying an action for tort. As for the codal concept, there is a real
problem, because 2176 does seem to exclude the possibility of a QD if there is an existing
contract between the parties.

In Consolidated Bank v. CA (L.C. Diaz and Calapre the Loser), the Court held that the law on
QD/CA is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties. It seems the Court is saying that as a general rule, a QD cannot exist if there is a pre-
existing contractual relationship between the parties, but did not provide a basis why this is
merely a general rule nor did it provide any exceptions.

In Air France v. Carrascoso, the Court held that although the relation of passenger and carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort.

Can the statement regarding torts and culpa contractual serve as legal basis for arguing
the same act can be both a quasi-delict and a tort?
NO.
(1) The issue in the case was whether the award of MD based on the alleged breach of
contract was proper. The Court ruled there was sufficient allegation of bad faith and
finding of bad faith in the complaint and in the decision respectively. The statement
had nothing to do with the Courts ruling.
(2) Taking the statement at face value, it would seem the Court is saying an act can both
be a breach of contract and a tort at the same time. It does not say an act can both be
culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana at the same time. The term tort cannot be
interpreted as QD/CA because the Court cited 21 and not 2176 as the basis of liability.
In the case, the court awarded MD under 2219(10) because of Art. 21. It held that the contract of
air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carriers employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not
merely contract for transportation. Any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier Petitioners
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. This is a violation of public duty with
petitioner-air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Assuming the discussion on 21 is not obiter dictum, at best, Air France can only be cited for the
rule an act breaches a contract can also be a violation of Art. 21.

Can a breach of contract be a violation of Art. 21?
YES. In Far East v. CA (declined credit card in InterCon), the Court appeared to say that a
breach of contract can be a violation of 21 if the breach is so deliberate as to approximate a
degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. It anchored the award of
damages on 21 and 2200, the latter providing that moral damages are due in breaches of
contract when the breach is attended by fraud or bad faith.

Aaron Valdez
In this case, the Court also said it had not overlooked the rule a quasi-delict can be the cause
for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort.
The Court inserted a footnote and said In QD/CA, moral damages may be recovered when the
act or omission complained of causes phys injuries or where the defendant is guilty of intentional
tort. It cited Air France and Singson, flimsy sources because:
(1) Dictum in Air France can only be cited for the rule an act that breaches a contract can
also be a violation of 21
(2) Singson provides the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor. The statement refers to torts and not to a QD under 2176.
(3) Court also cited cases decided prior to the current CC and cannot serve as bases for
saying a QD as defined 2176 can exist simultaneously with a contract between the
parties.
The Court also said that the doctrine that a QD can be the cause of a breaching contract could
not improve the Lunas claim because it can aptly govern only where the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The second
sentence of 2176 is not interpreted as a rule of preclusion but merely a rule requiring
independence. This means a QD can exist between contractual parties if the cause of action
exists without a contract. In this case, the damage claim was predicated solely on their
contractual relationship. Without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

Is a school liable for a stabbing of one of its students in its premises?
YES. In PSBA v. CA, the Court held that when an academic institution accepts students for
enrolment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. Institutions of learning, aside from providing an education,
must also meet the implicit or built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere
that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. This holding provides that there was a
contractual relationship between PBA and Bautista.

The Court further held that because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern a perusal of
2176 shows that obligations arising from obligations arising from QDs or tort arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. It seems that at this point,
the Court was of the view a QD can only arise between parties not otherwise bound by contract.

What was peculiar about PSBA?
In this case, the Court held that However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract...Air France is authority
for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
The use of the word impressionseems to downplay the binding effect of the rule earlier stated
by the Court that a QD can only arise between parties not otherwise bound by contract. Further,
the Court has accepted the existence of a tort even when there is a contract. It pointed out that
in the case, liability was based on tort and not on contract (the Court did in fact rule on the issue
of MD on the basis of breach of contract; discussion on tort was mere obiter. Seems Court read
the Air France differently).

Further, the Court cited Sangco, saying that a culpa contractual can also be a tort is not a
revolutionary view. Basically, the Court is saying the same act may constitute a breach of
contract and a source of extra-contractual obligations. It must be noted that extra-contractual
obligations is not a synonym for QD. The latter is only one form of the former. This case was
decided prior to enactment of 2176.

It held in this case that there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached through PSBAs negligence. Even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using
the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. That
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. A contractual relation is a sine qua non to the schools liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in 21.

HOWEVER, the Court held that a cause of action under 21 is still possible. It said that the
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in21. The text of 21 however requires the act
complained of be committed wilfullyand not merely negligently. Therefore 21 could not be the
basis of liability of PSBA if the allegation was that it was negligent.

Is the duty of PSBA to keep individuals within its premises safe limited onl y to its
students?
NO. In PSBA, the Court held that while it is contractually bound to keep its students safe, it is
arguable that it owes all individuals within its premises the duty of maintaining adequate security.
Making sure that individuals, particularly non-members of its academic community, do not carry
dangerous weapons within the premises is within the demands of due diligence.

What was said about culpa aquiliana in Syquia v. CA?
The Court held that a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the
existence of a culpa aquiliana. The antecedents of the case (hole in the coffin) provides that had
there been actual negligence on the part of Manila Memorial Park, it would be held liable not for
a QD/CA but for culpa contractual. The Court seems to be saying that a QD/CA can exist even if
there is a contract, but even if such QD/CA can exist, the negligent party will be held liable for
culpa contractual. This is in consonance with the Far East Bank test to determine whether there
can be a QD despite existence of a contract (Will a quasi-delict be deemed to underlie the
breach of a contract if without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission
can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself?). Thus, the existence of contract will not
prevent an action based on QD if an action based on QD could be filed without the contract. In
this case, the duty of due diligence on the part of MMPCI existed only because of a contract.

What was the Courts pronouncement on tort in LRT v. Navidad?
In this case, the Court held that a contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
QD/CA, 2194 applies. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Authors comments:
(1) Statement regarding applicability of 2194 is at best ambiguous. While a contract may
be breached by a tort (21), the rest of the sentence defies comprehension. At best it
implies the same act or omission can constitute QD/CA and a culpa contractual at the
same time, yet provides no basis for this statement.
(2) Statement regarding liability for tort arising even under a contract would follow from Air
France, but reference is made to PSBA, where tort referred to is 21, which is not the
cause of action relied upon by plaintiffs (2176/2180).
(3) Statement as to When act which constitutes a breach of contract....the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply
assumes that a QD is the same thing as tort. Thus, the rules on tort referred to may in
fact be the rules on QD. Even assuming that what the Court had in mind was QD
when it said tort, there was no adequate basis for the statement because sources
used were cases decided prior to NCC.

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