Week 2:

The Changing World Order: Rising Powers and International Institutions

2.1 Overview of Week 2
Hello there and welcome back again to our course, The Changing Global Order. This week is we
will look at some of these changing global power constellations. Obviously, there are a lot of
changes on the global level at the moment. Think about the rise of the so-called BRICs. We'll
hear more about these countries in this week's sessions. We will first have lectures by Professor
Rob De Wijk, who will look at changing global power structures and, for example, the role of
China. Then we'll have lectures by Professor Andre Gerrits, who will have a special emphasis on
the role of Russia. We see a lot of different changes on this global order and, obviously, these
are fascinating subjects to look at.
Now, maybe, meanwhile, you have done the test on week one, and you probably realized that
it was not all that easy. Obviously, thinking about theories of international relations is a bit
tough at times. So if you managed to really do well on this test, you're in [good] shape. Okay, let
us now enjoy the lectures that we will have in this week.
2.2 Power Politics (Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk)
Hello my name is Rob de Wijk. I'm a professor of international relations and security. This
lecture is about power politics in a multi-polar world. There is little scholarly disagreement that
since the end of the Cold War, a multi-polar world has slowly been re-emerging. Such a system
is less stable than a uni-polar or bipolar one, a distinction that is often made is that between
the West and the rest.
The Indian-American journalist and author Fareed Zakaria
argued that, due to the rise of the rest, we're now seeing the
emergence of a post-American world. In this world, the United
States and Europe compete with China and other emerging
powers over economic interests, which will spark new political
and security issues. This has led to a new debate on geo-
economics.
With a secure access to resources and
energy as dominant drivers of more
than geo-politics, countries around the
globe no longer focus solely on
territorial defense. Instead they also now consider the defense of vital
economic interests. Indeed both industrialized and industrializing
nations demand unrestrictive access to these resources, particularly
energy supplies, critical materials and food. This is a prerequisite for
continued economic growth and social political stability. This geo-
economics explains why major in-state conflicts can and do erupt over
economic issues and will continue to do so.
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RESOURCE STRUGGLE: Certain manifestations of this resource
struggle are already visible. On September the 7th, 2010 for instance, a Chinese trawler collided
with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel near the
uninhabited, but resource rich Senkaku and Diaoyu islands. The
incident and the detention of the Chinese captain, led to major
diplomatic fallout between the two nations. Japan eventually
relented, but only after China reportedly had already halted
critical exports of rare Earth minerals to its rival.
A similar incident took place in April 2012 between China and the
Philippines over the disputed Scarborough Shoal, which China claims as
an integral part of its territory. When a Philippine warship sought to
apprehend eight Chinese fishing vessels for illegal fishing, it found its
[route] blocked by two Chinese surveillance vessels. As the standoff
continued, China warned its population against travel to the
Philippines and raised trade barriers on imported pineapples and
bananas. Since then China has maintained a military presence in
Scarborough Shoal and implemented new legislation barring non
Chinese vessels from entering without authorization.
RESPONSE OF THE U.S. The rise and increase regional assertiveness
of China has triggered a debate in the United States in the pivotal
issue of re-balancing and re-entrenchment. U.S. Policy makers are
reducing the country's strategic commitments in response to a
decline in its relative power and defense budget. As a result,
Washington's foreign policy doctrines have been marked by
increased retrenchment, deep cuts in military spending and the
shifting of more of the United States global defense burdens onto
its allies. (See chart below.) Indirectly America's rebalancing to Asia
also points at increased danger of major power conflict.

US fears that the rise of China, and its mounting anti
access and area denial capabilities could pose a threat to
its naval forces. In particular it believes new Chinese anti
ship ballistic missiles, such as the F21D which could sink an
air craft carrier with a single hit,
and our game changes. In
response, U.S. military presented
the Air-Sea Battle concept, which
calls for strengthening of bases in
the Pacific and dispersal of forces and the ability to conduct long-range
operations. In addition, in response to Chinese assertions that the
South China Sea was a core interest of Chinese sovereignty, the Obama
administration stated in 2010 that freedom of maritime navigation in
the region is a US national interest.

Although this may seem far-fetched to some, incidents in the
Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could severely affect not
just global security, but also our security. Major power conflict put
trade routes, sea lines of communication, and access to trade
markets and resources at risk. Both developed and emerging
countries are extremely vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of
resources.

A 2010 report by the European Commission identified 14 critical minerals.
The report observes that many emerging economies are pursuing industrial
development strategies by means of trade, taxation and investment,
instruments aimed at preserving their resource base for their exclusive use.
In some cases, the situation is further
compounded by a high level of concentration
on the production in a few countries as you can
see on the map below. There's many reserves of critical materials
can only be found in a limited number of countries. Diversification
of supply is not an option. If a country for whatever reason stops
the export of raw materials or energy, Europe may have no other
option but to attempt to force its access to these commodities. In
extreme cases this clearly could lead to armed conflict. Moreover
as we know now, power politics takes place in Europe, as well.

POWER POLITICS IN EUROPE. In early 2014, Russia took advantage of perceived economic,
military and, consequently, political weakness of Europe, to carry out the annexation of the
Crimea. We should understand here that, for Russia, power politics is not about geo-economics,
but about ideas of restoring past greatness, and undoing an
aberration of history. This is the aim of the Soviet Union. This
form of power politics is fueled by a feeling of humiliation by
the west.
This is about politics as well.
Russia accuses the west about
taking advantage of Russia's
weakness after the collapse of the
Soviet Union when Russia was
unable to stop German
reunification, the enlargement
of NATO, the 1999 Kosovo war,
or the EU's Eastern Partnership. The way Europe and America
responded demonstrated that President Putin's assessment of a
possible reaction of the west was right. Apart from imposing
largely symbolic sanctions, Europe could do little to stop Russia's
annexation of the Crimea.
Interestingly, in Asia, America's response was very different
when China established an air defense zone in the East China
Sea, extending over the disputed islands. This zone requires for
an aircraft to report to the Chinese authorities before entering
air space. One day after its establishment, U.S. responded by
sending a pair of B-52 bombers on patrol into the zone. A
similar military show of force did not take place during the
Russian annexation of the Crimea.

CONSEQUENCES OF POWER POLITICS. So what are the
consequences of power politics? In the first place, it could
weaken the legitimacy or value of international treaties and
agreements. NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was not
supported by U.N. resolution. Consequently, humanitarian
operation was considered illegal by Russia and China. On the
other hand, by occupying the Crimea, Russia herself violated
U.N. charter, OSE [??] charter for European security, the
Budapest agreements, and all NATO Russia agreements. In
March 2014, a large majority of countries in the United Nations
general assembly dismissed the annexation as illegal, even as Russia sought to rally real
support for their idea of regional self determination. Remarkably even China, Russia's long time
ally, abstained from supporting its position in the U.N.
By violating the international rule of law major powers will
weaken global institutions such as the United Nations as well.
Another consequence is that Europe, which abandoned
traditional power politics after the end of the Second World War,
is now confronted with a world which it believed belonged to the
past. America's re-balancing to the east, a policy of retrenchment
and a concept of leading from behind all indicate that Europe
must be able to reassert and defend its vital interest, if
necessary without America's support. In the past few years,
before the Crimea, most
European governments focused
on the sovereign debt crisis, which had plunked it into
institutional and political crisis. And they neglected the
reemergence of power politics. However, Russia's seizure of
the Crimea has made clear that Europeans have no answer
when confronted with the power politics of major powers in
its own neighborhood. Europe has come to suspect that if it
had been militarily strong and politically united, President
Putin might not have risked this confrontation of the Crimea.
This is what power politics are all about.
So in summary, a multiple world is emerging. This has led to a
new debate on fuel economics and power politics. By
definition, a multi-polar world is less stable than the world we
know. In the next video we will look at the role of China in
global affairs.



A clearer map from lecture note. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-
materials/files/docs/crm-report-on-critical-raw-materials_en.pdf
Resource for detailed (tabulated) materials analysis: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-
materials/files/docs/crm-annexes_en.pdf

2.3 Rise of China ( Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk)
In this video, we will look at one of the most important rising powers of today, China. This
graph shows that today, political change is only about one country, China. As you can see on
this graph, for some years now the Western world is in steady relative decline. So it should
come as no surprise that China has increasingly become the focus of the Western worlds
geopolitical calculations.
U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made this very clear in 2011. She wrote a famous article
in Foreign Policy magazine. In this article she argued that the Asia-Pacific has become the key
driver of geopolitics. The key issue is that in the Asia-Pacific, only
China truly translates its increased economic power into military,
and consequently political power.
Now, it is good to remember that until the Middle Ages, China was
the most powerful country on the globe. Have another look at the
graph. Until 1820, China was still easily the biggest economy. In
those days, China's GDP accounted for more than 30% of the world's
total. But during the Industrial Revolution, the Western world's rapid development left China in
the dust. But historically, this is only a very recent development.
So for historical, psychological, and political reasons, the Chinese leadership consider China's
recent rise as merely the restoration of a great power to its rightful place under the sun. In fact,
the Chinese word for China, Zhong Guo, literally translates to
middle country, the country at the center of the world.
CHINAS 2013 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER. So China's rise is about
reclaiming what it sees as its rightful place in history. This is
psychologically and politically very important when we try to
understand China. China's recent white paper recognized the
shifting geopolitical center of gravity towards the east. I quote
from the white paper,
the Asia-Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world
economic development and strategic interaction between major powers. The U.S. is
adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is undergoing
profound changes

from this defense strategy. Moreover the white paper, or the defense strategy, identified signs
of increasing hegomonism, power politics, neo individualism, and the knowledge that this could
lead to competition in international military field.
At the same time there is also close cooperation between China and
the west. For example, in February 2012, European Union officials
went to Beijing in search of a Chinese contribution to the Eurozone
rescue fund. In addition, China invests strategically in Europe's
infrastructure and high tech industry. Due to its interventions to
save the Euro, growing trade relations, increasing for indirect
investments and huge dollar research, China plays an increasingly
dominant role in the Western world.
What then could be the source of conflict? Well in the first place
industrialized and industrializing nations alike need reliable and
unrestricted access to resources, particularly energy supplies, critical materials, and food. This is
requisite for continued economic growth and social political stability.
ACCESS TO RESOURCES. Between 2000 and 2008, China's
consumption of metals such as aluminum, copper, lead, nickel,
tin and zinc grew by an average of 16% per year, whereas the
demand for these minerals in the rest of the world grew by only
1% per year. Therefore access to resources is an important driver
for China's foreign policy. This could of course lead to
competition with other nations around the globe.
Food security is of particular importance. Very small increases in
food prices could have profound repercussions. For example, it
could create social unrest. When food becomes scarcer in
countries with a high food dependency rate, shown below in
dark blue, the cost of living to people can increase hugely almost
overnight. This carries a high risk of popular unrest and civil instability. In recent years climate
change and pollutions are already affecting food production in China. Consequently China
bought arable land in Africa and other parts of the world.

The key issue is that with China's rise, its global interests grow
with it. China needs an annual economic growth over 8% per year
to accommodate the domestic growth, to satisfy domestic needs.
A downturn in such growth could result in social unrest, which
would spark instability and ultimately, political fires. Uprisings or
revolutions have been an essential part and recurring part of
China's history. The Chinese leadership is, of course, aware of this
and therefore takes extreme care to maintain its social contract
with the people.
Access to raw materials and resource nationalism are two sides
of the same coin. A notable example is China export quota for
rare earth minerals. China produces 97% of the world's rare earth
metals, seventy elements critical to high-tech and green-tech manufacturing. Resource
nationalism and high power politics are two sides of the same
coin as well.
Beijing is already pursuing increasingly assertive policies in an
attempt to gain access to raw materials in Africa. Countries could
try to acquire bases in resource rich countries and could transfer
arms to resource rich or transit countries. China is one of the
biggest arms suppliers to resource-rich African states such as
Sudan and Zimbabwe. This development could turn the Indian
Ocean into the flashpoint of future geopolitical strife.
CHINAS DEFENSE INVESTMENTS. China's hunger for resources
explained numerous incidents with regional powers around the
South China Sea and with Japan.
This underscores the importance of the security of strategic
routes, as there are numerous potential flash points. Some
observers argue that war cannot be ruled out.
Chinese rhetoric is supported by investments in the build of its
armed forces. Chinese defense expenditure grew more than
most other countries according to SIPRI. Between 1998 and
2010, global military expenditure increased every year in real
terms. With double digit growth rates for last two decades China
has had the fastest growing defense budget by far. In March
2014, President Xi Jinping of China announced China's biggest
rise in military spending in three years. The official figure would
budget at a 12.2% increase. China seeks to develop more high-
tech weapons and to beef up coastal and air defenses. In fact
the real figure might be even higher.
In 2010, indiscretion started over extra regional ambitions. This
marked a shift from a brown water navy into a blue water
navy, capable of operating in distant places. The deployment of
a Chinese warship off the coast of Somalia to join the battle
against piracy is a clear expression of the new policy. In terms
of size, the Chinese navy already possesses around 190 major
combatant vessels. It is on-course to overtake the U.S. Navy by
2020. Moreover to support its future expeditionary
capabilities, China is producing force projection capabilities.
This includes the first aircraft carrier the Liaoning.

CHINA ON A COLLISON COURSE. It doesn't mean that China is
aiming at a new kind of aggressive or imperial world dominance.
China considers itself as a responsible world leader. It prefers soft
power and it puts the improving welfare of its own people first
before interfering with world affairs. The Chinese leaderships
stress peaceful rights. In the early 21st century, president Hu
Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao acknowledged that the rise
of the new power often results in challenges to global political
order and even war. Yet both leaders emphasized that China's rise
will not pose a threat to peace and stability, and that other
nations will benefit from it. Finally, the Chinese model of
autocracy and state capitalism remains extremely attractive
for other governments. In the eyes of some global leaders, the
financial crisis, which started in 2008, proved that China's
model is superior over the western neo-liberal capitalist
system. Indeed, this suggests that in China, wealth growth,
based on soft power could eventually come to replace
America's and Europe's soft power.
So, concluding, geo-political change is about one country,
China. The key issue is that China translates its economic
power into military and political power. This has profound
geopolitical consequences. In the next video, my colleague
Professor Gerrits will look at the role of Russia in current
global order.

Note: The drivers of vulnerability reference is an interactive map. Suggest visiting the
referenced website for better clarity.
http://www.hcss.nl/dossiers/drivers-of-vulnerability-monitor/21/

2.4 The Role of Russia (Prof. Dr. Gerrits)
Hi. My Name is Andre Gerrits. I'm a professor of Russian and International Studies at Leiden
University. In this video we'll discuss the shifts of global power, changing power relations at a
global level, including the emergence of new powers. I will pay special attention to the Russian
Federation, which might be seen as the world's most important re-emerging power.
POWER SHIFTS. Political power is shifting and it is diffusing into
various directions. It moves from one state or group of states to
another, which is called of course by the well known phrase, the
decline of the west and the rise of the rest. But power also
diffuses. It leaks away from the states to other actors, to other
institutions or to wired individuals, or groups of individuals. But in
global politics the central assumption of the shifting power
paradigm is actually the rise of new major states.
China, of course is the primary example. Within a relatively short
time span, the People's Republic of China has reached the second
position in almost all global rankings, obviously behind the United
States. China is the C in the BRIC abbreviation, which stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China,
which is sometimes headed by the S for South Africa.


The BRIC is an exclusive club of prominent countries of which no
single affiliate has ever officially applied for membership. The
notion was actually coined by an investment banker Jim O'Neil of
Goldman Sachs in a 2001 publication, Building Better Economic
Bricks. Well, O'Neil is a banker and as a banker he was primarily
interested of course in investment opportunities. He believed at
that time that these four economies would offer excellent, the
best, prospects for the growth and expansion, including of course
Western investment.
Well, from a collective of emerging economies, BRIC gradually
developed into a geopolitical notion, indicating the four major
rising powers at the global level, Brazil, Russia, India and China,
apparently were the prime challengers of the International
Liberal or Western order, which was and still is dominated by the
United States, and to a lesser extent, Europe. Is BRIC, the BRIC
notion more than a catchy phrase and how do you actually
recognize an emerging power? And do these four countries have
enough in common to put them in the very same category of
emerging powers? I will focus on Russia because Russia is
perhaps the most exotic member of the BRIC Club.
How do we recognize an emerging power when we see one? My
argument is that an emerging power, a rising power, is defined by
three criteria.
1. Rapidly growing economy of substantial scale.
2. An increasing political weight
3. The ambition to change the existing power relations.

That's absolutely crucial. In other words, a rising power combines
growing economic and political mass and a revisionist ambition.
Well, in economic terms, Russia is a relatively great power. Its GDP is
in the global top ten, although far behind the numbers one and two,
the United States and China. Its GDP per capita ranks about 40th which is substantially lower of
course than that of the United States but higher than China's. But Russia reaches particularly
high in some geographically relevant rankings. Not only is it the worlds' largest country (it
covers about one sixth of the earth) but it also borders most of the world's unstable and
explosive regions. Additionally it's one of the world's largest energy suppliers and a major arms
producer. So it's an important country indeed, but is it an emerging power? What do you think?
Is Russia truly an emerging power? (From the first 268 student responses, 68% said yes.)
I would say that the answer is negative. Different from Brazil, India and especially China, Russia
is not a rising or emerging power. The Russian Federation is the successor state, as you know,
to the Soviet Union, which during the Cold War was one of the two major global superpowers.
The Soviet Union was feared and sometimes even admired far beyond its own borders. Well the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Russia, one of the union's 15 constituent republics, became
independent.
During the 1990's, the country went through an unprecedented deep
political and economic crisis. Russia became only a shadow of the
former Soviet Union. It was only during the 2000s, under the
presidency of Vladimir Putin that Russia slowly re-emerged again.
The critical factor was not so much the administrative capabilities of
its leadership, which were generally low, but enormous price rises
for oil and gas on the world market. Russia finally recovered from its
economic malaise and Putin obviously became a popular and
powerful leader. The Russian Federation succeeded to reclaim its
position as a great power, maybe not a global great power but
certainly a regional one.

RUSSIA: THE VERDICT. In my opinion Russia is not an emerging
power, like China, India and Brazil. At best I would argue it is a re-
emerging power. It has huge resources, but mostly in the energy
fields. In geopolitical terms, Russia is an ambiguous power. There is
no doubt that it has a clear revisionist agenda. It wants to change the
global power relations, particularly the dominant, and as all Russians,
or practically Russians would have, the arrogant position of the
United States. Little love is lost I would argue between the two
protagonists of the Cold War. But different from most emerging
countries, Russia is also a status quo power. Russia has a clear stake
in the global order. It's one of the world's most important nuclear powers. It has a permanent
seat obviously in the U.N. Security Council, and it is a member, although it was suspended after
the Crimea crisis in 2014, of the G8. But Russia's position today is, to a very large extent, a
legacy of the Cold War. It's a legacy which the Russian Federation cherishes carefully.

So the BRIC actually represents a mixed group of countries. We have democracies and
authoritarian regimes, we have divergent geopolitical situations and we have a large variety of
interests and ambitions. The whole of the BRIC I would argue is actually smaller than the sum of
its parts. Interestingly, it is Russia that proved to be one of the most active members of the
BRIC. The transformation of BRIC from a group of growing economies into a club of rising
powers was mainly due to Russia's efforts. The Russian Federation obviously considers the
break an important political asset, an instrument to compensate for its own failures and
shortcomings.
Russia is not an exemplary power. Russia generates little admiration beyond its own borders. In
other words, Russia has a poor brand name. What the Russian leadership is actually doing is
using BRIC not only to mobilize more revisionist power at the global level, mostly against the
United States, but also to bolster its own reputation and influence at home.
RUSSIA TODAY. The collapse of the Soviet Union was an enormous blow to the Russians back
in 1991. They lost their empire. They lost their country. They actually lost their global position.
Russia appears to have finally recovered now from this devastating moment in its recent
history.
Today the country's foreign policy is driven by a new forceful
combination of ambitions. One, power, two, influence, but also
and very importantly status and honor. Russia wants to be
taken seriously. The Russians are
absolutely convinced that they
were belittled and degraded by the
Western powers after the Cold War.
And the 2014 annexation by Russia
by the Crimea needs to be seen
against this background. Putin drew
a line in the sand. The occupation of
Crimea saved Russia's influence and
honor in the general opinion in the
Kremlin. Putin realized that the
dismemberment of Ukraine could
seriously jeopardize his relations with the West, but he also
knew that it would strengthen his position at home. His act of
aggression was supported by a large majority of the Russian
population. The annexation of the Crimea, I would argue, is not
the beginning of a new era in global politics, although Putin
wants us to believe that. It's an expression of Russia's anger and
frustration rather than of its growing influence and strength.
Russia may be a re-emerging power, but it remains still far too
weak to actually define the global order of things.
In this video, we discussed the role and relevance of Russia among today's emerging powers.
Power is shifting away from the Trans Atlantic world to other regions to Asia in particular. As a
major power during the cold war and a re-emerging power in today's world, Russia in a way
symbolizes the link between the old and the new. In the next video we will dive deeper into
the subject. We will look more specifically at Russia's role in international organizations.


2.5 Russia Role in International Organizations (Prof. Dr. Gerrits)
Hello. Welcome back. In our last video, we discussed power shifts at the global level, including
the role of newly emerging powers especially the BRICs. In this video, we will again zoom in on
Russia, the Russian Federation, that is an old, new member, among these emerging powers,
and we will look specifically, at Russia's role in the international organizations.
Russia's changing role in international organizations is, of course, closely linked to fluctuations
in the country's foreign policy. From 1991, that is, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
country's foreign and international relations went through
different stages, clearly different stages. These successive phases
were all narrowly linked with the country's internal situation,
obviously, but also with its global environment. Given that
Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union, one of the two
major superpowers during the cold war, and that Russia still is
the largest, and one of the more powerful countries in the world,
it has a wide range of global and regional institutional affiliations.
In diplomatic terms, I would argue, Russia is a truly globalized
power. And this is of great importance to Russia and the
Russians, but also to the rest of the world.
There are very few global issues that can be effectively dealt with
without the active participation of Russia. Conflict resolution in
the Middle East and Afghanistan are examples. Terrorism in the
Caucasus and the Central Asian, but also the future of European
integration, given our competition between the EU and Russia,
and other issues which need the participation of Russia to be
effectively solved, the climate issue, water, and, obviously,
finally, energy.
MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Russia of
course, is one of the five permanent members of The United
Nations Security Council, and this is one of the country's most
crucial international privileges some would argue, which Russia
uses extensively, and strategically, especially to block initiatives
which it considers detrimental to its own national interest. A
possible intervention to the Syrian civil war is a good example.

Russia's also a member of the Council of Europe, which once was exclusively a club of
democracies, and currently is an organization that spans the whole of the Eurasian continent.
Russia's even formally affiliated with NATO. It's linked with the Trans Atlantic Military Alliance
through the so-called NATO-Russia council, and this affiliation gives Russia a very limited say in
NATO affairs. In short, Russia has a voice, but not a veto, in NATO.
Russia's participation in international institutions is part, obviously,
of its foreign policies in general. And a countrys foreign policy is
formed, I would argue, by three variables: 1) its domestic
resources or capabilities, 2) its environment regional and global,
and 3) the ambitions of a countrys leadership.
RUSSIAS FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LAST TWO DECADES. The
foreign policy of Russia during the last two decades can be divided
into two, separate stages which are loosely connected with its
major leaders, Boris Nicolai Yeltsin and Vladimir Vladmirvic Putin. During the largest part of the
1990s under Yeltsin, Russia's domestic resources were extremely limited, and its international
environment was highly unfavorable. The country was only very slowly recovering from the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the international context was dominated by defeat, and
marginalization. The West was in a triumphant mood, so Yeltsin had actually few other options
but to follow this very same West. Russian foreign policy was unprecedentedly pro Western
during the 1990s.
This situation changed from the end of that decade, under president Putin. Russia's domestic
conditions improved considerably, state power was consolidated and strengthened, the
economy recovered, the Putin leadership was popular and almost undisputed, and at the very
same time, the international situation changed as well, and again for the better. Prices for oil
and gas went up. Russia's finances improved significantly. International terrorism, in the wake
of 9-11, gave Russia an increasingly important geopolitical position. Russia even became a
partner in the war on terror. And finally, the days of western optimism and hubris were over,
from the 2000's. The United States struggled with unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And
the European Union struggled as well, mostly with itself. Russian foreign policy changed,
accordingly.
The Russian Federation sees itself, considers itself as an
autonomous, revisionist power, in, I would add, a truly
[INAUDIBLE] world. What are its major foreign policy
features? One, Russia is an assertive, and a revisionist power.
It has the clear ambition to change the current rules of the
game. Aspect number two, Russian foreign policy is a policy
by issue rather than by principle, which is very different from
the old Soviet Union's foreign policy. That was ideologically
inspired. Russia's foreign policy isn't. Actually the only
ideology that the current Russian leadership knows is the
perceived national interest. Thirdly, Russian foreign policy is
pragmatic and strategic. It has a very clear aim. That is the
consolidation of the current domestic order in Russia, and the
strengthening of Russia's position beyond its own borders,
internationally. And these two ambitions are very, closely related.
NEAR ABROAD Yeltsin's foreign policy priority was very clear, to have good, effective
relations with the West. Now, Putin obviously also has a clear stake in workable relations with
the west. But his real priority seems to lie elsewhere, in the country's own neighborhood. Putin
seems particularly interested in strengthening Russia's power and influence among its
neighboring countries, in other words, in the area that used to be the Soviet Union, including
Ukraine. In Russian political jargon, this part of the world is sometimes referred to as the so
called near abroad, which distinguishes it, apparently, from the real abroad. In other words,
Russia claims to have special privileges in this area. The former Soviet Union, with the exception
perhaps of the Baltic states, is seen as Russia's own sphere of influence.
Now, what are the overall goals in Russia's neighborhood? First of
all, I would argue Russia wants to establish greater security on its
own periphery. Secondly, it wants to maximize its economic
opportunities. And it wants to protect the well-being of ethnic
Russians. Finally, most importantly perhaps, Russian sees it as a
condition of its great power status.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.
There's a wide range of international, institutions and organizations
active in the former Soviet Union. And actually, Russia dominates
most of them. Not all of them, but most of them. To mention the
most important institutions, we have the Custom's Union, sort of a
European Union, to which Russia wants to add Ukraine. There's the
Commonwealth of Independent States, which is the oldest
organization in the area. We have the Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO, which
resembles NATO, and we have the Shanghai Corporation Organization, which also includes the
People's Republic of China. Now most of these organizations fall short in terms of investment of
resources and policy coordination. Membership and degree of
participation have fluctuated dramatically, and no two states in the
region have an identical history of memberships.
Well, due to its hegemonic position in the area, and the volatility of
these organizations, the Russian Federation prefers bilateral over
multilateral ties in its own neighborhood. These bilateral ties take
various forms. Political linkages include diplomatic and financial
support by Russia to friendly governmental or non-governmental
individuals and organizations.
Military links, are particularly important in relations between
Russia and its neighbors. Russian troops have intervened on several
occasions, especially in conflict zones, and most recently, in 2014, in the Crimea.

Economic interests are another major driver of Russian foreign policy, also in its neighborhood.
Russia's economic relations its neighboring countries are very nontransparent and difficult to
untangle, but the bottom line is always the same. They are supposed to support the expansion
of Russia's state interest, and those of its leaders. And these two issues are closely linked. I
would argue that for the first time in its history, Russia is actually being ruled by the very same
people who also own the country.
It remains to be seen if Russia's annexation of the Crimea really represents another era of
global politics. I have my doubts. Practically all Russians welcome the annexation of the Crimea,
that's for sure. And for the time being, the Russian leadership considers the seizure of this part
of Russia's historical lands as way more important than good and workable relations with the
West. But will it truly have a major impact on Russia's global position? What do you think?
Personally, I would say the answer is negative. Even in its own neighborhood, Russia is being
increasingly challenged by outside powers, by the European Union in the west, perhaps also by
United States, and by China and Central Asia.
SUMMARY. In conclusion, Russia is a particularly large, but not always
an exceptionally, powerful country. In this video we talked about the
various dramatic changes in Russian foreign policy, from the late Cold
War era. For a super power Russia, the deep crisIs of the 1990's was a
traumatic experience. For the re-emerging Russia, honor and status
seem as important as power and influence. Russia wants to be taken
seriously, and it needs to be taken seriously, in everybody's interests,
whether Russia is weak and compliant as it was in the 1990's, or
whether strong and more confrontational, as it is today.


2.6 Wrap Up Week 2
Hello there again. We are now concluding the second week of this course, The Changing Global
Order. You probably agree with me that you got a lot of information in this week's lectures.
Actually if you are still a bit uncertain about some of the topics we have learned about, make
sure you have a look again at the lectures and also obviously look at the assigned readings. At
the end of this week, as usual, you'll have a little multiple choice exam, to see that you
understood the material. Good luck taking this test.
What do we do now? In next week's lectures, we actually will start looking at a related but still
a bit different topic. What we will do is look at tools of conflict resolution: negotiations,
bargaining, and security. First you will learn a little bit about tools of conflict resolution as we
find in the literature, and you will be asked to apply this actually to a case that you are
interested in. Then we'll take you further to the topic of mediation. You will get lectures on the
rule of the security council and sanctions, another topic that's very important in today's world.
Finally, you'll get lectures on an institution that is located here in The Hague, the International
Criminal Court. So we very much look forward to having you back again in this course next
week. See you then.

Required Readings
Jones, Bruce (2010): Making Multilateralism Work: How the G-20 Can Help the United
Nations, Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation. Click here to read.
Jong, Sijbren de, Rem Korteweg, Joshua Polchar and Artur Usano (2012): New Players, New
Game? The Impact of Emerging Economies on Global Governance, HCSS, The Netherlands,
October 25. Click here to read (Click "Download report as PDF" on the right-hand side).
Monaghan, Andrew (2013): The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity,
Russia and Eurasia, REP 2013/03, Chatham House, London. Click here to read.
Recommended Readings
Jong, Sijbren de and Willem Auping (2014): The Geopolitics of Shale Gas, HCSS, The
Netherlands, February 11. Click here to read (Click "Download report as PDF" on the right-
hand side).
ONeill, Jim (2001): Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Global Economics
Paper, 66, Goldman Sachs, New York. Click here to read.
Lo, Bobo and Lilia Shevtsova (2012): A 21st Century MythAuthoritarian Modernization in
Russia and China, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow. Click here to read
These notes are taken from a Coursera course provided by the University of Leiden. They are intended only for
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