G.R. No.

112193 March 13, 1996

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON,
ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint
1
for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional
Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private
respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their
mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego,
Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father
and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an
amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982.
Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962
and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein
private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the
compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the
estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as
his children verbally among plaintiffs and their mothers family friends, as well as by myriad
different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of
paternal care and affection as above outlined.
2

Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of
Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose
Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as attys
fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.
3

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive
Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code
of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower
court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground
that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed
by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of
merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed
was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS
BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO
PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF
THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM
THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF
THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN
SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE
FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL
WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.
4

Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought
under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which
state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3,
1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of
prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the
New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation,
if based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will
be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of
the child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and
her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their
presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as
provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant
to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the
application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private
respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code.
The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested or acquired right, thus leaving it to
the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult
to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future.
5

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,
6
a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as
Claim for Inheritance but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate
child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and
based also on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, we
had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
7
where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since
it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor
child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court.
The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and
in holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent
Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code
and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the
vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased,
since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general
rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired
jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it
retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights
was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego
represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a
retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of
prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so far
as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to
have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws
shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this
case cannot be given a retroactive effect.

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors
have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3]in CA-GR CV No.
51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-
0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower
court for trial on the merits.[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be
given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years
from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to
implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because
Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She
argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be
impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former
was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The
putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and
this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to
its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of
the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise
of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency x x x.[11]Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or]
arise from procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13]distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said
to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion.[14](Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15]the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining
majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17]is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff
therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other
hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18]the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed
while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the
Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children.
Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the
time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he
is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any
legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19]the Court
explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception
for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in
the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late
Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this
relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The
two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In
short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from
marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed
almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children
were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21]the Court said that the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period
for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case
are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a
woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their
filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and
284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural
children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural
children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of
natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation
may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition
prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious
children.[22](Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones.[23]However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right
to recognition granted by Article 285
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
(under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have
filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points
out in his Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when
his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead
the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however,
the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner
to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is infact the correct
procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of
the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since
the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal
was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an
action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

[G.R. NO. 181556 : December 14, 2009]
IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND
LOAN BANK, INC. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN
BANK, INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June
17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that, inter alia, said
bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to
depositors, creditors and the general public.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due
course.
2
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted
as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302) was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:
SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the
preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets
reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court, reasonable
liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings
and collect payment therefor from available assets.
After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay
any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to
creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to
the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied)
Relying thereon, PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of
Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings, praying that an Order be issued for:
1. The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein
petitioner, PDIC, in the amount of P3,795,096.05;
2. The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution
and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.;
3. The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof;
4. The write-off of liabilities in the total amount of P1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof;
5. The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex "Q"
hereof;
6. Authorizing petitioner to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the
project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last
notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the lapse of said period, unclaimed
payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Rule 91 of
the Rules of Court;
7. Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws,
rules and regulations after the lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.
By Order of July 5, 2006, Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-
quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer, respectively praying for the approval of the Final
Project of Distribution and for authority for PDIC "to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus
dividends allocated . . . for creditors" of Intercity Bank.
In granting the motion, the trial court resolved in the negative the sole issue of whether Section
12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to
surplus dividends, it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to prevailing
jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid
their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.
PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals
7
before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank
(the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse
should be to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari since the question involved
was purely one of law.
By Resolution of October 17, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the
main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution dated January 24, 2008, PDIC filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

G.R. No. 181089 : October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAS, Complainant, v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order dated
September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31,
issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against
respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution dated January 2,
2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. ll
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaz, Silverios daughter from the first
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy
against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
complaint was an Affidavit (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-
marked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to
Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Informationlfor
Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one
SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not
been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to
speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the
second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The
prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still
subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument
that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak
of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest
by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan where we
held: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x xll
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the
second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004,
which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code;
that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for
bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be
entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be
DISMISSED.rllbrr
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on
January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of
prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both
marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering
the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be
interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration
of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for
all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among
others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere
declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following
issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a
valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of
securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the
annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information
for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla, the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA
dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in
behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed
criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of
actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by
the OSG and
said: In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of
the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question
the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People
of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we
required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of
its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for
the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did,
praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with
us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. ll
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged,
among others, that:
x x x x
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores
was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly
thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores
had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there
was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of
respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
28
rll Even if the
accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is,
therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first
marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the
declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of
the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a
bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may
even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.rllbrr
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with
the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the
RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision
became final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano
Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already
declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of
the Information for bigamy filed against her.
HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondents clear intent was to obtain judicial
declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.