Alejandro v Bernas (2011)

Petitioner Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Alejandro) is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit

with the lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI).
On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas
(Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to
be used as a law office.
a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments until the problem
is fixed by the management.
Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the MeTC against
Alejandro for failure to pay rentals.
During the pendency of the ejectment case or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through
respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked.
MeTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro.
OPI thru Atty. Jose Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. It was executed by Amor, as Property
Manager and respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with
security officers John Doe and Peter Doe. Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and
telephone facilities
MeTC Decision in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro as suspension of payment was justified.
RTC reversed and set aside decision
CA affirm
October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP)
Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious and unlawful which
prevented them from entering the premises and that the cutting off of facilities had unduly
prejudiced them
Defense: nowhere in petitioners complaint was it alleged that respondents employed violence
which is an essential element of grave coercion. And that petitioners in fact gained access to the
Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.
The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence was
employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased premises and cutting off of facilities, respondents
Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime of unjust vexation.
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the appeal was dismissed for their failure to
submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit
CA: On whether or not there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion (no). as the mere
presence of the security guards was insufficient to cause intimidation
WON there was grave coercion (no)
On probable cause:
determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
should be consigned and entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of public
prosecutors.This Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors determination of
probable cause
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that
a thing is so.
On grave coercion:
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for
which it was intended
The problem, however, lies on the second element.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation
to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to
give his consent Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation.
Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise
of the will is sufficient
petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the
presence of security guards. But it was not alleged that the security guards committed
anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily
stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.
Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights
On Unjust vexation:
Petitioners Joint Affidavit-Complaint adequately alleged the elements of unjust vexation. The
second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides for the
penalty of unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent
person.Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners charges but such matters may
only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits

Barbasa vs Tuquero
December 23, 2008
ROBERTO BARBASA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J p:
Facts:
Petitioner is the president of Push-Thru Marketing Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-
PL 05, 19 and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc., (TPI).
June 30, 1999: Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a
notice of disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and
Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations
for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, but failed to pay the back rentals.
July 1, 1999: Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and Victor Callueng, TPI
head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls
occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its
officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein
private respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Petitioners: TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in petitioner's stalls "in a violent and
intimidating manner" and by unnecessarily employing "several armed guards to intimidate and
frighten" petitioner and his employees and agents.
Respondents: The July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully; that it was
an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties, and in accordance with the
covenants set forth in the written agreements previously executed between petitioner and TPI;
that petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed; and that petitioner had
outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid interest
and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of P267,513.39 for all his rented
stalls.
Petitioner was likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times wherein it was
stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut.
Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the third
notice.

Pertinent portion of agreement with petitioner (Penalty Clause):
It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority
premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges corresponding to a total of three (3) months, even if
not consecutively incurred, the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and other utility
services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made, without
prejudice to any other remedies provided under this Contract, including the termination of this Contract.

Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila: DISMISSED complaint against David Go, Roberto
Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found probable cause against private
respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng.
Secretary of Justice: REVERSED the City Prosecutors Resolution.
CA: DISMISSED petitioners appeal for lack of merit and denied MR.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to
petitioner's stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion. (NO)

Held: Petition is DENIED. Decision of CA affirmed.

Ratio:
The crime of grave coercion has three elements:
(a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;
(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or
such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the
offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in
other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
right.
The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon petitioner's employees when the cutting off of petitioner's
electricity was effected.
It was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent.
The guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of
TPI's rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would
have gone there unannounced or cut petitioner's electricity through less desirable and
conspicuous means.
It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties
that TPI is given the option to cut off power and other utility services in petitioner's stalls in case
petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA
and utility charges corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of said charges,
expenses, penalty and interest is made.
There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents' act of exercising in behalf of TPI a
right afforded to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to which
petitioner had agreed and which he did execute and sign.


Sy v. Sec. of Justice
December 14, 2006
ALFREDO SY for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of GONZALO SY, VERONICA SY, ROSARIO SY,
MANUEL SY and JOSE SEE
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, LEON MARIA MAGSAYSAY and ENG'R. EMMANUEL LALIN

FACTS:
1985: Dolores F. Posadas, through resp. Leon Maria F. Magsaysay, as her atty-in-fact, filed an
ejectment case against petitioners to recover a parcel of land in Paco, Manila (8,295 sqm) where several
structures stand including their post-war built building w/c serve as their family residence w/ a small
sari-sari store

TC: in favor of Posadas
RTC: affirmed TCs decision
CA: set aside RTC decision and dismissed complaint

During the pendency of the appeal in the CA: Magsaysay obtained from the office of the Building Official
of Manila a Notice of Condemnation dated Feb 8, 1996
Petitioners caused the assessment of the structural soundness of their residence

Feb 20, 1996: a Certificate of Structural Inspection was issued by a licensed engineer, certifying to
the general integrity of the structure w/c merely needed minor repairs

Oct 1997: petitioners received a letter from the Office of the Building Official that Magsaysay requested for
the condemnation of certain structures, including the structure owned by petitioners.

A scheduled ocular inspection of the property was deferred at the instance of petitioners' counsel. An
order of demolition dated Feb 3, 1998 was issued by Manila Bldg Official Hermogenes B. Garcia, on
the basis of a Resolution dated Feb 3, 1998 issued by a committee created to act on the letter dated Oct 13,
1997 of Magsaysay

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration w/ the Sec of the DPWH and obtained a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the order of demolition

Morning of Aug 28, 1998: Emmanuel T. Lalin, w/ several men with hammers, ropes, axes and
crowbars, arrived at the complainants' residence and over their protests, demolished the building

Petitioners: respondents' act of demolishing their bldg w/o any legal authority to do so is an act of grave
coercion, punishable under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code
Magsaysay: he is one of the co-owners of the land and the was based on the lawful order of the City
Building Official of Manila and affirmed by the DPWH.
Lalin: demolition was undertaken pursuant to a duly-issued demolition order and that he was only hired
by respondent Magsaysay to implement the same.

City Prosecutor of Manila: dismissed the complaint for grave coercion for lack of merit.
Sec of Justice: denied, demolition was carried out pursuant to a duly issued demolition order.
Court of Appeals: denied the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioners: there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the filing of an
information for grave coercion against respondents
Respondents: determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is an executive function,
the correctness of which is a matter that the courts may not be compelled to pass upon

ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause for the filing of an information against respondents Magsaysay and Lalin
for the offense of grave coercion? Y

HELD:
In the instant case, we find that the acts complained of are sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause.

RATIO:
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof.

The elements of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1) that a
person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has
no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise
of any lawful right.

It is undisputed that on August 28, 1998, respondents, together with several men armed with hammers,
ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the petitioners' residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Petitioners tried to stop respondents from proceeding
with the demolition but their pleas went unheeded. Intimidated by respondents and their
demolition team, petitioners were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence
and were compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the
demolition while petitioners watched helplessly as their building was torn down. From the facts alleged in
the complaint, as well as the evidence presented in support thereof, there is prima facie showing that
respondents did not act under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

Lalin admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was hired by Magsaysay to implement the Demolition
Order. The building officials made manifestations before the TC that they were not aware of the
demolition and that Lalin is not connected with their office and denied conspiring with Magsaysay in
effecting the demolition.

Likewise, the Office of the Building Official issued an Order 13 dated Aug 28, 1998 directing respondent
Magsaysay to desist from proceeding with the demolition. On the same date, it also issued a Notice
advising respondent Lalin to stop the demolition for failing to comply with the 5-day prior notice
requirement and considering that the demolition was being effected within the 15-day reglementary
period for appeal. In another Order dated September 10, 1998, the Office of the Building Official declared
that the demolition was hastily done and in contravention of the terms and conditions of the Demolition
Order.

From the records, it is clear that a prima facie case for grave coercion exists and that there is sufficient
ground to sustain a finding of probable cause which needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Nevertheless,
respondents may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may only be determined in a full-blown
trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of the crime may be thoroughly passed
upon.

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal.

petition GRANTED. Decision of CA affirming Resolution of Sec. of Justice denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. City Prosecutor of Manila is ORDERED to file an
information for the offense of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the RPC against respondents Leon
Maria F. Magsaysay and Emmanuel T. Lalin.