The Afghan Insurgency: A Policy Brief

The War in Afghanistan has now dragged on for over a decade. Its initial goals of removing the Taliban
from power and killing key Al Qaeda operatives were accomplished years ago. However, a defiant
insurgency concentrated in the southern and eastern provinces remains problematic. The nited !tates
faces a difficult "uestion # how can it leave Afghanistan in any reasonable time frame without dooming its
shaky central government to certain failure$ The collapse of the %ar&ai government in %abul would likely
result in a bloody, protracted civil war that could easily end up with the Taliban retaking control of the
country. This outcome is unacceptable to the nited !tates' therefore a strategy must be implemented to
nullify the Afghan insurgency before the nited !tates can begin large#scale withdrawal. (ather than
escalating the conflict militarily, the most promising long term outcomes will result from undertaking
concerted efforts toward reconciliation and re#integration of Taliban fighters. This is a nuanced and
difficult approach, but as we shall see, the "uestion posed by the Afghan insurgency has no easy answers.
What is the nature of the Afghan insurgency, and how can the United States best deal
with it? This is a "uestion that has bedeviled the .!. since it launched )perating *nduring
+reedom in ,--., and one for which it has yet to find a definite long#term answer. This policy
brief will e/plore the issue and offer policy recommendations based off its conclusions.
Understanding the Problem
The Afghan insurgency is very difficult for Westerners to wrap their heads around. How
is it that a ragtag band of mountain men living in a remote region largely unchanged since
biblical times is able to stubbornly resist the most powerful military in the world$ The short
answer is simply0 because resisting powerful militaries is pretty much all these mountain men
have done since biblical times. Afghanistan has remained an elusive con"uest dating back to the
time of Ale/ander the 1reat in 2-- 3.4. His short#lived 5acedonian *mpire was unable to
con"uer the region we now call Afghanistan' the fearsome 5ongols were never able to make
lasting gains there' the 3ritish waged three unsuccessful wars before finally calling it "uits and
the !oviet nion merely accelerated its own dissolution with its decade#long Afghan
misadventure. 6ow the nited !tates finds itself waist#deep in the Afghan "uagmire with no
clear e/it in sight. If we hope to produce a better outcome than every other empire to set foot in
Afghanistan over the past two millennia, the first step lies in understanding e/actly who we7re
dealing with on the ground over there.
The Afghan insurgency is primarily represented by the Taliban, a militant group which
grew out of the resistance to !oviet occupation in the .89-s. The Taliban is composed almost
entirely of rural :ashtun tribesmen from the 1hil&ai and %a;ar confederations. The :ashtun are
Afghanistan7s largest ethnic group, and adhere to a strict ethical code known as the :ashtunwali
<=The Way of the :ashtuns=>, which dictates social norms regarding honor, ;ustice, hospitality,
revenge and loyalty. The :ashtunwali pre#dates the adoption of Islam by the :ashtuns, and
although it rarely conflicts with Islamic teaching, such is the :ashtunwali7s power over the
:ashtun people that in practice it takes precedence over even the Quran itself. The :ashtun7s
strict adherence to their ethical code can often result in behavior that seems illogical or pu&&ling
to outsiders. +or e/ample, one of the dictates of :ashtunwali is known as Nanawatai, and is
essentially a form of asylum or surrender offered to van"uished enemies. In ,--?, a wounded
.!. 6avy !*A@ was taken in by :ashtun tribesmen and given medical aid and protection
against Taliban fighters. These :ashtuns were willing to assist a man many of their neighbors
viewed as a mortal enemy in order to maintain strict adherence to their :ashtunwali code of
ethics. The Taliban protested, but ultimately could do nothing0 to egregiously defy the
:ashtunwali would be unthinkable. In a tribal society that has never been effectively governed in
over three millennia, the :ashtunwali has evolved into something above formal law, and has
become deeply ingrained into the culture and the people themselves.
The importance of understanding the :ashtunwali cannot be overstated, for it underlies
the motivations of every Taliban fighter, and in many cases is more deeply ingrained into the
fighters than even their Islamic faith. 3y fighting foreign occupying armies, the :ashtuns believe
they are defending their way of life, the :ashtunwali and their Islamic faith. They essentially
believe they are fighting to preserve their very e/istence as an independent people. +rom this
perspective, their dogged refusal to submit is more easily understood. However, the :ashtunwali
is not the only reason the Taliban has proven to be such a resolute and determined foe.
There is a cultural phenomenon among the frontier :ashtun that has e/isted for centuries0
the charismatic mullah movement. This is essentially a recurrent pattern of insurrection that
manifests itself every generation through the emergence of a new charismatic leader, or mullah,
whom :ashtun fighters rally around in their opposition to a foreign invader. The 3ritish
encountered this during the 1reat :ashtun (evolt of .98A, which was initiated by a charismatic
mullah named Hadda, who rallied his men with mystical parlor tricks and promises to turn
3ritish bullets into water. This role is currently filled in the Taliban by one 5ullah 5ohammed
)mar, commonly known as simply 5ullah )mar. @ike his predecessor Hadda a century past,
5ullah )mar found it useful to associate himself with a mystical aura. He accomplished this in
.88B by appearing atop a mos"ue in %handahar while wearing a cloak believed to have been
worn by the :rophet 5ohammed centuries before. Although this story may sound absurd to the
skeptical Western mind, this simple act was decisive in cementing 5ullah )mar7s status as a
Taliban leader. +or barely educated, illiterate :ashtun tribesmen, seeing 5ullah )mar wearing
the cloak of the :rophet was essentially witnessing him receive divine favor directly from Allah.
As a result, he en;oys a large and dedicated following as an inspirational figure, and attracts
thousands of young men to fight for the cause of ;ihad he promotes. 4onse"uently, even though
5ullah )mar has been in hiding for the past decade and has no known current operational role in
the Taliban, he continues to e/ert tremendous influence over Taliban fighters and ensures their
continued fervent resistance.
The strategies and tactics employed by the Taliban are also worth considering. It is very
easy to fall in the trap of underestimating the Taliban due to their rustic lifestyle, lack of
education and formal military training, and general ignorance of the outside world. However, this
would be a mistake. While the Taliban may lack sophistication and polish, these men are not
stupid. They know how to fight an asymmetrical guerilla war # they7ve been doing so for
millennia. Ale/ander the 1reat e/pressed his e/asperation at trying to engage the Afghanis in
pitched battles only to have them retreat on horseback for skirmishes, harassing his advance
parties and baggage train day after day. The Taliban has taken the e/act same playbook and
adapted it for the ,.st century, primarily utili&ing mountain pass ambushes of .!. military
patrols and tens of thousands of improvised e/plosive devices <I*Cs> and roadside bombs
scattered across the country.
The Taliban also makes use of the :ashtunwali code to bolster its operations as much as
possible. )ne common method they employ is deliberately fighting inside villages in order to
provoke American air strikes that will inflict collateral damage on the civilian population. The
Taliban knows that the relatives of any person killed in an American airstrike will be forced to
engage in Badal, the :ashtun custom of revenge or ;ustice. 3y inadvertently spilling :ashtun
blood in an airstrike, the nited !tates creates an entire clanDvillage of new enemies who swear
an oath to spill American blood in retribution. This is simply their custom, and it is a custom to
which the .!. military seems completely oblivious. Taliban mullahs also visit villages and
engage in both subtle and overt intimidation tactics, reminding villagers of the e/ceedingly long
memory of the Afghan people. They might tell the village elders that the Americans will stay in
Afghanistan for another five or ten years, but eventually they will leave, and when they do' the
Taliban will come back and massacre the entire family of everyone they suspect of having
collaborated with the nited !tates or the %ar&ai government. +or a rustic :ashtun farmer who
has no great love for the nited !tates to begin with, such threats only reinforce the easy
decision to provide assistance to the Taliban rather than to the occupying .!. Army. At the very
least, the Taliban can count on most :ashtun villagers to remain neutral rather than actively
conspiring against them.
It is important to again emphasi&e the intractable, fiercely independent temperament of
the :ashtun people in general and of the Taliban in particular. The Taliban can be understood as
a self#selected subset of the larger :ashtun population, a subset that represents the most
relentlessly defiant portion of an already defiant people. These are a people who have been
fighting foreign armies for millennia' it is simply a way of life for them. +or every :ashtun the
American military kills, ten of his relatives will pick up a gun and swear revenge based on
Badal. 5any of these people have little or no connection with the outside world. In his book In
the Graveyard of E!ires, !eth Eones writes of encountering :ashtun villagers in rural
Afghanistan who had never even heard of Afghan :resident Hamid %ar&ai, who had been in
office at the time for eight years. 5ore ama&ingly, Eones met Afghans who actually thought the
American military force he was traveling with were Soviets, who hadn7t set foot in the country in
thirty years. With a population so profoundly ignorant of the outside world, the Taliban has an
easy time recruiting, especially when they can point to violence inflicted by the .!. military. It7s
as simple as handing a young man a gun and telling him that the foreign invader wants to destroy
his family, his way of life and everything he7s ever known. If the .!. military happened to kill
one of his relatives, the Taliban wouldn7t even have to do anything. The young man will come
find them and beg for weapons and training to gain the revenge demanded by the :ashtunwali
and the Quran.
As we move on to discussing policy responses to the Afghan insurgency, we must keep in
mind that the insurgency itself e/ists as a result of fundamental characteristics of the :ashtun
people. These are a people whose culture demands revenge and defiance, and who simply will
not ever be cowed by force. 5any of the remaining insurgents currently fighting .!. troops in
Afghanistan were children on the day the twin towers fell. The war has dragged on for so long #
over a decade now # that the perverse reality is we are fighting an entirely new generation of
insurgents who not only had nothing to do with 8D.. or terrorism, but who can7t even e/plain
why the .!. is occupying their country in the first place. They do not particularly care, either.
They will fight us simply because we are there, for as long as we are there. And if they happen to
be killed in the process, their brothers and cousins and sons will take up arms and fight to avenge
them, and on and on it will go, for as long as it takes until one day we finally decide that enough
blood has been spilled in that barren land and leave for good.
U.S. Interests
nderstanding and effectively nullifying the Afghan insurgency is of vital importance for
the nited !tates because it is the primary stumbling block preventing the clean handover of
power to the Afghan government. The nited !tates government began its mission in
Afghanistan with the stated goal of removing the Taliban from power and capturing or killing the
Al Qaeda members they had been harboring. That mission has long since been accomplished #
the Taliban was routed from %abul within weeks of )peration *nduring +reedom7s beginning in
)ctober of ,--.. *very Al Qaeda member affiliated with the 8D.. attacks has been captured or
killed, including )sama 3in @aden. The remaining pockets of Taliban resistance are
concentrated in the !outheastern part of the country near the border with :akistan.
The fact that the Taliban has retreated to the lawless, tribal areas of the :akistani
borderland introduces a new strategic headache for the nited !tates0 the de#stabili&ation of
:akistan, a declared nuclear power. :akistan has a lengthy history intervening in the affairs of
Afghanistan, and the border is so porous in parts that many of the people living there make no
distinction between the countries at all in their daily life. The :akistani Inter#!ervices
Intelligence <I!I> actually supported and trained both the mu;ahedeen in the .89-s and the
Taliban in the .88-s. There is growing suspicion by some .!. intelligence analysts that the I!I,
or at least certain elements within the I!I, are currently supporting Afghan insurgents, as well as
the :akistani terrorist group known as Ha""ani. The worry is that the increasing activity of
terrorist groups in the tribal areas of :akistan will prove too much for the :akistani government
to control, with the worst case scenario being a collapse of the government and a resulting power
vacuum that would incite a civil war. A civil war in a nuclear power with such close ties to
terrorists and e/tremists is an unacceptable outcome, so the insurgent activity within :akistan
must somehow be eliminated or greatly reduced.
In regards to Afghanistan itself, the insurgency must be dealt with if we wish to leave the
country intact after our withdrawal. As it stands now, the central government of Hamid %ar&ai is
too weak to realistically hold on to power after the nited !tates leaves. If the nited !tates pulls
out and the central government falls, we would essentially be back to s"uare one in Afghanistan #
various warlords would fight it out for power, the Taliban would probably ultimately prove
victorious, and the entire country would be a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorist
planning and training. )ur decade#long struggle would have been entirely in vain, and we would
have s"uandered American lives and treasure with absolutely nothing to show for it. This is an
unacceptable outcome both politically and militarily, so the nited !tates must find a way to
ensure the Afghan government is sufficiently powerful to maintain itself before the .!. can
leave. nfortunately, increasing the strength of the Afghan central government has proven
problematic. It is not enough to simply give men uniforms and guns and call them military or
police. In a society with such deep tribal roots, the very idea of a central government is entirely
foreign. The notion of patriotism is alien to most Afghans' their loyalties are familial, tribal and
religious, not national. +urthermore, the central government has even less appeal when it appears
feeble and ineffective. However, power is entirely relative. If the insurgency can be sufficiently
weakened, the central government7s relative strength would increase, perhaps ade"uately enough
to allow for .!. withdrawal.
+inally, the entire Afghan mission must reach a resolution as soon as possible for fiscal
and budgetary reasons. The war is currently costing the nited !tates FG.A billion dollars per
month. 5ore and more Americans are beginning to "uestion the continued .!. presence in
Afghanistan after a decade of war, especially at a time when the nited !tates is mired in a
recession and tens of millions of Americans are out of work. The danger of not establishing a
clear strategy for de#escalating the Afghan insurgency from this perspective is that at some point
in the future the war could become so politically unpopular that 4ongress would act to
completely defund the Afghan mission, forcing a precipitous withdrawal of troops with little
notice. This would be among the worst possible scenarios, as Afghanistan would descend into
complete chaos and the central government would collapse within weeks. This outcome must be
avoided at all costs.
Existing Policies
The nited !tates has focused on employing a counter#insurgency strategy in
Afghanistan for several years now. 1eneral Cavid :etraeus literally wrote the book on this
strategy <known as 4)I6> and utili&ed it successfully in Ira". 4)I6 in Afghanistan has entailed
making efforts to reach out to the civilian population as much as possible and minimi&ing
civilian casualties at all costs. The nited !tates wants to portray itself as the protector of the
Afghan people, as an agent of peace and goodwill. To that end the .!. has invested heavily in
Afghan infrastructure, building schools, roads, bridges and other facilities to prove their good
intentions to the Afghan people. nfortunately, this has not seemed to prove particularly
effective, especially in the areas where the Taliban is most active. The .!. builds schools, but
they sit empty # parents are afraid to send their children for fear of retaliation from the Taliban. If
enough parents defy the Taliban and the school becomes popular, it often happens that the
village wakes up one morning to find that the Taliban has burned the school down over night.
+urthermore, despite their best efforts, the military has been unable to prevent repeated mistakes
leading to significant collateral damage and civilian casualties. *ach Afghan child killed by an
errant .!. bomb undoes thousands of man#hours and millions of dollars of goodwill effort the
.!. invested in the country. !imply put, it7s almost impossible to rebuild a country and bomb it
at the same time.
:resident )bama initiated an Afghan surge in ,--8, deploying an additional 22,---
troops, primarily concentrated in the southern portion of the country in the Helmand and
%andahar provinces. This allowed for a more effective 4)I6 strategy in areas that had
previously been Taliban strongholds. 4ivilian deaths have been down as a result, but by all
indications this is simply a conse"uence of the Taliban shifting operations to other parts of the
country. The Taliban has lately engaged in several successful assassinations of prominent
members of the Afghan government, including Ahmed Wali %ar&ai, the president7s half#brother
and 1eneral Caoud, the police commander of northern Afghanistan. As a result of watching one
high#profile killing after another, Afghan citi&ens are beginning to ask themselves a perfectly
rational "uestion0 =If they can7t protect themselves from the Taliban, how are they supposed to
protect us$= If the answer they come up with is negative, as it appears to be for a growing
number of citi&ens, the already declining support for the government can be e/pected to continue
withering further.
Taliban operations in the eastern borderlands have also intensified in recent years, and
Afghan Taliban fighters have been working hand#in#hand with elements of Al Qaeda in :akistan
and the Ha""ani network. .!. military operations in the areas surrounding the :akistani border
have been more focused toward counter#terrorism <4T> rather than counter#insurgency. 4T
efforts emphasi&e drone strikes against high value targets, various forms of high tech
surveillance and espionage, and carefully planned night time special operations raids on terrorist
facilities. :erhaps the best e/ample of the latter was the 5ay, ,-.. raid of a fortified compound
in Abbottabad, :akistan that resulted in the death of .!. arch#nemesis )sama 3in @aden. Crone
strikes have been responsible for the deaths of do&ens of top Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives,
the most recent high profile e/ample being the killing of Al Qaeda propagandist Anwar Al#
Awlaki in Hemen. These tactics aim to monitor terrorists and catch them by surprise at their
most vulnerable moments, rather than attempting to engage them in a more traditional military
fashion, a strategy that plays into the hands of a guerilla force like the Taliban.
3oth the 4T and the 4)I6 strategies have valid applications in a country like
Afghanistan. The trick is determining which strategy is correct to utili&e at any given time or
place. +or e/ample, a 4)I6 strategy cannot be effectively applied in an area with a heavy
concentration of enemy guerilla fighters, since their presence will disrupt efforts by the
occupying forces to reach out to the civilian population with goodwill efforts. In an area that has
a reduced presence of enemy guerilla activity, a 4)I6 strategy can be effectively implemented
and the civilian population will usually respond favorably to goodwill operations by the
occupying force. 4T strategies are the ideal choice for an area like eastern Afghanistan # rugged,
remote and crawling with insurgents. With careful monitoring of insurgent activity by drone and
satellite imagery, .!. special operations can strike high value targets when they are most
vulnerable, inflicting ma/imum damage on the enemy and increasing the likelihood of
recovering valuable intelligence.
This has essentially been the strategy the .!. military has been utili&ing in Afghanistan
for the past few years, and it has been moderately successful in killing insurgents and recovering
useful intelligence. Its long term feasibility can be called into "uestion, however, as the
insurgents seem relatively unperturbed by any setbacks. According to Eeffrey Cressler of the
Institute for the !tudy of War, Ha""ani network militants in the east regularly utili&e multiple
suicide bomb attacks, car bombs and mass infantry tactics which swarm .!. bases and convoys.
5any of their fighters are gunned down like dogs in the process, but Ha""ani knows it can rely
on an endless stream of recruits from the fundamentalist Islamic madrassas in the :akistani
border region, which pump out thousands of young men per year eager to take up ;ihad against
the American invader.
Policy Otions
@et7s take a look at a few policy options to consider in response to the continued Afghan
insurgency0
"otal #hased Withdrawal$ nder this option, the nited !tates would gradually reduce
its occupation force until finally leaving entirely, without any remaining military presence
whatsoever staying behind. Cespite the recent construction of seemingly permanent military
installations in southern Afghanistan, this is the strategy :resident )bama currently favors. The
:resident proposes to have all .!. troops withdrawn from Afghanistan by ,-.B, regardless of
the military and political situation on the ground at that time.
%a&ial %ilitary Engageent$ This would be the opposite strategy of the total phased
withdrawal. (ather than leaving, this strategy would entail a further increase in troop strength
<another .!. military surge> and a vigorous new onslaught against insurgents in the south and
east of the country. The goal would be to apply overwhelming force over a period of ,#2 years to
completely wipe out the e/isting insurgent force and dissuade potential new insurgents against
taking up ;ihad against the nited !tates. This strategy would produce increased casualties across
the board, including for the .!. military and Afghan civilian populations, and would entail a
ma;or continued .!. troop presence in Afghanistan for years to come.
'econciliation ( 'e)Integration$ This option recogni&es the numerous shades of gray
present in the Afghan conflict. The .!. military would cease large scale combat operations and
draw down most of its forces, leaving behind detachments of special operations and intelligence
forces to work with the Afghan central government. These remaining .!. forces would
concentrate on attempting to reconcile as many Taliban fighters as possible with the Afghan
government and re#integrate them into everyday Afghan life. +or factions that refused generous
offers of reconciliation and re#integration, the Afghan government and .!. could then offer
them a choice between a promise for peace in e/change for relative autonomy from the central
government in their tribal lands, or a life on the run, constantly looking over their shoulder for
un#ceasing targeting by special operations and drone attacks. This strategy would reduce .!.
troop levels by 9-#8-I within two years, with the remaining forces concentrated in a few key
bases and focused on playing peacemaker between Afghan factions.
Policy Analysis: Pros and !ons
6ow let7s consider the advantages and disadvantages of each option.
"otal #hased Withdrawal0
Advantages0
According to polling data in both the .!. and Afghanistan, the most favored option
Would reduce e/penses for the nited !tates considerably
.!. military casualties would be practically eliminated
The withdrawal of .!. forces would eliminate a ma;or raison d7etre of the Taliban
Afghans would take full ownership of their country and be more proactive in
reconstruction
Cisadvantages0
5a;or possibility of civil war if the nited !tates withdraws, destabili&ing the region
The Taliban could have free rein over much of the country, ensuring a safe haven for
terrorist activity
@ikelihood of increased violence against civilian populations
:olitical ramifications of the .!. =losing= the war and =retreating= from the Taliban
.!. would lose presence in one of the most important geostrategic locations in the world
%a&ial %ilitary Engageent$
Advantages0
Would inflict heavy damage on insurgent and terrorist activity along the borderlands
:ossibility of disrupting medium and long#term insurgent recruiting efforts
4ould serve to stabili&e the situation on the :akistani border
Would guarantee the stability of the Afghan central government for years to come
Aggressive, clear#cut mission goals could increase both troop morale and public
favorability
Cisadvantages0
.!. military and Afghan civilian casualties would both increase heavily
A politically unpopular and e/pensive war would increase in cost and duration
Increased .!. military presence in the borderlands could anger :akistani government
The guerilla tactics utili&ed by insurgents are effective in countering a large military force
Afghanistan would remain a client state for the foreseeable future, incapable of self#
government
'econciliation ( 'e)Integration$
Advantages0
*mphasis on reconciliation would give the .!. and Afghan government the moral high
ground in the eyes of the civilian population
Withdrawal of ma;ority of forces would greatly reduce military and civilian casualties
:reservation of special operations capability to facilitate compliance from recalcitrant
Taliban
Would provide Afghan citi&ens self#determination without risk of civil war
Taliban recruiting message would be greatly nullified by .!. peacemaking efforts
Cisadvantages0
Insurgents might re;ect .!. olive branch, view it as a sign of weakness and dig in their
heels
(emaining .!. forces could be spread too thin to ade"uately achieve mission goals
(econciliation of insurgents is time#consuming and its effectiveness uncertain
(e#Integration efforts could be hampered by targeted Taliban assassinations
!uch a nuanced approach would likely be a difficult sell both politically and militarily
Policy "ecommendations
There is no perfect solution to the problem posed by the Afghan insurgency. *ach choice
carries with it negative conse"uences, many of which are impossible to predict. The withdrawal
option would be the easiest and most cost#effective approach for the nited !tates, and would
allow for the ma/imum e/ercise of Afghan sovereignty in the years to come. However, in my
opinion, the risk of civil war is far too high with this option, and a withdrawal would result in
greatly increased instability in the country and the region for an indefinite period. +rom a
national security and national interest standpoint, this is too dangerous for the nited !tates to
accept. The ma/imal military engagement approach would inflict great damage on the insurgent
movement at the e/pense of destroy any remaining goodwill toward the .!. occupying force
due to the inevitable increases in civilian deaths that would take place as a result of heavy .!.
bombing. There is also no reason to believe that the .!. would be able to destroy the insurgent
movement, which as a conse"uence of the :ashtunwali code functions like a Hydra0 cut off one
head and two grow back. The (econciliation approach would be the most difficult to implement
effectively, but ultimately holds the best promise for achieving lasting results. The .!. cannot
win the peace in Afghanistan at the barrel of a gun, and it cannot win anything if it leaves the
country entirely. The .!. must make peace its priority over and above killing insurgents. The
removal of the bulk of combat troops would show the Afghans that the .!. is serious about
allowing them self#determination as a country, and would reduce the anger many insurgents feel
toward the massive .!. occupation. The small remaining contingent of special operations forces
would be ade"uate to disrupt the activities of the most intransigent Taliban who refused all
entreaties for reconciliation.
We must keep in mind the ultimate goal of any war is to win the peace. War itself is not
and must not be its own end. War and combat must only be employed to the e/tent that they
facilitate the introduction of a new peace. After a decade of war, the fighting in Afghanistan
shows no sign of letting up, and our enemy7s resolve remains as firm as ever. It7s the same
resolve that repelled Ale/ander, the 5ongols, the 3ritish *mpire and the !oviet nion. We must
learn from history rather than doom ourselves to repeat its errors. @et us not sheath the sword
entirely in favor of the olive branch, but let us give our enemies the option of peace. @et us
embody the eagle that embla&ons the great seal of our country0 its wings spread proudly, it
clutches in its right talon a cluster of arrows, representing war. In the left talon, an olive branch
represents peace. The nited !tates is prepared for war on the one hand and peace on the other.
3ut which shall prevail$ )n the great seal of the nited !tates, the bald eagle turns its head to
the left.
Toward the olive branch.
Sources !onsulted
1) Eones, !eth 1. In "he Graveyard *f E!ires, Aerica+s War In Afghanistan. W W
6orton J 4o Inc, ,-.-.
2) Eohnson, Thomas H. J 5ason, 5.4. Understanding the "aliban and Insurgency in
Afghanistan, +oreign :olicy (esearch Institute, Winter ,--A
3) !tanek&ai, 5ohammed 5asoom. "hwarting Afghanistan-s Insurgency, nited !tates
Institute of :eace. ,--9.
4) Eones, !eth 1. 'eintegrating Afghan Insurgents, (A6C 6ational Cefense (esources
Institute. ,-...
5) Ackerman, !pencer. Will the U,S, .oncede East Afghanistan to the "aliban? Wired
5aga&ine, Eune ,-...
6) :etraeus, Cavid. .ounterinsurgency /ield %anual. nited !tates Army, Cecember
,--G.
!omments
1) An e/cellent overall survey of the War in Afghanistan.
2) A paper that e/plores the background of the Taliban and the :ashtun culture.
2> A paper that gives a good overview of the path to peace in Afghanistan.
B> An in#depth analysis by Eones on the best methods of re#integrating insurgents.
?> 3rief article on eastern Afghanistan' "uote by Eeffrey Cressler.
G> The 3ible of counterinsurgency. All you would ever want to know about 4)I6.