Contents

A. ROSALES VS ROSALES ....................... 2

B. LAPUZ VS EUFEMIO ............................. 5
C. BARITUA VS CA ..................................... 8
D. SOLIVIO VS CA .................................... 11
E. FLORENTINO VS FLORENTINO ......... 19
F. EDROSO VS SABLAN .......................... 26
G. SIENES VS ESPARCIA ........................ 35
H. GONZALES VS CFI .............................. 37
I. CANO VS DIRECTOR .......................... 44



A. ROSALES VS ROSALES

GANCAYCO, J .:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the
latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on
February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow
Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross
value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the
trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the
trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal
heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R.
Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court
in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration
of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for
Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the
trial court which excluded the widow from getting
a share of the estate in question final as against
the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2)
groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation.
1
Restated, an intestate heir can
only inherit either by his own right, as in the order
of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code,
2
or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant
provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other
descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order
of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as
the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence
of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have
so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of
the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article
287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5
are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the
three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them
in the manner and to the extent established by
this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law
3
refers to the
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of
a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas,
4
to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be
determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless
a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of
the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the
said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of
the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V.
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a
share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the
Code.
The essence and nature of the right of
representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox
Rosales is called to succession by law because
of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother,
Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert
the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of
the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he
had an inchoate or contingent right to the
properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir.
Be that as it may, said right of her husband was
extinguished by his death that is why it is their
son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did
not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and
conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We
so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be
remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
B. LAPUZ VS EUFEMIO
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act
5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated
29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No.
20387, dismissing said case for legal separation
on the ground that the death of the therein
plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred
during the pendency of the case, abated the
cause of action as well as the action itself. The
dismissal order was issued over the objection of
Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff
(and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute
the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to
final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a
petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were
married civilly on 21 September 1934 and
canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her;
that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa
Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition,
herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses, and, along with
several other claims involving money and other
properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok,
alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and
the parties adduced their respective evidence.
But before the trial could be completed (the
respondent was already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969),
petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a
vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for
petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to
dismiss the "petition for legal separation"
1
on two
(2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period
provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased
petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel
for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order
under review, dismissing the case.
2
In the body
of the order, the court stated that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the
plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the
court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved
to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15
September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a
petition for review of the order of dismissal issued
by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October
1969. The same was given due course and
answer thereto was filed by respondent, who
prayed for the affirmance of the said order.
3

Although the defendant below, the herein
respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the
court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced
in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying
for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not
only the petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her
self-assumed substitute for the lower court did
not act on the motion for substitution) stated the
principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted
by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of
nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party
abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a
supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to
one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which
is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that
"the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal
of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22).
Not only this. The petition for legal separation
and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the
self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable
nor was the action for legal separation converted
into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a
valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a
voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death
of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for
legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will
abatement also apply if the action involves
property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce
in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and
in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses
can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to
the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no
need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the
suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during
the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871,
D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933,
332.")
4
.
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created
under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose
of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence
of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of
the parties to such action abates the action, for
the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived
the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter
of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of
either party to a divorce proceeding, before final
decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;
Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v.
Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196
N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17
Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620,
41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark.
452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md.
185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128
Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141.
5

The same rule is true of causes of action and
suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson
vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property
relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;
hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the
point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the
absolute conjugal community of property shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community,
without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be
awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
otherwise directed by the court in the interest of
said minors, for whom said court may appoint a
guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified
from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of
law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the
loss of right by the offending spouse to any share
of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of
the offending spouse made by the innocent one,
are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by
their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable
or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is
not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after
a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the
action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased, within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the
enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may
not be brought against executor or administrator.
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money
or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions
to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for
annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly
included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal
separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these
rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio
for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action
became moot and academic upon the death of
the latter, and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a
result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not
been void ab initio but only voidable under Article
83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been
generally believed dead, still the action for
annulment became extinguished as soon as one
of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the
parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation
of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out "in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse", as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised
Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the
Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

C. BARITUA VS CA
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as
erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws
and applicable jurisprudence the decision
1
of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987
which reversed and set aside that of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines
Sur.
2
The challenged decision adjudged the
petitioners liable to the private respondents in the
total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle
then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along
the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano,
in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident
with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar
Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner
Jose Baritua.
3
As a result of that accident
Bienvenido and his passenger died
4
and the
tricycle was damaged.
5
No criminal case arising
from the incident was ever instituted.
6

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a
consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of
the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the
bus insurer Philippine First Insurance
Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity)
Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In
consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of
Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI,
releasing and forever discharging them from all
actions, claims, and demands arising from the
accident which resulted in her husband's death
and the damage to the tricycle which the
deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise
executed an affidavit of desistance in which she
formally manifested her lack of interest in
instituting any case, either civil or criminal,
against the petitioners.
7

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and
ten months from the date of the accident on
November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who
are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners
with the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur.
8
In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that during the vigil for their
deceased son, the petitioners through their
representatives promised them (the private
respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement,
they shall be indemnified for the death of their
son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason
thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the
purchase price of which they (the private
respondents) only loaned to the victim. The
petitioners, however, reneged on their promise
and instead negotiated and settled their
obligations with the long-estranged wife of their
late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the
defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to
indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for
the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for
the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for
compensatory and exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral
damages.
9

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the
complaint, holding that the payment by the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and
her child, who are the preferred heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased
Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the
plaintiffs (herein private respondents),
extinguished any claim against the defendants
(petitioners).
10

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the judgment of the trial court.
The appellate court ruled that the release
executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did
not discharge the liability of the petitioners
because the case was instituted by the private
respondents in their own capacity and not as
"heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns"
of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived
the damages being prayed for (by the private
respondents) since she was not the one who
suffered these damages arising from the death of
their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said
that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony
of the appellants (private respondents) that they
were the ones who bought the tricycle that was
damaged in the incident. Appellants had the
burden of proof of such fact, and they did
establish such fact in their testimony . . .
11
Anent
the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the
funeral were likewise shouldered by the
appellants (the private respondents). This was
never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners).
. . . Payment (for these) were made by the
appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must
accrue in their favor.
12

Consequently, the respondent appellate court
ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the
tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00
fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees.
13
The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision
14
but their motion was denied.
15
Hence,
this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent
appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners are still liable to pay the private
respondents the aggregate amount of
P20,505.00 despite the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners
and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes
among them being by payment. Article 1231 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid
their obligation petition arising from the accident
that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only
question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse
and the one who received the petitioners'
payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
enumerates the persons to whom payment to
extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in
whose favor the obligation has been constituted,
or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and
her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons
authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code
states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants with respect to their legitimate
children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article
287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5
are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2.
Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other
hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all
classes of heirs. As it has been established that
Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they
begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted
correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as
the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural
guardian of their lone child. This is so even if
Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere
estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir
of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged
creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may
be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged
tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his
funeral, the said purchase price and expenses
are but money claims against the estate of their
deceased son.
16
These money claims are not
the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have
said, had been released by the agreement of the
extra-judicial settlement they concluded with
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's
widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
D. SOLIVIO VS CA
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated
January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for
the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-
half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant.
From both shares shall be equally deducted the
expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related
expenditures. Against the share of defendants
shall be charged the expenses for scholarship,
awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory
of the entire estate property, including but not
limited to, specific items already mentioned in this
decision and to render an accounting of the
property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00
as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist,
Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-
war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn,"
who died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.
His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster
half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2)
the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died
barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four
months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of
Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High
School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal
properties (various parcels of land in Calinog,
Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo,
Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but
no conjugal property was acquired during her
short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all
her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than
once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart
attack on February 26,1977 without having set up
the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and
Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of
helping indigent students in their schooling.
Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her
"Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27,
1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she
stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated
facts in the immediately preceding paragraph
[that herein movant is also the relative of the
deceased within the third degree, she being the
younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana,
father of the decedent herein], because prior to
the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent
and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia
would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later,
she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying
that letters of administration be issued to her; that
she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and
that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition,
as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done
for three reasons: (1) because the properties of
the estate had come from her sister, Salustia
Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest
relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as
sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the
estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now
Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of
the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations
of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No.
0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978,
Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because
she too was an heir of the deceased. On October
27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of
appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January
7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil
Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in
favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the
execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia
averred that the properties of the deceased had
already been transferred to, and were in the
possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her
motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010).
On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming
the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this
petition for review wherein she raised the
following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's
share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even
while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No.
2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same
court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented
from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through
extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were
subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia,
his relative within the third degree on his mother's
side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of
the estate after she had agreed to place the
same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation
has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find
merit in the petitioner's contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's
action for partition and recovery of her share of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the
probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet
no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir,
and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery
of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration
and thus far relieves the administrator from his
duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil.
367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56
SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No.
2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the
end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the
last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the
estate." The pertinent portions of the order are
quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for
Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole
Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the
record that despite the notices posted and the
publication of these proceedings as required by
law, no other heirs came out to interpose any
opposition to the instant proceeding. It further
appears that herein Administratrix is the only
claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration
as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established
that the late Esteban Javellana died single,
without any known issue, and without any
surviving parents. His nearest relative is the
herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his
late mother who reared him and with whom he
had always been living with [sic] during his
lifetime.
x x x x x x x x x
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this
estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal
heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died
intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo
City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry
up with the settlement of this estate so that it can
be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate
proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First
Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia
as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her
share of the properties of the deceased, was
properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her
remedy when the court denied her motion, was to
elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for
review on certiorari. However, instead of availing
of that remedy, she filed more than one year
later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate
action was improperly filed for it is the probate
court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere
with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695,
January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a
daughter filed a separate action to annul a project
of partition executed between her and her father
in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate delivered to
the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality
of the approval of the project of The probate
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the
proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent
in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and
legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold
that a separate and independent action is
necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding
multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive,
dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio,
70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the
only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the
range of the administratrix proceedings and can
not properly be made an independent action.
(Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is
not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA
1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v.
Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order
of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not
final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not
elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
(Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24,
1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.
455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where
despite the pendency of the special proceedings
for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants
filed a civil action in which they claimed that they
were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to
inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to
Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case
declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in
question were paraphernal properties of his wife,
Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only
heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such
declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only
heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case
No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and,
will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the
estate proceedings had been closed and
terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition was allowed
to continue. Considering that in the instant case,
the estate proceedings are still pending, but
nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings,
We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the
merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the
probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly
Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and
declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of
Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering
the partition of the estate, and requiring the
administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory
and accounting of the estate, were improper
and officious, to say the least, for these matters
he within the exclusive competence of the
probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the
intestate proceedings by extrinsic
fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy
that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in
Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No.
13207. It was only in her amended complaint of
March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged
for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of
judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing
party which prevented a fair submission of the
controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A
fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial
or presenting all of his case to the court, or one
which operates upon matters pertaining, not to
the judgment itself, but to the manner by which
such judgment was procured so much so that
there was no fair submission of the controversy.
For instance, if through fraudulent machination by
one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to
withdraw his defense or was prevented from
presenting an available defense or cause of
action in the case wherein the judgment was
obtained, such that the aggrieved party was
deprived of his day in court through no fault of his
own, the equitable relief against such judgment
may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R,
July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v.
Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of
extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside
the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into
the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-
21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however,
unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special
proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia.
She admitted in her complaint that she and
Celedonia had agreed that the latter would
"initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the
taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus
paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement
of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at
the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the
defendant shall initiate the necessary
proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and
other obligations, and to do everything else
required by law, and thereafter, secure the
partition of the estate between her and the
plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they
agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement
was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2,
Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from
intervening in the proceedings. She stayed
away by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother,
Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in
rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of
the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3,
Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's
original petition was published in the "Visayan
Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4,
p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of
her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the
settlement of the estate was, by order of the
court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New
Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp.
182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of
the proceedings was constructive notice to the
whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her
right to intervene in the proceedings for she had
actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
As pointed out by the probate court in its order of
October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however,
was filed about five months after Celedonia
Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem
and had been duly published as required by law,
despite which the present movant only came to
court now, then she is guilty of laches for
sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not
comply with the requisites of a petition for relief
from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum
8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory
jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was
in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are
available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean
132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was
the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree
on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it
was made in good faith and in the honest belief
that because the properties of Esteban had come
from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is
the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole
heirship if she stated in her petition that
Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so
state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the
court, matters which would defeat one's own
claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will
justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49
C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v.
Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW
2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for
administration of a decedent's estate may be filed
by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition
did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that
the estate of the deceased was subject
to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as
his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads
as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the
reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits
by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved
are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives
within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the
line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received
by gratuitous title and died without issue, making
his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.
(p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject
to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia
Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree
on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies
to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply
to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered
by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died
without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and
1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor
sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held
that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant
being relatives of the decedent within the third
degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction
of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled
one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate.
(p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to
deliver the estate of the deceased to the
foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came),
an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in
her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they
(petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been
visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record;
Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by
that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance
in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place
all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban,
Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor
his mother and to finance the education of
indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the
lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented
to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-
20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018;
People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned
by Concordia who, significantly, did not even
testify in the case, although she could have done
so by deposition if she were supposedly
indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband,
Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed
the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his
wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of
her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation" was established and
duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the
following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting
up of scholarships for such deserving students as
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may
decide of at least one scholar each to study at
West Visayas State College, and the University
of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in
Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one
scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist
Community for a deserving student who has the
religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities
that will promote the advancement and
enrichment of the various fields of educational
endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may
be named after its benevolent benefactors as a
token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in
the community to determine community needs
and be able to alleviate partially or totally said
needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary
activities for the proper care of the Solivio-
Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King
Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a
token of appreciation for the contribution of the
estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has
made this foundation possible. Also, in
perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and
those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
equivalents will be offered every February and
October, and Requiem masses every February
25th and October llth, their death anniversaries,
as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations,
contributions, endowments and financial aids or
loans from whatever source, to invest and
reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and
pay or apply only the income or such part thereof
as shall be determined by the Trustees for such
endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the
objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate,
develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange,
sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal,
in any manner permitted by law, in real and
personal property of every kind and description or
any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things
necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
enumerated or which shall at any time appear
conducive to the protection or benefit of the
corporation, including the exercise of the powers,
authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10,
Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for
review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982,
and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana
scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV
graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude
and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez
award for teaching for being the most outstanding
student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars
in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which
was donated by the Foundation. The School has
been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School
for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert
Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He
studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional
Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise
is a member of the Redemptorist Association that
gives yearly donations to help poor students who
want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers.
It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known
as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the
Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the
West Visayas State University for teachers' and
students' use, and has likewise contributed to
religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the
decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia
is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.
The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.
However, comformably with the agreement
between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio,
the entire estate of the deceased should be
conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javallana Foundation," of which both the
petitioner and the private respondent shall be
trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate
an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall
administer the same for the purposes set forth in
its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an
inventory and accounting of the estate of the
deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
E. FLORENTINO VS
FLORENTINO
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion
(together with her husband Simeon Serrano),
Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino,
and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for
Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the
minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson,
the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia,
Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the
surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio
Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and
Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against
Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging
as follows:chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the
first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the
marriage he begot nine children called, Jose,
Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita,
Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a
widower he married the second time Severina
Faz de Leon with whom he had two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he
was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon and the ten children first above mentioned;
that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on
the following 4th of March 1890.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's
aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria andIsabel died single, without
leaving any ascendants or
descendants; that Ramon, Miguel,
Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate
children of the deceased Jose Florentino who
was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad,
and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita
Florentino, now deceased, and her husband
Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the
children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.chanrobl esvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will
before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting
as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten
children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his
widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in
one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property
should be divided among all of his children of
both marriages.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibrar y chanrobl es virt ual lawli brar y
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate,
there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his
posthumos son, the property marked with the
letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a
gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table
service, livestock, palay, some personal property
and other objects mentioned in the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawli brar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son
of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all
his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November
18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of
her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among
same is included the property, described in the
complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos
Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a
reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino
deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that
each and every one of the parties mentioned in
said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the
fruits of the reservable property described
therein, either by direct participation or by
representation, in the manner mentioned in
paragraph 9 of the complaint.chanroblesvir tualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an
amicable manner, asked the defendants to
deliver their corresponding part of the reservable
property; that without any justifiable motive the
defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver
said property or to pay for its value; that for nine
years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving,
as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of
corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the
plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of
fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight
pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to
three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight
centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered,
of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the
unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned
reservable property and for the expenses of this
suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all
the foregoing property is reservable property; that
the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same,
in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the
aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint;
that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her
husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs
their share of the property in question, of the
palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their
value; and that they be condemned to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this
instance.chanroblesvirt ualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
To the preceding complaint counsel for the
defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of
action is based on the obligation of the widow
Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property
she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio
Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same
from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that,
there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to
be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de
Leon did not remarry after the death of this
husband nor have any natural child; that the right
claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in
article 968 and the following articles, but that
established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that
the object of the provisions of the aforementioned
articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable
property to those extraneous to the family of the
owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the
widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased
son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property
which originated from his father and her
husband) has all passed into the hands of the
defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a
daughter of the common ancestor's second
marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with
the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident
that the property left at the death of the
posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de
Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant,
into the hands of strangers; that said property
having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y
Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article
811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to
the present case because, when the defendant
Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and
succeeded to, the possession, of the property
lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz
de Leon, said property had, while in the
possession of her mother, lost the character of
reservable property - there being a legitimate
daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right
to succeed her in all her rights, property and
actions; that the restraints of the law whereby
said property may not passed into the possession
of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said
widow had no obligation to reserve same, as
Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the
present case, there is no property reserved for
the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress,
entitled to the property left by the death of the
widow Severina Faz de Leon who never
remarried; that the obligation to reserve is
secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime;
that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz
de Leon was in duty bound to respect the
legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant;
that her obligation to reserve the property could
not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime
which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in
support of these statements the decision of the
supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that,
finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil
Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose
the exclusion of the defendant from here right to
succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and
actions left by her legitimate mother, although the
said defendant has a better right than the
plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the
property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs,
as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law
which invalidates any law depriving any person of
an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that
the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the
plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22,
1918, the judge absolved the defendants from
the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to
pay the costs.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order,
moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial;
said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected
thereto and filed the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was allowed, certified and
forwarded to the clerk of this court.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer
of the defendants to the complaint of the
plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to
amend their complaint within the period
prescribed by the rules - undoubtedly believing
that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the
facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as
both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged
in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every
question reduced itself to one of the law, already
submitted to the decision of the court - the said
judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure
established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and
by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of
the instance.chanroblesvirt ualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the
defendants, instead of answering the complaint
of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a
demurrer based on the ground that the facts
alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause
of action. However, the judge preferred to
absolve the defendants, thereby making an end
to the cause, instead of dismissing the same,
because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the
controversy between the parties, that the
arguments adduced to support the demurrer
would be the same which the defendants would
allege in their answer - those dealing with a mere
question of law which the courts would have to
decide - and that, the demurrer having been
sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist - they
could do no less - upon alleging the same facts
as those set out in their complaint and if another
demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be
obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs - in spite of being
undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that
the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the
action stated in their complaint.chanroblesvirt ualawli brar y chanr obles virtual l awlibr ar y
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the
indicated defects is not necessary - as in this
case what has been done does not prejudice the
parties - the appellate court will now proceed to
decide the suit according to its merits, as found in
the record and to the legal provisions applicable
to the question of law in controversy so that
unnecessary delay and greater expense may be
avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary
proceedings be followed, the suit would be
subsequently decided in the manner and terms
that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully
and conscientiously formed for its
determination.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ary chanrobl es virt ual lawli brar y
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are
not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions
of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the
same article is applicable to the question of law
presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine
whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5
of the complaint is of the nature of reservable
property; and if so, whether in accordance with
the provision of the Civil Code in article 811,
Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who
inherited said property from her son Apolonio
Florentino III (born after the death of his father
Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve
and reserve same for the relatives, within the
third degree, of her aforementioned deceased
son Apolonio III.chanroblesvir tualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for
the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property
came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two
children were born, namely the defendant
Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III
(born after the death of his father). At the death of
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his
eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he
left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio
III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned
property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891
the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother
Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property
he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908,
instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving
daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant
herein, who took possession of all property left by
her father, same constituting the inheritance.
Included in said inheritance is the property,
specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino, and which, at the death of the said
posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina
left in her will said property, together with her
own, to her only daughter and forced heiress,
Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property
had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it
originated from the common ancestor of the
litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his
son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by
operation of law) to his legitimate mother and
ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibrar y chanrobl es virt ual lawli brar y
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
acquired the property, now claimed by his
brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from
his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was
inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according
to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the
property thus acquired for the benefit of the
relatives, within the third degree, of the line from
which such property came.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibrar y chanrobl es virt ual lawli brar y
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do
not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason
that said law imposes the obligation to reserve
and preserve same for certain designated
persons who, on the death of the said
ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration
the nature of the line from which such property
came) acquire the ownership of said property in
fact and by operation of law in the same manner
as forced heirs ( because they are
also such) - said property reverts to said line
as long as the aforementioned persons who, from
the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in
fact the right of reservatarios (person for
whom property is reserved), and are relatives,
within the third degree, of the descendant from
whom the reservable property came.chanroblesvir tualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property, while there are living, within the
third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but
a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable
property received. He is, however, the legitimate
owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime,
according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third
degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said
property becomes free property, by operation of
law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of
the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his
death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its
nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto
at the death of the relatives,
calledreservatarios, who belonged within
the third degree to the line from which such
property came.chanroblesvirtualawli brar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there are relatives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, calledreservatario,
over the property which
the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of
the one more remote. The right of representation
cannot be alleged when the one claiming same
as a reservatario of the reservable
property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are the
relatives, within the third degree, of the person
from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
In spite of what has been said relative to the right
of representation on the part of one alleging his
right as reservatario who is not within the
third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is
right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the
reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)
who are the brothers of the said deceased
person and relatives within the third degree in
accordance with article 811 of the Civil
Code.chanr oblesvirt ualawlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
In this case it is conceded without denial by
defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion,
Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate
children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon,
Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both
grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II,
and children of his deceased son, Jose
Florentino; that the same have the right to
represent their aforementioned father, Jose
Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad,
and Dolores are the legitimate children of the
deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the
daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and represent the right of their
aforementioned mother; and that the other
plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right
to represent their legitimate father Pedro
Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,
admitted by both parties, that the other children
of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that
this decision does not deal with them.chanroblesvirtualawli brar y chanrobles virt ual l awlibr ar y
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are
entitled to the reservable property left at the
death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his
three children of his first marriage - Encarnacion,
Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose,
Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their
own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes
Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage.
All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the
deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
within the third degree (four of whom being his
half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his
nephews as they are the children of his three
half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives
within the third degree in their own right and the
other twelve are such by representation, all of
them are indisputably entitled
as reservatarios to the property which
came from the common ancestor, Apolonio
Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance
during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to
his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code already cited, the trial judge refused to
accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting
that of the defendants, absolved the latter from
the complaint on the ground that said article is
absolutely inapplicable to the instant case,
inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino
survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the
reservable property came and her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant
Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina
Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that
when she inherited the property left at the death
of her mother, together with that which came
from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the
fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was
thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger
that the property coming from the same line
might fall into the hands of strangers had been
avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the
part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the
property of the deceased Apolonio III never did
come into existence because there is a forced
heiress who is entitled to such property.chanr oblesvirt ualawlibr ar y chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
The judgment appealed from is also founded on
the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does
not destroy the system of legitimate succession
and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply
said article in the instant case would be
permitting the reservable right to reduce and
impair the forced legitimate which exclusively
belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in
violation of the precept of article 813 of the same
Code which provides that the testator cannot
deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the
cases expressly determined by law. Neither can
he impose upon it any burden, condition, or
substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the
provisions concerning the usufruct of the
surviving spouse, citing the decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.chanroblesvirtualawli brar y chanrobles
virt ual lawli brar y
The principal question submitted to the court for
decision consists mainly in determining whether
they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was
not invested with the character of reservable
property when it was received by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon.chanroblesvirt ualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awli brar y
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in
paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any
doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor
Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of
Apolonio III without issue the same passed by
operation of law into the hands of his legitimate
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the
provision of article 811 of the Code, with the
object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of person other
than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio
Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this
property was in fact clothed with the character
and condition of reservable property when
Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her
son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the
dominion or right of ownership but only the right
of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary
obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it
as such reservable property to her deceased
son's relatives within the third degree, among
whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.chanroblesvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles
virt ual lawli brar y
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls
under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his
own property nor become the legitimate of his
forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in
case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said
reservable property losses such character.chanroblesvirtualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have
disposed in her will of all her own property in
favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever
provision there is in her will concerning the
reservable property received from her son
Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the otherreservatarios,
the half brothers and nephews of her daughter
Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation
to preserve and to deliver same to
thereservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.chanroblesvirt ualawli brar y chanr obles virtual l awlibr ar y
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon
an express provision of law, that by operation of
law all of the reservable property, received during
lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son,
Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the
legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said
property did not come to be the legitimate and
exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her
only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant
Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law
and in accordance with the order of legitimate
succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as
well as herself are entitled to such reservable
property.chanroblesvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed
that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming
from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz
de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and
the application of article 811 of the Code to the
instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the
defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she
is entitled to a part only of the reservable
property, there being no lawful or just reason
which serves as real foundation to disregard the
right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the
third degree, to participate in the reservable
property in question. As these relatives are at
present living, claiming for it with an indisputable
right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful
motive why their rights should not be upheld and
why they should not be granted equal
participation with the defendant in the litigated
property.chanroblesvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
The claim that because of Severina Faz de
Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes,
the property received from the deceased son
Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of
reservable property; and that the mother, the said
Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to
reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently
erroneous for the reason that, as has been
already stated, the reservable property, left in a
will by the aforementioned Severina to her only
daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the
inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate
of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a
forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance,
does not relieve Severina of her obligation to
reserve the property which she received from her
deceased son, nor did same lose the character of
reservable property, held before
the reservatarios received same.chanrobl esvirt ual awlibrar y chanrobl es virt ual lawli brar y
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the
heiress of the reservista Severina, took
possession of the property in question, same did
not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is
likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the
only reservataria. And there is no reason
founded upon law and upon the principle of
justice why the otherreservatarios, the
other brothers and nephews, relatives within the
third degree in accordance with the precept of
article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived
of portions of the property which, as reservable
property, pertain to them.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ary chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
From the foregoing it has been shown that the
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of
Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of
articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil
Code is not applicable in the instant case.chanr oblesvirt ualawlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
Following the provisions of article 813, the
Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of
the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired
and said article is expressly respected in this
decision.chanrobl esvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to
defend their supposed rights, it has not been
shown, upon any legal foundation, that the
reservable property belonged to, and was under
the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there
being relatives within the third degree of the
person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the
forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed
part of the legitime of the former; and that the
said forced heiress, in addition to being
a reservataria, had an exclusive right to
receive all of said property and to deprive the
other reservatarios, her relatives within
the third degree of certain portions thereof.chanrobl esvirtual awlibrar y chanrobles virt ual l awli brar y
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to
the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the
fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for
there is no evidence of any damage which can
give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As
to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced
by the land forming the principal part of the
reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the
plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the
portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the
quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same,
from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint
was filed; and the remaining seventh part should
go to the defendant Mercedes.chanr obl esvirt ual awlibr ar y chanr obl es virt ual law librar y
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the
reversal of the order of decision appealed from
we should declare, as we hereby do, that the
aforementioned property, inherited by the
deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son
Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property;
that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to
six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the
defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining
seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with
her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to
the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or
rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of
the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until
fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the
complaint is denied, without special findings as to
the costs of both instances. So ordered.chanroblesvir tualawli brar y chanrobles virtual l awlibr ar y
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm
and Avancea, JJ., concur.
F. EDROSO VS SABLAN
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the
registration of certain property classified as
required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso
applied for registration and issuance of title to two
parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare
77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare
6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were
filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard
and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano
Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In
this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who
was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his
father's death inherited the two said parcels.
Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and
without issue and by this decease the two parcels
of land passed through inheritance to his mother,
Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan
that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her
the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of
E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration and the application appealed through
a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court
held that the parcels of land in question partake
of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved and that in such a case application
could only be presented jointly in the names of
the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro
Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea
advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter
of the application are required by law to be
reserved a contention we regard as
indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from
her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his
ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by
inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise
acquired them by inheritance from his
ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him
in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. These are
admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the
hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for
he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for what he receives; and a very definite
conclusion of law also is that the uncles german
are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant,
or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law
for the relatives who are within the third degree
and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan,
inherited from him these two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and
belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria
Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded.
The trial court's ruling that they partake of the
nature property required by law to be reserved is
therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven
that the two parcels of land in question have
been acquired by operation of law, and that only
property acquired without a valuable
consideration, which is by operation of law, is
required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was
not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance
was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the
property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes
the alleged right required by law to be reserved,
of which the opponents speak; hence,
prescription of the right of action; and finally,
opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting
that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say,
although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from
her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without
issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of
fact, without any objection on the appellant's part.
(B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died
without issue, his mother became his heir by
virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under
article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his ascendants
shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the
heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands
had passed into her possession by free disposal
in her son's will; but the case presents no
testamentary provision that demonstrate any
transfer of property from the son to the mother,
not by operation of law, but by her son's wish.
The legal presumption is that the transfer of the
two parcels of land was abintestate or by
operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the
predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334,
No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil
Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will
as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be
reserved, but only what he would have perforce
left her as the legal portion of a legitimate
ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is
constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of
the children and descendants. The latter may
unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the
exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal
portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to
the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be
reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil
Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two
parcels of land which are the subject matter of
the application are required by law to be
reserved, because the interested party has not
proved that either of them became her
inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir
or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that
a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired
by his mother by operation of law. The law
provides that the other half is also presumed to
be acquired by operation of law that is, by
intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset
this presumption must be presented by the
interested party, that is, that the other half was
acquired by the man's wish and not by operation
of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible
that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be
reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in
the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following
statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo
Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to
my house and said that those rice lands were
mine, because we had already talked about
making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as
stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant
and must be delivered to her it cannot be
deduced that he renounced the right required by
law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for
they really belong to her and must be delivered to
her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the
defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's
right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the
property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of
section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds:
"Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved
by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight
allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what
those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor
did she do so in first instance, where she says
only the following, which is quoted from the
record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the
right required by law to be reserved in the
property; I refer to the prescription of the right of
action of those who are entitled to
the guaranty of that right for seeking that
guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right
the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember
correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right
of action, such right of action for seeking here
that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of
action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of
action for guaranteeing in the property registry
that this property is required by law to be
reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of
action has prescribed for requiring the applicant
to constitute the mortgage imposed by the
Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness
of the required by law to be reserved; but
because that right of action has prescribed, that
property has not been divested of its character of
property required by law to be reserved; that it
has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the
Civil Code, which went into effect in the
Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue
of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect
in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from
December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which
under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the
character of property reserved by operation of
law was such independently of the Mortgage
Law, which did not yet form part of the positive
legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country
since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by
granting the right of action to the persons in
whose favor the right is reserved by operation of
law to require of the person holding the property
a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer
for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that
to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to
lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the
principal obligation and the mortgage the
accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory
does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and
sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be
reserved in the two parcels of land in question
being indisputable, even though it be admitted
that the right of action which the Mortgage Law
grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such
right has prescribed, the only thing to be
determined by this appeal is the question raised
in the first assignment of error, that is, how said
two parcels of land can and ought to be
registered, not in the property registry newly
established by the Mortgage Law, but in the
registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as
the have slipped into the allegations quoted some
rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an
intricate subject as this of the rights required to
be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not
be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the
appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and
consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty
years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on
May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December
1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the
renovation of the law on real property, and
consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines
in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be
reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as
set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811,
the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the
children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have
required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer
without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that
went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be
applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the
Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil
Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the
right in favor of the children of the first marriage
when their father or mother contracts a second
marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the
supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth
in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894,
has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978
of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right
required to be reserved in the property refer
especially to the spouses who contract second or
later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be
applicable to the right establishes in article 811,
because, aside from the legal reason, which is
the same in both cases, such must be the
construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set forth in
the chapter that deals with inheritances in
common, either testate or intestate, and because
article 968, which heads the section that deals in
general with property required by law to be
reserved, makes reference to the provisions in
article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the
common nature of said provisions not to hold
them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal,
December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the
Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights
required by law to the reserved to which said
articles refer, are applicable to the special right
dealt with in article 811, because the same
principle exists and because of the general
nature of the provisions of the chapter in which
they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred
that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a
case had occurred of a right required to be
reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to
such right would have been able to institute,
against the ascendant who must make the
reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the
children of a first marriage against their father or
mother who has married again. The proceedings
for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of
the property subject to the right reserved,
annotation in the property registry of such right
reserved in the real property and appraisal of the
personal property; and the guaranty, under article
978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of
realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into
effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines
this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which
may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of
assurance and guaranty provided for the right
reserved in article 968, but there is a positive
provision of said law, which is an advantage over
the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read
thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right
reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only
be required by the relatives in whose favor the
property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if
minors, it will be require by the person who
should legally represent them. In either case the
right of the persons in whose favor the property
must be reserved will be secured by
the same requisites as set forth in the preceding
article (relative to the right reserved by article 968
of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection
2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of
the Civil Code refers, for the property required to
be reserved, upon the property of the person
obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both
the litigating parties agree that the period of
ninety days fixed for the right of action to the
guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that
guarantees the effectiveness of the right required
by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is
necessary to lay down a principle in this matter.
Now it should by noted that such action has not
prescribed, because the period of ninety days
fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise
of the right of action of the persons entitled to the
right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the
obligation of the person who must make the
reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass
without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers,
the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to
the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of
the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article
199 of the law the proceedings to which article
190 thereof refers will be instituted within the
ninety days succeeding the date of the date of
the acceptation of the inheritance by the person
obligated to reserve the property; after this period
has elapsed, the interested parties may require
the institution of such proceedings, if they are of
age; and in any other case, their legal
representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the
ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of
the period for the right must be reserved, but
really the commencement thereof, enables them
to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in
the law. So, if the annotation of the right required
by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question must be made in the property registry of
the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may
now institute proceedings to that end, and an
allegation of prescription against the exercise of
such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not
allege prescription of the right of action
for requiring that the property be reserved, for
she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the
case presents no necessity for the proceedings
that should be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription
of the right of action cannot take place, because
such right of action does not exist with reference
to instituting proceedings for annotation in the
registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property
required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as
was done in the present case, to intervene in the
registration proceedings with the claim set up by
the two opponents for recording therein the right
reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial
court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land
undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the
application cannot be made except in the name
of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title
consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of,
and recover. The person who has in himself all
these rights has the absolute or complete
ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person
who has the right to use and enjoy will have the
usufruct, and the person who has the rights of
disposal and recovery the direct title. The person
who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of
usufruct has the first two rights or using an
enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee
simple that is, the rights of disposal and
recovery, which pertain to another who, after the
usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of
error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person
who holds it subject to the reservation of article
811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those
of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to
the person in whose favor the reservation is
made. If that were so, the person holding the
property could not apply for registration of title,
but the person in whose favor it must be
reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion
does not seem to be admissible, although it
appears to be supported by decisions of the
supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and
June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of
June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the
enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at
two salient points the usufruct and the fee
simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become
obscure in the presence of that deceptive
emphasis which only brings out two things: that
the person holding the property will enjoy it and
that he must keep what he enjoys for other
persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that
the third opinion can now be maintained that
is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged
by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such
theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a
descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of the right of
ownership belong to him exclusively use,
enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary
title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line
whence the property proceeds or they die before
the ascendant heir who is the possessor and
absolute owner of the property. If there should be
relatives within the third degree who belong to
the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.
The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate
rights that the law wishes to be effective. The
opinion which makes this limitation consist in
reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of
a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of
disposal and recovery, does not seem to have
any support in the law, as it does not have,
according to the opinion that he has been
expressed in speaking of the rights of the father
or mother who has married again. There is a
marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs,
one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article
811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In
the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that
the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and
recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way
perform any act of disposal of the hereditary
property (except that he may dispose of the right
of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of
article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of
recovery thereof except the limited one in the
form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself,
because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the
ascendants who holds the property required by
article 811 to be reserved, and the father of
mother required by article 986 to reserve the
right, can dispose of the property they might
itself, the former from his descendant and the
latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it,
while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot
perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of
recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or
mother required by article 9687 to reserve the
right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be
reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall
be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate
children or descendants of the first marriage
survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid,
although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of
the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the
property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed
without a right to do so and without a right which
he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says
that the alienation subsists (to subject is to
continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of
this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent that are still pending may mortgage
or alienate it, provided always that he preserve
the right of the parties interested in said
conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants
of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the
alienation so long as the condition subsequent is
pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse
who must reserve the right is alive, because it
might easily happen that the person who must
reserve the right should outlive all the person in
whose favor the right is reserved and then there
would be no reason for the condition subsequent
that they survive him, and, the object of the law
having disappeared, the right required to be
reserved would disappear, and the alienation
would not only be valid but also in very way
absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation
is valid when the right required by law to be
reserved to the children is respected; while the
effects of the alienation depend upon a condition,
because it will or will not become definite, it will
continue to exist or cease to exist, according to
circumstances. This is what the law establishes
with reference to the reservation of article 968,
wherein the legislator expressly directs that the
surviving spouse who contracts a second
marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership.
Article 811 says nothing more than that the
ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes
the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right
required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution
in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives
within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have
only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary
who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set
forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he
is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the
manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but
the Direccion General of the registries, in an
opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles
974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy,
for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal
in the clearest manner the attitude of the
legislator on this subject, and the relatives with
the third degree ought not to be more privileged
in the right reserved in article 811 than the
children in the right reserved by article 975,
chiefly for the reason that the right required to be
reserved carries with it a condition subsequent,
and the property subject to those conditions can
validly be alienated in accordance with article 109
of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue,
pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code,
VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing
in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a
condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there
exists at the time of his death relatives within the
third degree of the descendants from whom they
inherit in the line whence the property proceeds.
If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of
the property at the death of the ascendants. If
they do not exist, the ascendants can freely
dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the
ascendants may alienate the property required by
law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he
has and nothing more because no one can give
what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will
therefore receive a limited and revocable title.
The relatives within the third degree will in their
turn have an expectation to the property while the
ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also
within the third degree. After the person who is
required by law to reserve the right has died, the
relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty
required by law to be reserved and they will
complete ownership, in fee simple, because the
condition and the usufruct have been terminated
by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell,
Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by
article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He
has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal
title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express
provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the
right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to
it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though
under a condition, reside in him while he lives.
After the right required by law to be reserved has
been assured, he can do anything that a genuine
owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third
degree in whose favor of the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is
no way, either actually, constructively or formally,
in their possession; and, moreover, because they
have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of
the descendants of whom they are relatives
within the third degree, that it to say, a second
contingent place in said legitimate succession in
the fashion of aspirants to a possible future
legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the
right is reserved should, after their rights has
been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of
even nothing more than the fee simple of the
property to be reserved his act would be null and
void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision
on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible
to determine the part "that might pertain therein
to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the
right required by law to be reserved the extent of
his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear
by his dying before the person required to
reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the
conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of
the person required by law to reserve the right
can be impugned by him in whose favor it is
reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership,
except that the legal title is burdened with a
condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that
he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that
only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of
persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the
property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of
the law: "To prevent persons outside a family
from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained
therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who
reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in
whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack
the alienation that may be absolutely made of the
property the law requires to be reserved, in the
present case, that which the appellant has made
of the two parcels of land in question to a third
party, because the conditional alienation that is
permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the
usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the
Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of
the property required by law to be reserved are
all that the person who must reserve it has during
his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the
usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to
whether or not she transmits the fee simple is
purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual
positive, as is the case of the institution of two
heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the
owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in
interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to
reserve the right has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and
recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is
in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate
it, although under a condition, the whole question
is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to
reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal,
himself alone register the ownership of the
property he has inherited, when the persons in
whose favor the reservation must be made
degree thereto, provided that the right reserved
to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as
the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de
retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights
and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can
also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of
being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed that the alienation the purchaser may
make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507,
which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when
the vendor reserves to himself the right to
recover the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with article 1518, and whatever more may
have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers
the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of
the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding
this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all
doubtful now that the vendee may register his
title in the same way as the owner of a thing
mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the
consent of his creditor and the former with the
consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing
bought when the acquirer knows by well from the
title entered in the registry that he acquires a title
revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more
certain and to be expected than the purely
contingent expectation of the person in whose
favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what
another has inherited. The purpose of the law
would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision
therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the
more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio,
eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed
from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that
the applicant is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land which are the
subject matter of the applicants, recording in the
registration the right required by article 811 to be
reserved to either or both of the opponents,
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they
survive her; without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent,
JJ., concur.
G. SIENES VS ESPARCIA
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to
secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the
sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia
spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of
the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan),
Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to
appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus
the costs of suit. In their answer appellees
disclaimed any knowledge or information
regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20,
1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants
and alleged that, if such sale was made, the
same was void on the ground that Andrea
Gutang had no right to dispose of the property
subject matter thereof. They further alleged that
said property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as
owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By
way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they
further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of
Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of
sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been
registered together with an affidavit of
adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on
July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the
aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property
as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower
court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot
No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay
is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them
is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same
lot is also void, and they have no valid title
thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in
question is part of and must be reverted to the
estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death
of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No
pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse
interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court
erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property;
secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and
lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as
reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso.
With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.
According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan,
the properties left by Saturnino upon his death
the date of which does not clearly appear of
record were left to his children as follows: Lot
3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375
to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina,
and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a
result of the cadastral proceedings, Original
Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368
was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother
administered the property for him, declared it in
her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1),
and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1
& C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at
the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE
whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the
property in question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina
Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of Original Certificate of Title No.
10275 which was in their possession the
latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
corresponding motion in the cadastral record No.
507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 &
9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951,
Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-
sisters of Francisco, and who as such had
declared the property in their name, on January
1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh.
2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in
their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts
already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it
by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his
mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was,
therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property
came, if any survived her. The record discloses in
this connection that Andrea Gutang died on
December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving
her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on
January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the
weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez
Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal
title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a
life usufructuary of the reservable property; that
he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee
being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295;
Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition
that the vendees would definitely acquire
ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the
vendor died without being survived by any person
entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch
much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana
Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the
former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale
executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of
the heirs within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the person obliged to reserve.
In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang,
the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the
former became the absolute owner of the
reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it
may be true that the sale made by her and her
sister prior to this event, became effective
because of the occurrence of the resolutory
condition, we are not now in a position to reverse
the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the
reversion of the property in question to the Estate
of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the
Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as
above modified is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in equity the
Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the
property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera
and Paredes, JJ.,concur.
H. GONZALES VS CFI
AQUINO, J.:1wph 1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting,
reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which
her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943
from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335).
The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito
Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17,
1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena
Races, and their seven children: four daughters
named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena
and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and
Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by
Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo
and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and
without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an
affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following: 1wph1. t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of
New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos.
80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475
of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon
City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No.
966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila
registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and
improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT
Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163
of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos.
48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No.
13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two
handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited
from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph 1. t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos
de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he
heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien
los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario'
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un
tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de
Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo
Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida
sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February,
1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-
third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y
Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her
will was admitted to probate as a holographic will
in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding
No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races
Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda
Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and
three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion,
Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said
properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her
three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the
action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six
assignments of error that the lower court erred in
not regarding the properties in question as
reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their
six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda
acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and
hereditary shares in the estate of her husband
Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding
that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the
reservable properties and that her claim is barred
by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private
respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971
denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave
due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only
legal issues can be raised under undisputed
facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts
the lower court resolved only the issue of whether
the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved
in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-
appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the
trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is
no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties
are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose
of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to
the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis
causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third
degree and to bypass the reservees in
the second degree or should that inheritance
automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel
issue or a question of first impression. lt was
resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480.
Before discussing the applicability to this case of
the doctrine in the Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief
discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-
troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the
parties in their five briefs in descanting on the
nature of reserve troncal which together with
the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was
abolished by the Code Commission to prevent
the decedent's estate from being entailed, to
eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by
the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the
improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a
certain family for generations which situation
allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is
incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as
remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they
penalize legitimate relationship, is considered
unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing
entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult
to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of
the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1wph 1. t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su
descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido
por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que
hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor
de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer
grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los
bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or
acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the
same property is inherited by another ascendant
or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant
should reserve the said property for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property
came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first
transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister
to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista,
which two transmissions precede the reservation,
and (3) a third transmissions of the same
property (in consequence of the reservation) from
the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the
first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil,
Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is
no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her
son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister,
to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The
said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de
Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1)
the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the
property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from theprepositus and who belongs to
the (line o tronco) from which the property came
and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters
(Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua
vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs.
Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el
peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por
una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a
manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y
muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar
de la vide personas extranas a una familia
puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran
quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found
in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from
his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single
and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso,
inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property
in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal
uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.
Marcelina could register the land under the
Torrens system in her name but the fact that the
land was reservable property in favor of her two
brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should
be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot
died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a
parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was
inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his
second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property
in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and
Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna
aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came
(Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in
Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915;
Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;Dizon vs.
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands
vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA
39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and
upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs.
Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo
inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed
to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the
property was reservable property. Upon the
death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of
Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the
third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth
degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is
confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives
exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil.
1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate
relationship. illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a
transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing
in return such as donacion and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p.
360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions,
namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property
came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to
the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished
if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable
and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival
of the reservees at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that
of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable
property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there
are no reservees at the time of the reservor's
death, the transferee's title would become
absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs.
Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an
inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the
reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance
made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48
Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the
reservee's right to the reservable property is
illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a
real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes
vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph 1. t
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus)
said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally
stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a
than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B.
L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime,
the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to
prevent the reservista from doing anything that
might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for
this purpose, they can compel the annotation of
their right in the registry of property even while
the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere
expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs
of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by
will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that
they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310,
cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death,
the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question
were indubitably reservable properties in the
hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a
reservor. The reservation became a certainty
when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs.
Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to
the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees
in the second degree, her three daughters and
three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue
is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in
her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren
the reservable properties which she had inherited
from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her
estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
191). The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
As repeatedly held in
the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit
the reservable properties from theprepositus, not
from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable
properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select
the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees
of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a
testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed
by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph 1. t
Reservable property left, through a will or
otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
together with his own property in favor of another
of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part
of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the
legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the
same as an inheritance from his ascendant has
the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right
of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he
has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio
Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio
III. These two inherited properties from their
father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his mother,
Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she
instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all
her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio
III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II
with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first
marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable
properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited
from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited
from his father Apolonio II and which Severina
willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as
reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That
theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being
reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from
her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was
entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, we are bound to follow in this case the
doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the reservor's
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives
within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable
character. The property should go to the nearest
reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his
will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that
there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common
descendants of the predeceased ascendant and
the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is
irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of
the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the
properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third
degree from the paternal line have survived and
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties
to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-
degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who
belong to the paternal line, the reason for
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent
persons outside a family from securing, by some
special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in
the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood
sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six
reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of
the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that
the reservable property bequeathed by the
reservor to her daughter does not form part of the
reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but
should be given to all the seven reservees or
nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third
degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by
giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
heiress of the reservor was only one of the
reservees and there is no reason founded upon
law and justice why the other reservees should
be deprived of their shares in the reservable
property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs.
Legarda's six children as reservees within the
second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not
inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are
the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition
that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs.
Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104
Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties
lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor,
Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family,
"except third-degree relatives who pertain to
both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could
have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death.
Since at the time of her death, there were (and
still are) reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose
their reservable character. The disposition of the
said properties should be made in accordance
with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and
not in accordance with the reservor's holographic
will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands,
105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is
reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that
the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda.
de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda,
with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The
shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F.
Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973,
respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
I. CANO VS DIRECTOR
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951,
issued in Land Registration Case No. 12,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of
Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban
(Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms
and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
notices have been duly published and posted as
required by law, and that the title of the applicant
to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is
registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and
decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of
general default, that the two parcels of land
described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots
Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of
Juban, with their improvements, be registered in
the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of
age, widow and resident of Juban, province of
Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No.
1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in
favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article
891 of the Civil code. After this decision shall
have become final for lack of appeal therefrom
within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let
the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree
and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued
in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October
1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio)
Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court,
alleging the death of the original registered owner
and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8,
1955, and praying that the original Certificate of
Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued
in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that
the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession
of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose
and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of
thereservista Maria Cano, who contended that
the application and operation of the reserva
troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary
contentious proceeding, and that the Registration
Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the
motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the
appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate, for the
reason that the death of the reservistavested the
ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria
Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that
the ownership of the reservatorio can not be
decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of
Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as
the reservatorio entitled to the reservable
property, are to be declared. In this connection,
appellants argue that the reversion in favor of
the reservatorio requires the declaration of the
existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant
by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third
degree belonging the line from which said
property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites
enumerated by appellants have already been
declared to exist by the decree of registration
wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario
troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of
facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired
by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from
her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who,
in turn, inherited the same from her father
Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely
under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil
Code; and that each and everyone of the private
oppositors are within the third degree of
consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero,
and who belonging to the same line from which
the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation
of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the
decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are
grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by
his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being
the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private
oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the
decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code;
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec.
App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons
(appellees included) are bared thereby from
contesting the existence of the constituent
elements of the reserva. The only requisites for
the passing of the title from the reservista to the
appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and
(2) the fact that the reservatario has survived
the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their
existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is
still necessary rests upon the assumption that
the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit,
the reservable property from the reservista. This
is not true. The reservatario is not
thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is
the reservable property part of the reservista's
estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus),
said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally
strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista,
the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no
more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon
the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to theprepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically
and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that
property is no part of the estate of the reservista,
and does not even answer for the debts of the
latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property
records without necessity of estate proceedings,
since the basic requisites therefor appear of
record. It is equally well settled that
the reservable property can not be transmitted by
a reservista to her or his own successors mortis
causa,(like appellants herein) so long as
a reservatario within the third degree from the
prepositus and belonging to the line whence the
property came, is in existence when
the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely
specifies the reservable character of the property,
without determining the identity of
the reservatario (as in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where
several reservatarios dispute the property among
themselves, further proceedings would be
unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights
of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have
been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere
claimed that there are other reservatarios of
equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that
the heirs of the reservista are merely
endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of
the reservable property to the detriment of the
party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and
therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Endencia JJ., concur.