Interview about Iraq

c. June 2004
copyright Rahul Mahajan, Forrest Wilder

You have been to Iraq twice this year - once in January and again in April.

-What, if anything, has changed about the occupation during that short time in your
view?

There are a few minor changes; a little more electrical power, slightly more supplies to
the hospitals. Theres also the formation of the Iraqi civil defense police and the new
army. But basically it was more of the same, without any significant change, until the
twin blowups with Fallujah and Moqtada al-Sadr. Then you saw a major ramping up of
militarization; even in relatively quiet areas of Baghdad, youd see constant helicopter
overflights, frequent tank and/or Hummer patrols, and youd hear explosions and gunfire.
Also, since then, the ancillary parts of the occupation have collapsed; the non-security
contractors cant do anything, and the people who supply the occupying forces often
dont or cant. And, of course, the siege of Fallujah is a new level of brutality in the
postwar period but its a logical extension of what has already been happening.

-How have the Iraqi people changed their attitude towards the occupying forces?

Iraqis are generally patient, non-ideological, and pragmatic. No matter how they felt, the
most common initial response was, Lets give them a chance and see what happens. By
the time I was there in January, I would say the significant majority in the south and
center felt the Americans had had their chance and had shown they had no intention of
keeping their promises. Even so, people were still hanging on the June 30 transfer of
sovereignty, knowing it would be a sham but hoping it wouldnt be. Even in January,
people felt that the American soldiers were cruel, unnecessarily brutal and violent, and
that the Americans in general didnt care at all about the fate of Iraqis. While I was there
in April, the patience and the wait and see attitude evaporated. Fallujah was the last
straw. I think the shift is simply the crystallization of existing attitudes, but it does seem
to me to be more or less irrevocable now.

By the way, its absolutely necessary to distinguish the north from the rest of the country,
for two reasons. First, there was no regime change; the KDP and the PUK have been
running the three governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyeh since shortly after the
Gulf War. Second, and related to this, the occupation has a minimal presence. American
forces are stationed only on bases and rarely interact with people; policing is done by the
same people whove been doing it for 13 years. Thus, public opinion in the north focuses
on happiness that the menace of Saddam is gone; there are no immediate grievances
about U.S. governance because the United States isnt governing.

- To what extent would you say the armed resistance to US occupation reflects the
political sentiments of typical Iraqis?

This relates very closely to the previous question. And remember that its a delicate
subject to speak with people about. Again leaving out the north, its hard to find anyone
who thinks that armed resistance against the military is illegitimate. There are some who
sympathize but dont think its the right path. There are some who think its not the right
path right now, but may become so soon. The majority, I think, has for many months had
the same attitude to the occupation but thought that the resistance was pointless. Thats
all changed now; I think, excluding the north, the significant majority of Iraqis are in total
sympathy with the resistance; most of them want the violence to stop, but blame it on the
U.S. forces.

In the U.S., support for the occupation of Iraq seems to be waning, but one still
hears the question: "What is the alternative? If we leave, the whole region will be
engulfed in chaos." Do you think there are viable alternatives to a U.S.-led
occupation of Iraq?

Of course there are. But thats not the operative question. The question is, how could one
get there from here. That is a very tricky one.

To start with, the question is just the latest example in a long history of similar reasoning.
Why do we have to go to war on Iraq? Because people are suffering under the sanctions
and Saddam. Why are they? Because we helped Saddam put down the uprising in 1991
and imposed the sanctions. Why did we have to go to war on Iraq before? Because he
invaded Kuwait and was a regional threat. Why was he a regional threat and why did he
invade Kuwait? Because we egged him on to invade Iran and supported him massively
while he did, giving him plentiful access to credit and materials he could use to arm
himself. Why did we have to prop up and egg on Iraq? Because there was the danger of
Iran exporting anti-American theocracy to the region. Why was there that danger?
Because we destroyed democracy in Iraq, leading to the emergence of a revolution, and
then supported Khomeini and the Islamists against the left. And so on.

Why do we now have to maintain the occupation? The whole region could be engulfed in
chaos; look at the chaos in Iraq now. Why is there chaos in Iraq and the threat of regional
chaos? Because we invaded in the first place. Refer to previous paragraph.This kind of
reasoning is not just done with Iraq, but it stands out the most vividly in the case of Iraq.
Im not saying that these becauses themselves are valid, just that even if they were they
are part of a self-perpetuating interventionist problem-creating logic that should be
transcended somehow.

But to get back to the question. What I would like to see in Iraq is a sovereign state with a
democratically elected government, respect for human rights, etc., and independence of
the far-flung U.S. military-imperial network. What the intelligent people in the
administration, if they exist, would like to see is Iraq with a democratically elected
government that has no power over anything important but that is happy to repress the
masses in appropriate ways to serve U.S. great-power goals in the country and the region.
These are both alternatives to the occupation, although the latter requires a large-scale
long-term U.S. military presence, mostly on isolated bases.

Their alternative to the current occupation is beginning to look like a pipe dream, based
on Iraqi popular consciousness. My alternative always was, based on U.S. power and the
difficulty of stopping it from doing what it wants.

But lets fantasize that we can dictate the immediate withdrawal of the United States.


Mainstream U.S. media rarely discusses Iraqi civilian casualties. Based on what
you've seen, how widespread are civilian casualties, and is the U.S. military
exercising restraint as it claims it does?

Civilian casualties are far more widespread than reported in the U.S. media. In fact, a
recent poll by PIPA showed that Americans tend to grossly underestimate the number
of civilian casualties. In the war itself, the number may have been 10-20,000; I dont
think theres any tally for the occupation, but its got to be in the range of 2000.

The U.S. military is not abiding by the laws of war. It exercises far less restraint than any
of the other countries military contingents. So its nothing like the claims being made;
on the other hand, obviously, they could bomb all of Fallujah into rubble if they want to,
without taking any losses.

But the direct killings of civilians, at least pre-Fallujah, are only one of the problems. The
United States removed the Iraqi government and, over a wide area and a wide range of
activities, has put nothing or almost nothing in its place. Security is atrocious; the number
of killings, kidnappings, and rapes being committed now is far greater than before. A
doctor at al-Yarmouk Hospital, one of the busier ones in Baghdad, estimated that they get
10-20 gunshot wounds a day. If even a tenth of them die, youre talking about in the area
of 500 people dying at just this hospital (the rate before the war was negligible by
comparison). And Im likely underestimating. On top of that, sanitation has worsened,
water treatment is no better, the situation of hospitals in terms of supplies may be worse
add it all up and you have a lot of civilian casualties because of the extreme negligence of
the CPA.

But I also dont think its right just to focus on civilian casualties. The U.S. presence in
Iraq is illegitimate, what its doing is illegitimate, and most of the fighters it has killed are
people who posed no threat to anyone if they were just left alone if, for example, we
hadnt invaded.

What is your impression of western reporters in Iraq? Are they largely confined to
safe portions of Baghdad?

Mixed. They are, almost all, woefully ignorant of the historical background of U.S.
policy and of Iraq itself. Very few speak Arabic. Those who dont are at the mercy of
their translators. Very few of them venture out, or if they do, they go as adjuncts of the
military. A typical episode: a CNN crew wanted to go around with one of the people who
went to Fallujah with me. But they were afraid to go anywhere. And they should have
been they were going around, if you can believe it, with helmets and flak jackets. All
this does is make you a target, of course; a helmet does not help when a Kalashnikov is
stuck in your face. This kind of buffoonery is common. And, certainly, there are many
reporters who hole up in the Palestine or the Sheraton and cover CPA press
conferences.

There were some reporters who took some risks to report as war correspondents; John
Burns of the New York Times was actually in custody for a while. And there are some,
like Alissa Rubin of the Los Angeles Times, Anthony Shadid and Rajiv Chandrasekaran
of the Washington Post, and Rory McCarthy of the Guardian who have done numerous
important, illuminating stories; of course, you have to read them carefully and allow for
the standard soft-pedaling that always happens when stories are critical. The Times, by
the way, has been far worse than the LA Times and the Post.

There are some systematic problems. For example, Ive never seen any accounting of
how Iraqs oil revenues are being spent; why hasnt any reporter dug this up? Its for sure
that the Iraqis have no clue.

Overall, Id give them a poor grade, with a few solid exceptions.

What is your response to John Kerry's pledge to send more troops to Iraq if
elected? What will this accomplish?

It will create more targets. Nobody can be sure, but I think a tipping point in popular
consciousness has been reached. With enough force they may be able to destroy
resistance, but I think they will be constrained from using that level of force by
international (and maybe domestic) political considerations. The resistance in Iraq isnt
political like that of the NLF in Vietnam, and the populace isnt nearly as mobilized, but
the basic feeling right now, as I wrote about above, is very widespread.

Id have to say that in general Democrats follow a much more casualty-averse military
strategy than do Republicans (American casualties, of course); this may mean that Kerry
may use more indiscriminate force than Bush, if, that is, he remains as committed to
crushing resistance in Iraq.

But, basically, Kerrys pledge stems from the fact that the elite, whose interests are
served by the mainstream of the Democratic Party, remains committed to the American
empire and to American imperial credibility. Withdrawal without gaining control of Iraq
will deal a shattering blow to that credibility, just as withdrawal from Vietnam did. Also,
once theyre in there, use of Iraq to dramatically increase control of world oil supplies is
a goal all parts of the foreign policy establishment share; they differ only on what costs
are worth bearing in order to attain that goal.

As far as I can tell, Kerrys solution is to do the same thing, only do it better and get more
other countries to help us, even though they can presumably see for themselves what a
disaster the occupation is now and would have virtually no incentive to get involved.

Other thoughts?