NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita

BARA LIDASAN VS COMELEC

Facts:
The petitioner is Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that RA 4790 be declared
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional mandate that no bill may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

RA 4790 is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province Of Lanao Del Sur

The initial number of barrios which would create the new legislative district
was 21. The conflict is out of 21 barrios, 11 of which belonged to another
provice-Cotabato, leaving the new district with only 9 barrios. The petitioner
invokes the one-subject rule because the act expressly indicated in the
province of Lanao Del sur, meaning the act should influence only Lanao del
sur and should not change the boundaries of Cotabato.

Issue:
Is RA 4790 unconstitutional for violating the one-subject rule?

Held:
Yes. RA 4790 is declared null and void.

Basis:
1. No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. (main basis)

The purposes of this provision are: First, congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one stature, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the PUBLIC and those concerned of the import of the
single subject thereof.
The title projects the impression that soley the province of Lanoa del Sur is
affected by the creation of the municipality of Dianaton but in reality, it
affected another province-Cotabato. The phrase in the Province of Lanao
del sur is misleading and deceptive. RA 4790 had two subjects: (1) the
creation of the municipality of Dianaton consisting of 21 barrios in the
province of Lanao Del sur, and (2) the dismemberment of a portion of
cotabato.
The title is defective because the title did not inform the congress and the
public as to the full impact of the law.

2. The whole act cannot be salvaged because the parts of the statute
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensation for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not
pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

The whole is declared unconstitutional because the legislature intended to
create the new municipality based on its projected income and inhabitants.
The 21 barrios would have enough income to support its own municipality,
but the creation of the new municipality with only 9 barrios would not
survive by itself.

Notes:
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute,
reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and
independent municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of
government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new
municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven
general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are
within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao
del Sur.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Pedro M. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-23326
December 18, 1965
REGALA, J .

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity
of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation
of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the
elective officials of both Houses (of Congress).

The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during
their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation
because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve
(12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary
for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years
of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24
months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest
rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of
the Constitution.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the
petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning
of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in
question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of
a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore,
is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:

Whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the
Constitution.


Ruling:

Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments
or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their
respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives
and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for
the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per
annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to
approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the
salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI,
includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal
point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other
emoluments.
Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession
of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the
approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby
declared unconstitutional by the SC.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
GR. No. 105371
November 11, 1993

Facts
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails
amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary
and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes,
such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the
petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from
this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law.
Philippine Judges Association assailed the said law complaining that the law
would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may
impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is
discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has
not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former
executives and their widows among others.
Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of
Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said
privilege for the President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec,
former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office.
Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege
has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the
AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the
Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay,
the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors,
and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.

Held:
There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should
be treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
does not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact result in unequal protection. What the
law requires is equality among equals according to valid classification. The
postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards
frank mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The
respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege should be extended
only to those who do not need it much at all but not to those who need it
badly. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others especially where theres no substantial distinction. The
distinction made is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.
The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation.
Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking
needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of
the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This
is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have
removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If
the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where
there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may
not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.

NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
For example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others
in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the
President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Macalintal vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and
lawyer.

Petitioner questions Section 18.5 of the abovementioned law because it
empowers the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party-list representatives, including the President and the Vice-
President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution that only Congress can proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President. Also, Section 25 of the same law allowing
Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
the same section, to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall
promulgate violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A,
Sec.1 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec.4 of the
Constitution
Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution

HELD:

Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. The canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice-President
must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4
of Art. VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim
winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list representatives.

Yes, Section 25 is unconstitutional. Congress will go beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority if it will be vested the powers to approve, review,
amend and revise the Implementing Rules and Regulations for RA 9189.
Congress will encroach the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC.

Garcillano v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Committee on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms

FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of two petitions. In 2005, respondent House
Committees (see case title) conducted a congressional investigation with
regard to the wiretapped conversations that surfaced between petitioner,
former COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano and former President Arroyo.

In 2007, the Senate conducted its own legislative inquiry where it summoned
another petitioner to this case, Major Sagge, member of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP) without the following:

PUBLICATION of the Senate Rules of Procedure governing inquiries in aid
of legislation

The intended legislation referred to in the preceding number (in aid of
legislation)

SECTION 21, Art. VI (1987 Constitution) provides that: [T]he Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

Respondents claimed that their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication was justified by the fact that the rules have never been
amended since 1995. Further, aside from the availability of free booklets
containing the 1995 rules, the Senates internet web page also provided the
1995 rules that serves as the functional equivalent of a written document with
reference to the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution was violated

HELD:
Petition to issue writ of prohibition GRANTED prohibiting the Senate and
any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation in
connection with the Hello Garci tapes.

The constitutional provision is CLEAR and UNAMBIGUOUS. The
definition of publication is stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The Electronic
Commerce Act (R.A. 8792) merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
of electronic data messages or electronic documents insofar as they constitute
the original copies. The internet is not the medium for publishing laws, rules,
and regulations.

While the Senate as an institution is not completely dissolved with each
national election (hence, a continuing body in the institutional sense), the
Senate of each Congress (e.g. 13th Congress, 14th Congress), however, acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the previous Congress. The
Senate is NOT a continuing body in connection to the conduct of its day-to-
day business because the members of the incumbent Congress are not
responsible for the acts and deliberations of the previous Congress which
they took no part in.

Hence, until the Senate shall have published its own rules of procedure
informing the public on whether or not they would retain or modify the rules
followed by the previous Congresses, the conduct of legislative inquiries in
aid of legislation contemplated in the constitution cannot not be legally
conducted.



Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the
Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG
Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages.

The information alleged that Kokoy Romualdez together with his wife and
the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of
the Filipino people, and that they obtained control of the countrys biggest
companies with the help of petitioner Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and others.

On 13 September 1988, the Senator Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a privilege
speech before the Senate on the alleging that the Ricardo Lopa took over
various government owned corporations and called upon "the Senate to look
into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

The matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and
directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues
raised, after which, it issued a resolution rejecting the petitioner's plea to be
excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its
investigation of the matter.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them
and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the
Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief.

Issue: Whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee inquiry has no valid
legislative purpose, it is not in aid of legislation?

Held:
Yes. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee
is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to
find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had
violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act",
a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.

*Notes:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES

Facts:
Standard Chartered Bank is engaged in banking, trust and other
related activities in the Philippines. Petitioner is accused by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile in his privilege speech of selling unregistered foreign securities
thereby violating RA 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code. In lieu of this,
defendant, Senate Committee, conducted investigation in aid of legislation.
Petitioner was invited to attend the hearing but petitioner refused. Petitioner
reasoned that it cannot attend the said investigation due to pending criminal
and civil cases involving the same issue.

Issue:

WON the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
can conduct investigation against Standard Chartered Bank despite pending
criminal and civil cases against latter in court

Held:
Yes. The mere filing of a criminal or civil case before a court or
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation.

a. On Self-incrimination:
The case at bar sees the privilege speech of Enrile as specific to the nature
and subject of inquiries which is to aid in legislation. The intent of the
legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may
not be enacted into law. Therefore, the issue of self-incrimination of the
petitioners cannot be invoked since they are not be indicted as accused in a
criminal proceeding. (Note that the privilege of self-incrimination may be
extended to investigations that partake to a nature of or are analogous to
criminal proceedings.)

b. On privacy
The petitioners right of privacy is superseded by the states right of public
disclosure and state interest.



NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno

Facts

The dispute arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by
the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. The purchase was effected and the price paid for
both estates P5,000,000.
Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to
determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper
and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just.
Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee
was petitioner Jean L. Arnault, the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt
in the negotiations for the purchase of the said estates by the
Government of the Philippines who delivered a part of the purchase
price to a representative vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered
his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single
centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically
owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust
Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through
which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and
who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.
Petitioner testified that 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him and that on the same occasion he
draw on said account 2 checks; one for P500,00 which he transferred
to the account of the Associated Agencies Inc., with PNB, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
Arnault contended that the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and
will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal
to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded
the legislative process. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Issue

Whether or not the Senate can impose penalty against those who refuse to
answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation

Ruling

Yes. The Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for
contempt. It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying
out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but
the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due
process of law.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as
to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator
is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to
answer a query that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to
make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear
abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and
unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give
frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course
with his right under the Constitution.

The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate,
which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body,
persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.

Garcia vs. Mata
GR No. L-33713

Facts:
Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive
status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to
reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600
which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA
1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any
appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation
bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA
1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an
appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to
a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion
of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN
APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule
on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in
the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions
are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional.
Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

Demetria vs Alba
G.R. No. 71977

FACTS:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing
funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of
the said PD. This Section provides that:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for
the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44 of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.

However, Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds
to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one
item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 196425
July 24, 2012

Facts:
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the
incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to
submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave
misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the powers of the congress
to delegate quasi judicial powers to administrative agencies?

Held:

NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out are
organization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an
express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O.
292(the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy
of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.

"The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring
needof every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President
inthe manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all,
the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of
EO292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another.

In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies, and
vice versa. The distinction between the allowable organizational actions
under Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it
touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive
actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman
and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II
and I, respectively, and was placed directly "under the Office of the
President."

Aglipay vs. Ruiz, Juan
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the
City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by
the Roman Catholic Church through the Act No. 4052. It is alleged that this action
of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter
to the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress constitutional.

HELD:
YES. Supreme Court held that there has been no constitutional infraction in
the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps
with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government".
The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint; that the only purpose in issuing
and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to
this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered
of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people.

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with
funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the
feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic
parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor
as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest,
Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return custody of the image to the council
on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used
for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the
priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-
petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the
subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not
duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed
to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation
of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any
sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image
with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.


HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving
the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day
of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I)
the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a
waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through
the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish
any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of
any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with
tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The
wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring
any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had
to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,
then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the
NOTE: Walang Nazareth Case and Senate v Ermita
resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the
lives of the masses.

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue(CIR)

Facts:
M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, Donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz
for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality of Victorias, Negros
Occidental. On March 3, 1958, M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donors gift tax return and
on April 29, 1960, respondent CIR issued an assessment for the donees gift tax
against the current parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, herein petitioner,
Fr. Casimiro Lladoc. The tax amounted to 1,370.00 including surcharges, interests
and the compromise for late filing of the return.
Petitioner protested and requested withdrawal but was denied by the CIR. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals claiming that he should not be made liable for
the tax because he was not the parish priest then who accepted the donation. The
Court of Tax Appeals held that the decision of CIR except for the payment of the
compromise for the late filing of the return. It held that it is only property or real
estate taxes which are exempted not excise tax.

Issue:
Whether Lladoc should be exempted from paying taxes

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that, Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguish ed from excise
taxes. Gift taxes such as in the above mentioned case, are not exempted from tax.
Hence the Church is liable.
Note:
In the end, hindi si father Lladoc yung liable kung di yung Head ng diocese nila,
yung bishop, kaya church nilagay ko sa huli at hindi si Father Lladoc.