1

PUT TOGHETHER BY SHIRE

Vice President Walter Mondale reports to President Jimmy Carter on his meeting with Somalian
Ambassador Addou regarding Soviet pressure for Somalia to accept Ethiopia's existing borders,
and a request for U.S. economic and military assistance to reduce Soviet presence in the area.

Memo.

May 12, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: The Vice President
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Somali Ambassador Addou,
May 11, 1977

Somali Ambassador Addou called on me May 11, at his request. He
also met last week with Cy Vance.

Addou began by describing Soviet pressures on Somalia to accept
Ethiopia's existing borders. According to Addou, the Soviets
have as their objective the creation of a cluster of states,
including Ethiopia, Somalia, Aden, and Djibouti, under Moscow's
influence.

Addou stated that Somalia's national interests dictate
otherwise: Somalia seeks the self-determination of Somali people
throughout the Horn. Because of this divergence, Somalia is
turning to us for economic and military assistance. Addou
cautioned that only he and President Siad know of this
initiative, which is being pursued at Siad's request.

Addou expressed satisfaction that a U.S. economic mission would
be traveling to Somalia next week to study specific projects. He
is concerned, however, about the vagueness of State's reply
concerning military assistance. Somalia recognizes our
difficulty in supplying large-scale military aid immediately
and, since there is no internal military threat in his country,
Addou noted, the U.S. could begin its military supply at a low
level. Addou insisted, nevertheless, that we give Somalia a
formal reply within one month as to whether we will assist with
military hardware. Only the U.S. can help Somalia in dealing
with the Soviet Union, Addou added.

I encouraged them, as did Cy Vance, to buy military equipment
elsewhere and that we would be supportive of that effort. He
then indicated that they might be able to buy military equipment
funneled through North Yemen. I'm not sure what he meant by
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that. He indicated a desire for armored personnel carriers and
mortars as desired items. He indicated receptivity to arms being
purchased for Somalia in Europe, but he repeatedly emphasized
the need for the symbolism of U.S. military support, even though
on a limited basis.

In reply to my question, Addou said that military assistance
from the U.S. definitely would lead Somalia to reduce the Soviet
presence. Somalia would end its military arrangements with the
Soviet Union. Somalia only had turned to the USSR in the first
place, he said, following U.S. and Western European refusal to
help. I asked what the Somalis would be prepared to do regarding
Berbera, and Addou replied, without specifying a time, that the
Soviet use of these installations also might be reconsidered. He
insisted that the Soviets simply have access to the port and
airfield at Berbera and that the communications center there is
jointly operated by the Soviets and the Somalis. Addou observed
that the soviets had infiltrated the entire Somali
establishment, including the military, and this all was a very
touchy matter. I told Addou that, unlike the Soviets, we have no
designs on Somalia.

Addou observed that the Soviets have targeted Ethiopia as a
model for communist revolution. Moscow, he noted, never was as
certain with Somalia because of Somalia's strong religious,
regional and nationalist commitments.

I told Addou that I would discuss our meeting with you. Addou
also hopes to meet with you personally.


















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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report.
Issues include: international broadcasting matters; Somalian-U.S. relations; U.S. economic aid to
the Sudan; U.S. arms sales to Ethiopia; Yugoslav sale of arms to Ethiopia; Soviet-Somalian
relations. Memo. National Security Council. SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 14, 1977.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 14 June 1977

Daily Activities:

Somalia: Conferred with State re Somali Ambassador's call on
President on Thursday, 16 June, and reviewed State's talking
points for President. Will have these with a couple of further
suggestions for you to send to the President tomorrow.

Ethiopia, Sudan, etc: Reviewed various current efforts with
State Area Director, Dick Post. State is becoming frustrated at
slowness with which AID is operating on getting Sudan aid
program moving. They say basic problem is that AID has only one
girl assigned to work on Horn of Africa and most of her time is
taken up with program that is continuing in Ethiopia. This is an
interesting example of problem of getting the bureaucracy to
respond to shifts in policy--the bureaucracy goes on doing the
old familiar things even though we want new initiatives to
start. Implementing a new aid program in Somalia is likely to
involve the same problems as with the Sudan. Since AID is
supposed to be operating under State, I suggested that at
highest level State give AID some push on this whole Horn aid
issue. They are going to try to get Vance to move on it. You
might want to mention this to him at some point.

State also has in the milla memo on our erstwhile Ethiopian arms
program. There are all sorts of left-over problems on which they
need decisions in principle: should everything be held back?
Should things such as trucks which are on docks waiting shipment
to Ethiopia be turned back to suppliers and sent elsewhere? What
about spare parts, etc. that PMGE has paid for--should we let
them have them? This memo should come through the mill sometime
in the next couple of weeks and will probably require
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Presidential decision.

Significant Information:

Ethiopia: Yugoslavs have sent Ethiopia 90 Patton tanks and large
stock of ammo and spare parts and another 90 T-55 tanks are
expected soon from USSR. --PMGE has claimed recapture of Humera
from the EDU on 12 June. In Addis Abada, PMGE has announced with
some fanfare release of 708 persons who have been amnestied. --
Sudan is reported to be going to ask for removal of OAU
Headquarters from Addis at OAU Ministerial in Libreville at end
of this month.

Somalia: Rather wild report claims that Soviets and Somalis have
patched up their differences and that in return for cessation of
Somali support to Eritrean insurgents, Soviets guarantee that
they will force Ethiopians to turn over Ogaden to Somalia when
Eritrean problem has been licked; Soviets will also permit
Somalis to take over Djibouti. All this sounds too farfetched to
make any sense--it may be disinformation Soviets are
deliberately planting or it may represent rationalizations of
pro-Soviet Somalis who are trying to stave off full break.


NOTE: State has come through with comprehensive memo re
reorganization of USIA. Most of it, I believe, we can endorse,
but I have questions about desirability of putting the
reorganized, consolidated USIA organization under State in way
AID now is. Believe President should keep it directly under
White House. Will prepare a memorandum for you tomorrow on this.
















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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: preparations
for President Jimmy Carter's 6/16/77 meeting with the Somali ambassador;
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 13 June 1977
Daily Activities

Horn of Africa: Conferred with State re talking point paper for
President's meeting with Somali Ambassador on Thursday, 16 June
and status report on implementation of PRM-21 which is in final
form and ready to be signed off on the 7th Floor. Also spent
half an hour briefing Henry Richardson on Horn situation

Ethiopia: The concluding sentence of a dispatch from our Embassy
in Addis provides a measure of just how "normal" the state of
affairs there has become "Addis itself, with the exception of
continued assassinations, has been unusually calm for a month or
more; how long it may last is anyone's guess but the relative
tranquility is welcome." Just a few assassinations every day;
that's all The PMGE has begun its offensive against the EDU in
the NW; there is no clear evidence yet how it is going. The
Ethiopian consul at Kassala, just over the border in the Sudan,
has applied for U. S. asylum.

Kenya: There is new reporting about the deteriorated condition
of Kenyatta's mind, though his physical health is said to be
good.

Somalia: Arnaud de Borchgrave has given our Embassy in
Mogadiscio text of a fascinating interview he has just had with
Siad, which will be coming out in this week's Newsweek. It shows
what a determined and astute person Siad is and how complex the
Somali political equation can be. Siad denies having broken with
the Russians and expresses considerable skepticism about the
willingness of the U. S. to shift to a policy of full support
for Somalia--he is realistic enough to see that we cannot take
responsibility for Somalia's territorial ambitions, among other
things. But he still leaves a good many doors open in our
directions and the fact he gave such a comprehensive interview
to an American publication is in itself highly significant. It
leads me to conclude that we will serve our interests best if we
avoid oversimplifications in our dealings with the Somalis, if
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we are open and frank with them about the help we give--pulling
no punches and engaging in now naive, oversimplified professions
of friendship. There are gains to be made in Somalia but we will
make them only if we are as firm about our principles and basic
positions as they are.










































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Memorandum regarding a meeting between President Jimmy Carter and Ambassador Addou to
discuss U.S. economic and military assistance for Somalia. Memo. National Security Council.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Somali Ambassador Addou with President
Carter, Oval Office, 2:00-2:20 p.m., 16 June 1977

PARTICIPANTS: President Carter
Ambassador Addou
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Talcott Seelye, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
Paul B. Henze, NSC

The meeting opened with Ambassador Addou making a rather
extensive statement to the President. He said he appreciated the
great honor of being received by the President and wished to
convey greetings from President Siad and his admiration for the
President's stand on human rights. "There is no political
oppression in Somalia," he declared, "and Somalia's people are
deeply democratic by nature." He went on to comment that the
situation in the region was becoming more complicated: "For
social and economic development we need peace and must be able
to defend ourselves." He said that his government was grateful
for the U.S. economic mission that had just visited Mogadiscio.
"We also want to be able to count on the U.S. for our defense.
The USSR is putting enormous pressure on the Somali government
to accept its idea of Soviet hegemony in the area. International
socialism is supposed to come first and national interests
second. Somalia's national interests must come first and other
forms of cooperation come afterward."

The Ambassador added that Somalis value their independence too
highly to be willing to consider joining together with Ethiopia
or other countries in the area. He described a "problem of human
rights" with Ethiopia--two million Somalis in Ethiopia, he said,
want to be free of Ethiopian rule. To protect its interests,
Somalia needs both economic and military assistance, he said,
and President Siad will be waiting for an answer. In conclusion
he summed up his position: "We must either resist Soviet
pressure or succumb. We hope not to have to succumb, which would
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be contrary to our national heritage.

We appreciate the deep interest you have shown in the Somali
people since you came to office. For years we have sought
improved relations with the United States, but we were not
listened to."

President Carter asked the Ambassador to convey to President
Siad his strong personal good wishes and thanks for his
interest, which parallels ours, in having an increasingly strong
friendship with Somalia. The President also asked that his
congratulations be conveyed to the Ambassador's daughter and
President Siad's son who will be married shortly. The President
then went on to comment that the United States has been
concerned about the closeness between Somalia and the USSR which
had been a reason for doubt on our part that our friendship
could be strong but, he said, "I believe that is now changing --
we have watched with care the development of Berber and the
calls of Soviet ships there; we also have the impression that
Soviet anti-submarine airplanes have been flying from Somalia.
Because of the independent nature of the Somali people, we feel
you are well able to take care of your own interests. We are
eager to understand your needs more clearly. But it is hard for
us to understand the military needs. A military attach would be
helpful in giving us more understanding of your military needs.
We do not want to compete with the USSR because we want Somalia
to be non-aligned and not dominated by anyone. We can move more
easily on a unilateral basis to give economic aid than military
aid. We are trying to work with the Saudis and our European
allies to see that Somalia has adequate defense capabilities
without relying on the Soviet Union. We want the Somalis to
recognize their own destiny. We hope your problems with Ethiopia
can be peacefully worked out, and we are pleased that the TFAI
will be encouraged in its independence by everyone in the area.
I hope your own people will see an advantage in seeking progress
with multinational friends, not by relying just on us but by
relying on European countries, too.

We are cooperating carefully with them and with the Saudis. In
meetings with some of our European friends we have discussed
Somalia and how important it is to have it associated with us as
a democratic country. We appreciate your own personal friendship
with our country and we recognize you as a spokesman for
democratic processes and freedom. There is no doubt that you
represent your nation well and report our views well to your
government and that means a great deal to us."

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The President continued:

"We recognize the strategic importance of your country because
of the character and attitude of your people and your insistence
on independence of action and thought. You can have a very
important influence in your whole region. The degree with which
we can communicate freely is important, of course, and we do
appreciate the steady but very gratifying trend toward the
removal of past doubts and misunderstandings and difficulties.
The trends are all in the right direction. We are very hopeful--
and the members of the Congress share my hope--that they will
culminate in a completely comfortable relationship between our
country and yours."

The Ambassador commented briefly on the fact that Somalis are
100% religious people and took his prayer beads out of his
pocket to emphasize that he himself prayed five times each day.
He went on to say that the Soviets came to Somalia because the
Somalis had had no choice--"but now we see in you, Mr.
President, hope and inspiration. We hope your human rights drive
encourages other people." The President at this point rose to
say that he would like to step out for a moment to get a small
gift he would like the Ambassador to take back to President
Siad. Meanwhile, Dr. Brzezinski asked the Ambassador whether
President Siad had made any public declarations about human
rights. The Ambassador noted that Siad had condemned the
killings that were taking place in Ethiopia and had taken Idi
Amin to task for his cruelty. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Siad
had said anything publicly about President Carter's human rights
position. The Ambassador indicated that he had not but that he
expected he would. The President returned with a volume of U.S.
satellite photography which was examined briefly by the
Ambassador and the President and then good-byes and good wishes
were exchanged.

The Ambassador said he would return from Somalia at the end of
August and he hoped there would be good developments by then.
Dr. Brzezinski accompanied the Ambassador to his car.







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Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Paul B. Henze regarding reasons why the U.S.
should not abandon Ethiopia, even as Somalian aggression threatens to cause the collapse of the
Ethiopian government. Memo. National Security Council. SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 17, 1977. 4
page(s).

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17 August 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Whither Ethiopia?

Ethiopia is collapsing faster than anyone thought possible only
a month ago. Mengistu lacks the capacity to inspire his soldiers
to fight. The groups he has most favored--the Gallas and the
Muslims--are deserting him in droves. If the Somalis capture
Diredawa soon and the Eritreans make more major gains in the
north, the situation is likely to deteriorate to the point where
Soviet and Cuban aid, in no matter what quantity it can be
supplied, will make little difference. If Mengistu is not pushed
out of power, the Soviets may be tempted to replace him with
someone they might consider more tractable and who would be less
tainted with failure. With such a figure, they could hope to
consolidate their position in a rump Ethiopia. This is only one
of several undesirable possibilities.

Under such cataclysmic circumstances, I propose we extricate
ourselves from mere preoccupation with whether we do or don't
give arms to the Somalis and what the consequences of not giving
them will be, and look out over broader horizons. (After all, if
the Somalis keep up at the rate they have been going, they will
soon have captured from the Ethiopians more military goods--
originally supplied by us--than we could possibly send them in
the next six months under the most favorable circumstances.) Our
basic aim in this part of the world remains to reduce Soviet
influence, increase our own influence and contribute to human
development in the whole area. Why then abandon Ethiopia?
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Instead of waiting for Mengistu to fall, let's consider whether
we could hasten his fall and replacement by a person or group
who could rally the country and set it back on the path to
constructive political evolution in association with the Free
World. We have heard a lot of talk about the great gains the
military takeover is supposed to have brought to Ethiopia
over the past three years, but there has never been much
evidence to substantiate this wishful interpretation of what has
been going on there as Mengistu, step by step, consolidated his
grip. It's been a bloody mess since November 1974 and the
outflow of educated and talented Ethiopians long ago became a
flood. Mengistu's alleged concern for the downtrodden never
applied to Eritrea. Every identifiable interest-group in the
population has been alienated: students, labor, church,
entrepreneurs, various tribal groups. And now we see the result:
demoralization, collapse. Ethiopia, the oldest political entity
in the world after Egypt and China, is about to fall to pieces.


Legally, however, Ethiopia can't fall to pieces. The OAU can't
reward Somali aggression. The Somalis are not that popular with
other Africans. None of the major powers of the world can
condone the Somali moves.(Eritrean independence is problematical
from a political and legal stand-point, too, but a bit less so,
for it was a UN-mandated territory.) Residually, there is still
a great deal of strength in the idea of the Ethiopian state and
Ethiopia makes more sense as a nation than most African states
do. So--sooner or later Ethiopia will have to be put back on its
feet and back together again. We owe it to the Ethiopians after
more than 30 years of close association and something of a
"special relationship" with them to play a role in this process.


What can we do? Mengistu wants to cozy up to us again. We can't
do that. He is a bloody tyrant and a failure besides. But we can
take advantage of his desperation to underscore our interest in
Ethiopia as such and in Ethiopians and their fate as people. We
should also consider going farther. We can make it clear that
our main problem is Mengistu and his clique but that we are
ready to be more supportive of a government more capable of
representing and defending the real interests of the Ethiopian
people. We don't have many direct channels of influence left in
Ethiopia, but we cannot be without means of getting word across
discreetly that if Mengistu were replaced by a more humane
government we would be prepared to consider helping Ethiopia
defend its legitimate interests. Among others, we might suggest
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this approach to the Israelis. It could be in their interest,
for they are in grave danger of losing their whole investment in
Ethiopia when Mengistu falls. They now tell us it is not
Mengistu they support, but the idea of Ethiopia as such. The
trouble is that the two concepts are rapidly becoming
incompatible. The Israelis stand to lose more than we from not
recognizing this and adjusting their position accordingly.
Interestingly enough, what sounds like reliable reporting of
Saudi attitudes indicates that the Saudis still favor a rescue
operation that might preserve some sort of loose Ethiopian
federation including Eritrea and nominally, at least, the
Ogaden.

It is not at all clear just who could take over from Mengistu in
Addis Ababa. We need to know more. There is an astonishing
dearth of evidence of serious plotting. Even in quiet times
under Haile Selassie, there was always a plot a month in
Ethiopia. That Mengistu is going to fall, however, now seems
inevitable. The Ethiopians are on the verge of losing
practically all the forces they have thrown into the Ogaden.
Between Diredawa and Addis and between the capital and Negelle
and Goba in the south there are almost no troops left. If the
Somalis are tempted to do so once they have these key towns,
they can probably march right on to Addis and push Mengistu out
of his chair. If that happens, some sort of internationalization
of the Ethiopian situation -- some sort of rescue operation
will have to be undertaken. Rather than waiting for events to
take their course, we should waste no time in determining
whether we have some capacity to influence them.

The following possible actions occur to me; others could
probably be thought of:

- Take advantage of Mengistu's overtures for keeping up dialogue
in the course of which we seek opportunities to pass word that
while we find it impossible to help Mengistu we are interested
in helping Ethiopia and would welcome a change of leadership. We
might send a special emissary out to Ethiopia ostensibly to size
up the situation and report back to Washington, e.g.

- Discuss with the Israelis, British, Italians, French, Germans,
Saudis and perhaps others how any or all of us could influence
what comes after Mengistu--and how we could keep the Soviets
from picking up the pieces and tightening their grip on what is
left.

- Talk to the EDU about what it thinks it might be able to do
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with a modicum of help from either/or (a) Europeans, (b) other
Africans, (c) Iranians, Saudis, etc., (d) ourselves.

NOTE: Nothing said above is intended to imply that we should not
continue consolidating our relations with all the other Horn
countries: Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti. It is especially important
to maintain a strong Kenya. Reasserting our influence in
Ethiopia would serve to bolster Kenya's confidence in the value
of reliance on the U.S. and the West. If we are passive in our
response to the cataclysm now affecting the Horn, the Soviets
could still come out the net gainers in the area, with major
influence over both Somalia and Ethiopia. If we reassert
ourselves in Ethiopia, the Soviets at best will be able only to
retain some residual influence in Somalia, but with the
disadvantage of having been humiliated by their Ethiopian
misadventure. The Sudan and even a fully independent Eritrea are
unlikely to want or need to accept Soviet
support for a long time to come.




























14



Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: request by
Somali Ambassador Adou to meet with Brzezinski; relations between Ethiopia and Somalia;
Israeli concern that the Soviet Union may press Ethiopia to expel Israeli military personnel.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 23 November 1977 (includes 22
November)

Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Conferred with State Area Director Post on a
number of current problems re Horn. Briefed him on Shah's
remarks on this area to President. Discussed U.S. initiative to
get Saudis to put pressure on South Yemenis to deny Soviets use
of Aden as replacement for Berbera.

Had call from Somali Ambassador Addou requesting appointment
with you next week. He said he has been called back to
Mogadiscio on consultation, leaving week after next, and would
like to have chance to hear your views before he leaves. I think
it might be useful for you to meet with him, though there is not
a lot new that can be said. Looking ahead, though, we might
start leaning on the Somalis to think of how they might
extricate themselves from the mess their impetuosity has got
them in: withdrawal from the Ogaden in return for promises of
some form of autonomy within framework of Ethiopian sovereignty,
e.g.

Lectured on Horn to Bob Rothberg's MIT/Harvard group yesterday
had very large turnout and flood of intelligent questions.
Believe there was considerable understanding for
Administration's position.

Ethiopia-Somalia: Somalis are in the midst of an effort to
capture Harar but Ethiopians appear to be putting up strong
resistance. The British have rebuffed Somali requests for
military help. Several reports indicates Somalis are
energetically buying arms and spares from Eastern European
sources. Presumably, Soviets will not interfere to stop this
flow.

Israelis are worried Soviets may press Ethiopians to eject them.
Kenyan establishment is very unhappy with Foreign Minister
15

Waiyaki for having gone overboard in anti-Israeli moves at UN.
Kenyans seem to have consolidated their relationship with
Israelis recently.

There has been a spate of reporting on the EDU which indicates
that:

*There is a serious leadership struggle in the organization.

*There is a controversy among Sudanese security organizations
over who looks after Ethiopian exile activities.

*EDU has learned of major tribal fight (Amharas/Tigres against
Gallas) which broke out among Ethiopian troopsin Humera area
over execution of Atnafu.

*As result, EDU is planning to mount major offensive against
Humera again by mid-December.





























16




Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: meeting
between U.S. officials and a Somali delegation; meeting with Israeli official David Tourgeman
regarding the situation in the Horn of Africa; Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts concerning
Cubans in Africa;

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 5 December 1977

Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Discussed Somali delegation with State and sent
you memo suggesting that if you see them it be this coming
Thursday along with the Somali ambassador. Vance will see them
but no one is advocating Presidential meeting though they have
request it.

David Tourgeman, Israeli Embassy Counsellor, came in to discuss
Horn situation. He was much less upbeat about Mengistu than
before though had a story to effect that Atnafu was not killed
by Mengistu but by extremists who forced Mengistu to go along
with their approach. This would appear to be last-ditch effort
on part of Israelis to salvage something of their earlier
contention that Mengistu is really pro-Western and worried about
the Soviets and therefore we should give him some arms....
Pretty far fetched, and I am not sure Tourgeman believed it
himself. He finished up by telling me he was worried that
Ethiopians might kick out the Israelis, especially as Soviets
become vindictive because of unhappiness over Sadat-Begin
initiatives. I said I thought the Israelis might fend off that
possibility by withdrawing from Ethiopia--where it seemed to me
increasingly doubtful that they could be accomplishing much
anyway.

Received report from Reinhardt on what VOA has been saying about
Cuban in Africa.

*Said did not accomplish much during his recent visit to Egypt
and alienated the Egyptians almost as much as he did Nimeiry.

*Kenyans are sending mission to Saudi Arabia with aim of
strengthening relations; a very constructive move and one we
have been urging for some time.
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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 9 December 1977 (includes 8 December)
Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Participated in your meeting with Somali
delegation morning of 8 December; prepared memo for President on
it which went to you this morning along with Siad's letter to
President; attended luncheon for this delegation hosted by State
at Metropolitan Club today. Ambassador Addou has requested token
meeting with Vice President next week; have sent you note re
this.

Was involved with State and you in efforts to get Soviet airlift
to Ethiopia publicized--it seems we came out rather successfully
with everyone on the same wavelength; now we must see what
results we have achieved.

Spent hour morning of 8 December with French academician/
journalist Gerard Chaliand who specializes on Horn and was in
Eritrea, courtesy of the EPLF, for 23 days earlier this year. He
had fascinating things to say about the Eritrean rebellion but
still believes that real solution for Eritrea lies not in
independence, but in confederation with a rational Ethiopia. How
that will come about he has no idea. He has more knowledge in
depth of Horn and more realistic understanding of it than anyone
I have talked to recently. Is considering doing an article for
Foreign Policy or Foreign Affairs which would be useful.

Told State and DOD that in view of President's approval of F-5
program for Sudan, thanks to fast State action, we didn't need
report which you had asked for as of 9 December; your memo
requesting it did the job!

Horn of Africa:

Ethiopians are launching a major offensive against the Somalis
in Sidamo and Bale this weekend.

Mengistu has restricted Israeli advisers in Addis to please the
Soviets.

A Soviet General is reported to have declared in Cuba that Cuba
18

will have over 30,000 troops in Africa by the end of this year.
There are some indications that the Cubans may be increasing
their manpower in Ethiopia by a couple of hundred.

The Italians are reporting that the Eritreans are going to
declare independence soon but there are no other indications of
this. Military operations in Eritrea continue bloody with no
major changes as Ethiopians try to open up road between Massawa
and Asmara.

Our embassy in Khartoum considers inherently unlikely a report
that the Sudanese and Egyptians have agreed to a scheme to
occupy Berbera to keep the Ethiopians from taking it from the
Somalis. We need more solid information on this before we jump
to any conclusions.
































19




Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: intelligence
assessment of Ethiopia's counteroffensive against Somalia; Soviet and Cuban intervention in
Ethiopia; U.S. discussions with Somali Ambassador Abdullahi Addou; Soviet military assistance
to Ethiopia.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE
SUBJECT: Evening Report - 10 January 1978

Daily Activities:

Spent much of the day on the Horn, holding two-hour SCC Working
Group meeting this morning with reps of State, CIA and DOD which
gave us useful opportunity to review latest information, latest
intelligence work in progress and latest policy thinking re Horn
problems. The Intelligence Community's military assessment is
coming to conclusion that the chances of a successful Ethiopian
counteroffensive against the Somalis before April are not good,
and if Ethiopians launch an offensive prematurely they are
likely to be beaten back. Implications of this conclusion for
policy are that the Somalis are not in as great danger of being
invaded as they have been claiming. This is turn leads to the
conclusion that measures to protect them may not be as urgent
as they want us to think. This does not mean that there is not
some justification for taking certain measures nevertheless for
the effect they can have on discouraging the Soviets and Cubans
from escalating their involvement further and in order to
reinforce the process that we are now engaged in of warning all
three parties--Ethiopians, Soviets and Cubans--that they should
not think in terms of invading and punishing Somalia. (S)

We also had a good deal of discussion of what could be
accomplished by further efforts to get negotiations going. We
concluded that there is very little chance of getting serious
negotiations going now because neither the Ethiopians nor the
Somalis see it in their interest to engage in serious
negotiations and Soviets and Cubans would undoubtedly discourage
Ethiopians from negotiating even if they were inclined to do so.
Therefore, it is important that the U.S. not get itself into the
center of any negotiating scheme that is bound to come to very
little. On the other hand, it is desirable for people like the
Iranians to be talking of encouraging negotiations and to be in
touch with both parties. If we look upon this as a situation
where we go through a new phase of what we have just been doing
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for several weeks: getting the Africans to try to negotiate,
then no harm will be done to our own position and gradually we
will increase realization on the part of the somalis, at least,
and perhaps later even the Ethiopians, that the only ultimate
solution must come through some form of negotiation.
There was general agreement that negotiation can ultimately
succeed only if and when the Soviets are willing to encourage it
seriously. Unlike the Middle East, where the Soviets are not
parties to the situation in an active way any more, they are the
key active party in the Horn; until they see it in their
interest to negotiate it is difficult to see how there can be
any negotiations. We reviewed the question whether there are any
pressures the U.S. can bring to bear on the Soviets anywhere
that will prompt them to change their approach in the Horn.
State/SP and Soviet specialists attending were skeptical. It is
primarily in this area, however, that I feel we need to do
further work.

I then had lunch with Somali Ambassador Addou and listened to
his view of the Horn situation for an hour and a half. His
current line is that nothing can change for the better in the
Horn until the "Elephant is removed." By Elephant, he means the
Soviets. But he has no idea how the Elephant can be removed. He
talked of encouraging the EDU to overthrow Mengistu and said the
Somalis have close ties with the EDU. I didn't tell him that our
own reporting indicates that the EDU is deteriorating. He shown
no interest in negotiating. The main thing I pushed with him was
a strong suggestion that the Somalis improve their position by
reassuring Kenya--which would make them look better with
everybody. He insisted they were trying to do so.

The COM conference that was going to take place in Nairobi this
coming weekend has been postponed until the middle of next week,
so I will not now be leaving any earlier than next Tuesday.

Significant Information:

Djibouti: the Somalis have already spent over $2 million in
covert action in Djibouti and have given their embassy in
Djibouti nearly $5 million to spend over the coming period if it
is necessary to bolster their position there. This is a
formidable outlay for a country with the resources of Somalia.

Ethiopia: Over the next six weeks between 15 and 18 Soviet ships
are expected to arrive in Ethiopia, transporting additional
supplies and equipment. In addition the Ethiopians are expected
to receive a total of 12 MIG-23's during this period, primarily
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by air. The scope of the Soviet investment is staggering....
They seem to have learned nothing from our experience in
Vietnam....

NOTE: Rick relayed notes on your luncheon discussion with
Vance and Brown today re Horn. Will be in touch with State
on continuing basis on these during next couple of days.








































22





Memorandum for David Aaron from Paul B. Henze regarding talking points for Somali
Ambassador Addou's visit to the U.S. Topics include: relations between the U.S. and Somalia;
President Siad's support for guerrillas in the Ogaden; U.S. economic assistance.
Memo. National Security Council.

October 24, 1978
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON
FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Visit of Somali Ambassador Addou

The best indication of what Addou may want to say is his
conversation with Newsom last week. He told Newsom Siad had
authorized him to tell us that he is going to return Somalia to
parliamentary democracy and that Addou will be going back to
head the new government. He was not clear about timetable or
mechanics of this process.

Harrop, who has been visiting Somalia this past weekend (along
with Admiral Packer) to take part in celebrations of the 9th
anniversary of Siad's 1969 coup, was told nothing about return
to democracy but heard a good deal about arms and the Ogaden
from Siad whose line was essentially no different from what it
was when I was out there a year ago September. Siad refuses to
give up his claim to the Ogaden and insists that he must support
the guerrillas, though he does not admit the extent of military
support he is giving them. Siad's celebrations went off well,
though intelligence reporting indicates that tribal dissidence
and dissatisfaction with Siad are growing (a good recent CIA
analysis is attached, TAB A). The Kenyans have recently
permitted a number of Somali dissidents (most of whom fled to
Kenya after last April's coup) to fly to Ethiopia to join the
anti-Siad Somali guerrillas Mengistu is supporting. Harrop
raised Kenya with Siad but got nowhere--same old story as
before.


Talking points to use with Addou: Addou is coming to deliver a
message to us, so you need not say a great deal to him. The idea
of returning to parliamentary democracy is certainly a welcome
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one, from our viewpoint, for this would mean putting Somalia
back on the path it successfully followed from 1960 to 1969.
Parliamentary democracy in Somalia was sometimes messy (it
always is; and there were special problems in Somalia because an
elaborate proportional representation system resulted in too
many parties) but it kept the country in better balance in its
international relations than it has had since and resulted in a
fair amount of economic progress. Somalia managed to change
presidents and prime ministers peacefully during this period.
The mystery about Siad's intention to return to democracy is how
he could do it and survive personally. It must be a very guided
and controlled "democracy" that he has in mind if, indeed, Siad
has this in mind at all. The whole story may be merely an Addou
ploy. You might want to ask Addou a few leading questions if you
wish to take the time. You might also ask, if he does not
volunteer the information, when he plans to go back to take up
his new responsibilities.

Other points to be made should be consistent with our current
stance toward Somalia:

* We want to regard Somalia as a friend and we want to help
Somalia with its economic development--we plan to continue and
expand the aid we are already giving (about $10M so far with
several additional projects being planned).

* We continue to be disturbed by Siad's support for guerrillas
in the Ogaden. There can be no planning for possible military
assistance while this goes on. In our view, Somali support for
the guerrillas exacerbates tensions with Ethiopia and forces
Ethiopia to rely on the Soviets and Cubans.

* While we sympathize with Somalia's concern for kinsmen in the
Ogaden, we notice that no African country is willing to support
Somali claims. Somalia is not the only African country that has
kindred peoples outside its borders. Continued fighting in the
Ogaden hardly benefits the people who live there. Wouldn't a
policy that enabled these people to live in peace and develop
some basis for autonomy within existing boundaries be more in
accord with recognized human rights principles?

* If Somalia wants to get the Soviets and Cubans out of Africa--
as we do too--wouldn't it be better to do everything possible to
get them out of Ethiopia so that relations between the countries
in the Horn could return to a normal, natural state?

(Finally, there is the so-called "trilateral proposal"--
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Congressman Leggett's scheme for Saudi financing of U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers projects in Somalia. It is doubtful that
Addou will raise this--in which case it is not to our advantage
to do so. Harrop mentioned it in Mogadiscio and got a lukewarm
response from Siad. State believes the Saudis are not really
interested in it but will suggest in response to the McGiffert
memorandum that we ask them. If Addou does raise it, recommend
you simply say that the Somalis will have to persuade the Saudis
to commit themselves before we can carry these proposals
farther.)