364

INTRODUCTION
Most adult persons are firmly convinced that they pos-
sess a will, that they are capable of making personal deci-
sions to act or not, to speak or not. We feel that the
choice is voluntary and under our personal control. The
decision-making process resides in our minds. All indi-
viduals possess this capability of making choices and
carrying out intentions according to personal wishes or
inclinations. We are in charge of our person. It is the
foundation of human behavior.
It may be disconcerting, therefore, that neurophysio-
logical evidence has been presented that casts doubt on
this deeply ingrained belief. Libet et al. (1) demonstrated
under experimental conditions that when subjects were
invited to make a willed movement of their right hand
whenever they wanted to, an electrical brain wave, the
Bereitschaftspotential, appeared over the left hemisphere
about 800 ms before the subject was aware of intending to
act. The cerebral electrical activity was almost completed
before the muscle electrical activity (EMG) appeared. The
authors concluded that a voluntary act can begin an
appreciable time before there is subject awareness of hav-
ing willed the act. This result suggests that physiological
neural activity precedes voluntary activity, that awareness
of the decision to act, of the idea to act, comes a split se-
cond later, and is interpreted by the mind as having pre-
ceded the act. The subjects awareness of the neural
activity and the corresponding ideation accompanying the
act, follow the act rather than preceding it.
Hallett (2) reviewed the work of Libet et al. and in addi-
tion showed, using the method of transcranial magnetic
stimulation, that voluntary, freely chosen movements of
either hand can be biased toward the right or left side.
Stimulation decided the choice rather than the subject
who felt that he had made it.
Extrapolating from these observations, it appears that
so-called willed acts are preceded by nervous system
activity that is unconscious, reflex and automatic, which
we become aware of with a slight delay, resulting in the
false impression that the act was personally willed. In
elementary terms, the natural impression, Im doing it,
therefore Im causing it to be done is wrong. More cor-
rectly stated, Im doing it but Im not willfully causing it
to be done. This distinction is at the heart of the matter.
The concept of a willed act as commonly accepted
becomes untenable.
This far-reaching thesis implies that the behavior of
humans represents the electrochemical activity of the
brain, involuntary, devoid of will and wish. We are
automatons. Although this position is arrived at on the
basis of physiological evidence it may prove incorrect.
Also the findings in a simple task under experimental con-
ditions may not apply to a complex voluntary act.
Nonetheless the proposition is of such importance that
exploring its implications could be an instructive exercise.
Before proceeding however, it should be pointed out
that somewhat the same conclusion may be reached on
the basis of rather elementary observation. Every thought,
feeling, inclination, intention, desire, every mental
impression no matter how brief or faint, must be created
by nervous system activity. How else could they arise?
If there were no free will
C. M. Fisher
Neurology Service, Massachusetts General Hospital, Fruit Street, Boston, MA 02114, USA
Summary Electrophysiological findings in humans who are performing voluntary acts, indicate that the intention to
act, follows brain activity rather than preceding it. This has implications for voluntary behavior and the doctrine of free
will. This essay reviews the fields of human behavior, including medicine, in which this new thesis might have far-
reaching significance. 2001 Harcourt Publishers Ltd
Received 28 June 2000
Accepted 5 September 2000
Correspondence to: C. M. Fisher, Neurology Service, Massachusetts
General Hospital, Fruit Street, Boston, MA 02114, USA.
Phone: 617-726-3895; Fax: 617-725-2353
Medical Hypotheses (2001) 56(3), 364366
2001 Harcourt Publishers Ltd
doi: 10.1054/mehy.2000.1216, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
Ideas would have to arise without a physical basis.
Nervous system activity must always precede. Every
nuance of thought and feeling arises in and must be pre-
ceded by its own specific electrical configuration in the
brain. If one has the experience of willing the nervous
system to do something, the impression of willing must
have been preceded by nervous system activity.
Otherwise there would be no source and we are in the
realm of the supernatural. Before I think of anything, it
must first have taken form in my nervous system. This
temporal primacy of nervous system activity is funda-
mental; it is basic to our present discussion.
THE MORE PRACTICAL ASPECTS
Much of our daily activity is routine, habitual, almost
automatic. Rising, bathing, dressing, breakfasting, chat-
ting, driving to work, proceed almost without self-
awareness, at least that is what is said. The nervous sys-
tem does what it has been trained to do. Closer attention
however, informs us that even in these routine activities
there is a background of observing and thinking going on,
interspersed with attention to the routine activities. Our
interest at present is in more complex behavior where the
thesis of no free will would have broad ramifications.
The view that we are automatons without volition,
unable to willfully direct our activities, might be taken to
mean that we are virtual prisoners of our natural endow-
ment, guided unalterably by preordained behavioral pat-
terns according to the doctrine of determinism. Nothing
could be further from the truth, for the nervous system is
still susceptible to all the stimuli arising in the environ-
ment.
Behavior is the product of a combination of heredity,
early instruction, the environment and experience. The
importance of heredity is clear from the study of monozy-
gotic twins reared apart. No matter how disparate the
environments in which the two children were reared, as
adults they are more alike in habits, demeanor and in all
psychological measurements of temperament and per-
sonality, than fraternal twins reared in the same house-
hold (3). Heredity is an important factor. According to the
present automaton theory, early instruction and the envir-
onment should be no less crucial. The tendency for the
automatic nervous system of one individual to copy or
mimic the activity of other nervous systems around, is
well-known but probably not fully appreciated. A child of
two with an attention span of 6 s, becomes able to make
the vocal sounds and speech of attendants, including the
regional accent. This remarkable phenomenon of echoing
and mimicking could have important implications for
child rearing. Does this tendency to copy persist into
adult life? If fadism is an indicator, the answer is in
the affirmative: styles, passing vogues, travel, recreation,
music, art, science, and all manner of temporary trends,
good and bad. The mimicking trait may be one of the
most powerful factors influencing daily behavior. Thus,
serving as an example will have an important moulding
influence, one nervous system acting as a model for
another: parent, teacher, pastor, coach, charismatic
leader, etc. The nervous system is by no means a prisoner
of determinism. It would seem reasonable to apply these
influences in the early years while a childs natural
endowment of nerve cells is still available for the estab-
lishment of desirable patterns of thought and habit.
Neural circuitry once established (habits) is difficult to
change. The music of early years determines the musical
tastes of later years.
In medicine, especially psychiatry, the principle of
automaticity could alter established thinking about
schizophrenia, depression, obsessivecompulsive disor-
der, attention deficithyperactive disorder, Tourettes
syndrome, panic disorder, paranoia psychopathy, psycho-
somatic disorders, anxiety, pain, bulimia, hysteria, com-
pensation neurosis, hypnosis, placebo effect, etc. The role
of alternative medical therapies would find a ready niche.
The terminology used in the interpretation of the results
of functional magnetic resonance imaging of the brain in
behavioral cases will require revision.
Symptoms are created in the nervous system; they are
not deliberately and willfully devised by the patient. The
patient cannot be held responsible, and assigning blame
should give way to a more logical understanding. The
results of treatment will receive a much different inter-
pretation. The term psychogenic will gain a connotation
quite different from the present one.
It is likely that talking as in cognitive therapy, would
be expected to alter, transiently or permanently, the
ideational circuitry of another nervous system, through
the introduction of new ideas, enthusiastic suggestion,
plausible beliefs and perhaps persuasion approaching
hypnosis. Instruction in groups or classes could be advan-
tageous as it offers the patient the advantage of being in a
group. The role of psychoanalysis and introspection
would depend on whether talking rearranges the associa-
tions within the brains circuitry for the better. The influ-
ence of exposure to literature, plays, movies, television,
etc. on behavior through example, has not been deter-
mined, although the prevailing view seems to be in the
negative.
There are many areas of individual and social behavior
which could be influenced under the doctrine of auto-
maticity. Viewpoints would require re-thinking and the
explanatory language would need to be revised. A partial
list includes: child rearing, education, childhood envir-
onment, discipline, delinquency, punishment, recidivism,
faulty habits (obesity, smoking, addiction to alcohol
and drugs, gambling, etc.), grieving, religiousness, male
If there were no free will 365
2001 Harcourt Publishers Ltd Medical Hypotheses (2001) 56(3), 364366
chauvinism, national aggression, etc. The role of reward is
controversial. In the training of animals reward is a funda-
mental feature and it is logical to expect the same effect in
humans as a reinforcing agent. A monetary award in pro-
fessional sport is a powerful motivator. Clearly the human
nervous system remains open to many moulding influ-
ences. In some of these fields the changes that might be
suggested by the new thinking, are already in place,
arrived at over years of experience, on empirical grounds.
Creativity in literature, music and art, and discovery
and invention in science, could be more rationally ana-
lyzed. The arts and sciences would be viewed in a new
light.
Commonly held opinions about personal behavior
might not withstand scrutiny. For example, motives and
viewpoints might be interpreted as ingrained biases, incap-
able of being modified, even when requiring tenuous bol-
stering. And could the difficulty that some persons have
in admitting to being wrong, stem from the fact that since
the viewpoint was created reflexly by the individuals
nervous system, it cannot be wrong for that person?
QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
If our actions are dictated by complex neural reflexes
over which we have no personal control, it follows that
we bear no personal responsibility for our actions. This is
true, but, by what must be one of biologys most ironic
incongruities, we feel that since we clearly performed our
acts, we are responsible for them; we falsely bear respon-
sibility. This conclusion follows if the prior arguments are
valid. Insight cannot be trusted.
Does not this new view demean the human condition,
all that we stand for, our dignity, pride in individual
achievement, effort, zeal, and moral character that place
us in the van of civilization? That is possible. But we still
are who we are, regardless of the process that engendered
the personality of each of us. Pride need not be lost.
There is the additional consideration that the feeling of
free will and personal responsibility is so firmly
entrenched, that the new thinking need not figure large,
personally.
DRIVE TO ACTION
If we have no will to act, what is the source of our self-
initiated daily activities, the mainspring of behavior? This
central question has been addressed by philosophers
through the ages, and in more recent years by evolution-
ary scientists. Borrowing from many views on the subject
it may be suggested for present purposes that biologic-
ally, humans have sensory needs or feelings that must be
fulfilled: hunger, thirst, warmth, sleep, sexual feelings,
mating, gregariousness, dominance, security, etc. When
these needs are not satisfied, the organism experiences a
feeling of dissatisfaction, dysphoria, unhappiness, depres-
sion, frustration, restlessness, etc. which require relief
through corrective action. In modern times and with
basic needs satisfied, the preceding list might be reduced
to gregariousness, mating, family stability and dominance
(status, self-esteem, beauty, wealth, possessions, recogni-
tion, etc.). Where a choice exists, the course of action will
depend on the balance between the feelings of satisfac-
tion, versus the feelings of dissatisfaction generated by
each of the possible courses of action. If it should prove
true that in a reflex automatic organism, such driving
forces determine behavior, unwilled, the present-day
working concepts of the underpinnings of human behav-
ior would require revamping.
CONCERNING HYSTERIA
In closing, the possible explanatory power of the tempo-
ral primacy of nervous system activity may be illustrated
as it applies to the problem of hysteria. It has been widely
proposed that in hysteria, in situations of mental anguish,
fear or monetary compensation, the idea of disablement
arises and is followed by the corresponding disability,
paralysis, imbalance, amnesia, seizure, etc. The patient is
aware of the neurological deficit and behaves accord-
ingly. A major puzzle has been the patients professed
lack of insight into the process and the obviously func-
tional nature of the signs. Recalling that a person cannot
deliberately and willfully act de novo, the idea of disable-
ment must first have taken form, unwilled, in the nervous
system. Therefore, it is in the hysterics mind that the
answer to the riddle must be sought, not in a disorder of
voluntary action. Is it possible that in a susceptible per-
son, an unbearable feeling in the psyche, combined with
a model in the environment reflexly suggests becoming
weak, etc. which is followed by the appearance of weak-
ness; etc. without reaching or registering in awareness, in
a nervous system susceptible to suggestion. The patient
would not be privy to the origin of the disability.
Hypnotized persons say that they do not recall their per-
formance under hypnosis. The relief of many hysterical
symptoms by suggestion would fit with this theory.
REFERENCES
1. Libet B., Gleason C. A., Wright E. W., Pearl D. K. Time of
Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral
Activity (Readiness-Potential). The Unconscious Initiation of a
Freely Voluntary Act. Brain 1983; 106: 623642.
2. Hallett M. Physiology of Free Will. Syllabus of the American
Academy of Neurology, April 2000.
3. Bouchard T. J., Lykken D. T., McGee M., Segal N. L., Tellegen A.
Sources of human psychological; differences: the Minnesota
study of twins reared apart. Science 1990; 250: 223228.
366 Fisher
Medical Hypotheses (2001) 56(3), 364366 2001 Harcourt Publishers Ltd