1. Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v.

Adana
Facts:- J o s e f a P o , ma n a g e r o f Ma y o n Ho t e l , wa s h e l d liable for the employees money claims eventhoughthe single proprietor business was registered in the name of
her daughter Pacita Po- P e t i t i o n e r s i n s i s t t h a t i t wa s e r r o r f o r t h e L a b o r Arbiter & the CA to have ruled that Josefa is the owner since her
participation was limited to merely being the overseer

ISSUE:

Ruling:- T h e c l a i m t h a t J o s e f a P o i s me r e l y t h e o v e r s e e r i s not borne out by the evidence- On l y J o s e f a a p p e a r e d i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s
w/ t h e Labor Arbiter. It was only on appeal w/ the NLRCt hat Pacita signed the pleadings- J o s e f a f a i l e d t o s u b mi t t h e d o c u me n t o f s a l e . I t was she who
exercises all acts & manifestations of ownership- No t wi t h s t a n d i n g t h e c e r t i f i c a t e o f r e g i s t r a t i o n , doubts were cast as to the true nature of Josefas involvement in
the enterprise, & the Labor Arbiter had the authority to resolve this issue- E v e n wh e n t h e c a s e wa s o n a p p e a l w/ t h e NL R C , nothing was submitted to negate the
Labor Arbiter s finding that Pacita is not the real owner of the hotel- T h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o r u l e t h a t J o s e f a i s the owner of the hotel
2. State Marine Corporation vs. Cebu Seamens Association *G.R. No. L-12444 February 28, 1963]
Facts: The petitioners were engaged in the business of marine coastwise transportation. They had a CBA with the Cebu Seamens Association. On September 12, 1952,
the respondent union filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that the officers and men working on board the petitioners vessels have not been paid their sick
leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened then to accept the reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners; that after the
Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P0.40 for every meal, while the masters and
officers were required to pay their meals and that because the captain had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed the captain.
The petitioner, on their defense, stated that they have suffered a financial losses in the operation of their vessels and there is no law which provides for the payment of
sick leave or vacation leave to employees of private firms; that with regards to their overtime pay, they have always observed the Eight-hour labor Law and that
overtime does not apply to those who provide means of transportation. The decision ruled in favor of the respondent union. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the required meals which the petitioner company deducted from the salary of the employees is considered as facilities, and not supplements.

Held: Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages.
Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborers and his familys existence and subsistence so that by express provisions of law, they form
part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay them just the
same. It is argued that the food or meal given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were mere facilities which should be
deducted from wages, and not supplements which, according to Section 19 of the Minimum Wage Law, should not be deducted from such wages. It was found out that
the meals were freely given to crew members prior to the effectivity of the Minimum Wage Law while they were on the high seas not as part of their wages but as a
necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew members during the voyage. The deductions therein made for the meals given after
August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels should continue giving the benefits. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed,
finding out that the meals or food in question are not facilities but supplements.

3. Gaa v CA (Patajo, 1985)

Facts: Europhil Industries Corporation was formerly one of the tenants in Trinity Building while Gaa wa sthen the building administrator.
December 12, 1973 - Europhil Industries commenced an action in the CFI of Manila for damage sagainst Gaa for trespassing upon its rights, namely, cutting of its
electricity, and removing its namefrom the building directory and gate passes of its officials and employees.
June 28, 1974 CFI ruled in favor of Europhil ordering Gaa to pay the former actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
August 1, 1975 - A writ of garnishment was issued pursuant to which Deputy Sheriff Roxas served aNotice of Garnishment upon El Grande Hotel, where Gaa was then
employed, garnishing her "salary,commission and/or remuneration."
Gaa then filed with the CFI of Manila a motion to lift said garnishment on the ground that her "salaries, commission and, or remuneration are exempted from
execution under Article 17082 of the New Civil Code.
CFI: denied Gaas motion and her subsequent MR.
CA: dismissed Gaas petition on the ground that Gaa is not a mere laborer as contemplated under Article 1708 as the term laborer does not apply to one who holds a
managerial or supervisory position like that of petitioner, but only to those "laborers occupying the lower strata."
It also held that the term "wages" means the pay given" as hire or reward to artisans, mechanics, domestics or menial servants, and laborers employed in
manufactories, agriculture, mines, and other manual occupation and usually employed to distinguish the sums paid to persons hired to perform manual labor, skilled
or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or season.

Issue:WON Gaa may be considered a laborer as contemplated under Article 1708 of the CC.

Held/Ratio NO. Gaa is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer but a responsibly placed employee of El Grande Hotel. Considering the importance of Gaa's function in El
Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that Gaa is occupying a position equivalent to that of a managerial or supervisory position.
The word "laborer" includes everyone who performs any kind of mental or physical labor, but as commonly and customarily used and understood, it only applies to
one engaged in some form of manual or physical labor
In Kline vs. Russell it was held that a laborer, within the statute exempting from garnishment the wages of a "laborer," is one whose work depends on mere physical
power to perform ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged in services consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the
exercise of intellectual faculties.
Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer" when it declared what are to be exempted from attachment and execution. The term
"wages" as distinguished from "salary", applies to the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the day, week,
month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher degree of employment, or a superior grade of services, and implies a position of office: by contrast, the term wages "
indicates considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive of a larger and more important service.
Bell vs. Indian Livestock Co it was held that salary is understood to relate to position of office, to be the compensation given for official or other service, as
distinguished from 'wages', the compensation for labor."
Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than
any others

4. Cebu Autobus v United Cebu Employees Assoc.
5. TSPI, INCORPORATION VS. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION G.R No. 163419. February 13, 2008
FACTS: TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the corporation Union for the increase of salary for the latters members for the year
2000 to 2002 starting from January 2000. thus, the increased in salary was materialized on January 1, 2000. However, on October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage
and production Board raised daily minimum wage from P 223.50 to P 250.00 starting November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of the 17 probationary employees
were increased to P250.00 and became regular employees therefore receiving another 10% increase in salary. In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage rates
as mandated by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17 recently regularized employees, received less wages. On January 19, 2001, TSPICs
HRD notified the 24 employees who are private respondents, that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were overpaid and the overpayment would be
deducted from their salaries starting February 2001. The Union on the other hand, asserted that there was no error and the deduction of the alleged overpayment
constituted diminution of pay.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged overpayment constitutes diminution of pay as alleged by the Union.

RULING: Yes, because it is considered that Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by unions and their employers are binding upon the parties and be acted in
strict compliance therewith. Thus, the CBA in this case is the law between the employers and their employees.

Therefore, there was no overpayment when there was an increase of salary for the members of the union simultaneous with the increasing of minimum wage for
workers in the National Capital Region. The CBA should be followed thus, the senior employees who were first promoted as regular employees shall be entitled for the
increase in their salaries and the same with lower rank workers.
6. William Barroga vs Data Center College et al
Facts: In November 1991, William Barroga was hired as an instructor by Data Center College in its Laoag City, Ilocos Norte campus. In June 1992, Barroga was re-
assigned to Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Part of the deal for his re-assignment was that Barroga will receive a monthly allowance of P1,200.00 for board and lodging while
performing his job in Vigan. However, Data Center made it clear in writing that Barroga is only entitled to the additional allowance while assigned in Vigan and such
allowance may be changed or forfeited if he will be re-assigned somewhere. In 1994, he was recalled to Laoag. Later, Barroga was also assigned as the temporary Head
of Education; he was also given a scholarship grant to support his post-graduate studies. In 2003, Barroga was advised that he will be transferred to Bangued, Abra.
Barroga refused because his father was sick and second, he found out that there will be no additional allowance this time and that he will be working there as an
instructor and not as a Head of Education. In the same year, he filed a labor case against Data College for constructive dismissal. Barroga alleged that the real purpose
of his transfer is to demote him to the rank of an instructor from being the Head for Education performing administrative functions and that his re-assignment will
entail an indirect reduction of his salary or diminution of pay considering that no additional allowance will be given to cover for board and lodging expenses. He claims
that such additional allowance was given in the past and therefore cannot be discontinued and withdrawn without violating the prohibition against non-diminution of
benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of additional allowance in Barrogas supposed re-assignment constitutes a diminution of benefits.
HELD: No. It is true that as a general rule, benefits and perks enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced and discontinued or diminished. But this rule is only applicable
to grants or benefits which are founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period which is consistent and deliberate. In the case at bar,
Barrogas additional allowance while in Vigan is not permanent. In fact, Data College made clear that such allowance is only applicable while Barroga is in Vigan and
such allowance is no longer applicable if he is going to be assigned somewhere. Further, Data College showed that it is experiencing financial difficulties hence the need
to withdraw the scholarship previously granted to Barroga. On the issue of his removal as Head for Education, the same is valid. Barroga was merely assigned in a
temporary capacity, such designation is terminable at the pleasure of Data College which made such appointment.
7. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) V. G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment,
except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. When negotiations for a
new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.
RULING: NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted
to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of
their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
8. BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), V FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO,February 15, 2012
FACTS: On May 23, 2008, Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he was an employee
of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to
certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante; that he reported for work from Monday
to Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and pay slips by the
company; that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Ruben
Ong , his superior ; that after several minutesof begging to the guard to allow him to enter, he saw Ong whom he approached and asked why he was being barred
fromentering the premises; that Ong replied by saying, " Tanungin mo anak mo; that he then went home and discussed the matter with his family; that he discovered
that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn after the two met at a fiesta celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong and convince him to spare
her father from trouble but he refused to accede; that thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without notice; and that he was neither given the
opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from work .Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries. Sometime in
December 2007, Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of P 300.00 per trip, which was later increased to
P 325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was
not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed theservices of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal dismissal.
Fly Ace submitted acopy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his contracted
services bearing the words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latters signatures/initials.

Labor Arbiter
LA dismissed the complaint. Javier failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace. [no ID, documents, payslips. Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking
business but in the importation and sales of groceries. Since there is aregular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to
Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on "pakiao" basis. NLRC It was of the view that a pakyaw
-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship."Payment by result x x x is a method of compensation and does not define the
essence of the relation. It is a mere method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.
"The NLRC further averred that it did not follow that a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because the work he
was doing was not directly related to the employers trade or business or the work may be considered as "ext ra" helper as in this case; and that the relationship of an
employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail whatever the parties may call it Finding Javier to be a regular employee, the NLRC ruled
that he was entitled to a security of tenure
For failing to present proof of a valid cause for his termination, Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal of Javier who was likewise entitled to back wages and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Court of Appeals Reinstated dismissal of complaint. Javier failed to prove by substantial evidence r-ee relationship. Did not pass
the control test.

ISSUE:WON Javier was regular employee of Fly Ace. NO, onus probandi was on Javier and he failed to provide substantial evidence.

RATIO: In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for
illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. Existence of an employer-employee relationship between him and Fly Ace is
essentially a
question of fact. In dealing with factual issues in labor cases, "
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient

9. Mabeza vs NLRC 271 SCRA 670
Norma Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at
Hotel Supreme and the DOLE inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees
to execute an affidavit which would purport that they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza signed the affidavit but she refused to certify it
with the prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed to take her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not granted yet shes not
being allowed to work. In May 1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng
also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he alleged that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to amend his reply in
the labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by
Mabeza. The labor arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether or not loss of confidence as ground for dismissal applies in the case at bar.
HELD: No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC.
Abandonment - Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her employment status. She even asked for a
leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his
purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended his reply to indicate that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas
dismissal.
Loss of Confidence- It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to workers whose positions require a
certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other
hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift
would not fall under any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further, the suspicious
filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence
as a ground of Mabezas dismissal.
10. ALIPIO R. RUGA, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. L-72654-61 January 22, 1990
Facts: Petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of 7/B Sandyman II, one of several fishing vessels owned and operated by private respondent De Guzman Fishing
Enterprises which is primarily engaged in the fishing business with port and office at Camaligan, Camarines Sur. Petitioners rendered service aboard said fishing vessel
in various capacities, as follows: Alipio Ruga and Jose Parma patron/pilot; Eladio Calderon, chief engineer; Laurente Bautu, second engineer; Jaime Barbin, master
fisherman; Nicanor Francisco, second fisherman; Philip Cervantes and Eleuterio Barbin, fishermen.

For services rendered in the conduct of private respondent's regular business of "trawl" fishing, petitioners were paid on percentage commission basis in cash by one
Mrs. Pilar de Guzman, cashier of private respondent. As agreed upon, they received thirteen percent (13%) of the proceeds of the sale of the fish-catch if the total
proceeds exceeded the cost of crude oil consumed during the fishing trip, otherwise, they received ten percent (10%) of the total proceeds of the sale. The
patron/pilot, chief engineer and master fisherman received a minimum income of P350.00 per week while the assistant engineer, second fisherman, and fisherman-
winchman received a minimum income of P260.00 per week.

On September 11, 1983 upon arrival at the fishing port, petitioners were told by Jorge de Guzman, president of private respondent, to proceed to the police station at
Camaligan, Camarines Sur, for investigation on the report that they sold some of their fish-catch at midsea to the prejudice of private respondent. Petitioners denied
the charge claiming that the same was a countermove to their having formed a labor union and becoming members of Defender of Industrial Agricultural Labor
Organizations and General Workers Union (DIALOGWU) on September 3, 1983.

During the investigation, no witnesses were presented to prove the charge against petitioners, and no criminal charges were formally filed against them.

Notwithstanding, private respondent refused to allow petitioners to return to the fishing vessel to resume their work on the same day, September 11, 1983.

On September 22, 1983, petitioners individually filed their complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, emergency cost of living allowance and
service incentive pay, with the then Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration Branch No. V, Legaspi City, Albay. They uniformly
contended that they were arbitrarily dismissed without being given ample time to look for a new job.

Issue: Whether or not the fishermen-crew members of the trawl fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II are employees of its owner-operator, De Guzman Fishing Enterprises.

Ruling: Disputing the finding of public respondent that a "joint fishing venture" exists between private respondent and petitioners, petitioners claim that public
respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and/or abused its discretion when it added facts not contained in the records when it stated that the pilot-crew members do not
receive compensation from the boat-owners except their share in the catch produced by their own efforts; that public respondent ignored the evidence of petitioners
that private respondent controlled the fishing operations; that public respondent did not take into account established jurisprudence that the relationship between the
fishing boat operators and their crew is one of direct employer and employee.

We have consistently ruled that in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. 8 The employment relation arises from contract of hire, express or implied. 9 In the
absence of hiring, no actual employer-employee relation could exist.

From the four (4) elements mentioned, we have generally relied on the so-called right-of-control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves
a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. The test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the
manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.

The petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May 30,1985 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioners to their former positions or any equivalent positions with 3-year backwages and other monetary benefits under the law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
11. Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) v. Ople
Facts:- T h e c o u r t a wa r d e d 1 0 % o f t h e b a c k wa g e s payable to all members of the bargaining unit as negotiation fee w/c covers AF, agency fee & the like. Only members of the
bargaining unit should be made to pay this assessment- E mp l o y e r s c h o o l c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e n e g o f e e o f 10% should not be charged against the 60%incremental proceeds
from tuition fee increases on the ground that this is not a bargain able matter as it has already been fixed by law; hence, only 30% should be subject to the computation of the 10% nego fee- T h e f a c u l t y
a s s o c i a t i o n a s s e r t s t h a t t h e wh o l e 90% incremental proceeds from TF increases should be the basis for computing the 10% nego fee. It alleged that were it not for the demand made by
the union & subsequent notice of strike that ensued arising from the non implementation of PD 451, the school would not grant the benefits there under
Issue:
Ruling:- T h e s c h o o l i s c o r r e c t - T h e wh o l e 9 0 % e c o n o mi c p a c k a g e a wa r d e d b y the NLRC cannot be the basis for computing the negotiation fees
as the law has already provided for the minimum percentage of TF increases to be allotted for teachers & other school personnel. This is mandatory & cannot be diminished although it may be increased by
collective bargaining- On l y t h e a mt b e y o n d t h a t ma n d a t e d b y l a w should be subject to nego fees & AF since it is only this w/c the employees had to bargain for - T h e 6 0 %
w/ c t h e l a w g r a n t s i s n o t a n e g o t i a b l e issue & not obtained by negotiation
12. PAL vs. NLRC (1989)
Facts: Private respondent Dolina completed hi s trai ning course with PAL as pilot. He was given temporary appointment for6 m o n t h s a s L i m i t e d
F i r s t O f f i c e r . H e a p p l i e d f o r regularization as First Officer and undergoes the required ps yc hol ogi c al ex ami nat i on wher ei n hi s
" Adapt abi l i t y Rat i ng" was f ound t o be " unac c ept abl e" and t he Pilot Acceptance Qualifications Board finds him not qualified forregular
employment in the Company. Dolina was placed under preventive suspension; hence he fil ed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
found the dismissal of Dolina justified, hence, PAL discontinued the payment of Dolinas sal ary. Dolina objected on the ground that the discontinuance
an earlier agreement that he would be kept in the payroll lunt i l t he c as e was f i nal l y r es ol ved by ar bi t r at i on. On a p p e a l , t h e N L R C
a f f i r me d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e L a b o r Ar bi t er but or der ed t he c ompany t o c ont i nue pay i ng Dolinas salary since the arbitration case was not yet
over.

Issue: Wh e t h e r t h e N L R C c o mmi t t e d g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n h o l d i n g t h a t D o l i n a wa s e n t i t l e d t o h i s salaries "until
this case is finally resolved."

Held: YES The order of the NLRC to continue paying Dolina his salary was an abus e of di s c r et i on. The c l aus e " pendi ng f i nal resolution of the case by
arbitration" should be understood t o be l i mi t ed onl y t o t he pr oc eedi ngs bef or e t he L abor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his
decision, the case was finally resolved by arbitration
13. Victorias milling company v cir digest 1963 l-17281
14. Celestial, et al. vs Southern Mindanao Experimental Station, et al., 106 Phil 696; G.R. No. L-12950, December 9, 1959
Facts: The Minimum Wage Law provides that in order than an employee or laborer may be paid the minimum wage of P2.50 a day, he must be employed by an
enterprise engaged in agriculture; said enterprise should operate a farm comprising more than 12 hectares; and said employee or laborer should be engaged in
agriculture.
Section 2 of the Minimum Wage Law (RA 602) provides a definition of agriculture: Agriculture includes farming in all its branches and among other things include
cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities, the raising of livestock
or poultry, and any practices performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, but does not include the
manufacturing or processing of sugar, coconuts, abaca, tobacco, pineapples or other farm products.
Respondent experimental station, which operates a farm comprising of 960 hectares, is an agency of the Bureau of Plant Industry which are both engaged in
agriculture or are dedicated in agricultural functions as provided by sections 1753 and 1754 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioners, employees of the experimental station alleged that they are entitled to the minimum wage of P4.00 a day, instead of P2.50, which was actually paid them
by the respondent experimental station. The Auditor General rendered a decision that they are entitled to the latter amount.
Issue: WON employees of an experimental station engaged in agriculture are agricultural employees.
Held: Yes. Where an experimental station operates a farm comprising 960 hectares, and, through its employees and laborers actually tills the soil, introduces and
plants seeds of the best crop varieties found by it after study and experiment, raises said crops in the best approved methods of cultivation, including the spacing of
each plant or seedling and the amount of water needed through irrigation, weeding, etc., and the other proper harvesting of the crops, including the timing and
method, discovers plant pests and their eradication by means of treatment with the proper insecticides, and thereafter extracts the seeds from the harvest for sale and
distribution to farmers, there can be no question that all these acts and functions fall within the definition of agriculture provided in the Minimum Wage Law, and
consequently, are agricultural.
It follows that the laborers and farm workers who actually carry out and perform these functions are also engaged in agriculture.
Some employees in the experimental station may be engaged in office work. In as much as they are all employed by the same, which is a farm enterprise, and their
work is incidental to agriculture, they may also be considered as agricultural workers and employees.
15. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., vs. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION . May 15, 1953 G.R. No. L-5594
Facts: Aclayan Bayo, a laborer at the Atok-Big-Wedge Mining Co., Inc., was suspended and subsequently dismissed by the latter because he was allegedly apprehended
on February 28, 1951, by a company's policeman with a bag of gold ores concealed under his left armpit, taking advantage of the cover of darkness. The propriety of
the action of the company forthwith came up before the Court of Industrial Relations which, in its original decision of December 8, 1951, authorized the dismissal.
However, upon motion for reconsideration, that court in banc, in its resolution dated March 4, 1952, set aside the original decision and ordered the company to
reinstate Aklayan Bayo and pay him his back wages from February 28, 1951 up to his actual reinstatement. The company has appealed by way of certiorari.
The lower court held that Aklayan Bayo is entitled to reinstatement, "not because he was acquitted by the Justice of the Peace Court, but because there was no
evidence what so ever of the alleged breach of trust or of any sufficient reason to distrust him."
The herein petition contends that, although Aklayan Bayo was prosecuted for theft before the justice of the peace of the Itogon, Mountain Province, and was
acquitted, the " conviction or acquittal in the criminal case was not absolutely necessary to authorize his dismissal by his employer, as long as facts which tend to show
that Bayo had been guilty of a breach of trust exist;" that, notwithstanding the acquittal, the facts remains that Aklayan Bayo was caught concealing in his person a bag
containing gold ores.
Issue:
Held: The finding of the Court of Industrial Relations that the alleged breach of trust is not supported by any evidence, is one of fact which is not authorized to review,
much less alter, in the present instance. Indeed, in its petition the petitioner intimate that the justice of the peace acquitted Aklayan Bayo in the theft case by virtue of
circumstance which, however, did not disprove the fact that gold ores were found in his possession, against the law and against the regulations of the company; and to
adopt petitioner's theory would necessarily result in our interference with the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations on a question of fact.
Wherefore, the appealed resolution is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.