The Allied retreat ended at the River Marne, where they prepared to make a stand

to defend Paris and this led to the start of the First Battle of the Marne, whi
ch was fought from 512 September 1914. The First Battle of the Marne was composed
of 3 major actions: the Battle of Ourcq, 59 September; the Battle of the Saint-G
ond Marshes, 69 September; and the Battle of the two Morins, 611 September, as wel
l as numerous ancilliary engagements.
Field Marshal John French, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, began t
o make contingency plans for a full retreat to the ports on the English Channel
followed by an immediate British evacuation. The French Military Governor of Par
is, General Joseph Gallieni, was tasked with the defence of the city. He wanted
to organise the French and British armies to counter the weight of the German ad
vance. Lord Kitchener the British Secretary of State for War, met with Field Mar
shal French and ordered him not to withdraw to the channel.
Gallieni's plan was a very simple one: All allied units would counter-attack the
Germans along the Marne, hopefully halting their advance. As this was going on,
allied reserves would be thrown in to restore the ranks and attack the German f
lanks. At noon on 5 September, the battle commenced when the French 6th Army, le
d by General Michel-Joseph Maunoury, accidentally stumbled into the forward guar
d of the German 1st Army under General Alexander von Kluck.
Western flank[edit]
Battle of the Marne positions on 9 September.
Joffre used the railways which had transported French troops to the German front
ier to move troops back from Lorraine and Alsace to form a new Sixth Army under
General Michel-Joseph Maunoury with nine divisions and two cavalry divisions. By
10 September twenty divisions and three cavalry divisions had been moved west f
rom the German border to the French centre and left and the balance of force bet
ween the German 1st3rd armies and the Third, Fourth, Ninth, Fifth armies, the BEF
and Sixth Army had changed to 44:56 divisions. On 3 September, Joffre replaced
Fifth Army commander General Charles Lanrezac (deemed too cautious and lacking i
n "offensive spirit") with General Louis Franchet d'Esprey. Late on 4 September J
offre ordered the Sixth Army to attack eastwards over the Ourcq towards Chteau Th
ierry as the BEF advanced towards Montmirail and the Fifth Army attacked northwa
rds, with its right flank protected by the Ninth Army along the St. Gond marshes
. The French FirstFourth armies to the east were to resist the attacks of the Ger
man 5th7th armies between Verdun and Toul and repulse an enveloping attack on the
defences south of Nancy from the north. The 6th and 7th armies were reinforced
by heavy artillery from Metz and attacked again on 4 September along the Moselle
.[9]
Oh 5 September the Sixth Army advanced eastwards from Paris and met the German I
V Reserve Corps, which had moved into the area that morning and was stopped shor
t of high ground north of Meaux. Overnight the IV Reserve Corps withdrew to a be
tter position 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) east and French air reconnaissance observed
German forces moving north to face the Sixth Army. Von Kluck, in turning to mee
t the threat to his right flank, opened a 30 mi (48 km) gap in the German lines
between the 1st Army and the 2nd Army on its left (east). Allied reconnaissance
aeroplanes discovered the gap and reported it to commanders on the ground.[10] G
eneral Alexander von Kluck the 1st Army commander, ordered the II Corps to move
back to the north bank of the Marne, which began a redeployment of all four 1st
Army corps to the north bank by 8 September. The swift move to the north bank pr
evented the Sixth Army from crossing the Ourcq but created a gap between the 1st
and 2nd Armies. The BEF advanced from 68 September and crossed the Petit Morin a
nd captured bridges over the Marne and established a bridgehead 8 kilometres (5.
0 mi) deep. The Fifth Army also advanced into the gap and by 8 September crossed
the Petit Morin, which forced Blow to withdraw the right flank of the 2nd Army.
Next day the Fifth Army recrossed the Marne and the German 1st and 2nd armies be
gan to retire as the French Ninth, Fourth and Third armies fought defensive batt
les against the 3rd Army which was forced to retreat with the 1st and 2nd armies
on 9 September.[11]
Further east the Third Army was forced back to the west of Verdun as German atta
cks were made on the Meuse Heights to the south-east but managed to maintain con
tact with Verdun and the Fourth Army to the west. German attacks against the Sec
ond Army south of Verdun from 5 September almost forced the French to retreat bu
t on 8 September the crisis eased. By 10 September the German armies west of Ver
dun were retreating towards the Aisne and the Franco-British were following-up,
collecting stragglers and equipment. On 12 September Joffre ordered an outflanki
ng move to the west and an attack northwards by the Third Army to cut off the Ge
rman retreat. The pursuit was too slow and on 14 September the German armies had
dug in north of the Aisne and the Allies met trench lines rather than rearguard
s. Frontal attacks by the Ninth, Fifth and Sixth armies were repulsed on 1516 Sep
tember, which led Joffre to begin the transfer of the Second Army west to the le
ft flank of the Sixth Army, the first phase of the operations to outflank the Ge
rman armies, which from 17 September to 1719 October moved the opposing armies th
rough Picardy and Flanders to the North Sea coast.[12]
The Allies were prompt in exploiting the break in the German lines, sending the
BEF and the Fifth Army through the gap between the two German armies. The right
wing of the Fifth Army simultaneously attacked and thus pinned the 2nd Army in t
he Battle of the Two Morins (Bataille des Deux Morins), named for the two rivers
in the area, the Grand Morin and Petit Morin.
The Germans still hoped to achieve a breakthrough against the Sixth Army between
6 and 8 September. The Sixth Army was reinforced on 7 September, by 10,000 Fren
ch reserve infantry ferried from Paris, 6,000 of whom were transported in 600 Pa
risian taxi cabs sent by General Joseph Gallieni, military governor of Paris.[13
] This famous episode of the First Battle of the Marne was the commandeering of
c.?600 Parisian taxicabs, mainly Renault AGs, by General Gallieni and French aut
horities in order to transport 6,000 French reserve infantry to the battle and i
s well documented by historians such as Barbara W. Tuchman in her Pulitzer Prize
winning book The Guns of August[14] and Georges Blond in The Marne.[15] Their a
rrival has traditionally been described as critical in stopping a possible Germa
n breakthrough against the Sixth Army. Recently, some historians, such as Strach
an in 2001, described the course of the battle without mentioning taxis and in 2
009, Herwig called the matter a legend and wrote that many French soldiers trave
lled in lorries and all the artillery left Paris by train.[16][17] Their impact
on morale, however, is undeniable: the taxis de la Marne were perceived as a man
ifestation of the union sacre of the French civilian population and its soldiers
at the front, reminiscent of the people in arms who had saved the French Republi
c in 1794. The "taxis de la Marne" became in France a symbol of unity and nation
al solidarity beyond their strategical role in the battle. The following night,
on 8 September, the Fifth Army launched a surprise attack against the 2nd Army,
further widening the gap between the 1st and 2nd armies.
Taxi cab of the Marne
By 9 September, the German 1st and 2nd armies were in danger of being encircled
and destroyed. Moltke suffered a nervous breakdown upon hearing of the danger. H
is subordinates took over and ordered a general retreat to the Aisne, to regroup
for another offensive. The Germans were pursued by the French and British, alth
ough the pace of the exhausted Allied forces was slow and averaged only 12 mi (1
9 km) per day. The Germans ceased their retreat after 40 mi (64 km), at a point
north of the Aisne River, where they dug in, preparing trenches. The German retr
eat of 913 September, marked the abandonment of the Schlieffen Plan. Moltke is sa
id to have reported to the Kaiser: "Your Majesty, we have lost the war."[citatio
n needed]
Eastern flank[edit]
See also: Battle of Grand Couronn
By 6 September, in the vicinity of Verdun, attacks by the German 3rd, 4th and 5t
h armies against the defending French Third, Fourth and Ninth armies had begun.
Fighting included the capture of the village of Revigny in the Battle of Revigny
(Bataille de Revigny) and fighting from Vitry-le-Franois in the Battle of Vitry
(Bataille de Vitry) to Szanne in the Battle of the Marshes of Saint-Gond (Bataill
e des Marais de Saint-Gond).[18] On 7 September German advances created a salien
t south of Verdun at St. Mihiel, which threatened to separate the Second and Thi
rd armies.[19] French general Castelnau prepared to abandon the French position
around Nancy, but his staff contacted Joffre who ordered Castelnau to hold for a
nother 24 hours.[20] German attacks continued through 8 September but soon began
to taper off as Moltke began shifting troops to the west. By 10 September the G
ermans had received orders to stop attacking and withdrawal towards the frontier
became general.[21]
Aftermath[edit]
Analysis[edit]
At the start of the war both sides had plans that they counted on to deliver a s
hort war.[22] However, both sides were ultimately disappointed. The Battle of th
e Marne was the second great battle on the Western Front, after the Battle of th
e Frontiers, and one of the most important events of the war. While the German S
chlieffen Plan failed to decisively defeat the Allies in France it succeeded in
the German army occupying a good portion of northern France as well as all of Be
lgium and it was the failure of the French Plan 17 that caused that situation.[2
3] It is generally agreed among historians that the battle is an allied victory
and that the victory at the Marne saved Paris and kept France in the war, but th
ere is considerable disagreement as to the extent of the victory.
After the battle of the Marne the German armies retreated for up to 90 kilometre
s (56 mi) and lost 11,717 prisoners, 30 guns and 100 machine-guns to the French
and 3,500 prisoners to the British, before reaching the Aisne.[24] The German re
tirement ended the hopes of Germany pushing the French back beyond the VerdunMarn
eParis line and a quick victory. Following the battle of the Marne and the subseq
uent failures by both sides to turn its opponent's northern flank during the Rac
e to the Sea the war of movement ended with the Germans and the Allies now facin
g each other across a stationary front line. Germany would be forced to assault
this line directly in their next campaign if they chose to continue focusing on
France in the name of knocking them out of the war eventually - but assaulting s
uch an excellent defensive position was sure to be costly. The Allies were faced
with the same dilemma and a long, bloody stalemate on the Western Front began.
Tuchman and Doughty wrote that Joffre's victory at the Marne was far from decisi
ve, Tuchman calling it an "... incomplete victory of the Marne ..." and Doughty
wrote "... opportunity for a decisive victory had slipped from his hands."[25][2
6] Sumner calls it a flawed victory and that it proved impossible to deal the Ge
rman armies "a decisive blow".[27] Tuchman wrote that Kluck explained the German
failure at the Marne as: "... the reason that transcends all others was the ext
raordinary aptitude of the French soldier to reco