KIME.RLE ENSHAW: race and sex are treated asmutuallyexclusive categories. She says single-axis framework distorts Blackwomen's experience. Single-axi s framework undermines feminist and antiracist analyses, she says.
KIME.RLE ENSHAW: race and sex are treated asmutuallyexclusive categories. She says single-axis framework distorts Blackwomen's experience. Single-axi s framework undermines feminist and antiracist analyses, she says.
KIME.RLE ENSHAW: race and sex are treated asmutuallyexclusive categories. She says single-axis framework distorts Blackwomen's experience. Single-axi s framework undermines feminist and antiracist analyses, she says.
RLE ~~ENSHAW, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Raceand Sex:A Blacl<
Fe~~; Cn~qu~of An~discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist PolitIcs, Umverslty of ChIcago Legal Forum (1989): 139-167. Reprinted bypermission. Demarginalizing the Intersection o/Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics One of the very few Black women's studies books is entitled All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave. l I havechosen this title asa point of departure in my efforts to develop aBlack feminist criticismbecause it sets forth aproblematic consequence of the tendency to treat race and gender asmutu- allyexclusivecategories bf experience and analysis. 2 I want to examine how this tendency is perpetuated by a single-axis framework that is dominant in anti- discrimination lawand that isalsoreflectedinfeminist theory and antiracist politics. I will center Blackwomen inthis analysis inorder to contrast themultidimension- ality of Blackwomen's experience with the single-axis analysis that distorts these ex- periences. Not only will this juxtaposition reveal how Blackwomen aretheoretically erased, it will also illustrate how this framework imports its own theoreticallimita- tions that undermine efforts tobroaden feminist and antiracist analyses. With Black women asthe starting point, it becomes more apparent how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination asdisadvantage occur- ring along a single categorical axis. I want to suggest further that this single-axis framework erases Blackwomen inthe conceptualization, identification and remedi- ation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry to the experiences of otherwise-privileged members of thegroup. Inother words, inraceindiscrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, thefocus ison race- and class-privileged women. This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot beunderstood asresulting from discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest further that this focus on otherwise- privileged group members creates adistorted analysis of racismand sexismbecause theoperative conceptions of raceand sexbecome grounded inexperiences that actu- allyrepresent only asubset of amuch more complex phenomenon. After examining the doctrinal manifestations of this single-axis framework, I will discuss how it contributes to themarginalization of Blackwomen in feminist theory and in antiracist politics. I argue that Black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse becauseboth arepredicated on adis- crete set of experiences that often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender. Theseproblems of exclusion cannot besolvedsimply byincluding Black women within an already established analytical structure. Becausethe intersectional experience isgreater than the sumof racism and sexism, any analysis that does not takeintersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address theparticular manner in which Black women are subordinated. Thus, for feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse toembrace theexperiences and concerns of Blackwomen, theentire framework that hasbeen used asabasis for translating "women's experience" or "the Blackexperience" into concrete policy demands must be rethought and recast. Asexamples of theoretical and political developments that miss the mark with re- spect to Black women because of their failure to consider intersectionality, I will briefly discuss the feminist critique of rape and separate spheres ideology.... women's experience and, consequently, acursory review of casesinvolving Black fe- male plaintiffs is quite revealing. To illustrate the difficulties inherent in judicial treatment of intersectionality, I will consider three Title VIe cases: DeGraffenreid v General Motors, 4 Moore v Hughes Helicopters' and Payne v Travenol. 6 ~.De~raffenreid v General Motors. In DeGraffenreid, fiveBlackwomen brought SUItagamst General Motors, alleging that the employer's seniority systemperpetu- ated the effects of past discrimination against Black women. Evidence adduced at trial revealed that General Motors simply did not hire Black women prior to 1964 and that all of the Blackwomen hired after 1970 lost their jobs in aseniority-based layoff during asubsequent recession. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to bring a suit not on behalf of Blacksor women, but specificallyon behalf of Blackwomen. The court stated: [P]laintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated that Black women are a special classto beprotected fromdiscrimination. The Court's own research has failed to d~scl~se.such ade~ision. The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to aremedy if they havebeen discnmmated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory reme- dies to create anew 'super-remedy' which would givethem relief beyond what the draft- ers of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states acause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively ei- ther, but not acombination of both. 7 Although General Motors didnot hireBlackwomen prior to 1964, thecourt noted that "General Motors has hired ... female employees for anumber of years prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:'8 Because General Motors did hire women-albeit white women--during the period that no Blackwomen werehired, there was, in the court's view, no sexdiscrimination that the seniority systemcould conceivably haveperpetuated. After refusing to consider the plaintiffs' sex discrimination claim, the court dis- missed the race discrimination complaint and recominended its consolidation with another casealleging racediscrimination against the same employer. 9 The plaintiffs responded that such consolidation would defeat thepurpose of their suit sincetheirs was not purely a race claim, but an action brought specifically on behalf of Black women alleging race and sexdiscrimination. '" T h e A n t i d i s c r i m i n a t i o n F r a m e w o r k A. The Experience of Intersectionality and the Doctrinal Response One way to approach the problem of intersectionality is to examine how courts frame and interpret the stories of Black women plaintiffs. While I cannot claimto know the circumstances underlying the cases that I will discuss, I nevertheless be- lievethat thewaycourts interpret claims madeby Blackwomen isitself part of Black 2. Moore v Hughes Helicopters, Inc. Moore v Hughes Helicopters, 1nc. 1O presents a different wayinwhich courts fail to understand or recognize Blackwomen's claims. Moore istypical of anumber of casesinwhich courts refused to certify Blackfemales ~sclassrepresentatives in raceand sexdiscrimination actions. ll In Moore, the plain- uff allegedthat the employer, Hughes Helicopter, practiced raceand sexdiscrimina- tion inpromotions toupper-level craft positions and to supervisory jobs. Moore in- troduced statistical evidence establishing a significant disparity between men and women, and somewhat lessof adisparity between Black and white men in supervi- sory jobs. 12 Affirming thedistrict court's refusal to certify Mooreastheclassrepresentative in thesexdiscrimination complaint on behalf of all women at Hughes, the Ninth Ci~- cuit noted approvingly: ' ... Moore had never claimed before theEEOC that shewasdiscriminated against asafe- male, but only asaBlackfemale.... [T]his raised serious doubts asto Moore's ability to adequately represent white femaleemployees. 13 Thecurious logicin Moore revealsnot only thenarrow scopeof antidiscrimination doctrine and its failureto embrace intersectionality, but alsothe centrality of white femaleexperiences intheconceptualization of gender discrimination. Oneinference that couldbedrawn fromthecourt's statement that Moore'scomplaint didnot entail aclaimof discrimination "against females" isthat discrimination against Black fe- males issomething lessthan discrimination against females. More than likely,how- ever, the court meant to imply that Moore did not claimthat all femalesweredis- criminated against but only Blackfemales. But eventhus recast, thecourt's rationale isproblematic for Blackwomen. The court rejected Moore's bid to represent all fe- males apparently because her attempt to specifyher racewasseen asbeing at odds with the standard allegation that the employer simply discriminated "against fe- males:' The court failedto seethat the absence of a racial referent does not necessarily mean that the claimbeing made is amore inclusiveone. Awhite woman claiming discrimination against femalesmay be in no better position to represent all women than aBlackwoman who claims discrimination asaBlackfemaleand wants to rep- resent all females. Thecourt's preferred articulation of "against females" isnot nec- essarily more inclusive-it just appears to be so because the racial contours of the claimarenot specified. The court's preference for "against females" rather than "against Blackfemales" revealstheimplicit grounding of whitefemaleexperiencesinthedoctrinal conceptu- alization of sex discrimination. For white women, claiming sex discrimination is simply astatement that but for gender, they would not havebeen disadvantaged. For them there isno need to specify discrimination as white femalesbecause their race does not contribute tothedisadvantage for whichthey seekredress. Theviewof dis- crimination that isderived fromthis grounding takesraceprivilegeasagiven. Discrimination against a white female is thus the standard sex discrimination claim; claimsthat divergefromthis standard appear to present some sort of hybrid claim. More significantly, because Black females' claims are seen as hybrid, they sometimes cannot represent those who may have"pure" claims of sexdiscrimina- tion. Theeffectof this approach isthat eventhough achallengedpolicy or practice may clearly discriminate against all females, the fact that it has particularly harsh consequences for Blackfemalesplaces Blackfemaleplaintiffs at odds with white fe- males. 3- Payne v 'fravenoL Black femaleplaintiffs have also encountered difficulty in their efforts to win certification asclassrepresentatives in some racediscriminati,on actions. This problemtypicallyarisesincaseswherestatistics suggestsignificant dis- parities between Blackandwhiteworkers and further disparities betweenBlackmen and Blackwomen. Courts in some cases l4 'havedenied certification based on logic that mirrors therationale inMoore: Thesexdisparities between Blackmenand Black women created such conflicting interests that Blackwomen could not possibly rep- resent Blackmen adequately. In one such case, Payne 11Tralleno~ 15 two Blackfemale plaintiffs alleging race discrimination brought a class action suit on behalf of all Blackemployees at apharmaceutical plant. 16 The court refused, however, to allow theplaintiffs to represent Blackmalesand granted thedefendant's request tonarrow the classto Black women only. Ultimately, the district court found that there had been extensiveracial discrimination at the plant and awarded back pay and con- structive seniority to the classof Blackfemaleemployees. But, despiteitsfinding of general racediscrimination, thecourt refusedtoextendtheremedy toBlackmen for fear that their conflicting interests would not beadequately addressed.17 In sum, several courts haveproved unable to deal with intersectionality, although for contrasting reasons. InDeGraffenreid, thecourt refusedtorecognizethepossibil- ity of compound discrimination against Blackwomen and analyzedtheir claimus- ing the employment of white women as the historical base. As aconsequence, the employment experiences of whitewomen obscured thedistinct discrimination that Blackwomen experienced. Conversely,in Moore, the court held that aBlackwoman could not usestatistics reflectingtheoverall sexdisparity in supervisory and upper-level labor jobs because shehad not claimed discrimination asawomen, but "only" asaBlackwoman. The court would not entertain the notion that discrimination experienced by Black women is indeed sexdiscrimination-provable through disparate impact statistics onwomen. Finally, courts, such as the one in Tralleno~ haveheld that Blackwomen cannot represent an entire classof Blacksduetopresumed classconflicts in caseswhere sex additionally disadvantaged Blackwomen. Asaresult, in the fewcaseswhere Black women are allowed to use overall statistics indicating racially disparate treatment Blackmen may not beableto shareintheremedy. Perhaps it appears tosomethat I haveofferedinconsistent criticisms of howBlack women aretreated in antidiscrimination law: I seemto be sayingthat in one case, Black women's claims were rejected and their experiences obscured because the court refused to acknowledgethat the employment experience of Blackwomen can be distinct from that of white women, while in other cases, the interests of Black women areharmed because Blackwomen's claims wereviewed asso distinct from the claims of either white women or Black men that the court denied to Black fe- malesrepresentation of thelarger class.It seemsthat I haveto saythat Blackwomen arethesameand harmed bybeing treated differently, or that they aredifferent and harmed bybeing treated thesame. But I cannot sayboth. This apparent contradiction isbut another manifestation of the conceptuallimi- tations of thesingle-issueanalysesthat intersectionality challenges. Thepoint isthat Black women can experience discrimination in any number of ways and that the contradiction arises from our assumptions that their claims of exclusion must be unidirectional. Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, liketraffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flowin another. If an accident happens in an intersec- tion, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, some- times, fromall of them. Similarly,if aBlackwomen isharmed because sheisin the intersection, her injury could result fromsexdiscrimination or racediscrimination. B. The Significance of Doctrinal Treatment of Intersectionality DeGraffenreid, Moore and Travenol aredoctrinal manifestations of acommon politi- cal and theoretical approach to discrimination which operates to marginalize Black women. Unable to grasp the importance of Black women's intersectional experi- ences, not only courts, but feminist and civil rights thinkers as well have treated Blackwomen inwaysthat denyboth theunique compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger classes of women and Blacks. Blackwomen areregarded either astoo much likewomen or Blacksand the com- pounded nature of their experienceisabsorbed into thecollectiveexperiences of ei- ther group or astoo different, inwhich caseBlackwomen's Blacknessor femaleness sometimes hasplacedtheir needs and perspectives at themargin of thefeminist and Blackliberationist agendas. Whileit couldbeargued that this failurerepresents an absenceof political will to include Blackwomen, I believethat it reflects an uncritical and disturbing accep- tance of dominant waysof thinking about discrimination. Consider first the defini- tion of discrimination that seemstobeoperative inantidiscrimination law: Discrim- ination which is wrongful proceeds from the identification of a specific class or category; either adiscriminator intentionally identifies this category, or aprocess is adopted whichsomehow disadvantages all members of this category.18According to the dominant view, a discriminator treats all people within a race or sex category similarly. Anysignificant experiential or statistical variation within this group sug- gestseither that thegroup isnot being discriminated against or that conflicting in- terests existwhichdefeat anyattempts to bring acommon claim. Consequently, one generally cannot combine thesecategories. Raceand sex, moreover, become signifi- cant onlywhen they operate to explicitlydisadvantage thevictims; becausetheprivi- leging of whiteness or maleness isimplicit, it isgenerally not perceivedat all. Underlying this conception of discrimination is a view that the wrong which antidiscrimination lawaddresses istheuseof raceor gender factors tointerfere with decisions that would otherwise be fair or neutral. This process-based definition is not grounded in abottom-up commitment to improve the substantive conditions for thosewho arevictimizedbytheinterplay of numerous factors. Instead, thedomi- nant messageof antidiscrimination lawisthat it will regulateonly thelimited extent towhich raceor sexinterferes with theprocess of determining outcomes. This nar- row objective is facilitated by the top-down strategy of using a singular "but for" analysis to ascertain the effects of race or sex. Because the scope of antidis- crimination lawissolimited, sexand racediscrimination havecometobedefined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but for their racial or sexual characteristics. Put differently, theparadigm of sexdiscrimination tends tobebased on the experiences of white women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on theexperiences of themost privileged Blacks.Notions of what constitutes raceandsexdiscrimination are, asaresult, narrowly tailored toembraceonly asmall set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against Blackwomen. Totheextent that this general description isaccurate, thefollowinganalogy canbe useful in describing how Black women are marginalized in the interface between antidiscrimination lawand raceand gender hierarchies: Imagine abasement which contains all peoplewho aredisadvantaged on thebasisof race, sex,class,sexual pref- erence, age and/or physical ability. These people are stacked-feet standing on shoulders-with those on thebottom being disadvantaged by the full array of fac- tors, uptothevery top, wheretheheads of all thosedisadvantaged byasingular fac- tor brush up against theceiling. Their ceilingisactually thefloor abovewhich only thosewho arenot disadvantaged inanywayreside. Ineffortsto correct someaspects of domination, those abovetheceilingadmit fromthebasement onlythosewho can saythat "but for" theceiling, they toowouldbeintheupper room. Ahatch isdevel- opedthrough whichthoseplacedimmediately belowcancrawl. Yetthishatch isgen- erallyavailableonly to thosewho-due to thesingularity of their burden and their otherwise privileged position relativeto those below-are in the position to crawl through. Thosewho aremultiply-burdened aregenerally left belowunless they can somehow pull themselves into thegroups that arepermitted to squeezethrough the hatch. Asthis analogy translates for Blackwomen, the problem isthat they can receive protection only to theextent that their experiences arerecognizably similar to those whose experiences tend to be reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine. If Black women cannot conclusivelysay that "but for" their race or "but for" their gender theywouldbetreated differently,they arenot invitedto climbthrough thehatch but told to wait intheunprotected margin until they canbeabsorbed into thebroader, protected categories of raceand sex. Tobring thisback to anon-metaphorical level,I amsuggestingthat Blackwomen can experience discrimination in ways that areboth similar to and different from thoseexperiencedbywhitewomen and Blackmen. Blackwomen sometimes experi- encediscrimination inwayssimilar to white women's experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yetoften they experience double- discrimination-the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on thebasis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Blackwomen-not thesumof raceand sexdiscrimination, but asBlackwomen. may makethe mistake of assuming that sincetheroleof Blackwomen inthe family and inother Blackinstitutions doesnot alwaysresemble thefamiliar manifestations o~patriarchy in thewhite community, Blackwomen aresomehow exempt frompa- tnarch.al norms. For example, Blackwomen havetraditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceedingthelabor participation rate of whitewomen 21An analysisof patriarchy that highlights thehistory of whitewomen's exclusionfro~the w~rkpla~emight permit theinferencethat Blackwomen havenot beenburdened by thISpartIcular gender-based expectation. Yetthe very fact that Blackwomen must ~ork conflicts ,:ith ~orms that women should not, often creating personal, emo- tIOnal and relatIOnshIp problems in Black women's lives. Thus, Blackwomen are bur~e.nednot only because they often haveto take on responsibilities that are not traditlonally femalebut, moreover, their assumption of theseroles issometimes in- terpreted within the Blackcommunity as either Blackwomen's failureto liveup to suchnorms or asanother manifestation of racism'sscourgeupon theBlackcommu- nity.22Thisisoneof themany aspectsof intersectionality that cannot beunderstood through ananalysis of patriarchy rooted inwhiteexperience. Another example of how theory emanating from a white context obscures the multidime?~ion~lity of Blackwomen's livesisfound infeminist discourseonrape. A central poli~Icalissueonthefeminist agendahasbeen thepervasiveproblemof rape. Part of theintellectual and political effort to mobilize around this issuehas involved thedevelopment of a~istorical ~ritiqueof therolethat lawhas playedinestablishing thebounds of normatlve sexualItyand inregulating femalesexual behavior.23Early carnal knowledge statutes and rape lawsareunderstood within this discourse to il- lustrate that the o~je~ti~eof rape statutes traditionally has not been to protect ~omen fromco.erciveintImacy but to protect and maintain aproperty-like interest in female.chastIty.24Although feminists quite rightly criticize these objectives, to charactenze rap~la,,: as reflecting male control over female sexuality is for Black women anoversImplIfiedaccount and anultimately inadequate account. Rapestat~tes gener~llydonot reflect male control overfemale sexuality,but white ~al~re~ulatIonof whtte femalesexuality.25Historically, therehasbeenabsolutely no instltutIonal effort to regulate Black femalechastity.26Courts in some states had goneso far as to instruct juries that, unlikewhite women, Black women werenot p~esumed~obechaste. 27 Also,whileit wastrue that theattempt to regulatethesexu- alItyof whItewo~en placedunchastewomen outside thelaw'sprotection, racismre- stored afallenwhitewoman's chastity wheretheallegedassailant wasaBlackman.28 No suchrestoration wasavailableto Blackwomen. Thesing~lar focus onrape asamanifestation of malepower over femalesexuality tends to eclipsethe useof rape as aweapon of racial terror.29When Blackwomen wereraped by wh~temales, they werebeing raped not as women generally, but as Blackwomen speCIfically:Their femalenessmade themsexuallyvulnerableto racist domination, whiletheir Blacknesseffectivelydenied themany protection. This white malepower wasreinforced byajudicial systeminwhich thesuccessful conviction of awhiteman for raping aBlackwoman wasvirtually unthinkable. In1851,Sojourner Truth declared "Ain'tI aWoman?" and challengedthesexistim- agery used by male critics to justify the disenfranchisement of women. The scene was aWomen's Rights Conference in Akron, Ohio; white male hecklers, invoking stereotypical images of "womanhood," argued that women weretoo frail and deli- catetotakeontheresponsibilities of political activity.When Sojourner Truth roseto speak, many white women urged that shebe silenced, fearing that shewould divert attention fromwomen's suffrageto emancipation. Truth, once permitted to speak, recounted thehorrors of slavery,and itsparticular impact on Blackwomen: Look at my arms! Ihave ploughed and planted and gathered into barns, and no man could head me-and ain't Iawoman? Iwould work asmuch and eat asmuch asaman- when Icould get it-and bear thelashaswell!And ain't Iawoman? Ihaveborn thirteen children, and seenmost of 'emsoldinto slavery,and when Icried out with my mother's grief, none but J esusheard me-and ain't Iawoman?I9 Byusingher ownlifeto reveal thecontradiction between theideological myths of womanhood andthereality of Blackwomen's experience, Truth's oratory provided a powerful rebuttal to the claimthat women werecategorically weaker than men. Yet Truth's personal challengeto thecoherence of the cult of true womanhood wasuse- ful only to theextent that whitewomen werewillingto reject theracist attempts to rationalize the contradiction-that because Blackwomen weresomething lessthan real women, their experiences had no bearing on true womanhood. Thus, this 19th-century Blackfeminist challenged not only patriarchy, but shealso challenged white feminists wishing to embrace Black women's history to relinquish their vestedness inwhiteness. The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves from awhite racial context that is seldom acknowledged. Not only are women of color in fact overlooked, but their exclusion isreinforced when white women speak for andaswomen. Theauthoritative universal voice-usually whitemalesubjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non-gendered objectivity-is merely transferred to those who, but for gender, share many of the same cultural, economic and social characteristics. When feminist theory attempts to describe women's experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality, or separate spheres ideology, it often over- lookstheroleof race. Femirliststhus ignorehowtheir ownracefunctions tomitigate some aspects of sexismand, moreover, how it often privileges them over and con- tributes tothedomination of other women. 20 Consequently, feminist theory remains white, and its potential to broaden and deepen its analysis by addressing non- privilegedwomen remains unrealized. Becauseideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy areusually premised upon whitefemaleexperiences, feminists and others informed by feminist literature In sum, sexistexpectations of chastity and racist assumptions of sexual promiscu- ity combined tl) createadistinct set of issues confronting Blackwomen. 30 These is- sues have seldom been explored in feminist literature nor are they prominent in antiracist politics. Thelynchingof Blackmales, theinstitutional practice that wasle- gitimized by the regulation of whitewomen's sexuality, has hitorically and contem- poraneously occupied the Black agenda on sexuality and violence. Consequently, Blackwomen arecaught between aBlackcommunity that, perhaps understandably, viewswith suspicion attempts to litigatequestions of sexual violence, and afeminist community that reinforces those suspicions by focusing on whitefemalesexuality.31 The suspicion is compounded by the historical fact that the protection of white fe- malesexualitywasoftenthepretext for terrorizing theBlackcommunity. Eventoday some fear that antirape agendas may undermine antiracist objectives. This is the paradigmatic political and theoretical dilemma created by the intersection of race and gender: Blackwomen arecaught between ideological and political currents that combine first to createand then tobury Blackwomen's experiences. wayto resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential col- lectiveaction. It isnot necessary to believethat apolitical consensus to focus on thelivesof the most disadvantaged will happen tomorrow in order to recenter the discrimination discourseat theintersection. It isenough, for now, that suchaneffort wouldencour- ageustolook beneath theprevailing conceptions of discrimination andto challenge the c~mplacency that accompanies belief in the effectivenessof this framework. By sodomg, wemay developlanguagewhichiscritical of thedominant viewandwhich provides somebasis for unifying activity.Thegoal of thisactivity shouldbeto facili- tatetheinclusion of marginalized groups for whomit canbesaid: "When they enter weall enter." , E x p a n d i n g F e m i n i s t T h e o r y a n d A n t i r a c i s t P o l i t i c s b y E m b r a c i n g t h e I n t e r s e c t i o n If anyreal effortsaretobemadetofreeBlackpeopleof theconstraints andconditions that characterize racial subordination, then theories and strategies purporting to re- flecttheBlackcommunity's needs must include ananalysisof sexismandpatriarchy. .Similarly,feminismmust includeananalysisof raceif it hopes to expresstheaspira- tions of non-white women. Neither Blackliberationist politics nor feminist theory can ignore the intersectional experiences of those whom the movements claimas their respective constituents. In order to include Black women, both movements must distance themselves fromearlier approaches inwhich experiences arerelevant onlywhen they arerelatedto certain clearlyidentifiable causes (for example, theop- pression of Blacksissignificant when based on race, of women when based on gen- der). Thepraxis of both should becentered on thelifechances and lifesituations of peoplewho should be caredabout without regard to thesource of their difficulties. I have stated earlier that the failure to embrace the complexities of com- poundedness isnot simply amatter of political will, but isalsodueto theinfluence of awayof thinking about discrimination which structures politics sothat struggles arecategorized assingular issues. Moreover, this structure imports adescriptiveand normative viewof societythat reinforces thestatus quo. It issomewhat ironic that those concerned with alleviating the illsof racismand sexismshould adopt suchatop-down approach to discrimination. If their efforts in- steadbegan with addressing the needs and problems of those who aremost disad- vantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where necessary, then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit. In addition, it seems that placing thosewho currently aremarginalized inthe center isthemost effective N o t e s 1.GloriaT. Hull, et aI, eds (The Feminist Press, 1982). 2. The m?st common linguistic manifestation of this analytical dilemma isrepresented in the conventlOna! usageof the term "Blacksand women." Although it may betrue that some peopl~mean to mclude Blackwomen ineither "Blacks" or "women;' thecontext inwhich the te~mISused actually suggests th.atoften Blackwomen arenot considered. See, for example, Ehzabeth Spelman, The InessentIal Woman 114-15(Beacon Press, 1988) (discussing an article on Blacksand women inthe military where "theracial identity of those identified as'women' does not become explicit until reference is made to Blackwomen, at which point it also be- comesclear that thecategory of women excludesBlackwomen"). Itseemsthat if Blackwomen were explicitly included, the preferred term would be either "Blacks and white women" or "Blackmen and all women." 3 Civil RightsAct of 1964,42USC &2000e, et seqasamended (1982). 4 413F Supp 142(ED Mo 1976). 5 708F2d475(9th Cir 1983). 6. 673F2d798(5th Cir 1982). 7 De Graffenreid, 413F Supp at 143. 8. Idat 144. 9 Idat 145I~M~sle;: v .Gen.eral Motors, 497F Supp 583(E D Mo 1980),plaintiffs, alleging broad~bas.edraCial d~scnmmatlo~a~General Motors' St. Louis facility, prevailed in aportion of th.elrTlt~eVII claim. The semonty systemchallenged in DeGraffenreid, however, was not conSideredmMosley. 10.708F2d475. 11.SeealsoMoore v Natio~alAssociation o/Securities Dealers, 27EPD (CCH) ~32,238(DDC 1981);but seeEdmondson v SImon, 86FRD375(NDIII 1980)(wherethecourt wasunwilling to hold as11 matter oflaw that no Blackfemalecould represent without conflict theinterests of both Blacksand females). ~2.708F2d at 479 Between J anuary 1976and J une 1979,the three years in which Moore claimed that she.was pass~~over the promotion, the percentage of white males occupying firs~-Ievelsupervisory pOSitIOnsranged from 70.3to 76.8%; Black males from 8.9to 10.9%; ~h~tewomen from1.8to 3.3%;and Blackfemalesfrom0to 2.2%. The overall male/female ra- tlO.1llthetop fiveI~bor grad~sranged from100/0%in1976to 98/1.8%in1979.Thewhite/Black ratio w~~5/J .3%III 1976and 7~.6/8%in1979.Theoverall ratio of men to women insupervi- sory pOSitIOnswas98.2to 1.8%III 1976to 93.4to 6.6%in1979;the Blacktowhite ratio during the sametimeperiod was78.6to 8.9%and 73.6to 13.1%. For promotions to thetop fivelabor grades, the percentages wereworse. Between1976and 1979,the percentage of white males in thesepositions ranged from85.3to 77.9%; Blackmales 3.3to 8%; white females from 0 to 1.40/0,and Black females from 0 to 0%. Overall, in 1979, 98.2%of the highest level employees weremale; 1.8%werefemale. 13.708F2dat 480(emphasis added). 14. See Strong v Arkansas Blue Cross &Blue Shield, Inc., 87FRD 496 (E D Ark 1980); Hammons v Folger Coffee Co., 87FRD600(WDMo1980);Edmondson v Simon, 86FRD375(N D III 1980); Vuyanich v Republic National Bank of Dallas, 82FRD (N D Tex1979); Colston v Maryland Cup Corp., 26FedRulesServ940 (D Md 1978). 15.416F Supp 248(ND Miss1976). 16.Thesuit commenced onMarch 2,1972,with thefilingof acomplaint bythree employees seekingto represent aclassof persons allegedlysubjected to racial discrimination at thehands of the defendants. Subsequently, theplaintiffs amended the complaint to add an allegation of sexdiscrimination. Of the original named plaintiffs, onewasaBlackmaleand two wereBlack females. In the course of the three-year period between the filingof the complaint and the trial, the only named maleplaintiff received permission of thecourt to withdraw for religious reasons. Idat 250. 17.Asthedissent in Travenol pointed out, there wasno reason to excludeBlackmales from thescopeof theremedy after counsel had presented sufficient evidenceto support afinding of discrinlination against Blackmen. If the rationale for excluding Blackmaleswasthe potential conflict between Blackmales and Blackfemales, then "[i]n this case, to paraphrase an old ad- age,theproof of plaintiffs' ability to represent theinterests of Blackmaleswasinthe represen- tation thereof' 673F2dat 837-38. 18. In much of antidiscrimination doctrine, the presence of intent to discriminate distinguishes unlawful fromlawful discrimination. SeeWashington v Davis, 426US229,239- 45 (1976) (proof of discriminatory purposes required to substantiate Equal Protection viola- tion). Under TitleVII, however, the Court has held that statistical data showing adispropor- tionate impact can sufficeto support afinding of discrimination. See Griggs, 401US at 432. Whether the distinction between the two analyseswill surviveisanopen question. SeeWards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v Atonia, 109SCt 2115,2122-23(1989) (plaintiffs must show more than meredisparity to support aprima faciecaseof disparate impact). For adiscussion of thecom- peting normative visions that underlie the intent and effects analyses, seeAlan David Free- man, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62Minn L Rev1049(1978). 19.Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movement in the United States 91(BelknapPressof Harvard University Press,1975).SeealsoBell Hooks, Ain't I a Woman 159- 60(South End Press, 1981). 20. For example, many white femaleswereableto gainentry into previously all white male enclaves not through bringing about afundamental reordering of male versus female work, but inlargepart by shifting their "female" responsibilities to poor and minority women. 21.Seegenerally J acquelineJ ones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present (Basic Books, 1985);Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class (Random House, 1981). 22.AsEli2abethHigginbotham noted, "women, who often fail to conform to 'appropriate' sexroles, havebeen pictured as, and made to feel, inadequate-even though aswomen, they possess traits recognized aspositivewhen held bymen in thewider society. Suchwomen are stigmatized because their lack of adherence to expected gender roles isseenasathreat to the valuesystem." Elizabeth Higginbotham, Two Representative Issues in Contemporary Sociologi- cal Work on Black Women, in Hull, et al, eds, But Some of Us AreBrave at 95(cited in note 1). 23.Seegenerally Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will (Simon and Schuster, 1975);Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press, 1987). 24.SeeBrownmiller, Against Our Willat 17;seegenerally Estrich, Real Rape. ~~.One of 0e central theor~tical .dilemmasof feminism that islargelyobscured by univer- saliZIngthewhitefemaleexpenence ISthat experiences that aredescribed asamanifestation of male control over females canbeinstead amanifestation of dominant group control over all subordinates: Thesignific~nceis~at other ~ondominant men maynot sharein, participate in or connect WIththebehaVIOr,beliefsor actIOnsat issue, and maybevictimized themselves by "male" power. In other contexts, however, "male authority" might include nonwhite men, particularly inprivate sphere contexts. Efforts to think more clearlyabout when Blackwomen aredominated aswomen and when they aredominated asBlack women aredirectly related to the question of when power is male and when it is white male. 26. SeeNote, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6Harv Women's L J 103,117-23(1983)(discussing the historical and contemporary evidence suggesting that Black women are generally not thought tobechaste). SeealsoHooks, Ain't I a Woman at 54(cited innote19)(stating that ste- reotypical imagesof Blackwomanhood during slaverywerebased on themyth that "all black women ;,ere immoral and sexuallyloose"); BeverlySmith, Black Women's Health: Notes for a Course, In Hull et al, eds, But Some of Us Are Brave at 110(cited in note 1) (noting that "... white men for centuries havejustified their sexual abuse of Blackwomen by claiming that we arelicentious, always'ready' for anysexual encounter"). 27The followingstatement isprobably unusual only in itscandor: "What hasbeen saidby someof our courts about anunchaste femalebeing acomparatively rareeJ (ceptionisno doubt true wherethepopulation iscomposed largelyof the Caucasian race, but wewould blind our- selvesto actual conditions if weadopted this rule where another racethat islargelyimmoral constitutes anappreciable part of the population." Dallas v State, 76PIa358,79 So690(1918), quoted in Note, 6Harv Women's L J at 121(cited in note 26). Espousing precisely this view, one commentator stated in 1902:"I sometimes hear of avir- tuous Negro woman but the idea is so absolutely inconceivable to me '" I cannot imagine such acreature asavirtuous Negro woman." Id at 82.Suchimages persist in popular culture. SeePaul Grein, Taking Stock of the Latest Pop Record Surprises, LATimes 6at 1(J uly7,1988) (recallingthe controversy in the late70Sover aRolling Stones recording which included the line"Black girlsjust wanna get fucked all night") ... 28.Becausethewaythe legal systemviewed chastity, Blackwomen could not bevictims of forciblerape. Onecommentator hasnoted that "[a]ccording to governing [stereotypes], chas- tity could not bepossessedbyBlackwomen. Thus, Blackwomen's rape chargeswereautomat- icallydiscounted, and the issueof chastity was contested only in cases where the rape com- plainant was awhite woman." Note, 6 Harv Women's L J at 126(cited in note 26). Black wome~'s ~~a~s of rape ;,ere not taken seriously regar.dlessof t.heoffender's race. A judge in 1912Said: ThiScourt will never takethe word of amgger agamst the word of awhite man [concerning rape]." Idat 120.On theother hand, lynchingwasconsidered aneffectiveremedy for aBlackman's rape of awhitewoman. Sincerape of awhitewoman byaBlackman was "a crime more horrible than death," the only way to assuage society's rage and to make the woman whole againwasto brutally murder the Blackman. Idat 125. 29 SeeThe Rape of Black Women as a Weapon of Terror, inGerda Lerner, ed, Black Women in White America 172-93(Pantheon Books, 1972).SeealsoBrownmiller, Against Our Will (cited ~note 23).Evenwhere Brownmiller acknowledges the useof rape asracial terrorism, shere- SiStSmaking a "special case" for Blackwomen by offering evidence that white women were raped by the Klan as well. Id at 139.Whether or not one considers the racist rape of Black women a"special case," such experiences are probably different. In any case, Brownmiller's treatment of theissueraisesserious questions about the ability to sustain ananalysisof patri- archywithout understanding itsmultiple intersections with racism. 30. Paula Giddings notes the combined effect of sexual and racial stereotypes: "Black women wereseenhaving anof theinferior qualities of white women without anyof their vir- tues." Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America 82(WilliamMorrow and Co, Inc, 1Sted 1984). 3 1 .Susan Brownmiller's treatment of the Emmett Till caseillustrates why antirape politici- zation makes some African Americans uncomfortable. Despite Brownmiller's quite laudable efforts to discuss elsewherethe rape of Blackwomen and the racisminvolved in much of the hysteria over the Black male threat, her analysis of the Till caseplaces the sexuality of white women, rather than racial terrorism, at center stage. Brownmiller states: "Rarelyhas onesingle caseexposed soclearlyasTill'sthe underlying group-male antagonisms over accesstowomen, for what began in Bryant's store should not be misconstrued as an innocent flirtation .... In concrete terms, the aq:essibility of all white women wason review:' Brownmiller, Against Our Will at 272 (cited in note 23) ...
Recovering From Rape: Practical Advice on Overcoming the Trauma and Coping with Police, Hospitals, and the Courts - for the Survivors of Sexual Assault and their Families, Lovers and Friends