Risks in Arctic offshore field developments

Ove T. Gudmestad
University of Stavanger, Norway
The 4th Norway Russia Arctic Offshore Workshop
Joint research and innovation for the petroleum industry
working in the Arctic
Oslo 18th June 2009
Reference to relevant Petromaks project
Presentation of work carried out in the project:
Design for operations, maintenance and support
(OMS) of complex production facilities in
remote, harsh and sensitive environment
A joint research project between University of
Stavanger and University of Troms, project leader
Markeset, University of Stavanger
A competence building project financed by
The Research Council of Norway (Petromaks program)
& EniNorge
Key issues in this project
Design (technical concepts and solutions, operations
and maintenance concepts)
Complex production facilities (top side, subsea,
pipeline)
Remote location (Long distance to market, far away
from major populated area)
Harsh environment (cold, snow, storm, icing, dark)
Sensitive environment (fishing grounds, cold water
temperature, slow breakdown of spills)
Operational processes (technical and
management/administrative, topside and subsea ,
offshore/ onshore)
Maintenance processes (technical and
management/administrative, topside and subsea,
offshore/ onshore)
Support processes (operational and maintenance
logistics, product support, industrial support services)
Objectives and limitations
1. We will discuss the risks involved in marine
operations in cold climate and arctic regions
2. We are concerned with the additional
challenges the marine industry is facing when
moving into cold regions
3. We will consider work in the ice free part of the
Barents Sea all year round
4. We will also consider summer seasonal work in
areas with winter ice
Arctic Conditions Characteristics, DNV
Areas which are subject to
physical conditions that differ
significantly from those found in
the Norwegian Sea.
The most significant criterion is
the presence of sea ice, for
which borders can be illustrated
as proposed by DNV in the
Barents 2020 project:

i) Spitsbergen - usually ice every winter
ii) Norwegian Sea - generally ice free
iii) Franz Josef Land - usually ice every winter
iv) North East Barents Sea - usually ice every winter
v) Novozemelsky - in between
vi) Kola - in between
vii) Pechora - usually ice every winter
viii) White Sea - usually ice every winter
Sub-area ii (the coast off Norway and Murmansk) is generally ice free,
whereas other sub-areas usually have ice every winter or are classified as
in-betweens.
Extreme challenges, Polar lows
1. During Polar lows there are rapid changes of wind;
say from 15 kts to 45 kts in less than 15 minutes,
with maximum wind speeds of 70 kts.
2. Polar lows are difficult to predict and meteorologists
cannot forecast the weather with reasonable
accuracy (in situations where polar lows might occur,
i.e. when there are winds from the north) for more
than 9 to 12 hours.
3. In other situations when the weather is unstable,
Polar lows may occur within few hours
4. Polar lows do in general occur in the period from
October to May and the monthly frequencies of Polar
lows in the Barents Sea are up to 15, recorded for
the period 1999-2007, (Noer, 2009). Occasionally,
Polar lows occur outside this period of the year
Polar Lows, potentially
of large concern
Small, rather intense low
pressure systems in the Arctic
Formed at sea in cold air outbreaks
winter time.
Often rapid development
Gale or storm force winds, seldom
hurricane.
Heavy snow showers, icing, changing
wind direction.
Life span 6h to 1-2 days
Diameter 100-500 km
Polar Lows are a rare special case of
strong troughs, lack of models and
data to predict these polar lows
Will climate changes influence on
intensity of polar lows?
Extreme challenges (cont.)
4. Icing is caused by sea spray, under cooled rain,
snow and atmospheric icing
5. There are occasions of rapid icing on offshore
platforms and vessels caused by sea sprays (for
example in an outside temperature of -15
o
C, the
accumulation of ice was 110 tons of ice in 17 hours,
Lset, 2009).
6. Ice is freezing on instruments, wiring and
mechanisms; there are slippery surfaces,
evacuation means may become non accessible, etc.
7. Low visibility is normal due to ice fog, lack of solar
radiation, frosting of windows, etc.
8. There is potential for the pollution of a pristine
clean environment. This requires more stringent
design measures and operational procedures than
elsewhere.
Icing on Melkya, Northern Norway, January
2006 (from Finnmark Dagblad)
Reoccurring deficiencies
1. Deficient risk assessment and understanding of risk,
2. Insufficient information regarding risks,
extrapolation from other areas/ similar operations
are not always possible,
3. There is no risk in my project
4. Deficient distribution of responsibility and lines of
communication,
5. Lack of implementation of required safety barriers
6. Deficient hand-over / communication
7. Procedures not followed,
8. Deficient follow-up by operator, etc.
Improving resilience of marine operations
1. Facilitate improved understanding of hazard
management by all personnel,
2. Propose a clear distribution of responsibilities for
hazard management,
3. Propose provision of so called faint signals
(Hollnagel et al. 2006) of the potential weaknesses
in the hazard management system,
4. Identify specific hazardous aspects of working in
arctic conditions and suggest management
procedures to secure that the necessary barriers are
present during executions of marine operations in
cold climate regions.
5. Improve weather forecasting services in cold climate
areas
Resilience requires two types of foresight
1. The first comes from learning from the past
and present experience. This includes
evaluation, learning and dissemination of
industry generic and facility specific incident
data, and keeping alive existing knowledge.
This is needed to identify potential failure
modes and consequences (e.g. risks due to
operating in non-chartered waters). Reference
also training and experience.
2. The second type of foresight is associated with
processing of faint signals. These signals can
include symptomatic events, suspected trends
and gut feelings (Hollnagel et al. 2006). This
is needed to identify potential non obvious
failure modes and consequences (e.g. sinking
in harbour due to ballast procedure short cuts)
Explorer, which struck an iceberg in the
Antarctic Ocean.
Notice: The captain had NO experience from Antarctic ice conditions
Improved comprehension of hazards
Hazard Bow Tie
Types of barriers
Improving barrier integrity
Barrier failure model
Secondary
barrier 1 -
Control of decay
mode 1
Barrier decay
mode 1 -
Underlying cause
of failure
Secondary
barrier 2 -
Control of decay
mode 2
Barrier decay
mode 2 -
Underlying cause
of failure
Primary barrier
Threat - Direct
cause of failure
H Hazard
H.02 Initiating
event (accident)
Rigging checked in
enclosed area
P rocedural control External pressure
Adherence to
wave/wind window
Strict adherence to
LOLER
Competent personnel
Lifting P re Risk
Assessment Checklist
Faulty rigging
Colour coding of lifting
equipment
Adherence to
wave/wind window
Strict adherence to
LOLER
Check for frozen or
damaged wires
Ensure crane
components are ice
free
Faulty crane /
component
Supervision
Ensure working
conditions appropriate
for Arctic
P erformance affected by
high stress
P ersonnel protected
for Arctic conditions
Operational review Insufficient competence
Banksman actively
monitors lifting
operations
Communication Lifting plans
Lifting P re Risk
Assessment Checklist
Human error
Competent Banksman
Visual inspection as
soon as the load is
lifted off the deck
Strict control of
pre-slung goods
onshore
Faulty sling
Lifting outside weather
window
Supply boat motion
exceeds the criteria
Inappropriate basket
used
A Arctic
related hazards
A.01 Lifting failure
Barrier Decay Modes and Secondary Barriers
Anomaly reporting
and management
OIE / IM-S P P -010
C orrosion inspect.
(external and internal)
I&F MC oor /
IM-S P P -002
Operational (best
practice) review
OS E O /
BCA-RM-005
Incorrect inhibitors /
usage
Use of corrosion
inhibitors
P IE / IM-S P P -006
Commissioning
review
OP E / MOD-IMP -002
Design review
(HAZOP , etc.)
E TL / MOD-E NG-011
Incorrect material
specification / usage
H2S resistant steels
are used in design
P IE / IM-S P P -004
Designed for
foreseeable
operating conditions
E ngC oor /
MOD-E NG-002
C orrosion / errosion /
deterioration
Operating
procedures
ATech /
P DS -P DS -012
P latform C ontrol
S ystem
OME / P C -P MR
P rocedural control
RE / MOD-CLO-006
Inadequate testing
Operational review
OS E O /
BCA-RM-005
Inadequate
maintenance
E S D system
P A / MM-MP O-001
Designed for
foreseeable
operating conditions
AIM / IM-S P P -001
Operating beyond
design limits
Control of intrusive
maintenance and
re-instatement
OIM / HS E -003
Isolation standard
and procedures
P A / HS E -028
C orporate audit
OIM / BC A-RM-002d
Inadequate compliance
monitoring
S upervision
C AM /
CAT-E S C-003
P rocedural review
ATech /
P DS -P DS -002
Inadequate task
specification
Management of
change
AssM / MGT-001
S upervision
C AM /
CAT-E S C-004
Lack of safety culture
P TW system
P A / HS E -021
Toolbox talks
P A / HS E -023
Risk assessment
P A / HS E -010
E rror during
maintenance
T Toxic gas
release
T.01b S our gas
riser topsides
release
Energising lines of defence
Linking hazard protection to personnel activities
Risk estimation
Risk matrix estimation criteria
<10
-6
10
-6
- 10
-4
10
-4
- 10
-2
10
-2
- 1 >1
10
-7
10
-5
10
-3
10
-1
10
People Environment Assets Reputation
Extremely
unlikely
Very unlikely Unlikely Probable Frequent
A B C D E
Minor injury Minor damage Minor damage Slight effect 1 A1 B1 C1 D1 E1
Loss time
accident
Significant
damage
Significant
damage
Minor effect 2 A2 B2 C2 D2 E2
Single or few
serious injuries
Severe
damage
Severe
damage
Major effect 3 A3 B3 C3 D3 E3
Single or few
fatalities
Major damage Major damage National effect 4 A4 B4 C4 D4 E4
Many fatalities
(5 or more)
Catastrophic
damage
Catastrophic
damage
International
Effect
5 A5 B5 C5 D5 E5
Increasing Likelihood >
<

I
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
Increasing Likelihood (Upper and Lower Values) >
Increasing Likelihood (Median Values) >
Simple risk assessment for heavy lift
operations
Risk evaluation for increased resilience
Barrier acceptance criteria
Evaluated Risk Criteria
Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for all threats
Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for each identified
consequence
Requires a minimum of two effective primary barriers in place for all threats
Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for each identified
consequence
Requires a minimum of one effective secondary barrier all barrier failure / decay
modes
Requires a minimum of three effective primary barriers in place for all threats
Requires a minimum of two effective primary barriers in place for each identified
consequence
Requires a minimum of one effective secondary barrier all barrier failure / decay
modes
Acceptable
Tolerable
(ALARP)
Intolerable
Accounting for arctic conditions
1. Main marine installation work only during summer
months
2. High pressure on personnel due to short season
3. Planning horizon only 9 to 12 hours
4. Extension into fall season might be needed

Secure good weather forecasts and wait on
weather

Only for activities that will not cause
catastrophic failures
5. Winterisation:

Equipment placed in enclosed areas

Heat tracing to avoid icing

Heated water for fire water

Personnel protection from cold

Slippery surfaces

Frozen or iced equipment
Vessel to
approach
platform at safe
speed and
Weather
criteria
adjusted for
Arctic
Insufficient
visibility
Competent
Master and
crew members
Op.
Coordinator
controls the
approach
Master
competent for
saling in Arctic
conditions
Vessel changes
agreed route due
to 'bergy bits'
Vessel
approach
(route) agreed
with Op.
Permission
required for
entry into 500m
zone
Supply boat
maneuvre failure
Supply boat is
positioned
against wind &
current
Vessel is
certified,
surveyed and
ISM acredited
Ensure harware
is ice free
All hardware
certified for
Arctic
conditions
Supply boat
system failure
Ice braker on
standby in
critical season
Weather
criteria
adjusted for
Arctic
Vessel trapped
by drifting ice
Master ensures
manoeuvrabilit
y of vessel
Supply boat
trapped against
platform by
drifting ice
A
Operations in
A.03 Supply boat
failure in safety
zone
Bow Tie with Arctic Barriers
Conclusions
1. Improved comprehension of major hazards

Operating personnel

Engineers and designers

Management team
2. Involvement in safety management system

Emphasis on understanding the Arctic barriers
3. Increased resilience of the safety management system

Invite the Devils advocate to identify risk
4. Need for implementation of Arctic barriers
5. Need for improved weather forecasts
6. The bow-tie method presented is an excellent tool to
identify needs for barriers
Notice: the present work has been carried out in
close cooperation with Dr Trbojevic of Risk
Support, London