Alfred H. Paddock - Us Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare 1941-1952 (1982)

!
~ i i
H. P a d d o c k , Jr.
US ARMY S P ECI AL WARF ARE
It s Ori gi ns
US ARMY S P ECI AL WARFARE
I t s Or i g i n s
P s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d Un c o n v e n t i o n a l Wa r f a r e , 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 5 2
by
Al ~ e d H. P a d d o c k , Jr.
1 9 8 2
4
m
Na t i o n a l De f e n s e Un i v e r s i t y Pr e s s
Fort Le s l e y J. McNai r
Was hi ng t on, DC 2 0 3 1 9
Opi ni ons, conclusi ons, and recommendati ons expressed or i mpli ed
wi thi n are solely those of the author, and do not necessari ly represent the
vi ews of the Nati onal Defense Uni versi ty, the Department of Defense, or
any other Government agency or pri vate organi zati on. Cleared for publi c
release; di stri buti on unli mi ted.
The fi nal manuscri pt of thi s book was copyedi ted under contract by
SSR, Inc., Washi ngton, DC.
Li brary of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-600513
Thi s book i s for sale by the Superi ntendent of Documents, US Govern-
ment Pri nti ng Offi ce, Washi ngton, DC, 20402. Facsi mi le copi es may be
purchased from the followi ng agenci es: Regi stered users should contact the
Defense Techni cal Informati on Center, Cameron Stati on, Alexandri a, Vi r-
gi ni a 22314. The general publi c should contact the Nati onal Techni cal
Informati on Servi ce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Spri ngfi eld, Vi rgi ni a, 22161.
CONTENTS
F OREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i x
P REF ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
T HE AUT HOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi i i
CHAP T ER
I. I NT RODUCT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. P S YCHOL OGI CAL WARF ARE I N WORL D
WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Th e Co o r d i na t o r of I nf or ma t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
OS S and OWl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Th e Ar my ' s Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e Br a nc h . . . . . . . 8
Di ssol ut i on of t he Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e
Br a nc h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Th e a t e r Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Pr o p a ga nd a Branch, G- 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appr a i sa l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,I 9-
III. UNCONVENT I ONAL WARF ARE I N WORL D
WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
OS S and Unc o nv e nt i o na l Wa r f a r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
OS S and t he Ar my . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Gue r r i l l a Wa r f a r e i n t he Phi l i ppi nes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
At t i t u d e s To wa r d Unc onve nt i ona l Wa r f a r e . . . . . . . 30
Di ssol ut i on of OS S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appr a i sa l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
- "
vi CONTENTS
IV. T HE I NT ERWAR YEARS, P ART h
P S YCHOLOGI CAL WARF ARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Cre a t i on of t he CI A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Ar my Demobi l i zat i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Psywar to Pl ans and Operat i ons Di vi si on . . . . . . . . . 44
Ei senhower and Mc Cl u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
The Ar my ' s Re a c t i on to NS C- 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The Carrol l Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Gordon Gr a y - - Re v i v a l of Int erest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
"Onl y a St a r t ": Prel ude to Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
V. T HE I NT ERWAR YEARS, P ART II:
UNCONVENT I ONAL WARF ARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The Ai r bor ne Re c onna i ssa nc e Uni t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
JCS and NS C Acti vi ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
The Offi ce of Pol i cy Coor di na t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Ar my Assi st ance to OP C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Joi nt Subsi di a r y Pl ans Di vi si on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
The Ar my and Unc onve nt i ona l Wa r f a r e Pri or to
Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
VI. KOREA AND T HE OF F I CE OF T HE CHI EF OF
P S YCHOLOGI CAL WARF ARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83
I mpe t us for a Psywar Di vi si on at De p a r t me nt of
the Ar my . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Cr e a t i on of t he Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
OCP W and Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e i n Korea . . . . . . 90
OCP W and Unc onve nt i ona l Wa r f a r e i n Korea . . . . 100
VII. T HE ROAD TO F ORT BRAGG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Psywar i n Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e Acti vi ti es i n t he Uni t e d
St at es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The Speci al Forces Ra nge r Re gi me nt . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
The Roa d to Fort Bragg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONTENTS vi i
VI I I . T HE P S YCHOL OGI CAL WARF ARE CENT ER
AND T HE ORI GI NS OF S P ECI AL
WARF ARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Or ga ni z a t i o n of t he Ce nt e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Th e 10th Spe c i a l Forces Gr o u p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
IX. S UMMI NG UP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
NOT ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
S OURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
GL OS S ARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
I NDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
FOREWORD
It has been sai d that the future can only be approached clearly and
wi sely i f the path leadi ng to the present i s known. In assessi ng nati onal
securi ty poli cy choi ces, deci si onmakers often do not have avai lable the
clari fyi ng perspecti ve provi ded by hi story. Recogni zi ng thi s problem, the
Nati onal Defense Uni versi ty has encouraged selected hi story-ori ented re-
search to complement our other topi cal publi cati ons on nati onal securi ty
i ssues. Thi s fi rst volume i n our new Mi li tary Hi story Seri es i s by Colonel
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, on the ori gi ns of the US Army' s speci al
warfare capabi li ty.
As the most seni or of our mi li tary servi ces, the Army has undergone
many organi zati onal and doctri nal changes si nce i ts i ncepti on as a small
mi li ti a force i n 1775. But the year 1945 marked the begi nni ng of an era of
dramati c change. The new global reali ti es of the post-World War II peri od
suggested the need for an Army able to respond to a spectrum of confli cts.
Thi s led to the bui ldi ng of a "speci al warfare" capabi li ty encompassi ng
psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare as a response to mi li tary chal-
lenges at the lower end of the confli ct spectrum.
Colonel Paddock traces the ori gi ns of Army speci al warfare from 1941
to 1952, the year the Army' s speci al warfare center was establi shed. Whi le
the Army had experi ence i n psychologi cal warfare, the major recent US
experi ence i n unconventi onal warfare had been i n the Offi ce of Strategi c
Servi ces, a ci vi li an agency, duri ng World War II. Many Army leaders,
trai ned and experi enced i n conventi onal warfare, hesi tantly accepted psy-
chologi cal warfare as a legi ti mate weapon i n the Army' s warti me arsenal,
but questi oned the vali di ty and appropri ateness of the Army' s adopti on of
unconventi onal operati ons. The conti nui ng tensi ons of the cold war and
hosti li ti es i n Korea resolved the ambi valence i n favor of coordi nati ng i n a
si ngle operati on the techni ques of both types of warfare.
i x
x FOREWORD
Colonel Paddock's extensi vely documented work traces a porti on of a
bri ef epi sode i n our Nati on's mi li tary hi story, but an i nstructi ve one. For
the hi stori an and mi li tary scholar, i t provi des the necessary backdrop for
understandi ng the subsequent evoluti on of the Army's speci al warfare
capabi li ty. For the nati onal securi ty poli cymaker, i t suggests the value of
the i nnovati ve i mpulse and the need for recepti vi ty to new i deas and adapt-
abi li ty to change.
Thus, thi s new NDU Press Mi li tary Hi story Seri es wi ll ai d us look
forward to effect change by remi ndi ng us of the lessons of past mi li tary
efforts.
JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PREFACE
The ori gi nal i ntent of thi s study was to analyze how the US Army,
whi ch was developed to fi ght conventi onal wars, attempted to cope wi th the
demands of low-i ntensi ty warfare after World War II. The pri mary focus
for the i nvesti gati on was to be the evoluti on of the Army's John F. Kennedy
Center for Mi li tary Assi stance at Fort Bragg, North Caroli na, from i ts
i ncepti on i n the early 1950's through the Vi etnam years. I sti ll i ntend, as
a future project, to accompli sh that ori gi nal goal. My preli mi nary research,
however, revealed that the story of how and why the Army deci ded to
undertake such a quest i n the fi rst place has not been adequately told. Thi s
study i s i ntended to fi ll that voi d i n our mi li tary hi story. Speci fi cally, i t
exami nes the Army' s acti vi ti es i n psychologi cal and unconventi onal war-
fare duri ng and after World War II to determi ne the i mpetus for, and
ori gi ns of, the formal "speci al warfare" capabi li ty created i n 1952 wi th the
establi shment of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center (later the Center for
Mi li tary Assi stance). An understandi ng of these hi stori cal roots should
provi de a more enli ghtened perspecti ve from whi ch to assess the sub-
sequent evoluti on of "speci al warfare" i n the Army.
I am i ndebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke Uni versi ty for fi rst
suggesti ng thi s topi c and for hi s constructi ve advi ce. The comments and
i nsi ghts provi ded on the outli ne and manuscri pt by my mentor, Professor
Theodore Ropp of Duke, were i nvaluable. The long talks wi th Professor
John K. Mahon, Uni versi ty of Flori da, duri ng hi s year wi th the US Army
Mi li tary Hi story Insti tute, were most appreci ated, as were the comments
on the manuscri pt by Professor Harold Deutsch of the Army War College
faculty. For thei r expert, wi lli ng assi stance duri ng my research, I am
parti cularly i ndebted to Wi lli am Cunli ffe and Ed Reese of the Nati onal
Archi ves, Mi ss Hannah Zei dli k of the US Army Center of Mi li tary Hi s-
tory, Mi ss Joyce Eaki n and Dr. Ri chard Sommers of the Mi li tary Hi story
Insti tute, and Mrs. Beverly Li ndsey of the John F. Kennedy Center for
Mi li tary Assi stance. My si ncere grati tude goes to my wi fe, Theresa, for her
xi
xi i PREFACE
pati ence, i ni ti ati ve, and thoroughly professi onal typi ng of the manuscri pt.
Paul Taborn, The Adjutant General's Offi ce, Department of the Army, was
most understandi ng and helpful i n the i nteragency processi ng of my
personal notes, documents from the Nati onal Archi ves, and the fi nal manu-
scri pt. Ti mely completi on of the study would not have been possi ble wi th-
out the encouragement, assi stance, and scholarly envi ronment provi ded by
the Army War College and Strategi c Studi es Insti tute.
Fi nally, thi s study i s dedi cated to my wi fe and three chi ldren, who
know better than anyone the sacri fi ces i t requi red.
A. H. P., JR.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE AUTHOR
Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr, was born 11 February 1937 i n Mos-
cow, Idaho; enli sted i n the US Army i n September 1957; and was commi s-
si oned through the Infantry Otfi cer Candi date School i n September 1958.
He earned hi s B.A. degree i n poli ti cal sci ence from Park College, and holds
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees i n hi story from Duke Uni versi ty. Colonel Paddock
i s a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the
US Army War College.
Hi s mi li tary career has i ncluded command and staff assi gnments i n
Korea, Laos, Oki nawa, Vi etnam, and the Uni ted States. He served three
combat tours wi th Speci al Forces uni ts i n Southeast Asi a. He was an
i nstructor i n strategy and strategi c studi es at the Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; served i n the Poli ti co-Mi li tary
Di vi si on of the Department of the Army Staff i n Washi ngton, DC; com-
manded the 6th Psychologi cal Operati ons Battali on at Fort Bragg, North
Caroli na; was both a faculty i nstructor for the Department of Nati onal and
Internati onal Securi ty Studi es and a Strategi c Research Analyst, Strategi c
Studi es Insti tute, at the US Army War College, Carli sle Barracks, Penn-
sylvani a; and commanded the 4th Psychologi cal Operati ons Group, Fort
Bragg, North Caroli na, from November 1979 to May 1982.
Colonel Paddock i s the author of "Does the Army Have a Future?
Deterrence and Ci vi l-Mi li tary Relati ons i n the Post-Vi etnam Era" whi ch
appeared i n the September 1978 i ssue of Parameters. He was a co-author
of Organization, Missions and Command and Control of Special Forces
and Ranger Units in the 1980's, publi shed by the Strategi c Studi es Insti -
tute i n Apri l 1979.
Colonel Paddock i s Chai rman, Department of Nati onal and Inter-
nati onal Securi ty Studi es, US Army War College, Carli sle Barracks,
Pennsylvani a.

XI I !
I
INTRODUCTION
In the fi rst half of the twenti eth century, Ameri can leaders employed
US Armed Forces to support Ameri can forei gn poli cy i n "conventi onal
warfare" agai nst the organi zed, uni formed forces of enemy nati ons. Al-
though the si ze and nature of the forces vari ed i n two world wars and
Korea, i n each of these confli cts the US Army performed i ts role wi th
regularly organi zed di vi si ons and wi thout the use of nuclear weapons.
Whether i nfantry, mechani zed i nfantry, armored, or ai rborne, the di vi si on
was the basi c formati on of the Army, the key organi zati on by whi ch
strength was measured i n conventi onal war. After World War II, poli ti cal
and mi li tary leaders began to consi der other forms of confli ct i n whi ch US
forces mi ght be engaged. Organi zati on, equi pment, and doctri ne were
reexami ned i n vi ew of the possi bi li ty of nuclear war, but i n thi s process the
di vi si on remai ned a fundamental mi li tary organi zati on. Si multaneously,
however, a few thi nkers began to consi der the possi bi li ty of forces capable
of operati ng at the opposi te end of the confli ct spectrum from nuclear war,
below the level of conventi onal war- - to consi der, i n short, a capabi li ty to
conduct guerri lla, or "unconventi onal" warfare. Regular di vi si ons were
never desi gned or equi pped for unconventi onal warfare, so speci al uni ts,
trai ni ng, and doctri ne would be necessary for such a task.
In 1952 the Army created the fi rst formal unconventi onal warfare
force i n i ts hi story, the 10th Speci al Forces Group, assi gned to the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center, an i nsti tuti on created that same year at Fort
Bragg, North Caroli na. From that year to the present, thi s i nsti tuti on,
known consecuti vely as the Psychologi cal Warfare Center, the Speci al
Warfare Center (1956), and fi nally the John F. Kennedy Center for Mi l-
i tary Assi stance (1969), has consti tuted the headquarters for Army "spe-
ci al warfare."
2 INTRODUCTION
Secretary of the Army Elvi s J. Stahr, Jr., defi ned "speci al warfare" i n
1962 as "a term used by the Army to embrace all mi li tary and parami li tary
measures and acti vi ti es related to unconventi onal warfare, counter-
i nsurgency, and psychologi cal warfare." ~ Unconventional warfare pri mar-
i ly encompassed guerri lla operati ons and subversi on to be carri ed out
wi thi n enemy or enemy-controlled terri tory by i ndi genous personnel, sup-
ported and di rected by US forces. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand,
i ncluded all acti ons, mi li tary and poli ti cal, taken by the forces of the
Uni ted States alone or i n conjuncti on wi th a legal government to prevent
or eliminate subversi ve i nsurgency. Psychological warfare eneompassea-
those acti vi ti es planned and conducted to i nfluence the opi ni ons, emoti ons,
atti tudes, and behavi or of the enemy, the i ndi genous populati on, and neu-
tral or fri endly forei gn groups to help support US objecti ves. 2 Uncon-
venti onal warfare, counteri nsurgency, and psychologi cal warfare, then,
compri sed the key elements of speci al warfare, whi ch accordi ng to Secre-
tary Stahr i ncluded the capabi li ty to fi ght "'as guerri llas as well as against
guerri llas and also i nvolves the employment of psychologi cal devi ces to
undermi ne the enemy's wi ll to resi st." ~
Secretary Stahr's words came from the early 1960's when speci al
warfare, then symboli zed by the Speci al Forces "Green Berets," enjoyed i ts
zeni th under the Kennedy admi ni strati on. Duri ng the next decade, the
goals of speci al warfare changed somewhat i n form and emphasi s, and the
concept receded i n i mportance wi thi n the Army. The speci al warfare hi s-
tori an mi ght be excused for noti ng that that more recent peri od i s rem-
i ni scent of the 1950's, when the i dea of speci al warfare struggled for
survi val. The story of speci al warfare, then, i s a story of the Army,
hesi tantly and reluctantly gropi ng wi th concepts of an "unconventi onal"
nature.
To understand the evoluti on of speci al warfare, parti cularly i ts em-
bryoni c exi stence i n the early 1950's, one must grapple wi th the questi ons
of how and why i t all began. An exami nati on of the ori gi nal organi zati on
of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center i n 1952 reveals that i ts major subor-
di nate el ements--the Psychologi cal Warfare School (di vi ded i nto psycho-
logi cal operati ons and speci al forces i nstructi onal departments), the 6th
Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet Group, and the 10th Speci al Forces
Group--al l i nvolved two of the three components of speci al warfare; that
i s, psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare. 4 The thi rd component, coun-
teri nsurgency, appeared later wi th US i nvolvement i n Southeast Asi a. In
addi ti on, the 1952 organi zati on of the Fort Bragg center seemed to favor
psychologi cal warfare over unconventi onal warfare; after all, i t was the
Psychological Warfare Center and the Psychological Warfare School.
INTRODUCTION 3
The apparent domi nance of psychologi cal warfare was also evi dent i n the
offi ci al unclassi fi ed li terature of the day, parti cularly the semi annual De-
partment of Defense reports for 1952. The 1 January- 30 June 1952 report,
for example, although hi ghli ghti ng the establi shment of the Psychologi cal
Warfare Center, made no menti on of the concomi tant creati on of the 10th
Speci al Forces Group, the fi rst uni t of i ts type i n Army hi story. 5
Why, i n 1952, di d the Army deci de, for the fi rst ti me i n i ts hi story, to
begi n a speci al warfare capabi li ty by establi shi ng the Psychologi cal War-
fare Center at Fort Bragg? What were the roots of psychologi cal and
unconventi onal warfare i n US Army experi ence, and why were these con-
cepts physi cally embodi ed i n the same locati on i n 19527 Fi nally, why di d
psychologi cal warfare achi eve ascendance over unconventi onal warfare?
Answers to these questi ons li e i n the hi story of psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warfare from World War II to creati on of the Psychologi cal
Warfare Center i n 1952.
II
PSYCHOLOGI CAL WARFARE
IN WORLD WAR II
Wi th the outbreak of World War II, the Uni ted States had vi rtually
no organi zed capabi li ty to conduct psychologi cal and unconventi onal war-
fare. That si tuati on changed on 11 July 1941, when Presi dent Frankli n D.
Roosevelt establi shed the Offi ce of Coordi nator of Informati on (COI) and
desi gnated Colonel Wi lli am J. Donovan as the fi rst di rector. Thus was
begun a bold i dea: through COl and i ts successor, the Offi ce of Strategi c
Servi ces (OSS), the Uni ted States began "i ts fi rst organi zed venture i nto
the fi elds of espi onage, propaganda, subversi on and related acti vi ti es under
the aegi s of a centrali zed i ntelli gence agency." 1
The Coordinator of I nformation
Ironi cally, the creati on of COI came largely from recommendati ons
followi ng Colonel Donovan's fact-fi ndi ng tri ps to the Mi ddle East and
Great Bri tai n. He had been i mpressed by the Bri ti sh method of
combi ni ng--i n agenci es called the Poli ti cal Warfare Executi ve and Speci al
Operati ons Executi ve--propaganda efforts wi th the "unorthodox" opera-
ti ons of sabotage, subversi on, and guerri lla warfare. He had been
i mpressed as well by the Bri ti sh system of i ntelli gence and counter-
i ntelli gence, as conducted by thei r Secret Intelli gence Servi ce, and by thei r
abi li ty to coordi nate i ntelli gence acti vi ti es wi th psychologi cal warfare and
speci al operati ons. Donovan thus proposed to Roosevelt the creati on of a
si ngle agency to centrali ze the i ntelli gence gathered by several un-
coordi nated offi ces i n Washi ngton, combi ni ng the functi ons of psycho-
logi cal warfare and speci al operati ons on the Bri ti sh model. 2 Accordi ng to
Corey Ford, Donovan's bi ographer, the Presi dent welcomed "the sug-
6 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II
gesti on of a si ngle agency whi ch would serve as a cl eari nghouse for all
i ntelli gence, as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and a trai ni ng
center for what were euphemi sti cal l y called ' speci al operati ons. ' " 3
As often happens to those who recommend measures of a far-reachi ng
nature, Donovan was "i nvi ted" by the Presi dent to head the agency that he
had proposed. 4 Ini ti ally COl contai ned two maj or di vi si ons, Research and
Analysi s ( R&A) and the Forei gn Inf ormati on Servi ce (FIS), plus secret
i ntelli gence and sabotage branches for trai ni ng. Dr. Wi lli am L. Langer, a
Harvard hi stori an, became di rector of R&A, the di vi si on desi gned to
eval uate all i ncomi ng i ntelli gence. Robert E. Sherwood, a pl aywri ght and
confi dant of Presi dent Roosevelt, became head of FIS, the psychologi cal
warf are di vi si on. As Wi lli am F. Daugherty has wri tten, FIS "undert ook to
spread the gospel of d e mo c r a c y . . , and to explai n the objecti ves of the
Uni ted States throughout the world except i n Lati n Ameri ca. " 5 To carry
out these ai ms, FIS used i nformati on from the wi re servi ces as propaganda
on i ts 11 commerci al shortwave stati ons, whi ch transmi tted i n several
languages. Af ter Pearl Harbor, Sherwood' s organi zati on broadcast more
than 300, 15-mi nute programs a week i n Europe and Asi a. 6
Donovan' s concept of psychologi cal warf are was all-encompassi ng.
The fi rst stage would be "i ntel l i gence penetrati on, " wi th the results, pro-
cessed by R&A, avai lable for strategi c planni ng and propaganda. Donovan
called propaganda the "arrow of i ni ti al penetrati on" and beli eved that i t
would be the fi rst phase i n operati ons agai nst an enemy. The next phase
would be speci al operati ons, i n the form of sabotage and subversi on, fol-
lowed by commando-l i ke rai ds, guerri l l a acti ons, and behi nd-the-li nes re-
si stance movements. All of thi s represented the softeni ng-up process pri or
to i nvasi on by fri endl y armed forces. Donovan' s vi si onary dream was to
uni fy these functi ons i n support of conventi onal uni t operati ons, thereby
forgi ng "a new i nstrument of war. "7
To carry out thi s concept, Donovan beli eved that COI should become
a supporti ng agency for the Joi nt Chi efs of Staf f (JCS) once JCS had been
created i n February 1942. The mi l i tary servi ces' de facto control over
personnel and materi el made i t necessary, he beli eved, to place COl under
JCS authori ty. He reali zed pragmati cal l y that the COl could not carry out
secret acti vi ti es wi thout the concurrence and support of theater com-
manders, and t hat those commanders also must coordi nate any such secret
acti vi ti es wi th conventi onal mi l i tary operati ons. For several months he
argued wi th Roosevel t for COl to be brought under the JCS, and for FIS
forei gn propaganda to be more closely coordi nated wi th the i ntelli gence
acti vi ti es of the mi l i tary servi ces. 8 But hi s arguments were unsuccessful.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II 7
OSS and OWl
Donovan' s comprehensi ve concept of psychologi cal warf are was not
shared by everyone. On 11 June 1942, less than a year af ter COI' s creati on,
Presi dent Roosevelt ordered that FIS be transf erred to the newly estab-
li shed Offi ce of War Inf ormati on (OWl ). By the same Executi ve order,
Roosevel t also di ssolved COl and suppl anted i t wi th a new organi zati on,
the Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, wi th Donovan conti nui ng as i ts head. 9 The
change, however, di d put OSS under JCS authori ty, as recommended by
Donovan on 8 June. t In effect, as Edward Hymof f succi nctly states, "CO1
became OSS and FIS became a di vi si on of the Offi ce of Wa r Inf orma-
ti on. " t t
Roosevel t' s deci si on to reorgani ze the psychologi cal warf are effort was
apparentl y moti vated by several factors. Fi rst, the i ncreasi ng number of
Government i nformati on agenci es had created probl ems of overall coordi -
nati on, and a need exi sted to consoli date warti me i nformati on and psycho-
logi cal warf are acti vi ti es. 12 There was also growi ng recogni ti on that COl
had become unwi eldy, and the Presi dent pref erred that US warti me propa-
ganda be separated from, rather than combi ned wi th, strategi c i ntelli gence
and subversi ve operati ons, j3 Then there was the probl em of personali ti es.
Donovan and Sherwood, Chi ef FIS, had di fferent vi ews on the role of FIS
as a part of COI. Accordi ng to Corey Ford, "Col onel Donovan beli eved
that, once a state of war exi sted, the propaganda arm should be exploi ted
as a weapon of decepti on and subversi on, and should be under mi l i tary
supervi si on, " whi le Sherwood "hel d that propaganda broadcasts should
sti ck scrupul ousl y to the facts, and let the truth eventual l y prevai l . " Sher-
wood beli eved that "t he Ameri can i mage overseas would s u f f e r . . , i f we
emul ated Axi s methods and resorted to li es and decei t. " He also beli eved
t hat FIS should remai n under ci vi li an di recti on, and he cl ashed wi th Don-
ovan over hi s proposals to put COI and FIS under JCS j uri sdi cti on. These
di fferi ng vi ews were hardeni ng i nto personal ani mosi ty between the two
men; si nce both Donovan and Sherwood had the respect of the Presi dent,
Roosevel t evi dentl y felt that i t would be wi se to separate thei r re-
sponsi bi li ti es. 14 Perhaps the most i mportant factor, however, was the op-
posi ti on of Harol d D. Smi th, Di rector of the Budget. Smi th submi tted a
memorandum to the Presi dent on 7 March 1942, proposi ng a reor-
gani zati on of war i nf ormati on servi ces that resul ted i n the f ormati on of
OWI. 15 Thus, for many reasons, the Presi dent shi fted the maj or re-
sponsi bi li ti es for psychologi cal warf are to the newly created OWl .
The creati on of OWI, howeve r, nei ther solved the probl ems of coordi -
nati on nor del i mi ted responsi bi li ti es for psychologi cal warfare, even wi th a
hi ghly respected Columbi a Broadcasti ng System reporter li ke Elmer Davi s
as i ts fi rst di rector. Although most exi sti ng i nformati on servi ces were trans-
ferred to OWI, Donovan's agency conti nued to keep i ts fi ngers i n the
propaganda pi e. Havi ng lost the battle to keep FIS under hi s di recti on i n
COI, Donovan conti nued to assume some psychologi cal warfare functi ons
for OSS.
Eventually the li nes of responsi bi li ty were more clearly drawn and
accepted by the two agenci es. In addi ti on to i ts i ntelli gence and speci al
operati ons acti vi ti es, OSS retai ned responsi bi li ty for "black" propaganda
operati ons, whi ch were essenti ally covert acti vi ti es usi ng i nformati on i s-
sued from a concealed or falsi fi ed source to lower the enemy's morale. '~
OWl , on the other hand, controlled all propaganda i n the Uni ted States
and all "whi te" propaganda--i nformati on, offi ci al or otherwi se, plai nly
i ssued from a known source--outsi de the Uni ted States wi th the excepti on
of the Western Hemi sphere; that remai ned a responsi bi li ty of the Offi ce of
Coordi nator of Inter-Ameri can Affai rs (CIAA) i n the State Department.'7
In March 1943, another Executi ve order more clearly i denti fi ed OWl ' s
responsi bi li ti es for conducti ng forei gn i nformati on and overt propaganda
operati ons, and also decreed that i ts acti vi ti es be coordi nated wi th plans of
the mi li tary servi ces. ~8
The Army's Psychological Warfare Branch
When the European war broke out, the Army, li ke other agenci es, was
i ll prepared to understand psychologi cal warfare, much less plan for and
conduct i t. Duri ng World War I, the Army had gi ven psychologi cal war-
fare token recogni ti on by establi shi ng the Psychologi cal Warfare Sub-
Secti on of G-2 i n the War Department, and the Propaganda Secti on, G-2,
General Headquarters (GHQ), Ameri can Expedi ti onary Forces. However,
from 1918 to 1941 no psychologi cal warfare offi ce exi sted at the War
Department. The lessons of experi ence were lost, and by 1941 only one
offi cer on the War Department staff had had psychologi cal warfare experi -
ence i n the previ ous war. He was Colonel Charles H. Mason who, as Chi ef
of the Intelli gence Branch, Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on (MID) from
November 1940 to July 1941, had tri ed to reestabli sh a branch for psycho-
logi cal warfare planni ng and operati ons. Hi s attempts fai led, however, and
Mason "complai ned that hi s efforts were met wi th i ndi fference and op-
posi ti on wi thi n the War Department." ,9
The fi rst posi ti ve steps toward creati on of a psychologi cal warfare
capabi li ty were a result of the personal i nterest of John McCloy, who had
recently been appoi nted Assi stant Secretary of War. Influenced by the
effecti veness of German propaganda, he suggested i n June 1941 that a
speci al study group be organi zed by Bri gadi er General Sherman Mi les,
Acti ng Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, to plan for future psychologi cal
warfare operati ons. 2 McCloy's acti on i llustrates a theme that recurs at
cri ti cal poi nts throughout the hi story of speci al warfare--i mportant gov-
ernmental ci vi li ans i ntervene to prod hesi tant and cauti ous uni formed
Army leaders i nto taki ng acti on on concepts of an "unconventi onal"
nature.
The speci al group suggested by McCIoy was establi shed on 25 June
1941 as the Psychologi c Branch, wi th Li eutenant Colonel Percy Black as
i ts chi ef. A great deal of secrecy surrounded i ts creati on. Curi ously, the
only offi cer wi th World War I psychologi cal warfare experi ence, Colonel
Mason, was not even i nformed of i ts exi stence. Black's i ni ti al study exam-
i ned all agenci es--offi ci al and pri vate--engaged i n psychologi cal i nforma-
ti on or propaganda, and concluded that "there was no effort to study the
effect of propaganda on vari ous groups, or relate propaganda plans to
the plans of the mi li tary hi gh command." Thi s embryoni c offi ce attempted
the followi ng tasks: li ai son wi th the Forei gn Moni tori ng Broadcast Servi ce
of the Federal Communi cati ons Commi ssi on to obtai n dai ly and weekly
summari es of forei gn broadcasts, completi on of surveys for the Offi ce for
Coordi nati on of Commerci al and Cultural Relati ons and for the Counci l
for Democracy, i ni ti ati on of a weekly telegram servi ce to mi li tary mi ssi ons
wi th a bri ef summary of nati onal defense progress, and purchase of copi es
of Newsweek and Life for di stri buti on to selected mi ssi ons i n Europe to
counteract the pi ctori al propaganda of Germany}' These i ni ti al efforts by
the Army were obvi ously modest.
To protect i ts stri ct securi ty, the Psychologi c Branch changed i ts name
to the Speci al Study Group. An advi sory commi ttee of ci vi li an psycho-
logi sts felt that i t was i nadvi sable to use terms li ke "propaganda, " "control
of opi ni on," and "psychi atry. " Thus the name Speci al Study Group "would
be far less reveali ng than any reference to psychology or propaganda."
Later, i n March 1942, the name changed to Psychologi cal Warfare
Branch, G-2, pri mari ly because the growi ng number of personnel i nvolved
made stri ct secrecy di ffi cult and because thi s same secrecy i mpeded coordi -
nati on wi th other offi ces. Colonel Black was succeeded by Colonel Oscar
M. Solbert, who remai ned chi ef of the branch unti l 26 July 1942. Hi s
successor was Colonel C. Blakeney, who conti nued as chi ef unti l the branch
was di ssolved i n December 1942. 22
The Speci al Study Group/Psychologi cal Warfare Branch expanded
upon the acti vi ti es begun under the Psychologi c Branch. One of i ts most
i mportant jobs was to produce a dai ly analysi s of Axi s propaganda, over
300 i ssues of whi ch were ci rculated for gui dance to the Offi ce of Facts and
Fi gures, CIAA, the Nati onal Broadcasti ng Corporati on, and the Bureau of
Publi c Relati ons. Si nce the War Department di d not control radi o broad-
casti ng, the branch was li mi ted to maki ng suggesti ons. These ranged from
suggested i tems for use i n speeches by the Chi ef of Staff, to suggested
broadcasts contai ni ng defi ni te objecti ves for use by COl. The branch also
helped plan leaflet operati ons i n strategi c and combat phases, and devel-
oped the Combat Propaganda Bulletin, a record of lessons learned
and recent acti vi ti es for di stri buti on i n Washi ngton and to the mi li tary
theaters.
In December 1942 the fi rst psychologi cal warfare uni ts were created
wi th the formati on of the 1 st and 2nd Radi o Servi ce Secti ons. Each secti on
had an authori zed strength of 3 offi cers and 39 enli sted men. Together the
two formed the 1st Combat Propaganda Company. When the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Branch was di ssolved on 31 December 1942, the company
was transferred from the Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce (MIS) to OSS, then
back to MIS on 2 March 1943. At thi s poi nt, the company was reorgani zed
i nto combat propaganda teams, equi pped wi th radi o transmi tters, sound
trucks, and language personnel, and then sent to Europe. 23
Concurrently, a draft trai ni ng manual, Combat Propaganda Com-
pany, was developed i n the autumn of 1942. It was based on an exi sti ng
pamphlet, Military Intelligence Propaganda--Confidential, wri tten by
Major P. M. Robi nett i n December 1940. The manual proved useful i n
organi zi ng propaganda compani es i n Europe duri ng 1943-45. 24The acti v-
i ti es of the Army's Speci al Study Group/Psychologi cal Warfare Branch
duri ng 1941-42 were vari ed but certai nly not "center stage" at the War
Department.
Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch
Di ssoluti on of the Psychologi cal Warfare Branch i n December 1942
grew from the problem of defi ni ng psychologi cal warfare, a problem that
persi sted throughout the war, and from i nteragency battles over re-
sponsi bi li ti es i n thi s new fi eld. The Joi nt Chi efs of Staff had created a Joi nt
Psychologi cal Warfare Commi ttee (JPWC) i n March 1942 (JCS 12) to
plan psychologi cal warfare i n combat theaters and enemy-controlled areas.
The commi t t ee was reconsti tuted on 21 June 1942 ( JCS 68), af t er OSS
and OWI were establ i shed as two separat e agenci es. Membershi p was
made up of general and flag offi cers f rom the Ar my' s G- 2 , the Offi ce of
Naval Intel l i gence ( ONI ) , the Wa r Depart ment General St af f ( WDGS) ,
and the Comma nde r i n Chi ef, US Fleet. Colonel Donovan served as chai r-
man. Establ i shed at the same ti me were a Joi nt Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e
Subcommi t t ee, a Support i ng Commi t t ee on Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e wi thi n
OSS, and a Joi nt Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e Advi sory Commi t t ee wi th Don-
ovan as chai rman. Thi s l ast commi t t ee was f ormed to coordi nate the psy-
chol ogi cal warf are acti vi ti es of agenci es outsi de the j uri sdi cti on of the JCS,
such as Nel son Rockef el l er' s CI AA, Henry Wal l ace' s Board of Economi c
Warf are, OWI , and the State Depart ment . 25
To tackl e the probl em of defi ni ng psychol ogi cal warf are, a "' Basi c
Est i mat e of Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e " was prepared by the OSS Support i ng
Commi t t e e and approved by the J P WC on 7 Sept ember. The fi ne hand of
Donovan i s seen i n the defi ni ti on of psychol ogi cal warf are contai ned i n thi s
Basi c Esti mate:
[Psychologi cal warfare] i s the coordi nati on and use of all means,
i ncludi ng moral and physi cal, by whi ch the end i s attai ned--other
than those of recogni zed mi li tary operati ons, but i ncludi ng the psycho-
logi cal exploi tati on of the result of those recogni zed mi li tary acti ons--
whi ch tend to destroy the wi ll of the enemy to achi eve vi ctory and to
damage hi s poli ti cal or economi c capaci ty to do so; whi ch tend to
depri ve the enemy of the support, assi stance or sympathy of hi s alli es
or associ ates or of neutrals, or to prevent hi s acqui si ti on of such sup-
port, assi stance, or sympathy; or whi ch tend to create, mai ntai n, or
i ncrease the wi ll to vi ctory of our own people and alli es and to acqui re,
mai ntai n, or to i ncrease the support, assi stance and sympathy of
neutrals.
The Basi c Est i mat e f urt her speci fi ed t hat propaganda, subversi on,
combat propaganda compani es, and i ntelli gence secured by research and
espi onage were the tools needed to carry out thi s broad concept of psycho-
logi cal wa r f a r e ) 6 The OSS Support i ng Commi t t e e had spent 6 mont hs
tryi ng to devel op a sal abl e defi ni ti on. But the JPWC, af t er havi ng approved
i t, di d not f orward the Basi c Est i mat e to the JCS for approval as a doctri ne
st at ement . 27
Thi s di ffi culty of defi ni ng psychol ogi cal warf are was li nked to OSS'
gropi ng whi le tryi ng to fi nd i ts ni che as a new agency. The War Report of
the OSS states the probl em: "A contri buti ng f actor to the whole si tuati on
12 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I1
was a defi ni te resentment of OSS, as such, whi ch found i ts strongest
expressi on i n Donovan's colleagues on the JPWC. Thi s resentment seemed
to be based, i n part, upon the fact that OSS was a ci vi li an agency, and, i n
part, upon the posi ti on of OSS as an agency of the JCS and tear that i t
mi ght encroach upon the functi ons of G-2 and/or ONI. " 25At any rate, the
exi sti ng psychologi cal warfare commi ttee system proved to be ponderous,
confusi ng, and generally unworkable.
Fi nally, on 23 December 1942, the JCS i ssued JCS 155/4D, whi ch
aboli shed the JPWC and made OSS responsi ble for "planni ng, developi ng,
coordi nati ng, and executi ng the mi li tary program of psychologi cal war-
fare" and for "the compi lati on of such poli ti cal, psychologi cal, soci ologi cal,
and economi c i nformati on as may be requi red by mi li tary operati ons." 29
Concurrent wi th the reorgani zati on of the JCS psychologi cal warfare ma-
chi nery, the Army deci ded to aboli sh i ts Psychologi cal Warfare Branch.
The deci si on was announced i n Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce Memo-
randum 147, 31 December 1942, whi ch explai ned that "si nce the Offi ce of
Strategi c Servi ces was responsi ble for propaganda, there appeared to be no
need for the Branch."3
At thi s poi nt the Army's parti ci pati on i n psychologi cal warfare ap-
peared to be mi ni mal. Such was not the case overseas, however, for JCS
155/4D, whi ch had preci pi tated the demi se of the Army's Psychologi cal
Warfare Branch, also gave theater commanders control of psychologi cal
warfare i n thei r juri sdi cti onal areas. 3~ In effect, the War Department, as
Paul Li nebarger states, consi dered "the theaters i n thi s respect as autono-
mous, and [left] to the respecti ve Theater Commanders the defi ni ti on of
thei r relati onshi p wi th OWI and OSS, and thei r use of each." 32
Theater Psychological Warfare
Most of the Army's operati onal work i n psychologi cal warfare took
place at the theater level, where the responsi ble organi zati on was normally
desi gnated a Psychologi cal Warfare Branch (PWB). The largest of these,
the PWB at Alli ed Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), was acti vated i n
North Afri ca i n November 1942 at the order of General Dwi ght D. Ei sen-
hower, and then expanded i n February 1944 to the Psychologi cal Warfare
Di vi si on, Supreme Headquarters, Alli ed Expedi ti onary Force (PWD/
SHAEF). 33 PWD/ SHAEF defi ned psychologi cal warfare as "the di s-
semi nati on of propaganda desi gned to undermi ne the enemy's wi ll to resi st,
demorali ze hi s forces and sustai n the morale of our supporters." 34 Wi th
thi s defi ni ti on, then, and the overall objecti ve of controlli ng and coordi -
nati ng psychologi cal warfare i n the area of conti nental Europe controlled
by the Supreme Commander, the speci fi c mi ssi ons of PWD were the
followi ng:
1. To wage psychologi cal warfare agai nst the enemy.
.
To use the vari ous medi a avai lable to psychologi cal warfare to
sustai n the morale of the people of fri endly nati ons occupi ed by the
enemy and to cause the people of these countri es to acqui esce i n the
wi shes of the Supreme Commander.
.
To conduct so-called consoli dati on propaganda operati ons i n li be-
rated fri endly countri es. [Consoli dati on propaganda was that di -
rected toward a mi li tary force and desi gned to i nsure compli ance
wi th the i nstructi ons promulgated by the commander of the oc-
cupyi ng force.]
4. To control i nformati on servi ces i n Alli ed-occupi ed Germany. 3s
To carry out these tasks, PWD used psychologi cal warfare tools such
as Bri ti sh Broadcasti ng Corporati on and OWI transmi tters, front-li ne
loudspeaker broadcasts, and large-scale leaflet droppi ng operati ons. PWD
even provi ded leaflets to be di spersed by the novel method of speci ally
desi gned arti llery shells, as
The basi c Army fi eld operati ng uni t for psychologi cal warfare was the
Mobi le Radi o Broadcasti ng (MRB) Company. Early MRB uni ts had
served wi th the Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce i n December 1942 and, after
bei ng transferred for a bri ef peri od to OSS, went back to the Army i n
March 1943. The equi pment for these uni ts was unli ke anythi ng con-
venti onal soldi ers had seen i n the fi eld--publi c address systems, radi os,
moni tori ng sets, loudspeakers, typewri ters, mobi le pri nti ng presses, and
leaflet bombs. MRB uni ts were usually di vi ded by the separate Army
groups and fi eld armi es i nto small teams, often to work i n di rect support of
frontli ne conventi onal combat uni ts. One MRB company commander,
Major Edward A. Caskey, descri bed hi s responsi bi li ti es as pri mari ly tacti -
cal, or combat, propaganda efforts. Hi s company used short-range radi o
broadcasts as well as tacti cal leaflets pri nted on the spot, then deli vered to
enemy li nes through the use of modi fi ed arti llery smoke shells. He also
mai ntai ned pri soner-of-war i nterrogati on teams that worked wi th G-2.
Caskey explai ned: "Both Germans and Itali ans (pri soners) stated that the
content of the leaflets had greatl y i nfluenced thei r deci si on [to surrender].
They all i nsi sted that they were mostl y i mpressed wi th the veraci ty of our
leaflets. " 37
Fi ve such compani es eventual l y served under P WD/ S HAEF . Al-
though these uni ts were the result of i mprovi sati on i n 1943 and 1944, the
doctri nal and organi zati onal concepts they embodi ed reappeared i n the
psychologi cal warf are uni ts formed duri ng the Korean confli ct. 3s
Taken together, then, several di verse organi zati ons i n PWD, both
ci vi li an and mi l i tary, somehow had to be fused i nto a common psycho-
logi cal warf are organi zati on. Accordi ng to an account prepared by the
PWD staff, P WD/ S HAEF "was the fi rst agency, mi l i tary or ci vi li an, to
coordi nate successfully i n Western Europe the efforts of the numerous
mi l i tary and ci vi li an agenci es whi ch had waged Angl o-Ameri can psycho-
logi cal warf are si nce the begi nni ng of the war. " The chi ef of PWD, Bri g-
adi er General Robert A. McCl ure, was assi sted by four deputi es, each
representi ng a ci vi li an agency that contri buted personnel to PWD. Two of
those agenci es were Ame r i c a n- - OWl and OSS; two were Bri ti sh- - the
Poli ti cal Intelli gence Department of the Forei gn Offi ce and the Mi ni stry of
Informati on. General McCl ure' s name wi ll reappear, for he was to fi gure
promi nentl y i n establi shi ng the Psychologi cal Warf are Center at Fort
Bragg i n 1952. 39
Not everyone was enamored wi th PWD operati ons. It was, by con-
venti onal uni t standards, a rather strange collecti on of personnel, equi p-
ment, and acti vi ti es. A survey report i n August 1943 by the Inspector
General , Maj or General Vi rgi l L. Peterson, descri bed the PWB i n Nort h
Af ri ca (f orerunner of P WD/ S HAEF ) as "a heterogeneous group of some
468 wri ters, psychologi sts, economi sts, li ngui sts, and world travel ers, "
whose efforts "were somewhat lacki ng i n coordi nati on and control, unti l
they were all assembled i n one bui ldi ng and placed under command of an
Ameri can Army offi cer." General Peterson concl uded hi s report wi th a
compl i ment, stati ng that hi s survey group "was much i mpressed wi th the
i ndustry and enthusi asm of the people engaged i n these psychologi cal
warf are acti vi ti es. " But he also added a caveat about the new organi zati on:
"The survey group does not feel quali fi ed to arri ve at any conclusi ons
regardi ng thei r value to the Theater, or the Army as a whole."4
Professor Saul K. Padover, a PWD combat i ntelli gence offi cer, was
l ater to recall that "at fi rst PWD was not much appreci ated; hard-bi tten
regul ar Army men ref erred to the psychologi cal warri ors as ' f eather mer-
chant s. ' " But Padover noted, as the war progressed, the organi zati on' s
effecti veness recei ved more respect from "formerly suspi ci ous com-
manders," parti cularly at the tacti cal level. And at the end, even generals
li ke George Patton were aski ng for frontli ne support because "i t was
defi ni tely recogni zed that the loudspeakers helped to persuade the enemy
to come over wi th arms i n the ai r. ''4]
The Propaganda Branch, G-2
The success of the PWB i n North Afri ca provi ded much of the i mpe-
tus to reestabli sh a psychologi cal warfare branch at the War Department.
General McClure's deputy, C. D. Jackson, OWl , returned to the Uni ted
States for a vi si t i n June 1943. Duri ng hi s tri p he talked wi th John J.
McCloy, Assi stant Secretary of War, who i n 1941 had di splayed the i nter-
est i n psychologi cal warfare that led to the creati on of the Psychologi c
Branch. Sti ll deeply i nterested, Secretary McCloy proceeded to staff pa-
pers left wi th hi m by Jackson. These papers contai ned a proposal for a
central psychologi cal warfare branch at the War Department to di rect and
coordi nate the work of the theater PWB's. 42 The seed had been planted.
Pri or to thi s, on 9 March 1943, the conti nui ng di ffi culty of clearly
defi ni ng the propaganda responsi bi li ti es of OSS and OWl had resulted i n
Executi ve Order 9312. That order gave OWI responsi bi li ty for planni ng,
developi ng, and executi ng all forei gn propaganda acti vi ti es "i nvolvi ng the
di ssemi nati on of i nformati on" (open, or "whi te, " propaganda). Thi s neces-
si tated a revi si on of JCS 155/4D, whi ch i n December 1942 had gi ven OSS
responsi bi li ty for mi li tary propaganda and whi ch had been the major rea-
son for di ssoluti on of the War Department's Psychologi cal Warfare
Branch. The revi sed di recti ve, JCS 155/7D, i ssued on 4 Apri l 1943, si mply
omi tted any reference to OWI and propaganda. 43 Thus a major, albei t
largely self-i mposed, constrai nt was li fted, allowi ng the Army to re-create
a psychologi cal warfare branch i n Washi ngton.
By August 1943, the papers Jackson had left wi th Secretary McCIoy
were begi nni ng to have an i mpact. In addi ti on to proposi ng a central
psychologi cal warfare branch at the War Department, the papers de-
scri bed the system by whi ch propaganda planni ng and control were bei ng
carri ed out i n the North Afri can theater. In a memorandum to the Secre-
tary to the General Staff, Colonel Otto L. Nelson, Bri gadi er General J. E.
Hull, Acti ng Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, Operati ons, and Plans Di vi si on
(OPD), commented that "although the value of propaganda may not be as
great as i ts proponents clai m, i t i s a recogni zed i nstrument of modern war
16 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I1
whi ch can be useful . " Af t er thi s rather ambi val ent endorsement, he stated
t hat the pri nci ples contai ned i n the PWB Nort h Afri can papers were sound
and recommended that they be ci rcul ated to theater commanders. 4a A
l etter dated 20 August 1943 to all maj or commanders forwarded the pa-
pers "i n the event you desi re to establi sh si mi lar agenci es. " One of the
papers, si gned by Colonel C. B. Hazel ti ne, strongly advocated a mi xed
ci vi li an-mi li tary team as "a must for maxi mum results i n a PWB or-
gani zati on. ''45 Yet, i t was thi s ci vi li an i nfluence and i nteracti on that made
psychologi cal warf are and unconventi onal warf are suspect to many con-
venti onal l y mi nded Army offi cers.
Meanwhi l e, General Peterson' s survey report on the PWB i n Nort h
Af ri ca was now i n ci rcul ati on, and the report contai ned the compl ai nt from
General McCl ure "t ha t there was no correspondi ng agency establi shed i n
the Wa r Department, through whi ch he could channel i ze hi s correspon-
dence. " Also at about thi s ti me, the JCS began to requi re theaters to
submi t plans for psychologi cal warfare. Both of these matters were di s-
cussed at the 23 August 1943 meeti ng of the Army' s General Counci l.
General McNarney, the Deputy Chi ef of Staff, recogni zed the re-
sponsi bi li ty of OWl "f or most of thi s work, " and was not prepared to
deci de "whet her or not the War Department should establi sh an agency
pri mari l y for deal i ng wi th these matters or attempt to coordi nate by li ai son
wi th OWI . " Thus he di rected the Operati ons Di vi si on and G- 2 to "get
together and submi t recommendati ons. " 46
The i mmedi ate resul t of thi s di recti ve was a report to the Joi nt Intel-
li gence Commi ttee on 8 September 1943 si gned by the Assi stant Chi ef of
Staff, G- 2, and the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, OPD. The report outli ned the
agenci es pri mari l y responsi ble for prepari ng and di ssemi nati ng forei gn
propaganda, and concl uded that a Wa r Department agency for control of
propaganda should be establi shed and have a di rect channel through the
JCS to the Combi ned Chi efs of "Staff (CCS). Recogni zi ng the Army' s
defi ci enci es i n thi s area, the report also noted that "t he aboli ti on of the
Psychol ogi cal Warf are Secti on of G- 2 (i n December 1942) has seri ously
reduced the War Department' s abi li ty to supply appropri ate materi al to
propaganda agenci es. " Fi nally, the report i ncluded thi s assessment of the
val ue of psychologi cal warfare:
Although the proponents of psywar are prone to exaggerate i ts i m-
portance, the mi li tary value of propaganda i n recent operati ons i n-
volvi ng Ameri can Forces has been clearly di scerni ble and propaganda
has also been used by our enemi es wi th marked success. It i s a powerful
weapon for i nfluenci ng men's mi nds and, therefore, cannot be
neglected. 47
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agai n we see a lukewarm endorsement of thi s new fi eld, but an en-
dorsement nevertheless. Momentum had gathered for a new psychologi cal
warfare branch i n the War Department.
By the mi ddle of October, Major General T. T. Handy, the G-3, and
Major General George V. Strong, the G-2, had submi tted a more detai led
study to General McNarney recommendi ng the establi shment of a central
authori ty wi thi n the War Department for propaganda plans, poli ci es, and
releases. The report was approved by General McNarney and the Secre-
tary of War on 26 October. 4s The matter appeared to be settled. But nei ther
General Strong nor General Handy wanted the responsi bi li ty of the new
functi on. In a memorandum to General Handy on 6 November 1943,
General Strong, the G-2, attached a study prepared by G- 3 that concluded
that the new branch should be i n the Operati ons Di vi si on because that
di vi si on "has the greatest i nterest i n operati onal propaganda and a di rect
channel to the Joi nt and Combi ned Chi efs of Staff on all operati onal
subjects. ''49 Not to be outdone, General Handy, the G- 3, acknowledged on
10 November that G- 3 di d have an i nterest i n operati onal propaganda. He
suggested that the new branch should be under the G- 2' s di recti on because
hi s posi ti ons as a member of the Emergency Combi ned Propaganda Com-
mi ttee and as a Joi nt Chi ef of Securi ty Control gave hi m close touch wi th
War Department coordi nati on and control of propaganda. 5 The matter
was fi nally resolved by referri ng to the ori gi nal recommendati ons approved
by General McNarney on 26 October, whi ch had speci fi ed that the new
propaganda agency be establi shed i n the Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on
(G- 2). 5t
The di alogue between G- 2 and G- 3 over a new functi on provi des
i nsi ght i nto atti tudes toward psychologi cal warfare. General staff di vi si ons
normally do not avoi d or gi ve up a functi on consi dered to be i mportant- - i f
i t has "hi gh vi si bi li ty." General Handy' s and General Strong's reluctance
to accept an acti vi ty that was new, di ffi cult to understand, and consi dered
by many offi cers as a mi nor si de show i n the war effort, i llustrates a theme
that recurs throughout thi s study- - the story of an Army hesi tant and
reluctant to accept concepts of an "unconventi onal" nature.
Creati on of the new Propaganda Branch i n G- 2 was formally an-
nounced on 15 November 1943 by Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on Di recti ve
No. 78. Duri ng the General Counci l meeti ng held the same day, General
Kroner, the G- 2 representati ve, stated that the head of psychologi cal
warfare acti vi ti es i n North Afri ca, General McClure, had i ndi cated that
there was no correspondi ng agency i n the War Department to consi der
psychol ogi cal warf are probl ems "a t the proper level." General Kroner
concl uded that "thi s i s i ndi cated as a need for thi s very i mport ant
branch. ''52 The seed, pl anted 6 months earl i er by Jackson i n hi s di scussi ons
wi th Assi stant Secret ary of Wa r McCl oy and by McCl ure' s own state-
ments duri ng the i nterveni ng peri od, had fi nally borne frui t.
The pri mary responsi bi l i ty of the new branch was to coordi nate propa-
ganda functi ons for the Wa r Depart ment . It prepared propaganda i tems
for use by OWl , CI AA, and other nonmi l i tary organi zati ons. It advi sed the
G- 2 on all propaganda probl ems presented by t heat er commanders. It
coordi nated propaganda mat t ers brought before the JCS and t he CCS by
the Wa r Depart ment . It shepherded OWl and CI AA plans through the
JCS, and i t coordi nated wi th si mi l ar branches i n the Na vy and St at e
Depart ment . Fi nal l y, the branch chi ef served as the Ar my me mbe r of the
JCS li ai son wi th OWI and CIAA. 53
At the end of the war, a few seni or offi cers recogni zed the need to bui ld
upon the Ar my' s experi ence and retai n a capabi l i ty for psychol ogi cal war-
fare. In a December 1945 l etter to the Wa r Depart ment , Maj or General L.
L. Lemni tzer, then head of the Joi nt Strategi c Survey Commi t t ee of the
JCS, stated:
To avoi d a repeti ti on of the PWB mi stakes we made i n World War II
and to take full advantage of the experi ence gai ned i n that war, I
recommend that a comprehensi ve study be made of thi s subject at an
early date wi th a vi ew of:
1. Analyzi ng all avai lable PWB materi al of World War II, i ncludi ng
parti cularly the PWB reports from the vari ous theaters of oper-
ati ons to establi sh sound PWB pri nci ples, techni ques, organi zati on,
equi pment and procedures for future employment of thi s weapon.
2. Establi shi ng short courses i n our staff schools to provi de future
commanders and staff offi cers wi th a general understandi ng and
appreci ati on of thi s new weapon of warfare.
3. Exami ni ng the feasi bi li ty of establi shi ng a small PWB secti on i n
the War Department to provi de conti nui ng study of thi s subject, or
fai li ng that, to assi gn thi s responsi bi li ty to an exi sti ng secti on or
agency best prepared to assume i t. 54
The Propaganda Branch had foreseen the need for such a study. In
Ma y 1945 l etters had been sent to t heat er PWB' s requesti ng the appropri -
ate hi stori cal materi al s. 55 The branch conti nued i n exi stence unti l Ja nua r y
1947, when the responsi bi l i ty for psychol ogi cal warf are acti vi ti es was
t ransf erred f rom G- 2 to the Pl ans and Operat i ons Di vi si on.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 1I 19
Appraisal
It i s i mpossi ble to di scuss the evoluti on of Army experi ence i n psycho-
logi cal warf are duri ng Worl d War II wi thout acknowl edgi ng the i mpact of
the maj or ci vi li an agenci es that had an i nterest i n thi s acti vi ty. Fi rst, the
Coordi nator of Informati on, then i ts successor, the Offi ce of Strategi c
Servi ces, and, fi nally, the Offi ce of War Inf ormat i on- - al l i nfluenced the
Army' s devel opment of a psychologi cal warf are capabi l i ty as they engaged
i n i nteragency struggles to sort out responsi bi li ti es i n the new fi eld. In many
respects, i t was the confusi on generated by thi s profusi on of agenci es that
forced the Wa r Depart ment to reestabli sh a Propaganda Branch i n No-
vember 1943. Through thi s offi ce and the theater Psychol ogi cal Warf are
Branch, the Ar my worked closely wi th these agenci es, and i n parti cul ar
OWl , for the durati on of the war.
Thi s rel i ance on ci vi li an agenci es di d not si t well wi th many mi l i tary
professi onals. A quotati on from the unsi gned l etter of an offi cer wi th Head-
quarters, Western Task Forces, i n 1942 i llustrates thi s atti tude:
I sti ll beli eve we could get along far better wi thout the OWl. The
psychologi cal si tuati on i s far too complex to be handled by poets and
gentlemen of the press i n Washi ngton and even the German Propa-
ganda Machi ne worked i n reverse i n the face of actual mi li tary
operati ons. The only propaganda whi ch can achi eve results i s the
propaganda of deeds not words. One U.S. medi um tank has proved far
more effecti ve than all the bag of tri ck gadgets, whi ch merely offend
good taste and gi ve nothi ng concrete where want i s great.
The offi cer ended hi s l etter wi th the conclusi on, "I beli eve that such agen-
ci es as the OWI and OSS can be profi tabl y el i mi nated i n the future. "56
Ironi cally, i t was a ci vi l i an- - Assi stant Secretary of Wa r John
Mc Cl oy- - who pushed the Army i nto developi ng a branch at the War
Depart ment for planni ng and coordi nati ng psychologi cal warf are acti v-
i ti es, i ni ti ally i n June 1941 and agai n i n November 1943. And i t was a
ci vi l i an- - C. D. Jackson of OWl - - wh o , as General McCl ure' s deputy,
provi ded Assi stant Secretary McCl oy wi th the P WB/ AF HQ orga-
ni zati onal papers that sti mul ated resurrecti on of a psychologi cal warf are
branch i n 1943. The i ni ti ati ve shown by i nfluenti al ci vi li ans to urge conser-
vati ve Army leaders to venture i nto a new and uncertai n fi eld i s a theme we
shall see throughout our i nvesti gati on of the ori gi ns of a speci al warf are
capabi l i ty for the Army.
Certai nl y Bri gadi er General McCl ure was an excepti on to thi s theme.
The ci vi l i an-mi l i tary t eam that he headed, fi rst i n Nort h Af ri ca P WB/
AFHQ, then l ater i n P WD/ S HAEF , served as the model for successful
Ar my psychol ogi cal wa r f a r e operati ons duri ng the war. The Mobi l e Radi o
Broadcasti ng compani es empl oyed i n Europe were the fi rst tacti cal propa-
ganda uni ts i n Ar my hi story. McCl ure hi msel f strongl y urged establ i sh-
ment of a central psychol ogi cal warf are agency i n the Wa r Depart ment .
All i n all, he was the most i mport ant Ar my offi cer i n thi s new fi eld duri ng
Worl d Wa r II.
Al though smal l throughout, the Propaganda Branch, G- 2 - - a nd i ts
predecessors, the Psychol ogi c Branch, the Speci al Study Group, and the
Psychol ogi cal Wa rf a re Br a nc h- - pe r f or me d a low-key, but val uabl e serv-
i ce. Its "pri nci pal success, " states A History of the Military Intelligence
Division, "was i n the gui dance i t gave to operati onal uni ts i n the fi eld, and
as an agency for the coordi nati on of propaganda acti vi ti es wi th mi l i tary
operati ons. ''57 Whi l e the MI D hi story may somewhat overstate the extent
of thi s success, nonetheless, t hat such an agency was deemed necessary was
demonst rat ed by the creati on of the Propaganda Branch 10 months af ter
di ssoluti on of the Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e Branch.
Ar my personnel empl oyed i n psychol ogi cal warf are i n all theaters
probabl y never total ed more than 2, 000 at any one ti me, 58 a mi nuscul e
number when compared to many other acti vi ti es. Despi te the often less-
than- enthusi asti c manner i n whi ch the Ar my embraced i t, psychol ogi cal
warf are gai ned respectabi l i ty. Formal organi zati ons and procedures were
devel oped t hat eventual l y bestowed thi s new endeavor wi th a degree of
l egi ti macy.
The i mpact of psychol ogi cal warf are i s al ways di ffi cult to assess. But
General Ei senhower, at least, thought the European experi ment useful:
In thi s war [he wrote i n PWD/ SHAEF' s account of i ts operati on],
whi ch was total i n every sense of the word, we have seen many great
changes i n mi li tary sci ence. It seems to me that not the least of these
was the development of psychologi cal warfare as a speci fi c and
effecti ve weapon.
The exact contri buti on of psychologi cal warfare toward the fi nal vi c-
tory cannot, of course, be measured i n terms of towns destroyed or
barri ers passed. However, I am convi nced that the expendi ture of men
and money i n wi eldi ng the spoken and wri tten word was an i mportant
contri buti ng factor i n undermi ni ng the enemy's wi ll to resi st and sup-
porti ng the fi ghti ng morale of our potenti al Alli es i n the occupi ed
countri es.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I1 21
Wi thout doubt, psychologi cal warfare has proved i ts ri ght to a place
of di gni ty i n our mi li tary arsenal. 59
Thus, Worl d Wa r II saw the Na t i o n- - a nd the US Ar my - - d e v e l o p the
f oundati on for a modern psychol ogi cal warf are capabi l i ty. Wha t i t would
do wi th thi s foundati on, so pai nful l y acqui red, remai ned to be seen.
III
UNCONV ENTI ONAL WARFARE
IN WORLD WAR II
The task of traci ng the ori gi ns of unconventi onal warfare i n the US
Army i s compli cated by the fact that i n the early 1960's several World War
II "eli te" uni ts were i ncluded i n the offi ci al li neage of Speci al Forces. One
of these was the 1 st Speci al Servi ce Force, a joi nt Uni ted States-Canadi an
uni t formed i n 1942 at Fort Wi lli am Henry Harri son, Montana, and
commanded by Major General Robert T. Frederi ck. Also i ncluded i n the
offi ci al li neage were US Army Ranger battali ons, the fi rst of whi ch was
formed on 19 June 1942 at Carri ckfergus i n Northern Ireland, under the
command of Colonel Wi lli am O. Darby. A si mi lar organi zati on, Bri gadi er
General Frank Merri ll's 5307th Composi te Uni t (Provi si onal), better
known as "Merri ll's Marauders," was not offi ci ally a part of Speci al Forces
li neage but has been i nformally adopted by Speci al Forces.'
Whatever the "offi ci al" li neage, however, none of these uni ts by
defi ni ti on was an unconventi onal warfare organi zati on. Accordi ng to the
Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms, unconventi onal warfare "i ncludes the
three i nterrelated fi elds of guerri lla warfare, evasi on and escape, and
subversi on. . , conducted wi thi n enemy or enemy-controlled terri tory by
predomi nately i ndi genous personnel usually supported and di rected by
personnel from an outsi de country. ''2 The 1st Speci al Servi ce Force, the
Ranger battali ons, and "Merri ll's Marauders" di d not fi t thi s descri pti on;
they were pri mari ly long-range penetrati on organi zati ons that speci ali zed
i n reconnai ssance, rai di ng, and commando operati ons. Bri ti sh Royal Ma-
ri ne Commandos and Orde Wi ngate's Rai ders performed si mi lar tasks for
the Bri ti sh throughout the Second World War. Yet the author hi mself
remembers standi ng i n a mass formati on wi th the 77th Speci al Forces
Group at Fort Bragg i n early 1960 when the 1st Speci al Servi ce Force was
2 3
24 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR Ii
reconsti tuted and consoli dated wi th the Ranger battali ons, then acti vated
as the parent uni t of all Speci al Forces Groups; i t was a memorable day,
as reti red Maj or General Frederi ck came down from Canada to presi de
over the conferral of 1st Speci al Servi ce Force and Ranger uni t colors,
li neage, and honors to the Army' s Speci al Forces.
Looki ng back on that scene, one wonders why Speci al Forces felt i t
necessary to adopt the li neage of uni ts that were not true forerunners of
unconventi onal warfare. An argument could be made that a few i ndi vi du-
als from those uni ts became early members of Speci al Forces, and that
some of the tacti cs and techni ques of thei r former uni ts were i ncorporated
i nto Speci al Forces trai ni ng. But these alone are i nsuffi ci ent explanati ons.
Apparentl y the answer was si mply that the Army had no true uncon-
venti onal warfare uni ts of i ts own; therefore, someone i n authori ty took the
best alternati ve and borrowed the li neage of some well-known "el i te"
speci al-purpose uni ts of Worl d War I1 fame. Whi le the li neage of those
uni ts undoubtedl y adds to the luster of Speci al Forces, li ttle i s served by
dwelli ng on thei r hi story as forerunners of a US Army unconventi onal
warfare capabi li ty.
OS S and Unconventional Warfare
Personnel of the Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces (OSS), however, di d
parti ci pate i n unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es duri ng Worl d War II, and
the US Army contri buted offi cers and men to thi s uni que organi zati on.
OSS bore the stamp of i ts fi rst chi ef, Wi lli am Joseph Donovan, an i mag-
i nati ve, forceful man neari ng 60, known si nce hi s youth as "Wi l d Bi ll."
Donovan was a hi ghly decorated World War I hero who had become a
mi lli onai re Wall Street corporate lawyer. Presi dent Roosevelt selected
hi m, as one cri ti c of OSS expressed i t, "to di rect the New Deal's excursi on
i nto espi onage, sabotage, ' bl ack' propaganda, guerri lla warfare, and other
' un-Ameri can' acti vi ti es."3 Establi shed to meet the speci al condi ti ons of
World Wai " II, OSS was the fi rst agency of i ts ki nd i n the hi story of the
Uni ted States. Largel y because of the i magi nati on and foresi ght of General
Donovan, OSS "undertook and carri ed out more di fferent types of enter-
pri ses calli ng for more vari ed ski lls than any other si ngle organi zati on of i ts
si ze i n the hi story of our country. ''4 Such di sparate tasks requi red a pot-
pourri of talent, wi th Ameri cans from all walks of li fe parti ci pati ng. OSS
strength had been esti mated at 12,000 to 30,000; the offi ci al War Report
of the OSS, however, released i n 1976, placed the agency' s maxi mum
strength i n December 1944 at 13,000 personnel, approxi mately 7,500 of
whom were stati oned overseas. 5
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I! 25
Donovan's agency was di vi ded i nto i ntelli gence, speci al operati ons,
and trai ni ng functi ons. Intelli gence and speci al operati ons were each fur-
ther subdi vi ded i nto several branches: Research and analysi s, secret i ntel-
li gence, and counterespi onage, for example, fell under i ntelli gence; and
sabotage, guerri lla warfare, and psychologi cal warfare fell under speci al
operati ons. Psychologi cal warfare bore the decei vi ng ti tle "Moral e Oper-
ati ons" (MO); that branch was responsi ble for creati ng and di ssemi nati ng
"black, " or covert propaganda. 6
In January 1943, duri ng one of hi s several reorgani zati ons of OSS,
Donovan establi shed the post of Deputy Di rector, Psychologi cal Warfare
Operati ons (PWO) to supervi se the acti vi ti es of both the Speci al Oper-
ati ons (SO) and Morale Operati ons branches. In May 1943, he organi zed
a thi rd branch, the Operati onal Group (OG) Command, to di rect guerri lla
warfare, and placed i t under the Deputy Di rector, PWO. Later, he
si mpli fi ed thi s ti tle to Deputy Di rector, Operati ons, wi th SO, MO, and OG
as subordi nate branches. 7 Through all thi s confusi on of seemi ngly i nter-
changeable organi zati onal ti tles and acti vi ti es, Donovan, even after losi ng
the responsi bi li ty for overt, or "whi te," propaganda to the Offi ce of War
Informati on (OWl ) i n March 1942, conti nued throughout the war to
percei ve a close i nterrelati onshi p between psychologi cal warfare and what
i n later years became known as unconventi onal warfare.
OSS and the Army
Although i ts role i n strategi c i ntelli gence was i mportant, the aspect of
OSS most appli cable to a di scussi on of unconventi onal warfare was "spe-
ci al operati ons," a term that covered, accordi ng to Harry Howe Ransom,
espi onage, counteri ntelli gence i n forei gn nati ons, sabotage, commando
rai ds, guerri lla and parti san-group acti vi ty. . , vari ous other forms of
psychologi cal warfare and underground operati ons. In essence, OSS
assumed operati onal responsi bi li ty i n a fi eld previ ously i gnored and
scorned by many di plomats and mi li tary professi onals. 8
The last poi nt i s si gni fi cant; OSS was not a mi li tary organi zati on, but
personnel from the mi li tary servi ces di d parti ci pate i n i ts acti vi ti es. The
Army contri buted the most mi li tary personnel duri ng the war--4,097 by
November 1943 and 8,360 by May 1945. 9
As early as 10 October 1941, when he had created a "Speci al Acti v-
i ti es" secti on i n the Coordi nator of Informati on (COl), Donovan had
26 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II
seri ously consi dered the i dea of speci al operati ons, i ncludi ng the formati on
of guerri lla uni ts. He had been i mpressed by the organi zati on and methods
of Great Bri tai n's Speci al Operati ons Executi ve (SOE). Movi ng qui ckly,
by December he had proposed to the Presi dent that the Uni ted States
organi ze "a guerri lla corps, i ndependent and separate from the Army and
Navy, and i mbued wi th a maxi mum of the offensi ve and i magi nati ve
spi ri t." By early 1942 he had requested trai ni ng areas from the De-
partment of Interi or and i nstructi onal personnel from the War Depart-
ment. Lack of a War Department allotment, however, i mpeded i ni ti al
recrui ti ng efforts for the projected guerri lla groups. ~
Predi ctably, the mi li tary servi ces had mi sgi vi ngs about a guerri lla
corps "i ndependent and separate from the Army and Navy." Duri ng the
peri od after Pearl Harbor, before the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff (JCS) had been
organi zed, US Forces were i n di sarray. Furthermore, Donovan had not
prepared the bureaucracy for hi s i nnovati ve proposal. As Wi lli am R. Cor-
son observes: "For Donovan to thi nk, even wi th FDR's endorsement, that
such an organi zati on could be brought to pass i n the face of the mi li tary's
obvi ous objecti ons was, chari tably, an act of lunacy on hi s part." ~
Asi de from the bureaucrati c sensi ti vi ti es i nvolved, many seni or mi l-
i tary leaders had seri ous reservati ons about the practi cali ty of Donovan's
i deas. Major General Strong, Army G-2, commenti ng on a memorandum
from COl i n June 1942 (by thi s ti me COl had been di ssolved and Donovan
was Di rector, OSS) on "Organi zati on of Guerri lla Warfare Command, "
regarded the proposal as "essenti ally unsound and unproducti ve." Strong
beli eved that most of the operati ons envi saged for such a force should be
carri ed out by speci ally trai ned regular troops; therefore, "to squander
ti me, men, equi pment, and tonnage on speci al guerri lla organi zati ons and
at the same ti me to compli cate the command and supply systems of the
Army by such projects would be culpable mi smanagement." Although he
recogni zed the value of sabotage and subversi ve acti vi ti es to mi li tary oper-
ati ons, Strong questi oned the feasi bi li ty of di recti ng such torces from
Washi ngton. In hi s opi ni on, guerri lla warfare, i f conducted at all, was a
functi on of regular Army task lorces whose operati ons would "take the
form of rai ds and are practi cally i denti cal wi th commando operati ons." 12
Strong's last statement reveals a fundamental, but not uncommon, mi s-
understandi ng of the nature of guerri lla warfare.
Despi te the reluctance of the mi li tary servi ces, one benefi t of placi ng
OSS under the di recti on of the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff was the i ssuance of
JCS 155/4D on 23 December 1942. That di recti ve gave OSS responsi bi li ty
for the organi zati on and conduct of guerri lla warfare, and speci fi ed that
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II 27
personnel employed i n guerri lla warfare be li mi ted to "organi zers, fo-
menters and operati onal nuclei of guerri lla uni ts."~ 3 Thus OSS had a
charter. Whi le Donovan's i ni ti al i deas for a "Guerri lla Group," compri sed
of 10 "Guerri lla Battali ons," di d not survi ve i ntact, he di d ulti mately create
a vari ety of unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es that depended heavi ly on
parti ci pati on by Army personnel.
Probably the best known unconventi onal warfare operati on i n whi ch
US Army personnel parti ci pated was that of Detachment 101 i n Burma,
commanded by Colonel W. R. Peers. Detachment 101 organi zed and
trai ned nati ve Kachi n tri besmen to conduct successful guerri lla warfare
operati ons agai nst the Japanese i n 1943 45. One former OSS member
suggested i n a conversati on wi th the author that 101 "represented a sort of
mi crocosm of the enti re range of OSS capabi li ti es." ~4The Kachi ns, led by
101, performed a vari ety of unconventi onal warfare mi ssi ons i n support of
Alli ed conventi onal operati ons. For example, they gathered i ntelli gence,
ai ded escape and evasi on efforts for downed US fli ers, undertook espi onage
and counterespi onage mi ssi ons, and attacked Japanese communi cati ons
lines.~ 5 Almost 700 US Army offi cers and enli sted men contri buted to 10 l' s
operati ons i n Northern Burma over a 3-year peri od. Total guerri lla
strength surpassed 10,000 by February 1945. After the completi on of i ts
mi ssi on i n Burma, Detachment 101 recei ved the Presi denti al Uni t Ci ta-
ti on) 6 Accordi ng to one student of OSS hi story, Detachment 101 per-
formed "the most successful OSS guerri lla operati ons of the war." ~7
Whi le Detachment 101 may have enjoyed the most spectacular tacti -
cal combat success, the major OSS effort duri ng the war was di rected at
France. t8 Here, US Army personnel made a si gni fi cant contri buti on to the
three groups of OSS operati onal uni ts that worked behi nd enemy li nes i n
di rect support of the French Resi stance. The fi rst group consi sted of 77
Ameri cans who worked i n ci vi li an clothes as organi zers of secret networks,
as radi o operators, or as i nstructors i n the use of weapons and explosi ves.
Thi rty-three members of that group were acti ve i n France before 6 June
1944, D-day. The second group consi sted of 78 Ameri cans who were mem-
bers of the "jedburgh teams," organi zed i n Great Bri tai n or Algi ers and
parachuted i nto France begi nni ng on D-day. Jedburgh teams were
composed of a Bri ti sh oi" Ameri can offi cer, a French offi cer, and a radi o
operator. These teams, usually worki ng i n uni form, coordi nated and legi t-
i mati zed Maqui s acti vi ti es under the aegi s of Supreme Headquarters,
Alli ed Expedi ti onary Force (SHAEF), obtai ned suppli es for the resi stance
groups, reported si gni fi cant i ntelli gence, and as a secondary role en-
gaged i n guerri lla warfare and attacks on German li nes of retreat or
communi cati onJ 9
28 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I1
The largest OSS group i n France consi sted of some 356 Ameri cans
who were members of OSS "Operati onal Groups" (OG's). All recrui ts for
the OG's were French-speaki ng volunteers from US Army uni ts, pri mari ly
i nfantry and engi neer (for demoli ti on experts). Medi cal techni ci ans were
procured from the Medi cal Corps, radi o operators from the Si gnal Corps. 2
Worki ng i n uni form, these teams parachuted behi nd the li nes after D-day
to perform a vari ety of mi ssi ons. They cut and harassed enemy commu-
ni cati on li nes; attacked vi tal enemy i nstallati ons; organi zed, trai ned, and
sustai ned the morale of local resi stance groups; and furni shed i ntelli gence
to the Alli ed armi es. Interesti ngly, Donovan di sti ngui shed between the
mi ssi ons of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OG's, even though
some aspects of thei r tacti cal operati ons were si mi lar. The cruci al
di fference i n hi s mi nd was that the OG's "fi tted i nto the pattern of OSS
acti vi ti es behi nd the enemy li nes."21
Actually, the mi ssi on of the OG's was di sti nct not only from that of
the Rangers and Commandos but also from that of other OSS acti vi ti es.
The OG Branch had been establi shed on 4 May 1943; then, on 27 Novem-
ber 1944, the OG Command was acti vated as a separate enti ty wi thi n OSS.
In addi ti on to basi c mi li tary trai ni ng, OG recrui ts recei ved speci ali zed
i nstructi on on such subjects as forei gn weapons, operati on and repai r of
enemy vehi cles, enemy espi onage organi zati ons, communi cati ons, demoli -
ti ons, organi zati on and trai ni ng of ci vi li ans for guerri lla warfare, para-
chute jumpi ng, and amphi bi ous operati ons. Thei r basi c functi on was to
organi ze resi stance groups i nto effecti ve guerri lla uni ts, equi p them wi th
weapons and suppli es, and lead them i nto attacks agai nst enemy targets, i n
concert wi th orders from the theater commander. As for how the concept
of thei r mi ssi on di ffered from those of other Speci al Operati ons acti vi ti es,
an OSS general ori entati on booklet publi shed i n 1944 descri bed i t thi s way:
"OG personnel acti vate guerri llas as mi li tary organi zati ons to engage
enemy forces. They always operate i n uni form as mi li tary uni ts and are not
pri mari ly concerned wi th i ndi vi dual acts of sabotage." Clearly, the OG's
were pri mari ly desi gned for guerri lla warfare, and the pri nci ples that they
embodi ed were to si gni fi cantly i nfluence the Army's effort to develop a
si mi lar capabi li ty i n later years. 22
Another perti nent aspect of the OG concept was i ts basi c operati onal
uni t, the secti on, composed of 2 offi cers and 13 enli sted men. Ei ght years
later the fi rst formal unconventi onal warfare uni t formed i n the US
Army- - the 10th Speci al Forces Group--was to adopt thi s same structure
for i ts basi c operati onal detachment. Also si gni fi cant i s the fact that the
fi rst commander of the 10th Speci al Forces Group was Colonel Aaron
Bank, an Army offi cer who had served wi th OSS i n France. Even the name
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I! 29
"Speci al Forces" i s remi ni scent of the combi ned headquarters formed i n
1943 by OSS and SOE whi ch i n 1944 was renamed "Speci al Forces
Headquart ers" ( SFHQ) . 23
"Throughout France, " states the War Report of the OSS, "bef ore and
af ter D-day, SFHQ suppli ed, di rected, and communi cated wi th the Maqui s
i n the l argest resi stance upri si ng i n hi story. " 24 A less enthusi asti c analysi s
of the role of SFHQ, and i n parti cul ar of OSS, was rendered by the G- 2
Di vi si on, War Departm. ent General Staf f ( WDGS) , i n a "Summa r y of
French Resi stance, 6 June-31 August 1944." The openi ng paragraph of
t hat summary reads as follows:
It must be borne i n mi nd that so-called resi stance acti vi ti es i n France
were the combi nati on of the efforts of the local French themselves
under the organi zati on and di recti on of Ameri can, Bri ti sh, and French
agents of SFHQ i nfi ltrated from the Uni ted Ki ngdom and North
Afri ca. In the majori ty of cases, the speci fi c acts of sabotage were
commi tted di rectly by the local French; and i t i s to them, for thei r
courage and dari ng, that the greater porti on of credi t for the end
results accompli shed must be gi ven. However, i t i s not at all out of
place for OSS i n general, and SO parti cularly, to take credi t for i ts
share i n the planni ng and di recti ng of the overall scheme of sabotage, z5
Once agai n, thi s eval uati on reveals more about the low regard accorded
unconventi onal acti vi ti es i n general, and the OSS i n parti cul ar, by many
Ar my offi cers, than i t does about the value of the resi stance i tself.
Whi l e the success of OSS and SOE efforts i n France i s di ffi cult to
esti mate, General Ei senhower, commenti ng on how effecti vely the Maqui s
cut enemy li nes of communi cati on i n support of the Normandy landi ngs,
stated that the French Resi stance forces were worth 15 di vi si ons to hi m i n
hi s i nvasi on of the Conti nent. 26
Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines
One l arge unconventi onal warf are operati on not di rected by OSS, but
i n whi ch US Army personnel played a key role, was the Phi li ppi ne Cam-
pai gn, 1941-45. When the Japanese overran the i slands, several Army
offi cers escaped to the mountai ns, where they establi shed extensi ve i ntel-
li gence networks and guerri l l a forces. In Nort hern Luzon, Li eutenant
Colonel Russell Vol ckmann equi pped, trai ned, and commanded fi ve Phi li p-
pi ne regi ments that successfully engaged the Japanese i n combat both
30 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II
i mmedi atel y before and duri ng ti le landi ng of US forces at Li ngayen i n
January 1945. On Mi ndanao, Li eutenant Colonel Wendel l Ferti g even-
tual l y consoli dated some 37,000 guerri l l a troops and held 90 percent of the
i sland unti l the end of the war. 27Both Vol ckmann and Ferti g were to fi gure
promi nentl y i n the acti vati on of the Army' s Speci al Forces i n the earl y
1950's.
Attitudes Toward Unconventional Warfare
Near the end of Worl d War II, Presi dent Roosevelt had foreseen the
need for a permanent strategi c i ntelli gence organi zati on for the postwar
peri od, and asked General Donovan to gi ve some thought to i ts possi ble
structure. Repl yi ng wi th a "' Memorandum for the Presi dent, " Donovan
proposed the "establ i shment of a central i ntelli gence authori ty, " whi ch
would report di rectl y to the Presi dent, "wi th responsi bi li ty to f rame i ntel-
li gence objecti ves and to collect and coordi nate the i ntelli gence materi al
requi red by the Executi ve Branch i n planni ng and carryi ng out nati onal
poli cy and strategy. " Donovan also urged the Presi dent to keep the trai ned,
speci ali zed personnel of OSS from bei ng di spersed af ter the war so that
they could contri bute to thi s proposed organi zati on. 28
When someone i n the Federal bureaucracy leaked a copy of Don-
ovan' s memorandum, the resul tant publi c furor over what the Chicago
Tribune called a proposed "Super- Spy System for Postwar New Deal "
forced Roosevelt to tell Donovan that he "woul d wai t out the storm and
submi t the proposal at a more propi ti ous moment . " That was i n February
1945. In Apri l the Presi dent di ed, and wi th hi s death the fortunes of OSS
were deal t a severe blow. 29 Whereas Donovan had enj oyed the confi dence
of Roosevelt, Edward Hymof f charges that Truman "had no concept of
OSS as an organi zati on nor what i t represented for the f uture of Ameri can
forei gn poli cy deci si onmaki ng. ''3
Presi dent Truman ordered that the OSS be di sbanded on 1 October
1945. One schol ar has suggested that Truman was moti vated
apparently because of pressures from the armed servi ces, the Federal
Bureau of Investi gati on [FBI], the Department of State, and the
Bureau of the Budget. Another i nfluence was undoubtedly Mr. Tru-
man's own apparent prejudi ce agai nst cloak and dagger operati ons by
the Uni ted States. To conti nue an i nternati onal spyi ng organi zati on i n
peaceti me seemed somehow un-Ameri can i n the atmosphere of the
i mmedi ate postwar peri od. 3'
It i s i nstructi ve to dwell on thi s analysi s for a moment. Fi rst, one must not
fall i nto the trap of exaggerati ng the success of OSS unconventi onal war-
fare operati ons. It may be true, as one hi stori an has suggested, that the
most si gni fi cant l ong-range work was done i n strategi c i ntelli gence by the
much less publi ci zed and romanti ci zed "col l ege professors, lawyers, and
others who worked ti relessly i n the research uni ts, i n the analysi s of eco-
nomi c objecti ves, and i n other operati onal analysi s and techni cal groups
wi thi n OSS. " It was these groups who contri buted much data on whi ch
successful warti me operati ons were based, and who developed techni ques
useful to contemporary i ntelli gence research and analysi s. 32
Moreover, the unconventi onal warf are operati ons of OSS actual l y
consti tuted a small porti on of the overall US war effort, and many OSS
resi stance acti vi ti es were haphazard, poorly organi zed, and uncoordi nated
wi th overall operati ons. Yet, one Worl d Wa r II parti ci pant has wri tten that
"unconventi onal warf are operati ons (not necessari ly those sponsored by
OSS) duri ng Worl d War II reaped a substanti al strategi c harvest, " ci ti ng
as exampl es the accompl i shments of Sovi et, Yugoslav, Al bani an, and
French parti sans i n i mmobi l i zi ng l arge numbers of German and Ital i an
di vi si ons) 3 The poi nt of thi s di scussi on, however, i s not to j udge the success
or fai l ure of OSS unconventi onal warf are operati ons, but to i l l ust rat e- - as
another resi stance parti ci pant, Charl es Thayer has done - - t ha t the fi rst
Ameri can experi ence wi th modern, sophi sti cated, l arge-scal e guerri l l a
movements took place duri ng Worl d War II, and f urthermore, that a
ci vi li an-led US agency, the OSS, and not the mi l i tary servi ces, stepped i n
to capi tal i ze on the potenti al for guerri l l a warfare. 34
In provi di ng leadershi p i n that area, General Donovan' s i nfant orga-
ni zati on i ncurred the wrath of other governmental agenci es, i ncludi ng the
mi l i tary servi ces. Opposi ti on to the i ntelli gence and speci al operati ons
efforts of OSS was so i ntense that Dr. Wi l l i am Langer, head of Research
and Analysi s, l ater observed that "perhaps Bi ll Donovan' s greatest si ngle
achi evement was to survi ve. " Even af ter bei ng placed under the di recti on
of the JCS i n 1942, Donovan i nsi sted on OSS i ndependence and freedom
from subservi ence to any si ngle agency or mi l i tary servi ce. 3~ It was thi s
i ndependence of OSS that was especi ally resented by "t he tradi ti onal i sts i n
the armed forces, " clai ms Edward Hymof f i n The OS S in Wor l d War II,
pri mari l y because "t hey had been pl agued duri ng the war by ci ti zens i n
uni form who had become offi cers only because they were i n OSS. " In
addi ti on, "even more frustrati ng for the mi l i tary professi onals were the
i rreverent i ndi vi duals i n OSS who constantl y flouted both authori ty and
standard operati ng procedures. " 36 Hymof f hi msel f was a member of OSS,
32 UNCONVENTI ONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR i l
and perhaps best typi fi es the atti tude of many Donovan "operati ves" by hi s
statement that one of the thi ngs he li ked best about the unorthodox agency
was that "i t was so unmi li tary." 37Donovan protected hi s "i rreverent i ndi -
vi duali sts" by reportedly often sayi ng, "I' d rather have a young li eutenant
wi th guts enough to di sobey an order than a colonel too regi mented to thi nk
and act for hi mself."3s
One of the most consi stent and outspoken opponents of OSS, Major
General George V. Strong, Chi ef of Army G-2 (Intelli gence), felt from the
outset of COl that Donovan's organi zati on confli cted wi th Army i nterests.
Strong also argued that "Wi ld Bi ll's" i ndependence would make hi m
i neffecti ve as a "team player." Later, when OSS came under the di recti on
of the JCS and was struggli ng for survi val, General Strong, accordi ng to
Corey Ford, "refused to exerci se hi s authori ty so that OSS could obtai n the
suppli es and personnel of whi ch i t was desperately i n need." In fact, 6
months passed before the JCS gave Donovan's organi zati on any oper-
ati onal i nstructi ons or offi ci al di recti ves about i ts responsi bi li ti es. The log-
jam broke only after Presi dent Roosevelt learned of the delay and told
General George C. Marshall, Chai rman of the JCS, to "gi ve Bi ll Donovan
a li ttle elbow room to operate i n." 39
In the face of such determi ned opposi ti on, Donovan survi ved only
because of the personal backi ng of Roosevelt. As Stewart Alsop and
Thomas Braden noted i n Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage,
the major adversari es of OSS- - the Army, the Navy, and the FBl - - "were
fully consci ous of Donovan's close fri endshi p wi th Roosevelt," and there-
fore were aware that "i f i t came to a showdown, the back door of the Whi te
House was always open to Wi lli am J. Donovan and a speci al plea." 40 The
parallel between Roosevelt's support of OSS and John F. Kennedy's vi go-
rous promoti on of Speci al Forces i n the face of reluctant foot-draggi ng by
some seni or mi li tary leaders 4t wi ll not be lost on students of speci al warfare
hi story, parti cularly when one consi ders that both organi zati ons lost
i nfluence after the deaths of the two presi dents.
Although the servi ces--parti cularly the Army--contri buted person-
nel to OSS, some commanders were reluctant to use OSS teams i n thei r
areas of responsi bi li ty. Detachment 101, for example, was i ni ti ally pre-
vented from operati ng i n Burma because General Joseph Sti lwell, com-
mander of Ameri can forces i n Chi na, Burma, and Indi a, was "fervently
prejudi ced agai nst the 'i rregular' mi li tary acti vi ty proposed by OSS," and
"di sparaged guerri lla tacti cs as 'i llegal acti on' and 'shadow boxi ng. '''42
Sti lweU eventually relented and later prai sed the contri buti ons of 101, but
General Douglas MacArthur steadfastly refused to permi t OSS to operate
UNCONV ENTI ONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II 33
i n the South Paci fi c t hroughout the war, even when General Donovan
offered a pl an to support guerri l l a operati ons i n the Phi li ppi nes. 43
In addi ti on to the personal ri valry, bureaucrat i c ant i pat hy, and j eal -
ousy t hat were provoked by General Donovan' s organi zati on, the oper-
ati ons of OSS may have antagoni zed mi l i tary l eaders of the "r e gul a r " US
Ar my who, by trai ni ng and experi ence, were condi ti oned to thi nk i n t erms
of conventi onal warf are. Some of these l eaders, therefore, may well have
looked askance at what they consi dered the unorthodox and unnecessary
OSS guerri l l a waref are acti vi ti es. Charl es Thayer, i n hi s book Guerrilla,
cl ai ms t hat ma ny general offi cers "ha rbor a deep- seated aversi on to guer-
ri llas, apparent l y because they fi t no conventi onal pat t ern and thei r under-
handed cl andesti ne tacti cs have li ttle i n common wi th the mi l i tary code of
honor and chi val ry whi ch career s o l d i e r s . . , li ke to associ ate wi th thei r
professi on. ' ' " In anot her at t empt to expl ai n why so many US mi l i tary
l eaders opposed unconventi onal warf are, Frankl i n Ma r k Osanka, a student
of guerri l l a acti vi ti es, offers thi s more convi nci ng rati onal e:
Guerri lla warfare has not been an Ameri can forte because i n most i ts
wa r s . . , the Uni ted States has not had to rely upon guerri lla warfare.
Ameri can experi ence wi th guerri lla warfare has been li mi ted by the
strength of Ameri can arms. The Uni ted States has been able to mobi -
li ze overwhelmi ng economi c and mi li tary power and to bri ng i t to bear
di rectly on the enemy, attacki ng hi m not where he was weakest but
where he was strongest, because we are stronger sti ll. Ameri can mi l-
i tary doctri ne has reflected thi s experi ence. 45
Despi te opposi ti on f rom the mi l i tary, however, by the end of the war
OSS had devel oped a nucleus of offi cers trai ned and experi enced i n guer-
ri lla warf are. Accordi ng to Thayer, seri ous efforts were made to persuade
the Pentagon to retai n thi s nucleus for f uture war, but "t hese recommen-
dati ons were to no avai l on the ostensi bl e ground that such ' el i te' groups
were i ncompati bl e wi th the democrat i c tradi ti on. " 46 Whi l e thi s expl anati on
of the Pent agon' s refusal may seem extreme, a respected mi l i tary hi stori an,
Russell Wei gl ey, states i n hi s History of the US Army that the Ar my has
a "l ong- st andi ng suspi ci on of eli te forces. ''47 Certai nl y thi s "suspi ci on"
ma y explai n the Ar my' s rel uctance to create an "unconventi onal warf are"
capabi l i ty i n the i mmedi at e postwar peri od, parti cul arl y when memori es of
OSS- Ar my ri val ry were sti ll fresh. Tha ye r does poi nt out t hat whi le most
of the personnel trai ned i n guerri l l a warf are were di scharged, a nucl eus of
psychol ogi cal warf are experts was retai ned, "l argel y as a resul t of the
newl y acqui red respectabi l i ty of thi s techni que i n the course of Worl d Wa r
II. "48 Wha t Tha ye r fai ls to menti on i s that the Ar my possessed i ts own
34 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 11
formal staffs and uni ts charged wi th the responsi bi li ty for psychologi cal
warfare. In other words, psychologi cal warfare had an i denti ty, however
tenuous, wi thi n the Army, an i denti ty that guerri lla warfare di d not share
because most of the offi cers and men who operated i n that area were
assi gned to OSS- - an organi zati on certai nly not consi dered part of the
Army. At any rate, psychologi cal warfare "survi ved" i n the i mmedi ate
post-World War II Army, although just barely, whi le the Pentagon appar-
ently gave i i ttle consi derati on to bui ldi ng on the nucleus of OSS-trai ned
offi cers to create a formal unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty.
Dissolution of OSS
Di smemberment of OSS took place qui ckly wi th Presi dent Truman' s
order di ssolvi ng the agency i n October 1945. By thi s ti me General Donovan
had reti red to ci vi li an li fe, and the remai ns of hi s former organi zati on were
di spersed to the unrecepti ve State and War Departments. Carefully trai n-
ed personnel dri fted away to other jobs outsi de Government. Porti ons of
the Secret Intelli gence and Speci al Operati ons branches joi ned the War
Department's newly establi shed Strategi c Servi ces Uni t (SSU), whi ch,
accordi ng to Corey Ford, "was nothi ng more than a caretaker body formed
to presi de over the li qui dati on of the OSS espi onage network." Bri gadi er
General John Magruder, formerly assi stant di rector of OSS, and head of
SSU unti l February 1946, resi gned i n protest over the agency's conti nui ng
loss of hi ghly trai ned personnel. For all practi cal purposes, any formal US
capabi li ty for guerri lla warfare di sappeared. Only a few secret i ntelli gence
and analysi s personnel remai ned, and there was li ttle need for thei r ski lls
i n the i mmedi ate postwar peri od. 49
Appraisal
The only true unconventi onal warfare organi zati on i n the Uni ted
States duri ng World War II was the Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, a ci vi li an
agency. Although a few Army offi cers parti ci pated i n non-OSS di rected
guerri lla operati ons i n the Phi li ppi nes, most of the Army's experi ence i n
unconventi onal warfare came from provi di ng personnel to serve wi th OSS.
Of parti cular note were the OSS Operati onal Groups that were recrui ted
enti rely from the Army and employed extensi vely i n Europe. In terms of
organi zati on, trai ni ng, and job descri pti on, the OG's presaged the basi c
operati onal detachment adopted by the Army's 10th Speci al Forces Group
upon i ts creati on i n 1952. Thus, for the Army the true roots of a modern
unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty lay i n i ts associ ati on wi th OSS.
Cl earl y, the central fi gure i n unconventi onal warf are duri ng Worl d
Wa r II was Maj or General Wi l l i am Donovan. Edmond Tayl or, a f ormer
member of COI / OSS, vi vi dly descri bes i n hi s book Awakening From
History Donovan' s vi si on of the potenti al of unconventi onal warfare:
The parami li tary and guerri lla aspects of the OSS mi ssi on probably
i nterested hi m more than any other. By combi ni ng unli mi ted nerve,
Yankee i ngenui ty, and self-reli ance, the Ameri can tradi ti on of fronti er
warfare, and the most advanced twenti eth-century sci ence or tech-
nology, Donovan beli eved that effecti vely unconventi onal soluti ons
could be found to almost any strategi c problem. Above and beyond hi s
other, someti mes mutually i ncompati ble goals, Donovan, I thi nk,
hoped to demonstrate through OSS that the normally untapped re-
serves of i ndi vi dual courage and resource, and the dynami sm of the
i ndi vi dual wi ll to wi n consti tute the basi c raw materi als of vi ctory, and
that i n an i ncreasi ngly mechani zed world, human di gni ty i s sti ll not
only a moral but a strategi c quanti ty. 5
Tayl or, an unabashed admi rer of Donovan ("I stayed i n OSS, though
someti mes attached to i t by nothi ng more tangi bl e than the i nvi si ble pres-
ence of Donovan i n my mi nd") offers a movi ng personal opi ni on about the
general ' s dedi cati on to unconventi onal warfare: "As far as I was concerned
General Donovan' s demonstrati on was conclusi ve, and i t made an abi di ng
contri buti on to the devel opment of my personal outl ook on the unendi ng
struggle for survi val among nati ons and ci vi li zati ons, i nsti tuti ons and i deol-
ogi es, that we call hi story. ''51
Wi thout questi on, Donovan i nheri ted many of hi s i deas from the
Bri ti sh. But only a man of hi s stature, perseverance, and personal dyna-
mi sm could have successfully appli ed those unorthodox concepts i n the face
of the i ntense opposi ti on and competi ng bureaucrati c i nterests that marked
US i nteragency efforts duri ng the war. Thus, whi le some of the Army
offi cers detai l ed to OSS were to play i mportant roles i n the creati on of the
10th Speci al Forces i n the earl y 1950's, Donovan must be consi dered the
spi ri tual f ather of Army unconventi onal warfare.
Actual l y, Donovan' s i nfluence on the Army extends beyond uncon-
venti onal warfare; i t also embraces psychologi cal warfare. As di scussed
earli er, the i ni ti al i dea behi nd formati on of the Coordi nator of Informati on,
at least as concei ved by Donovan, i ncluded combi ni ng i ntelli gence, speci al
operati ons, and propaganda functi ons i n the same agency. Indeed, hi s
all-encompassi ng concept of "psychol ogi cal warf are" i ncluded all the
el ement s- - and mo r e - - o f what the Army was l ater to call "speci al war-
f are" (wi th the excepti on of counteri nsurgency). Probabl y Donovan' s
36 UNCONV ENTI ONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II
greatest di sappoi ntment was losi ng the responsi bi l i ty for open, or "whi t e, "
propaganda, to the Otti ce of Wa r Inf ormat i on i n 1942 when COl became
OSS. Even af t er thi s setback, Donovan conti nued to stress t hroughout the
war the close i nterrel ati onshi p of psychol ogi cal warf are and speci al oper-
ati ons (unconventi onal warfare). It i s the aut hor' s bel i ef that thi s i n-
terrel ati onshi p, so fi rml y espoused by Donovan, i nfluenced General
McCi ure' s i deas about combi ni ng psychol ogi cal and unconventi onal war-
fare functi ons at both the Ar my St af f and the Psychol ogi cal Warf are
Cent er i n the earl y 1950's. COI, then, can be consi dered a common poi nt
of ori gi n for both unconventi onal and psychol ogi cal warf are i n modern
Ameri can experi ence, and Wi l l i am Donovan can also l egi ti matel y be con-
si dered the spi ri tual f ather of a "speci al warf are" capabi l i ty for the Army.
Looki ng at the Ar my' s experi ence wi th both psychol ogi cal and uncon-
venti onal warf are duri ng Worl d Wa r II, one i s struck by the si mi l ari ti es of
i nsti tuti onal responses to those two rel ati vel y new acti vi ti es. To ma ny
mi l i tary professi onal s, both were unorthodox, untri ed acti vi ti es, heavi ly
i nfluenced by ci vi li ans. Toget her they never i nvolved more than 10,000
Ar my personnel at any one t i me - - a mi nor si deshow, thought many, com-
pared to the overall "convent i onal " war effort. The mi l i tary response to
both was at ti mes hesi tant, skepti cal , i ndi fferent, and even antagoni sti c.
Psychol ogi cal warf are, however, gradual l y gai ned great er acceptance
wi thi n the Army. The cruci al di fference was that f ormal staf f secti ons and
uni ts were devel oped by the Ar my to empl oy thi s weapon. There was sti ll
a heavy rel i ance on ci vi li ans, but mi l i tary men were i n c omma nd and made
the fi nal deci si ons as to i ts use, parti cul arl y i n the vi rtual l y aut onomous
theaters. Thus psychol ogi cal warf are acqui red a measure of l egi ti macy
wi thi n the Ar my and survi ved as a f ormal acti vi ty af ter the war.
Unconventi onal warf are, on the other hand, remai ned the provi nce of
a ci vi li an agency, the OSS. Al though Donovan' s outfi t reli ed heavi ly on
Ar my personnel and was s~ :bject to JCS di recti on, i t nonethel ess remai ned
a separat e and di sti nct organi zati on. The tensi ons created by thi s i ndepen-
dent, "unconvent i onal " posture are perhaps best descri bed i n the fi nal
porti on of the War Report of the OSS:
An agency engaged i n secret and unorthodox acti vi ti es i s peculi arly
suscepti ble to di ffi culti es i n i ts relati ons wi th other agenci es and de-
partments of i ts government. Secrecy i nevi tably creates a psycho-
logi cal atti tude of di strust and suspi ci on on the part of others. In many
i nstances, thi s atti tude i s aggravated by the clash wi th establi shed
procedures and regulati ons whi ch the performance of i rregular and
unorthodox acti vi ti es often entai ls. 52
As a result of thi s i ndependence, OSS- - and unconventi onal
warfare--di d not gai n wi thi n the Army the degree of acceptance ulti -
mately enjoyed by psychologi cal warfare. Lacki ng soli d i nsti tuti onal roots,
OSS fai led to survi ve wi th the war's end. Its demi se meant the di sap-
pearance of any formal US capabi li ty for unconventi onal warfare. Only the
legacy of Wi lli am Donovan and the experi ence of the OSS personnel who
remai ned were left to bui ld on for the future. Both would be drawn upon
wi th the comi ng of the cold war.
IV
THE I NTERWAR YEARS, PART I:
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
"I t i s hard now to remember how menaci ng the Sovi et encroachments
appeared, " wrote Ray Cli ne i n 1976. ~ Cli ne, a f ormer Deputy Di rector of
the Central Intelli gence Agency (CIA), was speaki ng of the 1947-48
peri od, duri ng whi ch Ameri can concerns about Sovi et i ntenti ons were
gatheri ng i n i ntensi ty. The si tuati on was such that i n March 1948 the
Commander i n Chi ef, European Command ( EUCOM) , Colonel Luci us
Cl ay, cabled Washi ngton: "I have felt a subtle change i n Sovi et atti tude
whi ch I cannot defi ne but whi ch now gi ves me a feeli ng that i t [war] may
come wi th dramat i c suddenness. ''2 The Sovi et Uni on' s expansi on i nto
Eastern Europe; pressures on Greece, Turkey, and Iran; the Berli n Block-
ade; the fall of Chi na to the Communi sts; the U. S. S. R. ' s detonati on of an
atomi c devi ce i n 1949; and the Korean war i n 1950- - t hese were just some
of the devel opments that gradual l y hardened the atti tudes of US poli cy-
makers and shattered Ameri can dreams of a post-Worl d War II peace.
These atti tudes emerged from what Dani el Yergi n has called the "t wo
commandi ng i deas of Ameri can postwar forei gn pol i cy- - ant i - Communi sm
and a new doctri ne of nati onal securi ty. " The results, says Yergi n, were
poli ci es that "i ncl uded contai nment, confrontati on and i nterventi on, the
methods by whi ch US leaders have sought to make the world safe for
Ameri ca. ''3 As our pol i cymakers struggled to fi nd effecti ve means to re-
spond to the percei ved mi l i tary and i deologi cal threats, they exami ned
ways to i mprove US capabi li ti es i n i ntelli gence and psychologi cal and
unconventi onal warfare. The fi rst result of thi s quest was the creati on of the
CIA, but i t was also to have an i mpact upon the mi l i tary servi ces, parti c-
ul arl y the Army. To understand the ori gi ns of a speci al warf are capabi l i ty
for the Army, we fi rst must sketch the earl y hi story of the CIA, for the two
are i nextri cabl y i nterwoven.
39
4 0 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART 1
Creation of the CIA
Three months after he di sbanded the Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces
(OSS), Presi dent Truman on 22 January 1946 created the Central Intel-
li gence Group (CIG)- - t he di rect predecessor of the CIA. Truman had
reali zed the need for a centrali zed body to gather and coordi nate i ntel-
li gence i nformati on and to eli mi nate fri cti on among competi ng mi li tary
i ntelli gence servi ces. By the spri ng of 1946, the War Department's Strate-
gi c Servi ces Uni t was transferred to CIG, gi vi ng i t the remnants of an OSS
clandesti ne collecti on capabi li ty. Thi s led to the formati on of the Offi ce of
Speci al Operati ons (OSO), whi ch was responsi ble for espi onage and coun-
terespi onage. By June 1946, CIG had a strength of approxi mately 1,800,
of whi ch about one-thi rd were overseas wi th OSO.
Wi th the passage of the Nati onal Securi ty Act i n July 1947, CIG
became an i ndependent department renamed the Central Intelli gence
Agency. The major tasks assi gned to the agency were the followi ng: (1) to
advi se the Nati onal Securi ty Counci l (NSC) on matters related to nati onal
securi ty, (2) to make recommendati ons to the NSC about the coordi nati on
of i ntelli gence acti vi ti es of the departments, (3) to correlate and evaluate
i ntelli gence and provi de for i ts di ssemi nati on, (4) to carry out "servi ces of
common concern," and (5) "to perform such other functi ons and duti es
related to i ntelli gence affecti ng the nati onal securi ty as the NSC from ti me
to ti me di rect." The CIA also assumed the previ ous functi ons of CIG- -
clandesti ne and overt collecti on, producti on of nati onal current i ntel-
li gence, and i nteragency coordi nati on for nati onal esti mates.
Although the ori gi nal di scussi ons about the creati on of both CIG and
the CIA had focused on the problem of i ntelli gence coordi nati on, wi thi n a
year of the 1947 act the CIA was charged wi th the conduct of covert
psychologi cal, poli ti cal, parami li tary, and economi c acti vi ti es. On 14 De-
cember 1947, the Nati onal Securi ty Counci l adopted NSC 4/A, whi ch
gave the CIA responsi bi li ty for covert psychologi cal operati ons; on 22
December, the Speci al Procedures Group was set up wi thi n the CIA's
Offi ce of Speci al Operati ons to carry out psychologi cal operati ons. By June
1948, NSC 10/2 had broadened that authori ty for covert operati ons to
i nclude poli ti cal and economi c warfare and parami li tary acti vi ti es (such as
sabotage and support to guerri llas). The Speci al Procedures Group was
replaced by the Offi ce of Speci al Projects, whi ch shortly was renamed the
Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on (OPC). Its head was Frank Wi sner, the
former OSS stati on chi ef i n Rumani a. By the end of 1948, the CIA had a
li mi ted covert acti on capabi li ty.
THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I 41
The capabi l i ty for covert acti on expanded as a result of the Korean
war and the CIA' s parti ci pati on i n parami l i tary acti vi ti es i n the Far East.
OPC' s strength rose from 302 i n 1949 to 2,812, plus 3,142 overseas con-
tract personnel, i n 1952; i ts budget, from $4.7 mi lli on to $82 mi lli on; and
i ts number of overseas stati ons, from 7 to 47 duri ng the same peri od.
Another sti mulus for CI A/ OPC' s expansi on was NSC 68, i ssued on
14 Apri l 1950, whi ch called for a nonmi l i tary offensi ve agai nst the Sovi et
Uni on, i ncludi ng covert economi c, poli ti cal, and psychologi cal warf are to
foster unrest i n U. S. S. R. satelli te countri es. Si mi larly, NSC 10/5, whi ch
on 21 October 1951 had replaced NSC 10/2, agai n called for i ntensi fi ed
covert acti on and reaffi rmed the CIA' s responsi bi li ty for i ts conduct. Fi -
nally, i n August 1952, the cl andesti ne collecti on and secret i ntelli gence
functi ons of OSO merged wi th the covert acti on capabi li ti es of OPC. The
resulti ng amal gamati on was called the Di rectorate of Plans, wi th Frank
Wi sner of OPC i n charge and Ri chard Hel ms from OSO as hi s second i n
command. Thus by 1953 the CIA was si x ti mes the si ze i t had been i n 1947,
and the cl andesti ne servi ces had become by far the l argest component i n
the agency. 4
Thi s bri ef overvi ew has only hi ghl i ghted the CIA' s earl y hi story, but
a few poi nts should be emphasi zed. Fi rst, there was the i nfluence of OSS.
Corey Ford, Donovan' s bi ographer, states that the CIA "was the di rect
outgrowth of Donovan' s Worl d War II organi zati on, and was based on
f undamental OSS pri nci ples. "5 Allen Dulles, the fi rst ci vi li an di rector of
the CIA, states i n hi s The Craft of Intelligence that Truman based hi s
establ i shment of the CIA on the controversi al recommendati ons offered by
Donovan before Roosevelt' s death i n 1945, and that "muc h of the knowhow
and some of the personnel i n OSS were taken over by the Central Intel-
li gence Agency. ''6 In fact, i n 1949 one-thi rd of the CIA' s personnel had
previ ously served wi th OSS. 7 In i ts fi rst year, however, the agency was so
i ntel l i gence-ori ented that people wi th Worl d War II "speci al operati ons"
experi ence were not recrui ted. But by the l atter part of 1948, a growi ng
number of f ormer OSS personnel wi th guerri l l a warf are experi ence had
j oi ned the i ntelli gence agency. That i nflux conti nued throughout the
1940's, and when the Korean war began, even more f ormer OSS personnel
j oi ned the CI A)
The CIA' s fi rst years were also i nfluenced by the preoccupati on of US
pol i cymakers wi th the Sovi et threat, a preoccupati on that i s di ffi cult to
exaggerate. The i mpetus of the cold war provi ded an envi ronment of fear
that fostered renewed i nterest i n psychologi cal and unconventi onal war-
fare. As the Senate Select Commi ttee' s report on i ntelli gence acti vi ti es
states, "Deci si ons regardi ng US sponsorshi p of cl andesti ne acti vi ti es were
42 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I
gradual but consi stent, spurred on by the growi ng concern over Sovi et
i ntenti ons. ''9 Fi nally, the growth of the Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on was
i mportant, for i t was thi s part~ f the CIA wi th whi ch the Army would have
to i nteract most as i t groped to develop i ts own capabi li ty for psychologi cal
and unconventi onal warfare.
Army Demobilization
Duri ng 1945-46, Army psychologi cal warfare staffs and uni ts di ssi -
pated wi th the general demobi li zati on of the mi li tary establi shment. To be
sure, a few seni or offi cers recommended that the Army profi t from i ts
experi ence i n that relati vely new fi eld. In December 1945 Major General
Lemni tzer urged that the Army remember i ts warti me lessons and develop
a psychologi cal warfare capabi li ty for the future. He also recommended
that the servi ce schools i nclude i nstructi on "to provi de future commanders
and staff offi cers wi th a general understandi ng and appreci ati on of thi s new
weapon of warfare." to
General McClure, the key World War II fi gure i n Army psychologi cal
warfare, echoed the senti ments expressed by General Lemni tzer i n a letter
to the Propaganda Branch, War Department, i n early 1946: "'I urge that
a comprehensi ve document on the subject of psycholog! cal warfare be
produced and used i n the Nati onal War College and the Command and
General Staff School." McClure concluded by pronounci ng the followi ng
verdi ct: "The i gnorance, among mi li tary personnel, about psychologi cal
warfare, even now, i s astoundi ng." t t And at a hi gher level, the Chi ef of the
JCS Hi stori cal Secti on, Major General E. F. Hardi ng (USA), recom-
mended i n February 1946 that the JCS employ a ci vi li an professi onal to
wri te a hi story of World War II psychologi cal warfare. To make hi s poi nt
about the necessi ty of such a study, Hardi ng remi nded the JCS that the
Army's World War I experi ence i n thi s acti vi ty had not been recorded, and
argued the i mportance of psychologi cal warfare i n modern total war. ~2
Despi te these entreati es, the nati on longed for prompt return to normalcy.
The mi li tary servi ces, faced wi th the problems of rapi d demobi li zati on, gave
li ttle attenti on to the relati vely mi nor subject of psychologi cal warfare, j3
Some Army personnel di d, of course, have grave reservati ons about
Sovi et i ntenti ons, even though the U.S.S.R. had been a major ally i n war.
As a Senate report on US i ntelli gence acti vi ti es states, "Ameri can mi li tary
i ntelli gence offi cers were among the fi rst to percei ve the changed si tu-
ati on." t4 In a lengthy letter wri tten i n January 1946, Major General W. G.
Wyma n, the G- 2 of Ar my Ground Forces ( AGF) , pref aced hi s vi ews on the
i deologi cal threat, both domesti c and i nternati onal , posed by the U. S. S. R.
wi th thi s statement: "The confusi on of mi nd and the i nconsi derate thi nki ng
of the soldi ers of the Ground Forces i n the Uni ted States i s i l l ustrati ve of
si mi l ar t hought whi ch exi sts amongst troops of occupati on and the ci vi li an
popul ati on of the Uni ted St at es. " Al armed about the probl ems associ ated
wi th demobi l i zati on, he asked rhetori cal l y, "Whe r e i s the ment al peni ci lli n
that can be appl i ed to our loose thi nki ng to i nsure the whol esome t hought
t hat i s so urgentl y needed i n our country t oda y? " Launchi ng i nto a com-
pari son of communi sm and democracy, he outl i ned several areas of the
world under Sovi et domi nati on or pr e ssur e - - "t he tentacl es of commu-
ni s m" - - a nd then addressed the domesti c scene: "Ou r troubl es of the d a y - -
l abor, demobi l i zati on, the di scontented sol di er- - t hese thi ngs are the sores
on whi ch the vul tures of communi sm wi ll feed and f atten. "
Havi ng gi ven an overvi ew of the i lls, Wy ma n then turned to hi s
prescri pti on:
There must be some agency, some group ei ther wi thi n or outsi de our
nati onal securi ty forces, whi ch can i nterest i tself i n these matters.
There must be some weapon by whi ch we can defend ourselves from
the secret thi ng whi ch i s worki ng at our vi tals--thi s cancer of modern
ci vi li zati on . . . . A new government poli cy i s desperately needed to
i mplement the psychologi cal effort i ndi cated . . . . We must combat
thi s creepi ng shadow whi ch i s i n our mi dst.
General Wy ma n concl uded hi s l etter by urgi ng that the Wa r De-
part ment , "i n the i nterest of nati onal securi ty, " recommend to the Presi -
dent that:
1. Federal i ntelli gence agenci es concentrate on collecti ng i nformati on
on acti vi ti es subversi ve to our government at home and abroad.
2. A government agency be selected to wage a psychologi cal war
agai nst these acti vi ti es.
3. A poli cy be establi shed to publi ci ze such subversi ve acti vi ti es and
expose them to our people. 15
Thi s remarkabl e anal ysi s vi vi dly portrays the mood of the ti mes.
Whi l e General Wy ma n' s vi ews ma y today appear somewhat extreme, i n
1946 they represented the genui ne concerns and fears of a segment of
Ameri can soci ety, both i n and out of uni form. A l arger part of the popu-
lati on, however, desi red peace and a return to normal cy, and i t was these
confli cti ng pressures that pol i cymakers struggl ed wi th i n the i mmedi at e
post war peri od. Those same confli cti ng pressures also affected the evo-
luti on of psychol ogi cal warf are i n the Army.
Psywar to Plans and Operations Division
In May 1946 the Intel l i gence Di vi si on, G-2, began work on a recom-
mendati on t hat Wa r Depart ment responsi bi l i ty for psychol ogi cal warf are
be moved f rom G- 2 to a speci al staf f di vi si on created for thi s acti vi ty.
However, both the Chi ef of Inf ormati on, Maj or General M. S. Eddy, and
the Di rector, Pl ans and Operat i ons ( P &O) Di vi si on, Maj or General Lauri s
Norstad, felt that such a speci al staff di vi si on was not justi fi ed i n peace-
ti me, so the recommendat i on was wi thdrawn i n l ate June. General Norst ad
di d express the vi ew that hi s di vi si on should be responsi bl e for the pl anni ng
and poli cy gui dance for psychol ogi cal warf are, but onl y i f the propaganda
branch personnel f rom G- 2 were transf erred to hi m wi th the functi on. ~6
At the same ti me, General McCl ure, who was i n Ge r ma ny as Di rec-
tor, Inf ormat i on Control , responded to a request f rom Colonel D. W.
Johnston, Chi ef, Propaganda Branch, for hi s recommendat i ons about the
proper pl ace for psychol ogi cal warf are agenci es "wi thi n the staf f structure
of all appropri at e echel ons. " Usi ng hi s wart i me experi ence as an exampl e,
McCl ure argued strongl y t hat psychol ogi cal warf are should not be under
G- 2:
A great part of my di ffi culty i n carryi ng out what I felt was my mi ssi on
was wi th G- 2. The G 2's all felt that they had a monopoly on i ntel-
li gence and were reluctant i n the earli er stages to gi ve any of that
i ntelli gence to Psychologi cal Warfare knowi ng that i t would be broad-
cast or used i n pri nt.
He beli eved t hat an associ ati on of psychol ogi cal warf are wi th G- 3 would
be more producti ve: " My greatest contacts were wi th G- 3 and i t was wi th
the operati onal phases and even l ong- range operati onal p l a ns . . , that I
feel we di d our best work. "
McCl ure' s cl ear preference, however, was for a separate, speci al staff
secti on:
I am fi rmly convi nced that an acti vi ty as i mportant and as rami fi ed as
Psychologi cal Warfare i s one whi ch should have the personal attenti on
of the Chi ef of Staff and that the Di rector of Psychologi cal Warfare
should li kewi se have access to the Chi ef of Staff and even to the
Commander hi mself.
Here General McCl ure found the opportuni ty to promot e one of hi s favor-
i te themes:
I had that relati onshi p wi th the Chi ef of Staff and the Supreme Com-
mander [Ei senhower] throughout the war and even then i t was not as
sati sfactory as i t should have been because of our fai lure i n peace-ti me
to i ndoctri nate Commanders and Staff Offi cers wi th the capabi li ti es
and li mi tati ons of Psychologi cal Warfare.
He concl uded by recommendi ng agai n that "Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e be a
separat e Staf f Secti on reporti ng di rectl y to the Chi ef and Deput y Chi ef of
St af f wi th the closest li ai son wi th the G Secti ons as well as wi th other
Speci al St af f Secti ons. " 17(It was to be another four and a hal f years bef ore
the speci al staff secti on that McCl ure recommended would come to fru-
i ti on on the Ar my Staff, and he would be i ts fi rst head. )
Col onel Johnston real i zed that any at t empt to creat e a speci al staf f
secti on for psychol ogi cal warf are at t hat ti me would be futi le. Nonethel ess,
he at t empt ed to move the functi on out of the Intel l i gence Di vi si on. On 22
August 1946, he recommended the establ i shment of a "Psychol ogi cal War-
f are Gr oup" under Pl ans and Operat i ons ( P &O) i n the Wa r Depart ment
General St af f ( WDGS) . Rel yi ng heavi l y on General McCl ure' s argu-
ments, Johnston emphasi zed t hat psychol ogi cal warf are was "pri mari l y
operati onal i n nat ure and does not fall readi l y wi thi n the scope of the
Intel l i gence Di vi si on. " Perhaps the most i nteresti ng aspect of Johnst on' s
rati onal e for hi s proposed change was hi s bel i ef t hat the new li ne of aut hor-
i ty would el i mi nate f uture i nterf erence by ci vi li ans:
In the event of a future emergency, whi le overall poli ti cal and psycho-
logi cal warfare poli ci es wi ll stem from the Whi te House and the State
Department, the exi stence of a nuclear organi zati on wi thi n the War
Department possessi ng a complete plan for mi li tary psychologi cal
warfare and the techni cal means for i mplementati on, would avoi d the
si tuati on of World War II, wherei n theater commanders had thrust
upon them ci vi li an agenci es to conduct psychologi cal warfare wi thi n
thei r theaters, wi th resultant confli ct of authori ty and lack of control
over trai ni ng standards and performance. ~s
Here agai n we see evi dence of the resent ment t hat ma ny regul ar otti cers
fel t t oward what they consi dered unwarrant ed ci vi li an i nterference.
A deci si on on Col onel Johnst on' s recommendat i ons was del ayed unti l
Oct ober, and i t probabl y di ffered f rom what he had envi saged. The ori gi nal
paper had pi cked up some addi ti onal facets, and what the Acti ng Chi ef of
Staff approved on 3 October 1946 was a seri es of War Department recom-
mendati ons to the State-War-Navy Coordi nati ng Commi ttee (SWNCC)
"to gi ve early consi derati on to, and make prompt recommendati ons con-
cerni ng Psychologi cal Warfare Poli cy," and to "consi der i nformi ng the
U.S. publi c of forei gn subversi ve acti vi ti es wi thi n U.S." 19In those recom-
mendati ons, parti cularly those concerni ng subversi ve acti vi ti es, the i nflu-
ence of General Wyman' s January letter can be seen. Wi th regard to the
i ni ti al recommendati on to establi sh a Psychologi cal Warfare Group i n
P&O, however, the deci si on was that certai n psychologi cal warfare oper-
ati ons would be moved to other di vi si ons and agenci es, but that P&O would
provi de overall planni ng and poli cy gui dance. 2
Some footdraggi ng followed unti l, duri ng an i nformal conversati on on
6 November 1946 between General Hodes and General Li ncoln, General
Hodes agreed to take over i mmedi ately the psychologi cal warfare functi ons
of G-2 and to absorb i ts Propaganda Branch. 2t The Propaganda Branch
was formally di sconti nued by Intelli gence Di vi si on Memorandum No. 100
on 29 November 1946, and the branch personnel assi gned to the Poli cy
Secti on, P&O. 22 A mi nor era i n the evoluti on of War Department bureauc-
racy thus ended. Psychologi cal warfare, whi ch from 1941 had been a G-2
responsi bi li ty, passed to the operati ons si de of the house.
Actually, the responsi bi li ty for psychologi cal warfare had been di luted
i n the process. Whi le War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1,
i ssued on 10 January 1947, charged the Di rector of P&O wi th the re-
sponsi bi li ty for general supervi si on of Army psychologi cal warfare acti v-
i ti es, several other War Department agenci es were gi ven pi eces of the pi e.
These i ncluded the Di rector of Intelli gence, who retai ned responsi bi li ty for
collecti on, evaluati on, and i nterpretati on of soci ologi cal and psychologi cal
i nformati on, and the analysi s of forei gn propaganda; the Di rector of Orga-
ni zati on and Trai ni ng; the Di rector of Servi ce, Supply, and Procurement;
the Di rector of Research and Development; and the Chi ef of Publi c Infor-
mati on. 23 Real centrali zati on of psychologi cal warfare acti vi ti es di d not
occur unti l January 1951, when the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare (OCPW) was formed, wi th General McClure as i ts head.
Eisenhower and McCl ur e
At about the ti me that responsi bi li ty for psychologi cal warfare passed
to P&O, some i nterest i n the fi eld emerged at a hi gher poli cy level. Appar-
ently i ni ti ated by the i nterest of Secretary of War Robert Patterson, di s-
cussi ons about covert operati ons as a f uture f orm of war took pl ace i n
S WNCC. As an offshoot, i n December 1946 an S WNCC subcommi t t ee
f ormul at ed gui del i nes for the conduct of psychol ogi cal warf are i n peace-
ti me and warti me. Then, i n Apri l 1946 an S WNCC subcommi t t ee was
f ormed to pl an psychol ogi cal warf are; i n June 1947 i t was renamed the
Speci al Studi es and Eval uati on Subcommi t t ee. 24
In a me mor a ndum dated 19 June 1947 Ar my Chi ef of St af f Ei sen-
hower i ndi cated to the Di rector of P &O hi s desi re for the Wa r Depart ment
"t o take those steps t hat are necessary to keep ali ve the arts of psycho-
logi cal warf are and of cover and decepti on and t hat there should conti nue
i n bei ng a nucl eus of personnel capabl e of handl i ng these arts i n case an
emergency ari ses. " zs At the same ti me, the f ormer Worl d Wa r II Supreme
Alli ed Comma nde r asked hi s f ormer Chi ef of the Psychol ogi cal Wa rf a re
Di vi si on, SHAEF, for comment s on the subject.
McCl ure emphasi zed i n hi s repl y that "psychol ogi cal warf are must
become a part of every f uture war pl an. " He l amented the di spersi on of
peopl e wi th Worl d Wa r II experi ence, and speci fi cally recommended that:
1. A mi xed ci vi li an-mi li tary group, on a voluntary basi s, be charged
wi th studyi ng psychologi cal warfare poli ci es and practi ces duri ng
thi s war.
2. Research be undertaken, at once, i nto the effecti veness of PW
(psychologi cal warfare).
3. A PW Branch of the Di rector of Informati on be establi shed.
4. A PW Reserve, of li mi ted number, be establi shed.
5. Trai ni ng for PW be undertaken at the General Staff College and
the Nati onal Defense College) 6
In li ght of the strong vi ews t hat he had expressed earl i er about the
desi rabi l i ty of a Speci al St af f secti on for psychol ogi cal warf are, McCl ure' s
recommendat i on to put thi s functi on under the Chi ef of Inf ormat i on ap-
pears strange. Perhaps he had deci ded that such a proposal was futi l e
because of the previ ous resi stance to thi s i dea shown by the Wa r De-
pa rt me nt staff. Perhaps hi s post- Worl d Wa r II experi ence i n i nf ormati on
had convi nced hi m t hat thi s was the proper course. As he expl ai ned i n hi s
me mor a ndum to Ei senhower: "I t [psychol ogi cal warf are] i s more than
i ntelli gence; i t i s more than o p e r a t i o ns . . , i t is i nf ormat i on- - secured and
di ssemi nated to fri end and enemy. " 27
Li ttle resulted from General McClure's recommendati ons. Accordi ng
to the Di rector of P&O i n the staff reacti on requested by Ei senhower,
General McClure's fi rst two recommendati ons had been followed: A ci vi l-
i an hi stori an, Dr. E. P. Li lly, had been employed by the JCS to wri te a
hi story of psychologi cal warfare for World War II. But the War De-
partment staff beli eved that the responsi bi li ti es for psychologi cal warfare
should remai n as outli ned i n War Department Memorandum 575-10-1,
and not be a functi on of the Chi ef of Informati on. Nor was the establi sh-
ment of a psychologi cal warfare reserve beli eved practi cal. Wi th regard to
McClure's fi nal recommendati on, the Di rector of P&O, General Norstad,
si mply repli ed that the subject of psychologi cal warfare was i ncluded i n the
curri culum of the Nati onal War College, the Command and General Staff
College, and the Ai r War College. 28
Another seni or offi cer who was unhappy wi th the progress of US
psychologi cal warfare was General Wyman. He wrote to General Norstad
on 14 June 1947, and, wi th hi s usual i ntensi ty, declared, "I beli eve that the
SWNCC group that has been set up i s not suffi ci ently powerful to accom-
pli sh the urgent nati onal requi rement i n thi s fi eld. Such a group must have
no di verti ng duti es to take them away from thi s very extensi ve subject
whi ch i s so i mportant to us." He went on to state that a nati onal psycho-
logi cal warfare objecti ve must be establi shed, and that the Army needed an
i nteri m di recti ve so that i t could "bri ng an aggressi ve program to bear on
appropri ate objecti ves wi thout further delay." He concluded by reaffi rmi ng
the necessi ty for acti on at the hi ghest level: "I am convi nced that a nati onal
agency must be set up, usi ng SWNCC perhaps, but sti rred up and goaded
far beyond any present concept to i mmedi ate acti on." 29
In hi s reply, Norstad agreed on the need for a nati onal agency, but
remi nded General Wyman that the overall di recti on and control of peace-
ti me acti vi ti es was pri mari ly a State Department functi on. He i nformed
Wyman that two offi cers from P&O were members of the SWNCC Sub-
commi ttee on Psychologi cal Warfare, whi ch was pri mari ly a conti ngency
planni ng organi zati on that should not engage i n the day-to-day busi ness of
"selli ng democracy." He proceeded to draw a di sti ncti on between the
peaceti me acti vi ty of "selli ng democracy," an i nformati on functi on, and
"psychologi cal warfare," whi ch "should' apply only to warti me or pre-
belli gerency and have as i ts frank objecti ve the coerci on as well as the
provi si on of thought. ''3 Wyman agreed wi th Norstad's di staste for the
term "psychologi cal warfare," but felt that there was "a great need for a
synonym whi ch could be used i n peaceti me that would not shock the
sensi bi li ti es of a ci ti zen of democracy. ''3~
The probl em was not new. Duri ng Worl d Wa r II, agency di fferences
over "open, " "whi t e, " or "overt , " as opposed to "cl osed, " "bl ack, " or
"covert " propaganda had been a source of conti nui ng di ffi culty. In fact,
those di fferences had been one of the pri mary f actors i n the di ssoluti on of
COl and the di vi si on of psychol ogi cal warf are responsi bi li ti es between
OWl (overt) and OSS (covert). But thi s was a new ki nd of wa r - - a "col d
wa r " - - i n whi ch most Ameri cans desi red peace. Ma ny mi l i tary men
wanted to have nothi ng at all to do wi th psychol ogi cal warf are; i t was not
"real sol di eri ng. " Even those who felt that psychol ogi cal warf are was
i mport ant were underst andabl y perpl exed about the proper role of the
mi l i tary i n thi s mul ti f aceted and unorthodox acti vi ty. The correspondence
between General Norst ad and General Wy ma n mi rrored the di l emma
faced by concerned professi onals.
Norst ad asked the Chi ef of Inf ormat i on, General Eddy, for hi s i nfor-
mal vi ews on thi s sensi ti ve subject. Eddy' s reply, i n a l engthy me mor a ndum
wri tten i n Oct ober 1947, provi des some val uabl e i nsi ghts. He began by
concurri ng "i n the need to undert ake wi thout del ay an extensi ve campai gn
of psychol ogi cal warf are, i n both overt and covert phases, as a ma t t e r of
nati onal necessi ty to offset the effecti veness of the growi ng PW campai gn
, l aunched agai nst the Uni ted States by the U. S. S. R. " But then he di scussed
the i mport ance of careful l y presenti ng such a campai gn to the Ameri can
publ i c and the role of the mi l i tary i n such an effort:
Although the success or fai lure of such a PW campai gn wi ll be of the
most vi tal mi li tary concern, the poli ti cal structure of the U.S. pre-
cludes maki ng PW a mi li tary effort. In fact, the poli ti cal consi d-
erati ons are so sensi ti ve i n thi s fi eld that the whole program may be
defeated at i ts i ncepti on--no matter who assumes the i ni ti ati ve--i f the
enti re questi on of ways and means of broachi ng the subject to the
Presi dent, the Congress, the people--parti cularly the press--i s not
mi nutely exami ned by the best brai ns avai lable and handled wi th the
utmost tact, fi nesse and di screti on. Otherwi se, the Ameri can people
and the Congress wi ll mi sunderstand and di sapprove the project at the
outset.
Eddy beli eved that covert psychol ogi cal warf are would not be accept-
ed by the Ameri can peopl e "wi t hout a great deal of prel i mi nary educati on
and groundwork, " and emphasi zed that i t shoul d be conducted "unde r the
aegi s of an agency not di rectl y connected wi th the armed forces. " On the
other hand, the publ i c and Congress would probabl y accept overt psycho-
logi cal warf are, but onl y i f they were fully i nf ormed as to i ts need and
methods. That, Eddy sai d, would requi re the vol untary cooperati on of the
i nf ormati on medi a. Terms such as "psychol ogi cal warf are, " "propagan-
da, " and "subversi on" would have to be caref ul l y expl ai ned "so as not to
arouse publ i c i ndi gnati on or f ear of ' gest apo- i sm' and aut hori t ari ani sm i n
our own count ry. " And as for the mi l i t ary' s role i n thi s endeavor, Eddy
t hought that "t he enti re subj ect shoul d be sponsored by ci vi l i ans- - not
members of the mi l i tary e st a bl i shme nt - - bot h i n and out of the govern-
ment. Publ i cl y recogni zed mi l i tary parti ci pati on should be l i mi ted to ad-
vi ce, concurrence, and such perf ormance as may be del egated to i t. " 32
General Eddy' s vi ews vi vi dly port ray the murky and pol i ti cal l y sensi -
ti ve area that was psychol ogi cal warf are i n the earl y years of the cold war.
The ext reme cauti on he advocated undoubtedl y contri buted to the ambi v-
al ent atti tudes of many seni or Ar my offi cers toward thi s "grey area" acti v-
i ty duri ng the i nterwar peri od.
General McCl ure, however, was not ambi val ent, and rarel y mi ssed an
opportuni ty to press for a strong Ar my role i n psychol ogi cal warf are.
Respondi ng to a request from Ei senhower for a smal l number of ci vi li an
candi dates for a psychol ogi cal warf are reserve, McCl ure i n earl y Novem-
ber 1947 recommended a group of ei ght for poli cy pl anni ng and outli ned
how they could be used. He then added:
Although acti vi ti es of thi s group would have to be coordi nated wi th
other armed servi ces and wi th the State Department, i t appears to me
that the Army i s pri vi leged to take the i ni ti ati ve i n securi ng U.S.
Government coordi nati on of Psychologi cal Warfare acti vi ti es si nce the
Army i s the pri nci pal i mplementi ng agency i n four occupi ed countri es
and a contri buti ng agency through i ts Mi li tary Attache and Mi li tary
Mi ssi on systems. 3a
McCl ure was correct; the Ar my was heavi l y i nvolved i n ci vi l affai rs,
i nf ormati on control , and "reori ent at i on" acti vi ti es i n several occupi ed
countri es. No one was more aware of that than the f ormer Chi ef of
P WD/ S HAEF , who had left that posi ti on af ter the war to become Di rector
of Inf ormat i on Control i n Germany, and who was, at the ti me of thi s
me mor a ndum to Ei senhower, Chi ef of the Wa r Depart ment New York
Fi eld Offi ce, Ci vi l Affai rs Di vi si on.
One of the men recommended by McCl ure for the psychol ogi cal
warf are reserve group was Wi l l i am S. Pal ey, Chai rman of the Board of the
Col umbi a Broadcasti ng System. Pal ey came to see General Ei senhower
shortl y af ter the McCl ure me mor a ndum and expressed hi s wi lli ngness to
hel p i n psychol ogi cal warf are pl anni ng, but sai d he pref erred to do so as a
ci vi li an consul tant rat her than i n uni form. In a me mor a ndum to Secret ary
Forrestal , Ei senhower agreed wi th Pal ey' s pref erence "i nasmuch as the
sense of the di scussi on among i nterested agenci es has been to the effect that
ci vi li ans shoul d control and predomi nat e i n the current organi zati on and
pl anni ng. "
Thus havi ng establ i shed hi s accept ance of ci vi li an l eadershi p i n psy-
chol ogi cal warf are pl anni ng, Ei senhower then made a case for a strong role
for the mi l i tary i n the ongoi ng process:
I reali ze that there are hi gh-level commi ttees consi deri ng the subject,
but i t seems to me that the mi li tary must gi ve conti nued i mpetus to the
organi zati on and reali sti c functi oni ng of thi s i mportant acti vi ty. Fur-
ther, the Armed Servi ces should prepare plans now i nvolvi ng enunci -
ati on of poli cy and methods applyi ng to actual war.
The argument for a mi l i tary role i n psychol ogi cal warf are pl anni ng
made, Ei senhower tactf ul l y suggested t hat the Army, and speci fi cally hi s
f ormer P WD/ S HAEF chi ef, coul d provi de the necessary l eadershi p:
I do not know whether the responsi bi li ty for thi s planni ng should be
referred to the JCS or to an ad hoc commi ttee under your i mmedi ate
supervi si on. In the latter event, I could, i f you so desi re, detai l as the
head of a combi ned commi ttee, a bri gadi er general (Robert A. Mc-
Clure) who had extensi ve experi ence i n thi s fi eld duri ng the war i n
Europe. He was closely associ ated wi th Bi ll Paley and others of si mi lar
quali fi cati ons. He i s therefore i n a posi ti on to crystalli ze the experi ence
and knowledge acqui red duri ng the past war and should faci li tate the
development of a workable plan for the future employment of psycho-
logi cal warfare under condi ti ons of actual war.
Ever the di pl omat, Ei senhower closed hi s me mor a ndum to the Secre-
t ary wi th supreme tact: "Thi s note has no other purpose than to express
readi ness to be helpful. I f the mat t er i s compl etel y i n hand t hrough the
processes of the hi gh-l evel commi ttees, my suggesti ons ma y not be perti -
nent. " 34
The Chi ef of Staf f ' s offer was not accepted, and McCl ure stayed at hi s
post i n New York. Nonethel ess, Ei senhower' s i nterest i n psychol ogi cal
warf are was evi dent, and i t was equal l y evi dent t hat Robert A. McCl ure
carri ed some wei ght wi th the Chi ef. But the Ar my conti nued to feel i ts way
gi ngerl y i n thi s ambi guous and pol i ti cal l y sensi ti ve fi eld.
52 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART 1
The Army' s Reaction to NS C- 4
The task of del i neati ng agency responsi bi li ti es for psychologi cal war-
fare proved di ffi cult. In earl y November 1947, the Secretari es of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Ai r Force determi ned wi th the JCS that all
propaganda- - bot h overt and covert - - shoul d be a functi on of the State
Department, i n consul tati on wi th the CIA and a mi l i tary representati ve.
Accordi ngl y, Presi dent Truman assi gned psychologi cal warf are coordi -
nati on to the Secretary of State on 24 November, a deci si on that was
reversed wi thi n 3 weeks. Secretary of State George Marshal l opposed
taki ng responsi bi li ty for covert acti ons that mi ght embarrass the Depart-
ment and di scredi t US forei gn poli cy. He favored placi ng covert acti vi ti es
outsi de the Department, but sti ll subject to gui dance from the Secretary of
State. Si mi l arl y, the mi l i tary wanted to mai ntai n some control over covert
psychologi cal acti vi ti es wi thout assumi ng operati onal responsi bi li ty. Un-
wi lli ng to ri sk associ ati on wi th covert acti vi ti es, the Departments turned to
the CIA. 35 The result was NSC- 4, enti tl ed "Coordi nati on of Forei gn Intel-
li gence Inf ormati on Acti vi ti es, " a di recti ve that i n December 1951
"empowered the Secretary of State to coordi nate overseas i nformati on
acti vi ti es desi gned to counter communi sm, " and an annex, NSC- 4A, whi ch
"i nstructed the Di rector of Central Intelli gence to undertake covert psy-
chologi cal acti vi ti es i n pursui t of the ai m set forth i n NSC-4. "36 Shortl y
thereaf ter, on 22 December, the Speci al Procedures Group was establi shed
wi thi n the CIA' s Offi ce of Speci al Operati ons to carry out such covert
operati ons, a7 Thus, responsi bi li ty for covert psychologi cal warf are was
fi xed, or so i t appeared. But much needed to be done to defi ne agency
responsi bi li ti es for the overt si de.
The Army' s fi rst reacti on to NSC- 4 was an attempt to get i ts own
house i n order. A study was i ni ti ated i n January 1948 "t o determi ne what
steps are requi red to strengthen and cgordi nate all domesti c and forei gn
i nformati on measures of the Depart ment of the Army i n f urtherance of the
attai nment of U. S. nati onal objecti ves i n compl i ance wi th NSC- 4 and
exi sti ng regul ati ons. " The study di scussed the "i nsi di ous and destructi ve"
Communi st propaganda that "di rectl y t hreat ened" U.S. nati onal securi ty;
advocated strong counterpropaganda measures, both forei gn and domesti c;
and decl ared that "i nasmuch as the use of propaganda as a weapon of
ei ther war or peace i s of f undamental concern to the Department of the
Army, i t i s beli eved i mperati ve that Army efforts i n thi s fi eld be coordi -
nated and di rected. "
An asserti ve posture was taken regardi ng the sensi ti vi ty of psycho-
logi cal warfare:
THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART ! 53
The fact that the Ameri can people and Congress do not li ke anti /or are
afrai d of domesti c propaganda, i s no excuse for us to si destep our
responsi bi li ty. The responsi bi li ty of accepti ng the consequence of
doi ng nothi ng i s far greater. The Ameri can people have proved too
many ti mes that they can "take i t" i f they are told why.
The study also contai ned a l engthy di scussi on of opi ni on surveys f rom
Worl d War I I - - a cause for concern because they i ndi cated "a lack of
psychologi cal condi ti oni ng of the soldi er's mi nd before goi ng to war. " Thus
the wi sh: "I f the Army could engage i n ' whi te' propaganda for ci vi li an
consumpti on, i t would be benefi ci al as pri or i ndoctri nati on of the f uture
power of Army manpower. "
The study emphasi zed that three Army Speci al Staf f Di vi si ons--Ci vi l
Affai rs, Publ i c Informati on, and Troop Inf ormati on and Educat i on- - were
engaged i n di ssemi nati on of "whi t e" propaganda, but that thei r efforts
were uncoordi nated. Furthermore, there was "l i ttl e or no poli cy gui dance
or general supervi si on from P&O Di vi si on," as speci fi ed by Wa r De-
part ment Memorandum No. 575- 10- 1, i ssued i n January 1947. Si nce the
study was prepared by Colonel Yeaton of P&O, thi s last conclusi on was a
rather candi d and surpri si ng admi ssi on.
In any event, to remedy the si tuati on descri bed, the study recommen-
ded the followi ng:
That the Chi ef of Informati on be di rected to supervi se all current
operati ons of the Department of the Army i n the fi eld of i nformati on,
publi c relati ons, or educati on whi ch have psychologi cal or propaganda
i mpli cati ons.
That all "whi te" propaganda, domesti c and forei gn, i mplemented by
the Department of the Army and di ssemi nated by the three (3) Speci al
Staff Di vi si ons (Ci vi l Affai rs, Publi c Informati on and Troop Informa-
ti on and Educati on) be coordi nated by the Chi ef of Informati on.
That for psychologi cal warfare or propaganda purposes, the Chi ef of
Informati on recei ve poli cy gui dance from the Di rector of Plans and
Operati ons Di vi si on through appropri ate and conti nuous li ai son.
The Chi ef of Inf ormati on agreed wi th the recommendati ons, but be-
li eved strongl y that P&O should coordi nate the overall psychologi cal war-
f are effort. He also cauti oned agai nst casti ng the Chi ef of Inf ormati on i n
a psychologi cal warf are/ propaganda role. P&O concurred wi th thi s, but
saw "no danger i f handl ed as suggested. " On 18 December 1948, the study
recommendati ons were approved by the Secretary of the Army. 3s
As we have seen, the Army' s fi rst reacti on to NSC- 4 produced li ttle
i n the way of far-reachi ng measures, but rather an attempt to i mprove
i nternal coordi nati on of psychologi cal and i nformati on acti vi ti es. Those
modest steps i ndi cated the crosscurrents of uncertai nty and cauti on, on the
one hand, and a desi re to "do somethi ng" about a percei ved condi ti on of
nati onal malai se and weakness, on the other. They reflected a sense of
frustrati on by some wi th the lack of strong nati onal di recti on i n psycho-
logi cal warfare, and a feeli ng of uncertai nty about the Army' s leadershi p
role i n thi s poli ti cally sensi ti ve area.
Another i nteresti ng facet of the Army' s acti on was General McCl ure' s
role. Colonel Yeaton, who prepared the study for P&O, apparentl y felt
that i t was i mportant to note for the Chi ef of Staff that the paper had been
presented to McCl ure, "who gave complete concurrence. " 39Even from hi s
offi ce i n New York, then, General McCl ure conti nued to i nfluence the
Army' s thi nki ng on psychologi cal warfare.
McCl ure' s i nfluence conti nued to be felt at all levels of psychologi cal
warfare. A memorandum for the new Chi ef of Staff, General Omar Brad-
ley, wri tten i n March 1948 by Li eutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer (who
had replaced Norstad as Di rector of Plans and Operati ons), gave some
i ndi cati on about McCl ure' s stature:
In the last war thi s acti vi ty [psychologi cal warfare] was not promptly
or effi ci ently developed. Organi zati on and functi ons were accom-
pli shed under duress. Duri ng the course of the war, many men became
qui te profi ci ent i n thi s unusual, but very vi tal work. I beli eve that
Bri gadi er General Robert A. McClure should be brought to the War
Department for consultati on i n the premi ses. 4
The followup memorandum to that paragraph by the Assi stant Chi ef,
Plans and Poli cy Group, P&O, confi rms the key role of McCl ure i n poli cy
matters:
General McClure vi si ted Washi ngton before and after hi s tri p to
Europe. On the occasi on of each vi si t, he spent consi derable ti me i n
Poli cy. He was consulted on the provi si on of SANACC 304/6 and hi s
recommendati ons are embodi ed i n JCS 1735. He edi ted and approved
our psychologi cal warfare study now i n the hands of the Joi nt
Planners.
General McClure now feels that close li ai son has been establi shed
between P&O and hi mself. He has been of great assi stance i n the past,
and hi s opi ni on wi ll be sought i n the future on all major psychologi cal
warfare i ssues. 4j
Furt her evi dence of McCl ure' s st a t u r e - - a nd hi s close rel ati onshi p
wi th General We d e me y e r - - wa s a June 1948 "De a r Bob" l etter f rom We-
demeyer, thanki ng General McCl ure for hi s comment s on an Ar my pam-
phl et enti tl ed "Tact i cal Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e " to be used at the Ground
General School at Fort Ri ley:
Your constructi ve vi ews make i t possi ble to i mprove these trai ni ng
publi cati ons. I hope that we can send si mi lar materi al to you i n the
future, i n order to obtai n the conti nued benefi t of your knowledge and
experi ences. Furthermore, I trust that you can fi nd ti me to put down
on paper more of your experi ences and reflecti ons on the broader
aspects of psychologi cal warfare, because we fi nd ourselves short of
seasoned, mature Army wri ti ng i n thi s fi eld. 42
Swi tchi ng to a hi gher poli cy level, McCl ure, i n a "De a r AI" l etter to
General Wedemeyer i n Jul y 1948, lai d out i n consi derabl e detai l hi s con-
cerns and recommendat i ons for psychol ogi cal warf are. He began by
addressi ng a recent conversati on wi th General Oma r Bradl ey, who appre-
ci ated the val ue of psychol ogi cal warf are duri ng wart i me but apparent l y
felt that the Ar my should confi ne i tsel f to pl anni ng and leave overal l
responsi bi l i ty to the State Depart ment . McCl ure had some mi sgi vi ngs
about thi s approach:
I am sure few people reali ze that today the Department of the Army
i s the foremost U.S. propaganda agency of our Government. Why, a,nd
how come, would requi re i nvolved explanati on to the uni nformed. You
and I know the answers. By default, State Department has not taken
over i ts responsi bi li ti es i n thi s fi eld for many reasons--parti cularly
appropri ati ons.
Havi ng stated hi s maj or theme, McCl ure supported i t by presenti ng
a tour d' hori zon of the Ar my' s acti vi ti es. The Armed Forces radi o net-
works, the Overseas Stars and Stripes newspaper, the Troop Educati on
and Inf ormat i on program i n Europe and the Far East, the Ar my' s "com-
pl ete responsi bi l i ty for the propaganda to four occupi ed countri es, " the f act
that the Ar my control l ed more worl dwi de radi o broadcasts than the St at e
Depart ment , the US Mi l i tary Government newspapers publ i shed i n 3 for-
ei gn countri es, the 50 to 75 document ary fi lms di stri buted each year, the
world newsreel s made i n 3 l anguages each week, the control of all US
commerci al fi lms shown i n occupi ed countri es, the cul tural centers estab-
li shed i n 60 ci ti es of the occupi ed areas, the magazi nes publ i shed for
forei gn di stri buti on ( "We , the Ar my publi sh fi ve whi le St at e publ i shes
one") and the mi lli ons of pamphl et s and leaflets pri nted for educati onal
purposes i n 4 occupi ed count ri es- - al l of thi s, and more, prompt ed McCl ure
to declare, "I should say today that the Army has fi ve ti mes the outl et for
proj ecti on of Ameri ca that State has and probabl y a greater audi ence for
i ts propaganda. "
McCl ure also decl ared that the Army should not take a head-i n-the-
sand atti tude about these acti vi ti es, because, "Cal l i t what you may,
i nternati onal i nformati on, propaganda, or psychologi cal warfare, the re-
sponsi bi li ti es sti ll rest wi th us. " The responsi bi li ty for di recti ng and coordi -
nati ng propaganda was i n li ne wi th cl earl y establi shed US Government
objecti ves and coul d not be i gnored, but, McCl ure wrote, there was "no
Army or Nati onal Defense Agency doi ng so." McCl ure used hi s own
of f i ce- - whi ch was responsi ble for a si zeable porti on of the program i n
occupi ed a r e a s- - t o i llustrate the lack of central di recti on and coordi nati on:
"In the year I have been i n charge of the New York Fi eld Offi ce of Ci vi l
Affai rs Di vi si on there has never been a conference outsi de of my own offi ce
on propaganda poli cy. " That last statement startl ed someone- - perhaps
General We de me ye r - - f or the handwri tten excl amati on "Wow! " appears
next to i t.
Conti nui ng to beat the drum, McCl ure acknowl edged that NSC- 4 was
a step i n the ri ght di recti on, but that "a great need for uni ty of purpose and
central di recti on remai ned. " Wi th a touch of asserti ve pri de, McCl ure
added: "The Army has taken a maj or i nterest i n thi s fi eld and should be
pri vi leged to take the lead, i f necessary. "
Havi ng lai d hi s foundati on, McCl ure then summari zed hi s pleas to the
Di rector of Plans and Operati ons:
The whole purpose of thi s letter to you i s to urge:
1. recogni ti on of the responsi bi li ty of the Army;
2. an organi zati on i n bei ng wi thi n the Nati onal Defense setup to carry
on the operati ons whi ch the Army has assumed;
3. an organi zati on to plan for and further psychologi cal warfare;
4. a study of Psychologi cal Warfare--i ts capabi li ti es and short-
comi ngs;
5. uti li zati on of those wi lli ng, experi enced ci vi li ans, who are anxi ous
to help a future Psychologi cal Warfare organi zati on.
Two pages of speci fi c recommendati ons followed, i ncludi ng one for a
nati onal organi zati on to handle both black and whi te propaganda ("the
present separati on of black and whi te propaganda between State and CIA
i s basi cally unsound.") Others addressed techni cal research and vari ous
studi es needed, psychologi cal warfare i nstructi on for servi ce schools, ways
to i mprove the Reserve program for psychologi cal warfare offi cers, and, an
old theme, the "i ndoctri nati on of commanders i n the capabi li ti es and li m-
i tati ons of propaganda i n warfare."
Apologi zi ng for a lengthy letter, McClure closed by sayi ng that he had
wri tten a personal, rather than offi ci al, communi cati on si nce "much of thi s
i s outsi de of the fi eld of my offi ci al responsi bi li ty." 4~
It was, i n fact, an amazi ng letter, parti cularly si nce i t was wri tten by
a man who admi tted that much of what he wrote was outsi de hi s "offi ci al
responsi bi li ty." In terms of breadth, scope, and i magi nati on, i t was one of
the most comprehensi ve personal communi cati ons on the subject of psy-
chologi cal warfare wri tten by an Army offi cer duri ng the i nterwar years.
General Wedemeyer acknowledged McClure's dedi cati on and ex-
perti se wi th a thoughtful, but delayed, reply i n September: "I am deeply
grateful, Bob, for your fi ne letter and the i nclosures. I reali ze that you are
unquesti onably our outstandi ng authori ty on thi s very i mportant subject,
psychologi cal warfare, and feel deeply i ndebted for your contri buti on." As
a si denote, he menti oned that Frank Wi sner, Di rector of CIA's newly
created Offi ce of Speci al Projects (later renamed Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi -
nati on), had recently asked about the possi bi li ty of McClure "joi ni ng up
wi th hi s team" because he recogni zed that "you are perhaps the most
knowledgeable and experi enced offi cer i n the ga me . "" McClure di d not do
so, ho~ vever, and there i s a certai n i rony i n thi s mi nor epi sode i n vi ew of the
confli cts that later arose between Wi sner's "team" and that of General
McCture as Chi ef of the Army's Offi ce of Psychologi cal Warfare i n the
early 1950's.
The essence of Wedemeyer's response to McClure's mai n argument
for recogni ti on of the Army' s responsi bi li ti es and the need for a nati onal
psychologi cal warfare organi zati on was that the si tuati on was out of the
Army's hands. Unti l the NSC deci ded on several proposals before i t for
such an organi zati on, he repli ed, not much could be done about poli cy, nor
could Army plans for psychologi cal warfare be made fi rm. 45
Actually, Wedemeyer had gi ven the subject more thought than hi s
response to McClure may have i ndi cated. In early August he had wri tten
a me mo r a nd u m to General Bradl ey, the Chi ef of Staff, to offer "a few of
my t hought s" on psychol ogi cal warf are:
Thus far i n our:planni ng, both wi thi n the Joi nt Staff and i n P&O
Di vi si on, we have been i ncli ned to thi nk of psychologi cal warfare as a
means whi ch we should develop for gi vi ng further effect to strategi c
plans already developed. That i s, we have consi dered i t desi rable to
draw up a "psychologi cal warfare annex" to each strategi c plan. I am
now i ncli ned to thi nk that thi s may be an unsound approach. It re-
stri cts psychologi cal warfare acti vi ti es wi thi n the narrowed li mi ts of
the strategi c operati ons already determi ned wi thout due consi derati on
of the psychologi cal problem. 46
Thi s was an i mport a nt i nsi ght. Wh a t We de me ye r was suggest i ng was
t ha t psychol ogi cal wa rf a re shoul d be i ntegral to the st rat egi c pl anni ng
process, rat her t han an a f t e r t hought to those plans. The l ack of under-
st andi ng by seni or c omma nde r s and staffs of t he cruci al di sti ncti on
between those two approaches has hi stori cal l y pl agued t he work of psycho-
l ogi cal wa r f a r e pl anners. We de me ye r ' s tentati ve recogni ti on of thi s confli ct
represent ed an i mport a nt doct ri nal advance, but one t ha t was not al ways
adhered to by hi s successors.
Wi t h t hat t hought as ba c kground, We de me ye r outl i ned f or Bradl ey
" a new a ppr oa c h" t hat the P &O was prepared to i ni ti ate:
We wi ll select a small group of experi enced, forward thi nki ng,
young planners and assi gn them the task of developi ng i n broad
outli ne a war plan based on the followi ng si ngle war objecti ve: to
cause the people of Sovi et Russi a to overthrow thei r present total-
i tari an government and to render them maxi mum practi cable assi s-
tance i n thi s undertaki ng.
2. It i s expected that such a plan wi ll develop to the greatest possi ble
extent the full capabi li ti es of a psychologi cal warfare approach. It
may produce a radi cally di fferent scheme of mi li tary operati ons
from that contemplated under the HALFMOON concept.
When thi s plan i s developed, i f i t appears to have suffi ci ent meri t,
we wi ll then suggest that you present i t to the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff
for joi nt consi derati on. 47
Despi te i ts grandi ose obj ecti ve, We d e me y e r ' s proposal offered anot her
i mport a nt i nsi ght: the i mport ance of assessi ng, and perhaps acti ng upon,
t he potenti al psychol ogi cal vul nerabi l i ti es of a soci ety.
Bradley's response was guarded, stati ng that whi le the proposal was "a
good i dea," i t "mi ght be i mpracti cable as a li ne of acti on, but on the other
hand i t may not." He conceded that, i n any event, "i t would furni sh some
i deas for modi fi cati on of HALFMOON. " There i s li ttle i ndi cati on, how-
ever, that much resulted from Wedemeyer's proposal, partly because he
was unable to pry away from other di vi si ons the cali ber of planners needed
for the task envi saged. 48
Whi le not enough to sati sfy some li ke General McClure, some work
had been done i n Army psychologi cal warfare, both at the staff level and
i n the fi eld. In June 1947, based on a di recti ve from the Di rector of
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng, WDGS, an experi mental "Tacti cal Informa-
ti on Detachment" had been acti vated at Fort Ri ley, Kansas. The detach-
ment sent teams, equi pped wi th loudspeakers and leaflets, to parti ci pate i n
Army fi eld maneuvers i n the conti nental Uni ted States, the Cari bbean
area, and Hawai i . (The Tacti cal Informati on Detachment was to be the
only operati onal psychologi cal warfare troop uni t i n the US Army when
the Korean war erupted i n June 1950.) Studi es were started by Headquar-
ters, AGF, for a cellular combat propaganda uni t to replace the mobi le
teams of the MRB compani es used i n World War II. Psychologi cal warfare
extensi on courses were prepared by the Army General School at Fort Ri ley,
pri mari ly for speci ali sts i n the Mi li tary Intelli gence Reserve. 49
In September 1948, at the Department of the Army, P&O prepared
a "tentati ve Psychologi cal Warfare Plan (Army)" for warti me, whi ch
i ncluded esti mates of Speci al Staff personnel needed at theater, army, and
corps levels, as well as operati ng personnel needed to serve tacti cal uni ts
down to the level of regi mental combat teams. Staffi ng of thi s tentati ve
plan followed, but i n late December 1948 i t was determi ned that "no acti on
i s requi red or possi ble si nce, unti l hi gher authori ty has determi ned the
degree of Army responsi bi li ty i n PW [psychologi cal warfare], the degree
of Army need for TO&E uni ts cannot be determi ned. ''~ At the end of
1948, then, the Army was sti ll gi ngerly feeli ng i ts way, wai ti ng for "hi gher
authori ty" to deci de the extent of i ts role i n psychologi cal warfare.
In early 1949 some movement to provi de for nati onal overt psycho-
logi cal warfare planni ng began. In February, the NSC agreed that an
organi zati on for the peaceti me planni ng of overt psychologi cal warfare
should be establi shed wi thi n the State Department and di rected the NSC
staff to prepare a proposed di recti ve on the subject. The di recti ve estab-
li shed an organi zati on consi sti ng of a di rector appoi nted by the Secretary
of State, consultants from the other agenci es, as well as li ai son from the
CIA. The organi zati on was to be charged wi th planni ng and preparati on
"for the coordi nated conduct of forei gn and domesti c i nformati on pro-
grams and overt psychologi cal operati ons abroad i n the event of war or
threat of war as determi ned by the Presi dent." A si mi lar planni ng functi on
previ ously assi gned to the SWNCC Subcommi ttee on Speci al Studi es and
Evaluati ons was to be termi nated, accordi ng to the di recti ve. Whi le there
was some di sagreement among the mi li tary servi ces about certai n revi si ons
to the proposed di recti ve, they were resolved--at least i ni ti ally--to support
i t i n the i nterest of expedi ti ng the acti on. As General Maddocks (who had
replaced General Wedemeyer as di rector of P&O) penned on a memo-
randum to the Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Plans and Combat Operati ons,
General Wedemeyer: "P.S. The i mportant underlyi ng factor i n thi s matter
i s to get started. The di recti ve can be amended as need therefor ari ses, after
the group starts work. ''St To thi s, General McClure undoubtedly would
have added, "Amen! "
The Carroll Report
One reason the Army moved rather hesi tantly i n psychologi cal war-
fare was that the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, was hi mself
concerned about Army i nvolvement i n thi s acti vi ty. He defi ni tely opposed
any associ ati on wi th covert operati ons, stati ng i n June 1948 that he di d not
want the Army "even to know anythi ng about i t." 52 However, through the
combi ned efforts of two ci vi li an members of hi s staff--Under Secretary
Wi lli am H. Draper and Assi stant Secretary Gordon Gray- - and General
Wedemeyer, Royall gradually relented at least to the poi nt of allowi ng
more parti ci pati on by the Army i n overt psychologi cal warfare.
Under Secretary Draper started the ball rolli ng by employi ng a ci vi l-
i an consultant, Wallace Carroll, to prepare a study about the Army's role
i n current psychologi cal warfare acti vi ti es. Carroll's study, forwarded to
Draper on 24 February 1949, recommended that a separate "uni t" be
establi shed to take charge of the Army's psychologi cal warfare re-
sponsi bi li ti es. The "uni t" would be headed by a general offi cer or quali fi ed
ci vi li an, who would coordi nate wi th the Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Plans and
Operati ons (who at thi s ti me was General Wedemeyer)? 3
Apparently, Draper made the results of Carroll's study avai lable to
Secretary Royall, because i n a. subsequent di scussi on between General
Wedemeyer, the Secretary, and Assi stant Secretary Gray, Wedemeyer
reported that "Mr. Royall has changed somewhat i n hi s vi ew i n that he
accepts that we i n the Department of the Army must parti ci pate a li ttle;
i n fact, i t was poi nted out to hi m by Mr. Gray that we are actually
parti ci pati ng i n Europe. Mr. Royal l wants thi s acti vi ty under a ci vi li an
Secret ary and has desi gnated Mr. Gr a y to supervi se same. " 54
In thi s report to the Chi ef of Staff, General Bradl ey, Wedemeyer
stated t hat Gr a y subsequentl y asked hi m ( We de me ye r ) to propose to the
Secret ary an organi zati on wi th Gray as head, a ci vi li an assi stant for psy-
chol ogi cal warf are, and a group of 8 to 10 offi cers i n the Pl ans and Oper-
ati ons Di vi si on. Wedemeyer concl uded by remi ndi ng the Chi ef t hat "Mr .
Royal l i s very desi rous t hat the uni f ormed servi ces shoul d not be i nvolved
too much i n psychol ogi cal warf are, but he does accept certai n l i mi ted
responsi bi li ti es i n the Depart ment . " The Deputy Chi ef of Staf f for Pl ans
and Operat i ons apparent l y t hought that even thi s l ukewarm endorsement
represented progress si nce Royal l had told hi m a year earl i er that "t he
Ar my would have no part i n psychol ogi cal warf are and he admoni shed me
defi ni tely not to parti ci pate i n such acti vi ty. " 55
Respondi ng prompt l y to Gra y' s request, on 17 Ma r c h 1949 General
Wedemeyer f orwarded to Secret ary Royal l the followi ng memorandum:
Mr. Gordon Gray asked me to di scuss Psychologi cal Warfare wi th
Mr. Carroll, a ci vi li an consultant, whom Mr. Draper employed to
i nvesti gate reali sti c and mi ni mum Army parti ci pati on. Mr. Carroll
prepared a study whi ch I have analyzed carefully. Further, I talked
to offi cers who have had experi ence i n the psychologi cal fi eld.
2.
Last Saturday Mr. Gray and I had a di scussi on concerni ng Army
parti ci pati on that would be acceptable to you, and also that would
i nsure a reali sti c and yet not embarrassi ng role for the Army.
3.
I recommend that Psychologi cal Warfare be supervi sed by
Mr. Gray as a responsi bi li ty of hi s offi ce. A small group of offi cers
could be located i n P&O where they would coordi nate wi th the
Internati onal Group and the Strategi c Planni ng Group of that
Di vi si on of the General Staff. Mr. Gray should have a ci vi li an
assi stant whose pri mary functi on would be to handle all psycho-
logi cal warfare matters for hi m and to mai ntai n appropri ate con-
tacts wi th the State Department. Thi s latter Department i n the
fi nal analysi s should be responsi ble for all Psychologi cal Warfare
matters of poli cy and for the coordi nati on of Psychologi cal Warfare
acti vi ti es. The Army should do nothi ng except wi th the cogni zance
and at the request of the State Department. I had hoped to talk to
you personally about the above matter; however, the Joi nt Chi efs
of Staff are i n almost conti nuous sessi on and i t has not been possi ble
to do so. Mr. Gray asked me a few days ago to express my vi ews to
you concerni ng thi s subject; hence thi s memo. ~6
62 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART !
It was a masterful example of bureaucrati c persuasi on. Usi ng the
recommendati on of an outsi de ci vi li an consul tant to pry an openi ng i n
Royal l ' s opposi ti on, Draper, Gray, and General Wedemeyer worked to-
gether to tactful l y nudge the Secretary toward accepti ng some i ncrease i n
Army psychologi cal warfare planni ng. Royal l ' s sensi ti vi ty on the subject
undoubtedl y i nfluenced the Army' s ambi valence toward psychologi cal
warfare. Hi s resi stance i s the one notable excepti on duri ng the peri od of
thi s study of an i mportant ci vi li an Army offi ci al who adamantl y opposed
Army acti vi ty i n psychologi cal warfare. Indeed, the converse was more
often the case; ci vi li an offi ci als frequentl y found i t necessary to prod uni -
formed Army leaders i nto a greater effort i n psychologi cal warfare. Such
was to be the case wi th Gordon Gray, who succeeded Royall as Secretary
of the Army on 20 June 1949.
Gordon Gray--Revival of Interest
Not surpri si ngly, the emphasi s on i ncreased Army parti ci pati on i n
psychologi cal warfare urged upon Royal l near the end of hi s tenure was
conti nued by hi s successor. And wi th thi s apparent upswi ng i n i nterest by
the Army, agai n the advi ce of Bri gadi er General Robert A. McCl ure was
sought. "Dear Bob, " wrote the new Di rector of Plans and Operati ons,
Maj or General Charles L. Bolte, on 7 Jul y 1949:
You wi ll recall that some ti me ago we talked bri efly about the di s-
soluti on or di sappearance of adequate planni ng for other measures i n
the fi eld of psychologi cal warfare, si nce the war. I recall that you
expressed some concern over the fact that thi s matter was not recei vi ng
adequate, i f any, attenti on on the part of the appropri ate authori ti es,
at least i n the Mi li tary Establi shment. 57
In vi ew of McCl ure' s consi stent cri ti ci sm to that effect si nce the end
of Worl d War II, thi s last asserti on suggests consi derable understatement.
Bolte conti nued:
I thi nk that you wi ll be reli eved to know that the matter i s bei ng
revi ved and that some measures are to be taken to restore us to a more
adequate posi ti on. In that connecti on I have been asked to suggest, or
secure the suggesti ons of, some names of possi ble candi dates for ap-
poi ntment to a ci vi li an posi ti on i n the Offi ce of the Secretary of the
Army. I thought possi bly you mi ght have i n mi nd the names of some
appropri ate i ndi vi duals.
McCl ure, who by now had moved from New York to Fort Ord,
Cali forni a, to be the Assi stant Di vi si on Commander of the 4th Inf antry
Di vi si on, answered Bolte promptly. Grousi ng about havi ng recei ved un-
expected orders transferri ng hi m to the Northern Mi l i tary Di stri ct of
Vancouver Barracks ("The orders gave me only one week to pack up and
move whi ch shows the consi derati on whi ch the Army usually gi ves to the
domesti c si de of li fe"), McCl ure nonetheless appl auded the apparent re-
surgence of i nterest: "I am very pleased wi th the contents of your letter and
to reali ze that the D of A [ Department of the Army] i s at last waki ng up
to the i mportance of one of i ts maj or weapons- - a weapon whi ch can be
used wi thout repercussi ons of an atomi c bomb category. " He went on to
recommend several candi dates for the ci vi li an posi ti on, provi di ng a thumb-
nai l sketch of each person' s quali fi cati ons. 5s
McCl ure' s letter was en route to General Bolte when, on 11 July, a
meeti ng was held i n the Secretary of the Army' s offi ce to report on the
progress of psychologi cal warfare organi zati on wi thi n the Department of
the Army. Thi s much was clear: (1) a ci vi li an "supervi sor" for psycho-
logi cal warfare would be located i n the Offi ce of the Assi stant Secretary,
(2) a small worki ng group for psychologi cal warfare would be establi shed
i n P&O, and (3) a nucleus of i nformati on operators would be formed i n the
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Informati on.
What was not clear, however, was the relati onshi p between the ci vi li an
"supervi sor" and the team of offi cers i n P&O. General Wedemeyer' s un-
derstandi ng was that the ci vi li an "shoul d not be i n a posi ti on of authori ty
wi thi n P&O nor vi olate the chai n of c o mma nd . . , but should merely
' moni tor' the PW [psychologi cal warfare] functi ons of P&O along wi th
PW functi ons of other components of the Department of the Army. " The
Secretary' s understandi ng of the matter was qui te di fferent, as reported i n
Wedemeyer' s memorandum for record:
Mr. Gray stated the matter more f orcef ul l y. . . [he] speci fi cally i ndi -
cated that the ci vi li an "supervi sor" was not merely to moni tor but was
to take a real part i n the work concerni ng PW and he sai d, i n essence,
"i f, as thi ngs develop, we run i nto a di ffi culty si x or ei ght or twelve
months from now, and i f we do operate we are sure to run i nto a
di ffi culty sooner or later, I want to be able to say that i t was not just
a mi li tary matter but that i t was a fool ci vi li an mi xed up i n i t. I am
thi nki ng thi s way for the protecti on of the mi li tary."s
Another i nteresti ng aspect of thi s meeti ng was the advi ce provi ded by
Professor Paul Li nebarger, a ci vi li an consul tant and author of a recently
64 THE I NTERWAR YEARS, PART I
publi shed book on psychologi cal warfare. Li nebarger offered hi s vi ews on
desi rable quali fi cati ons for the ci vi li an "supervi sor," suggesti ng that P&O
could not fulfi ll i ts psychologi cal warfare responsi bi li ti es unless the offi cers
desi gnated were assi gned full ti me and gi ven the opportuni ty for travel.
General Bolte, Di rector, P&O, was reluctant to endorse thi s latter sug-
gesti on, i ndi cati ng, "as he had i ndi cated from ti me to ti me at other poi nts
i n the conference, that the responsi bi li ty should be wri tten out for P&O i n
full but that any external attempt to freeze or commi t P&O personnel or
structure would be unfortunate. ''6
The 11 July meeti ng provi des a valuable snapshot of the state of
psychologi cal warfare at the Department of the Army i n mi d-1949:
Gordon Gray, only a month i nto hi s new offi ce, i ntensely i nterested i n
psychologi cal warfare and forcefully exerti ng hi s authori ty i n terms of
organi zati on, yet also alert to the poli ti cal sensi ti vi ty of the subject; Gen-
eral Wedemeyer and General Bolte, i nterested i n the subject but wary
about i ts effect on tradi ti onal concerns of chai n of command and li nes of
authori ty, and perhaps sli ghtly resentful of ci vi li an i nfluence i n thi s fi eld,
especi ally when a myri ad of more fami li ar "purely mi li tary" problems
competed for thei r attenti on (for example, General Bolte's resi stance to
"external" pressures on hi m to dedi cate offi cers solely to psychologi cal
warfare); Professor Li nebarger, the ci vi li an consultant, naturally anxi ous
to see thi s speci ali zed subject recei ve greater attenti on, and perhaps just a
li ttle i mpati ent wi th the less-than-total endorsement of psychologi cal war-
fare by mi li tary leaders. Such was the range of emoti ons and atti tudes on
psychologi cal warfare, all of whi ch combi ned to portray a pi cture of hesi -
tancy and slow progress wi thi n the Department of the Army 11 months
before the Korean war would erupt.
Because many Army leaders sti ll consi dered psychologi cal warfare a
new development, such hesi tancy i s understandable. Even though the
Army had used psychologi cal warfare i n World War II, the Di rector of
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng i n May 1949 lumped i t together wi th atomi c
warfare, radi ologi cal defense, bi ologi cal warfare, gui ded mi ssi les, and sub-
versi ve warfare as "new developments [of warfare] or modi fi cati ons of
previ ous developments." General Bolte, Di rector of P&O, thought i t pre-
mature to parcel out responsi bi li ti es for these topi cs to speci fi c General
Staff agenci es unti l thei r roles and uses were better understood. Instead, he
recommended that all General Staff di vi si ons desi gnate contact offi cers for
di scussi ons of the developments under P&O moni torshi p. 61
Further, mi li tary servi ce schools also were gi vi ng li ttle attenti on to the
subject of psychologi cal warfare. A student commi ttee report prepared at
the Armed Forces Inf ormati on School, Carli sle Barracks, Pennsylvani a, i n
June 1949 concluded that there was no course i n psychologi cal warfare at
any servi ce i nstallati on adequate to provi de the necessary knowledge for an
Inf ormati on and Educati on offi cer. 62 The Ground General School curri cu-
l um at Fort Ri ley offered 9 hours of i nstructi on, the Command and General
Staff School, 1 hour; tentati ve and draft fi eld manual s were bei ng used i n
schools and for extensi on courses; no trai ni ng programs for Reserves were
avai lable or pl anned- - al l of whi ch led to the admi ssi on i n a P&O memo-
randum on 4 October 1949 that "much remai ns to be done i f the Army i s
to be ready to fulfi ll i ts operati onal and mobi li zati on responsi bi li ti es i n the
fi eld of psychologi cal warfare. " 63
By early 1950, Secretary Gray was begi nni ng to suspect the same. He
deci ded to query the new Chi ef of Staff, General J. Lawton Colli ns (who
had succeeded General Bradley i n August 1949), wi th a memorandum on
7 February 1950:
As you know, I am keenly i nterested i n the prompt and effecti ve
development of psychologi cal warfare wi thi n the Army.
I should li ke to have a report on the status of thi s matter by February
15th.
In thi s connecti on, I am parti cularly i nterested i n what consi derati on
has been gi ven to psychologi cal warfare i n conjuncti on wi th the cur-
rent reorgani zati on wi thi n the General Staff. 64
There was not much progress to report to the Secretary of the Army.
The openi ng paragraph of "Report on the Army Psychol ogi cal Warf are
Program, " i n fact, was a classi c example of the type of bureaucrati c gob-
bl edygook often used to obfuscate an i ssue:
Whi le defi ni te progress has been made i n the last si x months i n the
development and executi on of a psychologi cal warfare program wi thi n
the Army, much remai ns to be accompli shed. The establi shment of a
sound, comprehensi ve program and the effecti ve carryi ng out of the
many tasks and acti vi ti es under such a program i ncludes the soluti on
of many problems whi ch are i nterrelated and the soluti on of whi ch i s
dependent upon the sequenti al and systemati c development and com-
pleti on of the more fundamental aspects of the overall program. An
effort has been made, however, to meet the hi gher pri ori ty requi re-
ments i n all i mportant areas of the program as developed to date. 6S
Gray undoubtedly had to reread that paragraph, and even then proba-
bly wondered exactly what he had been told. In essence, the report stated
that some progress had been made i n operati onal planni ng, i n the prepara-
ti on of draft Tables of Organi zati on and Equi pment for troop uni ts, and i n
nonmateri el research. Progress had been slow, however, i n staff organi za-
ti on for psychologi cal warfare, doctri ne and techni ques, personnel and uni t
trai ni ng, trai ni ng li terature and trai ni ng ai ds, materi el, and i ntelli gence
requi rements. Most of the report, i n fact, di scussed problem areas and
acti ons that needed to be taken. In thi s last category was the expressed need
for a "school center for psychologi cal warfare at whi ch tacti cal doctri ne,
techni ques, trai ni ng li terature and tacti cal studi es can be prepared." 66 The
Psychologi cal Warfare Center, created almost 2 years later at Fort Bragg,
would eventually fi ll that voi d.
Probably of greatest i nterest to the Secretary, however, was the re-
port's statement that an i ncrease i n organi zati on and staff personnel for
psychologi cal warfare would shortly be recommended--of i nterest, no
doubt, because Gray had been wai ti ng pati ently si nce March 1949 for
progress on thi s matter.
Fi nally, the report tactfully asked the Secretary to be pati ent and
recogni ze the di ffi culti es i nherent i n deali ng wi th a new functi on: "For an
appreci able peri od of ti me, the development and executi on of a psycho-
logi cal warfare program wi ll be essenti ally a *pi oneeri ng' effort and wi ll
depend pri mari ly upon i ni ti ati ve, constant di recti on, and follow-up pro-
vi ded by the General Staff and by Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on i n parti c-
ular. ''67 The North Korean i nvasi on was only 4 months away at the ti me
of thi s report, and Gordon Gray was to leave hi s offi ce wi thi n a month.
" Onl y a St ar t " : Pr el ude to Korea
If the Army Staff thought that the new Secretary of the Army would
lessen the pressure for more progress i n psychologi cal warfare, they were
soon di sabused of that noti on. On 29 May 1950, wi thi n 5 weeks of re-
placi ng Gordon Gray, Frank Pace, Jr., sent the Chi ef of Staff a memo-
randum clearly outli ni ng hi s i nterest i n the subject:
1. On 7 February 1950, Secretary Gray requested a report on the
status of psychologi cal warfare development wi thi n the Army wi th
parti cular reference to wli at organi zati onal provi si on had been
made wi thi n the Department of the Army for the di recti on and
development of Army capabi li ty i n thi s fi eld. It i s my understandi ng
that a plan to authori ze the establi shment of a Psychologi cal War-
fare Branch i n G-3, Operati ons, and to provi de adequate staffi ng
was approved on the condi ti on that spaces be provi ded from wi thi n
G-3' s current personnel cei li ng.
2. Li ke Mr. Gray, whose vi ews on the subject of Psychologi cal War-
fare are si mi lar to mi ne, I beli eve the prompt development of the
capabi li ti es of the vari ous responsi ble agenci es and departments of
the government to execute Psychologi cal Warfare operati ons under
terms of reference establi shed by the Nati onal Securi ty Counci l i s
vi tal to the nati onal securi ty. The Department of the Army, of
course, has a defi ni te responsi bi li ty for psychologi cal warfare devel-
opment i nsofar as i t affects nati onal securi ty and the conduct of
mi li tary operati ons.
3. Please keep me advi sed on the progress bei ng made i n the establi sh-
ment of the contemplated branch to handle thi s acti vi ty for the
Department of the Army and i n the procurement of necessary
personnel. 68
Some, but not much, progress had been made. Shortl y af ter the status
report to Secretary Gray i n mi d- February, a study forwarded to the Chi ef
of Staf f recommended addi ti onal personnel for both psychologi cal warf are
and speci al operati ons, and a separate branch, desi gnated the Subsi di ary
Plans Branch, i n the Pl ans Group, P&O, for that purpose. 69
A requi rement had been establi shed for approxi matel y 16 offi cers wi th
speci ali zed quali fi cati ons i n psychologi cal warf are and speci al operati ons
for assi gnment to Headquarters, Depart ment of the Army; US Army,
Europe; Army Fi eld Forces (AFF); and to the Command and General
Staf f College, wi th the fi rst 5 offi cers to be avai lable Jul y 1951. The
Personnel Di vi si on ( G- 1 ) was asked to provi de a ci vi li an graduat e course
i n i nternati onal rel ati ons to furni sh suppl emental background i n psycho-
logi cal warf are and speci al operati ons for the offi cers selected. A j ob de-
scri pti on was desi gned, stati ng that the offi cers selected "must have had
di rect experi ence i n, or be thoroughl y fami l i ar wi th, the conduct of psycho-
logi cal warf are or of cl andesti ne and parami l i tary operati ons i n support of
mi l i tary operati ons. " Letters were sent to maj or subordi nate headquarters
announci ng the program. 7
G- 3, Operati ons (the redesi gnated Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on)
i ni ti ated a seri es of conferences wi th Headquarters, AFF, i n Fort Monroe,
Vi rgi ni a, to di scuss del i neati on of responsi bi li ti es for psychologi cal war-
fare. The fi rst conf erence was scheduled for 29 March 1950. One of the
i tems G- 3 proposed for di scussi on at thi s conference i s worthy of note:
"Preparat i on and conduct of speci ali zed school courses for Psychologi cal
Warf are student personnel, and of general i ndoctri nati on courses for all
students, i ncludi ng consi derati on of the desi rabi li ty of establi shi ng a
' school center' (pref erabl y as a part of, or as a secti on i n, an exi sti ng Army
school). ''71 Whi l e agreei ng that psychologi cal warf are deserved greater
emphasi s, AFF poi nted out that personnel and fi scal li mi tati ons presented
"a perplexi ng probl em. " The Tacti cal Inf ormati on Detachment (2 offi cers
and approxi matel y 20 men) represented an encouragi ng start, as di d the
psychologi cal warf are extensi on courses "now neari ng compl eti on, " and
the li mi ted but val uabl e trai ni ng materi al assembled. "But we admi t that
thi s i s only a start, " wrote Maj or General Robert Macon, Deputy Chi ef,
AFF, to the G- 3. 72
"Onl y a start" also accuratel y descri bed the si tuati on at Headquar-
ters, Department of the Army. In answer to Secretary Pace' s pri mary
questi on i n hi s 29 May memorandum, the G- 3 repli ed that the Psycho-
logi cal Warf are Branch would be acti vated "about 1 August" i f necessary
personnel savi ngs were effected as a result of an ongoi ng G- 3 survey. 73
Fi fteen months and two Secretari es of the Army af ter Kenneth Royal l ' s
i nstructi ons to establi sh such a branch, the Army Staf f was sti ll searchi ng
for the necessary personnel spaces.
Thus, f our- and- a- hal f years af ter General Lemni tzer and General
McCl ure had urged conti nued devel opment of psychologi cal warfare, the
Army was i ll-prepared m terms of personnel, equi pment, and organi zati on.
On the eve of the Korean war, i t had made "onl y a st art " toward devel-
opment of a psychologi cal warf are capabi li ty.
V
THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II:
UNCONVENTI ONAL WARFARE
If the Army's capabi li ty to conduct overt psychologi cal warfare was
meager i n June 1950, i ts unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty was non-
exi stent. It was not supposed to have such a capabi li ty i n peaceti me; NSC
10/2 gave the responsi bi li ty for covert parami li tary acti vi ti es to the Cen-
tral Intelli gence Agency (CIA) i n June 1948. Thi s i s not to say, however,
that the Army di d not consi der developi ng such a functi on. It di d- - and the
story of the Army's tentati ve fi rst steps i n thi s fi eld duri ng the i nterwar
years i s an i mportant li nk i n the deci si ons that ulti mately led to creati on of
the 10th Speci al Forces Group i n early 1952.
The Airborne Reconnaissance Units
As we have seen, the i mpetus for the i ni ti ati on of covert acti vi ti es after
World War II di d not ori gi nate i n the Central Intelli gence Group, the
forerunner of the CIA. Rather, i t came from Secretary of War Robert
Patterson i n late 1946, prompti ng di scussi on among agenci es i ni ti ally on
the subject of psychologi cal operati ons. 1 Wi thi n the Department of the
Army, Patterson di rected i n August 1946 that a letter be sent to the
Commandi ng General, Army Ground Forces (AGF), i ndi cati ng that "ai r-
borne reconnai ssance agents" were successfully employed duri ng World
War II under the supervi si on of the Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces (OSS).
Si nce the i nacti vati on of OSS, the letter stated, no branch i n the War
Department was i nterested i n the development of "ai rborne recon-
nai ssance." AGF was therefore asked to prepare a study and submi t rec-
ommendati ons on the desi rabi li ty and organi zati on of such a uni t. 2 The
War Department General Staff (WDGS) recei ved the study i n February
69
70 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II
1947. Incl uded i n the study' s recommendati ons was a request for an ex-
peri mental uni t of 6 offi cers and 35 enli sted men. The Mi l i tary Intelli gence
Di vi si on ( MI D) wi thi n WDGS recommended approval of the study,
noti ng:
The ai rborne reconnai ssance uni ts are of a speci al type whi ch i s essen-
ti al i n war ti me and i s one of the types developed by OSS. It i s essenti al
that such a uni t be mai ntai ned i n peace ti me to develop techni ques and
doctri nes of employment and that the knowledge of thi s doctri ne and
techni que be made known by teachi ng i n appropri ate schools. 3
Concurri ng wi th MID' s recommendati ons, the Di rector of Organi za-
ti on and Trai ni ng approved the study i n Apri l and di rected the Com-
mandi ng General , AGF, to develop tacti cs, techni ques, and trai ni ng for the
proposed uni t. A Tabl e of Organi zati on and Equi pment ( TO&E) was also
to be prepared and submi tted to the War Department; the necessary per-
sonnel spaces would be provi ded when acti vati on of the uni t was di rected. 4
Events of the next 18 months, however, showed the di ffi culti es that a
mi l i tary bureaucracy faces when tryi ng to create a new enti ty, especi ally
duri ng peri ods of fi scal and personnel constrai nts. By the mi ddle of 1948,
staff offi cers from Headquarters, AGF, were correspondi ng wi th Colonel
Ray Peers, f ormer commander of Detachment 101, OSS, to seek advi ce on
organi zati onal concepts for "t he Ai rborne Recon Company, or as we have
named i t, the Ranger Group. ''~ The ti tle "Ranger Group" demonstrated
the confusi on that often occurred when the Army grappl ed wi th creati ng
an "unconventi onal " organi zati on, parti cul arl y one wi th no formal prede-
cessors i n Army hi story. Thi s i s borne out i n Maj or Ernest Samussen' s
l etter to Colonel Peers, i n whi ch he noted that "we have strayed i n many
respects from your recommendati ons. Thi s i s largely due to our efforts to
make a mi l i tary organi zati on whi ch can be composed of cells of mi ni mum
si ze, and i s thereby capabl e of bei ng made i nto a TO&E. ''6
The confusi on over what to call the new uni t reflected di fferi ng i deas
about how the uni t would be used. A War Department paper di scussed
addi ng one "Ranger Group" to the General Reserve Troop Basi s, noti ng
that the proposed uni t would not accompli sh the purpose i ts author (appar-
entl y a Colonel Conrad) envi saged "i f approved from an OSS poi nt of
vi ew. " Thi s was i n September 1948; Army Fi eld Forces (f ormerl y AGF)
was sti ll worki ng on a TO&E for the Ranger Group that was not expected
to be approved before January 1949. 7
Ci rcul ati on of the proposed TO&E among the staff at Army Fi eld
Forces di d not cl ear up the confusi on. The developi ng uni t was a hybri d
THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II 71
organi zati on that combi ned Ranger and OSS concepts; wi tness the pro-
posed Ranger group mi ssi on "to organi ze and conduct overt and covert
operati ons behi nd enemy li nes thereby assumi ng functi ons formerly per-
formed by uni ts of the OSS." The group of approxi mately 115 offi cers and
135 enli sted men would be attached to Army groups or armi es or both to
perform tacti cal mi ssi ons. Its capabi li ti es would i nclude conduct of sabot-
age and surpri se attacks i n the enemy's rear areas; "black" psychologi cal
warfare and propaganda; collecti on of i nformati on by reconnai ssance and
espi onage; development, organi zati on, control, and supply of resi stance
groups; recrui tment, trai ni ng, and di recti on of forei gn ci vi li an agents;
control of captured enemy agents and assi sti ng i ntelli gence staffs i n coun-
terespi onage; and the organi zati on and control of escape systems i n enemy-
held terri tory. 8
From an "OSS poi nt of vi ew," thi s organi zati onal concept should have
been unacceptable. It attempted to lump together mi ssi ons and capabi li ti es
of Rangers and Commandos wi th those of Speci al Operati ons and Oper-
ati onal Group elements of OSS. It combi ned the tacti cal wi th the strategi c.
The mi ssi on statement sai d "OSS, " but the ti tle was "Ranger"; the mi ssi on
statement also sai d "tacti cal, " but the capabi li ti es beli ed OSS precepts,
and General Donovan hi mself had drawn a di sti ncti on between the mi s-
si ons of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OSS.
Eventually Ranger uni ts were formed and used i n Korea, but they
were not the OSS-type of "unconventi onal warfare" organi zati ons that
Secretary of War Patterson probably had i n mi nd when he fi rst rai sed the
i ssue i n 1946. The di alogue on "Ai rborne Reconnai ssance Uni ts/Ranger
Groups" duri ng 1946-48 clearly showed OSS' i nfluence on Army thi nki ng
and presaged si mi lar di scussi ons i n the early 1950's pri or to the formati on
of the 10th Speci al Forces Group.
Another example of early Army thi nki ng on unconventi onal warfare
was a study of speci al and subversi ve operati ons done i n late 1947 by the
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, Department of the Army Staff. Its
stated purpose was "to study speci al and subversi ve operati ons to deter-
mi ne the desi rabi li ty of i ncludi ng i nstructi on and study of such operati ons
i n the school system." 9 It consi dered speci al operati ons to be the acti vi ti es
of US troops to acti vate or support both resi stance groups and small uni t
operati ons behi nd enemy li nes. Secret i ntelli gence, morale operati ons
("bl ack" propaganda), and psychologi cal warfare were not i ncluded i n the
study.
o
72 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART ! I
Rel yi ng heavi l y on OSS hi stori cal data, i ncludi ng the seven vol umes
of the offi ci al War Report of the OSS, (whi ch had not been approved for
rel ease at that ti me), the study concl uded t hat "speci al operati ons of a
subversi ve nat ure" offered great potenti al that "no c omma nde r should
i gnore" i n hi s support of wart i me mi l i tary operati ons. The study' s recom-
mendati ons i ncl uded provi di ng 4 to 6 hours of i nstructi on on the subj ect i n
appropri at e servi ce schools, conti nued study of the capabi l i ti es and de-
si rabl e organi zati on for speci al operati ons, and the creati on of a "speci al
operati ons company. " That l ast recommendat i on was followed by the com-
ment t hat "thi s noti on shoul d be deferred pendi ng recei pt of recommen-
dati ons f rom the Joi nt Chi efs of Staf f regardi ng a proposal to establ i sh a
guerri l l a warf are corps. ~0
J CS a n d NS C Ac t i v i t i e s
The JCS proposal referred to was actual l y a seri es of studi es on
guerri l l a warf are t hat cul mi nated on 17 August 1948 i n JCS 1807/1, a
me mor a ndum f orwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Perti nent aspects of
that me mor a ndum were as follows:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The Uni ted States should provi de i tself wi th the organi zati on and
the means of supporti ng forei gn resi stance movements i n guerri lla
warfare to the advantage of Uni ted States nati onal securi ty duri ng
peace and war.
Guerri lla warfare should be supported under poli cy di recti on of
NSC.
Agenci es for conducti ng guerri lla warfare can be establi shed by
addi ng to the CIA' s speci al operati ons functi ons the responsi bi li ty
for supporti ng forei gn resi stance movements and by authori zi ng the
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff to engage i n the conduct of such operati ons.
Pri mary i nterest i n guerri lla warfare should be that of CIA
i n peaceti me and NME [Nati onal Mi li tary Establi shment] i n
warti me.
A separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be estab-
lished [emphasi s added]. Instead, NME, i n coordi nati on wi th State
Department and CIA, should select personnel, gi ve them necessary
trai ni ng i n establi shed Army schools, supplemented by courses i n
other mi li tary and State Department schools.
6. The trai ned personnel should not be permanently separated from
thei r ori gi nal servi ce. They should be avai lable on call for i ntroduc-
ti on i nto countri es to organi ze, di rect, and lead nati ve guerri llas. ~
The JCS was cl earl y backi ng away f rom the i dea of establ i shi ng a
"guerri l l a warf are corps" wi thi n the mi l i tary servi ces. Why? Because dur-
i ng thi s same peri od the CI A was begi nni ng to establ i sh i ts posi ti on i n the
fi eld of covert acti vi ti es. Dri ven by the i mpetus of the cold war, the Na -
ti onal Securi ty Counci l i n December 1947 gave the CI A responsi bi l i ty for
the conduct of covert psychol ogi cal operati ons ( NSC 4/ A) , and i n
Ma y 1948 expanded t hat chart er wi th NSC 10/2 to i nclude the followi ng:
Any covert acti vi ti es related to propaganda; preventi ve di rect acti on,
i ncludi ng sabotage, anti sabotage, demoli ti on and evacuati on meas-
ures; subversi on agai nst hosti le states, i ncludi ng assi stance to under-
ground resi stance movements, guerri llas and refugee li berati on
groups; and support of i ndi genous anti -Communi st elements i n threat-
ened countri es of the free world? 2
To carry out these acti vi ti es for the CIA, the Speci al Procedures
Group was establ i shed i n December 1947. Af t er NSC 10/2 was i ssued, i t
was repl aced by the Offi ce of Speci al Proj ects, whi ch was soon renamed the
Offi ce of Pol i cy Coordi nati on. ~3 Apparent i n all of these JCS and NSC
acti ons duri ng the l ate 1947- earl y 1948 peri od was a shi fti ng of re-
sponsi bi l i ty for covert acti vi ti es to the CIA.
The Ar my Staf f ' s reacti on to thi s shi ft was cold war enthusi asm mi xed
wi th cauti on about j uri sdi cti onal prerogati ves. For exampl e, i n a Ma y 1948
me mor a ndum to the Secret ary of the Ar my about NSC 10, Pl ans and
Operat i ons Di vi si on ( P&0) made these comments:
P&O'consi ders that there i s an urgent need for a Di rector of Speci al
Studi es [eventually the Offi ce of Speci al Projects i n NSC 10/1 and
NSC 10/2] under NSC who has a di recti ve to strengthen and extend
covert operati ons wi th the objecti ve of defeati ng communi sm i n the
present "cold war." A coordi nated nati onal effort can wi n the "war of
words" by provi ng that our Ameri can way of li fe i s approachi ng that
i deal desi red by all manki nd. However, i t i s beli eved that the authori ty
of thi s Di rector should not i nfri nge on the warti me prerogati ves of the
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff concerni ng plans for the conduct of a war. j~
And i n a 2 June me mor a ndum to the Secretary, P &O suggested changes
to a CI A report on NSC 10 to correct porti ons "whi ch appear to i nfri nge
upon the JCS responsi bi l i ti es concerni ng trai ni ng and war pl ans, " as well
74 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I1
as to correct "t he i mpli cati on that si mi lari ty i n operati onal methods i n
covert i ntelli gence acti vi ti es and covert operati ons makes the CIA the sole
agency to conduct such operati ons. " ~5Thi s l atter poi nt reveals a touch of
resentment concerni ng the CIA' s movement i nto the covert operati ons
fi eld.
Secretary of the Army Royal l had li ttle doubt on thi s subject, how-
ever. On the followi ng day, he emphati cal l y stated "t hat despi te the recom-
mendati ons of the Army staff, he di d not want a representati ve of the Army
to be a member of the speci al servi ces group [eventual l y the CIA' s Offi ce
of Speci al Proj ects], and f urther that he does not want the Army to get i nto
covert acti vi ti es or even to know anythi ng about i t. " 16
Despi te Royal l ' s rel uctance, the Army provi ded an offi cer, Colonel
Ivan D. Yeaton, to represent both the JCS and the Secretary of Defense to
the CIA' s Offi ce of Speci al Proj ects, i n accordance wi th NSC 10/2.1.17 The
new offi ce was to plan and conduct covert operati ons "i n ti me of peace, "
under the poli cy gui dance of an operati ons advi sory commi ttee composed
of representati ves from the State and Defense Departments. Such plans
and operati ons would be "coordi nated wi th and acceptabl e to the Joi nt
Chi efs of Staf f for warti me covert operati ons. " 18
The NSC 10/2 di recti ve had al ready assi gned responsi bi li ty for covert
operati ons to the CIA. The mi l i tary servi ces agreed to thi s because of thei r
strong desi re to "do somethi ng" about the percei ved threat of communi sm
and because of thei r rel uctance to openl y associ ate wi th the "di rt y tri cks"
busi ness. At the same ti me, the servi ces, parti cul arl y the Army, sensi ti ve to
thei r i nsti tuti onal prerogati ves, resi sted any i nterpretati ons that would
depri ve them of a voi ce i n the conduct of warti me covert operati ons. The
planni ng and preparati on responsi bi li ti es for such warti me acti vi ti es, how-
ever, were a potenti al area for ambi gui ty and di scord, as we shall see later.
Creati on of the Offi ce of Speci al Proj ects di d not mean that the
mi l i tary ceased to thi nk about unconventi onal warfare. In response to a
request from the Secretary of Defense to conti nue exami ni ng
"unconventi onal operati ons, " the JCS formed an ad hoc Guerri l l a Warf are
Subcommi ttee to prepare a study on guerri l l a warfare. (Interesti ngl y, the
subcommi ttee was part of an ad hoc Psychologi cal Warf are Commi ttee. )
The subcommi ttee' s study was essenti ally an exerci se to establi sh those
geographi cal areas of the world where i t would be advantageous to have i n
place resi stance movements capabl e of wagi ng guerri l l a warfare. The study
establi shed the followi ng pri ori ti es: Central Europe, the Mi ddl e East,
South Europe, West Europe, Scandi navi a, and the Far East. The study also
concl uded that the JCS "shoul d retai n strategi c and broad poli cy pl anni ng
functi ons of guerri l l a warf are" wi thi n the Nat i onal Mi l i tary Establ i sh-
ment, and that the Ar my "shoul d be assi gned pri mary responsi bi l i ty for all
other guerri l l a warf are functi ons. " The Navy and Ai r Force should have
not pri mary but "col l ateral responsi bi l i ti es" for thi s acti vi ty. Fi nally, a
f ami l i ar theme: In ti me of war, the t heat er commanders shoul d control
guerri l l a warf are wi thi n thei r areas. 19
The Office of Policy Coordination
Wi t hout questi on, the NSC 10/2 di recti ve was percei ved as a
si gni fi cant escal ati on of US i nterest i n the covert si de of the cold war. As
Wi l l i am R. Corson states:
The i ntelli gence communi ty's reacti on to the NSC' s apparently unan-
i mous endorsement and support of the "di rty tri cks" authori zati ons
was swi ft. In thei r vi ew no holds were barred. The NSC 10/2 deci si on
was broadly i nterpreted to mean that not only the Presi dent but all the
guys on the top had sai d to put on the brass knuckles and go to work.
As word about NSC 10/2 tri ckled down to the worki ng staffs i n the
i ntelli gence communi ty, i t was translated to mean that a declarati on
of war had been i ssued wi th equal i f not more force than i f the Con-
gress had so deci ded/
The pri nci pal agent for thi s i ncreased emphasi s on covert acti vi ti es
was to be the CI A' s Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on (OPC), headed by Frank
G. Wi sner. A l awyer by trai ni ng, Wi sner had served wi th di sti ncti on i n
OSS, pl anni ng and parti ci pati ng i n a number of i magi nati ve operati ons i n
the Bal kans duri ng Worl d Wa r II. At the ti me of hi s selecti on to head
OPC, he was servi ng as Deput y Assi stant Secret ary of State for Occupi ed
Countri es. Al though Wi sher appeared by background, experi ence, and
t e mpe r a me nt to be an excel l ent candi date for the new post, Ar my i ntel-
li gence l eaders opposed the choi ce on the basi s t hat he was "' another
Donovan who' l l run away wi th the bal l . " Nonethel ess, Secret ary of State
George Marshal l was confi dent that Wi sner was the ri ght man, and Secre-
t ary of Defense Forrestal endorsed the c hoi c e / '
Si nce the growth of OPC duri ng the years 1948-52 was to greatl y
i nfluence the Ar my' s devel opment of i ts own speci al warf are capabi l i ty, i t
i s i mport ant to understand Wi sner' s vi ew of hi s charter. Thi s was outl i ned
i n detai l i n a me mor a ndum dated 1 August 1949 to Col onel Yeaton of the
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff. n Wi sher expl ai ned the mi ssi on of OPC i n the follow-
i ng terms:
76 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II
To plan and to execute speci al (covert) operati ons or measures whi ch
are desi gned to rei nforce or to accompli sh Uni ted States forei gn poli cy
objecti ves; i n peaceti me, to formulate and execute plans to the neces-
sary state of readi ness i n order that appropri ate speci al (covert) oper-
ati ons may be executed i n ti me of war as consi dered necessary by
competent authori ty; i n warti me, to plan and execute such speci al
(covert) operati ons or measures as may be appropri ate i n the di scharge
of the OPC mi ssi on or as di rected by competent authori ty.
Acti vi ti es of the new organi zati on would set i t apart from other gov-
ernmental agenci es pri nci pally through an i mportant di sti ncti on:
The techni ques and means by whi ch OPC attai ns i ts objecti ves di ffer
from those of the Department of State and the Nati onal Mi li tary
Establi shment i nasmti ch as OPC operati ons are conducted i n a covert
or clandesti ne manner to the end that offi ci al Uni ted States i nterest or
responsi bi li ty i s not permi tted to appear and i f such i nterest should
i nadvertently appear, i t can be plausi bly di sclai med by thi s
government.
Speci fi cally, OPC was responsi ble for the planni ng and conduct of the
covert and clandesti ne aspects of these acti vi ti es:
I. Poli ti cal warfare i ncludi ng assi stance to underground resi stance
movements and support of i ndi genous anti -Communi st elements i n
threatened countri es of the free world.
2. Psychologi cal warfare i ncludi ng "black" and "gray" propaganda.
3. Economi c warfare.
4. Evacuati on, i ncludi ng the paramount responsi bi li ty for escape and
evasi on.
5. Guerri lla and parti san-type warfare.
6. Sabotage and countersabotage.
7. Other covert operati ons (excludi ng espi onage, counterespi onage,
and cover and decepti on for mi li tary operati ons).
Havi ng lai d out the mi ssi on and responsi bi li ti es of OPC, Wi sner pro-
ceeded to argue the necessi ty for a "process of mutual educati on, collabo-
rati on and understandi ng" between OPC, the Department of State, and the
mi l i tary servi ces concerni ng thi s "new weapon i n the Uni ted States arse-
nal. " In parti cular, he felt that the Nati onal Mi li tary Establ i shment should
"provi de gui dance and support wi th respect to such escape and evasi on,
countersabotage, sabotage and guerri lla warfare acti vi ti es as may be un-
dert aken duri ng peacet i me or whi ch mus t be prepared duri ng peacet i me
to a st at e o f readi ness f o r wart i me execut i on. " 23 [Emphasi s added. ]
Thi s last poi nt i s i mportant to hi ghli ght because di fferences of vi ew
developed later between the Army and OPC over who was resPonsi ble for
what and to what degree i n both peaceti me and warti me preparati on. At
thi s poi nt, however, the fi eld appeared to be open to the CIA/OPC, and
Frank Wi sher was eager for help from the mi li tary servi ces to launch hi s
operati on.
Army Assistance to OPC
In mi d-1949, Wi sner asked the Army's assi stance for trai ni ng person-
nel i n guerri lla warfare, for certai n logi sti cal support, and for the nomi -
nati on of an Army offi cer to be chi ef of the "Guerri lla Warfare Group" of
CIA; the last request was subsequently wi thdrawn. The Secretary of the
Army authori zed P&O to contact the CIA di rectly to determi ne i n detai l
the assi stance requi red. Li eutenant Colonel John R. Deane, Jr., P&O, was
desi gnated the Army's representati ve for such coordi nati on. Later, Li eu-
tenant Colonels R. A. Baker and E. E. Baker were desi gnated for di rect
contact i n the areas of logi sti cs and organi zati on and trai ni ng? 4
By November 1949, a seri es of conferences between representati ves of
the Department of the Army and the CIA had resulted i n the selecti on of
Fort Benni ng as a sui table locati on for a trai ni ng course desi red by the
CIA. One of the CIA/ OPC representati ves who took part i n these confer-
ences was an Army li eutenant colonel who had served wi th Detachment
101 i n Burma duri ng World War II. 25
The offi cer's former experi ence i n OSS i nsured hi m an i mportant role
i n these Army-CIA conferences. For example, i n one meeti ng a di scussi on
of OSS theater organi zati ons i n World War II led to agreement among
parti ci pants that the most effi ci ent operati on was one i n whi ch all clandes-
ti ne organi zati ons were brought under one head. Whi le not commi tti ng
OPC to a posi ti on, thi s former Detachment 101 member sai d that he felt
"reasonably certai n" that all of these plans and projects would be done wi th
the knowledge and approval of theater commanders. He further expressed
the vi ew that the proposed joi nt trai ni ng endeavor would help trai n some
mi li tary personnel i n covert acti vi ti es, thus maki ng the transi ti on of such
operati ons to JCS control i n case of war a smoother task.
On thi s last poi nt, Li eutenant Colonel Deane, P&O, expressed the
opi ni on that i f the CIA came under JCS control duri ng warti me, there was
no need for the Army to organi ze OSS-ti ke uni ts i n peaceti me, because
Army resi stance operati ons would confli ct wi th those of the CIA. Thus he
78 THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART !I
beli eved that the Nati onal Mi l i tary Establ i shment would want to i nsure
JCS j uri sdi cti on over the CIA duri ng warti me; i n thi s way the Army, by
assi sti ng the CIA i n i ts peaceti me trai ni ng program, would be layi ng the
groundwork for possi ble f uture behi nd-the-li nes support for i ts tacti cal
ground operati ons. The notes on these meeti ngs show consi derabl e agree-
ment on these i ssues between Deane and the OPC representati ve, as well
as the other parti ci pants. Indeed, the i mportance of these earl y conferences
between the CIA and the Army was not only the i nfluence of OSS experi -
ence, but also the degree of harmony that exi sted, harmony that would
l ater di sappear i n j uri sdi cti onal squabbles. 26
As f urther evi dence of thi s cooperati ve atti tude, the Army provi ded
two studi es on guerri l l a warf are to the CIA to assi st that group i n prepari ng
a trai ni ng program for covert operati ons. The studi es, prepared by Maj or
Mat errazzi and Captai n West of P&O, were forwarded wi th a memo-
randum stati ng that the studi es represented solely the i ndi vi dual vi ews of
the offi cers who prepared them. Nonethel ess, the studi es acknowledged the
potenti al val ue of resi stance operati ons i n a f uture war. They also acknowl-
edged the i nfluence of OSS experi ence on those offi cers i nterested i n the
subj ect of covert operati ons. Further, both papers concl uded that the Army
should organi ze and trai n a uni t i n peaceti me for the support of forei gn
resi stance movements i n the event of hosti li ti es. Both studi es had been
prepared i n earl y 1949, however, and wi th the growi ng promi nence of the
CIA i n thi s fi eld, they were apparentl y overtaken by events. 27
The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division
The emergence of the CIA i n both psychologi cal warf are and covert
operati ons, as well as the growi ng i nterest among the servi ces i n these
acti vi ti es because of i ncreasi ng cold war tensi ons, led to the establ i shment
of the Joi nt Subsi di ary Pl ans Di vi si on (JSPD) i n late 1949. The mi ssi on of
thi s new j oi nt agency, under the control of the JCS, was the followi ng:
[To] coordi nate the peaceti me development of psychologi cal warfare
and covert operati ons capabi li ti es wi thi n the Armed Servi ces, coordi -
nate detai led mi li tary plans and other agenci es of the government,
parti cularly wi th Department of State and the Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi -
nati on [CIA], and, i n warti me, [to] become the means by whi ch the
JCS would provi de conti nuous di recti on and gui dance i n these speci al-
i zed fi elds to commanders under thei r control) ~
Rear Admi ral Lesli e C. Stevens was selected to be the fi rst chi ef of the
JSPD, al though he had li mi ted experi ence i n psychologi cal warf are and
THE INTERW/~R YEARS, PART 11 79
covert operati ons. Stevens, assi sted by deputi es from each of the other
servi ces, i ni ti ally had a small staff of si x offi cers. The Army concurred i n
hi s nomi nati on. 29
Actual l y, the pri nci pal i mpetus for establ i shment of the JSPD appears
to have come from the CIA. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense
i n May 1949, the Di rector of Central Intelli gence asked that a staff of
servi ce representati ves be appoi nted to "consul t wi th and assi st CIA
offi cers i n the establ i shment of a parami l i tary trai ni ng program. " Frank
Wi sner' s request for uni l ateral assi stance from the Army was part of thi s
overall move by the CIA. The JCS consi dered the CIA' s request and
determi ned that a need exi sted for the proposed trai ni ng program. Thei r
creati on of the JSPD i n November 1949, they beli eved, also provi ded the
staff requested by the Di rector of Central Intelli gence, and the Chi ef,
JSPD, was di rected to effect the necessary li ai son between the CIA and the
Nati onal Mi l i tary Est abl i shment )
The Army and Unconventional Warfare Prior to Korea
By earl y 1950, i t was cl ear that the responsi bi li ty for unconventi onal
warf are- - pri mari l y as a result of NSC 10/ 2- - wa s shi fti ng to the CIA. The
i ntelli gence agency had agreed to attach li ai son offi cers to the staffs of
uni fi ed commands to parti ci pate i n planni ng for speci al operati ons, and the
JCS staffed a message to these commands noti fyi ng them that such li ai son
was avai lable i f they desi red i t. 31 Slowly but surely, the "new ki d on the
bl ock" was becomi ng more acti ve, and the servi ces appeared wi lli ng to
accept hi m.
Thi s i s not to say that the servi ces themselves ceased to consi der the
potenti al for unconventi onal warf are i n the face of growi ng US-Sovi et
tensi ons. An excel l ent exampl e of thi s i nterest was a l etter from Colonel C.
H. Gerhardt, G- 2, Headquarters, 2d Army, Fort Meade, Maryl and, to
Li eutenant General Al fred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chi ef of Staf f for Pl ans
and Combat Operati ons. Gerhardt, who had j ust attended a conference
that i ncluded General Gruent her and the Army' s Chi ef of Staff, General
Art hur Colli ns, i ndi cated hi s concern for both psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warf are i n thi s paragraph:
Now as to the i deas: About two years back Froggy Reed of the Ord-
nance was out here and we got talki ng about new developments. He
stated that there appeared to be no new developments planned i n
sabotage equi pment and other materi al necessary for an underground.
We then wrote up a short study to fi t the then si tuati on as far as doi ng
somethi ng about equi pment was concerned, Europe bei ng concerned
after bei ng overrun by the Red Army. The stages bei ng: fi rst, psycho-
logi cal warfare; second, an organi zed underground. Thi s underground
to be planned for now, and parti cularly development of equi pment,
new and streamli ned explosi ves, radi os, ki ts of vari ous ki nds, etc., that
could be stockpi led--some here and some i n the countri es i nvolved,
and an organi zati on put i nto bei ng that would blossom i nto a re-
si stance movement i n case of i nvasi on. 32
When General Colli ns saw Gerhardt ' s letter, he wrote besi de the ci ted
paragraph: "I agree that somethi ng defi ni te should be done on a pl an and
an organi zat i on. " Both the Di rector of Logi sti cs and the Di rector of Intel -
li gence were asked to "i nvesti gate the present status of pl anni ng on the
ma t t e r and submi t appropri at e recommendat i ons. " The resul tant status
report on covert operati ons summed up basi cal l y what has been di scussed
i n thi s chapter: CI A' s responsi bi li ty, under NSC 10/2, for pl anni ng and
conducti ng covert operati ons i n peaceti me; the establ i shment of OPC to
i mpl ement NSC 10/2; the work of two ad hoc JCS commi t t ees to prepare
gui dance to OPC i n the fi elds of guerri l l a warf are and escape and evasi on;
the creati on of the JSPD to i nsure "t he effecti ve di scharge of the re-
sponsi bi li ti es of the Joi nt Chi efs of St af f for psychol ogi cal warf are and
covert operati ons"; and the Secret ary of the Ar my' s approval on 28 Jul y
1949 of the provi si on of uni l ateral assi stance to OPC i n the fi eld of guerri l l a
warfare. 33
The draf t repl y to Gerhardt ' s l etter l eft out much of the sensi ti ve
mat eri al contai ned i n the status reports prepared by the Ar my Staff. None-
theless, the paragraph deal i ng wi th covert operati ons was si gni fi cant:
We have been acti ve on the Joi nt and Servi ce levels for someti me now
i n the fi eld of resi stance movements and other alli ed covert operati ons.
We are convi nced that the uti li zati on of i ndi genous manpower i n
covert operati ons i s an i mportant and very necessary adjunct to con-
venti onal t3,pe operati ons. We feel that we are maki ng progress i n
these matters but, of course, we must proceed wi th consi derable
cauti on. ~a
Tha t st at ement typi fi es the Ar my' s atti tude toward unconventi onal
warf are duri ng the i nterwar years. Prompt ed by Secret ary of Wa r Robert
Patterson, the Ar my began consi deri ng the possi bi li ti es for a covert oper-
ati ons capabi l i ty patterned af ter OSS uni ts as earl y as 1946, pri or to the
establ i shment of the CI A and OPC. Thi s i nterest was fuel ed by a growi ng
suspi ci on of Sovi et i ntenti ons, but constrai ned by recogni ti on of the poli ti -
THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART ! I 81
cal sensi ti vi ty of such a capabi l i ty duri ng peaceti me. Thus i t was al most
wi th a sense of reli ef that the servi ces, and parti cul arl y the Army, wel-
comed the emergence of CI A/ OP C to take the pri mary responsi bi li ty for
covert operati ons. Duri ng a peri od of personnel and fi scal constrai nts, thi s
allowed the Army to concentrate on the "conventi onal type operati ons"
wi th whi ch i t was more comfortabl e. Nonethel ess, the Army coul d not
enti rel y evade some responsi bi li ty for the embryoni c devel opment of an
unconventi onal warf are capabi li ty. Thus i t agreed to assi st OPC i n i ts
i ni ti al organi zati on and trai ni ng efforts. In fact, the evi dence suggests that
some Army leaders saw li mi ted cooperati on wi th CI A/ OP C as i n thei r
enl i ghtened self-i nterests; that i s, an opportuni ty to preserve some i nfluence
duri ng a peri od when i nsti tuti onal prerogati ves and j uri sdi cti onal bound-
ari es i n a new fi eld were i n a process of flux. At any rate, the Army' s
atti tude toward unconventi onal warf are duri ng the i nterwar years was
ambi val ent. Li mi ted though i t was, however, the Army' s acti vi ty i n thi s"
f i el d- - parti cul arl y the doctri nal confusi on that marked i ts tentati ve thi nk-
i ng on unconventi onal warf are and i ts earl y i nteracti on wi th the
CI A/ OP C- - i s i mportant for a full understandi ng of the subsequent devel-
opments that contri buted to the creati on of Speci al Forces. The fi rst of
these devel opments was the outbreak of war i n Korea.
OF
VI
KOREA AND THE OFFI CE
OF THE CHI EF
PSYCHOLOGI CAL WARFARE
A li ttle over 2 years after North Korean armed forces crossed the 38th
parallel, the US Army i n May 1952 establi shed the Psychologi cal Warfare
Center at Fort Bragg, North Caroli na. Thi s i nsti tuti on encompassed a
school for both psychologi cal operati ons and Speci al Forces trai ni ng, oper-
ati onal psychologi cal warfare uni ts, and the fi rst formal unconventi onal
warfare force i n Army hi story--the 10th Speci al Forces Group. We have
seen that whi le basi c planni ng took place duri ng the post-World War II
years, the Army's capabi li ty to conduct overt psychologi cal warfare was
mi ni mal i n June 1950. Si mi larly, whi le embryoni c thi nki ng on uncon-
venti onal warfare took place wi thi n the Army duri ng the i nterwar years, at
the ti me of the outbreak of war i n Korea pri mary responsi bi li ty for that
acti vi ty had shi fted to the CIA/OPC, or so i t appeared. Thus, an exam-
i nati on of the peri od between June 1950 and May 1952 i s cruci al to
understandi ng the Army's unprecedented deci si on to establi sh a center i n
whi ch capabi li ti es for both psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare
would be combi ned at Fort Bragg. Thi s chapter exami nes the i mpact of the
Korean war on those deci si ons.
Impetus for a Psywar Division at
Department of the Army
When the North Korean i nvasi on began on 22 June 1950, a small
Speci al Projects Branch exi sted i n the G-2 Di vi si on of Headquarters
(HQ), Far East Command (FECOM), that was charged wi th the re-
sponsi bi li ty for developi ng strategi c and tacti cal warfare plans. Thi s
8 3
84 KOREA AND THE OCPW
branch, headed by a ci vi li an, J. Woodal l Greene (who had been i n t h e F a r
East si nce 1943), was i ni ti ally confi ned to radi o broadcasti ng f rom Japan
and to leaflet ai rdrops, both of whi ch began by 29 June. Its personnel
shortages were parti al l y overcome by augment at i on f rom local State De-
part ment Inf ormat i on Servi ce personnel. The Depart ment of the Army, of
course, was unabl e to furni sh adequate support, due to shortages i n trai ned
personnel, uni ts, and sui tabl e equi pment. ~
The si tuati on was such that by 5 June, Secret ary of the Ar my Frank
Pace, Jr . - - who, i t wi ll be remembered, had been proddi ng the Ar my Staf f
to get i ts psychol ogi cal warf are house i n or de r - - showe d hi s concern wi th
a me mor a ndum for the Chi ef of Staff:
Events of the current Korean si tuati on further confi rm my vi ews on the
need for a Psychologi cal Warfare organi zati on i n the Department of
the Army. Please let me have a report on thi s matter showi ng acti on
taken or bei ng taken and, as well, such recommendati ons as you deem
appropri ate at thi s ti me. 2
The Secretary was told that acti on had been taken to acti vate a branch
of 10 offi cers wi thi n the G- 3 Di vi si on on 31 Jul y 1950 to provi de General
St af f supervi si on of all psychol ogi cal warf are and speci al operati ons acti v-
i ti es. Addi ti onal l y, a study to determi ne how to provi de for a nucleus of
personnel trai ned i n psychol ogi cal warf are was i n p r o gr e s s / I t i s i nteresti ng
that the Ar my pl anned to combi ne psychol ogi cal warf are and speci al oper-
ati ons acti vi ti es i n the proposed branch. Even wi th the CI A/ OP C' s grow-
i ng promi nence i n speci al operati ons, the Ar my apparent l y wanted to at
l east keep i ts hand i n the game.
Underst andabl y, Secret ary Pace was becomi ng i mpati ent wi th the
gl aci er-l i ke movement of the Ar my bureaucracy on a subj ect of personal
concern to hi m. Perhaps the most candi d anal ysi s of the Ar my' s slug-
gi shness was made i n mi d- Jul y 1950 by a young staf f offi cer i n the G- 3
Di vi si on:
Wi th the transfer of pri mary responsi bi li ty of Psychologi cal Warfare
from G- 2 to G- 3 i n January 1947, the acti vi ty reverted basi cally to a
planni ng functi on i nsofar as the Department of the Army was con-
cerned. Bei ng largely a planni ng functi on, the acti vi ty consi sted mai n-
ly of acti ons on hi ghly classi fi ed matters whi ch seldom came to the
attenti on of other General Staff Di vi si ons and the Techni cal Servi ces.
Consequently, because of the relati ve newness of the acti vi ty and
because of the hi gh classi fi cati on placed upon i t, a general lack of
i nformati on gradually developed outsi de of G- 3 (P&O) concerni ng
KOREA AND THE OCPW 85
Psychologi cal Warfare. The low pri ori ty placed on thi s acti vi ty wi thi n
G- 3 i n 1948, plus the return to i nacti ve duty of most experi enced
Psychologi cal Warfare offi cers, tended to accelerate thi s condi ti on.*
The offi cer went on to state that wi th the out break of war i n Korea,
the Ar my agai n had an i nterest i n psychol ogi cal warf are operati ons. He
thus recommended t hat the responsi bi li ti es for that fi eld be more cl earl y
del i neated among the General Staff, the Techni cal Servi ces, and the Chi ef
of Ar my Fi eld Forces. 5
Wi thi n a month of thi s assessment, that old Worl d Wa r II psycho-
logi cal warri or, Bri gadi er General Robert McCl ure, reentered the scene. In
a "De a r Ar ' l etter to Li eut enant General Al bert We de me ye r (who had
recentl y moved f rom hi s Pentagon assi gnment to become Comma ndi ng
General of the 6th Army, wi th headquart ers i n San Franci sco), Maj or
General Charl es Bolte, the G- 3, wrote that the Ar my' s program for psy-
chol ogi cal warf are was under revi ew to det ermi ne "t he f urt her or-
gani zati onal steps necessary to meet the operati onal requi rements of the
Korean si tuati on or of a general war. " He f urt her i ndi cated t hat the
Ar my' s responsi bi li ti es i n thi s fi eld were such that the possi bi li ty of a
permanent staf f agency, "pref erabl y i n the f orm of a Speci al St af f Di -
vi si on, " shoul d be consi dered for the Depart ment of the Army. To devel op
speci fi c recommendat i ons on psychol ogi cal warf are organi zati on for the
Chi ef of Staff, Bolte requested the presence of McCl ure (who was assi gned
to General Wedemeyer) for a few days because "I know of no one bet t er
quali fi ed to assi st us i n that respect. ' ' 6 In less t han 2 weeks, Bolte recei ved
thi s message f rom McCl ure: "Wi l l report to you for TDY 29 August . "7
Hel p was on the way.
Despi te these steps, by the end of August the Secret ary of the Ar my' s
pati ence wi th the apparent l ack of progress i n psychol ogi cal warf are orga-
ni zati on came to an end. Hi s di spl easure, pl ai nl y evi dent i n a me mor a ndum
to the Chi ef of Staff, General Colli ns, i s quoted i n i ts enti rety:
1. I have been followi ng the progress of the development of a psycho-
logi cal warfare program wi thi n the Department of the Army wi th
consi derable concern. I am not at all sati sfi ed that we are gi vi ng thi s
matter attenti on and support commensurate wi th the capabi li ti es of
psychologi cal warfare as a mi li tary weapon and an i nstrument of
nati onal poli cy.
2. The di scussi on of the Army Poli cy Counci l meeti ngs of 15 and 16
August and my own revi ew of the Army' s effort i n thi s fi eld have
i ndi cated that the pri nci pal di ffi culty for well over a year has been
organi zati on and manpower. Al though I am aware of the hi gh
cal i ber of work whi ch has been performed, i t i s of parti cul ar con-
cern to me that a psychologi cal warfare organi zati on whi ch Mr.
Gray approved i n Jul y 1949 has through del ay i n i ts establ i shment
cost the Army the servi ces of these spaces whi ch for the past year
could have been uti li zed i n developi ng the Army program to a more
comprehensi ve degree. Nor do I beli eve that wi th the establ i shment
of a psychologi cal warfare branch as of 1 August we have i n fact
assured ourselves of accompli shi ng desi red results, i f i n so doi ng we
are forced to rely on the Korean cri si s to secure temporary spaces
to meet personnel requi rements for a uni t whi ch was not desi gned
or i ntended to operate under warti me condi ti ons.
3. The establ i shment of a psychologi cal warfare organi zati on wi thi n
the Department of the Army i ndi cates recogni ti on of the i m-
portance of thi s acti vi ty i n mi l i tary sci ence. Adequate allowance
should therefore be made i n the appropri ate personnel cei li ngs to
afford thi s fi eld the permanent spaces i t requi res. I do not beli eve
an organi zati on whi ch has necessi tated so many studi es and taken
so long to set up should owe i ts fi nal establ i shment and compl ement
of personnel to an emergency whi ch may well warrant an enti rel y
di fferent type staff uni t.
4. I therefore desi re that such spaces as have been al l ocated to psycho-
logi cal warfare on a temporary basi s be establi shed on a permanent
basi s and that the nomi nati on of sui table personnel to bri ng the
recently establi shed psychologi cal warfare branch to requi red
strength be expedi ted.
5. I have asked Assi stant Secretary Earl Johnson to gi ve thi s matter
of manpower for psychologi cal warfare hi s personal attenti on. ~
Thi s l e t t e r i s i mp o r t a nt i n several respect s, Fi rst , t he bl unt t one of
Pa c e ' s me mo r a nd u m- - u nu s u a l l y so for c or r e sponde nc e be t we e n a Se c r e -
t a r y of t he Ar my a nd t he Ch i e f of S t a f f - - v i v i d l y d e mo nst r a t e s hi s e xa spe r -
a t i on wi t h wha t he saw as f oot dr a ggi ng by the Ar my on a subj e c t he
c onsi de r e d vi t al l y i mpor t a nt . Second, t he me mo r a nd u m reveal s Pa c e ' s de-
si re t o have t he ne c e ssa r y p e r ma ne nt or ga ni z a t i on i n pl a c e dur i ng pe a c e -
t i me , r a t h e r t ha n rel y on a c r i si s- i mpose d response to the probl e m. Fi na l l y,
t he me mo r a nd u m i s f ur t he r evi dence of a t he me t ha t we have seen t hr ough-
out t hi s s t u d y - - t h e pre ssure b r o u gh t to be a r by ci vi l i an l e a de r s on an Ar my
some wha t r e l uc t a nt to gr a p p l e wi th act i vi t i es of an "u nc o nv e nt i o na l "
na t ur e .
Wh a t Se c r e t a r y Pace, a nd hi s predecessors, were pe r ha ps l ess sensi t i ve
to, however, were the ge nui ne di f f i cul ti es t ha t personnel a nd fi scal con-
strai nts posed for Army leaders. Most were men who had advanced i n a
system that gave hi ghest pri ori ty to the "conventi onal," or "regular"
uni ts--i n i nfantry, armor, and arti llery--associ ated wi th combat arms.
Even those seni or offi cers who di splayed i nterest i n psychologi cal and
unconventi onal warfare capabi li ti es found i t natural, wi th the excepti on of
a few li ke General McClure, to gi ve lower pri ori ty to those acti vi ti es when
faced wi th the necessi ty of maki ng choi ces.
In any event, the Army Staff, as a result of Secretary Pace's proddi ng
and other current acti ons, struggled i n the face of a deteri orati ng combat
si tuati on i n Korea to i mprove i ts psychologi cal warfare organi zati on. Iron-
i cally, on the same day that Pace's bli steri ng memorandum was si gned,
General Bolte, the G-3, reported i n a meeti ng i n the Army's General
Counci l that McClure had arri ved i n Washi ngton to advi se and assi st i n
preparati on of recommendati ons to the Chi ef of Staff on several i mportant
aspects of psychologi cal warfare, i ncludi ng the possi bi li ty of a speci al staff
di vi si on at the Department of the Army, operati ons i n FECOM, and
adequate preparatory measures i n the European command (EUCOM). 9
On the followi ng day, 31 August, General Bolte forwarded a recom-
mendati on to the Chi ef of Staff for i mmedi ate acti vati on of the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Speci al Staff, stati ng that "a revi ew of present
organi zati onal arrangements i ndi cates that the Army i s not prepared to
meet i ts Psychologi cal Warfare obli gati ons," whi ch had greatly i ncreased
because of growi ng cold war tensi ons and the Korean confli ct. The or-
gani zati onal concept and proposed strength of 102 personnel for the new
di vi si on were qui ckly approved by the Vi ce Chi ef of Staff on 1 September
1950J
McClure obvi ously had a hand i n these moves, because duri ng the
peri od 28 August to 3 September he held conferences wi th all the Deputy
Chi efs of Staff; the Vi ce Chi ef of Staff; Secretary Pace; the Assi stant
Secretary of State, Publi c Affai rs; and members of the Joi nt Staff. At the
13 September meeti ng of the General Counci l, General Bolte reported that
General McClure fully supported hi s proposal to establi sh a psychologi cal
warfare di vi si on, and that approval for i t had been obtai ned. To effect an
orderly transi ti on, the Subsi di ary Plans Branch of G-3 would be expanded
to take care of psychologi cal warfare planni ng. Later the acti vi ty would be
transferred from G-3 to the new di vi si on, after fi nal approval about i ts
functi ons and acqui si ti on of suffi ci ent personnelJ ~
Creation of the Office of the Chief of
Psychological Warfare
Despi te the sense of urgency, creati on of the new di vi si on di d not occur
overni ght. Fi rst, there was the probl em of getti ng authori zati on for the
permanent allocati on of the addi ti onal personnel needed. A more seri ous
di ffi culty was procuri ng the necessary personnel trai ned i n the speci ali zed
ski lls of psychologi cal warfare. Si nce there was no basi c course i n psycho-
logi cal warf are avai lable wi thi n the Army- - i ndeed, wi thi n any of the
servi ces- - the G- 3 requested that a mi ni mum of 6 offi cers attend a 13-week
course on the subject proposed by Georgetown Uni versi ty and scheduled to
begi n on 2 October. Admi ttedl y, thi s was a stopgap measure that would not
adequatel y meet the Army' s overall requi rement for trai ned offi cers. 12
There were, i n fact, onl y seven offi cers quali fi ed i n psychologi cal war-
f are on acti ve duty i n 1950. One of these, Li eutenant Colonel John O.
Weaver, was recrui ted by the Chi ef, AFF, to become chi ef of a proposed
psychologi cal warf are department i n the Army General School at Fort
Ri ley, Kansas. Weaver had served as commandi ng offi cer of the combat
propaganda team of the 5th Army i n Ital y duri ng Worl d War II and was
a graduat e of the Bri ti sh psychologi cal warf are school i n Cai ro. Bri gadi er
General Robert McCl ure, i n hi s new posi ti on as Chi ef, Psychol ogi cal War-
fare Di vi si on (an obvi ous choi ce! ), forwarded the request for Weaver' s
assi gnment to the Adj ut ant General . Weaver was ordered to report to Fort
Ri l ey by December 1950.13
On 31 October, General McCl ure held hi s fi rst weekly staff meeti ng
wi th personnel of hi s embryoni c di vi si on. The mi nutes from thi s meeti ng
gi ve us val uabl e i nsi ghts i nto McCl ure' s phi losophy about psychologi cal
warf are and unconventi onal warfare. Fi rst, he stated that he had "backi ng
f rom the top down" for psychologi cal warfare, and that the di vi si on would
be granted a consi derabl e number of personnel. But then he i ssued a
warni ng: "As a general poli cy, all offi cers assi gned to thi s work should
watch thei r step as there i s an opi ni on preval ent among i ndi vi duals no1
conversant wi th psychologi cal warf are that anyone connected wi th tht
functi on i s a ' l ong-hai red, starry-eyed' i ndi vi dual . " Such a pessi mi sti c not~
at the outset must have been di squi eti ng to the assembled offi cers, parti cu
larly to those who were ambi ti ous. The statement was a comment ary on th,
Army' s atti tude toward psychologi cal warfare, or at least i ts atti tude a
percei ved by a "'true bel i ever" li ke General McCl ure. He hastened to add
however, "I thi nk that there i s nothi ng that i s not ni nety percent commo
sense, " a rather pragmati c approach, perhaps to quell the apprehensi ons c
hi s new subordi nates. ~4
McCl ure f urther stated that General Bol te agreed wi th hi m that
unconventi onal warf are di d not belong i n G- 3 and should be transf erred to
the Psychologi cal Warf are Di vi si on. The Di vi si on, expanded from the
Subsi di ary Pl ans Branch, had not yet formal l y become a separate Speci al
Staf f di vi si on and theref ore was sti ll under the G- 3. McCl ure felt that hi s
new organi zati on could be enti tl ed "psychol ogi cal warf are" and contai n
three subdi vi si ons: psychologi cal warfare, cover and decepti on, and uncon-
venti onal warf are} 5 We see here not onl y evi dence of McCl ure' s earl y
feeli ngs about the marri age of psychologi cal and unconventi onal warf are,
but also hi s tendency to gi ve psychologi cal warf are a rel ati vel y hi gher
pri ori ty. That atti tude on hi s part undoubtedl y would i nfluence the sub-
sequent co-locati on of psychologi cal and unconventi onal warf are uni ts at
Fort Bragg i n 1952, and the selecti on of the ti tle, Psychologi cal Warf are
Center.
Fi nally, on 15 January 1951, the Omce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warf are ( OCPW) became offi ci ally recogni zed- - but not wi thout
di ffi culty, as expressed i n a l etter by McCl ure to Maj or General Dani el
Noce, Chi ef of Staff, EUCOM, on that same day:
Orders have been i ssued effecti ve today, separati ng thi s Di vi si on from
G-3 and setti ng i t up as a Speci al Staff di vi si on. Wi th most of the stops
pulled out, i t has sti ll taken us four months to get the admi ni strati ve
responsi bi li ty from G-3. Even i n ti me of grave emergency the Pen-
tagon moves slowly. '6
Secretary of the Army Pace would have agreed wi th that note of exasper-
ati on. Nonethel ess, a new organi zati on, the fi rst of i ts type i n Army Staf f
hi story, had been born. Psychologi cal warf are had evolved from a small
secti on wi thi n a branch of G- 3 to an offi ce at Speci al Staf f level wi th di rect
access to the Chi ef of Staff.
By earl y February, McCl ure had bri efed the General Counci l on the
organi zati on and functi on of OCPW and expl ai ned the need for a rapi d
organi zati on of unconventi onal warfare. At thi s poi nt hi s vi ews on the
organi zati on of hi s new di vi si on were fi rm. Si nce the di vi si on had been
recogni zed and publi shed i n orders, he wanted an amendment authori zi ng
speci al operati ons acti vi ti es, and he envi saged three di vi si ons: propaganda,
unconventi onal warfare, and support} 7
As stated i n the speci al regul ati on that l ater outl i ned i ts organi zati on
and functi ons, the mi ssi on of OCPW was to "f ormul at e and develop psy-
chologi cal and speci al operati ons plans for the Army i n consonance wi th
establi shed poli cy and to recommend poli ci es for and supervi se the exe-
cuti on of Depart ment of the Army programs i n those fi elds." To carry out
thi s mi ssi on, the offi ce was organi zed i nto three maj or di vi si ons: Psycho-
logi cal Operati ons, Requi rements, and Speci al Operati ons. Al though the
thrust of the organi zati on was on psychologi cal warfare, the words "and
speci al operati ons" i n the precedi ng mi ssi on statement and the exi stence of
the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on are hi ghly si gni fi cant because i t was i n thi s
di vi si on that plans for creati on of the Army' s fi rst formal unconventi onal
warf are capabi l i ty were formul ated. Both the Psychologi cal Operati ons
and Speci al Operati ons Di vi si ons were subdi vi ded i nto branches for plans,
operati ons, and i ntelli gence and evaluati on, whi le the Requi rements
Di vi si on was pri mari l y concerned wi th organi zati on, personnel, trai ni ng,
logi sti cs, and research needs to support both psychologi cal and speci al
operati ons acti vi ti es. ~8
Cl earl y, the two maj or concerns of thi s unprecedented Army Staf f
offi ce were psychologi cal and unconventi onal warf are (or "speci al oper-
ati ons, " as the l atter was called at thi s ti me). Over the next 16 mont hs- - a
peri od of freneti c, di verse acti vi ty for General McCl ure and hi s
staf f - - pl ans, poli ci es, and deci si ons made i n the Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychologi cal Warf are were i nstrumental i n the Army' s deci si ons to estab-
li sh the Psychologi cal Warf are Center at Fort Bragg, to create the 10th
Speci al Forces Group, and fi nally, to co-l ocate the two capabi li ti es of
psychologi cal and unconventi onal warf are at thi s new center. To fully
understand why these deci si ons were made, we must exami ne these two
capabi li ti es i n Korea, as seen from the perspecti ve of OCPW and parti cu-
l arl y from that of General McCl ure.
OCPW and Psychological Warfare in Korea
Shortl y af ter the formal establ i shment of OCPW, Secretary of the
Army Pace reentered the f ray to gi ve McCl ure' s embryoni c program a
well-ti med boost of support. In another of hi s by now well-known memo-
randums to the Chi ef of Staf f on psychologi cal warfare, Pace referred to
OCPW (one can almost sense a between-the-li nes "and i t's about ti me! "),
then unequi vocally presented hi s vi ews on the subject:
I am keenly i nterested i n and concerned over the successful devel-
opment and progress of the psychologi cal warfare program. Its vi tal
i mportance to nati onal securi ty and defense i n the present emergency
must be fully recogni zed by all responsi ble commanders and staffs
throughout the Army. ~9
McCl ure coul d have asked for no better entree i n the struggl e for
recogni ti on and i nfluence that any new organi zati on i n a bureaucracy
experi ences. But the Secretary went even further; he also put i n a speci al
word for the speci al operati ons part of McCl ure' s offi ce. Ref erri ng agai n to
OCPW' s organi zati on, he stressed that theater commanders should use i t
as a model to put thei r own staffs on a sound basi s:
Such a basi s should envi sage the supervi si on of a combination of
propaganda and unconventional warfare activities by staff or-
gani zati ons that wi ll provi de for effecti ve i ntegrati on of those acti vi ti es
i n such a way as to i nsure full support of combat operati ons now bei ng
conducted or contemplated and planned for the future. 2
Si nce Pace heretof ore had not menti oned unconventi onal warf are i n
hi s proddi ng of the Chi ef of Staff, and si nce he referred i n thi s same
memorandum to a recent di scussi on wi th the Chi ef of Psychol ogi cal War-
f are and members of the Army Poli cy Counci l, one coul d concl ude that the
Secretary' s apparent endorsement of combi ni ng psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warf are planni ng functi ons was i nfluenced at least i n part by
General McCl ure' s vi ews. The phi losophy expressed by Pace' s memo-
randum i s si gni fi cant, for McCl ure carri ed i t forward i n hi s relati onshi ps
wi th the Far East and European theater commands and hi s attempts to
i nfluence thei r staff organi zati ons, and wi th Headquarters, AFF, i n the
US- - c ul mi na t i ng i n the co-locati on of psychologi cal and unconventi onal
warf are schooli ng and capabi li ti es under the Psychol ogi cal Warf are Cen-
ter establi shed at Fort Bragg i n May 1952.
The "present emergency" that Secretary Pace had ref erred to i n hi s
memorandum was, of course, the war i n Korea, whi ch had worsened wi th
hei ghteni ng cold war tensi ons wi th the Peopl e' s Republ i c of Chi na and the
Sovi et Uni on. But Pace beli eved that the Korean si tuati on offered an
"especi al opportuni ty for hi ghly profi table expl oi tati on" of psychologi cal
warfare. 21 Indeed, a key f eature of thi s peri od was the i ntense personal
i nterest i n the psychologi cal warf are aspects of the confli ct shown by the
Secretary, an i nterest that was of great help to General McCl ure.
Exampl es of the Secretary' s preoccupati on wi th the subj ect are found
i n hi s numerous conversati ons wi th General McCl ure and f requent
communi cati ons wi th the Commander i n Chi ef, Far East Command
( CI NCFE) , General Matthew B. Ri dgeway. In earl y May 1951, Pace
called McCl ure i nto hi s offi ce, rei terated hi s "keen i nterest" i n psycho-
logi cal warfare, and sai d that "qual i ty rather than quant i t y" should be the
measure of success i n usi ng thi s tool. He told McCl ure t hat he had di s-
cussed psychologi cal warfare wi th General Ri dgeway and expressed hi s
wi sh for an all out-effort i n the fi eld. Pace offered to help McClure wi th hi s
attempts to get the Ai r Force to furni sh a speci al squadron of ai rcraft for
psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare purposes, and concluded the
conference by aski ng the General to keep hi m i nformed of acti vi ti es i n the
fi eld and to seek hi s assi stance i f any problem developed. 22 Later the same
month, the Secretary called McClure to ask whether the Army was pre-
pared for psychologi cal warfare acti vi ti es "should the mi li tary success of
the U.N. [Uni ted Nati ons] forces result i n routi ng of the Reds." He also
wanted to know i f McClure was sati sfi ed wi th FECOM' s performance i n
psychologi cal warfare, and restated hi s i nterest i n quali ty rather than
quanti ty concerni ng producti on of leaflets and radi o broadcasts. 23 By the
end of May, Pace was convi nced that the ti me had come for the maxi mum
use of psychologi cal warfare i n Korea, and conveyed hi s "great personal
i nterest i n the matter" to General Ri dgeway. 24
Ri dgeway's reply to Pace captures the state of psychologi cal warfare
acti vi ti es i n Korea at that ti me. He stated hi s plan to materi ally expand the
psychologi cal warfare effort i n support of mi li tary operati ons, and i ndi -
cated that current leaflet operati ons gave pri ori ty to tacti cal leaflets,
"whose themes can be vari ed on short noti ce to adjust propaganda empha-
si s to fi t di fferent battle si tuati ons." The broad themes used for the tacti cal
operati ons i ncluded good treatment of pri soners, U.N. materi el superi ori ty,
and mounti ng enemy casualty fi gures. Strategi c propaganda efforts i n-
cluded newssheets, troop leaflets desi gned to depress morale and i ncrease
suscepti bi li ty to forthcomi ng tacti cal propaganda, and ci vi li an leaflets de-
si gned to arouse anti -Chi nese and anti -Sovi et feeli ng. Plans were underway
to double the weekly leaflet effort of approxi mately 1 3 mi lli on leaflets.
Radi o broadcasts, totali ng 13 hours dai ly i n the Korean language, would
be augmented by shortwave broadcasts i n Chi nese to reach Chi nese troops
i n Korea as well as Chi nese ci vi li ans and troops i n Manchuri a. Whi le i t was
too early to determi ne how i nfluenti al psychologi cal warfare had been i n
the recent heavy i ncrease i n the number of enemy pri soners taken, "pre-
li mi nary i nterrogati ons i ndi cate consi derable effecti veness, both by leaflets
and by loudspeakers." Ri dgeway concluded by stati ng hi s beli ef that regu-
lar psychologi cal warfare gui dance from Washi ngton was of "consi derable
i mportance," si nce acti vi ti es were "an i ntegral part of the worldwi de US
effort i n thi s fi eld and should be closely geared to acti vi ti es i n other areas,
especi ally i n the Far East. ''25
Pace sei zed upon Ri dgeway's last poi nt. Duri ng meeti ngs wi th mem-
bers of the Army Staff, he frequently stressed hi s endorsement of psycho-
logi cal warfare and urged the members to gi ve i t thei r full support. He
beli eved that i t was not recei vi ng suffi ci ent attenti on, and consi dered i t the
"cheapest form of warfare." He emphasi zed that psychologi cal warfare
had to be conducted wi thi n the framework of nati onal poli cy and that the
si tuati on duri ng negoti ati ons i n Korea i llustrated that poi nt. Explai ni ng
that he felt a responsi bi li ty to "do somethi ng" to i nsure that necessary
hi gh-level Government poli cy vi ews on the subject were prepared and
properly coordi nated wi th fi eld psychologi cal warfare, he di rected General
McClure to prepare a memorandum stati ng "what he as Secretary of the
Army should do" i n thi s matter. 26
General Ri dgeway followed up hi s desi re for "more posi ti ve and
defi ni ti ve poli cy gui dance" on psychologi cal warfare i n a cable to Pace i n
August 1 95 1. He also asked for help i n provi di ng a few quali fi ed personnel
for a psychologi cal warfare planni ng group i n FECOM, addi ng an i nter-
esti ng note concerni ng the quali ti es he most desi red i n those personnel: "I
personally rate i ntegri ty and i ntellectual capaci ty above experi ence, for the
latter wi thout both of the former i s a li abi li ty, not an assest. ''27
Pace's "Personal for Ri dgeway" reply agai n demonstrated hi s i nterest
i n thi s speci ali zed fi eld: "Psychologi cal warfare can and must become one
of our most effecti ve weapons i n combatti ng communi sm. I am anxi ous to
take whatever steps I can to achi eve thi s end." Pace i ndi cated that the
recently establi shed Psychologi cal Strategy Board (PSB), headed by Gor-
don Gray, should be able to provi de the nati onal poli cy gui dance needed,
and that "every effort i s bei ng exerted to make the board fully operati onal
at the earli est possi ble date. " 2gAs di rected by Presi dent Truman, the PSB
was created to provi de more effecti ve planni ng of psychologi cal operati ons
wi thi n the framework of approved nati onal poli ci es, and to coordi nate the
psychologi cal operati ons of all governmental departments and agenci es.
The Secretary's attempts to i nfluence the si tuati on i n Korea went
beyond these communi cati ons wi th FECOM. He sent a copy of Ri dgeway's
cable to Gordon Gray, together wi th hi s reply. McClure also forwarded
copi es of the same message to the JCS, urgi ng them to emphasi ze to the
PSB that General Ri dgeway's request for hi gh-level poli cy gui dance be
i ncluded "among the foremost of the Board's pri ori ty operati onal
matters." 29
Secretary Pace's i ntense i nterest i n psychologi cal warfare i nfluenced
the atti tudes and deci si ons of key deci si onmakers i n the Far East Com-
mand. Moreover, hi s enthusi asm for the subject ai ded General McClure i n
hi s endeavors to carve out a ni che for OCPW wi thi n the Washi ngton
bureaucracy. McCl ure was to make val uabl e use of the Secretary' s spon-
sorshi p of psychologi cal warfare, parti cul arl y i n hi s relati ons wi th
FECOM.
General McCl ure' s atti tude toward the Far East Command' s conduct
of psychologi cal warf are acti vi ti es was mi xed. On the one hand, he often
expressed sati sfacti on wi th FECOM' s progress i n thi s area, publi cly com-
pl i mented i ts efforts, and enthusi asti cal l y attempted to gi ve i t assi stance.
On the other hand, he was pri vatel y cri ti cal of psychologi cal warf are
operati ons i n the Far East and felt that FECOM was not wi lli ng to accept
the help offered. Undeterred, however, he i ntended "t o put pressure on
them to let us help t hem. " 30
McCl ure' s pri mary concern was wi th FECOM' s organi zati on for psy-
chologi cal warfare. Ini ti ally, the responsi bi li ty for psychologi cal warf are
resi ded i n the G- 2 Di vi si on of Headquarters, FECOM. Reflecti ng hi s own
Worl d Wa r II experi ence i n establi shi ng P WD/ SHAEF and, more re-
centl y, OCPW, McCl ure beli eved that a speci al staff di vi si on combi ni ng
both psychologi cal and unconventi onal warf are functi ons would enhance
i ts stature and faci l i tate operati ons. Thus, he urged i n letters, reports, and
vi si ts that thi s step be taken. He also recommended that the I st Radi o
Broadcasti ng and Leafl et ( RB&L) Group become the theater operati ng
agency for psychologi cal warf are when i t arri ved from the Uni ted States
l ater i n 1951. 3~ At thi s poi nt, i n earl y 1951, the onl y US psychologi cal
warf are uni t that the Depart ment of the Army had been able to provi de to
FECOM was the Tacti cal Inf ormati on Detachment, a small uni t of a li ttle
over 20 personnel.
When the Nort h Koreans attacked South Korea i n June 1950, the
Tacti cal Inf ormati on Det achment - - organi zed at Fort Ri ley, Kansas, i n
1947- - was the onl y operati onal psychologi cal warf are troop uni t i n the
U.S. Army. Sent to Korea i n the fall of 1950, i t was reorgani zed as the 1st
Loudspeaker and Leaflet ( L&L) Company, and served as the 8th Army' s
tacti cal propaganda uni t throughout the confli ct. 32 Tacti cal propaganda,
someti mes called combat propaganda, was di rected at a speci fi c audi ence
i n the forward battl e areas and i n support of locali zed operati ons. 33 Mobi le
l oudspeakers mounted on vehi cles and ai rcraf t became a pri mary means of
conducti ng tacti cal propaganda i n Korea. One noteworthy exampl e was
the use of a l oudspeaker mounted on a C- 47 ai rcraf t that i n 1951 ci rcled
over 1,800 Chi nese Communi st troops and i nduced them to surrender. 34
As earl y as 1947, whi le there was no real mi l i tary psychologi cal or-
gani zati on i n bei ng, a small planni ng st a f f - - a Psychologi cal Warf are See-
ti on (PWS)- - had been created i n the General Headquarters (GHQ) of
FECOM. Although PWS had no fi eld operati ng uni ts, wi th hasty augmen-
tati on i t di d begi n usi ng leaflets and radi o 2 days after the i nvasi on. Obvi -
ously, PWS could not effi ci ently support full-scale strategi c operati ons, so
the 1st Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organi zed at
Fort Ri ley and shi pped to Korea i n July 1951.
The 1st RB&L Group was speci fi cally desi gned to conduct strategi c
propaganda i n di rect support of mi li tary operati ons. 35Strategi c propagan-
da was i ntended to further long-term strategi c ai ms, and was di rected at
enemy forces, populati ons, or enemy-occupi ed areas. 36 To accompli sh these
tasks the 1st RB&L Group had the equi pment and capabi li ty to produce
newspapers and leaflets, and to augment or replace other means of broad-
casti ng radi o propaganda. The group supervi sed a radi o stati on network
known as the Voi ce of the Uni ted Nati ons, and often produced more than
200 mi lli on propaganda leaflets a week that were di ssemi nated by ai rcraft
or by speci ally desi gned arti llery shells. 37 The leaflets expressed vari ous
themes. Some, for example, offered i nducements for enemy soldi ers to
surrender; others were i ntended to bolster the morale of Korean ci vi li ans by
proclai mi ng U.N. support.
Although the RB&L group was a concept accelerated to meet the
requi rements of the Korean confli ct (plans were i ni ti ated by G-3, De-
partment of the Army, i n early 1950), i t performed functi ons si mi lar to
those deemed necessary to the conduct of psychologi cal warfare i n World
War II. Its Mobi le Radi o Broadcasti ng (MRB) Company bore a di rect
ancestral li nkage wi th the mobi le radi o broadcasti ng compani es formed
under PWD/ SHAEF to conduct propaganda operati ons i n North Afri ca
and the European theater duri ng 1944-45. In fact, the MRB compani es
were the basi c uni ts organi zed to perform tacti cal psychologi cal warfare
duri ng World War II, although radi o later became an essenti ally strategi c
weapon that had no place i n a purely tacti cal psychologi cal uni t) s Both the
strategi c propaganda concept embodi ed i n the RB&L group and the tacti -
cal propaganda i dea expressed by the L&L company were to fi gure prom-
i nently i n the psychologi cal warfare capabi li ty subsequently formed as part
of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center i n 1952.
By Apri l 1952, when the mi li tary si tuati on was at a stalemate along
the 38th parallel, three di fferent ki nds of psychologi cal warfare were un-
derway i n Korea. "Strategi c" psychologi cal warfare was carri ed out by the
Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on, GHQ FECOM, located i n Tokyo, the
secti on havi ng made the transi ti on to a speci al staff secti on as recom-
mended by McClure. The 1 st RB&L Group, whose headquarters were also
i n Tokyo, assi sted GHQ F ECOM i n thi s endeavor. Leafl et operati ons
bl anketed Nort h Korea wi th the excepti on of a 40-mi l e zone due north of
the mi l i tary li nes; radi o operati ons covered Nort h and South Korea as well
as parts of Manchuri a and Chi na. "Ta c t i c a l " psychol ogi cal warf are was
di rected by the Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e Di vi si on, G- 3, of HQ 8th Army,
eventual l y l ocated i n Seoul. Assi sted by the 1st L&L Company, thi s di -
vi si on di rected leaflet and l oudspeaker operati ons wi thi n 40 mi les of the
mi l i tary li ne of contact. "Consol i dat i on" propaganda was carri ed out by
the St at e Depart ment ' s US Inf ormat i on Servi ce, based i n Pusan. Its
pri nted and vi sual medi a operati ons were confi ned to t hat part of Korea
under the ci vi l admi ni strati on of the Republ i c of Korea government. Radi o
operati ons i n thi s area were under the control of fi eld t eams of the 1st
RB&L Group' s Mobi l e Radi o Broadcasti ng Co mp a ny ) ~
Anot her concern of General McCl ure was the fai l ure to use Korea as
a profi tabl e testi ng ground or l aboratory. He beli eved that the campai gn
there provi ded great opportuni ty for both experi mentati on and testi ng of
met hods and equi pment, and expressed to the Chi ef of Staf f i n August
1951 hi s di sappoi ntment i n the results to t hat poi nt. As an exampl e of what
he had i n mi nd, McCl ure suggested that hel i copters be equi pped wi th noi se
devi ces for spreadi ng terror. 4
McCl ure was parti cul arl y cri ti cal of the avai l abl e ai r support for
psychol ogi cal warf are i n Korea and used every means at hi s di sposal to try
to i mprove the si tuati on. In a "De a r Charl es" l etter to the G- 2, GHQ
FECOM, Maj or General Charl es A. Wi l l oughby, he unvei led hi s concerns:
I only wi sh that ai rcraft were assi gned for the tacti cal leafletti ng and
strategi c leafletti ng so that speci fi c targets and ti mi ng could be gi ven
wi th an assurance that they would be hi t. The New York Ti mes
Magazi ne Secti on two weeks ago carri ed a photograph of the i nteri or
of a C-47, showi ng a couple of harassed soldi ers attempti ng to throw
out handfuls of loose leaflets whi ch apparently were blowi ng all over
the i nteri or.
Ref erri ng to hi s own experi ence i n Worl d Wa r II, McCl ure conti nued:
I feel that the Ai r Forces have fallen down badly on us i n not usi ng,
at the begi nni ng of thi s trouble, the techni ques that we wound up wi th
i n 1945, such as: speci al leaflet squadrons, fi bre casi ngs for leaflet
bombs (of whi ch there are 80,000 here i n the Arsenal), regular oper-
ati ons plans and orders, pri nti ng and deli very on call, etc. We are sti ll
putti ng pressures on back here but can do very li ttle unless FEC makes
thi s type of operati on a mi li tary requi rement. 41
Duri ng hi s vi si t to FECOM i n Apri l 1951, McClure agai n presented
hi s vi ews on the subject of ai r support, stati ng that "unless ai rcraft de-
mands are made operati ons requi rements, the ai rdrops wi ll conti nue on a
catch-as-catch-can basi s." The C-47, he beli eved, was i nappropri ate for
leaflet drops; thus, "front li ne support suffers for lack of deli very by fi ghter
bomber." He recommended that a speci al squadron be organi zed for psy-
chologi cal and unconventi onal warfare purposes. 42
McClure pursued hi s basi c themes at every opportuni ty. He told the
US Ai r Force (USAF) Di rector of Operati ons i n May that "we were usi ng
1918 methods of droppi ng leaflets over front li ne troops and that i t was
both i neffi ci ent and expensi ve," and asked that the speci al ai r wi ngs bei ng
organi zed to support CIA acti vi ti es i n Korea be used for psychologi cal
warfare. In June, he fi red off a memorandum to the JCS recommendi ng
that di scussi ons be i ni ti ated between the servi ces i n order to make max-
i mum use of all tacti cal ai rcraft for the support of psychologi cal warfare.
He forcefully expressed hi s vi ews to both the Chi ef of Staff and the Secre-
tary of the Army, both of whom tri ed to i nfluence the si tuati on through
di scussi ons and correspondence wi th thei r counterparts i n the Ai r Force. 43
Wri ti ng to the Chi ef of Staff, FECOM, on "the questi on of ai r support
for psychologi cal warfare operati ons," McClure charged that i n actual
practi ce such support was arranged locally, that the theater commander
was unable to obtai n a speci fi c allocati on of ai rcraft. He observed that the
"undesi rabi li ty of such a haphazard arrangement was apparent i n the
European theater duri ng World War II and i s i n great measure borne out
by what I saw and covered i n my report to General Ri dgeway duri ng my
recent i nspecti on of psychologi cal warfare operati ons i n Korea." McClure
then boldly rei terated hi s proposal: "The soluti on we arri ved at i n Europe,
and whi ch I fi rmly beli eve i s the remedy now, was to place certai n speci fi ed
ai rcraft under the operati onal control of the Psychologi cal Warfare Staff
of the Seni or Commander." But even before doi ng thi s, such support
"should be determi ned to be an operati onal requi rement, and thi s deter-
mi nati on should be made now, once and for all." Thi s was rather forceful
language to use i n addressi ng a three-star general and smacked of telli ng
the theater commander how to do hi s job. Perhaps knowi ng that he had the
support of the Secretary of the Army gave McClure a measure of
confi dence i n thi s matter. At any rate, the poi nt that he was tryi ng to make,
McClure beli eved, was basi c to the whole questi on--psychologi cal warfare
must be recogni zed as important by the theater commander. Once that was
establi shed, i t was "si mply a questi on of the necessi ty for the theater staff
to control i ts operati onal tools i n order to fulfi ll i ts mi ssi on effi ci ently and
effecti vely." 44
Thi s was vi ntage McCl ure. Hi s campai gn to i mprove the ai r support
for psychol ogi cal warf are i n Korea i l l ustrates the strategi es and techni ques
used by thi s arti cul ate, energeti c "t rue bel i ever" i n hi s at t empt s to
i nfluence events i n the t heat er commands.
Sti ll anot her exampl e of General McCl ure' s techni que was hi s reac-
ti on to "Operat i on Ki l l er, " a phrase used by HQ F ECOM i n i ts press
rel eases to descri be operati ons agai nst the Nort h Korean and Chi nese
forces. The followi ng passage i s f rom a l etter wri tten to Maj or General
Wi l l oughby:
I have personally been di sturbed by the comparati vely few Chi nese
pri soners we are taki ng, ei ther by surrender or by capture. I reali ze
that they are not fi ghti ng as the Chi nese di d i n thei r ci vi l wars i n the
three-year peri od that I sat along the Shanki wan Rai lway li ne. On the
other hand, for two thousand years the Chi nese have been i nduced to
change si des, even to that of the Japanese, by consi derati ons of person-
al gai n or creature comforts. Is i t possi ble that the "Operati on Ki ller"
and the "Hunter Ki ller Teams" have been so wi dely publi ci zed to
Chi nese forces that they do not beli eve that they would be allowed to
surrender? The wi de publi ci ty and constant repeti ti on of the "ki ller"
i ntent of our operati ons and the gloati ng of the press, and apparently
even the i ndi vi duals i n the Battle Area, over the numbers ki lled versus
the numbers captured, has led to a good deal of unfavorable i nter-
nati onal reacti ons.
Demonst rat i ng t hat he di d i ndeed understand the perspecti ve of the
c omba t soldi er, McCl ure added:
I fully recogni ze that our troops must adopt a tough, hard-boi led ki ller
atti tude i f they are goi ng to not only survi ve, but to wi n these battles.
I wonder, however, i f that i ndoctri nati on, whi ch, I repeat, i s very
necessary, needs to be wi dely publi ci zed i n the press and broadcast to
our enemi es. 45
Wi l l oughby' s response to McCl ure acknowl edged t hat the "un-
f avorabl e psychol ogi cal effects caused by recent publ i ci ty of such t erms as
' Operat i onal Ki l l er' have been recogni zed here, and you wi ll note t hat
8th Ar my news rel eases have avoi ded such phraseol ogy. " Hi s repl y also
i ndi cated t hat he accepted several of McCl ure' s other suggesti ons on
propaganda themes and t echni ques: 6 Thus, through personal and offi ci al
correspondence and di scussi ons wi th key personnel, adroi t use of hi s re-
l ati onshi p wi th the Secret ary of the Army, and vi si ts to the Far East
Co mma nd - - b y both hi msel f and members of hi s st a f f - - Mc Cl u r e kept hi s
fi nger on the pulse of events i n Korea at the same ti me t hat he struggl ed
to staf f OCP W and establ i sh a ni che for hi s new organi zati on wi thi n the
Pent agon bureaucracy.
These efforts by OCPW to hel p were not al ways appreci at ed by HQ
FECOM. As an exampl e, i n Ja nua ry 1952, Li eut enant General Doyl e O.
Hi ckey, Chi ef of Staff, FECOM, wrote to McCl ure questi oni ng a Uni ted
Press story enti tl ed, "Psy Wa r Accounts for Thi rd of POW' s. " Hi ckey fel t
that the story was an exaggerati on:
Whi le psychologi cal warfare has unquesti onably been one factor i n
loweri ng the combat effecti veness of enemy soldi ers and i n i nfluenci ng
many of them to desert, i t seems evi dent that i n almost all cases the
acti on of our ground troops, supported by other combat arms, remai ns
the strongest and most di rect reason for the capture of pri soners. 47
McCl ure demonst rat ed consi derabl e tact i n hi s response, telli ng
Hi ckey, "I share fully your concern over the tendency to overpl ay the
results of psychol ogi cal warf are operati ons as evi denced i n the Uni ted
Press di spatch whi ch you brought to my attenti on i n your l etter of
13 Ja nua r y. " Never losi ng an opportuni ty to sell hi s wares, however,
McCl ure f urt her el aborated:
On the whole, I beli eve that we have been successful i n our determi ned
effort to keep psychologi cal warfare i n a proper context wi thi n the
"fami ly of weapons." My vi ews on thi s poi nt are i ncluded i n the
Secretary's report whi ch states: "Psychologi cal warfare has been
fi rmly recogni zed as an i ntegral member of our fami ly of weapons.
Whi le we reali ze fully that thi s mode of operati on i s not deci si ve by
i tself, i t i s also certai n that, i n combi nati on wi th the conventi onal
combat weapons, psychologi cal warfare wi ll contri bute materi ally to
the wi nni ng of wars. ''4~
The report t hat McCl ure referred to was the Secret ary of the Ar my' s
semi annual report, whi ch was i ncluded i n the Semi annual Report of the
Secret ary of Def ense- - i l l ust rat i ng agai n the si mi l ari ty of vi ews between
Secret ary Pace and the Chi ef, OCPW, on the subj ect of psychol ogi cal
warf are. Thi s exchange of letters, however, also i l l ustrates the tendency of
conventi onal commanders to be sensi ti ve to acti ons t hat appear to down-
grade the "pr i ma r y role of the combat role of the combat troops i n the
fi eld," as Hi ckey expressed i t, and thus to consi der psychol ogi cal warf are
as stri ctl y an anci l l ary, supporti ng acti vi ty. As an i nf antry offi cer, McCl ure
recogni zed thi s tendency, and hi s repl y to General Hi ckey reflects an
at t empt both to pl acate the conventi onal c omma nde r ' s vi e w- - t o take a
balanced posi ti on, that i s--and also to i nsure that "psywar" recei ved the
recogni ti on that he felt i t deserved. McClure walked thi s parti cular ti ght-
rope often.
The Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on, FECOM, had other cri ti ci sms to
make about the support recei ved from the home front. These i ncluded a
seri ous shortage of personnel wi th psychologi cal warfare trai ni ng or experi -
ence, parti cularly duri ng the fi rst 18 to 24 months of the war; the lack of
fi rm, prompt hi gh-level poli cy gui dance and operati onal di recti ves; the
li mi tati ons of current pri nti ng, loudspeaker, and di ssemi nati on equi pment;
the seri ous shortage of li ngui sts; and the lack of understandi ng of psycho-
logi cal warfare capabi li ti es by commanders and troops at all echelons,
whi ch FECOM attri buted to an apparently i neffecti ve ori entati on program
i n the Uni ted States. FECOM fi nally overcame thi s last defi ci ency, i t
clai med, through hi gh-level emphasi s on, and ori entati on by, the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Secti on wi thi n the theater; at the end of the confli ct,
"all di vi si ons and corps commanders were enthusi asti c supporters of psy-
war, demandi ng psywar support beyond abi li ty of psywar agenci es to
produce. ''4~
In spi te of these di fferences of perspecti ve between FECOM and
OCPW, i t i s apparent that General McClure and hi s staff genui nely strove
both to assi st FECOM to i nfluence the organi zati on and conduct of psycho-
logi cal warfare i n Korea. In large measure, these efforts were successful,
due pri nci pally to the personal i nterest and sponsorshi p of Secretary Pace,
to the provi si on of psychologi cal warfare personnel and uni ts by OCPW,
and to the energeti c, dedi cated leadershi p of General McClure. Uncon-
venti onal warfare acti vi ty i n Korea, however, was another story.
OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea
General McClure's atti tude toward FECOM' s conduct of uncon-
venti onal warfare operati ons was si mi lar to hi s vi ews on i ts psychologi cal
warfare efforts, and perhaps even more cri ti cal. Hi s cri ti ci sms focused on
two broad areas: overall organi zati on and planni ng for unconventi onal
warfare by FECOM, and CIA i nvolvement.
When the Korean war started, the mi ni mal psychologi cal warfare
organi zati on that exi sted i n FECOM exceeded the one for unconventi onal
warfare. Operati ons were i ni ti ated i n the wi nter of 1950 by the G-3, 8th
Army, when i t appeared that the potenti al exi sted for the use of di saffected
North Korean ci vi li an personnel i n behi nd-the-li nes acti vi ti es. Offi cers and
enli sted personnel--many of them wi th no previ ous experi ence i n uncon-
venti onal warfare--were recrui ted from wi thi n the theater to trai n and
di rect these nati ve personnel i n guerri lla acti vi ti es. To control these oper-
ati ons, the G-3 Mi scellaneous Group, 8th Army, was formed; later redes-
i gnated the Mi scellaneous Group, 8086th Army Uni t, i t fi nally was called
the Far East Command Li ai son Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Uni t.
Accordi ng to i ts Table of Di stri buti on (TD), the mi ssi on of the 8086th was
the followi ng:
1. To develop and di rect parti san warfare by trai ni ng i n sabotage
i ndi genous groups and i ndi vi duals both wi thi n Alli ed li nes and
behi nd enemy li nes.
2. To supply parti san groups and agents operati ng behi nd enemy li nes
by means cf water and ai r transportati on. 5
Although tacti cal condi ti ons di ctated that more emphasi s be placed at
fi rst on operati ons as opposed to trai ni ng, by early 1952 the 8240th had
three control organi zati ons for guerri lla operati ons known as LEOPARD,
WOLFPACK, AND KIRKLAND; BAKER Secti on provi ded ai r support
(C-46' s and C-47's). All of the control organi zati ons were based on the
i slands off the east and west coasts of Korea. Whi le thei r strengths vari ed,
by late 1952, for example, LEOPARD reported 5,500 combat effecti ves
and WOLFPACK, 6,800. These forces operated as groups from centers
wi thi n North Korea whi le others conducted tacti cal rai ds, ambushes, and
amphi bi ous operati ons from the U.N.-held offshore i slands. Although US
personnel often accompani ed the tacti cal operati ons, they were rarely
assi gned i ndefi ni tely to the guerri lla forces located wi thi n mai nland North
Korea. As an example of thei r hi t-and-run acti vi ty, the Far East Command
reported a total of 63 rai ds and 25 patrols launched agai nst Communi st
forces duri ng the peri od 15-21 November 1952, resulti ng i n 1,382 enemy
casualti es, although, as was often the case i n such operati ons, the casualty
fi gures may have been i nflated. 5~
WOLFPACK provi des an excellent example of the manner i n whi ch
these unconventi onal warfare organi zati ons evolved and operated. Estab-
li shed i n March 1952, usi ng the standard battali on organi zati on as a gui de,
the i ni ti al force had an aggregate strength of 4,000 North Koreans. At the
begi nni ng, the US personnel consi sted of four offi cers--the commander,
one offi cer i n WOLFPACK headquarters, and two i n subordi nate uni ts--
and three enli sted men, two of whom were communi cati ons speci ali sts.
Combat operati ons were requi red concurrently wi th the process of or-
gani zi ng, equi ppi ng, and trai ni ng. Ini ti ally, si x battali on-type uni ts were
organi zed, each wi th an operati ng base on a separate i sland, and by
June 1952 two more uni ts had been created. By December 1952 the
WOL F P ACK staf f consi sted, i n US personnel , of a commander, $3, $2,
two enli sted radi o operators, one operati ons noncommi ssi oned offi cer
( NCO) , and one i ntelli gence NCO. The $3 and $2 were l i eutenants wi th-
out previ ous unconventi onal warf are or speci al operati ons experi ence. Onl y
three of the ei ght subordi nate uni ts were commanded by US offi cers (cap-
tai ns), the others by Nort h Koreans. The captai n general l y functi oned as
a commander of a group the si ze of a battal i on. A total of two enli sted men
served i n these subordi nate uni ts as general assi stants and, on occasi on, as
deputi es to the captai ns to whom they were assi gned. 52
The operati ons conducted by WOLF P ACK uni ts were general l y di -
vi ded i nto three categori es: coastal , i ntermedi ate, and i nteri or. Coastal
operati ons were pl anned on a conventi onal basi s wi th forces of up to 800
men; they often i nvolved the use of ai r and naval fi re support and had as
thei r pri mary obj ecti ve the ki lli ng and capt ure of personnel. Int ermedi at e
operati ons f urther i nland were executed by groups of 5 to 10 men over a
peri od of 3 to 5 days, and were general l y di rected at pi npoi nt targets such
as gun posi ti ons, wi re li nes, and targets vul nerabl e to sni pi ng and demol i -
ti ons. Interi or operati ons represented the more classi c guerri l l a warf are
operati ons; i n these operati ons, a smal l el ement made an i ni ti al recon-
nai ssance, followed by a l arger i ncrement, then by recrui ti ng i n the oper-
ati onal area and i nfi ltrati on of the fi nal group. Pl anni ng usual l y called for
these forces to i nfi l trate i n the spri ng and to remai n unti l Nove mbe r of the
same year. 53
In 1953, a cadre f rom WOL F P ACK and the other organi zati ons
subordi nate to the Far East Comma nd Li ai son Det achment (8240th Ar my
Uni t ) were used to f orm what was called the Uni ted Nat i ons Parti san
Forces i n Korea ( UNPFK) . UNP F K consi sted of fi ve parti san i nf antry
regi ments and one parti san ai rborne i nf antry regi ment. It was pl anned that
thi s "fi rst Uni ted Nat i ons Parti san Di vi si on" would reach a strength of
20, 000 personnel by March 1952. Gui del i nes to the regi mental com-
manders f rom the 8240th i ncluded the followi ng advi ce:
Ini ti ati ve and aggressi veness tempered by calm judgement wi ll be
encouraged. Avoi d tryi ng to wi n the war by yourself; pace the attack
i n accordance wi th your advantage; when the advantage has passed,
get away to fi ght another day. Hi t and run; these are the guerri lla's
tacti cs. The planni ng of such an operati on should i nclude an escape
route and rallyi ng poi nt. Substi tute speed and surpri se for mass. 54
Unfortunately, as the organi zati on grew larger and more con-
venti onal, accordi ng to one parti ci pant, the effecti veness of i ts operati ons
decreased correspondi ngly) s
To oversee these unconventi onal warfare operati ons i n Korea, HQ
FECOM i n Tokyo establi shed the Far East Command Li ai son Group
(FECLG) under the operati onal control of the G-2. The Documents Re-
search Di vi si on, a part of the Speci al Staff, HQ FECOM (headed by a CIA
representati ve), controlled the CIA' s operati ons. The Joi nt Advi sory Com-
mi ssi on Korea (JACK), whose head was a mi li tary offi cer assi gned to the
CIA, controlled the CIA operati ons i n Korea--both OSO and OPC. Acti v-
i ti es of the CIA ran the gamut from covert i ntelli gence to unconventi onal
warfare. The CIA placed agents to collect i ntelli gence and assi st downed
pi lots i n escape and evasi on. It conducted sabotage and small boat patrols
for tacti cal i nformati on on both the east and west coasts. It organi zed
i ndi genous forces to remai n behi nd for shallow penetrati on patrolli ng to
augment combat patrolli ng and gai n i nformati on for large tacti cal oper-
ati ons. It conducted some guerri lla warfare. As one mi ght expect, the
vari ety of unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es engaged i n by both the CIA
and the servi ces resulted i n some confli cti ng and overlappi ng i nterests) 6
In an attempt to eli mi nate thi s confli ct, an organi zati on for Covert,
Clandesti ne and Related Acti vi ti es i n Korea (CCRAK) was acti vated i n
December 1951. Its purpose was to centrali ze di recti on of all servi ces and
CIA unconventi onal warfare operati ons at Headquarters, FECOM, by
combi ni ng them i n one organi zati on to support US forces i n Korea.
CCRAK was put under the di rect command of CINCFE, but conti nued
under the staff supervi si on of G-2. The Deputy Chi ef, CCRAK, was an
i ndi vi dual desi gnated by the Chi ef, Documents Research Secti on, CIA.
Colonel Archi bald Stuart, US Army, i nstalled as the Chi ef of CCRAK,
soon after was promoted to bri gadi er general. Essenti ally, however, the
unconventi onal warfare organi zati on of the servi ces and the CIA i n Korea
remai ned unchanged, wi th conti nui ng lack of coordi nati on between thei r
acti vi ti es, s7
It was thi s apparent lack of coordi nati on of unconventi onal warfare
acti vi ti es and the relati ve autonomy enjoyed by the CIA that most con-
cerned General McClure, Chi ef, OCPW. In early 1951, he had already
commented on the "unusual organi zati on" that FECOM had establi shed
"whereby responsi bi li ty for covert operati ons and speci al operati ons behi nd
the li nes i s placed i n the offi ce of the AC of S [Assi stant Chi ef of Staff],
G-2, i n addi ti on to i ts i ntelli gence responsi bi li ty." He thought that such
operati ons should be the responsi bi li ty of G- 3 or, even better, of a speci al
staff di vi si on for both psychologi cal warf are and speci al operati ons, s8 As we
have seen, McCl ure had recommended to FECOM that such a di vi si on be
establi shed, and i t was, i n June 1951. But the new di vi si on's responsi bi li ti es
for speci al operati ons apparentl y exi sted i n name only. In real i ty those
responsi bi li ti es resi ded wi thi n the G- 2. Calli ng the G- 3' s attenti on to the
apparent contraventi on by FECOM of i ts own general order that had
establi shed a Speci al Operati ons Secti on wi thi n the Psychol ogi cal Warf are
Di vi si on, McCl ure recommended t hat a cabl e be di spatched to CI NCFE
requesti ng clari fi cati on of (1) theater command and staff organi zati on for
planni ng and conduct of overt and covert unconventi onal warf are and
psychologi cal warfare, and (2) the rel ati onshi p of CI A/ OP C to that
organi zati on. 59
Two months later, the recommendati on was returned to OCPW wi th-
out acti on wi th the comment, "Whe n the psychologi cal warf are organi za-
ti on wi thi n FECOM has been establi shed on a fi rm basi s, i t i s consi dered
t hat representati ves from your offi ce should go to the Far East Command
to di scuss psychologi cal warf are acti vi ti es. " Whi l e thi s response from G- 3
may have been an at t empt to keep an overzeal ous OCPW from appeari ng
to questi on the prerogati ves of a theater commander, i t was also i ndi cati ve
of deeper tensi ons between McCl ure' s offi ce and those of the pri nci pal staff
agenci es, parti cul arl y the G- 2 and G- 3. These tensi ons were the result of
many factors, i ncludi ng the personal i ty confli cts that often devel op when
strong-wi lled men di sagree over i ssues. For exampl e, there was "bad feel-
i ng" between McCl ure and the G--2, Maj or General Bolli ng, part of whi ch
was due to j uri sdi cti onal di fferences over the staff responsi bli ty for escape
and evasi on. Perhaps the maj or factor, however, was the beli ef of many
staff offi cers that the relati vely new fi elds of psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warf are were "i nci dental acti vi ti es" that demanded an unjus-
ti fi ed share of attenti on and resources i n terms of thei r real val ue to the
Army. Thi s atti tude extended parti cul arl y to the younger fi eld, uncon-
venti onal warfare. Unf ort unat el y the si ngle-mi nded dedi cati on wi th whi ch
some of McCl ure' s staff pursued the creati on of Speci al Forces al i enated
many of those wi th whom they had to coordi nate poli ci es and acti vi ti es. 6
Undeterred by the G- 3 rebuff, McCl ure tri ed other tacti cs to empha-
si ze hi s poi nt on staff organi zati on. Wri ti ng to the Chi ef of Staff, FECOM,
i n October 195 l, he observed:
I understand that i n the setup of your new Psywar Di vi si on you have
not yet reached a fi rm deci si on on the placi ng of the speci al opera-
ti ons and parti cularly guerri lla warfare and si mi lar type acti vi ti es. I
strongly rei terate my comment to you on my vi si t to your headquarters
i n Apri l, that Psywar and Speci al Operati ons are so i nterrelated that
they should be under the same Staff Di vi si on. 6~
Wi th perhaps some exaggerati on, he added: " We have found the
organi zati on here at the Depart ment of the Ar my level to be worki ng
spendi dl y and i n compl ete harmony wi th other St af f Di vi si ons, both Gener-
al and Speci al . "
McCl ure' s pri nci pal concern about pl aci ng speci al operati ons under
G- 2 was t hat i t mi ght then be gi ven a lower pri ori ty:
Whi le Speci al Operati ons has some aspects of i ntelli gence gatheri ng,
that i s by no means i ts pri nci pal mi ssi on, and i f i t remai ns under G- 2
ri sks bei ng subordi nated to the i ntelli gence fi eld. All our planni ng here
contemplates the separati on of the i ntelli gence fi eld from the Speci al
Operati ons fi eld . . . . I feel very strongly that the Speci al Operati ons
i s as i t states an operati on more appropri ately moni tored by G- 3 than
G-2.
The recommendat i on had li ttle effect, so, several months l ater Mc-
Cl ure deci ded to t ry anot her tack. He prepared a comprehensi ve anal ysi s
of F ECOM' s organi zati on for psychol ogi cal and speci al operati ons for
General Ma r k Cl ark, who had repl aced General Ri dgeway as Comma nde r
i n Chi ef, Far East, i n Apri l 1952. Revi ewi ng hi s recommendat i on to Ri dge-
way i n Apri l 1951 to establ i sh an organi zati on to handl e psychol ogi cal and
speci al operati ons and the subsequent F ECOM general order i n June 1951
to establ i sh such an offi ce, McCl ure observed:
Whi le 1 have no desi re to prescri be or unduly i nfluence the organi za-
ti on whi ch should be adopted by any Theater Commander, I would
li ke to poi nt out the fact that Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on, GHQ
FECOM has to date assumed only those functi ons pertai ni ng to Psy-
chologi cal Warfare. Speci al Operati ons has remai ned under the Assi s-
tant Chi ef of Staff, G-2. 62
As a resul t of a JCS message i n August 1951, CI A and Covert
Operat i ons i n Korea had been pl aced under CI NFE. The acti vati on of
CCRAK was an at t empt to bri ng all behi nd-the-l i ne operati ons under a
si ngle c omma nd agency, but CCRAK remai ned under the general staff
supervi si on of G- 2, FECOM, as McCl ure remi nded Cl ark. Addi t i onal l y- -
and thi s was a parti cul arl y cruci al poi nt wi th the Chi ef, OCP W- - CI A, Far
East Comma nd, i nsi sted t hat J ACK (C1A, Korea) be mai nt ai ned as an
i ntegral organi zati on and remai n under the control of CIA, Far East.
Based on fi eld tri p reports by members of hi s offi ce, thei r experi ences
and j udgments, plus a comprehensi ve debri efi ng of a f ormer member of
CCRAK, McCl ure offered the followi ng conclusi ons i n hi s analysi s for
Clark:
2.
G-2, FEC, General Staff supervi si on of CCRAK and all behi nd-
the-li ne operati ons have resulted i n emphasi s on i ntelli gence, rather
than adequate developi ng i ndi genous forces [guerri lla] i n North
Korea and i n support of 8th Army.
To obtai n a balance of G-2, G-3 i nterest, thi s offi ce i s of the opi ni on
that Speci al Operati ons functi ons should be placed i n the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Secti on, FEC.
3.
4.
5.
In order to eli mi nate dupli cati on of personnel, equi pment, and
faci li ti es, and to i nsure effi ci ent coordi nated operati ons, CIA,
Korea, should be i ntegrated i nto a joi nt task force organi zati on
(Army, Navy, Ai r, and CIA) under the command of CINCFE.
The organi zati onal i ntegri ty poli cy advocated by CIA i s a basi c
factor adversely affecti ng Speci al Forces operati ons i n Korea.
Hi ghly quali fi ed personnel for key posi ti ons i n Speci al Operati ons
furni shed i n accordance wi th a speci al FEC requi si ti on are not fully
uti li zed i n thi s f i e l d . 63
These conclusi ons and thei r supporti ng di scussi on vi vi dly depi ct the
extent of OCPW' s di sapproval wi th the autonomous CIA role i n Korea.
Whi l e all behi nd-the-l i ne operati ons were ostensi bly under the control of
CI NCFE, i n reali ty, McCl ure argued, a dual chai n of command exi sted.
The commander of CCRAK took hi s orders from CI NCFE; the Dep-
uty Chi ef, CCRAK, recei ved hi s marchi ng orders from Documents Re-
search Di vi si on (CIA, Far East), who i n turn recei ved i ts gui dance from
CIA headquarters i nWashi ngt on. At the operati onal level, thi s meant that
JACK (CIA, Korea) di d not carry out mi ssi ons i n support of the 8th Army
wi thout authori ty from CIA, Far East. Coordi nati on of the unconventi onal
warf are operati ons run by CCRAK and the 8th Army was too dependent
on the personali ti es of key i ndi vi duals, he felt. Ironi cally, the CIA i n Korea
i ntegrated mi l i tary personnel i nto i ts organi zati on and often engaged i n
acti vi ti es si mi lar to those conducted by the 8th Army, but wi thout proper
overall coordi nati on. All i n all, McCl ure argued, CIA' s i nsi stence on or-
gani zati onal i ntegri ty resulted i n an allegedly j oi nt command, CCRAK,
that had no authori ty to exerci se command juri sdi cti on over CIA personnel
and efforts, i n unnecessary dupli cati on of personnel and acti vi ti es, and i n
multi ple channels that compli cated the coordi nati on and i ntegrati on of
operati ons. Together wi th the lack of overall formal planni ng and trai ni ng
for unconventi onal warfare by CCRAK or any other agency and the
emphasi s placed on i ntelli gence as opposed to guerri lla warfare, these
problems added up to a si tuati on where the potenti al for behi nd-the-li nes
operati ons was far from bei ng reali zed, McClure and hi s staff beli eved. 64
As we shall see, OCPW' s di fferences wi th the CIA were the harbi nger of
si mi lar frustrati ons encountered by OCPW i n i ts efforts to create Speci al
Forces and to plan for thei r use i n Europe, and i s a major theme i n
the evoluti on of the Army's attempt to create i ts own speci al warfare
capabi li ty.
Shortly after hi s memorandum to General Clark, McClure rei terated
hi s vi ew to G-3: "I beli eve that the unconventi onal warfare organi zati on
for Korea, i ncludi ng CIA/ OPC parti ci pati on therei n, reflects fundamental
and seri ous defects, speci fi cally for the conduct of guerri lla warfare."
McClure cri ti ci zed the conduct of guerri lla warfare i n Korea as "essen-
ti ally mi nor i n consequence and sporadi c i n nature" and stated the
FECOM lacked "an overall, i ntegrated program of Speci al Forces i n
Korea." It i s i nteresti ng to note that OCPW began to use the term "Speci al
Forces Operati ons," as di fferenti ated from "speci al operati ons," to
descri be US Army parti ci pati on i n guerri lla warfare acti vi ti es. "Speci al
operati ons," through long usage i n the Army and as outli ned i n "Fi eld
Servi ce Regulati ons" (Fi eld Manual 100-5), related to "ni ght com-
bat," "jungle operati ons," "joi nt amphi bi ous operati ons," and si mi lar
acti vi ti es. 6s
Actually, few Speci al Forces personnel were used for unconventi onal
warfare operati ons i n Korea. The 10th Speci al Forces Group was not
offi ci ally created unti l May 1952, at whi ch ti me i t began trai ni ng and
conti nued recrui ti ng efforts for personnel. Although OCPW urged HQ
FECOM i n November 1952 and January 1953 to requi si ti on Speci al
Forces staff personnel and detachments, FECOM di d not act unti l the
spri ng of 1953, when i t requested deployment of 55 offi cers and 9 enli sted
men from the 10th Speci al Forces Group. Some of these personnel became
di si llusi oned wi th thei r assi gnments i n Korea, beli evi ng that thei r Speci al
Forces and ai rborne trai ni ng were not properly uti li zed. More i mportantly,
however, there were no Speci al Forces operati onal detachments, as op-
posed to i ndi vi duals, requested and employed by the Far East Command.
An excellent opportuni ty to test unconventi onal warfare doctri ne and or-
gani zati on was lost, or so General McClure thought because he complai ned
of hi s di ffi culty i n getti ng experi ence data f rom F ECOM and of hi s di sap-
poi ntment i n F ECOM' s fai l ure to conduct "l a bor a t or y" tests of guerri l l a
operati ons. 66
Al though McCl ure conti nued throughout hi s tenure as Chi ef, OCPW,
to have reservati ons about the Far East Comma nd' s organi zati on and
conduct of unconventi onal warf are, not everyone shared hi s vi ews. A staf f
vi si t to FECOM by a me mbe r of the Joi nt Subsi di ary Pl ans Di vi si on i n l ate
1951 not onl y confi rmed t hat the organi zati on for the "covert " aspects of
unconventi onal warf are di d not follow the general li nes of command and
staf f responsi bi l i ty establ i shed by OCPW, but also resul ted i n the obser-
vati on t hat there was li ttle i ncl i nati on to do so:
There i s nowhere wi thi n FEC a desi re to organi ze covert acti vi ti es
under a Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on as i n D/ A [Department of the
Army]. The organi zati on i s sui table to the personali ti es and operati ons
wi thi n the theater. It i s sound, workable, and has the unquali fi ed
backi ng of both the mi li tary and CIA personnel concerned from top to
bottom. Offi cers wi thi n the theater are of the opi ni on, and ri ghtly so,
that the theater should be free to solve i ts organi zati onal problems i n
i ts own way; that what may seem i deal organi zati onally to far-off
Washi ngton i s not necessari ly the best soluti on to those more nearly
under the gu ns . 67
The tone of thi s report i ndi cates t hat the JCS had some sympat hy wi th
F ECOM' s posture on thi s matter. Furt hermore, as we have seen, the
Depart ment of the Ar my G- 2 and G- 3 f rom ti me to ti me resi sted OCPW' s
at t empt s to i nfluence F ECOM' s organi zati on and conduct of uncon-
venti onal warfare. The records of thi s peri od reveal i nstances where G- 3
i n parti cul ar tri ed to stop or "t one down" OCPW' s i ni ti ati ves and proposed
cables. In earl y 1953, for exampl e, G- 3 nonconcurred i n a cabl e f rom
OCPW to FECOM requesti ng i nf ormati on about the status and role of
"part i san forces. " Observi ng tartl y t hat "consi deri ng the number of G- 2
and P S YWAR offi cers who have vi si ted FECOM wi thi n the past few
months for the purpose of exami ni ng CCRAK organi zati on and acti vi ti es,
there should be no dearth of i nf ormati on on the subj ect i n D/ A, " the G- 3
response went on to conclude: "Whi l e the ostensi bl e purpose of the pro-
posed cabl e i s to obtai n i nf ormati on, the overall effect tends towards vei led
suspi ci on that CI NCF E i s on the ' wrong track. ' ' ' 68
Thi s was, of course, exactl y what McCl ure' s offi ce suspected, but
OCP W efforts to get F ECOM to recogni ze the errors of i ts ways i n uncon-
venti onal warf are general l y came to naught. Al though the Ar my Chi ef of
Staff, General Colli ns, shared some of McCl ure' s concerns about lack of a
fully i ntegrated joi nt staff i n Korea for unconventi onal warfare, the Far
East commander, General Clark, i nsi sted that the CIA' s organi zati onal
i ntegri ty under CCRAK be mai ntai ned. And whi le Clark also i nstructed
hi s staff to establi sh closer li ai son wi th OCPW, thi s di d not result i n any
si gni fi cant organi zati onal changes by FECOM i n i ts handli ng of uncon-
venti onal warfare. 69
For all practi cal purposes, both Far East Command and the CIA went
thei r own ways, uni nfluenced by General McClure and hi s staff.
In summary, wi th the i mpetus of the Korean war, the Army moved i n
late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organi zati on--the Offi ce of the
Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare. The personal i nterest and persi stent pres-
sure that Secretary of the Army Pace brought to bear on seni or Army
offi cers, both before and after the outbreak of war, were key factors i n thi s
step. Wi th Pace's support, Bri gadi er General McClure created a staff
under whi ch were placed the responsi bi li ti es for both psychologi cal and
unconventi onal warfare. Whi le i n the process of staffi ng and organi zi ng
thi s offi ce, MeClure energeti cally turned to the emergency i n Korea i n an
attempt to assi st and i nfluence FECOM' s organi zati on and conduct of
psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare--capabi li ti es that the Army
had neglected duri ng the i nterwar years. He was successful wi th psycho-
logi cal warfare, less so wi th unconventi onal. The confli ct i n Korea, how-
ever, i s only one part of the story i n our quest to determi ne why the Army
deci ded to establi sh the Psychologi cal Warfare Center and to create the
10th Speci al Forces Group. To complete the pi cture, we must next exami ne
the events that were taki ng place i n the Uni ted States and i n Europe.
VII
THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG
Spurred by the war i n Korea and the persi stent pressure of Secretary
of the Army Frank Pace, the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare
(OCPW) was created i n early 1951--a key li nk i n the chai n of events
leadi ng to establi shment of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort
Bragg, N.C. Under the leadershi p of Bri gadi er General Robert A. Mc-
Clure, OCPW i ni ti ated plans that resulted i n thi s unprecedented center
and i n acti vati on of an equally unprecedented concept and organi zati on,
Speci al Forces. To complete our exami nati on of how and why thi s
occurred--that i s, to understand the ori gi ns of a "speci al warfare" capabi l-
i ty for the Army- - we must look beyond t he more obvi ous sti mulus of the
Korean emergency to events taki ng place both i n Europe and i n the Uni ted
States.
Psywar in Europe
Whi le the confli ct i n Korea naturally occupi ed a major share of
OCPW' s attenti on, McClure found soon after arri val i n Washi ngton that
acquai ntances i n the European theater would be remi ndi ng hi m of thei r
needs. In December 1950, Major General Dani el Noce, Chi ef of Staff of
Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM) sent hi m a "Dear Bob"
letter:
I was sorry to hear that you lost your ni ce bi llet on the West Coast, but
feel that the Army wi ll benefi t materi ally from your assi gnment as
head of the new Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on i n the Department.
Certai nly, we have no other offi cer who has the broad experi ence whi ch
you have had i n that fi eld. ~
After thi s i ntroductory compli ment, General Noce got down to busi -
ness, stati ng that EUCOM' s di ffi culty i n obtai ni ng quali fi ed offi cers for
I11
112 THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG
psychologi cal warf are and speci al operati ons had substanti al l y slowed
progress i n planni ng for these acti vi ti es. He outli ned hi s needs for trai ned
offi cers i n both fi elds, i ndi cati ng that these needs had been di scussed re-
centl y wi th Li eutenant Col onel J. R. Deane, Jr., whom McCl ure had sent
to Europe on a li ai son tri p. Interesti ngl y, i n a comment that reflects some
of McCl ure' s organi zati onal phi losophy, Noce added:
The organi zati on of your di vi si on works i n qui te well wi th the psycho-
logi cal warfare and unconventi onal warfare organi zati on whi ch we
have establi shed i n thi s headquarters, si nce we have placed both of
these acti vi ti es i n one branch of our OPOT (G-3) Di vi si on.
McCl ure' s reply on 15 January 1951 reflected hi s frustrati on i n at-
tempti ng to restore speci ali zed ski lls neglected i n the i mmedi ate post-
Worl d Wa r II peri od:
I fully appreci ate your di ffi culty i n obtai ni ng quali fi ed offi cers for
psychologi cal warfare and unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es. We are
encounteri ng the same di ffi culti es here. I am greatly embarrassed that
we have been unable so far to furni sh you the two offi cers for psycho-
logi cal warfare planni ng whi ch you requested i n a radi o message some
ti me ago. 2
Thi s i s preci sely the condi ti on that McCl ure and a few other far-
si ghted i ndi vi duals had tri ed to avoi d when, j ust a few years earli er, they
had l amented the di spersal of people wi th Worl d War II experi ence and
had warned about the lack of attenti on bei ng pai d to mai ntai ni ng a psycho-
logi cal warf are capabi li ty. Now thei r propheci es had been fulfi lled. As one
of the few seni or offi cers who grasped the complexi ti es and possi bi li ti es of
thi s speci ali zed fi eld, McCl ure struggled to trai n personnel i n both the US
and the overseas theaters.
Unabl e to provi de the pl anners that General Noce i mmedi atel y needed,
McCl ure offered i n hi s 15 January letter to do "'some li ttle work here along
that li ne as suggesti ons for you. " In thi s same letter, McCl ure agai n
di scussed the val uabl e contri buti on made by ci vi li ans i n psychologi cal
warfare, menti oni ng speci fi cally the forthcomi ng vi si t to Europe of C. D.
Jackson, hi s f ormer deputy throughout Worl d War II. He also provi ded a
l engthy i llustrati on of what he called the "practi cal si de of back stoppi ng"
psychologi cal warf are operati ons, emphasi zi ng:
It i s for thi s reason of thi nki ng the problem through from the leaflets
i n the enemy soldi er or ci vi li an hands back to the tree from whi ch the
pulp i s produced, that a man wi th Jackson's experi ence wi ll be essen-
THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG 113
ti al. God forbi d that you go through the growi ng pai ns, tri al and error,
and frustrati ons that we di d i n World War I1 unti l we fi nally reached
maturi ty. I can assure you that we wi ll gi ve you all the help possi ble
back here.
And help he di d. McClure sent General Noce several gui dance mate-
ri als for psychologi cal warfare planni ng, i ncludi ng trai ni ng ci rculars, pro-
gram schedules, a draft Nati onal Psychologi cal Warfare Plan for General
War, the State Department's "Russi an Plan," and esti mates of logi sti cal
requi rements for psychologi cal warfare planni ng. 3 Increased efforts were
made to provi de the offi cers EUCOM needed, and by October a small
Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on had been formed i n the Speci al Plans
Branch of Headquarters, EUCOM. The 301st Radi o Broadcasti ng and
Leaflet (RB&L) Group, a New York Ci ty reserve uni t, was recalled to
acti ve duty, sent to Fort Ri ley, Kansas, for trai ni ng, and shi pped to Europe
i n November, together wi th the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L)
Company/
The deci si on to shi p the 301st RB&L Group to Europe was i tself
fraught wi th controversy and i ndi cati ve of the competi ng requi rements that
OCPW faced duri ng thi s hecti c peri od. General Wi lloughby, G-2, GHQ
FECOM, felt that assi gnment of the 301st to the Far East Command
would be the most practi cal soluti on to FECOM' s urgent needs, and
McClure i ni ti ally agreed wi th thi s assi gnment. A deci si on by G-3 to honor
the correspondi ng and pri or need expressed by the European theater forced
McClure to backtrack, however. Instead, the 1st Radi o Broadcasti ng and
Leaflet Group, a prototype uni t stati oned at Fort Ri ley, was shi pped to
FECOM. ~
In addi ti on to provi di ng such help as i t could to EUCOM, OCPW was
also i nvolved i n numerous planni ng acti ons for balanci ng the percei ved
Sovi et threat i n Europe. An example of such acti ons was a meeti ng called
by the Joi nt Strategi c Plans Di vi si on (JSPD) of the mi li tary servi ces'
psychologi cal warfare representati ves. The meeti ng explored sources of
di scontent wi thi n Sovi et satelli te servi ces (whi ch could be exploi ted for
propaganda to reduce morale), and means by whi ch the servi ces could
furni sh the State Department wi th materi als for psychologi cal warfare
agai nst the U.S.S.R. and i ts satelli te forces. The Acti ng Chi ef, JSPD,
agreed to awai t OCPW' s submi ssi on of an outli ne plan for overt psycho-
logi cal attack agai nst Sovi et and satelli te forces--a plan that would confi ne
i tself to mi li tary psychologi cal vui nerabi li ti es--before taki ng further ac-
ti on. The Army could make thi s contri buti on because McClure had pre-
vi ously alerted hi s staff to prepare a draft plan, "EEl [Essenti al Elements
of Informati on], Psychol ogi cal Vulnerabi li ti es of Sovi et Armed Forces i n
Current Peri od (Draf t ). " Thi s parti cul ar plan was i llustrati ve of many such
acti ons i ni ti ated by McCl ure duri ng thi s ti me and reflected both hi s abi li ty
to anti ci pate needs and hi s desi re to lead the way i n psychologi cal warf are
planni ng among the servi ces. 6
He was to have some competi ti on on that l atter score, and OCPW' s
runni ng feud wi th the Ai r Force was i ndi cati ve of the i nterservi ce ri valry
t hat marked these years. Whi l e attendi ng a j oi nt EUCOM- USAFE (US
Ai r Force, Europe) conference i n Europe, McCl ure noted somewhat
peevi shly that whi le both the Army and Ai r Force had exhi bi ts at the
conference i llustrati ng psychologi cal warf are objecti ves, techni ques, and
hi stori cal examples, the Ai r Force exhi bi t "was an el aborate and expensi ve
one" that had been on tour i n the Uni ted States and would vi si t parts of
Europe. Moreover, i n hi s eyes the exhi bi t was mi sleadi ng:
It i s unfortunate that the ai r exhi bi t fai ls to i ndi cate any joi nt par-
ti ci pati on by other servi ces i n the fi eld of Psychologi cal Warfare. A
false i mpressi on i s gi ven that Ai r Force i s uni laterally conducti ng
Psychologi cal Warfare even i n Korea today. Korean leaflets used i n
the exhi bi t and sample ones gi ven to the audi ence leave the i mpressi on
that the Ai r Force determi nes the content, pri nts the leaflet, selects the
target, and then makes di stri buti on. Qui te the contrary, no leaflet has
been desi gned or pri nted by the Ai r Force i n the Far East command
to date. It i s an Army operati on except for ai rli ft di stri buti on. Thi s i s
the same practi ce as World War I I . 7
McCl ure had been cri ti cal of Ai r Force support of Army psychologi cal
warf are operati ons i n Korea, but thi s statement reveals an even deeper
concern that the Ai r Force, i n i ts organi zati on and acti vi ti es, was "goi ng
i nto Psywar i n a bi g way, di sturbi ngly so i n some respects, " as he remarked
to hi s st af f ) Apparentl y the Ai r Force felt that i t had clai m to a strategi c
role i n psychologi cal warf are beyond that of si mply provi di ng the ai rplanes
for leaflet di stri buti on. Not i llogi cally, i t argued that i n addi ti on to provi d-
i ng the ai rli ft through i ts speci al Aeri al Resuppl y and Communi cati on
( ARC) Wi ngs, i t should also be able to compose and pri nt leaflets. 9 In i ts
staff organi zati on, research projects and trai ni ng plans, the Ai r Force
embarked upon a psychologi cal warf are program that resulted i n what one
di si nterested Navy observer characteri zed as "t he clash of two growi ng
organi zati ons, Army and Ai r Force Psychologi cal Warf are. "1 But Mc-
Cl ure beli eved that the Ai r Force plans, i f i mpl emented, would "resul t i n
extravagant dupli cati on of the mi ni mal numbers of personnel and i tems of
equi pment envi saged for Army propaganda operati ons. " 11 McCl ure' s sus-
pi ci ons of Ai r Force i ntrusi ons i nto what he consi dered Army terrai n
conti nued unabat ed and were i ntensi fi ed by di sagreements over re-
sponsi bi li ti es for unconventi onal warfare.
Psychological Warfare Activities in the United .States
The requi rements of the t heat er commands i n both Europe and the
Far East, and the concurrent need to devel op a trai ni ng program and
supporti ng structure for psychol ogi cal warf are i n the Uni ted States, pl aced
heavy demands upon McCl ure' s offi ce. The i mmedi at e need for a quali fi ed
Psychol ogi cal Wa rf a re offi cer i n each Ar my headquart ers was met by
sendi ng selected personnel to a 17-week course at Georgetown Uni versi ty,
but thi s stopgap measure onl y scratched the surface. A l etter f rom one of
McCl ure' s staf f to the harri ed commander of the 1st Radi o Broadcasti ng
and Leafl et Group, bei ng readi ed at Fort Ri l ey for depl oyment to the Far
East, vi vi dly depi cts the si tuati on:
In order that you wi ll be better able to appreci ate the personnel prob-
lems faci ng us here, I would li ke to gi ve you a li ttle i ndi cati on of our
i mmedi ate requi rements for offi cers. We must fi nd 38 offi cers for your
Group, 24 offi cers for a student body for the fi rst uni t offi cers' course
i n the Psychologi cal Warfare School, 14 offi cers for the Staff and
Faculty of the Psychologi cal Warfare School, 5 offi cers for the 1st
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 8 offi cers for the 5th Loudspeaker
and Leaflet Company, whi ch i s to be acti vated i n the near future, and
approxi mately 20 addi ti onal offi cers for thi s offi ce. That totals 109
offi cers needed i n the i mmedi ate future and there are addi ti onal mi s-
cellaneous slots to be fi lled. To meet thi s requi rement, we have so far
requested approxi mately 100 offi cers. We are fi ndi ng that we get only
fi fty percent of those we request. Those now bei ng requested wi ll not
be avai lable at the earli est unti l late Apri l or May. However, we hope
to have enough avai lable by Mi d-Apri l to provi de a mi ni mum staff for
the uni ts at Ri ley, a mi ni mum staff for the School, and a small student
body for the fi rst uni t offi cers' course. ~2
As seen earl i er, pl ans to establ i sh the Psychol ogi cal Wa r f a r e De-
part ment as a part of the Ar my General School at Fort Ri l ey began i n the
wi nter of 1950 when General McCl ure f orwarded a request f rom the Chi ef,
Ar my Fi eld Forces (AFF), to assi gn Li eut enant Col onel John O. Weaver
as the Depart ment ' s fi rst Chi ef. Weaver fi nally acqui red enough of a
f acul ty to establ i sh "t he worl d' s fi rst f ormal school of mi l i tary propa-
ganda" i n the spri ng of 1951. The purpose of hi s fi rst endeavor, the psycho-
logi cal warfare offi cer course, was
to trai n selected offi cers for assi gnment to psychologi cal warfare staff
and operati onal uni ts; to develop i n offi cers an understandi ng of the
nature and employment of propaganda i n combat and to make them
knowledgeable of the organi zati on's methods and techni ques for the
tacti cal conduct of propaganda i n the fi eld) 3
The courses were desi gned to provi de a general i ntroducti on to psycho-
logi cal warfare, strategi c i ntelli gence, forei gn army organi zati on,
i ntelli gence, and psychologi cal operati ons, and lasted 6 to 7 weeks.
Between June 1951 and Apri l 1952, 4 offi cer and 2 noncommi ssi oned
offi cer classes were graduated--a total of 334 students, i ncludi ng Navy,
Mari ne Corps, and Ai r Force students, as well as Alli ed students from
Canada, Great Bri tai n, Denmark, Belgi um, France, and Ital y) 4
By Apri l 1951, OCPW had requested the acti vati on of fi ve psycho-
logi cal warfare uni ts: the 1st L&L Company wi th the 8th Army i n Korea;
the 2d L&L Company at Fort Ri ley as a prototype uni t; the 5th L&L
Company at Fort Ri ley, but scheduled to be sent to Europe; the 1st RB&L
Group at Fort Ri ley, ori gi nally a prototype uni t but scheduled to be sent
to the Far East Command; and the 301st (Reserve) RB&L Group, to be
trai ned at Fort Ri ley i n May, then shi pped to Europe. In addi ti on, OCPW
developed organi zati onal concepts and functi ons for these troop uni ts, as
well as for OCPW and a Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Speci al Staff, for
theater command use. Army Fi eld Forces recei ved a di recti ve to establi sh
trai ni ng programs for the general i ndoctri nati on of all mi li tary personnel
i n psychologi cal warfare and to prepare detai led programs for both acti ve
and reserve psychologi cal warfare uni ts. In accordance wi th thi s di recti ve,
all Army schools recei ved a request to i nclude general i ndoctri nati on i n-
structi on i n psychologi cal warfare i n thei r curri cula. And by the end of
May, McClure began sendi ng out the fi rst of a seri es of i nformati onal
letters desi gned to mai ntai n a close contact between OCPW and Psycho-
logi cal Warfare offi cers i n all Army headquarters, ts
To conduct nonmateri el research i n support of the burgeoni ng psycho-
logi cal warfare effort, the Army reli ed almost exclusi vely upon a ci vi li an
agency, the Operati ons Research Offi ce (ORO) operated under contract by
the Johns Hopki ns Uni versi ty. Studi es by ORO i ncluded a three-volume
basi c reference work for psychologi cal warfare, manuals for use by psycho-
logi cal warfare operators i n speci fi c countri es, an analysi s and groupi ng of
sample leaflets from World War II and Korea to develop classi fi cati on
schemes, and a large amount of fi eld operati ons research i n Korea.
McClure' s staff was not enti rely sati sfi ed wi th ORO' s work, clai mi ng that
thei r projects were "too general i n concept" and not sui table for use by the
Army' s psychologi cal operators. The Johns Hopki ns Uni versi ty also began
to have mi sgi vi ngs about the contract, beli evi ng that i t could not properly
perform the development research (as opposed to operati ons research)
requi red by OCPW i n support of psychologi cal warfare. Eventually the
Human Resources Research Offi ce was formed to supplant ORO and
undertake a general program i n psychologi cal research for the Army. j6
McClure was parti cularly i nterested i n i mprovi ng the development
and procurement of sui table materi el for the conduct of psychologi cal
warfare. He felt that "as a result of the 1945-49 hi atus i n psychologi cal
warfare and speci al operati ons planni ng," the mi li tary "entered the Korean
confli ct wi th li ttle more than obsolete pi eces of World War II equi pment."
Examples of equi pment under development were a mobi le reproducti on
uni t for propaganda leaflets, a newly desi gned li ghtwei ght portable loud-
speaker for use i n frontli ne operati ons, and a completely equi pped mobi le
5,000-watt radi o broadcasti ng stati on, t7
As i f these myri ad competi ng requi rements were not enough to keep
i t busy, OCPW soon faced the possi bi li ty of a reducti on i n ci vi li an and
mi li tary personnel strength, a threat that i t avoi ded by i nvoki ng Secretary
Pace' s vi ews i n support of the Army' s psychologi cal warfare program.
McClure had a hard enough ti me as i t was obtai ni ng the quali fi ed people
needed for the speci ali zed ski lls of psychologi cal warfare and speci al oper-
ati ons. That, coupled wi th the fact that many offi cers were reluctant to
become i nvolved i n an acti vi ty consi dered "out of the mai nstream," meant
that he often had to "take what he could get," i n the words of one of hi s
former staff offi cers. Many of the offi cers assi gned to OCPW felt "trapped"
by the assi gnment because of McClure' s reluctance to release them for
other jobs, whi ch apparently caused consi derable di scontent. ~8'
There was also some di sgruntlement among hi s offi cers concerni ng
McClure' s i nsi stence on speci al staff status for OCPW, rather than re-
mai ni ng under the G- 3 as a part of the General Staff, a posi ti on, they
thought, of greater stature and "cl out" wi thi n the Army bureaucracy.
Certai nly there was some basi s for these feeli ngs--under normal ci rcum-
stances the General Staff does carry more "clout" and an aura of greater
presti ge. But McClure' s World War II experi ence had fi rmly etched i n hi s
mi nd the overri di ng advantages of relati ve autonomy and access to the top
deci si onmakers that speci al staff status afforded. As we have seen, thi s was
a theme consi stently advocated by hi m, both i n the Uni ted States and i n hi s
relati ons wi th the theater commands. Despi te these resentments, however,
McClure was both li ked and esteemed by those who worked for hi m.
"Robbi e" backed hi s subordi nates loyally, evi nced tremendous energy and
enthusi asm about OCPW' s role, and di splayed more abi li ty to arti culate
than di d most general offi cers of hi s ti me. ~9And he had vi si on. Thi s vi si on
extended to the fi eld of unconventi onal warfare.
The Special Forces Ranger Regiment
At the ti me of OCPW' s creati on, General McClure had successfully
lobbi ed to have responsi bi li ti es for the unconventi onal warfare functi on
transferred from G-3 to hi m. Whi le some thi nki ng on the subject of
behi nd-the-li nes acti vi ti es and speci al uni ts had taken place i n the Army
duri ng the i nterwar years, nothi ng much had been done to follow through
on those i ni ti al i deas--parti cularly si nce CIA/OPC' s assumpti on of the
pri mary responsi bi li ty for covert operati ons. Under McClure's leadershi p,
thi s si tuati on was to change, for wi thi n a year and a half the plans formu-
lated wi thi n hi s Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on (later renamed the Speci al
Forces Di vi si on) to create a formal unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty for
the Army came to frui ti on. But the path to that goal was not easy, nor di d
i t proceed i n a strai ght li ne.
McClure reali zed that hi s fi rsthand experti se was basi cally i n the
psychologi cal warfare fi eld, so early on he i ndi cated to hi s staff that he was
"fi ghti ng for offi cers wi th background and experi ence i n speci al oper-
ati ons." 20 He brought i nto the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on several offi cers
wi th World War II and Korean war experi ence i n guerri lla warfare or wi th
long-range penetrati on uni ts: Li eutenant Colonel Melvi n Russell Blai r and
Li eutenant Colonel Marvi n Waters, both of whom had served wi th "Mer-
ri ll's Marauders"; Colonel Aaron Bank, who had fought wi th the French
Maqui s as a member of OSS; Colonel Wendell Ferti g, who had com-
manded the guerri llas on Mi ndanao after the Japanese occupi ed the
Phi li ppi nes; and Li eutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, who had or-
gani zed and conducted guerri lla warfare operati ons i n North Luzon and
had planned and di rected behi nd-the-li nes operati ons i n North Korea. 2~
Colonel Volckmann remembered that General McClure had ap-
proached hi m i n the hospi tal (he had been evacuated from Korea i n De-
cember 1951 to Walter Reed Army Medi cal Center i n Washi ngton) wi th
a request to help organi ze the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on, and i t was only
after bei ng assured that the Department of the Army was i nterested i n
organi zed behi nd-the-li nes operati ons that he agreed to take the job. 22
Together, the group i n OCPW prepared studi es, plans, organi zati onal and
operati onal concepts, and trai ni ng programs for a formal US Army uncon-
venti onal warfare capabi li ty--Speci al Forces.
These studi es and organi zati onal concepts were i nevi tably based on
the personal operati onal experi ence of the offi cers i nvolved, as well as on
research of the past major resi stance movements. In addi ti on to hi s World
War II guerri lla warfare experi ence, Colonel Volckmann possessed a con-
si derable amount of i nformati on resulti ng from more than 6 months of
research he had undertaken i n 1949 at Fort Benni ng, Georgi a, whi le pre-
pari ng the draft fi eld manuals for Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla
Warfare and Combatting Guerrilla Forces. 23 Colonel Bank, another key
fi gure, had operated as a Jedburgh i n southern France, later organi zed and
trai ned anti -Nazi German pri soners of war for harassi ng tacti cs agai nst the
Germans i n Austri a, and sti ll later completed two OSS mi ssi ons i n
Indochi na. 24
Bank, who joi ned OCPW as Chi ef of the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on
at the end of March 1951 (to be succeeded by Colonel Ferti g i n July), 25
gi ves Volckmann consi derable credi t for "the development of posi ti on,
planni ng, and poli cy papers that helped sell the establi shment of Speci al
Forces uni ts i n the acti ve Army. " Bank also makes clear that he and
Volckmann based thei r plans for the Army' s unconventi onal warfare capa-
bi li ty on thei r World War II experi ences wi th the Phi li ppi ne guerri llas and
OSS, and that Speci al Forces uni ts were developed "i n the OSS pattern of
ti ny uni ts wi th the pri me mi ssi on of developi ng, trai ni ng, and equi ppi ng the
guerri lla potenti al deep i n enemy terri tory." To those who would i nsi st on
vi ewi ng the Army' s Ranger uni ts as forerunners of Speci al Forces, Bank
unequi vocally states that "actually they [Speci al Forces] have no con-
necti on wi th ranger-type organi zati ons si nce thei r mi ssi on and operati ons
are far more complex, ti me consumi ng, requi re much deeper penetrati on
and i ni ti ally are often of a strategi c nature. "! 6
The comments of Volckmann and Bank, made i n retrospect, may gi ve
the i mpressi on that a rather clear deli neati on of roles and mi ssi ons for
Speci al Forces was clearly understood from the begi nni ng. The evi dence
suggests otherwi se. In actuali ty, the path that led to the concept for or-
gani zati on and employment of Speci al Forces was tortuous and marked by
controversy. The i ni ti al di scussi ons wi thi n the Army on thi s subject, i n fact,
were remi ni scent of the rather confused di alog that took place duri ng the
mterwar years concerni ng the "Ai rborne Reconnai ssance uni ts," the
"Ra nge r Group, " and the "Speci al Operati ons Company, " all of whi ch
tended to i ntermi ngl e OSS and Ranger precepts. The task of cl eari ng up
thi s doctri nal confusi on proved to be no easi er i n 1951 than i t had been
duri ng the peri od pri or to Korea.
We have seen that i n earl y February 1951, General McCl ure bri efed
the Army General Counci l on the need for a rapi d organi zati on of uncon-
venti onal warfare, and that shortl y thereaf ter Secretary Pace provi ded
strong offi ci al support for the combi ni ng of psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warf are planni ng functi ons. By late March, a few weeks af ter
Vol ckmann joi ned OCPW, McCl ure' s new offi ce recei ved a copy of a bri ef
memorandum to the Di rector, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, from
Maj or General Maxwel l D. Tayl or, G- 3:
In consultati on wi th General McClure, please develop the Army re-
sponsi bi li ty for guerri lla and anti guerri lla warfare wi thi n the fi eld of
G-3 i nterests. Havi ng determi ned what our responsi bi li ty i s, I should
then li ke to veri fy that the vari ous elements i n the guerri lla mi ssi on are
clearly assi gned to subordi nate Army uni ts. 27
It i s i nteresti ng to note that Tayl or' s di recti ve i ncluded anti guerri l l a war-
fare. Whi le some li p servi ce was gi ven to thi s i n the studi es that followed,
i t was not consi dered an i mportant part of Speci al Forces unti l the 1960's,
when "count eri nsurgency" became the thi rd leg of the "speci al warf are"
tri ad at Fort Bragg.
Up to thi s poi nt, General McCl ure had not been able to do much about
the unconventi onal warf are part of hi s mi ssi on. Arrangements had been
made for a few offi cers from Army Fi eld Forces and the vari ous Army
headquarters i n the Uni ted States to attend a staff fami l i ari zati on course
i n guerri l l a warfare at Fort Benni ng begi nni ng 5 Apri l 1951. Those attend-
i ng were general l y the same offi cers who had attended the speci al psycho-
logi cal warf are course run by Georgetown Uni versi ty? 8 The course i n
guerri l l a warf are was set up after a seri es of conferences i n 1949 between
the Army and the CIA had led to the selecti on of Fort Benni ng as the si te
for a trai ni ng course desi red by the CIA. McCl ure had also requested that
hi s offi ce recei ve full reports on all behi nd-the-li nes operati ons i n Korea i n
order to carry out i ts assi gned responsi bi li ti es i n the fi eld of unconventi onal
warfare. 29 Except for these tentati ve steps, however, speci al operati ons
planni ng i n OCPW lagged behi nd psychologi cal warf are planni ng, pri mar-
i ly because of a lack of experi enced personnel. But when McCl ure acqui red
the people he needed, he plunged ahead.
Wi thi n 10 days of recei vi ng General Taylor's memorandum, McClure
di scussed the subject of guerri lla warfare wi th hi m and General Bolte, and
reported to hi s staff that both were "very much" i n favor of organi zi ng
"forei gn nati onal uni ts." General Taylor was to do a study on the use of
forei gn nati onals as i ndi vi duals or i n uni ts, whi le OCPW' s Speci al Oper-
ati ons Di vi si on was asked to study the possi bi li ty of organi zi ng a Ranger
company at Fort Ri ley wi th each platoon made up of a di fferent nati onali ty
group. One of the purposes of the company would be to work wi th US
aggressor forces i n exerci ses to teach soldi ers counterguerri lla tacti cs.
McClure's tentati ve thi nki ng at thi s early stage was to propose organi -
zati on of si x Ranger compani es of forei gn nati onals i n Europe, each com-
pany consi sti ng of a di fferent nati onali ty and attached to a US di vi si on.
The compani es were to be i n addi ti on to the "regul ar" Ranger battali ons
of US personnel. 3
Two poi nts need to be noted about thi s early di alog. Fi rst, i t was clear
that the focus of attenti on for future possi ble use of unconventi onal warfare
was Europe, even though the Army was currently engaged i n a "hot war"
i n Korea. The "forei gn nati onals" referred to were those from Eastern
European countri es and would be brought i nto the US Army through the
provi si ons of the Lodge bi ll (Publi c Law 597, 81st Congress, 30 June
1950). Second, i t was also clear that the pri nci pals i nvolved i n thi s di alog,
i ncludi ng General McClure, had not sorted out i n thei r mi nds the type of
speci al uni t desi red or i ts pri mary objecti ve.
Perhaps thi s was because the Chi ef of Staff, General Colli ns, was
hi mself unclear on the subject, as was evi dent i n hi s vi si t to the Infantry
Center at Fort Benni ng a few days later. Duri ng hi s conference there,
General Colli ns observed that "the Infantry School should consi der the
Rangers as well as other troops and i ndi genous personnel to i ni ti ate sub-
versi ve acti vi ti es. I personally establi shed the Rangers wi th the thought
that they mi ght serve as the nucleus of expansi on i n thi s di recti on." 3, Thi s
statement i s parti cularly reveali ng when one consi ders the clear-cut deli n-
eati on between the roles and mi ssi ons of Speci al Forces and Ranger uni ts
later i nsi sted on by the Chi ef of Staff. But such a deli neati on was nei ther
well understood nor agreed to by key deci si onmakers i n early 1951.
Li eutenant Colonel Volckmann from OCPW was present at the con-
ference attended by General Colli ns at Fort Benni ng, and was asked by the
Infantry School to analyze porti ons of the Chi ef of Staff's statements.
Volckmann's analysi s should be exami ned i n some detai l, for i t i s the fi rst
evi dence wi thi n OCPW of the phi losophi cal basi s for creati on of an Army
unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty.
Fi rst, Vol ckmann i nterpreted General Colli ns' use of the phrase "sub-
versi ve acti vi ti es" to mean what he called "'speci al forces operati ons. " He
defi ned these operati ons to i nclude those carri ed on wi thi n or behi nd the
enemy' s li nes, whi ch could encompass the followi ng:
1. Organi zati on and conduct of guerri l l a warfare.
2. Sabotage and subversi on.
3. Evasi on and escape.
4. Ranger and Commando- l i ke operati ons.
5. Long- range or deep penetrati on reconnai ssance.
6. Psychol ogi cal warf are (through the above me di a ) ) 2
Second, commenti ng on the Chi ef of Staff' s reference to i ndi genous
personnel, Vol ckmann offered the followi ng theoreti cal f ramework to clar-
i fy the overall obj ecti ve of speci al forces operati ons:
We may vi suali ze the world today as bei ng di vi ded i nto two major
groups or layers of i ndi vi duals that cover the earth unrestri cted by
nati onal boundari es. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together
by common i deologi es. Any future war may well be regarded as an
i nternati onal ci vi l war waged by these opposi ng layers. The full ex-
ploi tati on of our sympatheti c blue layer wi thi n the enemy's sphere of
i nfluence i s basi cally the mi ssi on of speci al forces operati ons. It i s from
the blue layer wi thi n the enemy's sphere of i nfluence that we must
foster resi stance movements, organi ze guerri lla or i ndi genous forces on
a mi li tary basi s, conduct sabotage and subversi on, effect evasi on and
escape. We should, through speci al forces operati ons, exploi t thi s layer
to assi st our ranger and commando operati ons, and as a medi a for
psychologi cal warfare.
Expl oi tati on of the "sympat het i c bl ue l ayer, " stated Vol ckmann,
would enabl e the West to offset the manpower superi ori ty of Sovi et forces
i n Europe, parti cul arl y duri ng the i ni ti al stages of thei r i nvasi on. Si mi larly,
the Alli es must be prepared to counter the "red l ayer" wi thi n thei r fri endl y
sphere of i nfluence, a probl em that i nvolved rear- area defense, for the
Sovi ets would exploi t thei r "sympatheti c red l ayer" to the maxi mum.
To effect the transi ti on from thi s theoreti cal f ramework to reali ty, at
least as far as the Army was concerned, Vol ckmann advocated concrete
measures: "Through actual command, staff, trai ni ng, and operati ons we
should pull the overall fi eld of speci al forces operati ons out of the clouds,
out of the di scussi on stage, and reduce i t to organi zati on, trai ni ng, and
operati ons. " To accompli sh thi s he recommended that the Inf antry Center
be desi gned as the focal poi nt for doctri ne, poli cy, and techni que, and
further advocated the acti vati on of a "Speci al Forces Command" under the
center to "explore, develop and conduct trai ni ng i n the fi eld of speci al
forces operati ons. " Under thi s command should be placed Ranger trai ni ng
and "al l other speci al forces operati ons. "
Two other poi nts should be noted about Vol ckmann' s analysi s. He
beli eved that "speci al forces operati ons" should be an accepted fi eld of
conventi onal ground warfare; therefore "we should cease to regard speci al
forces operati ons as i rregular or unconventi onal warfare. " Thus, the ulti -
mate objecti ve of speci al forces operati ons would be to "organi ze and
support, wherever possi ble wi thi n the enemy' s sphere of i nfluence, guerri lla
or i ndi genous forces on a mi l i tary basi s that are capable of effi ci ent and
controlled exploi tati on i n conjuncti on wi th our land, ai r, and sea forces. "
Havi ng establi shed that poi nt, Volckmann proceeded to present what
he envi saged as the Army' s role i n thi s acti vi ty i n relati on to the other
servi ces as well as to the CIA:
To me, i t i s basi cally sound that the mi li tary (the Army, si nce thi s fi eld
falls wi thi n ground operati ons) has the i nherent responsi bi li ty in peace
to prepare and plan for the conduct of speci al forces operati ons and i n
ti me of war to organi ze and conduct speci al forces operati ons. Further,
I feel that i t i s unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these
responsi bi li ti es to a ci vi l agency. 33
Vol ckmann' s analysi s i s i mportant because i t contai ns most of the maj or
elements of controversy attendant to the creati on of the Army' s uncon-
venti onal warfare capabi li ty. It also provi des i nsi ght i nto the phi losophy of
the man who, probably more than any offi cer i n General McCl ure' s em-
ploy, shaped the creati on of Speci al Forces.
Certai nl y, Vol ckmann' s reservati ons about the CIA' s role vi s-a-vi s the
mi l i tary servi ces--and parti cul arl y the Army- - was a maj or theme duri ng
these early years of OCPW' s exi stence, as was hi s vi ew that among the
servi ces the Army should have the predomi nant responsi bi li ty i n thi s rela-
ti vely new fi eld. (The Ai r Force, i n parti cular, di sagreed wi th thi s con-
tenti on. ) Hi s attempt to avoi d terms li ke "i rregul ar" or "unconventi onal "
warfare i ndi cated an early recogni ti on of the need to allay the suspi ci ons
of conventi onal mi li tary men (although the term "unconventi onal warfare"
remai ns i n use to thi s day). And hi s advocacy of a "Speci al Forces Com-
mand" and trai ni ng center was to come to frui ti on the followi ng year but
not at Fort Benni ng, and not i n the form that he i ntended. Whi le Volck-
mann clearly advocated the use of i ndi genous personnel i n guerri lla war-
fare, he apparently i ntended that a Ranger uni t would support and di rect
these personnel and not the OSS-type of Speci al Forces organi zati on that
he ulti mately played such an i nstrumental role i n creati ng. Hi s use of the
words "speci al forces operati ons," then, was synonymous wi th OCPW' s
understandi ng of "speci al operati ons;" that i s, all types of behi nd-the-li nes
acti vi ti es conducted for a mi li tary purpose, not just guerri lla warfare. 34
Later he would be more speci fi c i n di fferenti ati ng between Ranger and
Commando mi ssi ons and those i nvolvi ng the organi zati on and support of
i ndi genous personnel i n guerri lla warfare.
Another i nteresti ng aspect of Volckmann's memorandum was the
bureaucrati c tacti c used to bri ng i t to the attenti on of deci si onmakers.
After Volckmann returned from the Fort Benni ng conference, hi s memo-
randum was sent to the Chi ef of Staff, General Colli ns, wi th a request that
"the i nterpretati on that has been placed on these statements of General
Colli ns be confi rmed or commented on i n order that appropri ate acti on
may be i ni ti ated by the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, to i ni ti ate the
di recti ves necessary to accompli sh the desi res of the Chi ef of Staff." 35Thi s
proved the i mpetus for a seri es of foundati onal studi es by OCPW, i nclud-
i ng the fi rst one, "Army Responsi bi li ti es i n Respect to Speci al (Forces)
Operati ons," wri tten pri nci pally by Volckmann and later approved by the
Chi ef of Staff, a classi c i llustrati on of the manner i n whi ch one achi eves
"vi si bi li ty" for a pet project i n the Pentagon bureaucracy) 6
By the end of May, the thi nki ng i n G-3 and OCPW had begun to
crystalli ze concerni ng the uti li zati on of the Eastern European recrui ts who
would be brought i nto the Army vi a the Lodge bi ll. Standards of selecti on
were establi shed, and a goal of 800 set for persons who would volunteer for
ai rborne trai ni ng and who also possessed speci alti es related to the conduct
of guerri lla warfare. The mi ssi on of these ali ens would be to organi ze
guerri lla bands i n Eastern Europe after war began and attack the Sovi et
li nes of communi cati on, thei r purpose bei ng to slow, or "'retard," the Sovi et
advance i nto Western Europe. Plans were under development to trai n these
personnel i n i ncrements of 100 i n a cycle that i ncluded basi c combat
trai ni ng, completi on of the Ranger course at Fort Benni ng, and then fur-
ther speci ali zed i nstructi on i n guerri lla warfare, sabotage, clandesti ne
communi cati ons, and related subjects. 37
At the end of thi s trai ni ng cycle, the ali ens were to be sent to the
European theater command. It was here that the planni ng was less preci se.
One alternati ve was the formati on of addi ti onal "(Speci al Forces) Ranger
Compani es" to whi ch could be assi gned those Ameri cans and Eastern
European ali ens trai ned for behi nd-the-li nes operati ons, and whi ch would
be avai lable to the theater command for commi tment on D-day. Another
alternati ve was to move the ali ens to Europe for organi zati on i nto pro-
vi si onal uni ts, so as to be avai lable for such operati ons upon the outbreak
of hosti li ti es. 38 These opti ons evi dence McClure's i ni ti al rumi nati ons on the
subject, but i t was clear that nothi ng defi ni te had been settled.
Approxi mately a month later, OCPW' s thi nki ng on the Lodge bi ll
recrui ts began to show more speci fi ci ty. The formati on of a "Speci al Forces
Regi ment" of 3 battali ons, a total of 2,481 personnel, was proposed. Ap-
proxi mately 1,300 of the 2,097 enli sted personnel would be Lodge bi ll
recrui ts. The force could be trai ned and deployed to Europe i n company-
si ze i ncrements to i mplement the unconventi onal warfare secti on of current
war plans and "exploi t the esti mated 370,000 man potenti al wi thi n the
U.S.S.R. and i ts satelli tes." 39That last statement i s parti cularly propheti c
because, as we shall see, the subject of resi stance potenti al i n Europe was
to become a poi nt of contenti on between the Army and the CIA. Also
noteworthy duri ng thi s peri od were di scussi ons by OCPW that i ncluded the
i dea that approxi mately 4,415 personnel organi zed i nto appropri ate "oper-
ati onal groups" (an OSS term) would be needed i n peaceti me for commi t-
ment i n the event of war. The object of thi s peaceti me commi tment would
be to avoi d the mi stakes made duri ng World War II: "We must not scatter
arms, ammuni ti on and suppli es li ke so much grass seed and hope that they
wi ll fall on ferti le soi l and i n turn prove of some assi stance to our ai ms."
To di rect the forces i n Europe, a "Theater Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Com-
mand" i n the Uni ted States was proposed, and the basi c frame of reference
was the Speci al Forces Ranger uni t. 4
Thi s frame of reference took on a di fferent perspecti ve when the
Commander i n Chi ef, Far East Command, deacti vated hi s Ranger compa-
ni es i n July 1951. The Rangers had been reacti vated duri ng the Korean
confli ct as separate compani es and attached to i nfantry di vi si ons. The
8213th Army Uni t, known i nformally as the 8th Ranger Company, was the
fi rst to be created. It was formed at Camp Drake, Japan, i n August 1950,
wi th volunteers from US forces i n the Far East. It was attached to the 25th
Infantry Di vi si on, took part i n the dri ve to the Yalu, and was deacti vated
i n March 1951. Between September 1950 and September 1951, the Ranger
Command at Fort Benni ng formed and trai ned 14 Ai rborne Ranger corn-
pani cs. The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Compani es were assi gned to
di vi si ons throughout the 8th Army i n Korea and were used pri mari ly to
perform long-range patrols for speci ali zed mi ssi ons and to spearhead at-
tacks. The 2d and 4th were also attached to the 187th Regi mental Combat
Team for the combat jump at Munson-ni . After sufferi ng more than
50-percent casualti es, the Ranger compani es were i nacti vated and the
remai ni ng personnel assi gned throughout the di vi si ons. 4t
At the ti me of CINCFE' s acti on, the Commander i n Chi ef, Europe
(CINCEUR), i ndi cated that he saw no need for Ranger compani es i n
Europe, although he beli eved that there mi ght be a need for Ranger uni ts
of battali on si ze under certai n ci rcumstances. One of CINCEUR' s pri mary
reasons for that posi ti on was the feeli ng that "Rangers, as a whole, drai n
fi rst class soldi ers from i nfantry organi zati ons," a common complai nt lev-
eled agai nst eli te uni ts, and one that Speci al Forces would have to contend
wi th. 42 More perti nent to the advocates of "Speci al Forces Operati ons,"
however, were the vi ews of both CINCFE and CINCEUR that the Rang-
ers were not capable of conducti ng guerri lla warfare mi ssi ons i n thei r
theaters because of raci al and language barri ers. Instead, they beli eved,
such mi ssi ons should be conducted by i ndi genous personnel who were i n
turn trai ned, suppli ed, and controlled by Ameri can mi li tary personnel. 43
Voi ci ng a related concern, Army, Fi eld Forces (AFF)--commenti ng
on OCPW' s staff study, "Speci al Forces Ranger Uni ts"- - forwarded the
vi ew that any reference to Rangers should be deleted because "envi si oned
Speci al Forces wi ll i n all probabi li ty be i nvolved i n subversi ve acti vi ti es."
AFF beli eved that the concept of Speci al Forces should focus on the use of
i ndi genous guerri lla groups behi nd enemy li nes rather than Ameri can-
staffed Ranger uni ts; therefore, Rangers and Speci al Forces should be kept
as separate and di sti nct organi zati ons. 44
The result of all thi s was a meeti ng on 23 August 1951, presi ded over
by the G-3, General Taylor, from whi ch came a deci si on to deacti vate all
Ranger uni ts and convert the Ranger Trai ni ng Command i nto a De-
partment of the Infantry School. Thi s department would conduct Ranger
trai ni ng for selected offi cers and enli sted men who on completi on of the
course would return to thei r parent uni ts (a pattern that has conti nued unti l
the present day). Duri ng the meeti ng the questi on arose concerni ng what
agency would be capable of conducti ng "deep penetrati on acti vi ti es," at
whi ch poi nt, accordi ng to Colonel Aaron Bank's memorandum, "General
Taylor was thoroughly bri efed on the mi ssi on and capabi li ti es of a Speci al
Forces organi zati on. ''45
Thi s was perhaps the perfect i llustrati on of the adage, "bei ng at the
ri ght place at the ri ght ti me," because the personnel spaces needed to
create the 10th Speci al Forces Group ulti mately became avai lable as a
result of the deacti vati on of the Ranger uni ts. Henceforth there was to be
li ttle use of "Ranger" termi nology by OCPW i n i ts efforts to sell the
concept of Speci al Forces or i n i ts proposals for the organi zati on to carry
out guerri lla warfare. Its i ni ti al draft Table of Organi zati on and Equi p-
ment (TO&E) for the "Speci al Forces Group," for example, presented as
the group's mi ssi on the followi ng: "To i nfi ltrate i ts component operational
groups [emphasi s added] to desi gnated areas wi thi n the enemy's sphere of
i nfluence and organi ze the i ndi genous guerri lla potenti al on a mi li tary basi s
for tacti cal and strategi c exploi tati on i n conjuncti on wi th our land, sea, and
ai r forces." ~ The organi zati on and functi ons of the group and i ts subordi -
nate operati onal elements clearly depi cted the i nfluence of OSS concepts--
parti cularly the Operati onal Group command--rather than those of the
Rangers.
Ironi cally, a year later OCPW found i t necessary to poi nt out to Army
Fi eld Forces that use of the subordi nate uni ts of the Speci al Forces Group
on i ndependent Commando- or Ranger-li ke mi ssi ons, "whi le a capabi li ty,"
was "to be di scouraged as bei ng hi ghly wasteful of the hi ghly developed
ski lls wrapped up i n the operati onal teams." 47Thi s was i n the fall of 1952,
when the 10th Speci al Forces Group was recrui ti ng and trai ni ng at Fort
Bragg for deployment to Europe.
But Army Fi eld Forces was not the only command i n late 1952 whose
i deas on the use of Speci al Forces elements di ffered from those of OCPW.
In hi s preli mi nary planni ng for the uti li zati on of the 10th Speci al Forces
Group, Bri gadi er General Wi llard K. Li ebel of the European Command
envi saged the D-day employment of small groups to stri ke at close-i n
targets wi thi n a 50-mi le zone i mmedi ately i n front of US tacti cal di vi si ons.
McClure objected strenuously on thi s questi on of "basi c Speci al Forces
doctri ne," telli ng Li ebel that such an acti vi ty was a Ranger- or
Commando-li ke acti on, normally of short durati on, that di d not requi re
hi ghly trai ned Speci al Forces personnel, and that thi s "was not i n con-
sonance wi th the concept underlyi ng the creati on of the 10th Speci al
Forces Group." That concept was clear, thought McClure: "We conti nue
to mai ntai n that Speci al Forces Operati onal Detachments have the mi ssi on
and capabi li ty of developi ng i ndi genous guerri lla forces, conducti ng oper-
ati ons behi nd the enemy li nes, and of sustai ni ng these operati ons for an
i ndefi ni tely long ti me." To buttress hi s case, McClure told Li ebel that "the
Chi ef of Staff has i nsi sted that Speci al Forces shall not dupli cate the
trai ni ng and doctri ne of ranger and commando uni ts. " 4s Thi s was the same
Chi ef of Staff, General Colli ns, who i n Apri l 1951 stated that he had
"personal l y establi shed the Rangers wi th the thought that they mi ght serve
as the nucleus for expansi on i n thi s di recti on [to i ni ti ate subversi ve
acti vi ti es]. "
Thi s apparent turnabout i n the Chi ef of Staff' s phi losophy i llustrates
the confusi on and di ffi culti es that often accompany the emergence of a new
concept wi thi n the mi l i tary bureaucracy, parti cul arl y i f that concept i n-
volves the creati on of an "'eli te" uni t. One of the pri nci pal requi rements for
"'eli teness" i s the possessi on of a speci ali zed functi on, one that does not fall
wi thi n the provi nce of other mi l i tary organi zati ons. It i s di ffi cult to j usti fy
the exi stence of eli te uni ts i f there appears to be unnecessary overlappi ng
or redundancy of thei r functi ons and capabi li ti es wi th those of other uni ts.
Thi s i s parti cul arl y so duri ng peri ods of acute manpower shortages. In
order to survi ve, the defi ni ti on of an eli te uni t' s speci al mi ssi on (and the
acceptance of that mi ssi on by the bureaucracy) i s a cruci ally i mportant
task. 49
McCl ure and hi s staff came to recogni ze thi s necessi ty. Wi th the
deacti vati on of the Rangers, OCPW expended more and more effort to
speci fy guerri lla warfare as the pri mary mi ssi on of the Speci al Forces
organi zati on that they proposed. Part of the confusi on that marked thi s
effort was of thei r own maki ng, however. Thei r concept of "Speci al Forces
Operati ons, " for i nstance, was i n actual i ty an all-encompassi ng headi ng
under whi ch were grouped the many ki nds of operati ons- - of whi ch guer-
ri lla warfare was one- - whose only common denomi nator was that they
were conducted wi thi n or behi nd enemy li nes. One would have thought,
obvi ously, that a Speci al Forces uni t should conduct "Speci al Forces Oper-
ati ons" that i ncluded, by OCPW' s defi ni ti on, Ranger and Commando
acti vi ti es. But as ti me went on, the archi tects of Speci al Forces found i t
necessary to poi nt out the error, as they saw i t, of li nki ng the Speci al Forces
group and i ts component uni t mi ssi ons wi th the term "Speci al Forces
Operati ons, " on the assumpti on that the Speci al Forces Group was a
TO&E uni t desi gned to conduct all such operati ons. Needless to say, thi s
rather subtle di sti ncti on was lost on many. Thi s blurri ng of roles and
mi ssi ons was not ai ded, ei ther, by OCPW' s i ni ti al moves to graft the
guerri lla warfare concept onto the Ranger organi zati on, followed by i ts
rather vi gorous efforts to di ssoci ate Speci al Forces from the Rangers.
Eventually, OCPW di d answer General Tayl or' s i ni ti al di recti ve to
develop the Army responsi bi li ty for guerri lla warfare and then to assi gn
that responsi bi li ty to subordi nate Army uni ts. The uni t that evolved at Fort
Bragg i n 1952 was the Speci al Forces Group and i ts organi zati on was
based on OSS concepts, not Ranger. Perhaps Volckmann and hi s col-
leagues had OSS organi zati onal pri nci ples clearly i n mi nd from the begi n-
ni ng but found i t more opportune to gai n i ni ti al acceptance for thei r i deas
by taggi ng them onto the Rangers, whose hi story i n the Army was
known--parti cularly si nce the Chi ef of Staff i ni ti ally seemed to favor usi ng
the Rangers i n a guerri lla warfare role. Or perhaps i t was si mply that the
offi cers i nvolved were grappli ng wi th new i deas and experi menti ng wi th the
organi zati onal machi nery to i mplement those i deas. In all probabi li ty, the
answer i s that a combi nati on of the two moti ves was at work duri ng thi s
conceptual peri od, and the deacti vati on of the Rangers helped to clari fy the
si tuati on.
The Road to F ort Bragg
Concurrent wi th the deacti vati on of the Rangers, General McClure
began to take an i nterest i n establi shi ng a trai ni ng faci li ty for both psycho-
logi cal warfare and unconventi onal warfare. To be sure, Colonel Volck-
mann had campai gned si nce Apri l for a trai ni ng command or center that
would fully develop the doctri ne, techni ques, and logi sti cs of speci al forces
operati ons. And there had been some di scussi on between the G-3 Di vi si on
and Army Fi eld Forces i n early 1950, before the creati on of OCPW, about
the need for a "school center" for psychologi cal warfare. That di scussi on
had resulted i n establi shment of the Psychologi cal Warfare Department at
Fort Ri ley, just then produci ng i ts fi rst graduates. But now McClure began
to entertai n the i dea of centrali zi ng the functi ons of "the whole fi eld of
OCPW" at a post other than Fort Ri l ey)
McClure and Colonel Bank vi si ted Army Fi eld Forces i n mi d-August to
outli ne the Army' s responsi bi li ti es for unconventi onal warfare and to stress
the lack of organi zati on, trai ni ng, and planni ng i n that fi eld as compared
wi th the progress made i n psychologi cal warfare. The possi bi li ty was rai sed
of establi shi ng a "Guerri lla Trai ni ng Command" at Fort Benni ng or per-
haps Fort Campbell and movi ng the Psychologi cal Warfare Department
from Fort Ri ley to thi s new center. 5~ Thus began the search for a trai ni ng
center, a search that would end wi th the selecti on of Fort Bragg.
It was not an easy journey. Fi rst, there was the matter of the CIA. As
we have seen, the Army basi cally welcomed the emergence of CIA/ OPC
duri ng the i nterwar years, and i n 1949 agreed to provi de i t uni lateral
assi stance i n the fi eld of guerri lla warfare, whi ch i ncluded help i n setti ng
up a trai ni ng course at Fort Benni ng. After the outbreak of war i n Korea,
the Army also provi ded some personnel to the CIA for i ts acti vi ti es i n that
theater.
But then General McClure and hi s OCPW appeared on the scene. By
the spri ng of 1951, McClure had already expressed hi s reservati ons about
the relati vely autonomous role of OPC i n Korea. In subsequent months, the
frustrati on of hi s unsuccessful attempts to i nfluence the si tuati on i n Korea,
plus hi s battle to bri ng Speci al Forces i nto bei ng and plan for i ts use i n
Europe, transformed McClure's reservati ons i nto outri ght suspi ci ons about
the CIA' s moti ves.
The CIA reci procated those suspi ci ons. For example, i n mi d-1951,
both CIA/ OPC and OCPW entered i nto a seri es of conferences to deter-
mi ne means of further collaborati on i n guerri lla warfare trai ni ng pro-
grams. Even though the study that resulted i ndi cated that the CIA would
benefi t by sendi ng some of i ts personnel to the center bei ng proposed by
OCPW, the forwardi ng memorandum sent General McClure stated that
"Mr. Wi sner [head of OPC] would li ke i t to be clearly understood that thi s
understandi ng i s reached on the assumpti on that the Army i s creati ng a
Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Command for i ts own purposes and not at the
request of CIA. ''52 The caveat expressed by Frank Wi sner was obvi ous:
The CIA was not goi ng to place i tself i n the posi ti on of gi vi ng the Army
an excuse to justi fy the creati on of i ts own unconventi onal warfare capabi l-
i ty. Perhaps i t was i nevi table that two strong-wi lled men li ke Wi sner and
McClure, both eyei ng the same "turf " i n a relati vely new fi eld, would come
i nto confli ct i n attempti ng to establi sh the boundari es wi thi n whi ch each
would operate.
Not that there were no attempts to defi ne those boundari es and to
cooperate wi th each other. There were. Both men entered i nto an i ni ti al,
tentati ve agreement i n July 1951 concerni ng thei r understandi ng of the
respecti ve roles of CIA/ OPC and OCPW i n the fi eld of unconventi onal
warfare. The aforementi oned conferences on trai ni ng programs followed,
and i n Apri l 1952 the two agenci es agreed to an offi ci al li ai son arrangement
to coordi nate materi el research acti vi ti es) 3
There i s also evi dence that despi te hi s early reservati ons about OPC's
acti vi ti es i n Korea, McClure took a consi derably more broadmi nded vi ew
of the CIA's role i n unconventi onal warfare than di d certai n members of
hi s staff. After returni ng from a vi si t to Europe i n August and September
1952, where he had di scussed unconvent i onal wa rf a re pl anni ng f or t ha t
t heat er, Mc Cl u r e chi ded hi s staff:
Putnam [a JCS offi cer] and I talked at length reference the phi loso-
phi es I expressed--as I have repeated over and over wi th you people.
Putnam says they are not bei ng reflected by you people at the JSPD
level. I beli eve the Army should be the Executi ve Agent for guerri lla
acti vi ti es. I am not goi ng to fi ght wi th CIA as to thei r responsi bi li ti es
i n those fi elds.
Another i s the fact that I am fully i n accord wi th supporti ng the CIA
i n thei r peaceti me acti vi ti es i n getti ng ready for war to the maxi mum
extent I can and i n warti me wi ll welcome any of thei r resources to the
maxi mum of thei r capabi li ty, s4
Thi s was t he pr a gma t i c Mc Cl ur e of Wor l d Wa r II who, as Chi ef ,
P WD/ S HAEF , had br ought t oget her a numbe r of di sparat e agenci es and
nat i onal i t y groups, ci vi li an as well as mi l i tary, i n order to get t he j ob done.
He had l earned well f rom t hat mast er of compromi se and cooperat i on,
Dwi ght D. Ei senhower. But as the mont hs and years went by, Mc Cl u r e
be c a me less t ol erant , gradual l y adopt i ng i n hi s c onde mna t i on of t he CI A
t he phrases of the most vi rul ent cri ti cs on hi s staff. At the end of hi s t enure
as Chi ef , OCP W, the subj ect preoccupi ed hi m.
Wh a t caused thi s t ur na bout ? Perhaps the most succi nct expl anat i on
of Mc Cl ur e ' s c ha nge of at t i t ude i s f ound i n one of t he l ast l etters he wrot e
bef ore l eavi ng OCP W i n earl y 1953. Wri t i ng to hi s old f ri end General
BoRe, t hen Co mma nd e r i n Chi ef , Europe, Mc Cl u r e expl ai ned:
Unfortunately I wi ll not go through Germany on my way to Iran else
I would take the opportuni ty to bri ng you up to date on the Ar my/ CI A
relati onshi p. I feel that the latest paper on command relati onshi p has
so much fi ne pri nt i n i t that we have commi tted ourselves to the
creati on of a fourth servi ce whi ch wi ll effecti vely ti e the hands of the
mi li tary and requi re the Theater Commander to lean on and support
CIA for all Unconventi onal Warfare. In recent conferences at CIA, I
have heard the statement made repeatedly that, "Si nce we are now a
fourth servi ce many of the acti vi ti es for whi ch the Army was planni ng
should be transferred to CIA, i ncludi ng the command of mi li tary
forces desi gned for guerri lla warfare i n ti me of war." Needless to say
1 am very unhappy about i t both because I questi on the abi li ty of CIA
and second, because I have never beli eved the Joi nt Chi efs i ntended to
abrogate thei r res0onsi bi li ti es for the acti ve command of mi li tary
operati ons i n ti me of war? 5
Here, then, were McCl ure' s key gri evances. Asi de from the perenni al
questi on duri ng these earl y years of the preci se del i neati on of peaceti me
and warti me responsi bi li ti es for unconventi onal warf are between the CIA
and the Depart ment of Defense, McCl ure had si mply come to beli eve that
the CIA was not capabl e of holdi ng up i ts end of the bargai n, however i t
was defi ned. Imbued wi th the urgency of prepari ng the Nati on and the
Army for a possi ble war i n Europe, McCl ure was di ssati sfi ed wi th the
CIA' s apparent lack of progress i n preparati on for guerri l l a warfare. He
reported to the Chi ef of Staf f i n earl y September 1951 that the "CI A has
only now i ni ti ated planni ng for the executi on of preparatory measures to
ai d i n the retardati on of a Sovi et advance. " 56 He beli eved, therefore, that
the mi l i t ary- - and parti cul arl y the Ar my- - ne e de d to have unconventi onal
warf are forces i n bei ng, and that necessary planni ng, organi zati on, and
trai ni ng had to be carri ed out before D-day. In hi s vi ew, the mi l i tary
servi ces could not leave these preparati ons to chance or i n the hands of a
ci vi li an agency. Nor should the JCS allow a si tuati on to develop where the
theater commander i n an acti ve theater of war lacked fuli control over all
mi l i tary operati ons i n hi s area of responsi bi li ty, as had happened i n Korea,
McCl ure beli eved.
Underl yi ng McCl ure' s doubts about the CIA' s capabi l i ty to perform
the unconventi onal warf are mi ssi on, however, was a di fference of phi los-
ophy between OCPW and the CIA concerni ng the nature of resi stance
potenti al i n Europe. The CIA posi ti on on thi s subject was perhaps most
el oquentl y stated by i t~ Di rector, General Wal ter B. Smi th, i n a l etter
wri tten to the Army G- 2 i n March 1952. Smi th opened hi s l etter by
referri ng to McCl ure as follows:
At certai n ti mes i n the past we have been i mportuned by General
McClure's people to provi de them wi th detai led i nformati on concern-
i ng guerri lla groups of whi ch we may have some knowledge. We have
consi stently decli ned to furni sh thi s i nformati on to General McClure
because the i nformati on, requested i mpi nges di rectly upon secret oper-
ati ons i n whi ch we are currently engaged and for whi ch, at thi s ti me,
we are solely responsi ble. 57
Here was a real source of i rri tati on. The CIA, understandabl y, was
rel uctant to share i nformati on about i ts operati ons that could compromi se
i mportant i ntelli gence assets and perhaps undermi ne by premature di sclo-
sure the very resi stance potenti al that would be counted upon i n warti me.
McCl ure' s offi ce--al so underst andabl y- - was f rustrated by i ts i nabi li ty to
recei ve the i nformati on i t beli eved necessary for proper prewar planni ng,
and the extreme secrecy i nvolved onl y hei ghtened OCPW' s suspi ci ons
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
about the CI A' s lack of preparedness. It was to be a persi stent topi c of
di scord between the two agenci es.
In hi s March letter to the Army G- 2, the Di rector of the C1A also
questi oned "t he vali di ty of General McCl ure' s proposal for retardati on by
guerri lla forces. " Expressi ng both the vi ews of hi s agency and those of "the
leadi ng Bri ti sh experts i n thi s fi eld," Smi th explai ned:
It i s hi ghly doubtful that general resi stance forces wi ll develop any
substanti al offensi ve capabi li ty unti l at least D plus si x months. Enemy
controls and repri sals wi ll be extremely severe upon the outbreak of
war. Certai n underground organi zati ons have even i ndi cated that they
wi ll hesi tate to go i nto acti on unti l the Alli ed battle li ne i s stabi li zed
on the conti nent and the ti de i s turni ng our way.
Af ter enl argi ng upon thi s theme for several paragraphs, Smi th then
summari zed hi s posi ti on:
For the reasons outli ned above, any program whi ch contemplates that
large scale resi stance organi zati ons, developed pri or to D-day and held
i n readi ness for an i ndefi ni te peri od of ti me would be wi lli ng and
capable to deli ver major offensi ve blows wi thi n the fi rst few weeks
after the commencement of hosti li ti es i s consi dered by us to be unreal-
i sti c and i nfeasi ble, ss
McCl ure had, of course, consi dered the pros and cons of what he
termed the "'two di fferent schools of thought on the ti mi ng of the commi t-
ment of unconventi onal forces. " One school held that the fi rst few days of
a Sovi et attack were cri ti cal, and that even a few hours of delay produced
by unconventi onal warfare forces would be si gni fi cant. The other school
(the "Bri ti sh vi ew") held that guerri lla forces should not di ssi pate thei r
efforts prematurel y and thus di d not favor any upri si ng unti l regul ar Alli ed
mi li tary forces were i n a posi ti on to support them. McCl ure presented hi s
own analysi s to the Chi ef of Staff September 1951:
To accept the latter vi ew would mean nothi ng would happen on D-day
and not unti l we were i n a posi ti on to start li berati ng over-run coun-
tri es. To accept the former vi ew would mean attri ti on mi ght com-
pletely di ssolve that work and organi zati on whi ch has been created.
My personal vi ew i s that even wi th the attri ti on we have more to gai n
than to lose, and that i f the Bri ti sh can organi ze after D-day for a
future use, such guerri lla forces as desi red, obvi ously we could reor-
gani ze i n those areas where attri ti on had taken i ts toll. 59
In addi ti on to di sagreei ng wi th OCPW about how the resi stance
should be generated and when i t should be commi tted, the CIA also took
excepti on wi th OCPW' s esti mates of resi stance potenti al i n Eastern Eu-
rope; i t called the projected i ndi genous strength esti mates i n OCPW' s
Speci al Forces Operati ons Plan for Europe "unreali sti c and unattai nable."
These and other vi ews advanced by the CIA apparently formed the basi s
for i ni ti al JCS di sapproval of the plan i n late 1952. 60
These were fundamental di fferences. McClure's deepest concern,
however, was best i llustrated by the remark i n hi s letter to Bolte about CIA
ambi ti ons to become a "fourth servi ce." He was genui nely apprehensi ve of
allowi ng too much lati tude to the CIA because i t could lead to an undue
reli ance by the mi li tary on CIA/ OPC for unconventi onal warfare acti v-
i ti es. If that happened, he feared that unconventi onal warfare mi ght "be-
come regarded among mi li tary commanders and planners as a li mi ted,
speci al 'cloak and dagger' functi on rather than as a basi cally i mportant,
possi bly essenti al mi li tary responsi bi li ty. ''6t
Here agai n i s a remi nder of the problem wi th i mage as percei ved by
McClure and hi s staff--the constant battle to achi eve legi ti macy for un-
conventi onal warfare among "conventi onal" mi li tary offi cers. If too much
responsi bi li ty for unconventi onal warfare was passed to the CIA, i t could
rei nforce the reservati ons that many offi cers already harbored concerni ng
the Army's role i n unconventi onal warfare. In a peri od of budgetary and
manpower shortages, such reservati ons could qui ckly lead to the conclusi on
that the Army could not and should not attempt to dupli cate the functi ons
of a ci vi li an agency. In short, McClure's pri mary concern, whi le well
i ntenti oned, was bureaucrati c i n nature and ai med at the establi shment
and preservati on of an unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty for the Army.
Another threat to McClure's attempts to establi sh a strong Army role
i n unconventi onal warfare was the opposi ti on of the Ai r Force. We have
already seen that he was cri ti cal of the Ai r Force support of Army psycho-
logi cal warfare acti vi ti es i n Korea and was concerned about what he
consi dered the unnecessary dupli cati on of propaganda equi pment and per-
sonnel i n thei r Aeri al Resupply and Communi cati on (ARC) wi ngs. By
thei r support of CIA operati ons i n Korea, these same wi ngs also gave the
Ai r Force clai m to a leadi ng role i n unconventi onal warfare. The Ai r Force
li st of warti me mi ssi ons for these ARC wi ngs i ncluded i ntroducti on and
evacuati on of agents behi nd enemy li nes, aeri al resupply of guerri llas,
support of commando-type operati ons and i solated Army uni ts, pri nti ng
and packagi ng of leaflets, and provi di ng trai ned personnel capable of con-
ducti ng psychologi cal warfare through other medi a. In short, the Ai r Force
clai med the ARC wi ngs gave them the capabi li ty to support CIA acti vi ti es
duri ng peaceti me or warti me, to conduct overt psychologi cal warfare, and
to di rect, coordi nate, and support unconventi onal warfare operati ons. 62
Thi s close peaceti me associ ati on wi th the CIA caused the Ai r Force,
i n the eyes of OCPW, to champi on CIA/ OPC as the agency responsi ble for
planni ng and prepari ng the conduct of unconventi onal warfare, thus taki ng
i ssue wi th the concept that the Army had a major responsi bi li ty and
pri nci pal functi on i n thi s fi eld as part of land warfare. Si mi larly, the Ai r
Force used thi s associ ati on wi th CIA/OPC, thought OCPW, to seek a
uni lateral, preemi nent posi ti on among the mi li tary servi ces for control and
di recti on of warti me unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es. ~3
As one mi ght have expected, General McClure di sagreed wi th the
contenti ons of the Ai r Force. In hi s vi ew, the Ai r Force was essenti ally a
"supply agency" for unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es, "wi th trans-
portati on capable of doi ng certai n thi ngs that the Ground Forces are goi ng
to requi re and goi ng to command." He favored Ai r Force development of
speci al wi ngs to support psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare acti v-
i ti es, but not to dupli cate the Army's capabi li ti es, and certai nly not to be
used as a li cense to clai m a domi nant role i n those fi elds. 64McClure was
parti cularly di sturbed by the lack of joi nt unconventi onal warfare planni ng
that he found when he vi si ted Europe i n the fall of 1951, and told the Chi ef
of Staff that the Ai r Force not only di sagreed wi th the Army vi ew on
retardati on but also "felt they had a major responsi bi li ty i n the fi eld of
unconventi onal warfare whi ch di d not exclude the actual command of
guerri llas." Because of the uni lateral efforts of the servi ces and what he saw
as unnecessary dupli cati on and confusi on among them and i n thei r re-
lati onshi p wi th the CIA, McClure beli eved that one servi ce should be
desi gnated as the executi ve agency for guerri lla warfare, and that servi ce,
of course, should be the Army. 65
Valuable support for McClure's vi ew of a domi nant role lbr the Army
i n unconventi onal warfare came from General Ei senhower, the Supreme
Alli ed Commander i n Europe. Duri ng another vi si t to Europe i n November
1951, McClure bri efed Ei senhower on the command and coordi nati on
di ffi culti es that had ari sen wi th respect to unconventi onal warfare planni ng
for Europe. Ei senhower was "keenly alert" to the potenti al that uncon-
venti onal warfare offered, stated McClure i n hi s tri p report to the Chi ef of
Staff, and gave McClure permi ssi on to quote hi m on the followi ng vi ews:
One Servi ce must not only have a paramount i nterest i n thi s fi eld but
also be the controlli ng authori ty.
In my opi ni on thi s fi eld i s an Army one a nd . . , i n my theater i t wi ll
be.
All faci li ti es must be put under the Army. The Navy and Ai r Force
wi ll have to support the Army. Ai r support i s essenti al but i n thi s fi eld
the Ai r Force i s only a transport outfi t. 66
Ei senhower went on to speak strongly agai nst extravagance resulti ng
f rom dupl i cati on or i ndi vi dual servi ce jealousi es. It was a strong endorse-
ment of McCl ure' s vi ews, but the i nterservi ce ri val ry i n unconventional
warf are conti nued, parti cul arl y wi th respect to planni ng and command
responsi bi li ti es i n Europe. OCPW eventual l y di d obtai n recogni ti on for the
Army as havi ng pri mary responsi bi li ty among the servi ces for thi s new
fi eld. 67 But the confli ct between the Ai r Force and Army that marked thi s
process- - al ong wi th the confli ct between the Army and the CI A- - wa s a
key f eature i n the backdrop of McCl ure' s efforts to create Speci al Forces
and establi sh the Psychol ogi cal Warf are Center.
In addi ti on to the i nteragency and i nterservi ce ri val ry that OCPW had
to contend wi th, there was the not i nconsi derable chal l enge of selli ng the
Army on the concept of Speci al Forces and the i dea of a central i zed
trai ni ng command for both psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare. In
June 1951 General Colli ns, the Chi ef of Staff', approved the conclusi ons of
Vol ckmann' s i ni ti al study "Ar my Responsi bi li ti es for Speci al Forces Oper-
ati ons" and forwarded i t to the JCS, i ndi cati ng that unti l the JCS deli n-
eated servi ce responsi bi li ti es for unconventi onal warfare, the Army would
use thi s study as a basi s for planni ng. 68 Al though an i mportant fi rst step,
thi s general endorsement by Colli ns to proceed wi th i nvesti gati on and
planni ng on the subject di d not provi de OCPW wi th the speci fi c author-
i zati on needed.
That came only af ter the i ni ti al di scussi on by McCl ure and Colonel
Bank wi th Army Fi eld Forces i n August 1951; i n mi d- September the G- 3
concurred wi th the recommendati on of the Army Fi eld Forces that a
trai ni ng center should be establi shed for psychologi cal warf are and speci al
operati ons. Indi cati ng to OCPW that thi s center should be establi shed "on
an austere basi s, " the G- 3 also di rected acti on "t o establi sh the extent to
whi ch the resources of the Army are to be al l ocated to Speci al (Forces)
Operati ons. " But the followi ng cauti on was poi ntedl y added:
In vi ew of the acute manpower si tuati on and the known reluctance of
overseas commanders to accept speci al uni ts wi thi n thei r troop cei li ng,
i n preference to establi shed uni ts, the basi c poli cy i n regard to Speci al
(Forces) Operati ons should be the maxi mum uti li zati on of i ndi genous
personnel for such operati ons and the mi ni mum use of Ameri can
pe r sonne l . 69
Followi ng on the heels of the deacti vati on of the Ranger uni ts, thi s state-
ment clearly i ndi cates the wari ness wi th whi ch conventi onal commanders
and staffs regarded "eli te" and "speci al" uni ts, parti cularly duri ng peri ods
of budgetary and manpower shortages.
The openi ng, albei t narrow, provi ded by G-3, allowed OCPW to act.
A cascade of acti ons poured from McClure's staff: representati ves met wi th
the staff of Army Fi eld Forces to develop an agreed Table of Di stri buti on
for a Psychologi cal Warfare Center; Tables of Organi zati on and Equi p-
ment for the uni ts of a Speci al Forces Group (no longer called a Speci al
Forces Ranger Regi ment) were developed for staffi ng; a proposed trai ni ng
ci rcular descri bi ng the mi ssi on, capabi li ti es, organi zati on, concept of em-
ployment, and trai ni ng of a Speci al Forces Group was wri tten; a requi re-
ment for 3,700 personnel spaces, i ncludi ng 300 spaces for the proposed
trai ni ng center, was submi tted; a proposed di recti ve to the Chi ef of Army
Fi eld Forces outli ni ng hi s responsi bi li ti es i n psychologi cal warfare and
Speci al Forces Operati ons, as well as a suggested Army Fi eld Forces
trai ni ng program for these areas, was prepared; and Fort Campbell, Ken-
tucky, was recommended as the si te for the new center, wi th a suggested
acti vati on date of 1 December 1951. These acti ons were reported to G-3
on 5 October, scarcely 3 weeks after OCPW had recei ved the go-ahead
from them. 7 McClure wanted to move fast.
Army Fi eld Forces had recommended that the proposed trai ni ng cen-
ter be establi shed at ei ther Fort Campbell or Camp Pi ckett, Vi rgi ni a.
OCPW favored Fort Campbell because i t had ai rborne and parachute
mai ntenance faci li ti es, but recommended to G-3 that a fi nal deci si on on
the locati on be wi thheld unti l a survey of i nstallati ons was conducted. 7~ In
the end, though, the personnel spaces requested for Speci al Forces and the
center, the target date for acti vati on, and the tentati ve locati on all proved
i naccurate. But McClure was maki ng rapi d progress toward hi s goal.
Both McClure and hi s chi ef archi tect for Speci al Forces, Volckmann,
were aware of the suspi ci ons engendered among many offi cers by these
efforts to i ntroduce i nto the Army new i deas and a new organi zati on to carry
out those i deas. Both men took steps to di spel those suspi ci ons. In a paper
wri tten i n late October 195 I, Volckmann analyzed the problem thi s way:
The questi on of assets, capabi li ti es and support that must be di verted
to behi nd-the-li nes operati ons bri ngs us to a fi nal major problem. So
many stri ctly conventi onal mi li tary mi nds "flash-red" at the menti on
of anythi ng "speci al" or at the di versi on of personnel and equi pment
to any channel other than conventi onal regular forces. In a way, they
are justi fi ed i n safeguardi ng the di versi on of personnel, equi pment and
support that wi ll i n any way tend to weaken the capabi li ti es of our
regular forces. For the most part, however, thei r fears are wi thout
foundati on. If they wi ll but take ti me to vi ew the problem of any future
war as a whole, thei r i ni ti al reacti ons should be modi fi ed and thei r
fears di spelled. 72
Vol ckmann beli eved that Worl d War II betfi nd-the-li nes operati ons
had fallen far short of thei r potenti al. He bl amed thi s on the fai lure by the
mi l i tary to regard these acti vi ti es as an i ntegral part of conventi onal war-
fare. Proper emphasi s, i n other words, had been lacki ng at both staff and
operati ng levels. The result, i n hi s vi ew, was guerri lla warfare conducted as
a "si deshow" on a "shoestri ng, " uncoordi nated wi th the operati ons of
conventi onal forces. To prevent thi s from happeni ng agai n, and to convi nce
mi li tary men of the i mportance of behi nd-the-li nes operati ons i n modern
warfare, h e advocated general' i ndoctri nati on on the subject i n servi ce
schools and speci ali zed trai ni ng i n appropri ate centers, such as the one for
"speci al forces operati ons" that he had advocated 6 months earli er. 73
Si mi lari ly, i n a bri efi ng prepared for the Secretary of Defense i n early
November 1951, General McCl ure voi ced hi s concerns about the adverse
i mage that unconventi onal warfare had among some mi l i tary men:
I have been told that the dynami c manner i n whi ch my offi ce developed
led to apprehensi on on the part of some that the Army was seeki ng to
enter fi elds not properly a part of ground warfare. Thi s i s furthest from
our i ntent. We have sought and wi ll conti nue to seek to prepare our-
selves and the Army to di scharge those responsi bi li ti es whi ch are
proper and appropri ate Army functi ons . . . . Thi s broad fi eld of un-
conventi onal warfare must be planned and conducted on a Joi nt and
Nati onal basi s. No one Servi ce can "'go i t alone." 74
Whi le he was proud of what hi s offi ce had accompli shed, McCl ure told
those present at thi s bri efi ng that he was also "deepl y apprehensi ve over the
future. " Typi fyi ng the cold war fears that i mbued so many seni or offi cers
wi th a sense of urgency, he stated that "none of us i n thi s room today knows
how much ti me we wi ll have" because "we face an enemy who i s prepared
to take the fi eld tomorrow morni ng. " Hi s summati on: "In Psychologi cal
Operati ons we are fast approachi ng a state of readi ness," but i n Speci al
Operati ons, "we are years behi nd."75
An i roni c footnote concerni ng the term "speci al operati ons" should be
menti oned. It was about thi s ti me--the fall of 195 l - - t ha t the Army began
to use the term "speci al forces operati ons" as opposed to "speci al oper-
ati ons," the reason bei ng that the latter term was defi ned through long
usage i n the Army and as set forth i n Fi eld Manual 100-5 as relati ng to
such acti vi ti es as "ni ght combat," "jungle operati ons," and "joi nt amphi b-
i ous operati ons." OCPW argued that to adopt some other term for those
operati ons "would only lead to confusi on or result i n costly expendi ture of
f u nd s . . , to modi fy exi sti ng li terature and doctri ne already publi shed." 76
Later, the term "speci al forces operati ons" i tself would be dropped by the
Army, and replaced by "unconventi onal warfare" (whi ch encompassed
guerri lla warfare, evasi on and escape, subversi on and sabotage) as the
pri mary mi ssi on for Speci al Forces uni ts. The i rony i s that duri ng the
1970's, Speci al Forces would agai n adopt a versi on of "speci al operati ons"
(wi th the offi ci al defi ni ti on sti ll relati vely unchanged i n JCS and Army
li terature) as one of thei r pri mary mi ssi ons, a move that contri buted to the
percepti on that they were dupli cati ng functi ons and capabi li ti es of Ranger
uni ts. 77
A few days after McClure's bri efi ng for the Secretary of Defense, a
di scussi on took place duri ng McClure's weekly staff meeti ng on the forth-
comi ng survey of Army posts to select a si te for the Psychologi cal Warfare
Center. Of the posts to be vi si ted--Fort Benni ng, Fort Campbell, and Fort
Bragg--McCl ure had a defi ni te preference. He stated to Colonel Bank:
"Make i t Bragg i f you can. ''7~
And Fort Bragg i t was, but not wi thout di ffi culty. The surveys con-
ducted i n November by representati ves of OCPW, Army Fi eld Forces, and
the 3rd Army, revealed some resi stance to that si te. The Infantry Center
at Fort Benni ng di d not want to allocate space and faci li ti es to any acti vi ty
not di rectly related to i ts mi ssi on, an i roni c posi ti on i n vi ew of the di rect
support bei ng provi ded to i nfantry di vi si ons i n Korea by psychologi cal
warfare teams; and there were other objecti ons as well. The 3rd Army
opposed establi shi ng the center at Fort Bragg on the grounds that other
conventi onal combat uni ts scheduled for acti vati on there would have to be
organi zed at a less desi rable post. They suggested Camp Rucker, Alabama,
as an alternati ve, but that si te offered li ttle for ai rborne and amphi bi ous
trai ni ng and had no housi ng for dependents--a potenti al morale problem.
Of the si tes consi dered, the representati ves from OCPW and Army Fi eld
Forces clearly favored Fort Bragg: the necessary personnel spaces could be
accommodated; bui ldi ngs, wi th some modi fi cati on, were avai lable; and i t
offered superi or trai ni ng advantages and faci li ti es for both psychologi cal
warf are and Speci al Forces uni ts. 79 But fi rst the i mpasse had to be broken.
Thi s was accompl i shed by Colonel Glavi n, the Army Fi eld Forces
representati ve recentl y transf erred from OCPW, who arranged a confer-
ence between General Leonard, General Bradford, and General Hodge i n
an attempt to break the deadlock. Colonel Ferti g, Chi ef of OCPW' s Spe-
ci al Operati ons Di vi si on, urged McCl ure to personally bri ef General
Hodge on the desi rabi li ty of Fort Bragg, whi ch he apparentl y di d because
on 4 December Glavi n obtai ned approval for the Nort h Carol i na post. s
Sti ll to be obtai ned were the exact faci li ti es needed at Fort Bragg, so
another survey tri p was pl anned for thi s purpose. General McCl ure' s gui d-
ance was clear: "I want these requi rements to be modest. We have to go on
a very austere basi s at fi rst. " st He was very aware of the precari ous posi ti on
of these new i deas duri ng a peri od of budget cutti ng and di d not want to
j eopardi ze thei r chances of survi val by appeari ng to be too greedy i n hi s
demands.
The mi nutes of the OCPW staff meeti ng for October- December 1951
also depi ct conti nui ng efforts to i denti fy personnel on acti ve duty wi th
experi ence i n behi nd-the-li nes acti vi ti es. OCPW requested the Adj utant
General to prepare a roster of offi cers wi th OSS, Commando, Ranger, and
guerri l l a backgrounds, and sent an offi cer to vi si t General Donovan, then
practi ci ng law i n New York, to exami ne hi s personal fi les i n an attempt to
obtai n a li st of Army offi cers who had served i n OSS. Thi s last effort
resulted i n a roster of 3,900 names, whi ch were then screened to i denti fy
those sti ll on acti ve duty. 82 Certai nl y thi s i s sti ll another i ndi cator of the
pervasi ve i nfluence OSS had on the thi nki ng of the archi tects of Speci al
Forces duri ng thi s cruci al formati ve peri od.
The survey team that returned to Fort Bragg to select the exact
locati on deci ded upon an area known as Smoke Bomb Hi ll. Its bui ldi ngs,
left over from Worl d War II mobi li zati on, were sui table for barracks, mess
halls, admi ni strati on halls, classrooms, and a li brary. Esti mated cost for
rehabi l i tati on of the faci li ti es was $151,000, an exceedi ngl y modest sum.
Even thi s mi ni mal esti mate, however, caused some agi tati on; the 3rd Army
representati ve stated unoffi ci ally that hi s headquarters had no funds avai l-
able; thus Army Fi eld Forces would have to allocate the necessary moni es
i n order to get the proj ect under way. Despi te thi s mi nor maneuveri ng
between headquarters to fi x fi scal responsi bi li ti es, Li eutenant Colonel Mel-
vi n Blai r from OCPW reported to McCi ure that "i n general, the area i s
exactly what we wanted. ''s3 At the end of 1951, only two maj or tasks
remai ned- to obtai n the necessary personnel spaces for acti vati on of both
the center and Speci al Forces, and to get the Chi ef of Staff' s blessi ng for
the whole project.
General McCl ure personally i nvolved hi msel f i n these tasks. Af ter a
busy January- - duri ng whi ch he made a maj or presentati on before the
Psychologi cal Strategy Board on the Army' s acti vi ty i n psychologi cal war-
fare and guerri lla warfare, pursued the questi on of funds for hi s proposed
center, and i nvesti gated a securi ty breach concerni ng the acti vati on of
Speci al Forces S4--he conti nued the campai gn to bri ng hi s goals to frui ti on.
In an early February 1952 memorandum to the G- 3, McCl ure urged that
the acti vati on of new psychologi cal warfare and Speci al Forces uni ts "be
expedi ted by every feasi ble method. " Hi s rati onale was convi nci ng: no
Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet Group exi sted i n the Uni ted States to
functi on as school troops, to trai n replacement personnel for si mi lar uni ts
i n Europe and the Far East, or to meet emergency requi rements; and uni ts
of the proposed "Speci al Forces Group (Guerri l l a Warf are)" were needed
for planned D-day acti ons i n Europe. Cl earl y establi shi ng that, i n hi s vi ew,
the acti vati on of psychologi cal warfare and Speci al Forces uni ts was
closely i ntertwi ned wi th the concurrent acti on to approve and authori ze
spaces for the Psychologi cal Warf are Center, McCl ure also asked that the
l atter project be expedi ted. Recogni zi ng the vulnerabi li ty of hi s plans i n the
hands of budget cutters, McCl ure made an eloquent plea:
At ti mes when the Army as a whole i s faced wi th a reducti on i n the
number of authori zed spaces, i t becomes necessary to determi ne areas
whi ch can absorb "cuts" wi thout unduly i mpai ri ng overall effi ci ency.
A new acti vi ty faced wi th an across-the-board cut, or wi th a "cut"
made on a fi xed percentage basi s, can be cri ppled to the poi nt where
i ts exi stence i s seri ously threatened. Thi s i s parti cularly true i n the case
of Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al Operati ons acti vi ti es whi ch are
already on an austere basi s. I recommend that these factors be con-
si dered when an Army-wi de reducti on i n space authori zati on i s
contemplated, s5
The G- 3' s response to thi s plea was terse. McCl ure' s request for early
acti vati on of the psychologi cal warfare and Speci al Forces uni ts desi red
would be acted on after the "i mpl i cati ons of the reduced FY [fi scal year]
1953 budget have been fully wei ghed. " On a bri ghter note, the G- 3 di d
i ndi cate that i t was prepari ng a summary sheet for the Chi ef of Staf f
recommendi ng approval of the Psychologi cal Warf are Center. g6
Sure enough, on 3 March 1952, the promi sed summary sheet was sent
to General Colli ns. The sheet stated that i mpl ementati on of the conclusi ons
reached i n the study "Ar my Responsi bi li ti es i n Respect to Speci al Forces
Operati ons, " previ ously approved by Colli ns, requi red a "Psychol ogi cal
Warf are and Speci al Forces Cent er" i n peaceti me to trai n i ndi vi duals and
uni ts to support theater Speci al Forces operati ons. (Agai n we see the
i mportance of Vol ckmann' s i ni ti al study as the underl yi ng rati onal e for thi s
concept. ) The memorandum also i ndi cated that the proposed center would
consol i date psychologi cal warf are and Speci al Forces trai ni ng acti vi ti es at
a si ngle i nstallati on. Three weeks later, on 27 March 1952, the Chi ef of
Staf f gave hi s approval that such a center be establi shed, s7
Wi thi n 10 days, General McCl ure proudl y provi ded the detai ls of the
Chi ef of Staff' s deci si on to the JCS. A Psychol ogi cal Warf are Center
would be acti vated on or about 1 May 1952, at Fort Bragg, Nort h Carol i -
na. The admi ni strati ve staff and facul ty for Psychologi cal Warf are and
Speci al Forces Departments and a Research and Devel opment Board
would total 173 personnel on an austere basi s and i ncrease to a full strength
of 362 offi cers and men. The Psychologi cal Warf are School and uni ts at
Fort Ri ley, Kansas, would move to Fort Bragg once the new center was
acti vated. A total of 2,220 spaces had been authori zed for acti vati on of
Psychol ogi cal Warf are and Speci al Forces uni ts for fi scal year 1953-54.
A Speci al Forces Group would be acti vated at Fort Bragg i n 3 i n-
crements of approxi matel y 600 men and offi cers each, commenci ng about
1 May 1952. ss General McCl ure' s dream of central i zi ng the functi ons of
"t he whole fi eld of OCP W" was near reali ty. The long j ourney to Fort
Bragg was soon to end.
VIII
THE PSYCHOLOGI CAL WARFARE
CENTER AND THE ORIGINS OF
SPECI AL WARFARE
After recei vi ng the Chi ef of Staff's formal approval i n late March
1952, the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare moved qui ckly to
get the Psychologi cal Warfare Center on i ts feet. The formal order estab-
li shi ng the center at Fort Bragg, under the juri sdi cti on of the Commandi ng
General, 3rd Army, was publi shed on 14 Apri l 1952. Copi es of the Table
of Di stri buti on (TD) for the center were hand-carri ed by General
McClure's staff to 3rd Army, Army Fi eld Forces, and Fort Bragg duri ng
the peri od 16-18 Apri l. The mi ssi on of thi s unprecedented center, as
explai ned by the TD, was:
To conduct i ndi vi dual trai ni ng and supervi se uni t trai ni ng i n Psycho-
logi cal Warfare and Speci al Forces Operati ons; to develop and test
Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al Forces doctri ne, procedures, tac-
ti cs, and techni ques; to test and evaluate equi pment employed i n Psy-
chologi cal Warfare and Speci al Forces Operati ons. ~
Movement of equi pment and personnel from Fort Ri ley to Fort Bragg
began by late Apri l, and on 29 May 1952 the Chi ef of Army Fi eld Forces
at Fort Monroe, Vi rgi ni a, formally announced the acti vati on of the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The same order offi ci ally transferred
responsi bi li ti es for the development and teachi ng of psychologi cal warfare
doctri ne from the Army General School at Fort Ri ley to the newly formed
Psychologi cal Warfare Center)
143
144 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER
Organization of the Center
As ori gi nally establi shed, the Psychologi cal Warf are Center consi sted
of a provi si onal Psychologi cal Warf are School, the 6th Radi o Broadcasti ng
and Leafl et Group, a Psychologi cal Warf are Board, and the 10th Speci al
Forces Gr oup) Colonel Charl es N. Karl stad, f ormer Chi ef of Staf f of the
Inf ant ry Center, Fort Benni ng, Georgi a, was selected as the fi rst Com-
mander of the center and Commandant of the Psychologi cal Warf are
School. 4 In the foreword to an admi ni strati ve bookl et prepared for vi si tors
parti ci pati ng i n a psychologi cal warf are semi nar duri ng 1952, Colonel
Karl stad offered some thoughts on the role of hi s new command:
The PsyWar Center represents an effort uni que to the mi li tary hi story
of the Uni ted States. For the fi rst ti me, the techni ques of attacki ng
both the mi nds and the bodi es of our enemi es have been coordi nated
i n a si ngle trai ni ng operati on. The Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al
Forces Departments [of the Psychologi cal Warfare School], closely
li nked, i nstruct i n the unconventi onal weapons and tacti cs wi th whi ch
our modern army must be equi pped to functi on effecti vely agai nst
enemy forces. 5
(Karl stad' s comments are stri ki ngly remi ni scent of General Don-
ovan' s all-encompassi ng concept of psychologi cal warf are when he orga-
ni zed the Coordi nator of Inf ormati on 11 years earl i er. )
One may wonder why the Psychol ogi cal Warf are School was i ni ti ally
gi ven a provi si onal status. The G- 3, Depart ment of the Army, di sapproved
of i ts acti vati on as a formal l y desi gnated Army servi ce school on the basi s
that such a school was not necessary to the accompl i shment of the center' s
mi ssi on and t hat the establ i shment of a formal school would requi re addi -
ti onal funds. 6 Thi s must have been parti cul arl y perplexi ng to the personnel
at Fort Bragg; even as an el ement of the Army General School at Fort
Ri ley, the Psychol ogi cal Warf are Di vi si on had been gi ven servi ce school
recogni ti on. Formal servi ce schools enj oyed obvi ous advantages over the
i nformal schools such as those often set up by di vi si ons and regi ments.
These advantages i ncluded i ncreased presti ge, fundi ng, and equi pment
procurement as well as the opportuni ty to attract qual i ty facul ty personnel.
The Psychol ogi cal Warf are Center, i n a l etter si gned by Colonel Karl stad
and addressed to the Chi ef, Psychologi cal Warf are, Department of the
Army, made a strong case for reconsi derati on of the deci si on, an appeal
that recei ved the strong support of General McCl ure. 7 Apparentl y the
appeal was effecti ve, for on 22 October 1952 Depart ment of the Army
General Order No. 92 oti i ci ally establi shed the Psychol ogi cal Warf are
School as a servi ce school.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER 145
The purpose of the Psychologi cal Warf are School was to "prepare
selected i ndi vi duals of the Army to perform those psychologi cal warfare
and speci al forces duti es whi ch they may be called upon to perform i n
war. ''8 The school was organi zed i nto a small headquarters staff and two
i nstructi onal di vi si ons: the Psychologi cal Operati ons Department and the
Speci al Forces Department. In terms of longevi ty, the seni or element i n the
school was the Psychologi cal Operati ons Department; i t was a di rect de-
scendant of the Army General School's Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on,
whi ch had been transferred and i ntegrated i nto the Psychologi cal Warf are
Center i n early 1952. 9
Li eutenant Colonel Oti s E. Hays, Jr., who had been Deputy of the
Psychologi cal Warf are Di vi si on of the Army General School, became the
fi rst di rector of the Psychologi cal Operati ons Department. The mi ssi on of
the department was defi ned as the followi ng: The i nstructi on and trai ni ng
of selected offi cers i n the duti es of psychologi cal warfare operati ons staffs
from Department of the Army to fi eld army and corps levels; the i n-
structi on and trai ni ng of selected i ndi vi duals, offi cers, and non-
commi ssi oned offi cers as speci ali sts i n propaganda operati ons and as key
persons i n psychologi cal warfare operati onal uni ts; and the preparati on and
revi si on of extensi on course trai ni ng li terature, and fi eld manual s on psy-
chologi cal warfare organi zati on, operati ons, and doctri ne. 1 The i m-
portance of the Psychologi cal Operati ons Department' s acti vi ti es certai nl y
was enhanced by the Army' s needs i n Korea, as evi denced by thi s statement
from the 1 January- 30 June 1953 report of the Secretary of Defense:
The role of psychologi cal warfare as a support weapon i n combat was
hi ghli ghted by i mproved psychologi cal warfare operati ons carri ed on
by the Army duri ng the year, sti mulati ng the development of the
program at the Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg . . . .
Schools and uni ts have been establi shed there to trai n offi cers and
enli sted men i n all phases of thi s speci ali ty. ~
The Secretary' s report made no menti on of the acti vi ti es of ei ther t he
10th Speci al Forces Group or i ts counterpart i n the Psychologi cal Warf are
School, the Speci al Forces Department. Nor was there any menti on of
these two el ements- - or of the Army' s attempts to develop an uncon-
venti onal warfare capabi l i ty- - i n the 1 January- 30 June 1952 report of the
Secretary, al though that report di d note the establi shment of the Psycho-
logi cal Warf are Center at Fort Bragg "t o provi de comprehensi ve courses
of i nstructi on i n all phases of psychologi cal warfare. " J2
The lack of publi ci ty gi ven to Speci al Forces was due largely to
securi ty consi derati ons. Because the mi ssi on of Speci al Forces was
classi fi ed, li ttle reference to i ts organi zati on and acti vi ti es i ni ti ally appear-
ed i n press releases concerni ng the Psychologi cal Warfare Center. 13 The
center conti nued thi s cauti on wi th securi ty i n i ts own publi cati ons, much to
the consternati on of the Speci al Forces enthusi asts among McClure' s staff.
They complai ned that the student handbook publi shed by the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare School was "slanted heavi ly towards Psychologi cal War-
fare to the detri ment of Speci al Forces," and feared the result would be
"that the Speci al Forces student, therefore, wi ll look upon hi mself as a
'country cousi n' to the Psychologi cal Warfare Center." Li eutenant Colonel
Melvi n Blai r, who had been on the road attempti ng to "sell" Speci al Forces
i n a recrui tment program, was parti cularly mi ffed and recommended that
OCPW take acti on "to revi se the handbook along more i mparti al li nes." 14
(In later years--parti cul arl y duri ng the 1960's, the heyday of the "Green
Berets"--psychologi cal warfare would be consi dered the "country cousi n"
at the center, an i roni c turnabout i n percepti ons.) Whi le these complai nts
may appear tri vi al, they were evi dence of a resentment that went beyond
the securi ty restri cti ons on publi ci ty for Speci al Forces; some of McClure's
staff si mply di d not beli eve that unconventi onal warfare uni ts should be
associ ated wi th psychologi cal warfare, and certai nly not i n a subordi nate
role.
In any event, the juni or member of the Psychologi cal Warfare School
was the Speci al Forces Department, whi ch, unli ke the Psychologi cal Oper-
ati ons Department, had no predecessor i n US Army hi story. Wi th Colonel
Fi lmore K. Mearns as i ts fi rst di rector, the mi ssi ons of thi s department
were outli ned as follows: the conduct of regular Speci al Forces courses for
offi cers and selected enli sted men; the conduct of Speci al Forces ori entati on
courses for desi gnated personnel; the preparati on and revi si on of li terature
and lessons for Speci al Forces extensi on courses; and the preparati on and
revi si on of trai ni ng li terature, fi eld manuals, ci rculars, and speci al texts
on Speci al Forces operati ons? 5 Essenti ally, the department concentrated
on teachi ng the fundamentals of unconventi onal warfare, wi th emphasi s on
the conduct of guerri lla operati ons, to personnel bei ng assi gned to Speci al
Forces.
Another uni que organi zati on created as part of the center was the
Psychologi cal Warfare Board, whi ch was to "test, evaluate, and compi le
reports on materi el, doctri ne, procedure, techni que, and tacti cs pertai ni ng
to and for Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al Forces." 16 By early 1954, the
board had completed over 40 projects, among them the operati onal facets
of psychologi cal warfare transmi tter and recei vi ng equi pment, loudspeaker
equi pment, mobi le reproducti on equi pment, and di fferent types of leaflet
di ssemi nati on techni ques such as the use of mortar and arti llery shells,
rockets, li ght li ai son planes, and balloons. It appears that i n the early days
of 1952-53, the Psychologi cal Warfare Board devoted i ts acti vi ti es almost
exclusi vely to the support of uni ts li ke the 6th Radi o Broadcasti ng and
Leaflet (RB&L) Group, rather than to Speci al Forces. j7
The nucleus of the 6th Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet Group began
on 14 September 1951, wi th the formati on of a provi si onal Psychologi cal
Warfare Detachment at Fort Ri ley. That uni t soon achi eved status as a
permanent organi zati on, and on 2 May 1952 i t became the 6th RB&L
Group. The Group consi sted at that ti me of a Headquarters and Headquar-
ters Company, the 7th Reproducti on Company, and the 8th Mobi le Radi o
Broadcasti ng Company. In June 1952, i t moved to Fort Bragg to become
a part of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center. That month, the 2nd Loud-
speaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company was attached to the 6th RB&L
Group, and on 27 May 1953 the 12th Consoli dati on Company was acti -
vated and attached to the Group. As previ ously menti oned, the RB&L
organi zati onal concept was fi rst employed i n Korea and the Mobi le Radi o
Broadcasti ng Company' s ancestry could be traced to World War II, when
several of these compani es were used i n the European theater. The 6th
RB&L Group was desi gnated as a strategi c psychologi cal warfare oper-
ati onal uni t, and i ts pri mary purpose was to assi st the nati onal psycho-
logi cal warfare program duri ng warti me wi thi n the theater of operati on to
whi ch i t was assi gned. In addi ti on to conducti ng theater-wi de strategi c
propaganda, a further mi ssi on of the 6th RB&L was to support tacti cal
operati ons.~ 8
The 10th Special Forces Group
Even before acti vati on of the 10th Speci al Forces Group, Li eutenant
Colonel Blai r and Colonel Volckmann from the Speci al Operati ons Di -
vi si on, OCPW, began vi si ti ng Army i nstallati ons and schools throughout
the conti nental Uni ted States, Alaska, Hawai i , the Far East, and Europe
to promote i nterest i n the "new concept" of war. Volunteers had to be at
least 21 years old, be ai rborne quali fi ed or wi lli ng to become so, and
undergo a seri es of physi cal and psychologi cal tests. Enli sted men accepted
i nto Speci al Forces acqui red one or more of fi ve basi c occupati onal speci al-
i ti es: operati ons and i ntelli gence, engi neeri ng, weaponry, communi cati ons,
and medi cal ai d. ~9
The materi al used by OCPW for ori entati on and recrui tment
speci fi cally drew a di sti ncti on between Speci al Forces and Ranger uni ts:
Ranger uni ts are desi gned and trai ned to conduct shallow penetrati on
or i nfi ltrati on of enemy li nes. They can remai n i n the objecti ve area for
a li mi ted ti me only. Pri mari ly, they execute mi ssi ons of a harassi ng
and rai di ng nature agai nst targets close to fri endly front li nes. Ranger
mi ssi ons are performed solely by US personnel; they do not uti li ze
i ndi genous personnel i n thei r objecti ves. Speci al Forces uni ts have the
capabi li ty of conducti ng long-range penetrati on deep i nto the objecti ve
area i n order to organi ze, trai n, equi p, and control i ndi genous guerri lla
forces. 2
Indeed, not only di d OCPW make a di sti ncti on concerni ng the
mi ssi ons and capabi li ti es of Speci al Forces and Rangers, but the term
"Speci al Forces operati ons" i tself underwent a metamorphosi s. Volck-
mann's ori gi nal defi ni ti on i n early 1951 establi shed that Speci al Forces
operati ons were behi nd-the-li nes acti vi ti es that could encompass guerri lla
warfare, sabotage and subversi on, evasi on and escape, Ranger- and
Commando-li ke operati ons, long-range or deep-penetrati on reconnai s-
sance, and psychologi cal warfare. From January to late September 1952,
OCPW recrui ti ng materi al used the term to embrace the followi ng: organi -
zati on and conduct of guerri lla warfare; subversi on and sabotage; poli ti cal,
economi c, and psychologi cal warfare as i t pertai ns to behi nd-the-li nes
acti vi ti es; i nfi ltrati on and/or organi zati on of agents wi thi n the enemy's
sphere of i nfluence i n support of actual or projected Speci al Forces opera-
ti ons; Commando-type operati ons; escape and evasi on, as effected through
Speci al Forces operati ons; and anti guerri lla warfare i n areas overrun by
fri endly forces. 2t Both "Ranger operati ons" and "long-range or deep pene-
trati on reconnai ssance" di sappeared duri ng thi s transformati on; only
"Commando-type operati ons" remai ned as a hi nt of the earli er conceptual
confusi on. By November 1952, the focus became even more preci se, and
potenti al volunteers for thi s new eli te uni t were told that Speci al Forces
operati ons i ncluded guerri lla warfare, sabotage, and "other behi nd-the-
li nes mi ssi ons, whi ch are wi thi n the capabi li ti es of guerri lla warfare." 22
The lack of reference to Ranger o r Commando operati ons i s evi dent;
shortly thereafter, General McCi ure chastened General Li ebel for contem-
plati ng usi ng the 10th Speci al Forces Group for those types of acti vi ti es i n
Europe. 23 In effect, "Speci al Forces operati ons" were now synonymous
wi th "unconventi onal warfare."
The Speci al Forces came to li fe formally on 19 May 1952 wi th the
establi shment of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Spe-
ci al Forces Group, consti tuted and allotted to the Regular Army for acti -
vati on and organi zati on under the Commandi ng General, 3rd Army. One
hundred and twenty-two offi cers and men were to perform these acti vi ti es:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
To furni sh command, supply, and organi zati onal mai ntenance for a
Speci al Forces Group located i n rear areas and, when provi ded wi th
the necessary augmentati on i n personnel and equi pment, for subordi -
nate uni ts commi tted i n the objecti ve area; to furni sh admi ni strati on
for a Speci al Forces Group. 24
Ini ti ally, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company was basi cally
a "paper organi zati on," for when Colonel Aaron Bank left OCPW to joi n
the 10th Group on 19 June 1952 as i ts fi rst commander, he had a total
complement of only 7 enli sted men and I warrant offi cer present for duty. 2~
If Bank expected volunteers to swamp hi s new uni t, he was to be
di sappoi nted. By early July he complai ned that the flow of appli cati ons for
Speci al Forces was slow, attri buti ng thi s to less-than-enthusi asti c Army-
wi de support for the program and to the securi ty classi fi cati on of Speci al
Forces acti vi ti es. '6 A month later Colonel Karlstad reported to General
McClure that the total assi gned enli sted strength of the 10th was 259, of
whi ch only 123 were "operati onal uni t" volunteer personnel. The arri val
rate of volunteers was, he felt, "wholly unsati sfactory." 27Another factor
i nhi bi ti ng a rapi d bui ldup was the slow progress i n attracti ng forei gn
nati onals through the Lodge bi ll. As ori gi nally passed, the Lodge bi ll
provi ded for the enli stment of 2,500 ali ens i n the US Army. By mi d-1951,
the Army rai sed thi s cei li ng to 12,500 but actual recrui tment fell far short
of expectati ons. By August 1952, of 5,272 men who had appli ed for en-
li stment, only 411 recei ved the necessary securi ty clearances, and of that
number only 211 actually enli sted. ~s Concerned, MeClure's offi ce reported
that "the need to i ncrease Lodge bi ll enli stments remai ns a vi tal problem
affecti ng the accompli shment of mi ssi ons assi gned to OCPW. " 29At the
end of November 1952, however, only 22 Lodge bi ll personnel had been
assi gned to the 10th Speci al Forces Group. 3 Despi te thi s di sappoi nti ng
start, by Apri l 1953 the strength of the organi zati on desi gned to i mplement
a "new concept" had i ncreased to 1,700 offi cers and enli sted men. 3t
The "new concept" i s best i llustrated by the trai ni ng objecti ve pro-
posed for the newly acti vated 10th Speci al Forces Group:
To i nfi ltrate i ts component operati onal detachments to desi gnated
areas wi thi n the enemy's sphere of i nfluence and organi ze the i ndi ge-
nous guerri lla potenti al on a quasi mi li tary or a mi li tary basi s for
tacti cal and strategi c exploi tati on i n conjuncti on wi th our land, sea
and ai r forces. 32
Clearly, Speci al Forces were desi gned for unconventi onal warfare, wi th
emphasi s on guerri lla operati ons. Thi s i s si gni fi cant, because i n 1952 li ttle
attenti on was gi ven to counterguerri lla, or counteri nsurgency, operati ons.
That porti on of the speci al warfare concept was to come later, i n the late
1950's and early 1960's, i ni ti ati ng a doctri nal battle about the proper
functi on of Speci al Forces. At thi s early stage of i ts hi story, however,
Speci al Forces served unconventi onal warfare requi rements. The frame-
work for the 10th that resulted was a uni que blend of Army organi zati onal
tradi ti ons and conventi ons wi th the promi nent i deas and pri nci ples of
guerri lla warfare.
Essenti ally, the Speci al Forces Group represented a pool of trai ned
manpower from whi ch uni ts or combi nati ons of uni ts could be drawn to
execute speci fi c unconventi onal warfare mi ssi ons. The heart of the ori gi nal
group organi zati on was the Operati onal Detachment, Regi ment, a 15-man
uni t establi shed along the same li nes as the OSS Operati onal Group.
Commanded by a captai n, wi th a fi rst li eutenant as executi ve offi cer, the
Operati onal Detachment, Regi ment, contai ned 13 enli sted men and was
capable of i nfi ltrati ng behi nd enemy li nes to organi ze, trai n, and di rect
fri endly resi stance forces i n the conduct of unconventi onal warfare. De-
pendi ng on the si ze and makeup of the guerri lla forces i n a speci fi c area,
the Operati onal Detachment, Di stri ct B (commanded by a major), or the
Operati onal Detachment, Di stri ct A (commanded by a li eutenant colonel)
could also be employed, as could be a combi nati on of three types of teams.
In other words, these detachments, called "teams, " were to be uti li zed
si ngly or i n vari ous combi nati ons, dependi ng on the si ze and complexi ti es
of the speci fi c guerri lla organi zati on i nvolved. The team, i n whatever com-
bi nati on necessary, would come under the di rect control of the speci fi ed
theater command for bri efi ng and i nfi ltrati on i nto the objecti ve area, then
remai n i n radi o communi cati on wi th the theater headquarters so that the
acti vi ti es of the guerri lla organi zati on could be di rected to support oper-
ati ons of fri endly conventi onal forces most effecti vely. In short, the Speci al
Forces Group was not desi gned to be employed as a tacti cal enti ty--as, for
i nstance, a conventi onal di vi si on or bri gade mi ght be--but rather was
constructed around a cellular concept i n whi ch each area, di stri ct, and
regi mental detachment was vi ewed as a separate and di sti nct operati ng
uni t. 33
Colonel Bank had assumed command of a uni que organi zati on i n June
1952, one that requi red speci al trai ni ng to fulfi ll the mi ssi ons envi saged for
Speci al Forces. Based pri mari ly on the warti me experi ences of a few
former OSS offi cers i n the uni t, the 10th Speci al Forces Group developed
a trai ni ng program that was enti rely new to the Army. Early trai ni ng
stressed the i ndi vi dual ski lls represented i n the basi c Operati onal Detach-
ment, Regi ment: operati ons and i ntelli gence, li ght and heavy weapons,
demoli ti ons, radi o communi cati ons, and medi cal ai d. Each man trai ned
thoroughl y i n hi s parti cul ar speci alty, then parti ci pated i n "cross- trai ni ng"
to learn the rudi ments of the other ski lls represented i n the detachment.
The communi cati ons and medi cal ai d speci ali sts recei ved the longest trai n-
i ng courses si nce they requi red the most techni cal ski lls. Cl andesti ne
operati ons trai ni ng i n acti vi ti es such as the formati on and operati on of
i ntelli gence, sabotage, escape and evasi on, and securi ty also was stressed,
si nce, as Colonel Bank remarked, "these are easi ly negl ected i n favor of the
more exci ti ng guerri l l a tacti cs. " 34 Detachment trai ni ng at Camp McKal l ,
Nort h Carol i na, followed the i ndi vi dual and cross-trai ni ng phase. Fi nally,
a l engthy group-level maneuver i n the Chat t ahoochee Nati onal Forest,
Georgi a, compl eted the i ni ti al trai ni ng cycl e for thi s new organi zati on.
And so blossomed Speci al Forces, the fi rst formal US Army capabi l i ty
for unconventi onal warfare, co-located wi th, but yet a j uni or partner to,
psychologi cal warf are at Fort Bragg. Was thi s marri age between psy-
chologi cal and unconventi onal warf are one of choi ce? Apparentl y not.
Colonel Vol ckmann remembered:
Those of us who had worked on these programs were pri mari ly i nter-
ested i n Speci al Forces and not Psychologi cal Warfare and were very
much opposed to have Speci al Forces associ ated wi th and under the
Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We felt that there was
i n general a sti gma connected wi th Psychologi cal Warfare, especi ally
among combat men, that we di dn't care to have "rub off" on Speci al
Forces. Behi nd-the-li ne operati ons and the "di rty-tri cks game" had
enough opposi ti on amongst conventi onal mi li tary mi nds that had to be
overcome wi thout addi ng the addi ti onal problems i nherent i n Psycho-
logi cal Warfare. However, we lost that battle. 35
Colonel Bank had si mi lar mi sgi vi ngs. Shortl y af ter taki ng command
of the 10th, he di ffered wi th the Psychol ogi cal Warf are School f acul ty
concerni ng the "posi ti on of Speci al Forces i n relati on to psychologi cal
warf are. " He di scovered that the concept bei ng taught i n the Psychol ogi cal
Operati ons course was that Speci al Forces operati ons were a part of psy-
chologi cal warfare. Bank obj ected to thi s i nterpretati on i n an earl y or-
gani zati onal meeti ng at the Psychol ogi cal Warf are Center:
I don't beli eve that, as far as Speci al Forces i s concerned, that i s
correct. All the ti me that I was on the staff of PSYWAR (OCPW) I
never saw any paper of any ki nd that i ndi cates Speci al Forces oper-
ati ons i s a part of psychologi cal warfare. It i s our concept that Speci al
Forces operati ons i s a part of unconventi onal warfare. Just because
OCPW i s responsi ble for the moni tori ng and supervi si on of planni ng
and conduct of psychologi cal warfare and speci al forces operati ons
does not mean that they have to be the same. 36
Interesti ngl y, at about thi s same ti me a Reserve offi cer doi ng hi s
annual 2 weeks' trai ni ng at the Depart ment of the Ar my took i ssue wi th the
noti on of even combi ni ng the two fi elds wi thi n the Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychol ogi cal Warf are. Colonel Ol i ver Jackson Sands' vi ew was t hat the
ki nds of background, educati on, trai ni ng, and experi ence requi red were
i nherentl y di fferent f rom those necessary for the conduct of speci al oper-
ati ons; thus " r a r e l y . . . i s a person who i s sui tabl e for one of these acti vi ti es
quali fi ed for the ot her. " He also argued that the pl anni ng, executi on,
faci li ti es, equi pment, and support requi red for the two operati ons were
"total l y di fferent. " Because these acti vi ti es were, i n hi s vi ew, "wi del y di -
vergent i n type and charact er, " he recommended di vesti ng OCPW of the
Speci al Forces functi on. The l atter could then become part of the G- 3 ) 7
As mi ght have been expected, General McCl ure di d not agree wi th
Sands' anal ysi s, parti cul arl y si nce the speci al operati ons functi on had been
moved f rom G- 3 to OCPW at hi s request. There i s evi dence, however, that
other psychol ogi cal warf are offi cers also had mi sgi vi ngs about the Ar my' s
organi zati on for psychol ogi cal and unconventi onal warfare. Wri ti ng i n
1954 on tacti cal psychol ogi cal warf are duri ng the Korean confli ct, Colonel
Donal d F. Hal l expressed thi s vi ew:
Many psychologi cal warfare offi cers experi enced i n combat propa-
ganda operati ons have never subscri bed to the placement of psycho-
logi cal warfare and speci al forces under the same controlli ng staff
agenci es. Some have felt that a great error was made when the two
functi ons were placed under the same agency at Department of the
Army level, and there has been a growi ng concern about the tendency
to combi ne the two on down through the echelons to the Army i n the
fi eld.
The doubt as to the justi fi cati on for thi s concept has been an honest one
although few have had the capaci ty to questi on the deci si on i n hi gh
places. As a matter of economy i n meeti ng trai ni ng requi rements, most
have gone qui etly along wi th the development of the two functi ons as
"twi n acti vi ti es" at the hi gher levels, and parti cularly at the center
[The Psychologi cal Warfare Center]. But i t i s di ffi cult to concei ve of
guerri lla-type operati ons as true psychologi cal warfare; they seem to
be much more closely alli ed to strai ght combat operati ons wi thi n the
juri sdi cti on of G-3. 38
Beli evi ng, as di d Col onel Sands, that there were few i ndi vi duals who
would have wi de experi ence and capabi l i ti es i n both psychol ogi cal and
unconventi onal warfare, Colonel Hall feared that i f the two fi elds were
combi ned under one head, one of them "may suffer as a result of parti cular
emphasi s gi ven to the functi on i n whi ch the controlli ng personnel are
especi ally i nterested and experi enced."~ 9 Thi s, of course, was part of the
anxi ety suffered by Speci al Forces adherents i n 1952; at that ti me the
"controlli ng personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychologi cal Warfare
Center, were those wi th psychologi cal warfare backgrounds. (In later
years, the si tuati on would be reversed, especi ally at the center.) From early
1951 on, Volckmann and others i n the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on had
spoken pri mari ly i n terms of a Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Center, not a
Psychologi cal Warfare Center i n whi ch Speci al Forces would be relegated
to a subordi nate role. But, as Voi ckmann admi tted, "We lost that battle."
Indeed they di d. But why? Could i t have been because there was an
even greater "sti gma" attached "by conventi onal mi li tary mi nds" to un-
conventi onal warfare than to psychologi cal warfare'? Staff representati on
for psychologi cal warfare had exi sted at the Department of the Army and
i n overseas theaters duri ng World War I, World War II, and Korea. In
addi ti on, a defi ni te li neage of formal Army uni ts exi sted from both the
Korean war and World War II, when the Army had staff secti ons and uni ts
desi gned exclusi vely for the planni ng and conduct' of psychologi cal war-
fare. To be sure, as Dani el Lerner has shown i n hi s Sykewar, psychologi cal
warfare i n World War II had i ts share of "characters" who tended to
ali enate mi li tary professi onals. 4 But the major poi nt here i s that the Army
had staff secti ons and uni ts desi gned exclusi vely for the planni ng and
conduct of psychologi cal warfare, an acti vi ty that gradually gai ned re-
spectabi li ty i n both World War II and Korea. Such was not the case wi th
Speci al Forces and unconventi onal warfare i n the Army; unconventi onal
warfare's only real ancestry--and that i ndi rectly--was wi th the ci vi li an-
led OSS i n World War II, an organi zati on not held i n the hi ghest esteem
by many seni or mi li tary leaders.
Vi ewed from a hi stori cal perspecti ve, i t seems clear that Speci al
Forces emerged as an unprecedented enti ty wi thi n the Army under the
protecti ve wi ng of an establi shed, ongoi ng acti vi ty--psychologi cal warfare.
General McClure's foresi ght i n organi zi ng a Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on
i n the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, and hi s selecti on of
personnel for that di vi si on, gave unconventi onal warfare advocates li ke
Bank and Volckmann the offi ci al platform from whi ch to "sell" the Army
on the need for Speci al Forces uni ts. McClure's rati onale for i ncludi ng
unconventi onal warfare wi th psychologi cal warfare can reasonably be
li nked to hi s World War II experi ence wi th PWD/ SHAEF, hi s knowledge
of General Donovan' s i nsi stence on the close i nterrelati onshi p of psycho-
logi cal warfare and speci al operati ons, and the fact that the other
servi ces--as well as the JCS- - ha d the same organi zati onal phi losophy i n
thei r staffs. 4~ Al though i t i s apparent that key offi cers i n the Speci al Oper-
ati ons Di vi si on wanted to di ssoci ate unconventi onal and psychologi cal war-
fare, wi thout McCl ure' s stature and backi ng as a general offi cer headi ng
a speci al staff di vi si on at Department of the Army Headquarters, i t i s
i mprobable that Speci al Forces would have become a reali ty at the ti me
t hat i t di d. Speci al Forces and unconventi onal warfare arri ved through the
back door of the psychologi cal warfare house. Whi le the marri age of
psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare was probably a uni on of con-
veni ence (as Colonel Volckmann suggested) rather than choi ce, i t was
certai nly one of necessi ty for the Speci al Forces adherents.
Thus was created the Psychologi cal Warf are Center and the 10th
Speci al Forces Group- - t he ori gi ns of speci al warfare.
IX
SUMMI NG UP
Our quest to determi ne the ori gi ns of a speci al warfare capabi li ty for
the US Army has led us to i nvesti gate the pre-1952 roots of the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In doi ng so, we have traced the
modern hi stori cal antecedents of Ameri can experi ence wi th psychologi cal
and unconventi onal warfare. These two elements had a common poi nt of
ori gi n wi th the establi shment of the Coordi nator of Informati on (COI) i n
1941; i ndeed, General Wi lli am J. Donovan's all-encompassi ng concept of
psychologi cal warfare i ncluded all the aspects of what the Army was later
to call "speci al warfare" (wi th the excepti on of counteri nsurgency). Wi th
the di ssoluti on of COl i n 1942 and the parallel creati on of Offi ce of Stra-
tegi c Servi ces (OSS) and Offi ce of War Informati on (OWI), psychologi cal
and unconventi onal warfare took separate paths. They di d not formally
uni te i n the Army unti l the formati on of the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare (OCPW) i n 1951 and the foundi ng of the Psychologi cal
Warfare Center i n 1952.
Between 1941 and 1952, psychologi cal warfare developed a formal
li neage i n the Army traceable through uni ts and schools i n World War II,
the Korean confli ct, the Army General School at Fort Ri ley, and the
Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Addi ti onally, there had been
Department of the Army staff representati on for psychologi cal warfare
duri ng World War I, and, agai n, almost conti nuously si nce 1941. Psycho-
logi cal warfare, i n other words, had a tradi ti on i n the Army.
It was a ci vi li an--Assi stant Secretary of War, John J. McCl oy--who
pushed the Army i nto developi ng a branch at the War Department for the
planni ng and coordi nati on of psychologi cal warfare acti vi ti es, i ni ti ally i n
June 1941 and agai n i n November 1943. McCloy's i nterest i llustrates a
theme seen throughout our i nvesti gati on of the ori gi ns of speci al warfare:
155
156 SUMMING UP
the i ni ti ati ve demonstrated by i nfluenti al ci vi li an offi ci als to prod somewhat
conservati ve Army leaders i nto venturi ng forth i n new and uncertai n fi elds.
Certai nly Bri gadi er General Robert A. McClure was an excepti on to
thi s theme. The ci vi li an-mi li tary team that he headed fi rst i n North Afri ca
and then later i n PWD/ SHAEF, served as the model for successful Army
psychologi cal warfare operati ons. The Mobi le Radi o Broadcasti ng compa-
ni es employed i n Europe were the fi rst tacti cal propaganda uni ts of thei r
ki nd i n Army hi story and i nfluenced the development of si mi lar uni ts
duri ng the Korean war. And McClure hi mself had a strong hand i n urgi ng
that the War Department establi sh a central psychologi cal warfare agency.
All i n all, General McClure must be consi dered the most i mportant Army
offi cer to emerge i n thi s new fi eld duri ng World War II.
Contrary to the offi ci al li neage of Speci al Forces, unconventional
warfare, i n i ts stri ctest defi ni ti on, di d not have a traceable formal hi story
i n the Army. The Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, to whi ch the Army con-
tri buted personnel i n World War II, was the fi rst Ameri can agency devoted
to the planni ng, di recti on, and conduct of unconventi onal warfare, but i t
was not a mi li tary organi zati on. Nevertheless, i t left a legacy of or-
gani zati onal and combat knowledge that, together wi th a few key offi cers
who had World War II experi ence i n guerri lla warfare, was i nstrumental
i n the creati on of Speci al Forces i n 1952. Thi s gave the Army a formal
unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty for the fi rst ti me i n i ts hi story.
Duri ng the i nterwar years, the Army's psychologi cal warfare capabi l-
i ty langui shed, but staff planni ng acti vi ty di d not cease enti rely (contrary
to the clai m of one promi nent psychologi cal warfare text).~ Thi s acti vi ty
was kept ali ve by growi ng concerns about Sovi et i ntenti ons, by the i nterest
of a few seni or mi li tary offi cers li ke General Lemni tzer and General Mc-
Clure, and by the pressure brought to bear by several Secretari es of the
Army. In fact, a great deal of planni ng went on duri ng that peri od that
carri ed over to OCPW, more so than was later acknowledged by General
McClure even though he substanti ally contri buted to that effort from hi s
posts outsi de the Army Staff.
Si mi larly, the i mpetus for the i ni ti ati on of covert acti vi ti es after World
War II di d not ori gi nate i n the Central Intelli gence Group (forerunner of
the CIA); i t came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson, whose i nterest
i n developi ng an OSS-type "ai rborne reconnai ssance" uni t led the Army to
study an organi zati on that combi ned both OSS and Ranger precepts.
Although i nterest i n the subject waned after the growth of the respon-
si bi li ti es of the Central Intelli gence Agency/Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SUMMING UP 157
(CIA/OPC), the studi es and di alog that took place--li mi ted though they
were--clearly showed the i nfluence of OSS on Army thi nki ng and
presaged si mi lar di scussi ons i n the early 1950's pri or to formati on of the
10th Speci al Forces Group.
Notwi thstandi ng that more planni ng acti vi ty i n both psychologi cal
and unconventi onal warfare took place duri ng 1945-50 than i s generally
acknowledged, on the eve of the Korean war the Army was i ll-prepared i n
terms of personnel, equi pment, and organi zati on to conduct psychologi cal
warfare operati ons; i ts unconventi onal warfare capabi li ty was nonexi stent.
Wi th the i mpetus of the Korean war, the hei ghteni ng cold war ten-
si ons, and the persi stent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace,
Jr., the Army moved i n late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff
organi zati on--the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare. Wi th
Paee's support, Bri gadi er General McClure created a staff wi th re-
sponsi bi li ti es for both psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare. It was
largely as a result of McClure's status and foresi ght that the Army devel-
oped i ts fi rst capabi li ty to conduct unconventi onal warfare; the i nclusi on of
a Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on i n OCPW and McClure's selecti on of the key
personnel for that offi ce gave offi cers li ke Colonel Russell Volckmann and
Colonel Aaron Bank the opportuni ty to form plans for unconventi onal
warfare and the creati on of Speci al Forces. Despi te a "hot war" i n Korea,
the pri mary i nfluence behi nd the Army's i nterest i n unconventi onal war-
fare was the desi re for a guerri lla capabi li ty i n Europe to help "retard" a
Sovi et i nvasi on, should i t occur. (In fact, the development of Speci al Forces
came too late to play other than a mi ni mal role i n the 8th Army's behi nd-
the-li ne acti vi ti es.) After some i ni ti al experi mentati on wi th the organi -
zati onal machi nery to conduct thi s "new concept" of warfare, the uni t that
emerged was clearly desi gned to organi ze, trai n, and support i ndi genous
personnel i n behi nd-the-li nes resi stance acti vi ti es, and i t was based pri mar-
i ly on Donovan's OSS Operati onal Group concepts--not those of the
Rangers or Commandos. In order to provi de the necessary trai ni ng, mate-
ri el, and doctri nal support for both Speci al Forces and psychologi cal war-
fare uni ts, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at whi ch
the functi ons of the "whole fi eld of OCPW" would be located.
Roughly the same cold war tensi ons fueled i nterest i n both psycho-
logi cal and unconventi onal warfare, but there was a cruci al di fference i n
the recepti vi ty to each by the Army. Despi te some of the "characters"
associ ated wi th "sykewar," psychologi cal warfare organi zati ons gradually
attai ned i ncreased respectabi li ty i n the Army duri ng World War II and
Korea. On the other hand, the Army conti nued to vi ew unconventi onal
158 SUMMING UP
warfare wi th a certai n di staste. Thi s reluctance to accept Speci al Forces
resulted from the legacy of OSS-mi li tary ri valry duri ng World War II, a
lack of appreci ati on for unconventi onal warfare by offi cers trai ned for
conventi onal war, and a conti nui ng suspi ci on of eli te forces by the Army,
as well as from the fact that there was no formal precedent i n the Army's
hi story for Speci al Forces uni ts. Most i mportant of all were the constrai nts
of manpower and money i n what was, despi te the cold war, a peaceti me
Army. New i deas, parti cularly those that requi re an i ncrease i n personnel
and funds, are understandably di ffi cult to sell to leaders who must make
deci si ons on the basi s of essenti ali ty. (In thi s regard, i t i s i nstructi ve to note
that the spaces fi nally made avai lable for the formati on of the 10th Speci al
Forces Group came from the deacti vati on of the Rangers, another eli te
concept.)
In the face of resi stance, both wi thi n the Army and from the Ai r Force
and CIA, Speci al Forces nonetheless became a reali ty largely through the
support of General McClure and the persi stent efforts of Colonel Volck-
mann and Colonel Bank. But the bargai ni ng posi ti on of unconventi onal
warfare advocates was weak i n 1951-52; those i n OCPW who wanted a
separate exi stence for Speci al Forces found i t necessary to compromi se.
Because psychologi cal warfare had a formal li neage and a tradi ti on--and
unconventi onal warfare had nei ther--i t was expedi ent to bri ng Speci al
Forces i nto exi stence under the auspi ces of, and subordi nate to, psycho-
logi cal warfare. Thi s, plus the securi ty restrai nts placed on the publi ci zi ng
of Speci al Forces acti vi ti es, explai ns the apparent ascendancy of psycho-
logi cal warfare over unconventi onal warfare at that ti me.
General McClure's rati onale for combi ni ng these two acti vi ti es wi thi n
OCPW i n 1951 and at the Psychologi cal Warfare Center i n 1952 can be
parti ally attri buted to the heri tage of General Wi lli am Donovan's or-
gani zati onal phi losophy, and to the fact that the other mi li tary servi ces and
the JCS had the same combi nati on i n thei r staffs. In allowi ng McClure hi s
way, the Army may si mply have found i t conveni ent to lump these two
relati vely new out-of-the-mai nstream (thus "unconventi onal") acti vi ti es
together whi le i t attempted to sort out both i deas an d weapons. The result-
ant package could well have been called "mi scellaneous warfare" i nstead
of the eventual, more glamorous "speci al warfare." 2 Thus, the combi ni ng
of psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare under the Psychologi cal War-
fare Center was a marri age of both conveni ence and necessi ty, but one
that nevertheless gave t he Army the begi nni ngs of a "speci al warfare"
capabi li ty.
SUMMING UP 159
The person most responsi ble for achi evi ng thi s feat was Bri gadi er
General Robert A. McCl ure, clearly the central fi gure to emerge i n thi s
study. From World War II unti l early 1953, he alone provi ded the con-
ti nui ty, experti se, and gui dance at the general offi cer level that was so
essenti al to the ul ti mate establi shment of hi s dr e a m- - t he creati on of the
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Speci al Forces, and the
Psychologi cal Warf are Center. At every cruci al poi nt i n the unfoldi ng of
events leadi ng to these accompli shments, parti cul arl y after Worl d War II,
one fi nds hi s personal i mpri nt; i ndeed, the story of the ori gi ns of speci al
warfare could almost be told through a bi ography of thi s dedi cated, ener-
geti c vi si onary. Today hi s name i s recogni zed by few; the achi evements of
Vol ckmann and Bank are more fami li ar. One searches i n vai n for Mc-
Clure' s pi cture on the walls of the Center for Mi l i tary Assi stance or i n i ts
museum. But i f any one man can be called the father of speci al warfare,
surely that man was Robert A. McCl ure.
Even after i ts bi rth, the Psychologi cal Warf are Center, along wi th
Speci al Forces, led a precari ous exi stence) And McCl ure hi msel f left the
OCPW i n March 1953 an embi ttered man; the i mpli cati on was that he had
been i n a speci ali zed acti vi ty too l ong: But hi s legacy i s clear; the founda-
ti on he lai d was bui lt upon i n the 1960's when speci al warfare was ex-
panded to encompass counteri nsurgency, and to thi s day Speci al Forces
and psychologi cal warfare uni ts exi st, albei t uneasi ly, under the Center for
Mi l i tary Assi stance at Fort Bragg. Ironi cally, the Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychologi cal Warf are has not survi ved. The manner i n whi ch psycho-
logi cal and unconventi onal warfare evolved from 1941 unti l thei r uni on as
a formal Army capabi li ty i n 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout
the hi story of speci al warfare: the story of a hesi tant and rel uctant Army
attempti ng to cope wi th concepts and organi zati ons of an unconventi onal
nature.
NOTES
Archi val collecti ons ci ted i n notes are abbrevi ated as follows:
CMH
Nati onal Archi ves
USAJFKCMA
USAMHI
WNRC
Center of Mi li tary Hi story,
Washi ngton, D.C.
Nati onal Archi ves, Washi ngton, D.C.
US Army John F. Kennedy Center for
Mi li tary Assi stance, Fort Bragg, N.C.
US Army Mi li tary Hi story Insti tute,
Carli sle Barracks, Pa.
Washi ngton Nati onal Records Center,
Sui tland, Md.
Some fi les are desi gnated Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), or Confi denti al (C).
For other abbrevi ati ons and acronyms appeari ng i n the notes, see the glossary.
Chapter I Notes
1. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Informati on, Special
Warfare, US Army: An Army Specialty (Washi ngton, D.C., 1962), p. 55, USA
JFKCMA.
2. Army, Special Warfare, pp. 8f.; Joi nt Chi efs of Staff, Dictionary of US
Military Terms for Joint Usage (Washi ngton, D.C., August 1968).
3. Army, Special Warfare, p. 5.
4. Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C.,
Memorandum No. 14, "Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual, Headquarters, The
Psychologi cal Warfare Center," 12 November 1952, USAJFKCMA.
5. US, Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of De-
fense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the
Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, 1 January through 30 June 1952 (Washi ngton,
D.C.), p. 92.
161
162 NOTES
Chapter II Notes
1. Kermi t Roosevelt, ed., War Report of the OSS, 2 vols. (New York:
Walker & Co., 1976), 1:5; Propaganda Branch, Intelli gence Di vi si on, WDGS, The
Pentagon, Washi ngton, D.C., "A Syllabus of Psychologi cal Warfare" (October
1946), p. 27, USAJFKCMA; Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: Li ttle, Brown
& Co., 1970), pp. 335
2. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 91, 106f., 110.
3. Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 108.
4. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 110f.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:9,
31.
5. Wi lli am E. Daugherty and Morri s Janowi tz, A Psychological Warfare
Casebook (Baltimore: The Johns Hopki ns Press, 1958), p. 127.
7. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:16.
8. Wi lli am R. Corson, The Armies of lgnorance." The Rise of the American
Intelligence Empire (New York: Di al Press, 1977), pp. 182f.; Roosevelt, War
Report of the OSS, 1:20.
9. Ford, Donovan of OSS. pp. 127f., 337; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS,
1:26f.; Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 182.
11. Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Ballanti ne
Books, 1972), p. 46.
13. Hymoff, OSS in World War II, p. 70.
14. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 124f.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS,
1:19; Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 183.
15. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS. 1:26-28; Corson, Armies of Igno-
rance, pp. 184-86.
16. Paul Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan &
Pearce, 1954), p. 93; Hymoff, OSS in World War 1I, p. 70; Daugherty and Jan-
owi tz, Casebook, p. 128; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychologi cal War-
fare," p. 2; Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 126-28.
17. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare. p. 93; Daugherty and Janowi tz,
Casebook, p. 128; Corson, Armies oflgnorance, p. 185.
18. Daugherty and Janowi tz, Casebook, p. 129.
19. US, War Department General Staff, Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on G-2,
A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September
1945 (Washi ngton, D.C., 1946), pp. 289f.
20. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, p. 290.
21. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 291f.
22. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 293t".; Li nebarger, Psycho-
logical Warfare, pp. 93f.; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychologi cal War-
fare," p. 29.
NOTES 163
23. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 305, 309f.; Roosevelt, War
Report of the OSS, 1:213.
24. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 310-12.
25. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:97; Corson, Armies of Ignorance,
p. 199; Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 312f.
27. Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 200f.
29. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, ! :105.
32. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 97.
33. Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Supreme Headquarters, Alli ed Expedi -
ti onary Force, "An Account of Its Operati ons i n the Western European Campai gn,
1944- 45" (Bad Homburg, Germany, October 1945), pp. 17-19; Bri g. Gen. Robert
A. McClure, "Trends i n Army Psychologi cal Warfare, " Army Information Digest
7, no. 2 (February 1952):10.
34. "Records Pertai ni ng to Psychologi cal Warfare i n Custody of Hi stori cal
Records Secti on," 8 November 1949, p. 5, Hi stori cal Records Secti on, AGO,
Reference Ai d Number 7, Record Group 319, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on
091.412 (7 October 1949), FW 25/2, Nati onal Archi ves.
35. Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, "Operati ons i n Western European Cam-
pai gn," p. 13.
pai gn," p. 17.
37. Alli ed Force Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, Memo-
randum prepared i n Washi ngton, D.C., 26 November 1943, by Maj. Edward A.
Caskey, Commander, 1st MRB Company, Research Group 165, MID (G-2),
Propaganda Branch Correspondence, 1939-45, POWS, box 333, Nati onal
Archi ves.
38. Saul K. Padover and Harold D. Lasswell, "Psychologi cal Warfare, "
Headline Series, no. 86 (20 March 1951), pp. 14f.; Daugherty and Janowi tz,
Casebook, pp. 131f.; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychologi cal Warfare, "
pp. 32-43.
pai gn," pp. 13-17; Daugherty and Janowi tz, Casebook, p. 131.
40. War Department, Offi ce of the Inspector General, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Memorandum to the Deputy Chi ef of Staff from Maj. Gen. Vi rgi l L. Peterson,
17 August 1943, subject: Survey of Organi zati ons, Admi ni strati on, Supply and
Procedures of the North Afri can Theater of Operati ons, Nati onal Archi ves.
41. Padover and Lasswell, "Psychologi cal Warfare, " p. 16.
43. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:105-7, 213.
44. Operati ons and Plans Di rectorate, WDGS, Washi ngton D.C., Memo-
randum for Col. O. L. Nelson from Bri g. Gen. J. E. Hull, Acti ng Assi stant Chi ef
164 NOTES
of Staff, OPD, subject: Organi zati on for Propaganda Planni ng, 12 August 1943,
Record Group 165, OPD 000.24 (12 July 1943), Secti on I (Cases 1-39), Nati onal
Archi ves.
45. WDGS, The Adjutant General's Offi ce, Washi ngton D.C., Letter to all
major commanders, subject: Organi zati on for Propaganda Planni ng, 20 August
1943, AG 091.412 (16 August 1943), fi led wi th Record Group 165, OPD 000.24,
Secti on I (Cases 1-39), Nati onal Archi ves.
46. WDGS, Offi ce of the Deputy Chi ef of Staff, Extract from mi nutes of
General Counci l Meeti ng, 23 August 1943, Record Group 165, OPD 000.24,
Secti on II (Cases 40-61), Nati onal Archi ves.
47. WDGS, Memorandum to Joi nt Intelli gence Commi ttee wi th i nclosed
report by Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, and Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, OPD, subject:
War Department Propaganda Control Agency, 8 September 1943, Record Group
165, OPD 000.24, Secti on II (Cases 40-61), Nati onal Archi ves.
48. WDGS, Memorandum for the Deputy Chi ef of Staff, subject: Psycho-
logi cal Warfare/Establi shment of Agency for Deali ng wi th Problem of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, 16 October 1943, Record Group 165, OPD 000.24, Secti on II
(Cases 40-61), Nati onal Archi ves.
49. WDGS, Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, G-2, Memorandum for Maj. Gen.
T. T. Handy from Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, G-2, 6 November 1943, Record
Group 165, OPD 000.24, Secti on II (Cases 40-61), Nati onal Archi ves.
50. WDGS, Operati ons Di vi si on, Memorandum for Maj. Gen. George
V. Strong from Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, subject: War Department, Propa-
ganda Branch, 10 November 1945, Record Group 165, OPD 000.24, Secti on II
(Cases 40-61 ), Nati onal Archi ves.
51. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, pp. 317f.
53. WDGS, G-2, Mzmorandum from Maj. Gen. George V. Strong for Com-
mandi ng General, Army Ai r Forces; Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, Operati ons Di vi si on;
Chi ef, Ci vi l Affai rs Di vi si on; and Di rector, Bureau of Publi c Relati ons, subject:
Propaganda Secti on, MID, 23 November 1943. Memorandum attaches copy of
MID memorandum no. 78, 15 November 1943, establi shi ng a Propaganda Branch
i n the MID, and requests cooperati on and coordi nati on of all addressees. Fi led wi th
Record Group 165, OPD 000.24, Secti on II (Cases 40-61), Nati onal Archi ves.
54. JCS, Joi nt Strategi c Survey Commi ttee, Letter from Maj. Gen. L. L.
Lemni tzer, US Army, to Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, Operati ons Di vi si on, War De-
partment, subject: Research and Analysi s of PWD Acti vi ti es i n World War II,
22 December 1945, Record Group 165, OPD 000.24, Secti on III (Cases 62- ),
Nati onal Archi ves.
55. See note 54 above.
56. WDGS, G-2, unsi gned letter from i ndi vi dual wi th Headquarters, West-
ern Task Force, 26 November 1942 (apparently the wri ter was previ ously assi gned
to G-2), Research Group 319, G2 322.001 (1 October 1942), box 576, Nati onal
Archi ves.
57. Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, History, p. 322; see also Charles A. H.
Thomson, Overseas Information Service of the US Government (Washi ngton,
D.C.: Brooki ngs Insti tuti on, 1948), pp. 25f.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NOTES 165
58. Daugherty and Janowi tz, Casebook, pp. 134f.
59. Letter, General of the Army Dwi ght D. Ei senhower, Headquarters, US
Forces, European Theater, Offi ce of the Commandi ng General, i n Psychologi cal
Warfare Di vi si on, "Operati ons i n Western European Campai gn," p. 1.
Chapter III Notes
1. "Li neage of Speci al Forces," undated mi meographed fact sheet located i n
G-1 archi ves, USAJFKCMA. Department of the Army Di recti ve AGAO-322,
18 October 1960, consoli dated the vari ous Ranger Battali ons wi th the 1st Speci al
Servi ce Force and redesi gnated them all as the Ist Speci al Forces--whi ch became
the parent uni t of all Speci al Forces Groups.
2. Joi nt Chi efs of Staff, Dictionary of US Military Terms f or Joint Usage
(Washi ngton, D.C., August 1968).
3. R. Harri s Smi th, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central
Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: Uni versi ty of Cali forni a Press, 1972), pp. 1-2.
4. OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel f or the
O~ce of Strategic Services (New York: Ri nehart & Co., 1948), pp. 64-65.
5. See, for example, the vari ance of fi gures i n Ford, Donovan of OSS; Harry
Rowe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambri dge: Harvard
Uni versi ty Press, 1958); Hymoff, OSS in World War II; Smi th, OSS; Roosevelt,
War Report of the OSS, i: I ! 6.
6. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 167-68, 338-39.
8. Ransom, Central Intelligence, pp. 64-65.
9. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Staff, Mi nutes, Meeti ng
of the General Counci l, 13 November 1945. Fi gures extracted from the Report of
the War Department Manpower Board, p. 15, USAMHI.
10. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:70, 72, 80-82.
1 I. Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 177. In a bi t of understatement i n War
Report of the OSS, Roosevelt comments that "there seemed to be a deep-seated
di sapproval of the organi zati on of i ndependent mi li tary forces on the part of the
War Department" (1:223).
12. WDGS, G-2, Washi ngton D.C., Memorandum for the Assi stant Chi ef of
Staff, G- ! , subject: Comments on Memo from the CO1 re Organi zati on of Guer-
ri lla Warfare Command, 23 June 1942, from Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Record
Group 319, Army Intelli gence, 370.64, box 874, Nati onal Archi ves.
13. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 1:105, 223.
14. Hugh Chandler, pri vate i ntervi ew held at Fort Bragg, N. C., 8 March
1973.
15. US Army, Headquarters, Speci al Warfare School, Readings in Guerrilla
Warfare, (Fort Bragg, N.C., 1 December 1960), p. 29.
16. Wi lli am R. Peers and Dean Breli s, Behind the Burma Road: The Story
of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Forces (Boston: Li ttle, Brown & Co.,
166 NOTES
1963), pp. 207-20. Informati on on Detachment 101 acti vi ti es i s also contai ned i n
Charles F. Romanus and Ri ley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI: United States
Army in World War H, China-Burma-India Theater (Washi ngton, D.C.: Offi ce of
the Chi ef of Mi li tary Hi story, Department of the Army, 1959). See also Roosevelt,
War Report of the OSS, 2:369-92.
17. Smi th, OSS, p. 248.
18. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2:x, 358.
19. The Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, Operati onal Group Command, 1944-45,
"OSS Ai d to the French Resi stance i n World War II: Ori gi n and Development of
Resi stance i n France, Summary, " pp. 10-11, USAJFKCMA.
20. The Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, Operati onal Group Command, Grenoble,
France, 20 September 1944, "OSS Ai d to the French Resi stance i n World War II:
Operati ons i n Southern France, Operati onal Groups," pp. 1-3, USAJFKCMA;
Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2:170, 222.
21. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2:223; Department of the Army,
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., "A Study of Speci al and
Subversi ve Operati ons," 25 November 1947, G- 3 Hot Fi le, 091.412TS, 1949,
box 10, Nati onal Archi ves.
22. The Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces, Operati onal Group Command, Booklet,
"OG--Operati onal Group Command, " (Washi ngton, D.C., December 1944),
USAJFKCMA; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2:223-25.
23. The Office of Strategic Services, Operational Group Command, Grenoble,
France, 20 September 1944, "OSS Ai d to the French Resi stance i n World War II:
Operati ons i n Southern France, Operati onal Groups"; Speci al Operati ons Re-
search Offi ce, Undergrounds in Insurgent Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare
(Washi ngton, D.C.: Ameri can Uni versi ty, 1963), p. 204; Roosevelt, War Report of
the OSS, 2:i 45; OSS booklet, "OG--Operati onal Group Command,"
USAJFKCMA.
25. Department of the Army, General Staff, G-2, "Summary of French Re-
si stance, 6 June-31 August 1944," USAMHI.
26. Lt. Col. Henry C. Hart, "Uni ted States Employment of Underground
Forces," Military Review 26, no. 3 (March 1947):52-56; US Army Speci al War-
fare School, Readings in Guerrilla Warfare, p. 28.
27. Col. R. W. Volckmann, We Remained." Three Years behind the Enemy
Lines in the Philippines (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1954); US Army
Speci al Warfare School, Readings in Guerrilla Warfare, p. 28; Department of the
Army, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., "A Study of Spe-
ci al and Subversi ve Operati ons," 25 November 1947, G- 3 Hot Fi le, 091.412TS,
1949, box 10, Nati onal Archi ves.
28. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 302, 340-42.
29. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 303-4.
30. Hymoff, OSS in World War II, p. 341.
33. Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventi onal Warfare i n the Nuclear Era,"
Orbis 4, no. 13 (Fall 1960):323-37.
NOTES 167
34. Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 180.
36. Hymoff, OSS in World War IL p. 341.
37. Hymoff, OSS in World War IL p. 2.
38. Smi th, OSS, p. 6.
39. Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 109, 129, 162.
40. Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American
Espionage (New York: Reynal & Hi tchcock, 1946), p. 15.
41. Herbert Ri fl~ i nd, "From Rockets to Ri fles: The Presi dent's Guerri lla
Poli cy," Review, May-June 1962, pp. I- 12.
42. Smi th, OSS, pp. 243-44.
43. Ransom, Central Intelligence, p. 66; Smi th, OSS, pp. 34, 250-51.
44. Thayer, Guerrilla, pp. xvi i -xvi i i .
45. Frankli n Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Com-
munist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1962), p. xxi i .
46. Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 180.
47. Russell Wei gley, History of the United States Army (New York: Mac-
mi llan Co., 1967), p. 543.
48. Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 181.
49. Smi th, OSS, pp. 364-65; Ford, Donovan of OSS, pp. 314, 343; Hymoff,
OSS in World War IL pp. 341-42; Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa, p. 233; Allen
Dulles, The Craft oflntelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 43; OPD
Memo No. 6168, 30 September 1945, states that General Magruder was i nstructed
"to conti nue li qui dati on of acti vi ti es and personnel not needed for peaceti me pur-
poses," CCS 385(2-8-42), Secti on I, PT. 10, box 87, Nati onal Archi ves. A memo-
randum by the Chi ef of Staff, US Army, as part of JCS 965/2, 28 August 1945,
"Wi thdrawal of All Servi ce Personnel wi th OSS," i ndi cated approxi mately 8,000
US Army offi cers and enli sted men on duty wi th OSS i n July 1945, CCS 385
(2-8-42), Secti on I, PT. I0, box 37, Nati onal Archi ves.
50. Edmond Taylor, Awakening f rom History (Boston: Gambi t, 1969),
pp. 345f.
51. Taylor, Awakening f rom History, p. 346.
Chapter IV Notes
1. Ray S. Cli ne, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential
CIA (Washi ngton, D.C.: Acropoli s Books, 1976), p. 98.
2. Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 302.
3. Dani el Yergi n, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the
National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mi ffli n Co., 1977), p. 54.
168 NOTES
4. For a conci se summary of the early hi story of the CIA, see US, Congress,
Senate, Select Commi ttee to Study Governmental Operati ons wi th Respect to
Intelli gence Acti vi ti es, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and
Military Intelligence, bk. 4, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 94-755, 23 Apri l 1976,
pp. 4-41. See also Tyrus G. Fai n, ed., The Intelligence Community: History,
Organization, and Issues, Publi c Documents Seri es (New York: Bowker Co.,
1977), pp. 6-18; and Cli ne, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, pp. 99-110. For a more
detai led exami nati on, see Corson, Armies oflgnorance, pp. 221-329.
6. Dulles, Craft of Intelligence, p. 45.
7. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 4, p. 28.
8. Hugh Chandler, pri vate i ntervi ew held at Fort Bragg, N.C., 8 March
1973; tlymoff, OSS in World War 11, p. 347.
10. The Joi nt Chi efs of Staff, Joi nt Strategi c Survey Commi ttee, Washi ngton
D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, Operati ons Di vi si on, War Department, subject:
Research and Analysi s of PWB Acti vi ti es i n World War II, 22 December 1945,
from Maj. Gen. L. L. Lemni tzer, US Army, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons,
P&O 091.412 (22 August 1946) (P/ W #7), Nati onal Archi ves.
11. Offi ce of Di rector, Informati on Control, Offi ce of Mi li tary Government
for Germany, APO 742, US Army, Letter from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure,
Di rector, to Propaganda Branch, MID War Department, Record Group 319,
091.412 (13 January 1946), box 263, WNRC. Note that after McClure left
PWD/SHAEF at the war's end, he became the Di rector, Informati on Control, a
related acti vi ty.
12. Joi nt Chi efs of Staff, Hi stori cal Secti on, Memo for the JCS, subject:
Hi story of Psychologi cal Warfare Duri ng World War II, 8 February 1946, from
Maj. Gen. E. F. Hardi ng, Chi ef, CCS 314.7 (2-8-46), box 39, Nati onal Archi ves.
13. A perusal of the Army General Counci l Mi nutes for the i mmedi ate post-
war peri od provi des one wi th the flavor of the mi nd-boggli ng problems faced by the
Army duri ng the rush to demobi li ze. The General Counci l met weekly, was com-
posed of the seni or War Department leadershi p, and was chai red by ei ther the
Chi ef of Staff or the Deputy Chi ef of Staff. Mi nutes, USAMHI.
14. US, Congress, Senate, Select Commi ttee to Study Governmental Oper-
ati ons wi th respect to Intelli gence Acti vi ti es, Foreign and Military Intelligence,
bk. 1, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 95-755, 26 Apri l 1976, p. 19.
15. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Washi ngton D.C., Letter to Assi s-
tant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, subject: Project to Com-
bat subversi ve Acti vi ti es--The Uni ted States, 15 January 1946, from Maj. Gen.
W. G. Wyman, G-2, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (15
January 1946), Nati onal Archi ves.
16. WDGS, Intelli gence Di vi si on, Washi ngton D.C., Summary Sheet,
22 May 1946, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412, Secti on IA,
Case 7, Nati onal Archi ves.
17. Offi ce of Mi li tary Government for Germany (US), Offi ce of the Di rector
of Informati on Control, Letter to Col. D. W. Johnston, Chi ef, Propaganda Branch,
NOTES 169
MID, G-2, 21 June 1946, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319,
Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (22 August 1946) (FW 7), Nati onal Archi ves.
18. WDGS, Intelli gence Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., MID 912, Memo-
randum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: Establi shment of Psychologi cal Warfare
Group, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, WDGS, 22 August 1946, Record Group
319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (22 August 1946) (FW 7), Nati onal
Archi ves.
19. WDGS, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo for
Record, subject: Establi shment of Psychologi cal Warfare Group, P&O Di vi si on,
WDGS, 4 October 1946, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412
(27 September 1946), Nati onal Archi ves.
21. WDGS, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., handwri tten
notes dated 6 November 1946, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O
091.412, Secti on IA, Case 7, Nati onal Archi ves.
22. WDGS, Intelli gence Di vi si on, Memorandum No. 100, subject: Di scon-
ti nuance of Propaganda Branch, I.D., 29 November 1946, Record Group 319,
Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (29 November 1946), Nati onal Archi ves.
23. WDGS, War Department, Memorandum No. 575-10-1, Responsi bi li ty
of War Department Agenci es for Psychologi cal Warfare Functi ons, 10 January
1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (18 December 1946),
24. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 4, pp. 26f.; also Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (12 May 1947), Nati onal Archi ves.
25. War Department, The Chi ef of Staff, Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum
for the Di rector, Plans and Operati ons, WDGS, 19 June 1947, from Dwi ght D.
Ei senhower, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (19 June 1947),
26. WDGS, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Memorandum for the Chi ef of
Staff, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare, 21 June 1947, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, P&O staff reacti on, and Di rector, P&O Memo for the Chi ef of Staff,
29 July 1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, P &O 09 ! .412
(21 June 1947), Nati onal Archi ves.
29. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter to Maj.
Gen. Lauri s Norstad, Di rector of Plans and Operati ons, WDGS, from Maj. Gen.
W. G. Wyman, 14 June 1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412
(14 June 1947), Secti on II, Cases 16-30, Nati onal Archi ves.
30. WDGS, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Maj.
Gen. W. G. Wyman, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., from
Maj. Gen. Lauri s Norstad, 16 July 1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons,
P&O 091.412 (14 June 1947), Secti on II, Cases 16-30, Nati onal Archi ves.
31. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter to Maj.
Gen. Lauri s Norstad from Maj. Gen. W. G. Wyman, 22 July 1947, Record Group
319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (14 June 1947), Secti on II, Cases 16-30,
170 NOTES
32. Department of the Army, Chi ef of Informati on, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Memorandum for the Di rector, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, subject: Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, 31 October 1947, from Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy, Record Group 319,
Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, 1946-48, 091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, P&O
091.412 TS (31 October 1947), Nati onal Archi ves.
33. War Department, Speci al Staff, Ci vi l Affai rs Di vi si on, New York Fi eld
Offi ce, Memorandum for Gen. Dwi ght D. Ei senhower, subject: Candi dates for
Psychologi cal Warfare Reserve, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef, New
York Fi eld Offi ce, 5 November 1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O
091.412 (5 November 1947), Nati onal Archi ves.
34. Department of the Army, The Chi ef of Staff, Memorandum for Secretary
James V. Forrestal, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare, from Dwi ght D. Ei senhower,
17 November 1947, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, Nati onal Archi ves.
35. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 4, pp. 27-29.
36. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 1, pp. 48f.
38. Department of the Army, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton,
D.C. Summary Sheet and Study to Chi ef of Staff, subject: A Study of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector of Plans and Oper-
ati ons, I0 February 1948, Record Group 319, P&O Di vi si on, 1946-48,
091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, P&O 091.412 TS (15 January 1948), Nati onal
Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, 18 March 1948, from Lt. Gen. A. C.
Wedemeyer, Di rector, Plans and Operati ons, Record Group 319, Plans and Oper-
ati ons Di vi si on, 1946-48, 091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, fi led wi th P&O 091.412
(30 November 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Di rector, Plans and Operati ons, subject: Proposed Tri p
of Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 30 March 1948, from Col. Wi lli am S. Bi ddle,
Assi stant Chi ef, Plans and Poli cy Group, Record Group 319, Plans and Operati ons
Di vi si on, 1946-48,091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, P&O 091.412 (30 March 1948),
D.C., Letter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Ci vi l Affai rs Di vi si on, New York
Fi eld Offi ce, from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector of Plans and Operati ons,
18 June 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, fi led wi th P&O 091.412
(28 May 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
43. Department of the Army, Ci vi l Affai rs Di vi si on, New York Fi eld Offi ce,
Letter to Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, from
Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef, New York Fi eld Offi ce, 8 July 1948, Record
Grou p 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412, Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Letter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef, New York Fi eld Offi ce, Ci vi l
Affai rs Di vi si on, from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector of Plans and Oper-
NOTES 171
ati ons, 17 September 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412,
D.C., Memorandum for Gen. Omar Bradley, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare,
9 August 1948, by Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, fi led wi th P&O 091.412 TS (1 Sep-
tember 1948), Record Group 319, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, 1946-48,
091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for General Schuyler, subject: Lt. Col. Wi lli am H. Baumer,
16 August 1948, by Lt. Col. Robert M. Gant, Chi ef, Personnel Branch, P&O
Di vi si on, fi led wi th P&O 091.412 TS (1 September 1948), Record Group 319,
Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, 1946-48, 091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, Nati onal
Archi ves.
49. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 301.
D.C., DF to Di rector, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, subject: TO&E for
Psychologi cal Warfare Uni ts, from Di rector, Plans and Operati ons, 20 September
1948; also Memorandum for Record, subject: TO&E for Psychologi cal Warfare
Uni ts, 22 December 1948, Record Group 319, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on,
1946 48, 091.3-091.7, Secti on I, box 28, P&O 091.412 TS (20 September 1948),
D.C., Memorandum for Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Plans and Combat Operati ons,
subject: Planni ng for Warti me Conduct of Overt Psychologi cal Warfare (NSC
Staff Memorandum of 23 February 1949), 4 March 1949, Record Group 319,
Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (23 February
1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Record, subject: Bri efi ng on NSC Meeti ng, 3 June
1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, Hot Fi les, Nati onal
Archi ves.
53. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Under Secretary of the Army,
Washi ngton, D.C., "The Army' s Role i n Current Psychologi cal Warfare," A Re-
port to Wi lli am H. Draper, Under Secretary of the Army, by Wallace Carroll,
24 February 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot
Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (24 February ! 949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Extract on Psychologi cal Warfare from Deputy Chi ef of Staff, Combat Plans
and Operati ons, Di ary of i mportant events occurri ng duri ng Chi ef of Staff's recent
absence, 15 March 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10,
Hot Fi les, CSUSA (15 March 1949) TS, Nati onal Archi ves.
56. Department of the Army, Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Plans and Combat
Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Secretary of the Army Kenneth
172 NOTES
C. Royai l from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, 17 March 1949, Record Group 319,
Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, CSUSA 385 (17 March 1949) C,
D.C., Letter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure from Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte,
Di rector of Plans and Operati ons, 7 July 1949, Record Group 319, Army Oper-
ati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 S (7 July 1949), Nati onal
Archi ves.
58. Headquarters, Fort Ord, Cali f., Letter from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. Mc-
Clure to Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Di rector of Plans and Operati ons, De-
partment of the Army, 12 July 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons,
1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, 091.412 S (7 July 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Meeti ng wi th Secretary of the Army
Gordon Gray Concerni ng Psychologi cal Warfare, 11 July 1949, Record Group
319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, CSUSA 385 C (11 July 1949),
61. Department of the Army, Army Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo-
randum by Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, Di rector, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on,
subject: General Staff Responsi bi li ty for Planni ng Pertai ni ng to New Devel-
opments i n Warfare, 12 May 1949; also Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Charles L.
Bolte, Di rector, Plans and Operati ons, commenti ng on above subject, Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 381 (12 May 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
62. Armed Forces Informati on School, Carli sle Barracks, Pa., Student Com-
mi ttee Report, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare and Propaganda Analysi s, 9 June
1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, P&O 091.412 (8 September 1949),
D.C., MemorandUm to Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on requesti ng i nformati on
on psychologi cal warfare trai ni ng i n bei ng or planned, 19 August 1949; also P&O
Di vi si on memo on subject, 4 October 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons,
P&O 091.412 (19 August 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
64. Offi ce of the Secretary of the Army, Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum
from Gordon Gray to Chi ef of Staff, US Army, 7 February 1950, Record Group
319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, Hot Fi les, box 10, P&O 091.412 (7 February
D.C., "Report on the Army Psychologi cal Warfare Program," 13 February 1950,
Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, Hot Fi les, box 10, P&O 091.412
TS (7 February 1950), Nati onal Archi ves.
68. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Secretary of the Army, Washi ng-
ton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: Army Organi zati on for
Psychologi cal Warfare, 29 May 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.,
NOTES 173
Record Group 319, G-3 Operati ons, March 1950-51, 091.412, Cases 1-20,
D.C., Memorandum for Gen. Charles L. Bolte, subject: Army Organi zati on for
Psychologi cal Warfare, from General Schuyler, 13 February 1950, Record Group
319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, Hot Fi les, box 10, P&O 091.412 TS (7 February
70. Department of the Army, G-3, Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo-
randum to Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G- l , Personnel, subject: Requi rement for
Offi cers Wi th Speci ali zed Trai ni ng, 13 March 1960, OPS 091.412 (13 March
1950); Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Adjutant General, Washi ngton,
D.C., Letter to Commander i n Chi ef, Far East; Commandi ng General, US Army,
Europe; Chi ef, Army Fi eld Forces; Commandant, Command and General Staff
College, 17 Apri l 1950, AGAO-S 210.61 (31 March 1950) G-3; both fi led i n
71. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo-
randum, subject: Army Program for Psychologi cal Warfare, 13 March 1950,
box 154, OPS 091.412 (10 March 1950), Nati onal Archi ves.
72. Army Fi eld Forces, Offi ce of the Chi ef, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter to Maj.
Gen. R. E. Duff, Acti ng Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, from Maj. Gen. Robert C.
Macon, Deputy Chi ef, 7 June 1950, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, G-3
091.412 (Secti on III) (Cases 41-60) (Case 50 wi thdrawn, fi led i n Secti on III A),
73. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Summary
Sheet for Chi ef of Staff, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare Organi zati on i n the De-
partment of the Army, from Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, G-3, 13 July 1950,
Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, OPS 091.412 (Secti on II) (Cases 21-40)
(Case 26 wi thdrawn, fi led Secti on II A), 091.412 (5 July 1950) S, Nati onal
Archi ves.
Chapter V Notes
1. US, Congress, Senate, Select Commi ttee to Study Governmental Oper-
ati ons wi th Respect to Intelli gence Acti vi ti es, Foreign and Military Intelligence,
bk. 4, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 94-755, 23 Apri l 1976, p. 26.
2. WDGS, Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum
to the Adjutant General, subject: Ai rborne Reconnai ssance Uni ts, 19 August 1946,
from Maj. Gen. S. J. Chamberlai n, Di rector of Intelli gence, Record Group 319,
Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les, 1941-48, 373.14, box 874, WNRC.
174 NOTES
to Di rector, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, subject: Ai rborne Reconnai ssance
Uni ts, from Col. M. A. Solomon, Assi stant Executi ve, Di rector of Intelli gence,
6 March 1947, Record Group 319, Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les, 1941-48,
373.14, box 874, WNRC.
to Commandi ng General, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., subject: Ai r-
borne Reconnai ssance Uni ts, from Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall, Di rector of Organi zati on
and Trai ni ng, 9 Apri l 1947, Record Group 319, Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les,
1941-48, 373.14, box 874, WNRC.
5. Army Fi eld Forces, Offi ce of the Chi ef, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter from
Maj. Ernest Samusson, Jr., to Col. W. R. Peers, US Army Command and Staff
College, 24 June 1948, Record Group 319, Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les,
1941-48, 373.14, box 874, WNRC.
7. WDGS, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo-
randum to Di rector of Intelli gence, subject: Ranger Group (Old Proposed Ai rborne
Reconnai ssance Company), from Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, Acti ng Di rector, O&T
Di vi si on, 13 September 1948, Record Group 319, Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les,
1941-48, 373.14, box 874, WNRC.
8. Army Ground Forces, Intelli gence Secti on, Fort Monroe, Va., Memo-
randum for Lt. Col. Roland N. Gleszer, Intelli gence Di vi si on, WDGS, Record
Group 319, Army Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les, 1941-48, 373.14, box 874, WNRC.
The memo was sent by an offi cer named "Farri s," wi th a copy of a paper on the
Ranger Group that the Intelli gence Secti on was submi tti ng to the Plans Secti on for
forwardi ng to the WDGS.
9. Department of the Army, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, Washi ng-
ton, D.C., "A Study of Speci al and Subversi ve Operati ons," 25 November 1947,
Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, G-3, Hot Fi le
091.412 TS (1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., "Study on Guerri lla Warfare, " 1 March 1949, Record Group 319, Army
Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 370.64 TS (i March 1949), Na-
ti onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Di rector of Speci al
Studi es (NSC 10), from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector of Plans and Oper-
ati ons, 19 May 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, Hot
Fi les, P&O 092 TS (12 May 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
13. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, bk. 4, pp. 28-30.
D.C., memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Di rector of Speci al
Studi es (NSC 10), 19 May 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52,
box 9, Hot Fi les, P&0 092 TS (12 May 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Di rector of Speci al
NOTES 175
Studi es (NSC 10), from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector of Plans and Oper-
ati ons, 2 June 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, Hot
Fi les, P&O 092 TS (I 2 May 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Record, subject: Bri efi ng on NSC Meeti ng, 3 June
1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, Hot Fi les, Nati onal
Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, US Army, subject: Desi gnati on of
Mi li tary Establi shment Representati ves NSC 10/2 (Offi ce of Speci al Projects)
(JCS 1735/14), from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector, P&O Di vi si on,
19 August 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52, box 9, Hot
Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (31 July 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, subject: Offi ce of Speci al
Projects (NSC/IO/1), from Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Di rector, Plans and Oper-
ati ons Di vi si on, 16 June 1948, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1948-52,
box 9, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (16 June 1948), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Study on Guerri lla Warfare, 1 March
1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O
370.64 TS (! March 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
20. Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 304.
21. Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 306f.
22. Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on, Memorandum for Lt. Gen. A. C. We-
demeyer, OCSA, subject: Transmi ttal of OPC response to the Speci al Secti on Joi nt
Strategi c Plans Group request for i nformati on regardi ng the need for establi shment
of an NME organi zati on for collaborati on wi th OPC, from Frank G. Wi sner,
Assi stant Di rector of Poli cy Coordi nati on, 1 August 1949, Record Group 319,
Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les CSUSA 320 (1 August 1949) TS,
D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Department of the Army Assi stance to
the CIA i n the Fi eld of Guerri lla Warfare, 26 July 1949, and Summary Sheet for
Chi ef of Staff, same subject, 29 July 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons,
1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 370.64 TS (23 June 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Department of the Army Assi stance to
the CIA i n the Fi eld of Guerri lla Warfare, 21 November 1949, and Notes on
Meeti ng of Representati ves of CIA and NME Joi nt CIA/ NME Trai ni ng Program,
Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 370.64 TS
D.C., Memorandum for the Di rector of Central Intelli gence, subject: Request for
! 76 NOTES
Documents, 18 October 1949, Record Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52,
box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 370.64 TS (18 October 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: The Mi li tary Organi zati on for
Psychologi cal and Covert Operati ons (JCS 1735/32), 2 November 1949, from
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Di rector, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (28
October 1949), Nati onal Archi ves.
D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: Parami li tary Trai ni ng Program
(JCS 1735/34), 23 November 1949, from Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS
D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: Li ai son Wi th Uni fi ed Com-
mands for Speci al Operati ons, 20 December 1949, from Maj. Gen. Charles L.
Bolte, Di rector, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, Record Group 319, Army Oper-
ati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, P&O 091.412 TS (17 December 1949), Na-
ti onal Archi ves.
32. Headquarters, 2d Army, Fort George C. Meade, Md., Letter to Lt. Gen.
Alfred M. Gruenther, 30 November 1949, from Col. C. H. Gerhardt, Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, fi led wi th P&O 000.5
(30 November 1949) TS, Nati onal Archi ves.
33. See note 32 above; Department of the Army, Otti ce of the Chi ef of Staff,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Di rector, Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on,
5 January 1950, CSUSA 381 (5 January 1950) C, from Lt. Gen. Alfred M.
Gruenther, and Plans and Operati ons Division Summary Sheet, subject: Plans and
Organi zati on for Underground Development, 17 January 1950, Tab "B, " Planni ng
Status i n Covert Operati ons, P&O 000.5 (30 November 1949) TS, fi led i n Record
Group 319, Army Operati ons, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Fi les, Nati onal Archi ves.
34. See note 33 above, Tab "C, " proposed letter to Col. C. H. Gerhardt.
Chapter VI Notes
1. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Report on Psychologi cal Warfare Acti vi ti es--Far East Command, 31 August
1950, Record Group 319, G- 3 Operati ons, March 1950-5 I, 091.412, Case 41 - 100,
box 157, OPS 091.412 S (29 August 1950), Nati onal Archi ves.
ton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns, subject: Psychologi cal War-
fare Organi zati on i n the Department of the Army, 5 July 1950, from Secretary of
NOTES 177
the Army Frank Pace, Jr., fi led wi th G-3 091.412 S (5 July 1950), Nati onal
Archi ves.
3. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons Di vi si on, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Summary Sheet for the Chi ef of Staff, Psychologi cal Warfare Organi zati on i n the
Department of the Army, 13 July 1950, from Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Assi stant
Chi ef of Staff, G-3 091.412 S (5 July 1950), Nati onal Archi ves.
randum for Record, subject: Deli neati on of Responsi bi li ti es for Psychologi cal War-
fare, 17 July 1950, by Maj. Kenneth B. Stark, Record Group 319, G-3 Operati ons,
March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, box 154, OPS 091.412 (17 July 1950),
6. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to
Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Commandi ng General, 6th Army, from Maj. Gen.
Charles L. Bolte, G-3, 12 August 1950, Record Group 319, G-3 Operati ons,
March 1950-51,091.412, Case 1-20, box 154, 091.412 (11 August 1950), Na-
ti onal Archi ves.
7. See note 5 above, Message from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Maj.
Gen. C. L. Bolte, 24 August 1950.
ton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns, subject: Army Organi zati on
for Psychologi cal Warfare, 30 August 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace, Jr., fi led wi th OPS 091.412 (30 August 1950), Record Group 319, G-3
Operati ons, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, box 154, Nati onal Archi ves.
9. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Staff, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Mi nutes, Meeti ng of the General Counci l, Item No. 8, Assi stant Chi ef of Staff,
G-3, 30 August 1950, USAMHI.
Sheet for Chi ef of Staff, subject: Department of the Army Organi zati on for Psy-
chologi cal Warfare, 31 August 1950, Record Group 319, G-3 Operati ons, March
1950-51, 091.412, Case 41-100, box 157, OPS 091.412 (31 August 1950) S,
Mi nutes, Meeti ng of the General Counci l, Item No. 3, 13 September 1950,
USAMHI.
Sheet for Chi ef of Staff, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare Trai ni ng, 12 September
1950, from Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, G-3, Nati onal Archi ves.
13. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., DF to
Speci al Assi gnments Branch, Career Management Di vi si on, Offi ce of the Adjutant
General, subject: Personnel for Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, OCAFFE,
25 October 1950, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef, Psychologi cal War-
fare Di vi si on, G--3, Record Group 319, G-3 Operati ons, G3 091.412 (19 Sep-
tember 1950), Nati onal Archi ves.
randum for Record, Mi nutes of Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on Staff Meeti ng,
178 NOTES
31 October 1950, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, box 2, Fi le
020 Staff Meeti ngs, Nati onal Archi ves.
16. Department of the Army, G-3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to
Maj. Gen. Dani el Noce, Chi ef of Staff, EUCOM, from Bri gadi er General
MeClure, 15 January 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, box 6, 091.412 Propaganda, Nati onal Archi ves. General Order No. 1,
Department of the Army, 17 January 1951, establi shed the di vi si on as of 15
January 1951, General Counci l Mi nutes, 24 January 1951, USAMHI.
Mi nutes, Meeti ng of the General Counci l, 31 January 1951, USAMHI; De-
partment of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ngton,
D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 1 February 1951,
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, box 2, Nati onal Archi ves.
18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Speci al Regulati ons no. 10-
250-1, 22 May 1951, "'Organi zati ons and Functi ons, Department of the Army,
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Speci al Staff," pp. 11-12,
USAJFKCMA; US, Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of Defense, 1 January through 30 June 1951, p. 92.
ton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, subject: Importance of Army-Wi de
Support of the Psychologi cal Warfare Program, from Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace, Jr., 2 February 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War, Deci mal Fi le 1951-54,
384-385, box 23, fi led wi th Psy War 385 (2 February 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
22. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Conversati on wi th the
Secretary of the Army, 10 May 1951, by Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef of
Psychologi cal warfare, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, Na-
ti onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Telephone conversati on
wi th Mr. Pace, Sec/Army, 26 May 1951, Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef of.
Psychologi cal Warfare, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, Na-
ti onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Message DA 92760, 31 May 1951, from Chi ef of Staff, US
Army, to CINCFE; fi led wi th Psy War 091.412 TS (13 June 1951 ), Psychologi cal
Warfare, Far East Command, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, box 6, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Message C 64846, 13 June 1951, from CINCFE to SEC
ARMY; fi led wi th Psy War 091.412 TS (16 June 1951), Psychologi cal Warfare,
Far East Command, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54,
NOTES 179
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: ORO Bri efi ng for Secretary
of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., 23 July 1951, Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef
of Psychologi cal Warfare, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., unnumbered cable from Gen. Matthew B. Ri dgeway to Secre-
tary of the Army Pace, 17 August 1951, fi led wi th Psy War 091.412 FECOM TS
(17 September 1951), Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Message DA 81176, 11 September 1951, from Secretary of the
Army Pace to General Ri dgeway, fi led wi th Psy War 091.412 FECOM TS
(17 September 1951), Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Chi ef, Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on, JCS,
subject: Psychologi cal Warfare Poli cy Gui dance for FECOM, Psy War 091.412
FECOM TS (17 September 195 I), Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare. 1951-54, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum of Weekly Staff Meeti ngs, 8 March 1951,
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 020 Staff Meeti ngs, box 2,
Washi ngton, D.C., Informal Report as a Result of Vi si t of Chi ef, Psychologi cal
Warfare Di vi si on, DA, 24 Apri l 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, Psy War 319.1 TS (24 Apri l 1951), box 7, Nati onal Archi ves.
32. Lt. Ernest Coni ne, "New Hori zons i n Psychologi cal Warfare," Army
Information Digest 7, no. 12 (December 1951 ):22; Letter, Col. Oti s E. Hayes,
5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce); Li nebarger, Psychological
Warfare, pp. 301, 303.
pai gn," p. 13; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychologi cal Warfare," p. 2;
Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 45.
34. US, Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of
Defense, 1 January through 30 June 1951, p. 92.
35. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, pp. 301 2, 304.
36. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 45; Psychologi cal Warfare Di -
vi si on, "Operati ons i n Western European Campai gn," p. 13; Propaganda Branch,
"Syllabus of Psychologi cal Warfare," p. 2.
37. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, pp. 301-2, 304, 306-7.
38. Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, "'Operati ons i n Western European Cam-
pai gn," p. 19; McClure, "Trends i n Psychologi cal Warfare," p. 10; Daugherty and
Janowi tz, Casebook, p. 132; The Intelli gence School, Fort Ri ley, Kans., "'Tacti cal
180 NOTES
Psychologi cal Warfare, The Combat Psychologi cal Warfare Detachment," Octo-
ber 1946, p. 1, USAJFKCMA.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef, Psychologi cal Operati ons Di vi si on,
subject: Report on Fi eld Tri p to HQ FECOM and Korea, Capt. James J. Kelleher,
Jr., Operati ons Branch, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
SECRET Deci mal Fi les, 1951-54, 333-334, Psy War 333 (22 Apri l 1952), box 14,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Bri efi ng of the Chi ef of Staff
on Letter from Gen. Doyle O. Hi ckey, Chi ef of Staff, FECOM, and FECOM
Interi m Report on Comprehensi ve Psychologi cal Warfare Plans, 7 August 1951,
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 1, Psy
War 020 C/Staf f TS (9 August 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen. Charles A. Wi lloughby, Assi stant Chi ef of
Staff, G-2, GHQ FECOM, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 10 March 1951,
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, SECRET Deci mal Fi les,
1951-54, Psy War 091.412 (10 March 1951), box 6, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Informal Report as a Result of Vi si t of Chi ef, Psychologi cal
Warfare Di vi si on, DA, 24 Apri l 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, Psy War 319.1 TS (24 Apri l 1951), box 7, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Conference wi th General
Edwards, Di rector of Operati ons, US Ai r Force, 10 May 1951, Psy War 337
(i 0 May 1951 ); Memorandum for the Chi ef, Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on, JCS,
subject: Parti ci pati on by the Tacti cal Ai r Forces of the Servi ces i n Psychologi cal
Warfare, 14 June 1951, Psy War 360 (14 June 1951); Memorandum for Record,
subject: Bri efi ng of the Chi ef of Staff on letter from Gen. Doyle O. Hi ckey, Chi ef
of Staff, FECOM, and FECOM Interi m Report on Comprehensi ve Psychologi cal
Warfare Plans, 7 August 1951, Psy War 020 C/Staff TS (9 August 1951 ); Memo-
randum for the Secretary of the Ai r Force, subject: Equi pment for Psychologi cal
Operati ons i n Korea, 9 June 1951, from Robert A. Lovett, Assi stant Secretary of
the Army, OSA 400 Korea; Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure,
subject: Uti li zati on of Ai rcraft i n the Conduct of Psychologi cal Warfare, 24 July
1951, by Col. Frederi ck S. Haydon, Chi ef, Plans Branch, Psy War 373 S (24 July
1951 ); all fi led i n Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54,
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hi ckey, Chi ef of Staff, Far East
Command, 13 July 1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319,
Psy War Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 360-370.64, box 19, Psy War 360 (13 July
1951 ), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen. Charles A. Wi lloughby, Assi stant Chi ef of
Staff, G-2, GHQ, Far East Command, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure,
NOTES 181
12 March 195 ! , Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, box
6, Psy War 091.412 (10 March 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure from Maj. Gen.
Charles A. Wi lloughby, 24 March 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n
Offi ce, 1951-54, 091.412-091.714~ box 8, Psy War 091.412 (24 March 1951),
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter from Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hi ckey, Chi ef of Staff, GHQ,
Far East Command, 13 January 1952, to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record
Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, 1951-54, box 1, Psy War 000.7 (13 January
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Lt. Gen. Doyle
O. Hi ckey, 28 January 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, 1951-54,
box 1, Psy War 000.7 (13 January 1952)., Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., AFFE Cable No. EX 22958 to DEPTAR Wash, DC for Psy
War, 090425Sep 53, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54,
SECRET Deci mal Fi les, 333-334, box 14, Psy War 334 S (9 September 1953),
50. Headquarters, 8th US Army Korea, Table of Di stri buti on No. 80-8086,
Mi scellaneous Group, 8086th Army Uni t, undated, Record Group 319, Army-
Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, SECRET Deci mal Fi les, 400. I 12 to 413.52,
box 26, Psy War 400.34 (S) (1951), Nati onal Archi ves; i ntervi ew wi th Robert
Bodroghy, Strategi c Studi es Insti tute, US Army War College, Carli sle Barracks,
Pa., 15 May 1979. As a young Army offi cer, Bodroghy was a member of the
LEOPARD organi zati on.
51. Intervi ew wi th Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979; Psy War 091 Korea
(31 December 1952), Weekly Summary from Korea of Items of Operati onal In-
terest for Peri od 16-22 December 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, SECRET Deci mal Fi les, 091-091.412, box 7, Nati onal Ar-
chi ves; HQ Far East Command Li ai son Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Uni t,
Guerri lla Secti on, Guerri lla Operati ons Outli ne, 1952, to Commanders of LEOP-
ARD, WOLFPACK, KIRKLAND, and BAKER Secti on, 11 Apri l 1952, by Lt.
Col. Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guerri lla Di vi si on, fi led wi th Staff Vi si t of Col.
Bradford Butler, Jr., March 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Notes on WOLFPACK.
source: Maj. R. M. Ri pley, Seri es No. 037760, Former Commandi ng Offi cer, by
Col. Bradford Butler, Jr., Chi ef, Speci al Forces Operati ons and Trai ni ng Branch,
Speci al Forces Di vi si on, 29 December 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Nati onal Archi ves; Intervi ew wi th Robert Bodroghy,
15 May 1979.
182 NOTES
54. Headquarters, Far East Command Li ai son Detachment (Korea), 8240th
Army Uni t, Guerri lla Operati ons Outli ne, 1953, by Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool,
OIC Guerri lla Di vi si on, 22 January 1953, fi led wi th Staff Vi si t of Col. Bradford
Butler, Jr., March 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
55. Intervi ew wi th Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979.
56. Headquarters, Far East Command, Letter from Maj. Gen. Charles A.
Wi lloughby to Maj. Gen. Charles L. BoRe, subject: Covert Intelli gence Acti vi ti es,
Korea, 12 January 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal fi les, box 5, 091 Korea, Nati onal Archi ves; Joi nt Subsi di ary
Plans Di vi si on, JCS, Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Chi ef, Joi nt Subsi di ary
Plans Di vi si on, subject: Report on Tri p to FECOM, 26 November-17 December
1951, by Col. W. tl. S. Wri ght, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al War-
fare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 323.3-333, box 9, Psy War 333 TS (20 December
57. See note 56; also, i ntervi ew wi th Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979.
58. Department of the Army, Offce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, subject:
Reports on Speci al Operati ons i n Korea, 15 March 1951, by Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, 1951-54,
091, box 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: CINC-
FE Organi zati on for Covert Operati ons and Clandesti ne Intelli gence, 3 August
1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, Psy War 040 CIA TS (20 July
60. See note 59; response from G- 3 was dated 2 October 1951; also, i ntervi ew
wi th Col. John B. B. Trussell (Ret.), at Carli sle Barracks, Pa., 7 May 1979; a revi ew
of the OCPW, G-2, and G- 3 fi les reveals numerous i nstances of poli cy di fferences.
61. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare.
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hi ckey, Chi ef of Staff, GHQ, Far
East Command, 25 October 1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, 091.412 Far East, Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. Mark Clark, subject: Psychologi cal
Warfare Matters, 2 May 1952, by Bri g. Gen. Robert A. MeClure, Record Group
319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Psy War
091.412 TS, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Re-
vi sed Di scussi on of Queri es Concerni ng Guerri lla Warfare, 23 May 1952, by Bri g.
Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (23 May 1952), Nati onal
NOTES 183
Archi ves; Memorandum for Col. D. V. Johnson, Assi stant Chi ef, Plans Di vi si on,
Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G 3, subject: Responsi bi li ti es of the Servi ces and the Joi nt
Chi efs of Staff for Unconventi onal Warfare, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure,
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les,
box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (26 October 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
66. Headquarters, 10th Speci al Forces Group Ai rborne, Fort Bragg, N.C.,
Letter to Commandi ng Offi cer, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C.,
subject: Si tuati on of Speci al Forces Offi cers i n FECOM, 19 May 1953, by Col.
Aaron Bank, Commandi ng Offi cer, fi led wi th Psy War 220.3 (14 May 1953),
Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Nati onal Archi ves;
Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ng-
ton, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen. Ri ley F. Enni s, Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, GHQ,
FECOM, from Col. Wi lli am J. Blythe, Chi ef, Speci al Forces Di vi si on, 24 Novem-
ber 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Nati onal
Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Message DA 927709 to
CINCFE, 2 January 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, TS
Deci mal Fi les, 1951-54, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (13 December 1952), Na-
ti onal Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memorandum for
Record, subject: Conversati on wi th Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor reference Speci al
Forces Operati ons i n the Far East Command, Ree~ ord Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 319, Psy War 337 TS
(26 December 1952), Nati onal Archi ves; i ntervi ew wi th Robert Bodroghy, 15 May
1979.
67. The Joi nt Chi efs of Staff, Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on, Washi ngton,
D.C., Memorandum for Chi et, Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on, subject: Report on
Tri p to FECOM, 26 November- 17 December 195 I, by Col. W. H. S. Wri ght, US
Army, 20 December 1951, fi led wi th Psy War 333 TS (20 December 1951 ), Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les,
323.3-333, box 9, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Di sposi ti on Form to G- l , G-2, G-3, subject: The Status and
Role of"Parti san Forces," 18 February 1953, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure
wi th G-3 response, 20 February 1953, by Maj. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, TS Deci mal Fi les, 1951-54,
383.7-385, box 20, Psy War 384 FE TS (18 February 1953), Nati onal Archi ves.
Letter from Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns to Gen. Mark Clark, 19 February 1953, fi led
wi th Psy War 370.64 TS (19 February 1953), Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Nati onal
Archi ves; Headquarters, Far East Command, Offi ce of the Commander i n Chi ef,
Letter from Gen. Mark Clark to Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns, 12 March 1953, fi led wi th
Psy War 370.64 TS (9 Apri l 1953), Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Nati onal Archi ves.
184 NOTES
Chapter VII Notes
1. Headquarters, European Command, Letter from Maj. Gen. Dani el Noce,
Chi ef of Staff, to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 13 December 1950, Record Group
091.412 TS (13 December 1950, 15 January 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
2. Department of the Army, G- 3 Operati ons, Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to
Maj. Gen Dani el Note, Chi ef of Staff, EUCOM, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, 15 January 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Psy War 091.412 TS (13 December 1950, 15
January 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., letter from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Maj. Gen. Dani el
Noce, 12 June 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 195 ! -54,
TS Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Psy War 091.412 TS (12 June 1951 ), Nati onal Archi ves.
4. See note 3 above, Headquarters, European Command, Letter from Lt. Col.
R. G. Ci ccolella, Chi ef, Psy War Secti on, Speci al Plans Branch, Operati ons, Plans,
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 15 October
1951, Psy War 337, Nati onal Archi ves; Letter from Lt. Col. R. G. Ci ccolella to
McClure, 14 November 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records
Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 385.2-400, box 24, Psy War 400 (14 Novem-
ber 1951) S, Nati onal Archi ves; Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ngton, D.C., Progress Report- - 1 Apri l 1951, Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 319.1, Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Maj. Gen.
Charles A. Wi lloughby, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 10
March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Psy
War 091.412, Nati onal Archi ves; also Psy War 322 (19 February 1951 ), Request
for Increase i n Authori zed Strength of Psy War Uni ts, Psy War 322 (28 February
1951), RB&L Grou'p for FECOM, and Psy War 322 (5 March 1951), Reduced
Strength RB&L Group for EUCOM, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce,
Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Meeti ng called by Colonel
Hopki ns, JSPD, by Lt. Col. Ri chard Hi rsch, Intelli gence and Evaluati on Branch,
2 August 1951, Record Group 319 Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Psy War 091.412, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Staff Meeti ng, 6 December 1951,
box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meeti ngs, Nati onal Archi ves; Memorandum for Chi ef of
Staff, US Army, subject: Psychologi cal Warfare Conference EUCOM, 27-28
November 1951, by Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 6 December 1951, Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 334S (6 December
NOTES 185
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 8 March
1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal
Fi les, box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meeti ngs, Nati onal Archi ves.
9. Intervi ew wi th Col. John B. B. Trussell, US Army (Ret.), at Carli sle
Barracks, Pa., 7 May 1979. Colonel Trussell, as a li eutenant colonel, was a staff
offi cer i n OCPW duri ng the early 1950's.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum from Captai n Hahn, US Navy, to Deputy Chi ef
of Naval Operati ons, subject: Ai r Force Vi ews Relati ng to Retardati on (of Sovi et
Advances), 20 October 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 15, Psy War 381, Nati onal Archi ves; see also Psy
War 350.001 TS (7 January 1952), subject: Psychologi cal Warfare Presentati on
for PSB, TS Deci mal Fi les, 1951-54, box 13, and Psy War 385 TS (29 August
1951), subject: Apprai sal of Capabi li ti es of Psychologi cal Operati ons i n Depart-
ment of Defense, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 20, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Chi ef of Staff, US Army, subject: Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Conference, EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by Bri g. Gen.
Robert A. McClure, 6 December 1951, Record Group 3 i 9, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 334 S (6 December 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
! 2. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter from Maj. Kenneth B. Stark to Lt. Col. Homer E.
, Shi elds, 12 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
13. Li nebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 304; Letter, Col. Oti s E. Hayes, Jr.
(Ret.), 5 May 1969, to Offi ce of Informati on, John F. Kennedy Center for Speci al
Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce); Army General School, Fort
Ri ley, Kans., "Program of Instructi on, Psychologi cal Warfare Uni t Offi cer
Course," January 1951, p. i , USAJFKCMA.
14. Army General School, Fort Ri ley, Kans., "Program of Instructi on for
Psychologi cal Warfare Offi cer Course," August 1951, p. 12, USAJFKCMA; Let-
ter, Col. Oti s E. Hayes, 5 May 1969, to Offi ce of Informati on, USAJFKCMA
(Publi c Affai rs Offi ce). Colonel Hayes was recalled to acti ve duty i n 1951 as
Deputy of the Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on at Fort Ri ley. After the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center was acti vated at Fort Bragg i n 1952, he became the fi rst
Di rector of the Psychologi cal Operati ons Department (i n the Psychologi cal War-
fare School) and remai ned i n that posi ti on for 18 months.
15. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warl~ are,
Washi ngton, D.C., Progress Report, Personnel and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, 1 Apri l
1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War
319.1, Nati onal Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Letter to
Lt. Col. John W. Whi te, G- 3 Secti on, Headquarters, I st Army, Governor's Island,
N.Y., from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 24 May 1951, Psy War 320.2, Nati onal
Archi ves.
16. Department of the Army, Operati ons Research Offi ce, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Letter from Elli s A. Johnson, Di rector, to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:
186 NOTES
Research for Psychologi cal Warfare, 8 May 1951, Psy War 400.112; Offi ce of the
Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memorandum for Chi ef, Psychologi cal Warfare,
subject: Non-materi el Research Program, 7 February 1951, from Lt. Col. Jerome
G. Sacks, Research Branch, fi led wi th Psy War 400.112 (29 February 195 i ); Offi ce
of the Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject:
Apprai sal of Capabi li ti es of Psychologi cal Operati ons i n Department of Defense,
from Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., 21 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-
Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, ! 951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 20, Psy War 385 TS,
Washi ngton, D.C., "Bri efi ng for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Acti vi ti es,"
5 November 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch,
Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 334-337, Psy War 337 S (5 November 1951 ), Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to Offi ce of the Chi ef of Staff of the Army,
subject: Reducti on of Mi li tary and Ci vi li an Personnel i n the Chi ef of Staff area, 27
August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, SECRET Deci -
mal Fi les, 1951-54, 092-230, box 9, Psy War 230 (17 August 1951), Nati onal
Archi ves; i ntervi ew wi th Col. John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.
19. Intervi ew wi th Col. John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.
Washi ngton, D.C., Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 8 March 1951, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, Nati onal
Archi ves.
21. Letter, Bri g. Gen. Russell W. Volckmann (Ret.), 21 March 1969, to
Offi ce of Informati on, John F. Kennedy Center for Speci al Warfare, US-
AJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce); Letters, Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.),
17 February 1968 and 3 Apri l 1968, to Offi ce of Informati on, John F. Kennedy
Center for Speci al Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce).
22. Letter, Volckmann, 21 March 1969 (see note 21 above).
23. Letters, Volckmann and Bank (see note 21 above).
24. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.), 23 February 1969, to Offi ce of In-
formati on, John F. Kennedy Center for Speci al Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Publi c
Affai rs Offi ce).
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Staff Meeti ngs, 29 March 1951 and
19 July 1959, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, box 2, Nati onal Archi ves. These frequent changes of di vi si on chi ef
desi gnati ons were probably due to the relati ve date of rank, or seni ori ty, among the
colonels brought i nto the Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on.
27. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the G-3, Washi ngton, D.C., Memo-
randum for Di rector, O&T Di vi si on, subject: Responsi bi li ti es of Army wi th Re-
spect to Guerri lla Warfare, 20 March 1951, by Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (20 March 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
NOTES 187
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 8 March 1951, Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, subject:
Reports on Speci al Operati ons i n Korea, 15 March ! 95 ! , by Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, 1951-54,
box 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 29 March 1951, Record
31. Headquarters, The Infantry School, Fort Benni ng, Ga., Memorandum to
the Commandi ng Geaeral, Infantry Center, subject: Analysi s and Suggesti ons re
Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns' Conference, 5 Apri l 1951, from Lt. Col. Russell W.
Volckmann, 9 Apri l 1951, fi led wi th Psy War 337 TS (16 Apri l 1951), Record
Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box i 2,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Assi stant Chi ef of
Staff, G-3, subject: Defi ni ti ons Relati ng to Psychologi cal Warfare, Speci al Oper-
ati ons and Guerri lla Warfare, 17 Apri l 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 370.64 (17 Apri l 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Summary Sheet of Chi ef of Staff, subject: Gen. J. Lawton
Colli ns' Conference at the Infantry Center, 5 Apri l 1951, from Col. Edward Glavi n,
Acti ng Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare (summary sheet prepared by Lt. Col.
Russell W. Volckmann), 16 Apri l 195 ! , Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, Psy War 337 (16 Apri l 1951), Nati onal
Archi ves.
36. See note 35 above; see also Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef
of Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ngton, D.C., Bri efi ng Notes, Conference wi th
G- I , -2, -3, -4, and AFF re Trai ni ng i n the Fi eld of Speci al (Forces) Operati ons,
21 June 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, box 12, Psy War 337 TS (21 June 1951), Nati onal Archi ves. The
studi es resulti ng from thi s acti on, i n addi ti on to "Army Responsi bi li ti es i n Report
to Speci al (Forces) Operati ons," were "Theater Speci al Forces Command and
(Z. I. ) Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Command"; "Speci al Forces Ranger Uni t s- - and- -
Speci al Forces Ranger Uni ts, Recrui ti ng and Trai ni ng of Personnel"; "Rear Area
Defense"; and "Executi ve Agent for the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff for Matters Per-
tai ni ng to Guerri lla Warfare."
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. C. D. Eddleman, subject: Uti li zati on of
Lodge Bi ll Recrui ts i n Speci al (Forces) Operati ons, 23 May 1951, from Bri g. Gen.
188 NOTES
Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54,
TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 373.2 TS (23 May 1951),
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Staff
Studi es, "Speci al Forces Ranger Uni ts" and "Speci al Forces Ranger Uni ts, Re-
crui ti ng and Trai ni ng of Personnel," 12 June 1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, 270.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 (12 June 1951), Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Bri efi ng Notes, Conference wi th G- I , -2, -3, -4 and AFF re
Trai ni ng i n the Fi eld of Speci al (Forces) Operati ons, 21 June 1951, Record Group
337 TS (21 June 1951), Nati onal Archi ves. Addi ti onally, Li eutenant Colonel
Volckmann had earli er rei terated to McClure the conclusi on "that a need exi sts for
a trai ni ng command or center that wi ll bri ng together the many segments of speci al
(forces) operati ons under a program that wi ll fully develop doctri ne, poli ci es,
techni ques, and t a c t i c s. . , and that wi ll develop equi pment and suppli es." Thi s
came after a tri p, di rected by McClure, to observe trai ni ng and i nstructi on at the
CIA' s "School Number One," the Ranger Trai ni ng Center, and the Infantry
Center--al l at Fort Benni ng. Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memo-
randum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Fi ndi ngs and Recommen-
dati ons re Speci al Operati ons Trai ni ng, Fort Benni ng, Ga., 24 Apri l 1951, by Lt.
Col. Russell W. Volckmann, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (3 May
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:
Ranger Uni ts, 17 July 1951, from Col. Wendell W. Ferti g, Chi ef, Speci al Oper-
ati ons, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le
(C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, P.sy War 322 S(17 July 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
42. See note 41 above; see also Eli ot A Cohen, Commandos and Politicians:
El i t e Mi l i t ary Units in Modern Democracies (Cambri dge: Center for Internati onal
Affai rs, Harvard Uni versi ty, 1978), pp. 56-58.
43. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare.
44. Adjutant General, Army Fi eld Forces, Letter to Adjutant General, De-
partment of the Army, subject: Trai ni ng of Indi vi duals and Uni ts of the Army i n
Speci al (Forces) Operati ons, 23 August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, box 6, 091.412 TS Propaganda (23 August 1951),
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Conference to Resolve
Ranger Program, 24 August 1951, by Col. Aaron Bank, Speci al Operati ons Di -
vi si on, Record Group 319, Psy War 337 (24 August 1951 ), Nati onal Archi ves. The
NOTES 189
pri nci pals attendi ng the conference were General Taylor, General Bradford, G-3,
AFF, and General McAuli ffe, G-1.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Re-
quest for Spaces i n the Acti ve Army, 28 September 1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert
A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal
Fi le (C), 1951-54, 311.5-319.1, box 11, Psy War 320.2 (28 September 1951),
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Table
of Organi zati on and Equi pment 33-510 (proposed) for Speci al Forces Group
(Abn), i 3 November 1952, wi th draft 1 st I nd letter to OCA FF, Record Group 3 i 9,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 8, Psy War 320.3
TS (30 September 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
48. Headquarters, European Command, Letter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. Mc-
Clure, 12 November 1952, from Bri g. Gen. Wi llard K. Li ebel, Chi ef, Support Plans
Branch, J-3, Psy War 240 (12 November 1952); Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, Letter to Bri gadi er General Li ebel,8 December 1952, from Mc-
Clure, Psy War 290 (8 December 1952); Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare, Letter to General Li ebel from General McClure, 19 December 1952, Psy
War 290 (19 December 1952); all fi led i n Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Nati onal Archi ves.
49. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, parti cularly hi s di scussi on of "The
Speci ali st Functi on," pp. 30f.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McCi ure, subject:
Fi ndi ngs and Recommendati ons re Speci al Operati ons Trai ni ng, Fort Benni ng,
Ga., from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 24 Apri l 1951, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15,
Psy War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), Nati onal Archi ves. Volckmann had been
di rected by McClure to vi si t Fort Benni ng to revi ew the trai ni ng and i nstructi on at
the CIA' s "School Number One," the Ranger Trai ni ng Center, and,the Infantry
School, wi th emphasi s on the speci al operati ons i nstructi on, then report to hi m hi s
fi ndi ngs and recommendati ons (see memorandum from McClure to Volckmann, 19
March 1951, fi led wi th above reference). See also General McClure's and Colonel
Bank's di scussi on wi th AFF concerni ng a trai ni ng center, Department of the Army,
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of
Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 16 August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 020 Staff Meeti ng, box 2, Nati onal Archi ves.
51. See note 50 above, especi ally Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 16 Au-
gust 1951.
52. Central Intelli gence Agency, Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on, Washi ngton,
D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, through the Joi nt Sub-
si di ary Plans Di vi si on, JCS, subject: Joi nt CIA-DA Guerri lla Warfare Trai ni ng,
from Ki lbourne Johnston, Deputy Assi stant Di rector for Poli cy Coordi nati on, 17
190 NOTES
August 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54,
360-370.64, box 19, Psy War 370.64 (21 August 1951) S, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Agreement between Frank G. Wi sner, Assi stant Di rector for
Poli cy Coordi nati on, CIA, and Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare--Staff, DA. on the Respecti ve Roles and Responsi bi li ti es of
CIA/ OPC and Psy War Di vi si on, Speci al Staff, Department of the Army, i n the
Fi eld of Unconventi onal Warfare, 17 July 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef
of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, 020 CIA, Nati onal Ar-
chi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memorandum for the Chi ef,
Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on, JCS, subject: Coordi nati on of Army Psychologi cal
Warfare Materi el Research Acti vi ti es wi th CIA, 25 March 1952, from Bri g. Gen.
Robert A. McClure, and reply from CIA, 23 Apri l 1952, Record Group 319, Psy
War Admi n Offi ce, box 25, Psy War 400.112 (25 March 1952) C, Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Meeti ng, 5 September 1951, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 12, Psy War 337
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Charles L. BoRe, Commander i n Chi ef, US
Army, Europe, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 1953 undated (probably late
February or early March 1953), Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce,
Records Branch, 195! -54, 020-40, box 3, Psy War 040 CIA (undated) 53, Nati on-
al Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chi ef of Staff, subject: Staff vi si t to Europe,
13 September 1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 323.3 333, box 9, Psy
War 333 Europe TS (12 September 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
57. Central Intelli gence Agency, Offi ce of the Di rector, Washi ngton, D.C.,
Letter to Maj. Gen. A. R. Boi li ng, Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, 10 March 1952, from Walter B. Smi th, Di rector, fi led wi th Record
Psy War 370.64, Guerri lla Warfare, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns, Chi ef of Staff,
subject: Staff Vi si t to Europe, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure,10 September
Fi les, 323.3-333, box 9, Psy War 333 (10 September 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
60. The CIA' s statement appeared i n a memorandum dated 6 June 1952, an
enclosure to JCS 1969/73, Memorandum for Chai rman, JCS, subject: Overseas
CIA Logi sti cal Support Bases; see Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare,
Memorandum for the Chi ef of Hi story, subject: Summary of Major Events and
Problems, Psy War 314.7 TS ( 15 August 1953); see also Psy War 314.7 (6 January
1953), Hi story of DA Acti vi ti es, for OCPW' s explanati on of why the JCS di sap-
NOTES 191
proved i ts Speci al Forces Operati ons Plan for Europe; both are fi led i n Record
311-319.1, box 7, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Paul D. Harki ns, subject: JSPC
808/112, Command Relati onshi ps between the CIA/ OPC Organi zati on and the
Armed Forces i n Actual Theaters of War Where Ameri can Forces Are Engaged
(29 December 1952), from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare, 30 December 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 000.1-020, box 1, Nati onal Archi ves. General Harki ns
was the "Army Planner," a seni or offi cer responsi ble for presenti ng the Army' s
posi ti on on JCS acti ons.
Washi ngton, D.C., Ai r Force Presentati on to the Psychologi cal Strategy Board on
10 January 1952, fi led wi th Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 337-350.05, box 13, Psy War 350.001 TS (7 January
Washi ngton, D.C., Di scussi ons of Questi ons by the Under Secretary of the Army
concerni ng Army Role i n Guerri lla and Unconventi onal Warfare, i n response to a
Memorandum to the Vi ce Chi ef of Staff, subject: Guerri lla Warfare, 11 Apri l
1952, fi led wi th Psy War 320.64 TS (3 May 1952) (12 May 1952), TS Deci mal
Fi les, 1951-54, box 15, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Meeti ng, 5 September 1951, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 12, Psy War 337
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Colli ns, Chi ef of Staff,
subject: Staff Vi si t to Europe, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 12 September
Fi les, 323.3-333, box 9, Psy War 333 (10 September 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Staff, US Army, subject: Uncon-
venti onal Warfare (Speci al Forces Operati ons) Di scussi ons Held at EUCOM and
SHAPE, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 5 December 1951, Record Group
319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64,
box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (5 December 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to the Chi ef of Mi li tary Hi story, subject: Sum-
mary of Major Acti vi ti es of OCPW for Peri od 9 September ! 951 to 31 December
1952, 7 Apri l 1953. JCS Deci si on 1969/18, 27 March 1952, Responsi bi li ti es of the
Servi ces and the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff for Guerri lla Warfare, assi gned to the Army
pri mary responsi bi li ty for guerri lla warfare i n combat operati ons on land. The
deci si on also assi gned to the Army pri mary responsi bi li ty for developi ng, i n coordi -
nati on wi th the other servi ces and subject to JCS poli cy di recti on, the doctri ne,
tacti cs, techni ques, procedures, and equi pment employed by guerri lla forces i n
192 NOTES
combat operati ons on land, and for trai ni ng these forces wi th the assi stance of the
other servi ces. Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi le, 311-319.1, box 7, Psy War 314.7 (6 January 1953), Nati onal
Archi ves.
68. General Colli ns' di recti ve remai ned i n effect for 9 months unti l March
1952. At that ti me, after consi derable i nterservi ce battli ng, the JCS assi gned the
Army pri mary responsi bi li ty for guerri lla warfare. See note 67 above; see also the
bri efi ng by Bri g. Gen. Bullock (McClure's replacement as Chi ef, OCPW) to the
Chi ef, Army Fi eld Servi ces, at Fort Monroe, Va., 5 October 1953, Record
337-350.05, box 13, Psy War 337 TS (2 October 1953), Nati onal Archi ves.
69. Department of the Army, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, G-3,
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, subject:
Trai ni ng of Indi vi duals and Uni ts of the Army i n Speci al (Forces) Operati ons, 14
September 1951, from Bri g. Gen. D. A. D. Ogden, G-3, 370.2 TS (23 August
1951 ), fi led wi th Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, ! 951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951),
Washi ngton, D.C., Response to G-3, 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), subject:
Trai ni ng of Indi vi duals and Uni ts of the Army i n Speci al (Forces) Operati ons, from
Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 5 October 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef
of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, fi led wi th
Psy War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), Nati onal Archi ves. The mi nutes of the
13 September 1951 weekly OCPW staff meeti ng show that a plan for a Center for
Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al Operati ons Trai ni ng was bei ng worked on, wi th
the i ntent of maki ng the necessary suggesti ons to AFF, who i n turn could recom-
mend to G-3 that such a center be establi shed--an i nteresti ng, but not uncommon,
bi t of bureaucrati c maneuveri ng for a pet project; Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef
of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meet-
i ngs, Nati onal Archi ves.
71. See note 70 above, OCPW response to G-3, 5 October 1951.
Washi ngton, D.C., "Speci al Forces Operati ons," by Col. Russell W. Volckmann,
26 October 1951, fi led i n Psy War 372.2 Operati ons, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., "Bri efi ng for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Matters,"
5 November 1951, by Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War
Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54 334-337, box 15, Psy
War 337 S (5 November 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
75. See Note 74 above.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Col. D. V. Johnson, Assi stant Chi ef, Plans
Di vi si on, Offi ce of the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Responsi bi li ti es of the
Servi ces and the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff for Unconventi onal Warfare, 26 October
1951, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
NOTES 193
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War
370.64 TS (26 October 1951), Nati onal Archi ves.
77. Department of the Army, Trai ni ng Ci rcular 31-20-1, The Role of US
Army Special Forces, 22 October 1976. In Commandos and Politicians, Eli ot
Cohen states that "the US Army contri buted to the downfall of Speci al Forces by
creati ng two Ranger battali ons [i n 1974-75]. These uni ts fi t the speci ali st model:
They are relati vely small forces trai ned for such mi ssi ons as the rescue of hostages
(along the li nes of Israel's Entebbe Rai d)" (Cohen, p. 88). These types of mi ssi ons,
as well as other uni lateral (no i ndi genous personnel) Ranger or Commando-li ke
"di rect acti on" acti vi ti es, have, however, become part of the Speci al Forces' grow-
i ng repertoi re of capabi li ti es (Cohen somewhat i nelegantly calls Speci al Forces
"guerri lla/commandos, prepari ng for a vari ety of mi li tary odd jobs," p. 25). Cohen
di scusses the desi re among eli te uni ts to acqui re new mi ssi ons and addi ti onal
personnel, and concludes: "The mi ssi on of eli te troops must be as ri gorously defi ned
as possi ble: a ni che must be carved out for them and they must be kept wi thi n i t"
(p. 97).
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 8 November 1951, Record
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Record, subject: Survey for Psychologi cal
Warfare Center, 19 November 1951, by Col. Wendell W. Ferti g, Chi ef, Speci al
Operati ons Di vi si on; Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:
Status of Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Center, 3 December 1951, by Col. Wendell W.
Ferti g; both fi led i n Psy War 322C (3 December 1951), Record Group 319, Psy
War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi les (C), 1951-54, Nati onal Ar-
chi ves. The personnel who made the i ni ti al survey of Fort Benni ng and Fort Bragg
duri ng the peri od 13 to 15 November 1951 were Col. Aaron Bank and Maj.
Kenneth B. Stark of OCPW, Col. Edward Glavi n of AFF, and Maj. Taylor of the
G- 3 Di vi si on, Psy War Secti on, 3d Army.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:
Status of Speci al Forces Trai ni ng Center, 3 December 1951, by Col. Wendell W.
Ferti g, Psy War 322C (3 December 1951), Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n
Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951 54, Nati onal Archi ves; see also
OCPW Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319,
Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, 020 Staff
Meeti ngs, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 6 December 1951, Record
82. See note 81 above; see also Mi nutes of Weekly Staff Meeti ngs,
25 October 1951 and 8 November 1951, Record Group 319, Army Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 2, 020 Staff Meeti ngs, Nati onal
Archi ves.
194 NOTES
83. Offi ce of the Post Engi neer, Fort Bragg, N.C., Memorandum for Record,
subject: Establi shment of Psychologi cal Warfare Center, 12 December 1951, by A.
W. Hart, Di vi si on Chi ef, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, Fi le
123 Money and Savi ngs, Nati onal Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare, Memorandum for Record, subject: Fort Bragg Survey, 17 December
1951, from Lt. Col. Melvi n R. Blai r, Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on, Record Group
319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, Fi le 061.2 Army and Mi li tary Surveys,
Nati onal Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Mi nutes of
Weekly Staff Meeti ng, 20 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of
Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, 020 Staff Meeti ngs, Nati onal Ar-
chi ves. The survey team that selected Smoke Bomb Hi ll consi sted of Col. Edward
Glavi n, AFF; Lt. Col. Melvi n R. Blai r and Maj. Kenneth B. Stark, OCPW; Lt. Col.
John O. Weaver, Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Army General School, Fort
Ri ley; and Lt. Col. Brock and Maj. Taylor, 3d Army.
Washi ngtoh, D.C., Memorandum for Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:
Psychologi cal Warfare Presentati on for PSB, 7 January 1952, from Col. Wendell
W. Ferti g, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, 337-350.05, box 13, Psy War 350.01 TS (7 January 1952), Nati onal
Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memorandum to the
Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject: Funds for a Psychologi cal Warfare Center,
14 January 1952, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Psy War 123 (14 January
1952), Nati onal Archi ves; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memo-
randum for the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, subject: Compromi se of Classi fi ed
Informati on, 22 January ! 952, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group
319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54,
370.64-380.01, box 20, Psy War 380.01 C (22 January 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
The breach of securi ty that annoyed McClure was the followi ng sentence from the
21 January 1952 i ssue of Newsweek: "The Army wi ll soon open a secret guerri lla
warfare and sabotage school for mi li tary personnel and CIA agents at Fort Bragg,
N.C." McClure i nsi sted that thi s i nformati on had been handled wi thi n OCPW as
a TOP SECRET matter, wi th di ssemi nati on on a "need-to-know" basi s, and he
therefore requested an i nvesti gati on to determi ne the source of the leak. Although
the G-2 refused to follow through on the request, the i nci dent reveals the sensi ti ve
manner i n whi ch Speci al Forces acti vi ti es were bei ng handled by OCPW at thi s
ti me and helps explai n i n part why so li ttle publi ci ty was gi ven to Speci al Forces,
i ncludi ng no menti on of thi s acti vi ty i n the ti tle of the proposed center at Fort
Bragg.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject:
Uti li zati on of Acti ve Army Spaces Allocated for FY 1952 and FY 1953, 6 Febru-
ary 1952, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n
Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 319.5-320.3, box 12, Psy War
320.2 (6 February 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
86. See note 85 above, Comment No. 2 from Bri g. Gen. G. J. Hi ggi ns, Chi ef,
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, G-3, 15 February 1952.
NOTES 195
87. Department of the Army, Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, Washi ngton,
D.C., Summary Sheet for Chi ef of Staff, US Army, subject: Establi shment of
Psychologi cal Warfare and Speci al Forces Center, 3 March 1952, from Maj. Gen.
C. D. Eddleman, Deputy Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, Record Group 319, Army-
Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 8, Psy War 322 TS
(3 March 1952), Nati onal Archi ves. The total personnel needs for the center i tself
were stated as 362, of whi ch 312 would be mi li tary and 50 ci vi li an. Twenty-ni ne
spaces (27 mi li tary and 2 ci vi li an) from the Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Army
General School, Fort Ri ley, would be transferred to the new center at Fort Bragg.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef, Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on,
JCS, subject: Acti vati on of Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C.,
from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McCi ure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce,
Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 319.5-320.3, box 13, Psy War 322
(7 Apri l 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
Chapter VIII Notes
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Deputy Chi ef of Staff for Operati ons and
Admi ni strati on, subject: Acti vati on and Mi ssi on of the Psychologi cal Warfare
Center, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 22 May 1952, Record Group 319, Psy
War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13,
Psy War 322 (22 May 1952), Nati onal Archi ves. Department of the Army General
Order No. 37, 14 Apri l 1952, establi shed the Psychologi cal Warfare Center as a
Class I acti vi ty and i nstallati on, effecti ve 10 Apri l 1952 (extract fi led wi th above
reference). A copy of the Recommended Table of Di stri buti on for the Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center can be found wi th Psy War 320.3 ( 16 Apri l 1952), Nati onal
Archi ves.
2. Offi ce, Chi ef of Army Fi eld Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter, subject:
Psychologi cal Warfare Doctri ne Development and Instructi on, 29 May 1952, US-
AJFKCMA; Letter, Col. Oti s E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Publi c
Affai rs Offi ce). An advance party from the Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Army
General School, consi sti ng of Lt. Col. John O. Weaver wi th fi ve offi cers and seven
enli sted men was scheduled to arri ve at Fort Bragg on 27 Apri l 1952; the remai nder
of thi s di vi si on (ei ght offi cers and four enli sted men) was scheduled to move not
later than 15 May 1952. See Army Fi eld Forces letter, subject: Psy War Center,
30 Apri l 1952, to Commandi ng General, 3d Army, fi led wi th Psy War 322 (I May
3. Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Memo-
randum No. 14, "Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual, Headquarters, Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center," 12 November 1952, p. 3, USAJFKCMA.
196 NOTES
4. Letter, Col. Oti s E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs
Offi ce).
5. Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., "Admi n-
i strati ve Informati on Handbook, Psychologi cal Warfare Semi nar, 17-19 Decem-
ber 1952," December 1952, p. 2. USAJFKCMA.
6. Department of the Army, Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Di vi si on, G-3, Wash-
i ngton, D.C., DF to Psy War, subject: Establi shment of the Psychologi cal Oper-
ati ons School, 27 August 1952, G-3 352 (6 August 1952), fi led ~ vi th Psy War 322
(25 September 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
7. Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Letter to
the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, subject: Acti vati on of the Psychologi cal
Warfare School, 12 September 1952, USAJFKCMA; Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psy-
chologi cal Warfare, Memorandum to the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, subject:
Establi shment of the Psychologi cal Warfare School, 25 September 1952, Psy War
322 (25 September 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
8. The Psychologi cal Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., "Gui de for Staff and
Faculty," Apri l 1953, p. I 0, USAJFKCMA. Addi ti onal detai l on the mi ssi on of the
school can be found i n the Psychologi cal Warfare Center's Memorandum No. 14,
"Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual," and "Admi ni strati ve Informati on Hand-
book," USAJFKCMA.
9. Letter, Col. Oti s E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs
Offi ce).
10. Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Memorandum No. 14,
"Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual," p. 52, USAJFKCMA.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef of Informati on, subject: Proposed
Conti ngency Pre.~ s Release Regardi ng Psy War Center, 17 June 1952, from Bri g.
Gen. Robert A. McClure, Psy War 000.7 (16 June 1952); and Memorandum for
G-3, subject: Proposed Press Release Regardi ng the Psychologi cal Warfare Cen-
ter, 1 July 1952, from Col. Wendell W. Ferti g, Acti ng Chi ef, OCPW, Psy War
000.7 (1 July 1952); both i n Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, 1951-54,
box i , Nati onal Archi ves. General McClure told the Chi ef of Informati on i n hi s 17
June 1952 memorandum that the mi ssi on of Speci al Forces was classi fi ed
confi denti al; thus i t was "consi dered unwi se to make any reference thereto i n the
proposed conti ngency release." When Col. C. H. Karlstad assumed command of
the center, the story noti ng thi s event i n the Fort Bragg newspaper made no
reference to Speci al Forces operati ons. Later, the Chi ef of Informati on suggested
that the press release i nclude reference to Speci al Forces "to prevent undue probi ng
by the news servi ces i nto Speci al Forces acti vi ti es at Fort Bragg, N.C." By late
August 1952, after several weeks of correspondence between G-2, G-3, the Chi ef
of Informati on, OCPW, and Army Fi eld Forces, a speci fi c poli cy on the matter sti ll
had not been resolved. Nor had the problem been solved by January 1953, when the
Speci al Forces Di vi si on i ni ti ated acti on to downgrade from Confi denti al to Re-
NOTES 197
stri cted certai n aspects of the Speci al Forces Program (see Psy War 380.01, Record
Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54,
370.64-380.01, box 20, Nati onal Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum for the Chi ef, Speci al Forces Di vi si on, subject:
Student Handbook- - "The Psychologi cal Warfare School," 13 August 1952, from
Lt. Col. Marvi n J. Waters, Operati ons and Trai ni ng Branch; Memorandum for
Col. Wendell W. Ferti g, subject: Psy War Center Student Handbook, 14 August
1952, from Col. Wi lli am J. Blythe, Chi ef, Speci al Forces Di vi si on; Memorandum
for Colonel Blythe, subject: Student Handbook--"The Psychologi cal Warfare
School," 21 August 1952, from Lt. Col. Melvi n R. Blai r; all fi led under Psy War
332, Army Servi ce Schools, Nati onal Archi ves. Colonel Blai r complai ned that "not
a si ngle word i s devoted to the role of Speci al Forces" i n chapter I of the Handbook,
although "approxi mately 50% of the Staff and Faculty personnel and student body
wi ll be Speci al Forces personnel."
15. Headquarters, Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Memorandum No. 14,
"Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual," p. 49. USAJFKCMA.
16. See note 15 above, p. 34; see also the Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort
Bragg, N.C., Psy War, 1954, p. 1, USAJFKCMA.
17. Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Psy War, USAJFKCMA. Apparently the
Board gave li ttle attenti on to Speci al Forces operati ons: In the above publi cati on,
whi ch outli ned acti vi ti es of the Board si nce i ts i ncepti on, there was no menti on of
any unconventi onal warfare projects, nor were there any Speci al Forces members
on the Board as of early 1954. Psy War purports "to tell the story of the US Army' s
Psychologi cal Warfare Center," but nowhere i n the 99-page book i s any reference
made to the Speci al Forces Group or i nstructi onal department that consti tuted
i ntegral elements of the center. Undoubtedly, thi s was agai n the result of securi ty-
consci ousness, perhaps carri ed to an extreme, concerni ng Speci al Forces acti vi ti es.
18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washi ngton, D.C., Trai ni ng
Ci rcular No. 13, "Mi li tary Aspects of Psychologi cal Warfare, " 8 June 1953, pp.
6f., USAJFKCMA; Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Psy War, pp. 35-69,
USAJFKCMA.
19. Melvi n Russell Blai r, "Toughest Outfi t i n the Army, " Saturday Evening
Post, 228 (I 2 May 1956): 40-41; Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of
Psychologi cal Warfare, Washi ngton, D.C., Ori entati on Conference for TI&E
(Troop Informati on and Educati on) Offi cers, subject: "Current Developments i n
the Fi eld of Speci al Forces Operati ons" (15 January 1952), by Lt. Col. Melvi n R.
Blai r, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le
(C), 1951-54, 334-337, box 15, Psy War 337 (C) (10 January 1952), Nati onal
Archi ves; Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare,
Washi ngton, D.C., Letter to the Chi ef, Army Fi eld Forces, subject: Speci al Forces
Ori entati on for Trai ni ng Di recti ve and Recepti on Centers, 24 June 1952, Record
Group 319, Psy War, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2, box 18, Psy War
353 (24 June 1952), Nati onal Archi ves; also OCPW letter, subject: Ori entati on
Conferences for Servi ce Schools and Selected Headquarters and Installati ons, to
Chi ef, Army Fi eld Forces, 1 August 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War, Deci mal
198 NOTES
Fi le (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2, box 18, Psy War 353 (1 August 1952), Nati onal
Archi ves.
Washi ngton, D.C., Ori entati on Conference, "Current Developments i n the Fi eld of
Speci al Forces Operati ons," to be presented to servi ce schools, Army Headquar-
ters, and selected i nstallati ons duri ng the peri od 1 October 1952-March 1953, by
Lt. Col. Melvi n R. Blai r, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Off'i ce, Records
Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C) 334-337, 1951-54, box 15, Psy War 337 S (24 Sep-
tember 1952), Nati onal Archi ves; also Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), Ori en-
tati on Materi al for Use i n Connecti on wi th Selecti on of Volunteers for Speci al
Forces, Record Group 319, Psy War, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2,
box 18, Nati onal Archi ves; and Psy War 335 C (10 January 1952), Ori entati on
Conference for TI&E (Troop Informati on and Educati on) Offi cers, subject: "Cur-
rent Developments i n the Fi eld of Speci al Forces Operati ons" (15 January 1952),
by Lt. Col. Melvi n R. Blai r, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records
Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 334-337, box 15, Nati onal Archi ves.
21. See note 20 above, Psy War 337 TS (16 Apri l 1951), Psy War 337 C (10
January 1952), and Psy War 337 (24 September 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
22. See note 20 above, Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
23. See note 20 above, Psy War 290 TS (8 December 1952) and Psy War 390
TS (19 December 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
24. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Adjutant General, Washi ngton,
D.C., Letter, subject: Acti vati on of a Uni t of the General Reserve, 19 May 1952,
AGAO-I, Department of the Army, Washi ngton, D.C., TO&E 33-2 (proposed),
14 Apri l 1952, ci ted i n US Army Combat Developments Command, Speci al War-
fare Agency, Combat Developments Study: Organi zati on for US Army Speci al
Forces, August 1964, USAJFKCMA; Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef
of Speci al Forces, Washi ngton, D.C., DF to G3, Organi zati on Branch, subject:
Acti vati on of Speci al Forces Uni ts, 2 May 1952, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A.
McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal
Fi le (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Psy War 322 (1 May 1952), Nati onal
Archi ves.
25. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968, USAJFKCMA (Publi c
Affai rs Offi ce).
26. The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Comments by
Members Attendi ng Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Conference, 9 July 1952, US-
AJFKCMA. Attendees i ncluded representati ves from OCPW, AFF, 3d Army, and
the Psychologi cal Warfare Center. Colonel Bank strongly urged that the Speci al
Forces Group TO&E' s be declassi fi ed; present classi fi cati on restri cted publi ci ty i n
Army publi cati ons, and the men could not even tell others thei r correct uni t
desi gnati on, other than the Psychologi cal Warfare Center--whi ch li mi ted thei r
pri de i n thei r uni t, Bank beli eved.
27. Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Let-
ter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure from Col. C. H. Karlstad, Commandi ng
Offi cer, 12 September 1952, fi led wi th Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al
Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 322, Nati onal Archi ves. Karlstad asked McClure for
assi stance i n getti ng the 7 US trai ni ng di vi si ons to fulfi ll thei r allotted quotas of 35
NOTES 1 ~
volunteers per month for Speci al Forces. McClure followed through on the request
rapi dly and wrote back to Karlstad on 22 September that the si tuati on should soon
i mprove.
Washi ngton, D.C., Staff Study to Chi ef of Staff, US Army, subject: Staff Study on
Intensi fi cati on of Lodge Bi ll Recrui tment Program, 8 August 1952, from Bri g.
Gen. Robert A. MClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
1951-56, TS Deci mal Fi les, 337-350.05, box 13, Psy War 342 TS (8 August 1952),
Nati onal Archi ves. The reasons for thi s low rate were many: The many marri ed
people and German nati onals who appli ed were not eli gi ble; the ci ti zens of NATO
member nati ons who appli ed were not eli gi ble; many appli cants were di squali fi ed
on mental and physi cal grounds; and many appli cants changed thei r mi nds duri ng
the long ti me requi red for securi ty checks.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to the Chi ef, Legi slati ve Li ai son, subject: Pro-
gram for Li ai son wi th the Congress, Tab A, "Intensi fi cati on of Lodge Bi ll Re-
crui tment Program, " from Col. Wendell W. Ferti g, Acti ng Chi ef, OCPW, 15
August 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Deci mal Fi les, box 2, Psy War 032.1, Nati onal Archi ves. Tab A, prepared by Col.
Wi lli am J. Blythe, Speci al Forces Di vi si on, projected the overall need for Lodge bi ll
personnel as 4,875 for Speci al Forces and 40 for psychologi cal warfare uni ts.
30. Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Let-
ter to Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure, from Col. C. H. Karlstad, 25 November
1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, Nati onal
Archi ves.
31. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968, USAJFKCMA (Publi c
Affai rs Offi ce).
Washi ngton, D.C., Trai ni ng Ci rcular, Speci al Forces Group (Ai rborne), 13 May
1952, Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le
(C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Psy War 322 (13 May 1952), Nati onal Archi ves.
33. Speci al Warfare Agency, "Organi zati on for Speci al Forces,"
pp. II- 10- II- 13.
34. Letters, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968 and 3 Apri l 1968,
USA. IFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce).
35. Letter, Bri g. Gen. Russell W. Volckmann, 21 March 1969,
USAJFKCMA (Publi c Affai rs Offi ce).
36. Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C.,
Comments by Members Attendi ng Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Conference, 9 3uly
1952, USA.JFKCMA.
Washi ngton, D.C., Memorandum to the Chi ef, Plans and Poli cy Branch, OCPW,
from Col. Oli ver Jackson Sands, .It., US Army Reserve, 7 July 1952, Record Group
319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare, 1951-54, TS Deci mal Fi les, box 6, Nati onal
Archi ves. Colonel Sands' memorandum forwarded a study that hc had undertaken
duri ng hi s 2 weeks of duty i n OCPW, the subject of whi ch was "to study the
posi ti on of the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare i n the Nati onal Estab-
200 NOTES
l i shment. " Recogni zi ng the l i mi tati ons of ti me and breadth i n hi s endeavor, Sands
suggested that the study "be used to sti mul ate thi nki ng among those who are more
closely connected wi th the probl em. "
38. Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warf are,
Washi ngton, D.C., "Tacti cal Psychologi cal Warf are i n the Korean Confli ct: An
Informal Commentary on Propaganda Operati ons of the 8th US Army, 1950-5 I, "
by Col. Donald F. Hall, 1 Apri l 1954, Record Group 319, Army- Chi ef of Speci al
Warf are, 1951-54, Secret Deci mal Fi les, 091-091. 412, box 7, Psy War 091 Korea,
Nati onal Archi ves. Colonel Hal l was the Psychologi cal Warf are Offi cer for the 8th
Army i n Korea from 9 November 1952 to 14 January 1954, then l ater served i n that
capaci ty at Headquarters, Army Fi el d Forces. Most of the comments and recom-
mendati ons i n hi s report were li mi ted to the tacti cal aspects of psychologi cal
warfare.
40. Dani el Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against German),, D-
Day to VE-Day (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949), pp. 67-93.
41. See note 37 above, Psy War 090.412 TS (7 Jul y 1952). McCl ure' s
handwri tten comment regardi ng Colonel Sand' s report i s i nstructi ve: "Thi s i s an
i nteresti ng report although I do not concur that Propaganda and Speci al Forces
Operati ons are so compl etel y di fferent as to requi re separati on parti cul arl y when
(a) all other servi ces have same combi nati on, (b) JSPD has dual responsi bi li ty, (c)
bl ack covert and whi te propaganda are spli t between State and OPC. "
Chapter IX Notes
i . Daugherty and Janowi tz, Casebook, pp. 137f., wri te: "In the mi l i tary es-
tabl i sment i n Washi ngton, staff planni ng acti vi ti es i nvolvi ng psychologi cal warfare
ceased wi th the end of Worl d War II hosti li ti es. " The authors i nfer that nothi ng
was done at the Department of the Army unti l creati on of the OCPW. McCl ure
hi msel f was prone to exaggerate somewhat the authorshi p of OCPW' s achi eve-
ments. As an example, planni ng for both the Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet Group
and Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company concepts was under way i n G- 3 before the
outbreak of war i n 1950 and before the creati on of OCPW; but McCl ure would
cl ai m l ater that those i deas, based on Worl d War 11 experi ence, ori gi nated i n
OCPW.
2. I am i ndebted to Prof. Theodore Ropp, Duke Uni versi ty, for thi s i nsi ght.
3. In an economy move, Army Fi eld Forces recommended i n October 1953
that the Psychologi cal Warf are Center be deacti vated and the responsi bi li ty for
psychologi cal warfare trai ni ng transferred back to the Army General School at
Fort Ri ley. Under thi s plan, all Speci al Forces schooli ng would have been conduc-
ted wi thi n uni ts, rather than i n a separate school. Af ter a long and i mpassi oned
appeal by OCPW the result was a Psychologi cal Warf are Center that survi ved, but
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NOTES 201
at reduced strength. See Offi ce of the Chi ef of Army Fi eld Forces, Fort Monroe,
Va., Letter to Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army, subject:
Future of Psychologi cal Warfare Center, 12 October 1953, fi led wi th Psy War 322,
Psy War Center C (30 October 1953), Record Group 319, Psy War Admi n Offi ce,
Records Branch, Deci mal Fi le (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Nati onal Archi ves.
4. A letter to hi s fri end Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte expressed MeClure' s feel-
i ngs about leavi ng OCPW: "To my unexpected surpri se and wi th no li ttle conster-
nati on, I have recei ved orders transferri ng me to Iran to lead the Mi li tary Mi ssi on.
After 10'/2 of the past 12 years i n thi s parti cular fi eld and wi th the added emphasi s
bei ng placed thereon by the Whi te House, I fai l to appreci ate G- l ' s poli cy. I asked
the Chi ef i f there was anythi ng behi nd i t and he assured me there was not. The
i nference i s that I have been i n thi s fi eld too long and there was no future for me
as long as I conti nue i n a speci ali zed acti vi ty. There are already some rumbli ngs i n
Defense and across the ri ver but nevertheless I am selli ng my house and packi ng
up. " Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Letter to Lt. Gen. Charles L.
Bolte, Commander i n Chi ef, US Army, Europe, 4 March 1953, Record Group 319,
Psy War Admi n Offi ce, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, box 3, Psy War 040
CIA (undated) 53, Nati onal Archi ves. Ironi cally, McClure had decri ed the scarci ty
of general offi cers i n the Army wi th psychologi cal warfare or speci al operati ons
experi ence. He tri ed to i ncrease the number of general offi cers assi gned to these
speci ali zed acti vi ti es, i ncludi ng a general offi cer to head the Psychologi cal Warfare
Center. But he was unsuccessful i n these attempts, and now he--probabl y the most
experi enced general offi cer i n any of the servi ces--was bei ng forced to leave the
fi eld that he had devoted so much of hi s career to bui ldi ng up. See Offi ce of the
Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, Memorandum for the Deputy Chi ef of Staff for
Operati ons and Admi ni strati on, subject: Assi gnment of General Offi cers to Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Acti vi ti es, 30 October 1952, from Bri g. Gen. Robert A. McClure;
McClure' s Memorandum for Record, subject: Conversati on wi th General
McAuli ffe reference General Offi cers, 26 December 1952; and Memorandums for
Record, 2 March 1953 and 6 March 1953, subject: Selecti on of Commander for the
Psychologi cal Warfare Center, by Lt. Col. Wi lli am Trabue, Executi ve, OCPW; all
fi led wi th Psy War 210.3, Record Group 319, Army-Chi ef of Speci al Warfare,
SOURCES
Se c t i on I - - Re s e a r c h Ai ds
The research for thi s study began, natural l y enough, at the US Army John F.
Kennedy Center for Mi l i tary Assi stance, Fort Bragg, N. C. The center' s archi ves
were found i n three separate locati ons: the Insti tute for Mi l i tary Assi stance Li -
brary, the center G- I, and the center Publ i c Affai rs Offi ce. Wi thi n recent years, the
G- I fi les have been transferred to the Publ i c Affai rs Offi ce, and are mai ntai ned
there by the center hi stori an, Mrs. Beverly Li ndsey. Mrs. Li ndsey also has a fi le of
correspondence wi th many of the key offi cers at the center i n the earl y 1950's, and
and keeps some hi stori cal documents i n her pri vate collecti on. The personal fi les of
Mr. John Farrel l , Combat Developments, Insti tute for Mi l i tary Assi stance, were
helpful. The Insti tute l i brary i s small but speci ali zed i n i ts collecti on of speci al
warfare secondary sources. Whi l e i mportant materi al s about the establ i shment of
the Psychologi cal Warf are Center were uncovered, the pri mary sources of the
center' s archi ves are not well organi zed and pertai n pri mari l y to the post-1952
years. One must search elsewhere for more detai l ed i nformati on about the center' s
hi stori cal roots.
At the US Army Mi l i tary Hi story Insti tute ( USAMHI ) , Carl i sl e Barracks,
Pa., key staffpersonnel who were most helpful to the author were Mi ss Joyce Eaki n,
Assi stant Di rector, Li brary Servi ces, and Dr. Ri chard Sommers, Archi vi st. Mi ss
Eaki n has speci al MHI bi bl i ographi es for US Rangers and Speci al Forces i n her
fi les, i s knowl edgeabl e about i nsti tute holdi ngs, and can provi de val uabl e contacts
at both the Center of Mi l i tary Hi story ( CMH) and the Nati onal Archi ves i n
Washi ngton, D.C. Dr. Sommers mai ntai ns the papers and oral hi stori es of numer-
ous seni or Army offi cers; those of Robert A. McCl ure, Ray Peers, and Wi l l i am P.
Yarborough were parti cul arl y useful for my work. The MHI Speci al Bi bl i ographi c
Seri es, number 13, volumes i and 2, Oral Hi story, contai n references to these and
other offi cers, as well as a cross-i ndex of key topi cs. The i nsti tute also has a
compl ete set of the Army General Counci l Mi nutes for the peri od 1942 to 1952.
The counci l met weekly, was composed of the seni or Wa r Department leadershi p,
and was chai red by ei ther the Chi ef of Staff or Deputy Chi ef of Staff. These
mi nutes were parti cul arl y useful i n provi di ng an overvi ew of the maj or deci si ons
and events l eadi ng to establ i shment of the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychol ogi cal
203
204 SOURCES
Warfare (OCPW) i n 1951. Si mi larly, the War Department' s History of the Mil-
itary Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945, whi ch can be
found i n the MHI, provi des some useful leads to the Army' s psychologi cal warfare
acti vi ti es duri ng World War II.
Mi ss Hannah Zei dli k, General Reference Branch, Center of Mi li tary Hi story,
Washi ngton, D.C., provi ded CMH speci al bi bli ographi es on psychologi cal warfare
and Speci al Forces, as well as assi stance i n locati ng materi als on these topi cs i n the
CMH card catalog and fi les. Of note were copi es of OCPW semi annual and annual
hi stori cal summari es for the early 1950's, whi ch provi ded valuable leads to pursue
i n the Department of the Army records, Nati onal Archi ves.
At the Nati onal Archi ves, Wi lli am Cunli ffe and Ed Reese, Modern Mi li tary
Branch, were the key archi vi sts who helped to ferret out i nformati on on US psycho-
logi cal and unconventi onal warfare from 1941 to 1952; John Taylor was most
helpful wi th Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces (OSS) records. Indeed, these collecti ons i n
the Nati onal Archi ves provi ded the foundati on upon whi ch thi s study i s based.
Foremost i n i mportance were the records of the War Department General and
Speci al Staff (Record Group 165) and those of the Army Staff (Record Group
319). Records of the followi ng staff agenci es were i nstrumental i n traci ng the
hi story of psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es wi thi n the Army: the
Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on (MID), G- 2 (Speci al Studi es Group), 1941; the
Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce, G-2, 1941-42; the
Propaganda Branch, G-2, 1943-45; the Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, Plans and
Operati ons Di vi si on (P&O), 1947; the Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Offi ce of
the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-3, 1950; and the Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare, Speci al Staff, 1951-54. These last records were cruci al i n determi ni ng
poli ci es, key personali ti es, and deci si ons leadi ng to the formati on of Speci al Forces
and creati on of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The footnotes for
each chapter of the text provi de more comprehensi ve reference to all of the records.
Section l l - - Pri mary Sources
Nat i onal Archives
Records of the Army Staff (Record Group 319).
G- 3 Operati ons, March 1950-51, 091. 412 seri es, boxes 154-58.
Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on, 1946-48, 091. 412 seri es, i ncludi ng Top Secret
fi les.
Army Operati ons, 1948-52, 091.412 seri es, Top Secret "Hot Fi les," parti cu-
larly boxes 9 and 10. Includes Plans and Operati ons Di vi si on and G- 3
Operati ons records on psychologi cal and unconventi onal warfare and
i nterface wi th the CIA.
SOURCES 205
Offi ce
Army
of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare, 1951-54.
Unclassi fi ed and Confi denti al Deci mal Fi le, 13 feet, 40 boxes.
Secret Deci mal Correspondence Fi le, 6 feet, 30 boxes.
Top Secret Deci mal Correspondence Fi le, 6 Feet, 22 boxes.
Intelli gence Deci mal Fi les, 1941-48, Washi ngton Nati onal Records
Center (WNRC), Sui tland, Md., parti cularly seri es 370.5 (1-31-42)
to 373.2, box 874; seri es 322.001 (10-31-42) to 322.03 (1-1-43), box
576; seri es 091.4 (9-20-43) to 091.412 (1-1-47), box 262; seri es
091.412 ( 121.31-46) to 091.412 Counterpropaganda, box 263.
Records of the Joi nt Chi efs of Staff (Record Group 218). See seri es 385,
1946-53, boxes 147-56, for i nformati on on psychologi cal and uncon-
venti onal warfare.
Records of the War Department General and Speci al Staff (Record Group 165).
Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on (G-2), Propaganda Branch Correspondence,
1939-45, boxes 326-44. Contai ns reports, di recti ves, bulleti ns, and
other papers deali ng wi th psychologi cal warfare and propaganda acti v-
i ti es i n overseas theaters. 6 feet.
Offi ce of the Di rector of Intelli gence (G-2), 1906-49.
The Psychologi c Secti on contai ns classi fi ed propaganda manuals and
other records relati ng to propaganda and psychologi cal warfare, 1918-
26. 2 feet.
Operati ons and Plans Di rectorate (OPD), OPD 000.24 Secti on I (Cases
1-39), OPD 000.24 Secti on II (Cases 40-61), September 1943-
January 1944, and OPD 000.24 Secti on III (Case 62- ), February
1944-December 1945. Contai ns excellent materi al on i nteracti on be-
tween OPD, G-2, and other offi ces, establi shment of Propaganda
Branch, G-2, and organi zati on for psychologi cal warfare i n the War
Department General Staff (WDGS).
US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance
Army General School, Fort Ri ley, Kans. Instructi onal Text, "Tacti cal Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, The Combat Psychologi cal Warfare Detachment," October
1946.
Army General School, Fort Ri ley, Kans. "Program of Instructi on for Psychologi cal
Warfare Offi cer Course," August 1951.
Army General School, Fort Ri ley, Kans. "Program of Instructi on, Psychologi cal
Warfare Uni t Offi cer Course," January 1951. Beli eved to be the fi rst formal
course i n psychologi cal warfare taught i n the Uni ted States.
Department of the Army, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Informati on. Special Warfare, US
Army: An Army Specialty. Washi ngton, D.C., 1962.
The Ground General School, Fort Ri ley, Kans. Speci al Text No. 8, "Strategi c
Psychologi cal Warfare, " 15 February 1949.
206 SOURCES
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washi ngton, D.C. Trai ni ng Ci rcular
No. 13, "Mi li tary Aspects of Psychologi cal Warfare," 8 June 1953. Gi ves
defi ni ti ons and organi zati on for psychologi cal warfare at nati onal and De-
partment of the Army levels. Outli nes mi ssi on and organi zati ons of the Radi o
Broadcasti ng and Leaflet Group and the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washi ngton, D.C. Speci al Regulati ons
No. 10-250-1, "Organi zati on and Functi ons, Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, Speci al Staff," 22 May 1951.
Headquarters, John F. Kennedy Center for Mi li tary Assi stance, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Undated fact sheet, "Li neage of Speci al Forces" (mi meographed).
Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. "'Admi ni s-
trati ve Informati on Handbook, Psychologi cal Warfare Semi nar, 17-19 De-
cember 1952," December 1952. Gi ves detai led mi ssi on of the Psychologi cal
Warfare School and an outli ne of some of i ts early academi c subjects. Also
contai ns map outli ni ng physi cal organi zati on of the center.
Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. Letter to
Chi ef, Psychologi cal Warfare, Department of the Army, subject: "Acti vati on
of the Psychologi cal Warfare School," 12 September 1952. The center's ap-
peal to the Department of the Army to gi ve the Psychologi cal Warfare School
a formal servi ce school status rather than a provi si onal status.
Headquarters, The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. Memo-
randum No. 14, "Organi zati on and Functi ons Manual, Headquarters, The
Psychologi cal Warfare Center," 12 November 1952. The earli est formal doc-
ument publi shed by the Psychologi cal Warfare Center that I have been able
to fi nd--the basi c organi zati onal di recti ve for the center.
The Insti tute for Mi li tary Assi stance Li brary, Fort Bragg, N.C. "Examples of
UW." A folder of reports and speeches on vari ous aspects of unconventi onal
warfare. Includes the 1956 speech by Ray Peers to the Speci al Warfare
School, one of the most comprehensi ve speeches I have read on the detai ls of
a guerri lla warfare organi zati on (OSS Detachment 101, Burma).
The Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces. "OSS Ai d to the French Resi stance i n World
War II." The followi ng i ndi vi dual reports were assembled i n 1944-45 under
the di recti on of Col. Joseph Li ncoln. They are basi cally post-acti on reports of
OSS acti vi ti es and operati ons taken verbati m from uni t and personal journals.
These reports represent the ri chest lode of i nformati on I have seen on the
detai ls of actual OSS organi zati on, techni ques, trai ni ng, personnel, and oper-
ati ons i n Europe.
"Ori gi n and Development of Resi stance i n France: Summary."
"Jedburghs: DOUGLAS II, Number 61, through JULIAN II, Number 67."
"Operati ons i n Southern France: Operati onal Group."
"Ameri can Parti ci pati on i n MASSINGHAM Operati ons Mounted i n
North Afri ca: Jedburghs."
"Corsi ca: Operati on Tommy."
"Poles i n France Used by the Resi stance: A Report on the Organi zati on of
Poles i n France by SOE/OSS to Create a Guerri lla Force for Augmen-
ti ng the Acti vi ti es of French Resi stance Elements."
SOURCES 207
"DF Secti on."
"Massi ve Supply Drops."
"Mi ssi ons: F-Secti on."
"F-Secti on Ci rcui ts: Reports by Parti ci pati ng Ameri can Personnel of OSS."
"F-Secti on: Reports by OSS Parti ci pants."
"SO- RF Secti on Mi ssi ons: Introducti on and Fi rst Quarter, 1944."
"SO-RF Secti on Mi ssi ons: Second Quarter, 1944."
"Mi ssi ons and Sabotage: RF Secti on, Thi rd Quarter, 1944."
Operati ons Research Offi ce (ORO), The Johns Hopki ns Uni versi ty.
Techni cal Memorandum ORO-T-64 (AFFE), "UN Parti san Warfare i n
Korea, 1951-1954," June 1956. A study performed by a team from ORO that
traveled to Korea, exami ned records, and conducted i ntervi ews. Attempts to
evaluate magni tude and effecti veness of US parti san warfare acti vi ti es. IMA
Li brary archi ves.
Propaganda Branch, Intelli gence Di vi si on, War Department General Staff, The
Pentagon, Washi ngton, D.C. "Revi sed Draft War Department Fi eld Manual,
FM 30-60," September 1946.
Propaganda Branch, Intelli gence Di vi si on, War Department General Staff, The
Pentagon, Washi ngton, D.C. "A Syllabus of Psychologi cal Warfare," October
i 946.
The Psychologi cal Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C. "Gui de for Staff and Fac-
ulty," Apri l 1953. Contai ns organi zati on and functi ons of the school, boards,
and commi ttees; i nformati on on preparati on of i nstructi on and i nstructi onal
materi al; and i nformati on on admi ni strati on of students and academi c
evaluati on.
The Psychologi cal Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. Psy War, 1954.
The fi rst publi cati on that gi ves some detai ls on the background, trai ni ng, and
acti vi ti es of the i ndi vi dual uni ts assi gned to the Psychologi cal Warfare Center.
Contai ns uni t organi zati on and chai n of command charts. No menti on i s made
of the Speci al Forces Department i n the Psychologi cal Warfare School or of
the Speci al Forces Group.
The Psychologi cal Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C. "Student Handbook," Sep-
tember 1953. Contai ns mi ssi on and organi zati on of school, academi c and
admi ni strati ve i nformati on pertai ni ng to students, and a valuable organi zati on
chart of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center dated 1 August 1953.
Publi c Affai rs, Offi ce, John F. Kennedy Center for Mi li tary Assi stance, Fort Bragg,
N.C. Letters from:
Bri g. Gen. Russell W. Volckmann (Ret. ), wi th one enclosure, 21 March
1969.
Col. Oti s E. Hays, Jr., (Ret. ) wi th fi ve enclosures, 5 May 1969.
Col. Aaron Bank (Ret. ), 17 February 1968, 3 Apri l 1968, and 27 Feb-
ruary 1973.
These letters not only contai ned valuable i nformati on but also provi ded i m-
portant leads on the ori gi ns of the Psychologi cal Warfare Center.
208 SOURCES
Section l l I--Secondary Sources
Aerospace Studi es Insti tute. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53.
Maxwell Ai r Force Base, Ala.: US Ai r Uni versi ty, 1964.
Alcorn, Robert Hayden. No Bugles f or Spies: Tales of the OSS. New York: Davi d
McKay Co., 1962.
Alsop, Stewart, and Braden, Thomas. Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espio-
nage. New York: Reynal & Hi tchcock, 1946.
Alti eri , James J. Darby's Rangers. Fi sher-Harri son Corporati on, 1977.
Beaumont, Roger A. Military Elites. Indi anapoli s and New York: Bobbs-Merri ll
Co., 1974.
Bjelajac, Slavko N. "Unconventi onal Warfare i n the Nuclear Era." Orbis 4, no. 13
(Fall 1960):323-37.
Blai r, Melvi n Russell. "Toughest Outfi t i n the Army." Saturday Evening Post, 228
(12 May 1956).
Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance,
1950 to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1977.
Cli ne, Ray S. Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA. Wash-
i ngton: Acropoli s Books, 1976.
Cohen, Eli ot A. Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern
Democracies. Cambri dge: Center for Internati onal Affai rs, Harvard Uni ver-
si ty, 1978.
Colby, Wi lli am. Honorable Melt" My Life in the CIA. New York: Si mon &
Schuster, 1978.
Coni ne Ernest. "New Hori zons i n Psychologi cal Warfare." Army Information
Digest 7, no. 12 (December 1952):21-27.
Corson, Wi lli am R. The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intel-
ligence Empire. New York: Di al Press, 1977.
Daughterty, Wi lli am E., and Janowi tz, Morri s. A Psychological Warfare Case-
book. Balti more: The Johns Hopki ns Press, 1958.
Dei tchman, Seymour J. Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building and
Using Military Power in a World at War Cambri dge: MIT Press, 1969.
Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
Dyer, Murray. The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare.
Balti more: The John Hopki ns Press, 1959.
Elli ot-Bateman, Mi chael, ed. The Fourth Dimension of Warfare. Vol. 1. New
York: Praeger, 1970.
Fai n, Tyrus G.; Plant, Katheri ne C.; and Mi lloy, Ross. The Intelligence Commu-
nity: History, Organization, and lssues. Publi c Documents Seri es. New York:
Bowker Co., 1977.
Fayetteville Observer Fayettevi Ue, N.C., March-June 1952.
Foot, M. R. D. Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism,
1940-1945. London: Eyre Metheuen.
Ford, Corey, Donovan of OSS. Boston: Li ttle, Brown & Co., 1970.
Hall, Donald F. "Organi zati on for Combat Propaganda." Army Information Di-
gest 6, no. 5 (May 1951):11- 16.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOURCES 209
Harki ns, Phi li p. Blackburn's Headquarters. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1955.
Hart, Henry C. "US Employment of Underground Forces." Military Review 26,
no. 3 (March 1947):50-56.
Hazen, Wi lli am E., and Wi lson, Barbara Anne. The Purposes and Practices of
Guerrilla Warfare: A Structured Anthology. 4 vols. Washi ngton: The Amer-
i can Uni versi ty Center for Research i n Soci al Systems, 1969.
Hei lbrunn, Otto. Warfare in the Enemy' s Rear. New York: Praeger, 1963.
Holley, I. B., Jr. Ideas and Weapons. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, I971.
Hymoff, Edward. The OSS in World War II. New York: Ballanti ne Books, 1972.
Ladd, James D. Commandos and Rangers of World War II. London: McDonald
& Janes, 1978.
Lerner, Dani el. Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to
VE-Day. New York: George W. Steward, 1949.
Li nebarger, Paul M. A. Psychological Warfare. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce,
1948.
Matloff, Mauri ce, ed. Army Historical Series, American Military History. Wash-
i ngton, D.C.: Offi ce of the Chi ef of Mi li tary Hi story, Department of the Army,
1969.
McClure, Robert A. "Trends i n Army Psychologi cal Warfare. " Army Information
Digest 7, no. 2 (February 1952):8-14.
Morgan, Wi lli am J. The OSS and I. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1957.
Osanka, Frankli n Mark, d. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist
Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
OSS Assessment Staff. Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel f or the Office
of Strategic Services. New York: Rei nehart & Co., 1948.
Padover, Saul K., and Lasswell, Harold D. "Psychologi cal Warfare. " Headline
Series, no. 86 (20 March 1951), pp. 14f.
Peers, Wi lli am R., and Breli s, Dean. Behind the Burma Road: The Story of
America' s Most Successful Guerrilla Forces. Boston: Li ttle, Brown & Co.,
1963.
Prouty, L. Fletcher. The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the
United States and the World. Englewood Cli ffs, N.J.: Prenti ce-Hall, Inc.,
1973.
Ransom, Harry Howe. Central Intelligence and National Security. Cambri dge:
Harvard Uni versi ty Press, 1958.
Ri ffki nd, Herbert. "From Rockets to Ri fles: The Presi dent's Guerri lla Poli cy."
Review, May-June 1962, pp. 1-12.
Romanus, Charles F., and Sunderland, Ri ley. Time Runs Out in CBI: United
States Army in World War 11; China-Burma-India Theater. Washi ngton,
D.C.: Offi ce of the Chi ef of Mi li tary Hi story, Department of the Army, 1959.
Roosevelt, Kermi t, ed. War Report of the OSS. 2 vols. New York: Walker & Co.,
1976.
Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. New York: Colli er Books, 1959.
Smi th, R. Harri s. OSS." The Secret History of America' s First Central Intelligence
Agency. Berkeley: Uni versi ty of Cali forni a Press, 1972.
210 SOURCES
Speci al Operati ons Research Offi ce. Undergrounds in Insurgent Revolutionary and
Resistance Warfare. Washi ngton, D.C.: Ameri can Uni versi ty, 1963.
Tarr, Davi d W. American Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Macmi llan Co.,
1966.
Taylor, Edmond, Awakening from History. Boston: Gambi t, 1969.
Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper & Row, 1960.
Thayer, Charles W. Guerrilla. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
Thomson, Charles A. H. Overseas Information Service of the US Government.
Washi ngton, D.C.: Brooki ngs Insti tuti on, 1948.
Truscott, L. K., Jr. Command Missions: A Personal Story. New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1954.
US Army. Headquarters, Speci al Warfare School. Readings in Guerrilla Warfare.
Fort Bragg, N.C., December 1960.
US Congress. Senate, Select Commi ttee to Study Governmental Operati ons wi th
Respect to Intelli gence Acti vi ti es. Final Report. Books 1, 4. Washi ngton,
D.C.: Government Pri nti ng Offi ce, 1976.
US Department of Defense. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and
Secretary of the Air Force, 1949 through 1958. Washi ngton, D.C.
US War Department. General Staff, Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on G-2. History
of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945.
Washi ngton, D.C., 1946.
Volckmann, R. W. We Remained: Three Years behind the Enemy Lines in the
Philippines. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1954.
Wei gley, Russell. History of the US Army. New York: Macmi llan Co., 1967.
Yergi n, Dani el. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National
Security State. Boston: Houghton Mi ffli n Co., 1977.
GLOSSARY
AFF
AFHQ
AG
AGF
ARC
CCRAK
CCS
CIA
CIAA
CIA/OPC
CIG
CINCEUR
CINCFE
CMH
COI
CSUSA
DA
EUCOM
FBI
FEC/ LG
FECOM
FIS
FM
GHQ
GHQ FECOM
HQ
HQ FECOM
JACK
JCS
JPWC
JSPD
L&L
MHI
MID
MIS
Army Fi eld Forces
Alli ed Forces Headquarters
Adjutant General
Army Ground Forces
Aeri al Resupply and Communi cati ons (Wi ngs, USAF)
Covert, Clandesti ne, and Related Acti vi ti es
Combi ned Chi efs of Staff
Central Intelli gence Agency
Offi ce of Coordi nator of Inter-Ameri can Affai rs
Central Intelli gence Agency/Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on
Central Intelli gence Group
Commander i n Chi ef, Europe
Commander i n Chi ef, Far East
Center of Mi li tary Hi story
Coordi nator of Informati on
Chi ef of Staff, US Army
Department of the Army
European Command
Federal Bureau of Investi gati on
Far East Command Li ai son Group
Far East Command
Forei gn Informati on Servi ce (COI)
Fi eld Manual
General Headquarters
General Headquarters, Far East Command
Headquarters
Headquarters, Far East Command
Joi nt Advi sory Commi ssi on Korea
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff
Joi nt Psychologi cal Warfare Commi ttee
Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on
Loudspeaker and Leaflet (Company)
US Army Mi li tary Hi story Insti tute
Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on
Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce
211
212 GLOSSARY
MO
MRB
NCO
NME
NSC
O&T
OCPW
OG
OG' s
ONI
OPC
OPD
ORO
OSO
OSS
OWl
P&O
PSB
PW
PWB
PWB/ AFHQ
PWD
PWD/ SHAEF
PWO
PWS
R&A
RB&L
SANACC
SFHQ
SHAEF
SO
SOE
SSU
SWNCC
TD
TO&E
UN
UNPFK
USA
USAF
USAFE
WDGS
WNRC
Morale Operati ons
Mobi le Radi o Broadcasti ng (Company)
noncommi ssi oned offi cer
Nati onal Mi li tary Establi shment
Nati onal Securi ty Counci l
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng (Di vi si on)
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare
Operati onal Group (Command)
Operati onal Groups (OSS)
Offi ce of Naval Intelli gence
Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on
Operati ons and Plans Di rectorate
Operati ons Research Offi ce
Offi ce of Speci al Operati ons
Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces
Offi ce of War Informati on
Plans and Operati ons (Di vi si on)
Psychologi cal Strategy Board
psychologi cal warfare
Psychologi cal Warfare Branch
Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, Alli ed Forces Headquarters
Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on
Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Supreme Headquarters,
Alli ed Expedi ti onary Force
Psychologi cal Warfare Operati ons
Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on
Research and Analysi s (COl )
Radi z Broadcasti ng and Leaflet (Group)
State-Army-Navy-Ai r Force Coordi nati ng Commi ttee
Speci al Forces Headquarters
Supreme Headquarters, Alli ed Expedi ti onary Force
Speci al Operati ons
Speci al Operati ons Executi ve (Great Bri tai n)
Strategi c Servi ces Uni t
State-War-Navy Coordi nati ng Commi ttee
Table of Di stri buti on
Table of Organi zati on and Equi pment
Uni ted Nati ons
Uni ted Nati ons Parti san Forces i n Korea
US Army
US Ai r Force
US Ai r Force, Europe
War Department General Staff
Washi ngton Nati onal Records Center
I NDEX
Aeri al Resupply and Communi cati on
(ARC) Wi ngs, i 14, 134-135
Ai rborne reconnai ssance, 69-72, 156
Ai r Force psychologi cal warfare,
114, 134-136
Ai r support to psychologi cal warfare,
96-98, 114
Ai r War College, 48
Alsop, Stewart, 32
Armed Forces Informati on School,
Carli sle Barracks, 65
Armed Forces radi o networks, 55
Army Fi eld Forces, 116, 126-127,
129, 136-137, 139-140, 143
Army General Counci l, 168
Army General School, Fort Ri ley,
59, 88, 115, 144-145
"Army Responsi bi li ti es i n Respect to
Speci al (Forces) Operati ons,"
124, 142
"Army Responsi bi li ti es for Speci al
Forces Operati ons," 136
Awakening From History, 35
Baker, E. E., 77
Baker, Li eutenant Colonel R. A., 77
Bank, Colonel Aaron, 28, 118-119,
126, 129, 136, 139, 149,
150-151, 153, 157-159, 198
"Basi c Esti mate of Psychologi cal
Warfare," 11
Black, Li eutenant Colonel Percy, 9
Blai r, Li eutenant Colonel Melvi n
Russell, li B, 141, 146-147, 197
Blakeney, Colonel C., 9
Board of Economi c Warfare~ 11
Boi li ng, Major General Alexander
R., Jr., 104
Bolte, Major General Charles L.,
62-64, 85, 87, 89, 121, 131, 134
Braden, Thomas, 32
Bradford, General, 140
Bradley, General Omar, 54-55,
58-59, 61, 65
Broadcasti ng
Armed Forces networks, 55
forei gn, 9-10
front-li ne, 13, 15
i n Korea, 84, 92, 94-96, 147
loudspeakers, 94, 96, 117, 146
propaganda, 6-7, 92, 156
Bureau of the Budget, 30
Burma, 27
Carroll Report, 60-62
Carroll, Wallace, 60-61
Caskey, Major Edward A., 13-14
Center for Mi li tary Assi stance, 159
Central Intelli gence Agency (CIA),
59
covert acti on by, 40-41, 52, 69,
74-81, 103, 105, 156-157
creati on of, 39-42, 168
and guerri lla warfare, 40, 72-74,
76-81, 103, 120, 129-136
JCS juri sdi cti on over, 78, 105
i n Korea, 97, 100, 103, 105-109,
120, 130, 134
mi ssi on, 40, 76-771 i 23, 134
213
214 INDEX
para-mi li tary ai d from Army, 79,
130
and pre-Korean War uncon-
venti onal warfare, 79-81
propaganda i n, 57
relati onshi p wi th OCPW,
106-107, 123, 129-136, 158
Central Intelli gence Group (CIG),
40, 69, 156
Chi ef of Informati on, 44, 47, 53, 63
Chi ef of Staff of Headquarters, Eu-
ropean Command (EUCOM),
111-115
CIA/OPC. See Central Intelli gence
Agency; Offi ce of Poli cy Coor-
di nati on, CIA.
Clark, General Mark, 105-107, 109
Clay, Colonel Luci us, 39
Cli ne, Ray, 39
Cold war, 41, 49-50, 75, 78, 138,
157-158
Colli ns, General Arthur, 79-80
Colli ns, General J. Lawton, 65, 85,
108, 121-122, 124, 128, 136,
142
Combat Propaganda Bulletin, 10
Combat Propaganda Company, 1st,
10
Combatting Guerrilla Forces, 119
Combi ned Chi efs of Staff (CCS),
16, 18
Command and General Staff Col-
lege, 42, 47-48, 65
Commander i n Chi ef, Europe
(CINCEUR), 126
Commander i n Chi ef, Far East
(CINCFE), 105-106, 108,
125-126
Commandos, 6, 23, 25-26, 28, 71,
122, 124, 148
Conrad, Colonel, 70
Coordi nator of Informati on (COl ),
5-8, 10, 25-26, 32, 35-36, 49,
155
Coordi nator of Inter-Ameri can
Affai rs (CIAA), 8, 10-11, 18
Corson, Wi lli am R., 26, 75
Counteri nsurgency, 2, 120, 155
Covert, Clandesti ne and Related Ac-
ti vi ti es i n Korea (CCRAK),
103, 105-109
The Craft of Intelligence, 41
Darby, Colonel Wi lli am O., 23
Daugherty, Wi lli am F., 6
Deane, Li eutenant Colonel John R.,
Jr., 77-78, 112
Department of the Army General
Order No. 92, 144
Detachment 101, 27, 32, 70, 77
Di rectorate of Plans, CIA, 41
Documents Research Di vi si on, CIA,
106
Donovan, Colonel Wi lli am Joseph
apprai sal of, 35-37, 158
as chai rman of JPWC, 11- i 2
and COl, 5, 25-26
concept of psychologi cal warfare,
6-8, 35, 144, 154-155,
157-158
and establi shment of CIA, 30, 41
opposi ti on to, 31-35
and OSS, 7 8, 24-28, 31-32, 71,
157
personnel fi les of, 140
and Roosevelt, 24, 26, 30, 32
Draper, Wi lli am H., 60-62
Dulles, Allen, 41
o
Eddy, Major General M. S., 44,
49-50
Ei senhower, Dwi ght D., 12-13
and French resi stance, 29 '
and i mpact of psychologi cal war-
fare, 20-21
and McClure, 45-51, 131,
135-136
support for unconventi onal
warfare, 135-136
Escape and evasi on, 23, 27, 76, 80,
103-104, 122, 139, 148
Espi onage, 5, 11, 7 I
Executi ve Order 9312, 15
Far East Command (FECOM), 83,
93-96, 98-101, 103-105,
107-109, 113
Far East Command Li ai son Detach-
ment (Korea) 8240th Army
Uni t, 101-103
Federal Bureau of Investi gati on
(FBI), 30
Federal Communi cati ons Commi s-
si on, 9
Ferti g, Li eutenant Colonel Wendell,
30, 118-119, 140
Ford, Corey, 5, 7, 32, 34, 41
Forei gn Moni tori ng Broadcast Ser-
vi ce, 8
Forrestal, James V., 51, 75
Fort Benni ng, 77, 119-121, 130, 139
Fort Bragg, 1-3, 14, 66, 83, 89-91,
111, 129, 139-140, 142-147,
151, 155, 159
Fort Campbell, 137, 139
Fort Monroe, 67
Fort Ri ley, 59, 65, 88, 113,
115-116, 129, 142-144, 147,
200
Fort Wi lli am Henry Harri son, 23
Frederi ck, Major General Robert T.,
23-24
French resi stance, 27-29
Georgetown Uni versi ty, 88, 115, 120
Gerhardt, Colonel C. H., 79-80
Glavi n, Colonel, 140
Gray, Gordon, 60-67, 86, 93
Green Berets, 2, 146
Green, J. Woodall, 84
Ground General School, Fort Ri ley,
65
Gruenther, Li eutenant General
Alfred M., 79
Guerrilla, 33
Guerri lla Group, 27
Guerri lla warfare, I- 2
acti ons i n, 6, 101
Bri ti sh, 5
i n Burma, 27
INDEX 215
and CIA, 40, 72-74, 76-81, 103,
120, 129-136
forei gn nati onals i n, 124-125, 127,
148
i n France, 27-29
i n Korea, 101-109
objecti ons to, 33
i n OSS, 25-33
i n the Phi li ppi nes, 29-30
Rangers organi zati onal role,
128-129
responsi bi li ty for, 129-136,
191-192
studi es on, 72-75, 119, 137-138
trai ni ng, 72-73, 77-79, 118-130,
143, 146
i n unconventi onal warfare, 23,
25-28, 34, 72, 100-109, 135,
138, 149, 157
Guerri lla Warfare Group, CIA, 77
HALFMOON, 58-59
Hall, Colonel Donald F., 152-153,
200
Handy, Major General T. T., 17
Hardi ng, Major General E. F., 42
Hays, Li eutenant Colonel Oti s E.,
Jr., 145, 185
Hazelti ne, Colonel C. B., 16
Helms, Ri chard, 41
Hi ckey, Li eutenant General Doyle
O., 94
"A Hi story of the Mi li tary Intel-
li gence Di vi si on," 20
History of the US Army, 33
Hodes, General Henry I., 46
Hodge, General, 140
Hull, Bri gadi er General J. E., 15-16
Human Resources Research Offi ce,
117
Hymoff, Edward, 7, 30, 31
Intelli gence Di vi si on, G-2, 44-46
Intelli gence Di vi si on Memorandum
No. 100, 46
Jackson, C. D., 15, 18-19, 112
JCS 155/4D, 12, 15, 26
216 INDEX
JCS 155/7D, 15
JCS 1807/1, 72
Jedburgh teams, 27, ! 19
John F. Kennedy Center for Mi l-
i tary Assi stance, I
Johns Hopki ns Uni versi ty, 116-117
Johnson, Earl, 86
Johnston, Colonel D. W., 44-45
Joi nt Advi sory Commi ssi on Korea
(JACK), 103, 105-106
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff (JCS)
authori ty of, 6-7, 26, 31-32
and covert acti vi ti es, 77, 105
and guerri lla warfare, 74, 80, 132,
134, 191--192
and JSPD, 78-79
juri sdi cti on over CIA, 78-79, 105
and propaganda, 18, 52
i n psychologi cal warfare planni ng,
10-12, 16, 42, 51, 58, 72-75,
97, 136
Joi nt Intelli gence Commi ttee, 16
Joi nt Psychologi cal Warf are Com-
mi ttee (JPWC), 10-12
Joi nt Psychologi cal Warf are Sub-
commi ttee, 11
Joi nt Strategi c Plans Di vi si on
(JSPD), 113
Joi nt Subsi di ary Plans Di vi si on
(JSPD), JCS, 78-79
Kachi n tri besmen, 27
Karlstad, Colonel Charles N., 144,
149, 198--199
Kennedy, John F., 2, 32
KI RKLAND, 101
Korea, 1
CIA i n, 97, 100, 103, 105-109,
120, 134
guerri lla warfare i n, 101-109
i nfluence on psychologi cal warfare
development, 83-88, 11 ! , 157
OCPW and psychologi cal warfare
i n, 90- I00
OCPW and unconventi onal war-
fare i n, i 00-109, 114
parami l i tary acti on i n, 41
psychologi cal warfare uni ts i n, 14,
139, 145, 147
Rangers i n, 71
and Speci al Forces, 8 i , 90
Kroner, General, 17-18
Langer, Wi lli am L., 6, 31,
Leaflets
arti llery shell di spersi on, 13, 95,
146
bombs, 96
i n Korea, 84, 95-97
operati onal evaluati on of, 146- ! 47
tacti cal, 92
Lemni tzer, Maj or General L. L., 18,
42, 68, 156
Leonard, General, 140
LEOPARD, 101
Lerner, Dani el, 153
Li ebel, Bri gadi er General Wi llard
K., 127, 148
Li lly, E. P., 48
Li ncoln, Bri gadi er General George
A., 46
Li nebarger, Paul, 12, 63-64
Li ngayen, 30
Lodge bi ll (Publi c Law 597), 121,
124-125, 149
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company
(L & L)
1st, 94, 96, 115-116
2d, 116, 147
5th, 113, 115-116
Loudspeakers, 94, 96, 117, 146
Luzon, 29
MacArthur, General Douglas, 32-33
McCloy, John, 8-9, 15, 18-19, 155
McClure, Bri gadi er General Robert
A., 16. See also Offi ce of the
Chi ef of Psychologi cal Warfare.
as Chi ef, OCPW, 46, 57, 88-96,
98 99, 103, 108, 111, 136,
139, 153, 157, 199-201
and Ei senhower, 45-51, 131,
135-136
and EUCOM, 111 - 115
INDEX 217
foundi ng of Psychologi cal Warfare
Center, 137, 139-154,
188-189
and genesi s of psychologi cal war-
fare development, 17-20,
44-46, 37-91, 97, 156-157
i mage of unconventi onal warfare,
138
i nfluence of Donovan, 36, 140
and Korean War, 90-109
and materi el, ! 17
i n psychologi cal warfare devel-
opment, 42, 54-57, 59,
62-63, 68, 85, 87-90, 104,
113-118, 138-139, 157-159
as PWD/SHAEF, 14, 20, 131,
153, 156
and role of CIA 129-136, 158
and Speci al Forces, 1 ! 1-130, 134,
136, 139-143, 146, 148-149,
152-154, 156-159, 194,
196-198
McNarney, General Joseph T.,
16 18
Macon, Major General Robert, 68
Maddocks, General Ray T., 60
Magruder, Bri gadi er General John,
34, 167
Maqui s, 27, 29
Marshall, General George C., 32,
52, 75
Mason, Colonel Charles H., 8-9
Materrazzi , Captai n, 78
Mearns, Colonel Fi lmore K., 146
Merri ll, Bri gadi er General Frank, 23
"Merri ll's Marauders," 23, 118
Mi les, Bri gadi er General Sherman, 9
Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on, Intel-
li gence Branch, 8, 17, 70
Mi li tary Intelli gence Di vi si on Di rec-
ti ve No. 78, 17
Military Intelligence Propaganda--
Confidential, 10
Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce (MIS),
10, 13
Mi li tary Intelli gence Servi ce Memo-
randum 147, 12
Mobi le Radi o Broadcasti ng (MRB)
Compani es, 13, 20, 95, 156
Morale Operati ons (MO), 0SS, 25
Nati onal Defense College, 47
Nati onal Mi li tary Establi shment
(NME), 72, 76
Nati onal Psychologi cal Warfare
Plan for General War, 113
Nati onal securi ty, 39, 43
Nati onal Securi ty Act, 40, 52
Nati onal Securi ty Counci l (NSC),
40, 57, 59, 73
Nati onal War College, 42, 48
Nelson, Colonel Otto L., 15-16
Noce, Major General Dani el, 89,
111-113
Norstad, Major General Lauri s, 44,
48-49, 54
North Afri can theater, 14-17, 20
NSC di recti ves
4, 52, 54, 56
4/A, 40, 52, 73
10/2, 40-41, 69, 73-75, 79-80
10/2.1, 74
10/5, 41
68, 41
Nuclear war, 1
Offi ce of the Chi ef of Psychologi cal
Warfare (OCPW)
vs. Ai r Force support, 96-98, 114,
123
creati on of, 46, 88-90, 111,
153-157, 159
di fferences wi th CIA, 106-107,
123, 129-136, 158
di fferences wi th FECOM, 100,
108-109
i n Korea, 90-109
and McClure, 46, 57, 88-96,
98-99, 108, 111, 136
organi zati on, 90-91, 153-154,
199-200
218 INDEX
personnel, 88, 99-100, 115-117,
136-137
pri mary responsi bi li ty for uncon-
venti onal warfare, 136,
153-154
propaganda i n, 89, 91, 94-100
and Speci al Forces, I 11-130, 134,
136-137, 143, 147, 158
and start of Psychologi cal War-
fare Center, 143, 152-154
Offi ce of Naval Intelli gence (ONI),
11-12
Offi ce of Poli cy Coordi nati on
(OPC), CIA, 57
Army assi stance to, 77-78,
129-130
i n Korea, 41, 103, 107, 130
mi ssi on, 75-77, 83-84, 130,
156-157
responsi bi li ty for covert opera-
ti ons, 80-81, 83, 118
Offi ce of Speci al Operati ons (OSO),
40, 52, 103
Offi ce of Speci al Projects, CIA, 57,
74
Offi ce of Strategi c Servi ces (OSS),
5, 167
and ai rborne reconnai ssance,
69-72
apprai sal of, 34-37, 153, 156
and the Army, 25-29, 31, 33-35,
129
i n Burma, 27
di ssoluti on of, 30, 34, 40
establi shment of, 7-8, 10-11, 27,
155
i n France, 27-29
i nfluence of, 41, 78, 80, 155-158
organi zati on, 25
i n the Phi li ppi nes, 29-20, 119
and propaganda, 7-8, ! 5, 49
recrui tment, 26, 34, 140
resentment of, 12, 19, 31-34
value of, 29, 31, 153, 156
Offi ce of War Informati on (OWl),
11
and OSS, 7-8, 25
propaganda mi ssi on, 15-16, 18,
25, 36, 49
and psychologi cal warfare, 7-8,
19, 155
resentment of, 19
and Theater Commanders, 12
Operati onal Groups (OG), OSS, 25,
28, 34, 127
"Operati on Ki ller," 98
Operati ons Research Offi ce ~ ORO),
116-117
Organization and Conduct of Guer-
rilla Warfare, 119
Osanka, Frankli n Mark, 33
The OSS in World War II, 31
Overseas Stars and Stripes, 55
Pace, Frank, Jr., 66, 68, 84, 86-87,
89-94, 97, 99-100, 104, 111,
117, 120, 157
Padover, Saul K., 14-15
Paley, Wi lli am S., 50-51
Patterson, Robert, 46, 69, 71, 80,
156
Peers, Colonel W. R., 27, 70
People's Republi c of Chi na, 91-92,
96, 98
Peterson, Major General Vi rgi l L.,
14, 16
Phi li ppi ne Campai gn, 29-30
Plans and Operati ons (P&O) Di -
vi si on, 44-48, 53-54, 56, 58-61,
63-65, 67
Propaganda, 5
"black," 8, 25, 49, 57, 71, 76
combat teams, 10-I 1, 152
consoli dati on operati ons, 13,
52-53
effect of, 9, 53, 156
forei gn, 6-7, 10, 52
loudspeakers i n, 94
i n OCPW, 89, 91, 94-100
school, 115-1 i 6
i n State Department, 52
value of, 15-20
INDEX 219
"whi te," 8, 15, 25, 36, 49, 53, 57
Propaganda Branch, G-2, 15-20, 46
Psychologi cal Operati ons De-
partment, Psychologi cal War-
fare Center, 142, 145, 185
Psychologi cal Strategy Board (PSB),
93, 141
Psychologi cal warfare. See also
speci fi c types.
centrali zati on of, 46, 52-60, 87
ci vi li an i nfluence on, 16, 19, 45,
64, 153
defi ni ti on, 2, 10-12
development, 8-10, 16-21, 42-46,
59-68, 79-81, 83-88,
156-159
Donovan's concept of, 6-8, 35,
144, 154-155, 157-158
and EUCOM, 111-115
and OCPW i n Korea, 90-109
and OWl, 7-8, 19, 155
personnel, 20, 42, 59, 67-68, 73,
86-87, 115-120, 141-142
poli cy, 46, 59-68
recogni ti on by Army, 8, 17,
35-37, 42-44, 71-72, 83-88,
155
research, I 16- l 17
trai ni ng, 47-48, 50, 59, 65, 67-68,
72-73, 79, 84, I 12,
115-130, 140
vs. unconventi onal warfare, 2-3,
36, 152-154
Psychologi cal Warfare Board, 144,
146-147
Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, Al-
li ed Forces Headquarters
(PWB/AFHQ), 12
Psychologi cal Warfare Branch, G-2,
9-12, 15-16, 20, 68
Psychologi cal Warfare Center
establi shment, 1-3, 14, 66, 83,
89-91, 109, 111, 136-142,
144, 154-155, 159
funds for, 141, 144
locati on, 137, 139-142, 200-201
mi ssi on, 36, 95, 143, 145-154
organi zati on of, 137, 144-147,
152-154, 158
personnel, 115, 149, 198-199, 201
and Speci al Forces, 143, 145-154
Psychologi cal Warfare Department,
Fort Ri ley, 129, 142
Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on,
G-3, of HQ 8th Army, 96
Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on,
Speci al Staff, 87, 89, 116
Psychologi cal Warfare Di vi si on, Su-
preme Headquarters, Ai led Ex-
pedi ti onary Force
(PWD/SHAEF), 12, 14, 20, 95
Psychologi cal Warfare Group, P&O,
45-46
Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on,
EUCOM, 113
Psychologi cal Warfare Secti on,
FECOM, 94-95, 100, 105
Psychologi c Branch, 9-10, 20
Radi o broadcasti ng. See Broad-
casti ng.
Radi o Broadcasti ng and Leaflet
Group (RB&L)
1st, 94-96, 115-116
6th, 2, 144, 147
301st, 113, 116
Radi o Servi ce Secti ons, I st and 2d,
10
Rai ders, Orde Wi ngate's, 23
Rangers, 165, 193
counterguerri lla compani es, 121
establi shment of, 23-24
deacti vati on of, 126-129, 137, 158
Group, 70-71
mi ssi ons of, 28, 119, 121, 124,
129, 148, 156
Speci al Forces Compani es, 125
Speci al Forces Regi ment,
118-129, 137
trai ni ng, 123, 126
Ransom, Harry Howe, 25
220 INDEX
Reconnai ssance, 23, 69-72, 122,
148, 156
Resi stance, 6, 27-29, 71-72, 76, 78,
125, 132-134
Ri dgeway, General Matthew B.,
91-93, 97, 105
Robi nett, Major P. M., 10
Rockefeller, Nelson, 1 I
Roosevelt, Frankli n D., 5-7, 24, 26,
30, 32, 41
Royall, Kenneth C., 60-62, 68, 74
Sabotage, 6, 25-26, 40, 71, 76, 103,
122, 139, 148
Samussen, Major Ernest, 70
Sands, Colonel Oli ver Jackson, 152,
i 99- 200
Secretary of the Ai r Force, 52
Secretary of the Army, 52, 60, 65,
80, 97-99
Secretary of Defense, 52, 72, 74, 99,
138-139, 145
Secretary of the Navy, 52
Secretary of State, 59
Secretary of War, 17, 69
Sherwood, Robert E., 6-7
Smi th, Harold D., 7
Smi th, General Walter B., 132-133
Solbert, Colonel Oscar M., 9
Speci al Forces, 156
and counteri nsurgency, 120, 155
creati on of, 81, 104, 111, 119,
136, 140, 153, 157-159
Green Berets, 2, 146
Headquarters (SFHQ), 29
mi ssi on, 119-122, 136, 148,
150-154
Operati onal Detachments, 127
operati ons, 122-123, 126, 128,
142-143, 152
promoti on of, 32
trai ni ng, 83, 130, 142-154
Trai ni ng Command, 130
Speci al Forces Command, 123-124
Speci al Forces Department, Psycho-
logi cal Warfare Center, 142,
145-146
Speci al Forces, 1 st Speci al Servi ce,
23-24, 165
Speci al Forces, 10th Group, 1, 3, 28,
34-35, 69, 71, 83, 90, 107, 109,
127, 144-145, 147-154,
157-158
Speci al Forces, 77th Group, 23
Speci al Forces Group (Guerri lla
Warfare), 141
Speci al Forces Ranger Regi ment,
! 18-129, 137
Speci al Operati ons (SO), OSS, 25,
71, 150
Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on, OCPW,
90, 104-105, 118-119, 121,
124, 139-140, 153-154, 157
Speci al Studi es and Evaluati on Sub-
commi ttee, SWNCC, 47, 60
Speci al Study Group, 9-10, 20
Speci al warfare, 1, 3. See also Spe-
ci al Forces.
defi ni ti on of, 2, 155
early study of, 71-72
ori gi ns of, 39, 11 I
Stahr, Elvi s J., Jr., 2
State-War-Navy Coordi nati ng Com-
mi ttee (SWNCC), 46-48, 60
Stevens, Rear Admi ral Lesli e C.,
78-79
Sti lwei l, General Joseph, 32
Strategi c Servi ces Uni t (SSU), 34,
40
Strong, Major General George V.,
17, 26, 32
Stuart, Colonel Archi bald, 103
Sub Rosa: The OSS and American
Espionage, 32
Subversi on, 2, 5-7, 26
publi c i nformati on on, 43, 46
i n unconventi onal warfare, ! I, 23,
71-72, 122, 139, 148
Supporti ng Commi ttee on Psycho-
logi cal Warfare, 11
Supreme Headquarters, Alli ed Expe-
di ti onary Force (SHAEF), 27
Sykewar. 153
INDEX 221
Tacti cal Informati on Detachment,
59, 68, 94
Taylor, Edmond, 35
Taylor, Major General Maxwell D.,
120-121, 126, 128
Thayer, Charles, 31, 33
Truman, Harry S., 30, 34, 40-41,
52, 93
Unconventi onal warfare
ai rborne reconnai ssance i n, 69-72,
157
atti tudes on, 30-34, 71, 81, 83-88,
138, 158
capabi li ti es, 69, 111-115, 120, 133
defi ni ti on of, 23, 25, 156
di vi si on of OCPW, 89, 118-121,
152-154, 157
guerri lla warfare i n, 23, 25-28,
34, 72, 100-109, 135, 138,
149, 157
OCPW i n Korea, 100-109
ori gi ns of, 5, 23-24, 109, 119,
134, 153, 156-157
OSS i n, 34, 36-37
vs. psychologi cal warfare, 2-3, 25,
152-154
shi ft.to CIA, 78-81, 103, 131, 135
trai ni ng, 134, 146, 149
Uni on of Sovi et Soci ali st Republi cs,
39, 41-43, 49, 58, 79-80, 91,
113, 125
Uni ted Ki ngdom
i ntelli gence system, 5, 14
Speci al Operati ons Executi ve
(SOE), 26
and unconventi onal warfare, 23
Uni ted Nati ons (UN), 92, 95
Uni ted Nati ons Parti san Forces i n
Korea (UNPFK), 102
US Department of Defense, 3, 132
US Department of Interi or, 26
US Department of the Navy, 18
US Department of State, 8, 1 ! , 18,
30, 34, 48, 52, 55-57, 61, 72,
76, 84, 113
US Informati on Servi ce, 96
US War Department, 8, 12, 15-18,
26, 34
Voi ce of the Uni ted Nati ons, 95
Volckmann, Li eutenant Colonel
Russell, 188-189
fi eld manuals of, 119
i n Phi li ppi nes, 29-30
and speci al forces operati ons,
122-124, 129, 136-138, 142,
147-148, 151-154, 158-159
i n Speci al Operati ons Di vi si on,
OCPW, 118-122, 157
Wallace, Henry, 1 !
War Department General Staff
(WDGS), 11, 59, 69-70
War Department Memorandum
No. 575-10-1, 46, 48, 53
War Report of the OSS, 11 - 12, 24,
29, 36, 72
Waters, Li eutenant Colonel Marvi n,
118
Weaver, Li eutenant Colonel John
O., 88, 115
Wedemeyer, Li eutenant General Al-
bert C., 54-64, 85
Wei gley, Russell, 33
West, Captai n, 78
Wi lloughby, Major General Charles
A., 96, 98, 113
Wi sner, Frank G., 40-41, 57, 75-77,
79, 130
WOLFPACK, 101-102
Wyman, Major General W. G.,
42-43, 46, 48-49
Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 53-54,
74-75
Yergi n, Dani el, 39
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRI NTI NG OFFI CE= 1 9 8 2 - 3 7 0 " 4 6 2 / 8 4 5 6
NATI ONAL DEFENSE UNI V ERSI TY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN S . PUSTAY, US AF
PRESIDENT
THE RESEARCH DIRECTORATE AND NDU PRESS
Director of Research and Publisher
Colonel Frankli n D. Margi otta, USAF
Associate Director
Colonel Frederi ck T. Ki ley, USAF
Deputy Director, National Security Affairs Institute
Li eutenant Co|onel Terry L. Heyns, USAF
Deputy Director, Publications and Administration
Li eutenant Commander A. J. McAloon, USN
Executive Secretary
JoAnne Lewi s
Senior Editor
George C. Maerz
Editors
Evelyn Lakes
Albert C. Heldcr
Supervising Editorial Assistant
Loui se Davi s
Editorial Clerks
T. Rence Wi lli ams (Lead Clerk)
Dorothy M. Mack
Laura W. Hall
NAT I ONAL DEF ENS E UNI VERS I T Y P RES S
F o r t Le s l e y J. Mc Na i r
Wa s h i ngt o n, DC 2 0 3 1 9

Alfred H. Paddock - Us Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare 1941-1952 (1982)

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Alfred H. Paddock - Us Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare 1941-1952 (1982)

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

!

Você também pode gostar