November 2012 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Civil Law

Posted on December 14, 2012 by Rose Marie M. King-Dominguez Posted in Civil Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged co-ownership, contract, damages, filiation,
laches, land registration, lease, marriage, mortgage, sale, succession, will
Here are select November 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:
Civil Code
Co-ownership; validity of partition contracts. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the
subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for the partition
of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually conveyances, disguised as
partitions, of portions of Lot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the
subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C. It cannot be overemphasized enough that the two deeds of
absolute sale over portions of substantially the same parcel of land antedated the subdivision
agreements in question and their execution acknowledged too before a notary public. Rupeta
Cano Vda. De Viray and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray v. Spouses Jose Usi and Amelita
Usi, G.R.No.192486. November 21,2012.
Constructive delivery; execution of public instrument only prima facie presumption of delivery.
Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. Related to this article
is Article 1497 which provides that [t]he thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee. With respect to incorporeal property, Article
1498 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule: the execution of a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. However, the execution of a public
instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery, which is negated by the
failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. [A] person who does not have
actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and
delivery of a public instrument. In this case, no constructive delivery of the land transpired upon
the execution of the deed of sale since it was not the spouses Villamor, Sr. but the respondents
who had actual possession of the land. The presumption of constructive delivery is inapplicable
and must yield to the reality that the petitioners were not placed in possession and control of the
land. Sps. Erosto Santiago and Nelsi Santiago v. Mancer Villamor, et al.; G.R. No. 168499.
November 26,2012
Contracts; inadequacy of consideration does not render the contract void; need not be monetary.
Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at
bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. While consideration is usually in
the form of money or property, it need not be monetary. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic
of the Philippines; G.R. No. 180705. November 27, 2012.
Contracts; requisites; disputable presumption that there is sufficient consideration for a Contract.
Under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established. The following contract is inexistent
and void from the beginning: those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction. There is a disputable presumption that there was a sufficient consideration for a
contract. The rule then is that the party who stands to profit from a declaration of the nullity of a
contract on the ground of insufficiency of consideration which would necessarily refer to one
who asserts such nullityhas the burden of overthrowing the presumption offered by the Rules
of Court. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic of the Philippines; G.R. No. 180705.
November 27, 2012.
Damages; entitlement; when death results from delict. Anent the award of damages, when death
occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. People
of the Philippines v. Marcial M. Malicdem; G.R. No. 184601. November 12, 2012.
Damages; exemplary damages in delict; awarded when there is an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it
is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. People of the Philippines v.
Marcial M. Malicdem; G.R. No. 184601. November 12, 2012.
Damages for violation of right to privacy; inviolability of diplomatic residence. As already
exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the
taking of the pictures of Lavinas residence without the latters knowledge and consent. Nestor
reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestors surreptitious acts negate his
allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then,
his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor
violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and he
cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Hence, the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavinas favor is proper. Nestor N.
Padalhin, et al. Vs. Nelson D. Lavia. G.R. No. 183026. November 14,2012.
Filiation; support; entitlement; clear and convincing proof of filiation. Time and again, this Court
has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of
the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and Randy B. Perla; G.R. No. 172471,
November 12, 2012.
Filiation; open and continuous possession of status. To prove open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously. Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy
and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, [t]he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and Randy B. Perla;
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012.
Filiation; proof; Certificate of Live Birth; not competent proof of paternity when putative father
had no hand in preparation; Baptismal Certificate; per se not a competent proof of filiation or
circumstantial evidence to prove filiation. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation
of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity. And while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and
Randy B. Perla; G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012.
Laches; elements. The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in
nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Evidence is of
utmost importance in establishing the existence of laches because there is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to the
particular circumstances. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations.
Laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be
present in order to constitute laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event the relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. Jack
Arroyo v. Bocago Inland Devt Corp. (BIDECO), G.R. No. 167880 November 14,2012
Lease; rescission in reciprocal obligation. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the power
to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him. A lease contract is a reciprocal contract. By signing the lease
agreement, the lessor grants possession over his/her property to the lessee for a period of time in
exchange for rental payment. Indeed, rescission is statutorily recognized in a contract of lease.
The aggrieved party is given the option to the aggrieved party to ask for: (1) the rescission of the
contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for
damages, allowing the contract to remain in force. Sps. Socrates Sy and Cely Sy v. Andoks
Litson Corporation. G.R. No. 192108. November 21, 2012.
Marriage; petition for nullity of marriage; AM No. 02-11-10; appearance by the Office of the
Solicitor General still required. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and
Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation
and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological illness. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R.
No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence; thorough and in-depth assessment required.
The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No.
159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or disabling supervening factor required. It is
not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations must be shown. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R.
No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina guidelines. The pronouncements in
Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the
psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of
evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos,
Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to a
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently
prove that respondent spouses psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior
to the time of the marriage. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic
Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.
Marriage; psychological incapacity; totality of evidence proving incapacity required. Even if the
expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination was to be dispensed with only
if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein,
was the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
But where, like here, the parties had full opportunity to present the professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be represented and be weighed by the trial
courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages. It
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the
Philippines and Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.
Mortgage; mortgagee in good faith relying on Torrens Certificate of Title; Indefeasibility.
Primarily, it bears noting that the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith is based on the rule that
all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is in deference to the public interest in
upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title as evidence of lawful ownership of the land
or of any encumbrance thereon. In the case of banks and other financial institutions, however,
greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued with public interest, failing
which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a
standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property
offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner(s)
thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular inspection is to protect the true owner of the
property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a usurper
who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto. Philippine Banking Corporation
v. Arturo Dy, et al., G.R. No. 183774. November 14, 2012
Property; accretion; elements; By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects if the current of the water belongs to the owner if the land adjacent to the
banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up
riverbed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a
law vests the ownership in some other person. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos
III and Arcadio Santos, Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012
Property; builder in good faith; not limited to those claiming ownership over property; builder in
good faith; landowners options. Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes
that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at
least, he has a claim of title thereto. In Tuatis, we ruled that the seller (the owner of the land) has
two options under Article 448: (1) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after
reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value
is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay
reasonable rent. Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Sps. Arsenio (deceased) and Angeles Nanol, et al.
G.R. No. 176791. November 14, 2012
Quieting of title. The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to
prove only two things, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the
plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in
dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Joaquin G. Chung,
Jr., et al. Vs. Jack Daniel Mondragon, et al.; G.R. No. 179754. November 21, 2012.
Quieting of title; legal or equitable title in quieting of title. An action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things
in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for
an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy. Dionisio Mananquil, et al. v. Roberto Moico; G.R. No. 180076.
November 20, 2012.
Sales; Art 1544; elements of double sale. A double sale situation, which would call, if necessary,
the application of Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, arises when, as jurisprudence teaches, the
following requisites concur: (a) The two (or more) sales transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c)
The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller. Rupeta Cano
Vda. De Viray and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray v. Spouses Jose Usi and Amelita
Usi, G.R.No.192486. November 21,2012.
Sales; contract of sale; purchasers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays
its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same
property. However, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the
purchaser must be wary and must investigate the rights of the actual possessor; without such
inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.
Sps. Erosto Santiago and Nelsi Santiago v. Mancer Villamor, et al.; G.R. No. 168499. November
26,2012.
Succession; will; attestation clause; statement of number of pages; mandatory requirement;
substantial compliance only when evidence aliunde is not necessary.The law is clear that the
attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of
the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance
for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The
statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it consists
of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written cannot
be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mereexamination of the will itself
but through the presentation of evidence. Richard B. Lopez v. Diana Jeanne Lopez, et al., G.R.
No. 189984. November 12, 2012.
Special Laws
Family Code; abandonment not a ground for declaration of nullity.Abandonment was not one of
the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of
the Family Code. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594.
November 12, 2012.
Land Titles and Deeds; confirmation of imperfect title; requirements. Under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), then, applicants for confirmation
of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. Republic of the
Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12,
2012
Land Titles and Deeds; property of public dominion; proof of alienability and disposability; not
subject to acquisitive prescription. The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the
gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium
to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because the lot was not formed
through accretion. Hence the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of the subject lot that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument that respondents possessed the subject lot for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to
the State as part of its public dominion. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos III
and Arcadio Santos, Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012
Maceda Law; entitlement to cash surrender value; requisites; cancellation of contract; requisites.
In this connection, we deem it necessary to point out that, under the Maceda Law, the actual
cancellation of a contract to sell takes place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the
notarized notice of cancellation, and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
In other words, before a contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled, the seller has (1)
to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value.
Until and unless the seller complies with these twin mandatory requirements, the contract to sell
between the parties remains valid and subsisting. Thus, the buyer has the right to continue
occupying the property subject of the contract to sell, and may still reinstate the contract by
updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation of the contract.
Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Sps. Arsenio (deceased) and Angeles Nanol, et al. G.R. No.
176791. November 14, 2012.