Hegeler Institute

APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN HERACLITUS' PHILOSOPHY

Author(s): J. M. Moravcsik
Source: The Monist, Vol. 74, No. 4, Heraclitus (OCTOBER 1991), pp. 551-567
Published by: Hegeler Institute
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN HERACLITUS' PHILOSOPHY
The
questions
that
occupied early
Ionian
philosophers
are
very general
in
nature,
and are not linked to the various skills and crafts that surface ear
ly
in Greek civilization.1 The awe and wonder
fuelling
these
questions
were
directed towards
large
scale
phenomena, and?according
to the
interpreta
tion
presented
in this
essay?called
for more than mere
re-descriptions
or
re-labellings
of various features of
reality. They
called for
explanations,
but
the notion of an
intellectually adequate explanation
took a
long
time to
develop. Conceptions
of
adequate explanation
were
changing throughout
Pre-Socratic
philosophy.
It was left to Aristotle to
attempt
to
capture
the
various
models,
and
give
them a
unifying
structure within an
explicit
theory.2
Explanations
in modern
philosophies
are often
thought
of as human
constructions. We
explain
one
thing
in terms of
something
else to a certain
audience. But within Greek
thought, up
to and
including Aristotle,
we can
detect another
conception
that to some extent can be still seen in our own
thinking
as well.
According
to this
view,
some elements of
reality explain
or
account for others. An obvious illustration of this
conception
is the
appearance-reality
distinction. We construe some entities
as
appearances
of
some
other,
more
fundamental, underlying
ones.
According
to the view of
this
essay,
this
way
of
interpreting experience
is
very deep-seated,
and can
be seen in
every phase
of Greek
thought, including
the
pre-philosophical,
Homeric one.
The
appearance-reality distinction, especially
when extended to cover
cosmic
phenomena,
calls for three
conceptions:
a
conception
of the nature
of the
appearances,
a
conception
of the nature of the
underlying reality,
and
a
conception
of the relation between the two. This
essay places
Heraclitus'
thought
within the framework of a
general conception
of Pre-Socratic
thought
that
interprets
this
as a succession of
proposals
for what should be
our main
explanatory
structure; i.e.,
our main
conception
of what is
ap
pearance,
what is
reality,
and how the two are linked.
There are
many ways
in which one can
speculate
about the natures of
what one takes to be elements of
reality.
For
example,
one
might
want to ex
plain why something appears
to our senses the
way
it
does; why
the sun
shines. One
might
also want an account of what enables some humans to
Copyright
?
1991,
THE
MONIST,
La
Salle,
IL 61301.
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552
J. M. MORAVCSIK
reach
high
standards of excellence in certain activities. For
example,
what
enables Achilles to be such a
magnificent fighter.
Still further
questions
have much wider
scope.
One
might
wonder what basic structures such kinds
have as
numbers, living things,
or material stuffs. On an even more
general
plane,
one
might
wonder about the most
general
features of
change, genera
tion, destruction,
and
persistence.
Explanations
do not take
place
in an intellectual vacuum.
They
build
on
previous attempts. They
have to take
something
for
granted
in order to
be able to claim that one
thing explains
another. For one cannot
question
everything
at the same time. To
attempt
that would be?to borrow Otto
Neurath's felicitous
image?like being
in a boat at
sea,
and
wanting
to tear
up
all of the
planks
at the same time for
repair.
The
ship
would sink. Just as
we can
repair only
some of the
planks
at
any given time,
so we must
keep
some elements of our
conceptual ship
fixed while we
question
others. We
regard
some
things self-explanatory
and others in need of
explanation?on
a
ship
we
keep
some
things fixed,
and
repair
or
improve
other
parts
with
reference to what is
being
retained.
With
respect
to
every
explanatory pattern
we should raise the
following
three
questions:
(1)
What is taken for
granted?
(2)
What
appears
as
problematic
and
calling
for
explanation?
(3)
What structure counts as an
illuminating explanatory pattern?
For
example,
we can take some observable features of natural bodies for
granted,
and ask for their
underlying
causes. Or we can take some
presumably
unobservable
entity,
like a
deity,
for
granted,
and ask how it ac
counts or the observable fact that some humans are
capable
of
outstanding
performance.
Some of our
explanations
rest on
analogies
between
everyday
experience
and
large-scale events,
while in others we
forge concepts
that
go
beyond
common sense and do not correlate with
everyday conceptions.
Some
explanations
are mixtures of these
types;
others
altogether
different.
The
possibilities
are endless.
We can take certain kinds of
unities?stuff, genera,
forces?for
grant
ed,
and
try
to account for
diversities,
or
question
the unities assumed
by
common sense
by positing underlying diversity.
In all of this there is no
intellectual coercion on
Pre-Socratics,
or
anyone else,
to view common
sense either as to be
always questioned,
or as
something
to be saved if at all
possible.3
In the
following
sections we shall see what Heraclitus took for
granted,
what he saw as
problematic,
and what he
regarded
as
appropriate
on
tologica!
structures with
explanatory force, i.e.,
illuminating
what is mere
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY
553
appearance
and what is
reality.
His
pioneering
efforts in
carving
out?or
discovering??new explanatory patterns
rested
partly
on his dissatisfaction
with
previous attempts.
To
explain this,
we shall first look
briefly
at the ex
planatory patterns
that Heraclitus'
predecessors?and
even some of his con
temporaries
and
successors?employed.
I
The
Background.
The use of certain
explanatory patterns
to account for the unusual is
not
unique
to the
philosophic
literature. We find it
already
at the dawn of
any
kind of literature. In Homer we find
primarily
two kinds of facts
represented
as
problematic.
These are:
large
scale natural
phenomena
such
as the
changing
of
seasons, storms,
plagues,
etc.,
and
outstanding
human
achievements such as sustained
prowess
in
fighting,
the
winning
of crucial
duels,
or shrewdness.
Both kinds of
phenomena
were construed as
explicable
in terms of
some
posited
mode of
origin
or
production.
In
many
contexts such
explana
tions are still with us
today.
At times we answer
questions
like:
"Why
can he
perform
the
way
he does?"
by referring
to a
parent, ancestor,
or
producer,
and assume the link between
product
and
producer,
or
originating
creature,
to be
non-problematic.
We think that to some extent children have some of
the characteristics of their
parents,
and that the features of some artifacts
can be
explained by
some of the
properties
of their
producers.
This
is, then,
the
productive
model of
ontological explanation.
Within
this framework we can
explain
the
prowess
of a
warrior
by
reference to his
semi-divine
origin,
and
threatening
natural
phenomena by
reference to the
fluctuating
moods and attitudes of the
gods
who are
responsible
for them.
Within this context
plagues
and achievements are treated as the
ap
pearances,
with divinities and
royalty
as the more fundamental
underlying
elements. The links of
parentage
and artifact
production
were taken as non
problematic,
and
processes analogous
to these were
posited
as
linking, e.g.,
the
deities,
to what was taken as their
product
or
progeny.
Some of the limitations of this model of
explanation
should be obvious.
For
example,
it does not account for the
unity
or
persistence
of some of the
"products".
It does not account for the fact that Achilles is a human with
various conditions in his nature
enabling
him to function as a
biological
unit,
and
persist
under certain circumstances
through
time. The same
ap
plies
to
unity
and
persistence
conditions for storms or
plagues.
The most
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554
J. M. MORAVCSIK
one can
say
is:
"
. . .
because this is how the
gods
wanted it". But while this
might
be an answer to the
question
of
why
there is a
plague
here and
now,
it
does not answer
questions
about
general
conditions of
unity
and
persistence
for
storms,
etc.
As was
suggested above,
the nature of the
explananda
is left as non
problematic.
There is no
analysis
of what
corresponds
to the true assertion
that, e.g.,
Nestor is wise.
Presumably
one would
say: Nestor, wisdom,
and
a connection. But none of these three items receive further
analysis.
There are other limitations on this model. The
analogies
to birth and
artifact
production
fit
everywhere?and
nowhere. There are no clear con
ceptual
constraints on what counts as
analogous
to
procreation
and to ar
tifact
production. Furthermore,
we are not told how in these
"analogous"
cases,
elements or features are transmitted or
produced.
The model cries out
for transmission or transformation
principles. Finally,
this
explanatory pat
tern
yields typically only singular
rather than
general
lawlike
explanations.
One can
say
that this
plague
was
produced by
the wrath of that
god
or
godess,
but
nobody
was
willing
to
say
that
every plague
is
produced by
some
negative feeling
of some divine
being.
Nor did
anyone
believe that
from the
putative
fact that Achilles'
strength
and
prowess
can be linked to
his divine
mother,
one could conclude:
"everyone
who has a divne mother is
a
good fighter."
Within this model the notions of
change
and
causality
are left
pretty
much as taken for
granted. Everyday
modes of
production
and
procrea
tion?even if stretched
by analogies?are hardly
sufficient to
yield general
notions of
change
and causal links.
The
productive
model should also stimulate some to wonder about in
finite
regress.
If is F because it comes from
y9
then we should be able to
ask: "what made
y
an Fi
Eventually something
has to be taken as self
explanatory.
But what sorts of entities should these be? The
productive
model as it surfaces in
early
Greek
writings
is best suited as a candidate to
explain
what are
intuitively
seen as
dynamic phenomena.
These would in
clude human
actions, passions,
and the manifestation of natural forces such
as those of
winds, oceans, fires,
etc. It is less suited
already
on the intuitive
level to
explain why
some metals are harder than
others,
or what makes
earth
dry
at some times and moist at others. These
phenomena
call for other
explanatory patterns.
In
presenting
this sketch of the
first,
the
productive model,
the ex
amples given
seem to fit into what would be
regarded today
as a materialist
framework. We must not conclude that it must have seemed this
way
also
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APPEARANCE
AND REALITY 555
to the ancients. Unless and until one is
presented
with
strong
evidence to the
contrary,
we should assume that modern
ontological dichotomies,
like
mateialist-dualist, abstract-concrete,
etc. were not
parts
of the
conceptual
framework within which the culture under
investigation
functions.
E.g.,
part
of the
implicit "ontology"
of Homer
already
includes entities like
fear,
and the
sky;
but there is no evidence that one could have
gotten
an infor
mative answer from those
living
with this sort of
epic
whether fear was
material or
mental,
and whether the
sky
was a material
entity.
The intellec
tual
changes
are not from a materialist framework to a less materialist
one,
but rather from an undifferentiated framework to one within which some of
the dichotomies referred to above can be drawn.
Modern science uses
explanations
in terms of
origin
for a certain class
of
questions, e.g.,
those that come
up
in
archeology
or in
evolutionary
biology.
But these
explanations
are couched within a
sophisticated
framework that includes the
acknowledgement
of abstract entities like
qualities
or attributes.
Furthermore,
such
explanations posit explicitly
mechanisms for
changes
of various sorts.
There are also
very poor
uses of this
type
of
explanation
to be found in
today's
world. Racial or
religious prejudice
is at a time couched in terms of
alleged explanations
that claim that
anyone
with such-and-such a
parentage
must have certain
negative characteristics,
even
though
there is no scientific
genetic
account that would back such wild
charges.
We
see, then,
from this brief sketch what the
productive
model took
for
granted,
what it took to be
problematic,
and how it tried to account for
the
problematic by
accounts
relying
on
analogies
with
production
and
pro
creation.
Within this scheme one can assume that in certain
ways
the
"product"
is
the same as the
producer. Asking
what seems
like
a reasonable
question:
"How are
they
the same?" leads to the second
explanatory pattern
which we
shall call the constitutive
analysis.
For it answers the
question posed
above
by positing
a common
part
or
ingredient
between
alleged producer
and
pro
duct,
and
goes
on to claim that the basic
explanatory power
lies in
analyses
that tell
you
what the constituents
or
ingredients
of an
entry
are. If two en
tities seem to behave and act the same
way,
then this model
suggests
look
ing
for a common element as the
explanatory
factor.4 The notion of a consti
tuent admits of several
interpretations. Parts, stuff, ingredients,
all offer
themselves as
candidates,
and the distinction between these was not noted
consciously
for
quite
some time after the model came into use. The
ques
tions: "What is it made of?" and "What does it come from?" admit of a tran
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556
J. M. MORAVCSIK
sitional formulation in which "What is it
coming
from?" is construed as ask
ing
for
ingredients
whose mixture resulted in the
entity
under
scrutiny.5
One cannot tell which version of the constitutive
analysis
is
being
used until
one sees the
implications
and further
questions
that a basic constitutive
claim is said to have and raise.
One
way
to move from the
productive
to the constitutive model is to
question
what the former takes for
granted, namely
the mode in which
something
is
supposed
to be transferred from
parent
or
producer
to
"pro
duct".
According
to the constitutive model the transfer must be in terms of
common elements
being
somehow created
among
entities
forming
the ex
planatory
chains. The
underlying
constitutive elements do the real
explain
ing,
and
eventually
some of these have to be viewed as
self-explanatory.
The move from the
productive
to the constitutive model is crucial to
the shift from the
conceptual
framework of Homer and other
literary figures
to Tha?es and other
early
Ionians.6 The
relatively simplistic
constitutive
models of Tha?es and Anaximander were
supplemented by
more
complex
versions of the same model in the works of their successors. Some ultimate
constituents
are
stuffs,
while others are countable collections of
pluralities,
such as atoms. In some versions there are
only
a few basic kinds of consti
tuents,
while in others there is an
indefinitely large
collection of these. Some
of the
posited
basic
parts
are
observable,
while in other theories the basic
elements are in
principle
unobservable.
The
early
versions of the constitutive model have both
advantages
and
disadvantages.
One of the
advantages
is the
severing
of the link to an
thropomorphic
accounts,
and hence the extension of
explanations
over a
much wider
range
of
phenomena.
On the other
hand,
within the new model
the
following questions
arise: how are stuffs transformed into each other?
How do we account for the
diversity
of constituents? In
short,
the new
model
requires
the
discovery?or
invention?of
principles
of transforma
tion and transmission of its own.
As we
saw,
the
productive
model worked
particularly
well with
dynamic phenomena
such as vast forces of nature or human
prowess,
for it
is difficult to
ask,
at least on the level of
sophistication
achieved
by
the Pre
Socratics,
"what are these
things
made of?". The constitutive model does
better with what seem like static
phenomena
such as
stability
and
per
sistence,
while
doing
less well with the
phenomena
of
growth
and
develop
ment.
The shift in
explanatory
models fits the shift in
literary
form. The
pro
ductive model traces
origin,
and thus the form of historical
narrative,
found
in
epic
literature and
th?ogonies
of other sorts is well suited for it. The con
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY
557
stitutive model focusses on
part-whole analyses,
and thus
sequential
nar
ratives are not of central interest. The forms of treatise and didactic
poetry
are more suitable vehicles for this model.
The difference between the constitutive models
of, e.g.,
Anaximenes
and
Democritus,
leads to different views
concerning unity
and
diversity.
The basic constituents in the
early
Ionian
analyses
like that of Anaximenes
are
designated by
"mass
terms"; i.e.,
terms that do not
pluralize
and hence
do not individuate their
ranges
of
application.
On the other hand 'atom' is a
"count-term";
it
pluralizes
and calls for
principles
of individuation and
per
sistence.7
Like
any model,
this one too has its own
key primitive
or undefined no
tion, namely
that of a constituent. This notion is left on the intuitive
level,
and it is
interesting
to see how different
conceptions
of this notion
emerge
in
the
history
of Greek
philosophy.
We must not think that
"part"
or "consti
tuent" had a
particularly
materialistic flavor to the
early Greeks,
for the
reason mentioned
above, e.g.,
that the
required
dichotomies for this sort of
stance were not
yet developed.
So the field is wide
open:
are forces consti
tuents? are virtues like
justice
or
courage
constituents? what about direc
tions of
development?
The notion of
"part" stayed
in the tradition for a
long
time even after the constitutive model is
jettisoned.
For
example,
Plato
raises
questions
of relations between what we would describe as abstract
attribute-like entities in terms of the
part-whole
relation.
Heraclitus' immediate
predecessors
worked with basic stuffs as the
key
constituents within their constitutive
analyses.
We shall review now what is
taken for
granted,
what is
problematic,
and what is
explanatory
within
these schemes.8
The basic stuffs are construed
as
being self-explanatory,
or at
any
rate
not
needing explanation.
Furthermore,
the
unity
and
persistence
of the basic
stuffs is also taken for
granted. Diversity
is
interpreted simply
as the
spatio
temporal
scatter of basic stuffs. It is not natural for us or for the
early
Greeks to ask
questions
like: "What makes water
(air, etc.)
one?" On the
surface,
it seems that these
things just
are what
they
are,
and that their
per
sistence is the function of their
having
at all times the same
parts.
From the
phenomenal point
of
view,
a
body
of water seems to remain the same
body
of water because it
keeps
the same
parts.
Permanent
character,
salient causal
properties,
and
qualitative
dif
ferences are
among
the chief
explananda
of this model. Character is seen as
resting
on the basic
compositional
structure,
causal
properties
are ultimate
ly
the function of the
powers
that basic stuffs
have,
and
qualitative
dif
ferences are accounted for
by mixing
and various transformations of basic
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558 J. M.
MORAVCSIK
stuff. Some of the
key explanans
is observable and some
unobservable, just
as in the
productive
model.
The constitutive model has its own limitations.
First,
it is not clear how
the
unity
of entities
picked
out
by
count-nouns such as
'human', 'tree',
'mountain',
etc. is
explained just by analyzing
these into
key
constituents.
Secondly,
as mentioned
already,
it is not clear how the basic stuffs and their
mixings
account for
growth,
and
development,
and
dynamic
facts like
plagues. Finally,
whether our basic level contains one or
many key stuffs,
sooner or later one would want to know what their natures
are,
especially
if
they
have also causal
powers,
and
obey principles
of
mixing
and
separation.
In modern
disciplines
like
physics
or theories of musical
harmony
con
stitutive
analyses
are
parts
of
larger
frameworks in which attributes are
analyzed
and linked
together
in various
ways.
This
requires
more
concep
tual
distinctions,
and
conceptions
like that of an
attribute,
which were not
yet
articulated within the
early
constitutive models
we
just
sketched.
II
Heraclitus.
The shift from the
early
Ionians to Heraclitus*
thought
can be best
understood when one reflects on what is taken for
granted,
what is
prob
lematical,
and what counts as
explanation.
The
practitioners
of the con
stitutive model focussed?for
good
reasons,
as we saw?on static
phenomena mostly.
Heraclitus reaches back to the
phenomena
around
which the
productive
model
centered,
and wants to
develop
a framework
within which both the
dynamic
and the static is
given equally adequate
treatment. Hence the shift in terms of basic entities from stuffs like
earth,
or
water,
to what one would
conceptualize
easier as forces such as wind and
fire.
Heraclitus thinks that his
predecessors
have not
fully appreciated
what
one would call
qualitative
and numerical
diversity.
He
regards
the intuition
that
unity, homomerousness,
and
qualitative
sameness are
fundamental,
while
diversity
and
change
is on the
surface,
to be
explained
in terms of
what is
static,
as crude and
superficial.
For Heraclitus
change
and
stability,
diversity
and
unity
are
equally fundamental,
and co-exist
throughout
all
regions
of
reality.
This radical
conceptual
shift does not come without a
price
to be
paid.
For once we
reject
the idea that the
underlying reality
consists of
one or at most few basic kinds of
stuff,
the
unity
and
persistence
of elements
of nature becomes
problematic.
The
question:
"What enables this to be the
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY
559
same water as the water that was here before?" does not
raise,
at least on the
surface,
the
conceptual questions
raised
by questions
like: "What enables
this to be the same
human, tree,
etc. that was
there before?" The former
question
can be construed as
calling
for an answer in terms of sameness of
parts,
but the latter forces us to come to
grips
with
dynamic processes
in
volved in
biological maintenance, growth, decay,
etc. In the second case we
see
permanence
as
forged by
forces
affecting
the substance in
question
through time,
and
causing changes obeying principles
of
regularity.
To re
main the same
lump
of earth
might
be
simply
a case of
retaining
the same
material
parts;
but to remain the same
living thing requires
constant
change,
and
systematic replacement
of
parts,
in order to remain the same
entity.
Heraclitus' interest in
unity, persistence,
and
diversity,
is a direct
consequence
of his
seeing
the earlier constitutive
analyses
as
inadequate,
but his work on these notions raises new
problems.
The
interplay
of various
forces
might
be
responsible
for the
persistence
of
living things,
but how will
it account for
questions
about what holds stuffs like earth or water
together?9
Causality
and
change
remain notions that are taken for
granted,
and so
is the fact that there are
seemingly separate
entities scattered
over
space
and
time,
with
complex
natures.
A
key
move in Heraclitus'
forging
of new
explanations
is
taking
certain
elements of human
experience
such as tension and
harmony,
and
projecting
these onto a cosmic scale so as to cover accounts of
unity
and
persistence
for
both the static and the
dynamic.
His
underlying
elements are also?as in the
earlier
model?partly
observable and
partly
unobservable. He wants to ex
plain dynamic phenomena,
but without the
anthropomorphism
of the
earlier
productive
model.
The Heraclitean
fragments
left to us exhibit once more the close rela
tion between form and content. Heraclitus is not
just adding
new wrinkles
to the constitutive model of the
early Ionians,
but is
challenging
us to
accept
a
radically
new
conception
of
reality
in which the
dynamic
underlies even
what on the surface looks like static. He demands a
conceptual
reorienta
tion in which
change
and lack of
change
are
equally
fundamental;
this is not
just
a matter of additional observational data. Thus a form similar to the
oracular suits his
purposes;
with the
important
difference that the whimsical
gods
as sources are
replaced by
the voice of reason.10 His "dark
sayings"
fall
into the tradition of the
oracular,
the
myth,
and other forms suited
primari
ly
to introduce divine
messages.
This mode of communication is also used
by
Parmenides and
Plato, among others,
when
they
are about to introduce
radical
conceptual change.
In all of these cases form and content
support
each other.
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560 J. M. MORAVCSIK
The Heraclitean
conceptual
revolution consists
basically
of three main
steps. First,
he
posits
a
steady
and
only partly
observable stream of constant
change
as fundamental to
reality.
It is anachronistic to ask about the
precise
conceptual ingredients
of this fundamental
change,
as
apparently
Plato
did.11
Any analysis
of
change
as the
gaining
or
losing
of
attributes,
or of
links between instants and minimal
temporal
intervals was
beyond
the con
ceptual
arsenal available to Heraclitus. Heraclitus' interest in time and
change
was not related to the
potential
infinite
divisibility
of the
temporal.
His fascination arose from the observation that
change
is not
always
destructive of
persistence
and
stability,
but is in
many
cases a
necessary
condition for these states. This
insight
was recovered later
by
Aristotle and
built into his view of the
dynamics
of substantial
persistence.
Secondly,
Heraclitus
posits
basic
interplays
of tensions
among
vast
natural forces and a
resulting harmony
that holds
together
the smaller
elements of
reality
as well as the
larger
ones,
and within this
hierarchically
holistic
cosmology,
the whole of
reality
as well. His chosen
primary
ele
ment, fire,
is much more suitable to
play
this role in this sort of
dynamic
cosmos than the stuffs of his
predecessors
such as earth or water. The latter
can be seen as collections of
parts,
where the whole is the mere sum of
parts.
But it is more difficult to think of fire in this
way.
Fire is not
just
bits of stuff
sitting
in
space
and time. Nor is it
simply
a force like heat or cold. It is
associated with life and
yet
not confined to the realm of the
organic.
Thus it
is
ideally
suited to be the kind of cosmic
glue
that underlies the harmonies of
tensions associated with each
unity
within the Heraclitean universe.
Thirdly,
Heraclitus has a new
approach
to numerical and
qualitative
diversity
and sameness. Heraclitus and other Greek
philosophers up
to
Aristotle
operate
with a notion of
qualitative
sameness that admits of
degrees
and the
limiting
case of which is what we should call
identity.
In this
way
it foreshadows Leibniz's
conception
of
identity, i.e.,
sameness in terms
of sameness of all
qualities.
Thus in this framework
complete
difference
would be for two
things
not to have
anything
in common. Heraclitus would
deny
that this could ever take
place.
Modern
logicians
echo the Heraclitean
insight by pointing
out that
any
two entities have some
predicate
or other in
common,
no matter how remote this
might
be from common-sense
descrip
tions.
With
regard
to
"complete
sameness" Heraclitus has two theses:
(i)
At
any
given
time the sameness or
unity
of a real
thing depends
on it
being
also
"not the
same", i.e., having
a
complex
nature held
together by
tension and
balance between a number of forces that inhere in the
thing.
In
paradoxical
ways?that apparently
Heraclitus loved?one could
say
that for him
things
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY 561
were the same
by
not
being
the same. A
thing
without
qualitative diversity
and
changes
involved in
growing, living,
and
decaying
could not
exist,
or
"be what it is",
(ii)
An element of
reality,
be it a human or a river or a
larger
unit,
can
persist ("remain
the
same") only
if over time it
changes
its
parts.
It
gains
some
parts,
loses some
parts, "according
to measure".
Again,
in a
more
paradoxical mode,
a
thing
can remain the same
(as itself) only
if it
does not remain
(qualitatively)
the same
(as itself).
Thus for Heraclitus
sameness and difference are
intrinsically
interwoven and
mutually depen
dent. This
complex
state of "interwovenness" was later
analyzed by
Plato in
precise
and
non-paradoxical
ways,
in the
Sophist,
while
retaining
a stable
and fixed fundamental
layer
of
reality?something
that would have
displeased
Heraclitus.
A detailed and
thorough
examination of these
points
is
beyond
the con
fines of this
paper,
but a few remarks
may
be
appropriate.
A world con
strued as
basically
scattered stuff
through space
and
time,
with mechanical
causal interactions between otherwise inert
bits,
is easier to
interpret
con
ceptually
in such modern terms as succession of states and the
interplay
of
relational
properties.
Heraclitus' world of hierarchical holism in which units
are more than mere sums of
parts,
and forces create constant tension and
balance,
has in its
logical analysis
as the basic notion that of
opposition.
This was at this
stage
not reduced to
separate logical, metaphysical,
and
physical species.12
Heraclitus' view
brought
him into conflict with the common-sense in
tuition,
shared
by many philosophers
as
well,
that
persistence
should be at
some level the sameness of
parts.
A common-sense answer to a
question
like: "What makes this
puddle
of water the same
puddle
as the one that was
here two hours
ago?"
is: "because
nothing
has
changed;
it is still made
up
of
the same material and same
parts
as before." We have the same intuition
about other entities like
piles
of
sugar
or coal. Heraclitus confronts
us with
two claims.
First,
this
story
is not true and indeed cannot be true of
living
things. Secondly,
even in the cases of
seemingly
less
dynamic phenomena
this
conception
is
inadequate.
A
river,
an
illness,
or civic life in a communi
ty, require
the same
dynamic
structure of
unity
and
persistence
as the
organic.
Hence the need and
subsequent explanatory
value of
positing
a
constant flow of
change.13
This flow is
required
also for
giving
fire the
privileged position
that it receives from Heraclitus.
For,
as was
pointed
out
before,
it is difficult to construe the
persistence
of fire as the
retaining
of the
same
parts.
Its
persistence
seem to fit better in the
dynamic
structure that is
part
of Heraclitus' overall
conceptual
framework.14
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562
J. M. MORAVCSIK
The choice of fire as
fundamental,
and the overall
dynamic conception
of
reality, underlying deceptively
static
appearances,
is
complemented
in
the Heraclitean scheme
by
the notion of tension and
opposition.
Is his
point
about sameness and
difference,
hot and
cold,
etc. a
point
of
logic,
or what
he took to be a
necessary
truth about
reality,
or what we would call
today
a
principle
of
physics?15
A modern
philosopher today
would
probably say
that the notion has to be
analyzed
in terms of
a
variety
of
concepts,
some
metaphysical,
some
logical,
and some
physical,
and then the
examples
distributed
among
the various
precise
modern
concepts.
But while such a
move
may clarify,
it could also
destroy
and distort. Heraclitus has a
unitary
vision of the laws of
reality; perhaps
we are unable
today
to
recapture
this
kind of vision.
Heraclitus'
positing?or discovering?a dynamic reality
that underlies
static surface
phenomena brings
him into clashes with the common sense of
his time as well as that of ours. Our
explanations,
be these scientific or
philosophical,
tend to take the stable and
unchanging
to be the
explanatory,
and take the
dynamic
to be the
explanandum. Furthermore,
his hierarchical
structure of wholes and
parts
clashes with the common view held
today?perhaps
conditioned
by
the earlier successes of mechanistic ex
planations
in
physics?of
the world as
separate
scattered bits of matter.16 In
these
ways
Heraclitus
changed
the Ionian intellectual
landscape by turning
certain
commonly accepted ways
of
viewing
the
appearance-reality
distinc
tion
upside
down. It took further reflection on the
part
of his successors to
see that laws of
dynamic
but
regular processes
are themselves instances of
the fixed and
unchanging.
Heraclitus'
conception
has its own difficulties. He leaves
key
notions
like those of
opposition
and
change unanalyzed.
Not
surprisingly,
these
cry
out for
analysis;
both Plato and Aristotle offered
attempted
clarifications of
these
concepts
in
subsequent philosophy. Furthermore,
within his own view
there are
principles
and rules
governing dynamic processes,
but the nature
and
ontological
status of these
principles
is never made clear.
In
spite
of these
difficulties,
one can
safely
conclude that Heraclitus
showed some of the weaknesses of the constitutive model as
employed by
his
predecessors
and
contemporaries.
In order to cover all of the
phenomena
that Heraclitus
rightly
insists must be
parts
of the
explananda,
the constitutive model has to stretch the notion of constituent
beyond
what
any analogy
with our
pretheoretic
intuitions would bear.
Furthermore,
even in
any
extended reformulation of the constitutive
model,
the
analysis
of
complexes
into
simple parts
cannot do all of the
explaining.
There must
be
principles governing
the various
changes
and lawlike
processes
that
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY 563
yields harmony
and
stability,
even
among
the
dynamic phenomena.
Hence
Heraclitus' insistence on
"logos"
and "metron" as the
"ruling"
elements.
Though
Heraclitus does not offer a
precise
and
sophisticated ontology,
his
treatment of
logos
and measure indicates that
he?rightly?did
not see these
as
just
additional constituents.
The next
pattern
of
explanation emerges
?s
a result of
seeing
that it is
the
logos
and metron that offer the final
explanations.
These are the self
explanatory. Hence, why
not do what the other models did
also; namely
to
identify
that which is ultimate from an
explanatory point
of view with what
is
ontologically
most fundamental? The
principles
of
harmony
and tension
must be a
separate
realm from that which
they govern. Why
not make them
a
separate ontological category,
and
regard
this as the
underlying reality,
regardless
of what this does to our
everyday
convictions about the
experien
tial
being
in some sense the most fundamental?
This next
pattern
is worked out
by
Plato. It is
subsequently
modified
by Aristotle,
and then reworked
repeatedly
in the
history
of
philosophy.
One of its versions is the medieval
theory
of
universals; i.e.,
the view that
there is an abstract
entity
not in
space
or time called a
universal,
associated
with
every predicate.
This is not Plato's
view,
and
clearly
could not have
been the view of Heraclitus. The Platonic version of this
explanatory
model
involved a detailed characterization of the
ontological
nature and status of
what
gives
and constitutes
order,
as well as the relation between these
elements and the world of
space
and time in which order
is?according
to
Plato
imperfectly?reflected.
This
involves, among
other
things,
hammer
ing
out the
conception
of what became known as the attribute-instance con
figuration.
But the basic intuition
underlying
it is that of order and
ordering
principles
on the one
hand,
and a world of
dynamic changes
in which order
and structure is reflected not
merely
the contrast between universals and
particulars.
Thus we shall call this the
ordering-structuring
model.
It would be anachronistic to
expect
of Heraclitus that he should have
built what became known as the Platonic
building
blocks of the
ordering
structuring
model. That would have
required
him not
only
to focus on
dynamic phenomena,
but at the same time to see also mathematics as the
paradigm
of
sciences,
and the status of numbers as well as their relations to
numberable collections as the
key ontological
notions. One
"big
move" at a
time,
is all we can
expect
of
pioneers.
This
presentation
of Heraclitus differs from standard modern versions.
Thus it is worth
sketching briefly
how this
presentation
handles what is one
of the most often discussed
fragments
of
Heraclitus, namely
the river
fragments. Contemporary
debates center on whether these were
supposed
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564
J. M. MORAVCSIK
to show total
flux,
or
only
the kind of
dynamism
that is
exemplified already
by
some
everyday phenomena.
Within our
presentation,
that issue could
not have been the main focus for Heraclitus. For we see Heraclitus as a tran
sitional
figure
between different
conceptions
of
unity
and
persistence.
The
river
fragments
read best if we take them to be Heraclitus
showing
how
sameness of
parts
is not a
guarantee
of
persistence,
and in
many
cases would
work
actually
towards destruction.17
The
fragments dealing
with what
happens
when we
step
into a river
deal with the
following
facts:
(i)
we
step
into a river once or twice within a
certain
period
of
time; (ii)
we
step
into "different
waters", i.e.,
not into the
same
parts
of the water of the river as we
perform
these
actions; (Hi)
the
persistence
of the river and
changes
in the
constituency
of the water of the
river are not in
conflict;
on the
contrary,
the former
requires
the latter.
Our common-sense
conception
of
a river covers
up many
of its com
plexities.
A river is a
combination of water and
riverbank,
but this cannot
be described as a mere
juxtaposition
of
parts.
It is a whole
greater
than the
mere sum of these
elements,
for without the water the riverbank is not a
riverbank but
only bulges
within
a
landscape.
On the other
hand,
without
the river-bank the water is not
river-water,
but
just watery
stuff. The water
must
change
if the river is to
survive;
without such
changes
the river is not a
river but a mere
stagnant body
of water.
In order to make these Heraclitean
points
we need not assume that he
had a
very precise
notion of what counts as
parts
of the
water;
water at cer
tain
places,
water at
spatio-temporal points,
or water molecules traceable
down the river. At a certain
time, t',
we
step
into a
river; i.e.,
into water
that is between riverbanks. At a later
time, t",
we
step
into the same
river,
but in virtue of
this,
into a different sum of
waterparts.
The water that con
stitutes the river at t
'
is not identical with the mass of water that constitutes
the river at t ". The same
point
can be made also if we consider
only
one
stepping
into the
river,
since such an action takes
time,
and what was
just
said is true as
long
as an action or actions take
place
over a time interval.
Thus the
"experiment"
shows that we cannot define the
persistence
of the
river in terms of
retaining
the same water
parts. Underlying
the
picture
is
the
suggestion
that the
changes
in water are
necessary
for the survival of the
river.
The main
point is, then, negative
and critical. Heraclitus tells us what
does not account for the
persistence
of the river. His
positive
view must be
inferred from other
fragments; indicating
that the
persistence
of the river is
a matter of
changes
in water
constituency according
to certain
principles
of
measure.
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APPEARANCE AND REALITY
565
It is
easy
to see how what is said about the river can be
generalized
to
cover all
parts
of
reality.
Humans and other
organic
entities too need con
stant
replenishment
of
parts
in order to
persist,
and the same
holds, though
less
obviously,
of
artifacts, mountains,
or even rocks. Some
changes
are
more on the surface than
others;
some are slower than others. Mountains
change shapes,
rocks lose
parts.
In all such cases neither: "What holds it
together?"
nor "What enables it to
persist?"
can be answered
adequately by
reference to the
parts
that
something
has and its rentention of these.
Ill
Heraclitus: A
Lonely Voice,
or a
Transitional
Figure?
Given the
interpretation presented
we can see Heraclitus as
seeing
the
shortcomings
of the constitutive
analysis
without
yet having forged
what
became the
ordering-structuring
model of
explanation.
But we can see in
embryonic
form the elements of that model in various
parts
of Heraclitus'
philosophy.
We can see
it,
above
all,
in his
conception
of
reality
and
ap
pearance.
For his
reality
is not
literally
"underneath" the observable
things
and
events,
as
perhaps
in Democritus and
Anaxagoras,
but more like
Plato,
"above" the
warring
elements and
processes.
His
"logos"
and "metron" can
be seen as the forerunners of Plato's Forms. This is the
part
of Heraclitus'
philosophy
that
prevents
the historian from
classifying
it as
"merely"
a
dynamic
version of the constitutive model.
Still,
we should not underestimate the
importance
of the
emphasis
on
the
dynamic
not
only
with reference to the
explananda
but also as included
in the
explanans.
For
just
as the
"logos"
can be seen as what evolved later in
to the realm of
Forms,
so the tensions and wars of
opposites
can be seen as
what was harnessed within Aristotle's
theory
of matter as
potentiality,
and
potentiality
as a
key ingredient
in what leads to
persistence.
The
ordering
model does not
necessarily give
an
analysis
of all kinds of
change,
but it does
analyze regular change
that is constitutive of the func
tioning
of some natural unit as the inherence of
ordering
elements?certain
attributes??in the flux of time. This model also
helps
with
persistence by
construing
the order of causal
sequences leading
to
growth
and then what is
necessary
for
persistence,
as a
configuration
of abstract elements con
stituting
order under ideal
circumstances, being
reflected in
space
and time.
The
development
from
productive
models to constitutive models to
ordering-structuring
models is
just
as
important
a
development
in Western
thought
as the
journey
"from
myth
to
logic".
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566
J. M. MORAVCSIK
So from one
point
of view Heraclitus is a transitional
figure.
But from
another
point
of view we can see him as a
lonely
voice
crying
in what
seemed to him an intellectual desert. For Heraclitus would not have been
happy
with either the Platonic or the Aristotelian solutions to the
concep
tual
problems they
inherited. Neither of these
philosophies
have the total
organic unity
and interrelatedness that is essential to Heraclitus, view of
both
appearance
and
reality.
Plato's two-world
ontology
and Aristotle's
dichotomies between the essential and accidental and the
potential
and the
actual violate the
unitary
and holistic nature of Heraclitus' vision.
Heraclitus
might
have borrowed?had it been available to him?a
phrase
from T. S.
Eliot,
and described the
philosophies
that came after him
as?from his
point
of view?"a
heap
of broken
images".
Heraclitean
metaphors
of
war, strife, tension,
etc. are turned
by
his successors into
more
precise
technical
expressions,
but in the course of this his
unitary
vi
sion is lost.
This
unitary aspect
of his vision is
perhaps responsible
for his
being
able to look out over the
Aegean,
and see in the sea and the islands not
only
strife and
harmony
that for him was
intelligible,
but also
a world in which
he can feel at home. He has not
explained
away
the conflicts and
suffering,
but can see these as
aspects
of
larger harmonies,
thus
providing
him with an
interpretation
of
reality
that construes this as a
place
where the
thoughtful
person
can find a home.
Many
centuries later the German
poet, Novalis,
wrote:
"Philosophie
ist
eigenlich Heimweh;
der Trieb ?berall zu Hause zu
sein."
("Philosophy
is
fundamentally
a
yearning
for a
home;
the
striving
to
be able to feel at home in all
parts
of
reality").
This characterization
applies
well to Heraclitus. His
contempt
for common sense and efforts to
present
us
with a
radically
new and different
conception
of
reality
has its roots
partly
in his
striving
towards what he
thought
was not
only
a true
picture,
but one
within which honest souls can find a home.18
Stanford University
J. M. Moravcsik
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APPEARANCE
AND REALITY 567
NOTES
1. For an
early description
of arts and crafts see the Iliad bk.
XVIII,
lines
409-605;
the
making
of the shield.
2. On this see
Moravcsik, J.,
"Aristotle on
Adequate Explanations", Synthese,
28
(1974),
3-17.
3.
My interpretation
in terms of Heraclitus' overall
conceptions
differs both from
Popper, Karl,
"Back to the
Pre-Socratics", Proceedings of
the Aristotelian
Society
m.s. 59
(1958-59), 1-24,
and
Kirk,
G.
S., "Popper
on Science and the Pre
Socratics",
Mind n.s. 69
(1960),
318-39.
4. I use
'part'
and 'constituent' in a
very
broad intuitive sense;
including parts
of
trees or animals as well as
parts
of stories or
arguments,
without
any prejudice
in
favor or
against
materialism and its rival
ontological
views.
5. I am indebted to Jonathan Barnes on this
point
for discussion.
6. In
stressing
these
aspects
of
conceptual
shift in Pre-Socratic
thought,
I do not
mean to belittle the
interesting insights, compatible
with
my interpretation,
that can
be found in Bruno Snell's "From
Myth
to
Logic"
in The
Discovery of
the Mind
translated
by
T. G.
Rosenmeyer (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
University Press,
1953),
ch. 9.
7. For an elucidation of the count-mass term distinction see
Gabbay, D.,
Moravcsik, J.,
"Sameness and
Individuation",
Journal
of Philosophy,
70
(1973),
513-26.
8. These
conceptual
shifts in terms of
explanatory
structure are not to be con
fused with the Kuhnian shifts in so-called
paradigms.
9. A
possible
interest in
persistence questions?but only
on a cosmic scale?can
be seen in Anaximander's introduction of the notion of
a vortex. I am indebted to
Professor Robert Bolton for discussion on this
point.
10. For more discussion of the difference between
knowledge
and
insight
see
my
"Understanding",
Dial?ctica,
33
(1979),
202-16.
11.
Cratylus
402a.
12. On
opposites
see
especially
Diels'
fragments B58, 61, 63, 88,
and 126.
13. On constant
change
see
B6, 12,
49a.
14.
Concerning fire,
see
B30, 31,
and
76;
also
Kahn,
Charles
H.,
The Art and
Thought of
Heraclitus
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
15.
Concerning tension,
see
B48, 53,
and
80;
also
Kahn, Op. cit., pp.
195-200.
16. B8 and 10.
17. B12 and
49a; my interpretation
is
independent
of recent controversies con
cerning
the exact text and number of the river
fragments.
18. I am indebted to Professor Brad In wood and Professor Jonathan Barnes for
useful comments on an earlier draft. Needless to
say, they
are not
responsible
for the
resulting changes.
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