Articles

Internal Security Priorities for the New
Government: Institutional Reforms

Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services
Internal Security Centre
May 19, 2014
Since the Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26th November 2008, the complexity
of internal security of challenges faced by the nation has increased. In order
to deal with these challenges, a concerted, coordinated institutional approach
based on the widest possible political consensus and improved Centre-State
synergy is required. In addition, new internal security challenges arising out
of contemporary trends like increasing urbanization, growth of mega cities,
demographic shift, rising expectations of the youth and social media, need to
be taken into account. If not addressed urgently, these challenges will
become more complex and go out of hand.
A huge debate has taken place in the country on the nature of internal security challenges and
how to deal with them. The Group of Ministers Report in 2001 had made a series of
recommendations many of which have been implemented. Yet, we are still some distance away
from being confident about handling these challenges. A large number of recommendations have
been made by various experts and expert committees. The implementation of the
recommendations has, however, been poor. The political consensus on implementing the key
recommendations, for instance, the setting up of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre has
proved to be elusive.
Following is a selection of recommendations1 , which if implemented urgently, could prove to
be transformative in addressing the internal security challenges. A time bound implementation
will create a broader consensus on the internal security issues which is urgently needed.
Centre-State Relations:
In the past few years, strained relationships and absence of effective communication between
Centre and the States have created hurdles in addressing problems of internal security
constructively. Political consensus on internal security issues is lacking. Therefore it is
recommended that:
1. The Prime Minister should hold right in the beginning of his tenure meetings with the
Chief Ministers and political parties to build a political consensus on carrying out
institutional reforms, implementing recommendations of various committees set up by
the Government of India and setting up a comprehensive agenda for internal security
reform.
2. The constitutional mechanisms like the National Integration Council (NIA), Development
Council, etc. should be reinvigorated to discuss internal security issues between the
Centre and the States.
Counter-Terrorism
The absence of a Central Institution to tackle terrorism has resulted in a fragmented approach to
terrorism. Therefore it is recommended that:
1. Set up urgently an NCTC like body to fight terrorism If need be, examine the existing
draft and modify.
2. Operationalize the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) and strengthen national
Investigation Agency (NIA)
3. Explore ways to curb the internal sources for terrorist funding.
Policing Reforms
Shortage of policemen, lack of proper training and inadequate infrastructure has constrained the
effective functioning of the Police. Steps recommended are:
1. Start a recruitment drive and bring the police population ratio to the UN prescribed norm
of 222 per 100,000 people. Follow it up with good policing and training infrastructure as
well as judicial reforms.
2. Provide adequate legal cover to central police forces for counter terrorism operations.
Border Management
Lack of a well-coordinated approach towards border management has rendered the countrys
borders insecure. The problem is further aggravated by sense of alienation displayed by people
residing along the border areas. To amend the situation, recommendations are:
1. Constitute a Border Management Commission for formulating a common vision for
border management and developing strategies and policies. A Similar commission should
be set up for coastal security.
2. Ensure regular visits of central leaders to the border areas as well as neighbouring
countries and reach out directly to the people.
International Cooperation
Terrorist threat has international dimensions. On the diplomatic dimension of Internal Security,
recommendations are:
1. Achieve cooperation with other countries with regard to counterterrorism
2. Have extradition treaties and agreements on criminal matters
3. Get training and expertise from other countries
Research
Any long-term sustainable approach to deal with internal security issues will need to be based on
systematic research of the different dimensions of internal security challenges. Thus, there is a
need for setting up research institutions dealing with issues such as ethno-cultural studies of
populations groups, languages, social media and its impact, police and crime, conflict resolution,
insurgencies etc. Specialized research institutions should be set up to help formulate proper
internal security policies.
Emerging issues
There are various emerging issues which require immediate and adequate attention. These are:
1. Perception management has been the weakest link in Indias fighting against internal
security problems. The government has not been able to win the battle of narratives and
counter-narratives. To strengthen perception management, uniform and whole
government approach towards a specific issue should be ensured. Counter narratives to
the propaganda of the terrorists and insurgents should be developed and popularized.
2. The internet and the social media are fast emerging as the arenas for competing
narratives. Urgent steps should be taken against the growing radicalization through them.
3. Cyber security reforms should be ushered in by enhancing capabilities through training
and setting up of Cyber forensics.
4. Emphasis should be on preparation of big data, their mining and analyses. Private sectors
should be involved for such exercises and most of the expertise lies outside the
government.
5. By 2050, 50 per cent of India will be urbanized. These urban and peri-urban areas
could emerge as areas of dissonance, which require attention through competent urban
policing. Governance of mega cities also their own challenge.
6.Challenging Stereotypes: Reinventing the
national discourse on the North East
7. Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services
8. Shruti Pandalai
9. May 16, 2014
10. Ethnic clashes between Bodos (Assams biggest tribal group) and Muslims in lower
Assam in early May, forced media attention once again to the myriad conflicts stemming
from contested identities in the North East. Election rhetoric around issues of illegal
migration into north eastern states, targeted at specific vote banks seems to have further
fuelled the reportage. A fortnight on, perhaps understandably, the region has faded from
the medias radar, since action has now shifted to New Delhi with the country ushering in
political change.
11. Typically, issues from the North East despite making headlines, are often lost in
translation. The gravity and historic context of the conflict is often lost en masse in the
national public consciousness. Mass medias access to the lowest common denominator
makes it a crucial player in building national narratives and breaking stereotypes. These
narratives can come handy for the state to make sure the message is clear in areas prone
to conflict, where citizens are often victims of misinformation and agenda driven
campaigns.
12. This is not to say that bridging perception gaps will resolve the conflicts in the North
East, but the case has to be made to at least inform and build common frames of reference
and initiate larger public interest in the region. If attempts have been made already, then
we need to investigate their limited presence in influencing opinions and debates in the
larger national consciousness. Its paradoxical that despite the rise in rich academic
research on the various problems plaguing the North East, their play in mass public
discourse is negligible and incident oriented.
13. Insurgencies have been raging on is the North East for decades, yet unlike Kashmir
which has become ingrained in public consciousness and the national discourse one
could argue that the North East has not received the same attention. Apart from spot
reports on violence, which is definitely a step forward from the early days of complete
ignorance; there is little effort to understand the contested narratives of the various
conflicts. Images of the Manipuri women protest against the rape of Manorama Devi in
2004, anti-AFSPA activist Irom Sharmila, and shots of training camps of the ULFA are
regurgitated time and again in the mass media. While these are powerful and symbolic,
they have stereotyped a complex region with a flattened idea of homogeneity.
14. Such perceptions fail to inform that each of these states has its own distinctive culture,
many competing identities and internal conflicts. In popular imagination, the North East
is a monolith, and there has been very little effort to challenge this representation. Every
time a student from the North East gets harassed in Delhi, opinion columns are flooded
with words like alienation, prejudice and integration of the North East. But is there
an interest beyond the superficial?
15. In a survey which got a lot of attention two years ago, it was revealed that stereotypes
that haunt the North East were still very basic.1 In their results 87% Indians outside the
North East, could not name all seven states.52% had a negative perception of the region
and their reflections were limited to " insurgency, most underdeveloped states and
"people with mongoloid features and weird food habits. 76% were unaware of peace
talks underway in the region and 30% said they would never seek employment in the NE
even if suited career interests.2 While you may choose to argue with the findings, it does
reflect the extent to which the frames of reference are skewed. If this is still the starting
point, then there is a lot of work which needs to be done.
16. Blaming the media singularly for the abysmal state of misinformation is nothing but
shooting the messenger. Its a chicken and egg situation, if you ask the national media
why the bias in coverage, they argue a lack of audience interest. Sadly the regional media
too hasnt been able to perform its role independently. Reporters from the region have
told me that they are under constant pressure from insurgent groups to carry their press
releases verbatim, they do it for survival. They also say that if local media are overtly
critical of the state their advertisements are cut down. Often the states paranoia of
misuse of media platforms by miscreants becomes the biggest obstacle in challenging
narratives of armed groups.3
17. If you look at the propaganda of many of these armed groups against the Indian state
the grievances espoused focus on neglect, lack of governance and resource and economic
exploitation. Till development in the North East is achieved these discourses will only get
amplified and appropriated along ethno-centric lines. What is surprising though is the
lack of investment from the Centre and state governments to fight back the propaganda
and challenge narratives.
18. The very fact that the term 'racism' is gaining currency to describe prejudices and biases
in cases of assaults against people of the North East - should worry the Indian state. This
framing of debate as the mainland vs periphery with the vision of a homogenous North
East, which is contrary to the reality on the ground, is the very essence of the problem.
19. The othering of identities and perceptions, however, goes both ways and is not often
reflected in the media discourse. In an eye-opener of a piece in The Hindu, Patricia
Mukhim, the Editor of The Shillong Times questions eloquently that while the people
from Indias North East face severe discrimination in Delhi and elsewhere, has anyone
asked how the northeast treat the outsiders?4 She makes a case for the unreported
incidents of attacks and discrimination faced by non-tribals struggling to survive in the
North East. It is a dismal picture, starkly different from the flattened construction of a
homogenous North East that is repeatedly manufactured in our public consciousness.
20. If the larger goal is to understand the challenges of the North East, it requires a strong
national narrative which reconciles its many identities and adds to the peace process.
Contested histories, tribal vs. non-tribal ethnicities, failure of states to provide for basics
and security in the region, legitimate grievances and the profitable economics of war,
have layered and formed the identities of people from this region. These need to find
more representation. Till we arrive at an informed understanding of the region beyond the
stereotypes which gain traction in our national public consciousness and debate, the
North East will continue to suffer from both prejudice and indifference and the media
will continue to wait for the next incident.
21. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or
of the Government of India.
Naval symposium in China: Decoding the
outcome
Sarabjeet Singh Parmar
April 29, 2014
One of the hallmarks of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) held at Qingdao, China
in April 2014 was the adoption of an agreement called the Code for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (CUES). This agreement signed by the US, China and around two dozen Asia-Pacific
nations (including India, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and
Australia amongst others) caters for improving communications when ships of the signatory
nations meet in an unplanned event at sea and thereby reduce the possibility of any
misunderstanding or collision that in turn could lead to increased friction. Admiral Wu Shengli,
PLAN Chief, in his keynote address had stated that For the sake of the extremely precious
peace we enjoy at present, we need to try to avoid extreme behaviours that may endanger
regional security and stability. Seen as a positive a step towards establishing international
standards in relation to the use of the sea, as per the text of the agreement, the main loophole is
that the agreement is not legally binding. This is an aspect that is clearly understandable as any
legality attached to the agreement could have resulted it in either firstly, being rejected out right
or secondly, following the path that the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea has meandered
on since the first draft was rejected in 1999. In either case it would have been a non starter. The
Chinese had earlier objected to CUES in the symposium held in 2012 and had objected to usage
of the word code as it made the agreement legally binding as well as the use of English in the
document.
For CUES to become a reality there are some major decisions to be taken and milestones to be
achieved by nations. These issues and concerns were aired during the meeting. The main issues
that need to be resolved include the time frame for implementation, to what extent would nations
adopt the code and intimation of any issue that is considered contentious or inimical to any
nations interests.
Coming on the heels of the series of incidences involving ships from PLAN, the US, Japanese,
Philippine, Vietnam and Indian navies, the agreement is considered noteworthy. However, as the
euphoria of the agreement was settling, the Chinese stance on the CUES was made clear in an
interview1 by the head of the Chinese Navys Maritime Security/Safety Policy Research
Division. The main points were:
The agreement is a recommendation and not legally binding.
It is voluntary and does not apply in territorial waters
Applicability of usage, when and where would be dependent on bilateral talks.
The points are reminiscent of the stances the Chinese adopt in the South China Sea dispute; in
the East China Sea and with respect to bilateralism from time to time. Adoption of the CUES in
totality would weaken the Chinese stance in the South and East China Seas especially with
respect to the islands and areas under dispute with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. In this
context, Vice Admiral Xu Hongmeng, PLAN, had said that the agreement would have a positive
impact on maritime conduct but would not make much of an impact in the disputed waters of the
East and South China Seas2. Therefore, the Chinese are unlikely to agree to implementation of
CUES in these areas except for perhaps in the context of selective extra regional navies with
which they would establish a bilateral understanding.
Therefore, amongst the main players in the Asia Pacific region it appears that the main adherents
to this agreement in its maximum applicability, as of now, would be PLAN and the US navy.
This understanding is apparently based on the separate bilateral talks between the respective
naval chiefs. In this regard Admiral Greenert the US Chief of Naval Operations had stated that it
was not as formal or deliberate as CUES but was something that could be considered as a
foundation.3
For CUES to be even marginally successful in the initial phase requires a follow up of actions by
nations and improvements suggested to the code. In addition a lot would depend on how the
Chinese adopt the code and implement it especially in the South and East China Seas.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the
Government of India.
UNSCR 1540: A decade of existence
Rajiv Nayan
April 28, 2014
On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution, which
asked the member states to desist from supporting the efforts of non-State actors to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
and their means of delivery. This resolution became popular as UNSC Resolution 1540. The
resolution was initially opposed by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, but later these
countries supported the resolution to fight the danger of WMD terrorism. The resolution that was
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter makes it binding for the member countries.
The UNSC took several initiatives to coordinate the implementation of the resolution 1540. Of
all, the most significant was setting up of the UNSCR 1540 committee. From time to time,
different UNSC resolutions were adopted to extend the tenure of the committee. The UNSCR
1540 committee will now continue to exist, at least, till April 25, 2021. The UNSCR 1977,
adopted in April 2011, in fact, gave the committee the mandate to exist till 2021. Over a decade,
the committee has scrutinised reports of the member states regarding implementation of the
UNSCR 1540, and has mobilised support to assist the member countries in implementing the
resolution. The 1540 resolution has introduced unprecedented changes in the export controls
landscape, though it is still facing several questions and challenges regarding control and
regulation of WMD.
The UNSCR 1540 greatly internationalised export controls. Before the advent of the resolution,
the export control scene was dominated by multilateral export controls regimes, though the
treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention (BTWC) provided the mandate for the ban on transfer, production and
possession of two of the WMD. As materials required for development of WMD have civil or
peaceful uses, the member countries were allowed to undertake legitimate trade in most of these
materials.
However, the BTWC does not provide any standard or detailed procedure to control biological
goods. It is the member countries which develop their own procedures for international
commerce in bio-technology and related goods. The CWC has relatively detailed provisions for
chemical goods. It has divided the chemicals into three categories for commerce. The schedule 3
contains dual-use goods which are to be traded more liberally. As there is no such international
treaty or deliberative body for nuclear trade, a multilateral export control body like the Nuclear
Suppliers Group by and large determined the terms of global nuclear commerce. The missiles
control also basically received the template from the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The UNSCR 1540 is comprehensive in its mandate and reach. It covers all the WMD and their
delivery systems. The resolution per se does not have very detailed provisions, but the process of
implementation and the UNSCR 1540 committee provided an appropriate institutional
framework and procedural dynamics for export controls after its establishment pursuant to
UNSCR 1540. The deliberation on export control was no longer confined to less than 50
countries. The group of experts, which has been assisting the committee, is drawn from the UN
member states. Even Iraq, Pakistan and India have been represented on the expert group.
The committee through the matrix developed by the expert group has, to a great extent,
harmonised the global WMD controls. As discussed, the comprehensive 1540 resolution,
basically, provides the broad mandate for securing WMD and their delivery systems. It was the
committee that asked the countries to submit their reports using the matrix. The countries were
indirectly made to identify the gap and match to the criteria developed in the matrix. Several
countries first searched their existing legal systems to provide statutory authority to export
controls, later, passed new law to bridge the identified gap. The UNSCR strengthened norms for
export control in the last.
Interestingly, in the beginning, India was sceptical of the resolution. India sided with the NAM
group of countries. The NAM group opposed the UNSCR 1540 on grounds that that UNSC is
not the appropriate body for legislating international law. However, realising the danger of
WMD India along with other countries started supporting the resolution and later to implement
the resolution it took a series of measures.
Active India
India submitted its reports to the UNSC 1540 committee. The first two reports were general in
nature, but when the committee asked the countries to file their national reports using the matrix
developed by the UNSCR 1540 committee, India submitted the reports using the UNSCR 1540
committee matrix. India periodically updated its reports. The reporting is indeed a great
opportunity for India to showcase its legislative, regulatory and enforcement frameworks to the
international community. At the same time, the filing of reports and the subsequent assessment
also made India realise the gap in its control structure.
To implement the UNSCR 1540, India had to fill in the gap in its legislative system, and for the
purpose, the Indian Parliament passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery
Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill on May 13, 2005. After receiving the
Presidential assent on June 6, 2005 the bill became an act or a law. This Act is popularly referred
to as the WMD Act. On a number of occasions, Indian officials stated: Specifically, the WMD
Act fulfils India's obligations pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the possession, manufacture,
transportation, acquisition, development of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or biological
weapons by non-State actors.
This act introduced several global good practices for WMD control to the India system. Through
the act the Indian export controls system has transit and trans-shipment controls, retransfer
control, technology transfer controls, brokering controls and end-use based controls. The WMD
Act also led to the changes in other laws like Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act.
This act helped India in properly implementing and enforcing the general objectives of the
UNSCR 1540 by providing statutory authority to the licensing and the Customs departments.
The engagement is continuing in other implementation activities of the UNSCR 1540. India has
been supporting the UNSCR 1540 committee set up to implement the mandate of the resolution.
The resolution 1977, which extended the mandate of the UNSCR 1540 till April 25, 2021, had
the support of India as well. The 1540 committee is also supposed to work in coordination of
other international organisations such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Under the aegis of IAEA India
organised a training course on physical protection of nuclear installations. India is also prepared
to share its expertise with any country which is interested in it.
However, the success of a decade of existence of the UNSCR 1540 should not make the
international community overlook persisting problems. The objective of the 1540 is to
internationalise WMD security by targeting the entire supply chain. Even the countries, which do
not have high technology or dual use technology or WMD technology, have been brought under
the control framework to plug the loophole in the global control system. The mechanisms such as
brokerage and intangible control were introduced for these countries. Yet, some countries have
not taken appropriate legislative, regulatory and enforcement measures. Expertise and funding
have not reached despite the best of efforts by the international community.
Quite importantly, the 1540 model is structured on the Western experience. The Western
countries are also finding that the Cold War export control structure is fast losing its utility. A
strong voice is already emanating from these countries to restructure and reorient the export
control, but somehow the local dynamic is preventing the restructuring. Shockingly, a country
like the United States that is in the forefront is not able to pass its lapsed Export Administration
Act for more than two decades. The international community needs to review the functioning of
the best practices the UNSCR 1540 has promoted so far. The need is to develop a set of effective
practices. The shift in the global paradigm that is taking place because of the UNSCR 1540
needs another shift to make its character truly international.
Where is Ukraine headed to?
K. P. Fabian
April 23, 2014
There was hardly any good reason to expect any significant agreement to work together for de-
escalation of the mounting tension by the four participants - US, Russia, EU, and Ukraine - at the
Geneva Conference held on April 17. But, observers were puzzled when it was announced that
there was agreement to work towards de-escalation: illegally formed armed groups will be
disbanded; occupied government buildings, squares, and streets will be vacated; protesters who
surrender weapons and vacate sites of protests will be pardoned; and a constitutional reform to
give more powers to regional governments will be initiated.
It looked too good to be true. The first inkling of trouble came when President Obama soon after
the signing of the agreement in Geneva expressed doubt about Russias willingness to comply
sincerely and threatened severe sanctions in case of non-compliance. Obviously, President
Obama did not want to wait a while to figure out how Russia was going to behave. Perhaps, he
wanted to make sure that the Geneva accord would not hold. The reason for such a conjecture is
that it was the US that torpedoed the February 21st accord signed with the then President
Yanukovych, an accord that has many elements in common with the Geneva accord.
We do not know whether Russia is sincere and serious about the Geneva accord. The day before
the Conference, German Chancellor Merkel phoned up President Putin and he told her that
Ukraine was moving towards a civil war. He must have asked her about her stand on economic
sanctions on Russia. She might have told him that her preference was to use diplomacy rather
than confrontational sanctions. We can only guess what exactly was said.
But we do know that there is a divide between US and EU about the wisdom and desirability of
imposing harsh economic sanctions on Russia. In any such confrontation, EU stands to lose
much more than the US, though it can be argued that Russia will be the worst loser. There are
6000 German firms working in Russia. Russia supplies 25% or more of gas consumed by EU
through pipelines passing through Ukraine. While US would like to replace Russia as a supplier
of gas by 2020 when it becomes a net exporter of energy, it is not clear that EU wants to put all
its eggs in the US basket.
A poll has indicated that only 35% of Germans and French want to get tough with Russia over
Ukraine. In UK, the percentage is higher at 45. Historians will remember the 1922 Treaty of
Rapallo signed between Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic. Germany was able to
circumvent the limitations put on its armament by the Treaty of Versailles by carrying out certain
tests in Russia. In turn, Germany helped the Red Army to organize itself. Germans have a guilt
complex towards Russia for having invaded it causing the death of 25 million. However, a
brazen invasion of Ukraine by Russia might not leave Germany with any option but to confront
Russia with stiff economic sanctions.
It is unlikely that Russia has serious plans to invade Ukraine. Russia knows the enormous
economic cost of such an invasion. It also knows that in military terms NATO is incapable of
coming to Ukraines rescue without starting a war in Europe. There is no reason to believe that
EU or even US really wants a war. Yet, US, and perhaps Russia too, are prepared to play
brinkmanship and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there can be a war that nobody
wanted.
The key question is, why is the US doing what it is doing? There are clear signals that neo-cons
have a say in determining policy towards Russia; they want to resurrect the Cold War. The even
more intriguing question is , why is President Obama who advocated a peaceful approach when
he came to the White House six years ago now letting the neo-cons such as Victoria Nuland in
the State and Samantha Power, PR in New York, control policy? It appears that neo-cons want to
escalate tension hoping that Finland and Sweden will ask to join NATO. Having been
Ambassador to Finland ,I doubt whether Finland will ask to join NATO.
Russia wants Finlandization of Ukraine. If US does not agree, and if there is a move to take
Ukraine into NATO, Russia might stage yet another ritual of referendum-independence- request
to join Russia.
The US is a fast declining superpower and the world is no longer unipolar. Yet, the international
financial world is still unipolar and controlled by the US. However, if the US unilaterally
punishes Russia by invoking financial sanctions, the divide between US and EU will be exposed.
The incident in Slovansk in eastern Ukraine when three Russian speakers were killed is a
troubling indicator of what can happen. The interim government in Kiev is perhaps neither
willing nor able to disarm the right wing armed groups. The Russian speakers up in revolt in the
east have said that they wont be the first to disarm. The prospects for serious de-escalation are
bleak indeed. Vice Presidents visit under way now (22nd April) might reassure Kiev, but it
will not help in finding a way out.
Indias abstention in the vote against Sri
Lanka at Geneva: Likely Implications
Smruti S. Pattanaik
April 16, 2014
Indias decision to abstain at the UNHRC vote on the resolution against Sri Lanka in Geneva on
March 27 this year came as a surprise to many who have looked at Indias Sri Lanka policy only
through the prism of Tamil Nadu factor and have discounted New Delhis foreign policy
considerations that might have dictated its approach. Does this mean that Tamil Nadu has ceased
to be a factor in Indias Sri Lanka policy or is it a course correction as indicated by some
observers?
Popular opinion within Tamil Nadu and electoral calculations may not be playing as big a role as
it is made out to be. This is evident from the fact that even when electoral campaign is in full
swing at the moment; New Delhi chose to abstain instead of voting in favour of the US
sponsored resolution. Moreover, one does not see too much of a contradiction between New
Delhis action and demands of Tamil political parties motivated by populist considerations,
keeping electoral calculations in mind. Had the electoral calculation and alliance politics been so
important, as some analysts tend to argue, India would have voted in favour of the resolution.
Alternately, had it been a course correction, then India would have voted against the resolution.
Abstention implies that India supports most of the clauses in the resolution excepting those
related to international investigation.
Indias voting in 2012 and 2013 was as much in line with Indias interest as its voting in 2014.
Earlier it was a reaction to Rajapaksa governments approach to reconciliation and its reluctance
to deliver inclusive political settlement as assured to the government of India while enlisting
Indias support in its war efforts.1 Now, it has much to do with the wording of the US sponsored
resolution which for the first time sanctioned international investigation under the Office of High
Commission of Human Rights (OHCHR). India has always regarded any international
investigation into conduct of war within a state as illegitimate intrusion into the sovereign sphere
of a state. Hence, New Delhi chose to abstain rather vote in favour of the resolution brought by
the US in the UNHRC in Geneva.
Explaining its earlier stance and justifying its present one, Indias Permanent representative to
the UN Offices in Geneva, Dilip Sinha explained that India was supportive of close engagement
of the UN Special Procedures with the government of Sri Lanka. It was in this spirit that India
supported the resolutions adopted in 2012 and 2013, which sought to promote such cooperation.
He further stated, India believes that it is imperative for every country to have the means of
addressing human rights violations through robust national mechanisms It has been Indias
firm belief that adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national sovereignty and
institutions is counterproductive We are, therefore, concerned that the resolution has the
potential to hinder the efforts of the country rather than contribute constructively to its efforts,
and hence inadvertently complicate the situation.2
Since the end of the war, Indias policy has focused on asking Sri Lanka to implement the
recommendation of Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and full
implementation of 13th Amendment and, as it was promised by the government of Sri Lanka, to
go beyond it to promote genuine political reconciliation. India believes that Sri Lanka has made
partial progress in fulfilling some of its commitments to the international community last year. It
has held the first ever election to the Northern Provincial Council (NPC); it is in the process of
implementing trilingual policy and promoting official use of Tamil language; it has a National
Action Plan in place to implement LLRC; and it has constituted a three-member Commission to
investigate Missing Person.
It is undeniable that even though progress in some of these issues has not been satisfactory and
the Tamils continue to accuse the government of not fulfilling its obligations under the LLRC,
Indian pressures on Rajapaksa government have worked to some extent. It is a fact that Sri
Lanka was not too keen to hold election to the NPC and even attempted to repeal the Thirteenth
Amendment. However, Indian pressure on Sri Lanka not to repeal the 13th Amendment brought
by the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), an ally of Rajapakse government, seemed to have worked.3
The same can be said about Indias insistence to hold the NPC elections. India thus, feels that by
engaging the government of Sri Lanka and preventing international isolation on the issue it can
nudge Sri Lanka in the right direction. There is already enough international pressure on
Colombo and Indias voting in favour of US resolution would not have added much.
Nevertheless, despite its abstention, India will continue to be evaluated negatively in Sri Lanka
for its approach to the Tamil issue. Moreover, the government of Sri Lanka is also taking steps
which may unnecessarily complicate bilateral relations. For example, the mandate of the
Presidential Commission looking into cases of alleged disappearances in its Northern and
Eastern Provinces (during June 10, 1990 - May 19, 2009) has now been expanded to include the
period starting from 1983, thus bringing in the period during which the Indian Peace Keeping
Force operated within Sri Lanka at the invitation of Sri Lankan government. This is intended to
politicize the issue and stoke nationalist sentiments within Sri Lanka. Such divisive politics is
being played to put pressure on India rather than make a sincere effort to heal the past wounds. It
is not clear, how the Sri Lankan government is going to persecute those IPKF soldiers who might
be found guilty, and what action it could take against those who were part of the then
government that signed the Indo-Lanka accord under which the IPKF operated. Moreover, how
is Rajapakse government going to deal with President Premadasas supply of arm to the LTTE to
fight IPKF which was used to intimidate and kill people opposed to the LTTE in North and East?
It is fact that while the Sri Lankan government has taken some political measures under Indian
and international pressures, its overall approach to the resolution of the Tamil grievances has
been rather cosmetic. It continues to drum up nationalistic sentiment by terming UNHRC
resolution as international conspiracy against the regime, threat to its sovereignty, plot to punish
the government for eradicating terrorism, as was evident in the governments run up to election
campaign in the Southern and Western provinces. Its arrest of human rights activist like Father
Praveen and Ruki Fernando who were released subsequently, its continuing detention of
Balendran Jeyakumari and her daughter in trumped up charges that they had provided shelter to
the LTTE activists, and its constant efforts to raise the bogey of LTTE resurrection etc. points to
the regimes decision to keep the North and East under tight security control and its lack of
sincerity to fulfil its commitment to the international community.
The government of Sri Lanka has now banned 15 Tamil diaspora organisations to combat
terrorism and to control terrorist financing citing UN resolution 1373. This prevents any Sri
Lankan to have contact with some of these organisations who are involved in postwar
reconstruction. Already, the Cabinet spokesperson has warned parliamentarians against testifying
before the UN commission that has now been mandated to look into human rights violation in Sri
Lanka. It has been said that since the parliamentarians have taken an oath to protect the
sovereignty of the country, such deposition would be tantamount to treason and that the
government would initiate legal action against such individuals under the State Secrets Act.
This has been done primarily to stop TNA MPs from deposing before the commission How the
UNHRC is going to implement the resolution passed in Geneva without any cooperation of the
Sri Lankan government is yet to be seen.
In this context, Indias abstention is not going to change the ground reality in Sri Lanka. It is
unlikely that Colombo will engage New Delhi to resolve the long standing grievance of the
Tamils. Its increasing propensity to use Sinhala nationalism and portrayal of Tamil political
aspiration as terrorism provides less scope for New Delhi to engage in any meaningful dialogue
over the issue. In spite of New Delhis voting, the Tamils of Sri Lanka are losing faith in any
internal mechanism which may be asked to probe the issue of disappearance and human rights
violations during the war. The Rajapaksa government must realize that any international probe
by OHCHR and its likely confrontation with Colombo is likely to internationalise the Tamil
issue further, a dynamic over which neither New Delhi nor Colombo would have any control.
This is an eventuality Rajapaksa should better avoid.
Implications of India`s Services Voters
Gautam Sen
April 9, 2014
The Supreme Court of India in a verdict on March 24 this year directed the Election Commission
of India (ECI) to allow the Armed Forces voters (the term also includes central police & para-
military forces functioning within the ambit of the relevant Service Act) to vote like general
electors in the places of their posting. The Court has, however, qualified this decision by
allowing the service voters to exercise their franchise as general electors, only in peace areas,
i.e., other-than-border areas. It is the prerogative of the ECI to decide on voter registration and
the method of voting of all voters including the service voters, under the plenary powers vested
in it under Article 324 of India`s Constitution and the Concomitant Representation of People`s
Act (RPA). The ECI counsel had, however, pointed out during the court hearings that the
implications of this decision, in some of the constituencies where the deployment of the service
personnel is high, would alter the demographic composition or intrinsic character of the
electorate there.
The consequences of this court verdict require careful assessment. A huge discontent may arise
among the local people in some of the areas where the armed forces personnel (and also central
police & para-military forces) are deployed particularly the tribal areas where the population size
of the indigenous electorate in the constituencies is small while the strength of the central armed
forces including the defence forces personnel may be substantial if not more. The outcome of the
voting may, therefore, be drastically different if all the service personnel posted within the
territorial jurisdiction of such constituencies cast their franchise as general electors. This
phenomenon would definitely affect the tribal areas of the north eastern states and also to an
extent Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, the impact may be felt more in case of state assembly
elections because local opinion may get negated on issues thrown up in the polls when there are
divergence in perceptions between some mainstream political parties and local parties contesting
these elections.
The service voters and their family members eligible to be voters should have an opportunity to
exercise their voting right. Provisions of the RPA already provide adequate opportunity for this
purpose. In the event of a service voter settling down in the place of his posting, which may
happen normally during his last service tenure or soon thereafter, there is no embargo for such a
voter to be deemed as normally resident in the place of his posting and considered as a general
elector, and not as a service voter to be provided the facility of postal ballot or proxy voting (in
these cases they are categorized as classified service voters). Therefore, enabling a service voter
to exercise his franchise in the constituency where his unit is located, at any time of his service
career, has more demerits and is fraught with negative local political consequences. Moreover,
reckoning the existing transfer profile of services personnel where they are deployed at short
notice from place to place as per the exigencies of operational requirement, as a consequence of
the recent Supreme Court decision, such personnel will have to be extra vigilant to ensure that
they do not miss out from the electoral rolls in their new place of posting.
India has had a healthy tradition of the services personnel being apolitical while being allowed to
exercise their democratic right of voting in the electoral process. Service personnel have also
been discharging a crucial supportive role to the ECI for enabling the conduct of peaceful and
fair elections. While the state police and central police and para-military units have been in the
front tier of security network during the elections, the armed forces have discharged a crucial
auxiliary-cum-supportive role. The electorate has been highly appreciative of the services role
towards enabling free and fair elections. Nothing should be done to undermine this healthy
respect or set in motion any development or institutional change which is likely to cause
apprehension in any part of the civil electorate.
The security of the nation is affected by the nature of its polity, and depends on how different
instruments of the state, including the services, are viewed by its citizens. For a diverse nation
like India it is essential that the state institutions allow for the reflection of this diversity in the
electoral process leading to popular based government. The delimitation of constituencies,
decision in regard to the size of constituency-wise electorates and the number of seats to be
assigned to legislatures, etc., are undertaken within the purview of India`s Constitution in a
manner that the will of the people gets reflected apropos constituency areas, as per their normal
residential status.
The existing electoral system provides opportunities and protects the interests of even the small
communities. If this enabling system is overwhelmed by inclusion of service voters as general
electors, in constituencies where they are not likely to be eventually assimilated, it would amount
to undermining the multi-dimensional election mechanism and distorting the process by which
aspirations and will of the small and geographically dispersed communities have been expressed,
without benefitting the service voters in any substantive sense.
Why is Japan important to Indias energy
security?
Manish Vaid
April 1, 2014
The increasing importance accorded to India-Japan relationship was reemphasized during Prime
Minister Abes New Delhi visit late January that brought into sharp focus the critical issue of
energy security in the changing geo-political landscape in Asia. The highlight of the visit were
deliberations on energy efficiency and conservation measures, which both the countries believe
can effectively handle the energy crisis, thereby providing a secure and sustainable energy
future.
Moreover, this visit also significantly opened avenues for bolstering energy ties between the two
countries in areas ranging from conventional to non-conventional energy resources.
This renewed energy cooperation between the two countries attains significance particularly at a
time when India, despite having an objective of energy independence through substantially
decreasing its crude imports by 2030 is actually becoming increasingly dependent on it. If
estimates of BP Energy Outlook 2035 are to be believed, Indias oil imports will rise by 169 per
cent, accounting for 60 per cent of the net increase in imports.
It therefore becomes inescapable for India to find a way out in dealing with its ever increasing
energy consumption and imports by implementing stringent measures of energy efficiency and
conservation, while inculcating energy discipline at the core of its economic activity as a long
term sustainable goal. India-Japan energy cooperation will also address the concern of Indias
rising crude import bills and falling domestic natural gas production by importing liquefied
natural gas (LNG) jointly, bringing down the procurement cost.
Though, Indo-Japan energy cooperation initially began in the beginning of the new millennium
when during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Mori in 2000 to India, Global Partnership in
the 21st Century was launched. However, greater thrust given to energy sector cooperation was
evident in India-Japan joint statement on Enhancement of Cooperation on Environment
Protection and Energy Security, during Abes visit in August 2007.
Keeping the fundamental objective of energy security in mind, various agreements between these
two countries have been signed during Abes January visit. To enhance energy efficiency in
telecom towers, for instance, memorandum of undertaking (MoU) was signed between Japans
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) and Indias
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Communication & Information Technology,
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India on a Model Project for Energy
Management Systems.
Further, to reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in coal-fired plant, both countries agreed to use
Clean Coal Technologies. And as a result, they signed a loan agreement between National
Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) and Japan Bank of International Cooperation
(JBIC) for Kudgi supercritical coal-fired power project in Karnataka and Auraiya power project
in Uttar Pradesh to the tune of $430 million.
On energy efficiency and conservation front both these countries have agreed upon to extend
their partnership under agreement signed between Indias Petroleum Conservation Research
Association and Japans Energy Conservation Centre, which aims to promote energy efficiency
including reduction of greenhouse gas emissions using clean technologies, promoting energy
labeling for energy efficient appliances and so on.
Further, Japan can augment its support for Indias coal sector endeavour, through
implementation of coal washery technology, promotion of high-efficiency use of low rank coal
and implementation of communication system for the purpose of securing safety in coal mine,
while promoting sustainable economic growth taking environmental issues into consideration.
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) is already involved
in commercial scale project which reduces ash content of coal using highly efficient coal
washery technology at Angul in eastern State of Odisha. India and Japan are also strengthening
their cooperation on renewable energy front and some of their initiatives include Waste to
Energy, Green Corridor and development of smart grid.
Notably, Japan has already gained a leadership status in these areas way back since 1970s,
consequently having a clear competitive advantage over other countries, thanks to its Sunshine
and Moonlight Projects which was launched in 1974 and 1978 respectively. Strikingly, the
outcome of these initiatives was reduction of crude oil imports by Japan from around 80 per cent
in 1973 to about 50 per cent during 1990s, thereby shifting its focus from oil to renewable energy
and natural gas.
India is trying to deal with its domestic energy concerns of falling oil and gas production and
rising crude oil and coal imports through various measures including reforming its New
Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP), intensifying its efforts in developing domestic
unconventional energy resources and diversifying its crude imports. In this regard Japans
support holds special importance.
Besides, support towards energy efficiency and conservation technologies, Japan is also willing
to cooperate in Indias effort to augment domestic oil and gas reserves and joint procurement of
costlier LNG so as to cut the cost of its import. In this regard Indias Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited (ONGC) has signed a memorandum of understanding with Japans Mitsui
& Co. for exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources in India and elsewhere,
enhancing similar such future opportunities.
As regard procurement of LNG, both the countries have already moved forward in their decision
to cooperate in joint procurement of LNG so as to cut the Asian Premium to some extent
benefiting both the largest and emerging LNG importer. Chubu Electric Power Company of
Japan and Gas Authority India Limited (GAIL) of India have joined hands and soon are going to
sign a memorandum of understanding in this regard.
Both the countries have realised the need to cooperate in enhancing the safety of nuclear power
plants, thereby reopening the possibilities of further dialogue in civil nuclear energy cooperation
on a faster track by reaffirming the importance of early conclusion of the negotiations of an
Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, taking into account the joint
statement of May 29, 2013. This gained further prominence when on December 16, 2013, the
draft Basic Energy Plan declared that nuclear power would remain to be a key base power
source so as to stable energy supply, cost reduction and measure to combat global warming.
Last but not the least India and Japan are further willing to give the highest priority to global
environment challenges while strengthening their energy security through continuous and
effective action. Both the countries recognise the need to promote industrial cooperation to
expand bilateral energy cooperation on a commercial basis. In this regard New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) and The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI) held Japan-India Energy Forum and are already providing valuable inputs to the
bilateral engagement on energy security. Similar such arrangements have been made between the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and NEDO for promoting Japanese technologies needed
to help energy issues in India.
Therefore, for a energy thirsty nation like India which is expected to increase its dependency on
imported crude and also to a greater extent on LNG, tying up with Japan would secure Indias
energy insecurity to a greater extent, thereby offering extended mutual benefits to both the
countries, particularly with respect to energy savings and efficiency, which should be the
topmost agenda for any energy hungry nation.
Both the countries with these efforts would also ensure energy security not at the cost of
environment degradation but through ways and means that also ensures holistic sustainable
development of their economies.
Manish Vaid is Junior Fellow with Observer Research Foundation having research interest in
energy policy and geopolitics.
Attachment
Nuclear Security Summit: An Assessment
Arvind Gupta and Rajiv Nayan
March 29, 2014
The Hague Nuclear Security Summit concluded with a Communiqu in which the participants
took stock of the progress made in nuclear and radiological materials and called for further
strengthening of international nuclear security architecture and nuclear security culture. The
nuclear security architecture consists of various legal instruments, international organizations
and their initiatives as well as good practices in the area. In addition, there were a number of
additional pledges1 on nuclear security announced by different countries.
The Nuclear Security Summit process began with the first NSS in Washington in 2010 held at
President Obamas initiative and has now grown into a vast activity with multiple stakeholders.
The focus of the first summit was to secure nuclear material and radiological substance in order
to prevent them from falling in the hands of terrorists. The second summit held in Seoul in 2012
in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, carried forward the process initiated in
Washington. It also focused on the need for tackling nuclear security and nuclear safety in a
coherent manner thus blurring the distinction between the two. A great deal of attention was
paid to securing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium.
The recent Hague Summit maintains the continuity with the earlier summits building upon the
work already done. Following the Seoul Summit, it deals with topics like the strengthening of the
international nuclear security architecture, enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), safety of nuclear materials including highly enriched uranium, separated
plutonium and other radio-active resources and materials, nuclear security and safety, illicit
trafficking of nuclear materials, nuclear forensics, information security, nuclear transportation
etc. The Hague communiqu is, however, much longer (36 paras) and detailed as compared to
the Seoul Summit communiqu of 13 paras.
Following the Stuxnet worm attack on the control system of Iranian centrifuges, the issue of
cyber security has occupied centrestage in nuclear safety security discussion. The Communiqu
talks specifically of the growing threat of cyber-attacks and their potential impact on nuclear
security and calls upon the states and private sector to take appropriate measures to secure their
facilities.
Overall, the Hague Communiqu does not break any fresh grounds but it pushes the states to take
greater responsibility for nuclear security. There have been calls on the sidelines of the summit
for consolidating the fragmented international nuclear security legal regime for converting
voluntary commitment by states to legally binding commitments on nuclear security.
Suggestions have also been made to states for incorporating the IAEA guidelines on nuclear
security and safety in national legislations.
Gift Baskets
The Communiqu is an agreed document representing the lowest common denominator of views.
It is interesting to examine the gift baskets or the separate pledges undertaken by countries or a
group of countries at the summit. The process of gift basket pledges began in 2012 and has
continued in 2014. For instance, the US issued 15 joint statements, South Korea 10 and Japan,
Kazakhstan and the UK 9 each. Among the P-5, Russia and China did not undertake any pledge.
Pakistan signed one pledge while India did not undertake any. Earlier, India had pledged to offer
a Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) which it has fulfilled. These pledges
cover a range of subjects such as maritime supply chain security, transport security, nuclear
smuggling, nuclear forensics, global minimization of nuclear materials etc. Such pledges given
out by states indicate their preferences with regard to different aspects of nuclear security. They
also build pressure on other states to join such initiatives.
India and Nuclear Security
India has been a victim of international terrorism for many decades and is deeply concerned at
the clear and present danger prospect of nuclear terrorism. India is an active and enthusiastic
participant in the nuclear security process. The Prime Minister attended the first two summits
while the Hague Summit was attended by the External Affairs Minister. India has to take care of
its ambitious nuclear energy programme. It cannot afford to compromise with its credible
minimum deterrent which is dependent upon the production of adequate amount of fissile
material. Yet, India has taken a number of steps to strengthen the nuclear security regime. In a
national progress report, India has indicated that it is a party to 13 universal instruments to
combat international terrorism. It is also an active participant in UN and other mechanisms as
evident in the implementation of 1540 UNSCR. It has equally strengthened its national legal
framework and is fully committed to international cooperation having established a Global
Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) which has organized a series of national &
international training programmes. The Indian progress report says that the enriched uranium
based fuel in the APSARA nascent reactor has been placed in a safeguarded facility. The
Apsara reactor will henceforth use low-enriched uranium as a fuel. The report stresses that
Indias closed nuclear fuel cycle, based on reprocess-to-reuse, is an inherently safer process.
The report also points out that India has developed an advanced heavy water reactor based on
LEU and thorium with new safety and proliferation resistance features. India has contributed $
1 million contribution to IAEAs activities.
Future of Nuclear Security Process
The next nuclear security summit will be held in Washington in 2016. This is likely to be the last
summit in the process. Thereafter, the IAEA will most likely play the nodal role on nuclear
security issues.
The process of building nuclear security is a tedious one. First, a large amount of nuclear and
radiological material needs to be secured in thousands of facilities around the world. Second,
there are differences among key countries on issues like peer-review of nuclear material.
Third, the IAEA has been deficient in resources. Fourth, the issue of reducing or limiting the
nuclear fissile material is a sensitive one on which states hold different views. The original
commitment of securing nuclear material in four years has not yet been achieved. The danger of
nuclear terrorism remains palpable.
In the years to come, a lot more activity on nuclear security can be expected. Much of it will
arise from the commitment taken by states at the three nuclear security summits and the
voluntary pledges undertaken by different countries. A good deal of pressure from civil society
and think tanks on nuclear security issues can be expected. One area of their focus would be
minimization of nuclear fissile material and India will also encounter pressure in this regard,
particularly from foreign civil society organizations and think tanks. The demand to reduce
fissile materials products will be made on India as well. India has already got the policy of
credible minimum Deterrence. However, the best solution lies in global nuclear disarmament
because unclear reduction for national needs will always be contested.
UNSC Vote on the Crimean Issue: Why did
China Abstain?
R. S. Kalha
March 21, 2014
When China decided to abstain in the vote taken in the UN Security Council on the issue of the
referendum to decide on Crimeas future; it handed the Western powers a pyrrhic victory for
they could then proclaim that Russia was completely isolated as all the other UNSC members
had voted in favour of the western sponsored resolution. Despite their rather close relations with
Russia, President Xi Jinping chose Russia as the first country that he visited on taking office and
was in Sochi for the Winter Olympics, the Chinese were aware of the ramifications of their
abstention. The reasons for abstention go far beyond the immediate issue at hand and are
enveloped in deep Chinese strategic interests. The abstention in no way lessens their intention in
firmly maintaining close and mutually beneficial strategic ties with Russia.
It has been stated Chinese policy that a fundamental aspect of international law is the proviso
that the territorial integrity of nation states must not be violated. China has been fairly consistent
in this approach. China opposed the creation of Bangladesh, as much as it did the NATO
bombing of Serbia which ultimately led to the subsequent separation of Kosovo from Serbia.
China along with Russia and India did not recognize the separation of Kosovo. Thus while taking
a formal position on the question of the territorial integrity of nation states; Chinese policy on the
other hand has also been quite realistic. China subsequently recognized Bangladesh as an
independent state; is quiescent over Kosovo and in all probability will recognize the Crimea as a
part of Russia if Chinese press coverage is any indication, but albeit after a decent interval.
This obvious dichotomy of approach in Chinese policy has as its genesis fears about the viability
of its own territorial integrity. China has land frontiers with 14 countries [13; if POK is
discounted] and although the population of non-Han minorities is only about 100 million, yet the
minorities occupy nearly one-half of the Chinese landmass. Han Chinese constitute nearly 90 per
cent of Chinas total population and are ethnically fairly homogenous. But the two important
minority areas of Tibet and Xinjiang that abut India and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan make the Chinese extremely sensitive on any developments in these
two areas. History shows that Inner Asia with Tibet located at its strategic epicenter has suffered
from periodical political upheavals. In the past Tibetan cultural and religious influence in Central
Asia was significant. Despite enormous efforts put in over the years China has still not been able
to pacify Tibetan aspirations for complete autonomy or even independence. There have been 126
self- immolations by Tibetans since 2009 in protest against Chinese rule. China has tried
everything from brutal crackdowns to economic sops and yet the Tibetan yearning for
independence just not died down to Chinas utter exasperation.
In Xinjiang, local communities overlap with those of the Central Asian states and their cultural,
religious and ethnic affinities with their kin across borders are strong. The commitment of these
communities to the Chinese Central government is rather weak. Therefore administrative and
political control in Xinjiang becomes problematical and cannot be divorced totally from the
events in Central Asian republics. Last week the Chinese official media reported that more than
10 members of the Xinjiang separatist forces knifed to death more than 29 civilians at
Kunming Railway station; seriously injuring another 130. The Regional Public Security Bureau
reported that about 190 such attacks have taken place in 2012, admitting to an increase over 2011
by a significant margin. It has also been admitted that Uyghur separatists have started
attacking civilians instead of the symbols of governmental authority such as police stations,
police vehicles or regional party and government offices. The separatist Uyghur group led by
Rebiya Kadeer, who is based abroad, has not yet achieved significant traction.
It is, therefore, obvious that the Chinese leadership is adamant that there can be no dilution of the
concept of the principle of non-violation of the territorial integrity of nation states in the
international system. To show any laxity in this regard would directly impact on its own
domestic situation and its integrity as a nation state. The Russian claim that Crimea was stolen
from it does indeed have significant resonance in China; for that was also the Chinese position
earlier that in the historical period of its national humiliation significant Chinese territories
were stolen from it by the then imperialist powers. Fortunately for countries situated on
Chinas periphery, except for the notable exceptions of India and Bhutan, all of Chinas land
borders have been settled by the Peoples Republic.
On the other hand, Chinese strategists sitting in Beijing would not be too unhappy at the turn of
events in Eastern Europe. With increasing signs of rising tension between Russia and the western
powers led by the United States; the attention of the US would increasingly focus on Russia. The
so-called Russian threat is likely to become an issue in US domestic politics, with each candidate
for US Congressional elections slated for later this year likely to take extreme positions. Already
both former Secretary of State Clinton and Vice-President Biden, with aspiring Presidential
ambitions, have utilized this issue to promote their candidacy with hard rhetorical flourishes
against Russia. With Putin and Russia as their foremost targets; China in Asia would seem rather
far away.
Xi Jinping is due to visit Western Europe from 22 March-1 April 2014 and would also be the
first Chinese President to visit EU headquarters in Brussels. EU-China trade is booming at US $
560 billion and with increasing tension between Russia and Western Europe the leaders of
Western Europe would undoubtedly assiduously court the Chinese. Xi Jinping is assured of a
fulsome red-carpet treatment. It would be interesting to watch whether the European leaders
raise the question of human rights violations in China, as they so regularly do, or in the context
of their desire to further isolate President Putin all such inconveniences will now be brushed
under the carpet?
For nation states of Asia on the periphery of China this too will be a testy period. The US seems
far too preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Syrian imbroglio, the Iran nuclear question
and now Putins aggressiveness over the Ukraine. Although quite sensibly President Obama has
refused to get militarily involved over the Crimea, yet US foreign policy focus is perhaps once
again reverting to being Europe-centric. This would be consistent with the logic that events in
Europe are important political issues in domestic American politics.
Therefore what is the future of the US pivot to Asia? Has China, now courted by both Russia
and the US, thus achieved a distinct strategic advantage by simply sitting on the side-lines?
Why Pakistan cannot defeat the Taliban
Sushant Sareen
March 10, 2014
Is Pakistan fighting a losing war against the Islamists? It would appear so given the sort of
confusion in the country about what this war is all about. There is also a lack of clarity on what is
desirable (reconciling and reintegrating the Taliban, entering into a negotiated settlement the
terms and conditions of which remain an enigma, or even an elimination and extermination of
the Pakistani Taliban) and whether this is theoretically, let alone practically, possible. Then there
is the nagging doubt about how much of what is achievable will be sustainable. Compounding to
the problem are the multiple and often contradictory objectives (internal and external, tactical
and strategic) which different agencies and organs of state seem to be pursuing. Worse still no
one seems to have a clear idea on how to obtain these objectives, which is leading to state
entities working at cross-purposes. The Taliban also have their internecine conflicts, turf wars,
ego clashes and differences over tactics, for instance, on whether or not to talk with the Pakistani
state. But despite this, they all are working (and killing) towards a common objective in pursuit
of their grand idea of grabbing power and imposing their brand of Islam, first in Afghanistan
and Pakistan and eventually in rest of the world. The Pakistani state and society, on the other
hand, is split on who or what is the enemy, where it wants to go and how it wants to get there.
Shortly after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the then ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha
declared Pakistans then enemy no. 1, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah
Mehsud, a loyal and patriotic Pakistani. The message that Pasha was sending was clear: in the
event of hostilities breaking out with India (the eternal enemy!), he expected Mehsud to throw in
his weight behind the Pakistan Army. This was almost as though the Pakistan army had more
confidence in the TTPs fanatics than on its own firepower in taking on India.
The current Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar, who is trying to take on the mantle of security
czar and chief peacemaker rolled into one, took a leaf out of Pashas book when he declared in
the National Assembly that a clear majority of the Taliban were not enemies of the
countrymost Taliban groups had no animosity to the state of Pakistan and that the elements
that were targeting the state were doing to at the behest of foreign agencies (read CIA, RAW and
Mossad). 1 Amazingly, just days before he gave the Taliban a certificate of patriotism, Chaudhry
Nisar had triumphantly unveiled the National Internal Security Policy to stem the tide of
terrorism and Talibanisation in the country.
Surely there is something seriously wrong. In a country where the government spends nearly
nine months to come up with a policy document to fight terrorists responsible for the deaths of
nearly 50,000 people, and yet the man who makes the policy doesnt consider these terrorists
enemies of the country! Of course, this comes as no surprise in a country where TTPs denials of
involvement in an attack readily lapped up even though their fingerprints and footprints are clear
in the involvement. Instead of condemning terror and demanding action against the perpetrators,
politicians and religious leaders blame the government for its lapses and its inability to make
peace with the terrorists. It is also a country where politicians and ministers in charge of the
security policy are so terrified of coming into the cross-hairs of the terrorists that they are
reported to be sending messages to the TTP about how they have carefully avoided saying
anything against the Taliban. In these messages these leaders have washed their hands off the air
strikes which they have explained as being ordered by the army in retaliation to TTP attacks, and
have pleaded with the TTP to announce a ceasefire so that they could push ahead with a dialogue
with them. From this it should be quite clear how this phony war is being fought and why it
cant be won.2
It isnt just the politicians who are playing both sides of the game. The military hasnt quite been
able to make up its mind on whether the Taliban and other sundry jihadists are assets or
unacceptable liabilities. There is a significant section within the army that isnt ready to make a
clean break with the radical Islamists just yet. This section continues to attach utility to the
jihadists for achieving objectives in both Afghanistan and India. They would like nothing better
than to isolate and eliminate only those Islamists who are not willing to dance to the tunes of the
GHQ in Rawalpindi and then continue their joint venture with the other radical groups. In other
words, the Pakistan army has no real ideological or cultural problem with the Taliban/Al Qaeda
combine per se; it only has a problem with that segment of the Islamist conglomerate that is
targeting them. Jihad after all has been one of the mottos of the Pakistan army and jihadists like
the notorious Fazlur Rehman Khalil of the Harkatul Ansar and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen infamy are
still used to act as intermediaries.
The trouble is that as the Islamists become stronger, more autonomous and less dependent on the
Pakistani Army and its agencies and as they expand their area of operation and influence, the
segment that is willing to follow the GHQs line is becoming smaller by the day. Even as Pakistan
becomes weaker because the war of thousand cuts it inflicted upon its neighbours has now
started making more cuts in Pakistan, the army is now caught in a terrible bind. If it continues to
flirt with the Taliban, the latter will continue to gain in strength. On the other hand, if the army
has realised its monumental mistake of backing the Taliban in the fond belief that they stand the
best guarantee of a friendly Afghanistan not becoming Indias playground, then they might be in
even greater trouble because undoing this mistake will involve a complete overhaul of practically
every aspect of Pakistani national life and narrative. That in a country that is deeply divided is
almost a mission impossible.
Notwithstanding the usual bombast of the top-brass about how they can clean up the terror in the
North Waziristan Agency (NWA) within a matter of days and weeks, things are not looking
good. Although many people claim that the Taliban announced a ceasefire as a result of the
aerial bombing on terrorist hideouts in NWA and other Tribal Agencies in FATA and some areas
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Taliban dont seem to have suffered any major loss of commanders,
cadres or capability as a result of these bombing runs. In any case, conquering NWA is the easy
part; the tough part is to bring the peace and establish the writ of the government, and on this
there are no clear answers. As for establishing the writ, even though the Taliban have no visible
presence in a city like Lahore, one letter from them to traders is enough to ensure a bonfire of all
pornographic CDs, something that all the laws and police could not manage ever.
The simple truth that has eluded Pakistan is that fighting the Taliban is like fighting a shadow.
The Taliban are but a symptom, admittedly a malignant one. The real problem is of religious
extremism which is manifesting itself in radical Islamism and has struck deep roots in state and
society. But instead of doing something about this fundamental issue, the Pakistanis are busy
hiding behind the fiction of the nebulous third force which they claim is standing between them
and their brethren, the Taliban. With such a self-defeating approach, how can Pakistan ever
defeat the Taliban?
Political Crisis in Thailand and Its Effects on
Foreign Relations
Sasiwan Chingchit
January 22, 2014
There is still no end in sight for Thailands political crisis that has lasted for
more than seven years since the government of Thaksin Shinawatra was
toppled by a military coup in September 2006. Without the intervention by
the Thai military, the judiciary or other decision-making forces, Suthep
Tuagsubans Shut down Bangkok, Restart Thailand campaign, which
started on January 13, will merely prolong the present political deadlock.
Indeed, it may last even after the February election as the Democrat Party
and its anti-government supporters boycott the national poll.
But the side-effects of the years-long attempt to root out Thaksin's influence from Thai politics
goes beyond domestic political instability and polarization. On the international front, Thailands
relations with foreign countries are being jeopardized by political scams aiming to discredit
Thaksin and his party-led government. For some countries, engaging with Thailand without
being drawn into the existing political game is becoming increasingly difficult.
The Shadow of Preah Vihear Temple
The classic case is the Thailand-Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear Temple that flared up
in 2008. Following the joint communique in which Thailand expressed support for Cambodia to
list Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site, The Peoples Alliance for Democracy
(PAD), or the so-called Yellow Shirt movement, accused the People Power Partys Foreign
Minister Noppadon Pattama of ceding the 4.6 square kilometer area surrounding the Temple to
Cambodia and abandoning Thailands right to reclaim the Preah Vihear in exchange for business
concessions in Cambodia.
The Democrat Party, the then main opposition party, repeated the PADs charges against
Noppadon in the no-confidence debate despite the Foreign Ministers insistence that Cambodia
had agreed with Thailand to list the Temples vicinity in accordance with the 1962 Thai
Cabinets Resolution which would not alter the existing territory. It also ignored the fact that
Thailand can no longer request the International Court of Justice (ICJ)to reverse its 1962 verdict
to award Preah Vihear to Cambodia. With the Democrats push, the Thai Administrative Court
and Constitutional Court both ruled against the validity of the joint communique. Noppadon
resigned from the post and Cambodia went on to register the Temple with the UNESCO but the
relations between the two countries significantly deteriorated due to the nationalist fervor being
stirred up on both sides. From 2008 until the end of Democrat Partys government in July 2011,
the Thailand-Cambodia border had witnessed several alleged incursions, diplomatic tensions and
military skirmishes.
Thaksin has close personal ties with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and may even have
used that to benefit his family business in Cambodia but the Preah Vihear case has proven to be a
wrong move of the anti-Thaksin forces which vow to protect their national territory. In May
2011, Cambodia finally requested the ICJ to interpret its 1962 rule on Preah Vihear and claimed
its right over the 4.6 square kilometer area. The verdict was announced last November entitling
Cambodia to the whole area of the Temples promontory. While the Thai government insists that
Cambodia did not succeed in taking what it had claimed, it is certain that Thailand will lose some
of the area it has occupied for more than 50 years.
With the Cambodian government being considered by the Yellow Shirts and Democrat
supporters as Thaksins collaborator and a threat to Thailands national integrity, the future
territorial settlement over ICJs ruling between the two governments can possibly stoke further
political tension.
The America Conspiracy
The US is another country that has become a target of the royalist cum nationalist Yellow Shirts.
Last month, around a thousand protesters belonging to the Network of Students and Citizens for
Reforms (NSCR), one of the alliances that form the current anti-Yingluck Shinawatra
government movement, marched to the US Embassy and demanded that US ambassador Kristie
Kenney be transferred. According to the NSCR leader, Nitithorn Lamlua, the US sided with the
Yingluck government by requesting the protesters to respect democracy and the election. He also
accused the US of supporting the corrupt and tyrannical government so that it can exploit
Thailands oil reserve and set up a military base to contain China.
Nitithorn is a lawyer and political advisor of PAD whose main leader Sondhi Limthongkul owns
the influential Manager Daily newspaper and ASTV, the Yellow Shirts political mouthpiece.
Just a week before the march, Manager Daily reported the scandal on social media that the
Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs had hired Davenport McKesson Corporation to lobby the
US government to set up a naval base in Thailand. The report cited the confirmation of the news
validity from Korbsak Sabhavasu, the Deputy Chairman of the Democrat Party, who also posted
on his Facebook that the government is selling out the country to the US. The scandal went
viral and was widely shared among the anti-government supporters but the Thai Foreign Minister
responded quickly enough to prove no association with Davenport.
In fact, this is not the first time that the US is mentioned while Yingluck government is accused
of trying to sell out Thailand for personal interest. In June 2012, NASAs request to use U-Tapao
airbase for atmospheric studies in Southeast Asia was suspected by the Yellow Shirts to be a deal
in which the Thai government would allow Washington to use its military airbase for strategic
purpose in exchange for a US visa for Thaksin. The concerted pressure from the Yellow Shirts
and Democrat Party on the governments decision resulted in NASAs cancellation of the plan.
Ironically, it was under the Democrat Partys government that the U-Tapao had been offered by
Thailand to be the base for the research.
Nitithorns accusation of the US role and interest in Thailand is not new. The Ugly America
discourse has been spreading for a while through Sondhis talk show on ASTV and Manager
Daily which from last April to September published 21 episodes of the articles by Chatchawan
Chatsuthichai who tries to paint out the US conspiracy to take over Thailand and the world. In
the propaganda-like talk shows and articles of these pseudo-foreign policy analysts, the US
cooperation with the Thaksin regime is projected as being behind Thailands high oil price and
CIA funding behind the Red Shirt movement and the insurgency in Thailands Deep South.
According to them, the US pivot to Asia is a threat to Thailand and the whole Asia as the
superpower is against Asian solidarity and creates Chinas conflict with Japan and Taiwan.
Deciphering the double speak
The Democrat Party and the Yellow Shirts hostility towards the US is puzzling. Even in the
latest political crisis, many countries, including even China, issued statements in support of the
upcoming election and encouraging an early resolution of the conflict under the constitutional
framework and rule of law. Although the US sanctions against the 2006 military coup were
widely criticized by the anti-Thaksin forces, it was later revealed that the US had known in
advance and given the green light for the Thai military. The sanction on Thailand under the Bush
administration was routine rather than serious and the Bush government also avoided criticizing
the Thai military regime.
What explains this behavior could be the US taking a proactive role in Thai politics and its
changing position towards military coup under the Obama administration. During his Thailand
visit in May 2010, the US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with some leaders
from Thaksins party and called on both sides to resolve the conflict. Earlier, the US ambassador
to Thailand Eric John also held a few rounds of discussion between all parties involved in the
political crisis. But this move from the US was strongly criticized by Kasit Piromya, the Foreign
Minister of Democrat Partys government as an attempt to intervene in Thai domestic politics.
When the Thai Army considered another coup in 2010 and consulted with the US defence
representatives, they received the answer that the US had no choice but to employ a stronger
measure against the coup. Last month, when Nitithorn announced the plan to seize the US
embassy on stage, the anti-government alliances had just failed miserably to convince the Army
to stage another coup.
All this has naturally led to further American concern about the negative trend in US relations
with one of its five treaty allies in Asia, as expressed by Ernest Bower, an American expert on
US-Southeast Asia relations at CSIS. One immediate approach has been to reduce disengage and
backtrack. To avoid being accused of taking sides and getting further entangled, US senior
officials have recently started to skip Bangkok, and prefer to visit other Southeast Asian
countries over its oldest ally.
China and Thailands Deep South
As for China, despite allowing Thaksin residency and closely engaging with the Yingluck
government in many projects, the Asian great power had managed to stay free from being a
victim of Thai political polarization for a long while. However, this seemed to end last October
when Sondhi started to call for his supporters to take a strong stand against Chinas plan to
colonize Thailand with its business and Chinese immigration which will be easily facilitated by
the future rail connectivity and the impending visa exemption. He also warned that Chinese
capitalism is a bigger evil than the American. This came as a surprise as Sondhi and many of
PAD followers were always proud to be the Chinese descendant who loves Thailand. China is a
main partner in Thailands plan to construct high speed rail links across the country with the 2.2
trillion baht loans which is heavily criticized by the anti-government movement.
The political divisiveness in Thailand creates conditions in which any country having a business
with Thaksins family or Thaksin-backed government could be considered by the anti-Thaksin
forces to be complicit with Thaksin's alleged scheme to take over Thailand. Singapore faced that
charge early on when Thaksin sold his Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings and was exempt
from capital gains tax.
Another example related to Thaksins talks with Najib Razak and Malaysias agreement to assist
Thailand by facilitating talks between the Thai government and the Deep South separatist group
Barisan Revolusi Nasional. Sondhi and the Democrat Party politicians accused Malaysias move
as part of a grander plan of Kuala Lumpur to support the insurgents plan to gain independence
and convert Thailands Deep South into a friendly buffer state.
Politics and geopolitics
While the main purpose of the movement is to overthrow Thaksins power, the sense of
animosity and mistrust towards other countries among the Yellow Shirts and Democrat Party
supporters is the by product that is severely affecting Thailands external relations with the
United States, other key partners, and its overall position in Southeast Asia. In the short term this
fits well with the populist discourse of restoring the nation largely held among the mobilized
middle-class protesters who keep sharing information from media outlets and the social networks
of their political camps. However, in the long run, the Thai publics inability to access alternative
information sources and positions from different international sources, their lack of
understanding about current international politics, coupled with the inculcated national history
which centered on how the royal family has saved Thailand from internal and external threats,
can all generate an unhealthy and uncontrollable nationalism.
This trend in Thai politics does not bode well for Thailands ambition to be the center of
cooperation and connectivity in Indochina linking with different countries and regions. It carries
the potential to disrupt or damage any project Thailand collaborates with in other countries and
seriously affect Thailands foreign relations at every level.
Thailand is a key country in ASEAN which occupies a significant geostrategic location in Asia
and Southeast Asia. For major powers like the US, China, India and Japan, Thailand serves as a
gateway for further economic and political engagement with Indochina. While engagement with
the Thai government is necessary, it is equally important that the external actors avoid becoming
a target of Thai public resentment. For now, there is no better way than keeping transparency and
accountability in all projects and maintaining good will.
Governance in Northern Province of Sri
Lanka: Stresses and Strains
Gautam Sen
January 21, 2014
CV Wigneswaran, Chief Minister of Northern Province of Sri Lanka has lamented in a recent
public speech on January 10, organized by a Colombo-based think tank that Colombo is not
appreciative of the essence of issues of governance in his province. The Chief Minister has
opined that Sri Lanka Army (SLA) is hindering governance in the northern province and that
post-war context demands a different approach to governance.1 Wigneswaran has further
highlighted that militarization is affecting resettlement of the internally displaced Tamils, the
SLA has taken over private land and even agricultural activities and as a result "locals have to
purchase produce from their own land cultivated by Army".2 The Chief Minister has also spoken
on his recurring difference with the provincial Governor, Maj Gen (retd) G.A.Chandrasiri inter-
alia alleging inadequate administrative structure and staff with the province as well as his
administrative staff being "used to the Governor`s ways"3 are posing hurdles. Wigneswaran has,
however, admitted that there has been some progress in these matters after his recent interactions
with President Rajapakse.
The essence of the problem which the Chief Minister has highlighted is that there is dualism in
administration in the province and that the officials of the provincial administration are often
facing contradictory or overlapping instructions from the provincial government and the
Governor. Some may view this as an outcome of a structural problem of the 13th Amendment.
This aspect seems to have got accentuated in the Northern province as against other provinces in
Sri Lanka, because of the fundamental differences between the Rajapakse regime and the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) on the issue of devolution and rights of Tamils on the one hand and the
Army and the TNA on the other, rendering the functioning of the northern provincial
government difficult. This, according to the Chief Minister, is affecting the implementation of
the policies. There are, however, reports that the present governor is not unpopular with the
provincial bureaucracy including Mrs. R. Wijiayaludchumi, the chief secretary. On the contrary,
there are media reports that the chief secretary has been receiving threats for not being
cooperative with the TNA executive.
Wigneswaran has been having a political tussle with governor Chandrasiri even before
September last year when elections brought the TNA to power and has frequently expressed his
uneasiness towards the governor. The stand of Wigneswaran does not seem to arise on matters of
principle because during the last presidential elections in Sri Lanka he had supported Sarath
Fonseka, a retired general, against Rajapakse.4 Despite the hangover of the past, the Chief
Minister and his ruling political alliance seems basically intended to ensure a more effective
control of the political executive over the provincial bureaucracy. The problems are systemic
because of the very limited political and administrative devolution affected to the northern
province by the Rajapakse government.
It is, therefore, essential to codify the executive instructions for administering the northern
province under some statutory rules issued at the provincial level with concurrence of the central
government. The proposed executive instructions may apply to all the provinces. Such a measure
may even be supported by the UNP and some of the other non-Tamil political parties. This may
seem an apparent anomaly with statutory rules to be operative in the province suggested to be
issued with central government concurrence (which should be exercised through the governor).
However, there may not exist any alternative because of some grey areas in the devolution
process and the de-facto overlapping jurisdiction being exercised by the northern province`s
chief minister and the governor, as cited above. The statutory rules should not leave any scope
for cognizance of directives or advice from the provincial governor to the provincial officials.
Article 154 of Sri Lankas Constitution read with the 13th Amendment does not seem to pose
any impediment in this regard. The only point of interface should be at the provincial apex level,
i.e., between the chief minister and the governor. Unresolved or contentious issues thereafter
may only be mediated at the level of the central government under a consensus. Without such an
institutional arrangement, a virtual subversion of the limited devolution to the northern province
would actually be taking place.
The issues at stake are significant from the standpoint of economic empowerment of the agrarian
Tamil people, ensuring sustainable means of livelihood for them and overall development of
their violence ravaged province, and most importantly the unity of the country. Not only the
Tamil parties of Sri Lanka but some of the mainstream political parties of that country including
the progressive elements like Sri Lanka Sama Samaja and Nava Sama Samaja Party have an
important role to play towards ensuring that the limited devolution process in Sri Lanka.
A mature handling on the part of Wigneswaran will be necessary so that the constitutional
structure is not eroded and a constant dialogue ensues between the provincial political executive
and the Rajapakse administration. Attempts by the Wigneswaran government to pressurise the
centre by invoking Article 154B to withdraw the governor is unlikely to yield desirable
outcomes. In fact the focus should be on effective governance in the existing limited functional
areas devolved.5
Measures for Improving Management of
National Security
Gurmeet Kanwal
January 16, 2014
India faces multiple external and internal security threats and challenges, but its response to
defeat these successfully has often been inadequate. Indias response is usually marked by knee
jerk reactions that fail to optimise the capacities of various organs of the state. With the
experience gained over the last six decades, there are several steps that the government can take
to improve the functioning of higher defence organisations and better manage national security,
including planning for the neutralisation of emerging threats and challenges.
The first and foremost item on the governments defence and national security reforms agenda
should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that
for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental,
inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review. Such a review must take the public into
confidence and not be conducted behind closed doors. Like in most other democracies, the NSS
should be signed by Prime Minister, who is the head of government, placed on the table of
Parliament and released as a public document. Only then will various stakeholders take
ownership of the strategy and work unitedly to achieve its aims and objectives.
The armed forces are now in the second year of the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17) and it has not
yet been formally approved with full financial backing by the Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS). The government has also not formally approved the long-term integrated perspective plan
(LTIPP 2007-22) formulated by HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Without these essential approvals,
defence procurement is being undertaken through ad hoc annual procurement plans, rather than
being based on duly prioritised long-term plans that are designed to systematically enhance
Indias combat potential. These are serious lacunae as effective defence planning cannot be
undertaken in a policy void. The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence
plans or else defence modernisation will continue to lag and the growing military capabilities gap
with Chinas Peoples Liberation Army will assume ominous proportions. This can be done only
by reviving the dormant National Security Council (NSC) as defence planning is in the domain
of the NSC and not the CCS, which deals with current and near-term threats and challenges and
reacts to emergent situations.
The inability to speedily conclude major defence contracts to enhance national security
preparedness in the face of growing threats and challenges, exemplifies the governments
challenges in grappling with systemic flaws in the procurement procedures and processes.
Despite having formulated the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and the Defence
Production Policy (DPrP), the government has been unable to reduce bureaucratic red tape and
defence modernisation continues to stagnate. It is difficult to understand why the budgetary
allocations earmarked on the capital account for the modernisation of the armed forces should
continue to be surrendered year after year with complete lack of accountability. The year FY
2010-11 had brought some encouraging news as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) managed to
fully utilise all the funds that were allocated on the capital account. This should become the norm
rather than the exception.
While internal security challenges are gradually gaining prominence, preparations for
conventional conflict must not be neglected. Major defence procurement decisions must be made
quickly. The army is still without towed and self-propelled 155 mm howitzers for the plains and
the mountains and urgently needs new utility helicopters, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) as
also to acquire weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency operations. The navy waited for
long for INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, which has been refurbished in a
Russian shipyard at exorbitant cost and with operationally unacceptable time overruns.
Construction of the indigenous air defence ship has also been delayed. The plan of the air force
to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft in order to maintain its edge over
the regional air forces is stuck in the procurement quagmire, even as the indigenous LCA project
continues to lag inordinately behind schedule. All three Services need a large number of light
and medium lift helicopters. Indias nuclear forces require the Agni-III missile and nuclear-
powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to acquire genuine deterrent capability. The
armed forces do not have a truly integrated C4I2SR system for network-centric warfare, which
will allow them to synergise their combat capabilities and defend against cyber-attacks. The
approach followed is still a platform-centric one despite the demonstrated advantages of
switching to a network-centric approach.
All of these high-priority acquisitions will require extensive budgetary support. With the defence
budget languishing at less than 2.0 per cent of Indias GDP compared with Chinas 3.5 per cent
and Pakistans 4.5 per cent plus US military aid it will not be possible for the armed forces to
undertake any meaningful modernisation. The funds available on the capital account at present
are inadequate to suffice even for the replacement of obsolete weapons systems and obsolescent
equipment that are still in service well beyond their useful life cycles. The central police and
para-military forces (CPMFs) also need to be modernised and better trained as they are facing
increasingly greater threats while continuing to be equipped with sub-standard weapons.
The government must immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a permanent
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide single-point advice to the CCS on military
matters and to synergise operational plans as well as capital acquisitions. Any further dithering
on this key structural reform in higher defence management on the grounds of the lack of
political consensus and the inability of the armed forces to agree on the issue will be extremely
detrimental to Indias interests in the light of the dangerous developments taking place in Indias
neighbourhood. The logical next step would be to constitute tri-Service integrated theatre
commands to synergise the capabilities of individual Services. International experience shows
that such reform has to be imposed form the top down and can never work if the government
keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.
Attachment
Naga Violence: Reminiscent of Wild West
Namrata Goswami
January 9, 2014
When you have to shoot, shoot, dont talk, is a line that has stayed over the years from the
classic The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. Thats the kind of scenario unfolding in Nagaland.
Shooting has been rampant, with little room for talk, and inter-tribal feud and tension between
the civilian Naga population and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Isak Chisi
Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) is high.
It all started on December 21, 2013 when two Sumi women were allegedly molested by four
NSCN (IM) cadres near Aghuito town as they were travelling towards Zunheboto. The NSCN
(IM) cadres stopped the vehicle in the early hours of that morning, and allegedly stripped
searched the women and injured the two male passengers who were accompanying them. This
led to a large rally the next day organized by the powerful Sumi Hoho who demanded that the
four cadres must be handed over to the District Administration by December 25. When the
NSCN (IM) refused to oblige and instead stated that it would carry out its own internal review,
the Sumi Hoho along with thousands of Sumi villagers marched towards the nearby NSCN (IM)
designated camp at Mukali in Zunheboto district. This has resulted in a cross-fire between the
outfit and the villagers leading to approximately eight deaths (two NSCN IM cadres and five
civilians) and a few injured.
This kind of protest by local Nagas against the NSCN (IM) designated camps is the first of its
kind. While there have been incidences of NSCN (IM) cadre misbehavior, it is usually reported
to the NSCN (IM) leadership at the top level like Muivah or Swu who looks into the matter. In
fact, Swu, the Chairman of the outfit, has held numerous meetings in the past with cadres who
have misbehaved warning them of the strictest punishment possible. This time around, what is
significantly new is that local Naga population has asserted their unwillingness to be dictated by
the armed groups diktat.
Tension between the NSCN (IM) and the Sumi Hoho is not new. In 2007, Azheto Chophy, a low
rung leader of the NSCN (IM) along with 100 or more NSCN (IM) cadres deserted the outfit and
formed the NSCN (Unification). The NSCN (IM)s hold on Naga society was questioned at that
time after civil society bodies like the Western Sumi Hoho, which had earlier supported the
outfit, shifted their loyalty to the NSCN (U). This was an alignment along tribal lines as Chophy
is a Sumi Naga. This rift got reflected in the NSCN (IM)s inner workings when there were
indications then that there was a difference of opinion between the two main leaders of the
NSCN (IM), Muivah (a Tangkhul) and Swu (a Sumi), on this split but matters seems to have
settled down between the two leaders.
Going beyond the particular, the broader implications of the recent violence is that local people
are now openly challenging the NSCN (IM)s methods of collecting so called taxes from
vehicles plying on roads in Nagaland. This must have miffed the outfit as it amplifies its
decreasing hold on the imagination of the Naga population. The deeper social impact of this
trend is that if NSCN (IM) cadres have been asked to behave tough on those who refuse to cede
to their monetary demands, they may end up misusing their ill-begotten power and visibly
indulge in more coercive methods.
The second significant implication is that the cease-fire framework between the NSCN (IM) and
the Union government is under threat of breaking down if the cadres have indulged in fire-
power. It also shows that the cease-fire ground rules have not been followed by the outfit. Cadres
of the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) have admitted to the national media that they often broke
cease-fire rules. For instance, according to cease-fire rules, both the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K)
cadres are to be confined to designated camps and carrying of arms in civilian areas is banned.
No one follows these rules and armed insurgent cadres are found moving in civilian areas. The
recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply
unable to keep extortion networks in check. Neither are they capable of enforcing the cease-
fire with the outfits.
The third implication of the recent violence is on the Naga peace talks. Both Muivah and Swu
are in New Delhi for the next round of peace talks. While the cease-fire agreement signed in
1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by
the outfit with extortions, inter-factional killings, and the recent violence against civilians render
the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.
Such violent incidences between the NSCN (IM) who will want to maintain its dominance in
Naga areas and the local population, starting to challenge the outfit openly, will recur. The only
mechanism by which the negative consequences of such incidences are limited is a robust and
effective police presence to maintain law and order. A viable programme of disarming the outfit
should also be worked out soon, and be made a condition for continuance of peace talks.
Arab Spring: Implications for India
West Asia Centre
January 2, 2014
The wave of poplar protests called Arab Spring started in Tunisia in December 2010 when the
people protested against their ruler Ben Ali who then fled to Saudi Arabia. This raised hopes
among millions of other citizens in the neighbouring Arab countries. Thus, within a short span of
time the protests spread to other countries like Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
Bahrain, Yemen and some other Gulf countries. The demands of the protesters varied from
country to country but in general it included demands for political freedom, social freedom, press
freedom, improved human rights conditions, economic betterment etc. The demands reflect a
desire among the masses, particularly the new generation of young and educated, to be liberated
from the reins of the old and authoritarian leadership and play a role in the decision making
process of the state. Till date, the protests have overthrown four long serving dictators Ben
Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh of
Yemen. While the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria is struggling for its survival, other countries
have successfully managed to suppress the protests against the regimes either by crackdown by
the security forces or by promising economic and political reforms.
This has brought the region a new contour a wave of protests for democratic reforms in an
otherwise authoritarian Arab world. The regime change also carries with it the potentials of
change in policies towards the neighbourhood and beyond. Throughout the uprisings, the major
regional countries have fought political and diplomatic wars among themselves trying to assert
their influence over the region. The Shia-Sunni war of words has come to the fore during the
protests. The outside powers have taken the opportunity to strengthen their interests by
intervening in the conflicts. On the whole, the regional security scenario in West Asia has
worsened with the arrival of the Arab Spring.
But the prospect of democracy in the region has receded. Most regimes have been able to keep at
bay, at least for the time being, the calls for change. The expectations from the Arab Spring
turned out to be overambitious. The old order has reasserted itself and managed to survive for the
time being. Arab spring is now commonly referred to as Arab winter, reflecting the failure of
protests movements to bring about change in the region. Democracy may not have come to these
countries as expected, yet the region has nevertheless changed dramatically in the last three
years. The regimes have survived, but there is no surety how long will they survive. The internal
and external environment has changed. What is now clear is that the change will be
unpredictable and nonlinear and violence ridden. The old order will have to find new ways of
surviving. Repression, inducement and cajolement seem to be the tactic.
The major characteristics of the Arab spring have been:
A great deal of violence has erupted and is likely to continue. There is no early prospect of
democracy taking hold in the region. The new regimes are likely to be even more repressive.
They will use repression and inducements to subdue protests and perpetuate themselves.
A fall of Syrian regime will change the balance of power. The so called Shia axis of resistance
consisting of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon will be weakened. Extremism will grow
exponentially, affecting not only the region but globally. The historic sectarian fault lines have
become wide open and the region could be torn apart if the sectarian tensions continue
unchecked.
Amidst the protests and violence in the Arab streets, Iran has risen as a major regional power.
Iran-Saudi rivalry for supremacy will be the defining feature of the evolving situation.
Religious extremism has become pronounced. Al Qaeda had got a second wind. Salafists are on
the rise and becoming prominent in the political arena. Muslim Brotherhood has tasted power
in Egypt but later has been thrown out of power and subsequently banned by the Egyptian
government. The behaviour and future action of the Muslim Brotherhood will, to large extend,
determine the security and democratic transition in Egypt.
GCC counties like Qatar are involved in carving out a new balance of power. Qatar, though small
but extremely rich, is playing an aggressive role in the new balance of power. Likewise, Turkey,
which led the call for Assad regime to reform, has become an important player in the region.
The regime is sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood. But, the role of Turkey and Qatar is
controversial and may lead to unintended consequences.
The rise of Iran has deeply upset the Sunni regimes. Its alleged quest for nuclear weapons has
alarmed the GCC countries and Israel. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will almost
certainly do so, possibly with the help of Pakistan.
Chemical weapons have been used in Syria. Russia has brokered a deal under which Syria is set
to hand over its pile of chemical weapons for destruction. Syrian regime has got a reprieve. In
this process, the US has been seen as weak and not in control of the situation.
The US policies may undergo change. The US has already started talk to Iran on nuclear issue
and was forced to take Russian help in the Syrian case. The shale gas revolution in the US will
reduce its dependence upon the oil from the region although its strategic objective of
controlling Iran still remains. Saudi Arabia is extremely upset with the US on the Syrian deal and
the US talks with Iran. It showed its displeasure by not accepting a seat in the UNSC, an
unprecedented step.
Implications for India
India has longstanding historical and cultural relations with the West Asian region. For India, in
particular, West Asia is a significantly important region. People-to-people contacts have existed
between India and West Asia for centuries. India has been a supporter of the Palestinian cause
and has demanded a comprehensive relationship with the Palestinian state and the people. Any
development in the region has direct implications for India. There are nearly 6.5 million Indians
living and working in the West Asian region. According to a World Bank report India received
US $ 70 billion in remittances during 2012 and a majority of the remittances came from the
region. In addition, Indias total trade with West Asia in the year 2012-13 stands at US$ 205.71
billion. The region is also vital for India's energy security. Nearly two-thirds of our hydrocarbon
imports are from this region.
India has two choices: be passive and reactive as the region takes new shape, or, be proactive and
help shape the region keeping its own interests in mind. Most countries in the region want India
to play a more proactive role in keeping with its rising global profile. Indias substantial interests
in the region would compel India to be proactive and not be a mere bystander. India will have to
carve out a well thought out strategy towards the region.
Political
Declare a clearly articulated Look West Policy: As IndiaGulf relationship is taking an upward
trajectory, and Indias stakes and interests are growing with time, it is time for India to adopt a
formally articulated Look West Policy in line with the successful Look East Policy. The sheer
volume of Indias engagement with the region and its critical importance Indias security means
that standing aloof is no option. A Look West Policy should focus on strengthening bilateral
political, economic and security ties with the countries of the Gulf region. As the countries of the
region have adopted a Look East Policy to targeting the Asian powers, it is an opportune time for
India to adopt and pursue a policy solely focusing on the region. Institutionalising the exchange
of regular high-level visits and setting reasonably high targets with specific time lines will be
necessary. Regular interaction at the highest levels will infuse further confidence in the
relationship. Thus, India must articulate its interests in the region clearly through a Look West
Policy backed by road maps and resources.
Appoint a special envoy for West Asia: It may be useful for India to resume the practice of
appointing a special envoy for West Asia who keeps in regular touch with the leaders of the
region on a regular basis. It would help in understanding the changing political dynamics in the
region and help shape Indias policy towards them.
Upgrade bilateral relationships: India has excellent bilateral relations with most countries in the
region such as Iran, Iraq and the GCC countries. Egypt is reaching out to India to which India
must respond favourably. With Palestine India has had historically friendly relations and India
supports the Palestinian cause. Indias relationship with Israel has strengthened since the
establishment of the diplomatic ties in 1992. Israel has emerged as a major source of defence
technology and equipments and also as a supplier of agricultural technologies to India. It is also
keen to expand its ties with India at political level. These relationships are valuable and need to
be solidified and India must strengthen the bilateral relationship by engaging them in multiple
fronts.
Cooperate on multilateral formats: Along with strengthening bilateral ties with the countries of
the region India must deal with these countries in multilateral forums like the GCC and Arab
League. GCC is one such important and influential regional organisation in the region India has
been trying to engage deeply with. India has links with GCC which must be continuously
stimulated. Despite their internal differences on some matters, the countries of the GCC follow a
similar policies on several political, economic, security and strategic matters. Most recently,
their unity was reflected during the uprising in Bahrain where the member countries not only
gave political support but also economic aid and military support to deal with the crisis. The
shared challenges in the region have gradually made the organisation stronger and they have
been taking steps to further strengthen their links and discover new areas of cooperation among
themselves. Thus, it may be easier to deal with the organisation as a whole on matters on which
all members of GCC have a common position.
Follow a balanced approach between countries: India will have to do some fine balancing acts:
between Iran and GCC; between Israel and the Arabs; between Israel and the Palestinians. The
situation can be handled by taking principled positions, by expanding the basis of bilateral
relations, by focussing on the economic and people to people content of the ties. India should
also strengthen ties on human security issues, particularly, counter-terrorism. Given the
complex nature of the politics in the region, it would be wise for India to continue with the
policy of balancing its relationship with major players in the region. As India has stakes
transcending the GCC, Iran and Iraq, taking sides will be detrimental to Indias interests. Rather,
India should try to engage with the countries and work together on the mutual areas of interest.
Security
Forging new cooperative security architecture: The present security architecture in West Asia is
US-centric. With the rise of new actors the balance of power in the region is being altered. India,
on account of its considerable security interests should be alive to the emergence of new
developments in the security arena and be proactive in the region. Indias recent initiatives with
the region reflect its growing desire to strengthen defence and security ties with the Gulf
countries, though this has been taking place at a slow pace. There are several issues such as
terrorism, piracy, criminal activities, money laundering and small arms smuggling which call for
increasing security cooperation between India and the Gulf countries, but security being a very
sensitive issue, these countries usually adopt caution in moving forward. However, as the
security challenges continue to grow not only for India but also for the Gulf countries, increased
cooperation in this field is required in the future regional security architecture. We should
expand and strengthen our missions by posting new Defence Attaches in the region.
Build out of area capabilities: During the protests as the security situation deteriorated in some
countries, India took up the rescue efforts to evacuate citizens. India has successfully evacuated
citizens from countries like Egypt and Libya. Keeping in view the fluid political and security
situation in the region, such contingencies may be expected to arise in future. India should pay
special importance to building out of area capacities. This will require building diplomatic
capabilities, naval capacities and a dialogue with partners in West Asia.
Be prepared for a fundamentalist backlash: The rise of extremism in the region will have
unpleasant consequences for India. There are reports that extremists from Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Bangladesh are fighting in Syria. India must be prepared to deal with the fundamentalist
blow back from the region by strengthening its internal security systems, by raising awareness
about the looming threat and by involving our moderate populations in bilateral and multilateral
contacts. In the past, there have been reports of some extremist elements in India being
ideologically motivated by some groups in the region and also of receiving money through
hawala channel. Thus, India should remain prepared for any such backlash coming from the
region.
Economic
Diversifying Indias trade relations: Indias trade with West Asian countries is highly skewed and
trade balance is mostly in favour of the regional countries except the UAE. Indias bilateral trade
is heavily dominated by the energy supply from the region. Also, a large chunk of the Indias
total trade is exchanged with big trading partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Thus, there is a
need to diversify trade with other countries of the region which needs special attention by India.
Need for enhancing investment: The GCCs investments into India have increased in recent
years (from US$ 223 million in 2005 to US$ 2639.5 million in January 2012), however, it remains
much below their potential. India need to take tangible steps to attract foreign investments by
further relaxing some trade rules including regulatory restrictions and inviting West Asian
investors in general and GCC investors in particular to actively participate in Indias robust
growth story for mutual benefit. It is equally important to identify specific areas for cooperation
such as export of engineering goods and textiles, and also a huge scope for increase in
consultancy, including turnkey projects in the infrastructure sector in the Gulf region.
Cooperation in small and medium enterprise (SME): India has built its expertise in the SME
business model worldwide; though, this talent has still not been used in West Asian countries
appropriately. India could influence this potential and the desire of West Asian countries to
diversify their economies to build a mutually beneficial relationship. Trade and investment
cooperation between India and the West Asian region must be based on a long-term strategy
and an effective mechanism so as to achieve the desired objectives of the two sides. The
mechanism should be a multistage setup involving both official and non-official agencies like
trade organisations, financial institutions and shipping corporations.
Energy
Energy Cooperation: The current buyerseller relationship needs to change into a partnership of
criss-cross investments in India and the West Asian oil-exporting countries. This policy will
facilitate greater interdependence and also help address the general criticism that Indias policy
towards the region needs to go beyond energy considerations.
India should look for opportunities for joint ventures in West Asia not only with international
companies but also with local companies. Priority should be accorded to projects like LNG
liquefaction, fertiliser and desalination plants and other such ventures which will be beneficial
for both sides. For attracting investments from the sovereign funds of these countries, India
should engage in high-level diplomacy with countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.
Through a mutually agreed upon mechanism, a share of the oil and gas revenues earned from
India should be earmarked for investment in India. The purchase of a minimum fixed volume of
oil and/or gas at average monthly prices could be worked out and agreed upon bilaterally.
Iran and Iraq need to be factored in a big way while formulating India's energy policy towards
the region. Although Iraq is a high-risk proposition and Iran a problematic one, to ensure its
future stable energy supply, India should work on long-term plans to expand its energy
cooperation with Iraq and Iran.
Food security is a big issue in the West Asian region. Therefore, an energy and food trade-off
can be looked upon as a policy option to strengthen Indias energy ties with the regional
countries.
Surplus refining capacity is Indias strength, which should be leveraged through contractual
arrangements involving the purchase of crude oil and sale of refined products with as many
countries as possible. Some oil-exporting countries may want refining capacities to be created
on their soil. India could enter into joint ventures for establishing refineries on their soil.
There could be a structured IndiaGCC energy cooperation dialogue every year to enhance the
energy cooperation between India and the GCC countries. Such a dialogue could cover upstream
and downstream hydrocarbon cooperation, energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean
technologies and civil nuclear cooperation.
Soft power
Establishing India Chairs in the West Asian countries would further promote their
understanding of India. It is important for us to create awareness about Indias foreign policy
and the role that India can play in the establishment of peace and stability not only in the south
or West Asia but also the in the world. Indias capability and enthusiasm to play the role of a
responsible world power should be emphasised and spread in the intellectual discourse and
among the policy makers in the region. In this regard, establishing India chairs would be an
important step in right direction. Indian educational, technical and vocational institutions should
be encouraged to open their branches in West Asia, much the way the Western institutions are
doing.
Similarly, to give a further boost to the diplomatic presence in the region and spread Indian
culture among the West Asian countries, India should seriously consider establishing India
Culture Centres throughout the region. Culture Centres would facilitate understanding and
exchange of each others culture, people and promote understandings between the people.
India needs to use its soft power such as cultural exchange, holding inter-faith dialogues and
developing language skills.
An annual India-West Asia dialogue should be established to discuss the developments in the
region and to promote mutual bilateral relations between the two. Such a dialogue would
provide an avenue for discussion of scholarly and policy related issues. Scholars and
representatives from both India and the West Asian countries can gather to freely discuss and
deliberate on the issues of mutual concern and interest. Premier Indian security think tanks
could anchor such dialogues. India must devote substantial diplomatic and intellectual resources
to understand the evolving trends in this highly complex region. Contacts must be maintained at
official and non-official levels. MEAs public diplomacy division should be active in explaining
Indias links with the region and stressing Indias stakes.
Building academic linkages: India should devote significant scholarly and academic interests in
studying the region. One dynamic step in this regard would be to bolster the teaching of Arabic
and Persian languages and produce a crop of youngsters who can engage with the region at a
level beyond that of skilled workers.
Is It Time to Withdraw the Army from
Kashmir?
Vivek Chadha
December 13, 2013
A study of insurgencies reveals that security forces tend to lose the support of intelligentsia and
media, as the movement tends to prolong. It is often a result of either low levels of violence or
casualties, beginning of an electoral process and the re-establishment of local administration
machinery. More importantly, it is the result of missing the wood for the trees. This is especially
true for Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
A recent opinion piece by the Editor of a major national daily, argued that it is time for the
withdrawal of the army from Kashmir. In his article, he alludes to the army vetoing government
proposals on Siachen troops withdrawal and dilution of Armed Forces Special Powers Act
(AFSPA). He contends that past conditions represented a proxy war launched from Pakistan and
they have been defeated. He further adds that if Hizb or Lashkar thugs again surface some
place, you can easily confront them with overwhelming force within minutes. Finally, in order
to illustrate peace on ground, he quotes a figure of 17 security force casualties in 2012.1
The spirit of the article rightly highlights the need to build upon the peace dividend, offered by
the relative conditions of peace in the state. The need for bold and imaginative political
initiatives, as must always be the case for final settlement of popular discontentment, is also
seconded without reservation. However, the reading of the situation and solutions offered
indicates a rather simplistic understanding of conditions in Indias neighbourhood and within the
state.
The assertion that the army can veto a government proposal on issues like Siachen or AFSPA, is
either a case of misunderstanding of constitutional powers and privileges, or an under estimation
of parliamentary democracy. The last sixty years have proved on more occasion than one that the
armed forces remain firmly under the control of civilian leadership in India. It has also been seen
that decision making remains a function of elected representatives, albeit with advice from
various state organs. Therefore, while the advice of the army on both issues is in public domain
to deduce that this advice functions as a veto, is a gross overestimation of the powers and
influence of the men in uniform. The government receives inputs from various sources, as a
prelude to decision making. Critical inputs are provided by intelligence agencies, as well as state
and central administrative representatives. Army happens to be one amongst these agencies.
The article also declares defeat of Pakistans proxy war in J&K. This would be the likely
conclusion, if the basis of assessments are the violence figures between 2008 and 2012 (Table 1).
Table 1 - Trends of Terrorist Violence in J&K
Year Incidents SFs
Killed
Civilians
Killed
Terrorists
Killed
2005 1990 189 557 917
2006 1667 151 389 591
2007 1092 110 158 472
2008 708 75 91 339
2009 499 79 71 239
2010 488 69 47 232
2011 340 33 31 100
2012 220 15 15 72
Source: Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of Home Affairs2
However, a careful analysis of existing circumstances belies these claims and can often throw up
misleading results. A brief look at the increased violence figures along the LoC, not only
highlights this paradox, but also provides a sign of times to come in 2014. 2013 witnessed the
highest ceasefire violations in eight years. This was also accompanied by a sharp increase in
security force casualties until August 18, 2013. By this time, 36 soldiers had already been killed,
as compared to 15 during the complete 2012. This was also accompanied by higher numbers of
successful infiltration, which is borne by an increase in security force casualties within the state.
This is by no stretch of imagination a situation, which can be classified as return of normalcy in
the state. The security situation in the state is not only linked with the conditions along the LoC
but also geo-political realities in Indias neighbourhood.
A closer look at the events in the Af-Pak region suggest that the de-induction of US led forces
from Afghanistan in 2014, is likely to become a tipping point for Pakistan to re-establish its
control by proxy in that country. This could witness, a deflection of jehadi forces from
Afghanistan towards their next battle ground in Kashmir. Irrespective of this possible deflection
of jehadi forces, the end of war in Afghanistan is definitely likely to result in release of Pakistani
forces deployed in the region and their re-deployment along traditional areas of the border with
India. Both these factors will strengthen Pakistans ability to heighten tensions along the Line of
Control (LoC), as also induct terrorists through vulnerable areas. This should in turn call for
careful analysis and monitoring of the developing situation in Indias neighbourhood.
The call for de-induction of the army from the state is also misleading. The deployment in J&K
follows a three tier pattern. The urban areas are provided security by the local police and central
police forces. The rural hinterland has the deployment of Rashtriya Rifles (RR), which is a para
military force. The army is deployed on the LoC, with the task of maintaining the territorial
integrity of the country and stopping infiltration of terrorists. Therefore, any call for de-induction
of the army is misleading. If it is presumed that the call actually pertains to the RR, then it
needs careful analysis if its areas of deployment are peaceful enough for denudation of forces. It
also needs to be questioned if the already stretched CRPF, which also looks after Naxal hit areas
has the numbers and capacity to undertake this additional responsibility. The army has
maintained for long that deployment in counterinsurgency areas adversely impacts its ability to
concentrate on its primary role of guarding the nations borders. It is in the interest of the country
and the army that the CRPF takes over these responsibilities. However, the question that begs an
answer is, whether the CRPF is ready for this task?
The final assertion of the article deals with the ability to redeploy in case of an adverse situation
in a matter of minutes. It needs to be understood that the mere deployment of a force is not a
guarantee for its immediate effectiveness. Unlike flag marches in aid to civil authorities,
deployment in terrorist infected areas requires the buildup of operational and intelligence
network by units, which takes months if not years of diligent effort. Secondly, the initial
deployment of security forces in an area is often referred to as the kinetic phase of operations,
which is usually accompanied by heavier casualties and collateral damage, given the large
presence of terrorists. Therefore, re-deployment is likely to be accompanied by not only greater
security force casualties, but more importantly civilian ones as well. Therefore, any decision to
de-induct forces must be deliberate, reasoned and well considered.
Over a period of time, some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the
armys presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality
of its role and responsibility are better understood and articulated. The induction of the army in
an internal security scenario is accompanied by the task of bringing violence down to levels,
wherein, the elected representatives of the state and the administrative machinery can function
effectively. At this stage, political negotiations attempt to find a respectable and long term
solution to the problem at hand. Therefore, the timing of these negotiations and the call to
undertake bold measures must be a decision guided by the elected representatives of the country.
The army was and shall remain one of the cogs in the wheel that assists in the running of state
machinery.
The reduction of the armys numbers, visibility and presence must come. However, the
prevailing realities in Indias neighbourhood, its impact on J&K, as well as the recent spurt in
violence suggest that the time is not opportune for this decision. It would be appropriate to better
understand the impact of US led de-induction from Afghanistan in 2014, along with the
conditions both on the LoC and inside the state, before a decision on the issue is taken.
US Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific:
Implications for West Asia
Gulshan Dietl
December 11, 2013
States adopt postures and pursue policies in response to the global situation. As the global
situation evolves, so do the strategic choices of the states. During the Cold War, the United
States was completely focussed on the Soviet Union and constantly striving to contain and if
possible, to roll back - the Soviet presence from the Third World. The best and the brightest in
the American academia studied the Soviet Union and the Kremlinologists occupied the best
births among policy wonks.
The decline of Marxism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed all that. The
ideologues of Marxism shifted their sights to the new ideology of Islam. Initially, the emergence
of independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus received its share of international
attention. The US interest in the large quantities of oil and gas and US concerns over nuclear
proliferation and re-emergence of Islam dominated its foreign policy calculus. Very soon
thereafter, West Asia acquired the status of the most crucial region. After the nine-eleven, the
Global War on Terrorism led the US into long-drawn-out wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. In the
process its military reach extended and deepened throughout West Asia and beyond.
It is China that now occupies the epicentre of US worldview. In 2011, the Obama administration
made a series of pronouncements on a pivot to Asia-Pacific, identifying it as a priority region.
The US would deploy greater naval assets, create new military capabilities and prepare to engage
in a newly formulated Air Sea Battle in the region. The first demonstrative act of the pivot was
the US-Japan announcement of the Dynamic Defence Force in October 2011 that would lead to a
broadened military alliance.
A year after the initial pronouncements on pivot, the policy was rechristened rebalancing. It
down played the military aspects of the pivot, emphasized economic cooperation and called for
closer engagement with China. A Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) between the US and some
twelve states in the region would create a free trade area. Simultaneously, the US would enhance
its economic assistance and deepen its diplomatic involvement. Consequently, the attitude to
China has moved from tacit confrontation to cautious accommodation.
The twenty-first century is widely expected to be the Asian Century. The economic growth in
Asia is expected to outpace the West by a wide margin. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific hosts
a number of formidable problems - some long-standing and some of recent origin. The legal and
political status of Taiwan is fraught with the potential of conflict. A defiant North Korea has
acquired nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. South China Sea has become a jumble of
contesting territorial claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and
Indonesia. The islands in the East China Sea are disputed among China, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. The recent Chinese announcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East
China Sea and the unhindered exploratory flights of two American B-52 bombers right through it
may yet lead to an ugly situation in future.
These issues are central to the US concerns and directly impinge on the US security in the long
run. In the circumstances, Asia-Pacific has become a hotbed of competition; mainly between the
US and China. The US needs to stand firm with its Allies in the face of an assertive Chinese
foreign policy. It also needs to demonstrate that the decade-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have not sapped its will to lead the world, and that its economic downturn would not diminish its
commitment to its Allies.
An interesting aspect of the pivot/rebalancing is that it has had a very short gestation period.
Consequently, it has led to a lot of questioning among the US allies and adversaries. A vigorous
public debate about its implications and fallouts has ensued. A bipartisan group of the US
Congress has written to the National Security Advisor Susan Rice to conduct a formal strategy
review of the Administrations approach to the US global military posture. The Europeans are
unsure of what the pivot might bring to them. The US has had to placate the European Allies.
The US vice president Joe Biden has had to reassure the Europeans that the US is not leaving
them. Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world. That is a
fact. We are not going anywhere. In the Asia-Pacific itself, the sceptics view it as a lot of
rhetoric and many fear destabilization and destruction as happened in West Asia during US
decade of democratization there.
In West Asia, Israel and the Arab states in the Gulf are equally worried. The Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still insistent on the US strikes on Iran. Amitai Etzioni, an
Israeli-American Sociologist at the George Washington University, argues that the pivot is
premature. According to him, it will take decades before Chinas Peoples Liberation Army will
be in a position to threaten the super power status of the US. In the meanwhile, turning away
from West Asia where a number of urgent challenges remain, including the Syrian civil war, the
ongoing struggle with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and Irans nuclear programme would undermine
the US interests and needlessly antagonise China.
On the other end of the spectrum, there are diametrically opposite prescriptions from within the
US think tanks calling for quietly downgrading involvement in the sorry mess of West Asia as
the problems there can at best be managed, but never solved.
There is palpable fear among the Syrian rebels and their supporters inside the US establishment
about the US distraction from West Asia. Senator John McCain, a leading Republican Senator
and an advocate of greater US support to the Syrian rebels, threatened to hold up General
Michael Dempseys confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee as the
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issue of US commitment to Syria.
The US administration has sought to assuage the West Asian feelings that the ties with Asia-
Pacific would not be at the expense of West Asia. The US Central Command has rolled out
staggering statistics of US military presence deployed there: 125,000 American troops around
Iran including 90,000 in and around Afghanistan, 20,000 in West Asia and 15,000 to 20,000
serving on warships. The Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel has pronounced the US ties to the
region as unbreakable, but that they needed to be renewed and reinvigorated after a decade of
war. At the same time, however, he has had to defend the US commitment to prioritize its
posture, activity and investment in Asia-Pacific leaving the people in Europe, West Asia and
Asia-Pacific thoroughly confused.
The situation on the ground, in the circumstances, remains a better guide to assess whether the
US is retreating from West Asia. The US forces have withdrawn from Iraq and are in the process
of withdrawing from Afghanistan. The US chose to lead from behind on the Libyan Spring. It
refused to accept the French-Turkish proposal to set up a No Fly Zone in Syria and opted to
work through the Friends of Syria instead. As of now, it has chosen to step back from a
confrontation with Syria. And finally, it has signed an interim nuclear deal with Iran indicating
its preference to work through multi-lateral diplomatic channel.
There are two factors that have facilitated the direction of perceptible US retreat from West Asia.
One, the production of shale oil and gas has largely diminished US dependence on the imported
energy from West Asia. In fact, the country may in future become an energy exporter. Two, the
US economic turndown has put severe limitations on its power projection worldwide. The US
federal government shutdown for over two weeks over budget allocations has rung alarm bells
worldwide. The fact that President Obama had to call off his week-long visit to Asia to attend the
APEC and ASEAN summits has raised serious questions regarding the US security assurances
and economic contribution to Asia-Pacific as also to West Asia.
The soothing sounds to the European and West Asian Allies, in the circumstances, remain just
sounds. A greater attention to Asia-Pacific would necessarily translate into that much lesser
attention everywhere else. Asia-Pacific is bound to remain at the top of the US foreign policy
agenda till the international situation warrants a relook. In coming years, the US global posture
may set less ambitious goals and allocate fewer resources to pursue them.
Government of India
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:
India Seeking New Role in the Eurasian
Regional Mechanism
Meena Singh Roy
IDSA Monograph Series No. 34
2014
India, in 2005, acquired the observer status in the SCO. Since then it has constructively
participated in all SCO summit meetings thus showing its strong willingness to be meaningfully
associated with this regional grouping. It has also expressed its desire to join the SCO as a full
member. Despite India's keen interest and desire to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
as a full member, it is still a step too far and one that seems unlikely soon with the organisation's
current trajectory. However, this is not to argue that India should lose interest in the SCO. Given
the complexities of the relations among the SCO member-states and other geopolitical realities, it
is still premature to write off the effectiveness of this regional grouping. So far, its success has
been somewhat mixed in various areas but in the long run, its relevance for the region will not
wane. Therefore, in the long run, it will be in India's interest to watch the developments closely
from within as a full member rather than sit on the side-lines. The major hurdle for India to
acquire the full membership in the SCO is the lack of consensus among the member-states. It is
believed that China would try and delay India's entry as full member in this regional
organisation, whereas Russia along with the Central Asian countries would continue to support
India's full membership in the SCO. However, it is debatable whether China can stall India's
entry in the SCO for long. In long-term China would find it difficult to block India's membership
in the SCO because of the increasing relevance of India for China to manage many regional and
global security and economic challenges in the era of changing global order. New regional and
global order would demand greater cooperation between India and China in future.
Heavy Satellite Launch Vehicles: An
Assessment
Ajey Lele and Parveen Bhardwaj
February 19, 2014
A satellite launch vehicle (rocket) is designed to lift a satellite from the earth
and to deliver it to the desired orbit. The strength of such a vehicle depends
on the weight of the satellite and the nature of the orbit in which it is to be
placed. With advancing rocket technology, capability to put the heavy
satellites into different orbits has increased significantly. Recently, India
joined the coveted club having capacities to launch around 2 tonnes of
payload into the geostationary orbit. This Issue Brief makes an assessment of
the existing global capabilities to launch heavy satellites into the space.
Technically, launch vehicles could be categorised based on various features. It could be based on
the number of stages the vehicle use for launching a satellite like single stage, twin stage, etc. It
could also be based on method of assembly like vertically or horizontally assembled. However,
the most common approach of classification could be based on the payload carrying capacity.
There could be further sub-classifications in this category based on the orbits in which the
payload is to be delivered.
In relative sense for rocket scientists development of technology for delivering less than 2000-
kg payload satellites in the low earth orbit (LEO) has been an easier task than putting heavier
satellites in higher orbits. Currently, every space-faring state is not in a position to put heavy
satellites into the geosynchronous orbit. Interestingly, even states like India with much advanced
space programme has not been able to successfully undertake Moon and Mars missions but could
achieve success in this field only at a later stage.
On January 5, 2014, India conducted a successful launch of GSLV-D5 under its Geosynchronous
Launch Vehicle programme. With this launch India, has for the first time, succeed in
demonstrating its indigenous cryogenic technology. For India mastering this technology is
extremely important because without cryogenic/semi-cryogenic technology it is not in a position
to further develop its rocket programme for launching heavy satellites. What India has achieved
with the successful launch of GSLV-D5 on January 5, 2014 (approximately two tones payload)
could be viewed as a first step in the direction of developing a reliable launch system for the
delivery of heavy satellites into different orbits. For all these years India has been depending on
outside agencies to launch its communication/weather satellites (normally of four tonne variety)
at cost. With the Indian system being available the cost of such exercises will not only be
significantly less but could attract business by offering launch facilities using GSLV vehicle.
Indias cryogenic engine development programme was in making for many years. In fact during
early 1990s India was denied this technology. Russia was then supposed to transfer this
technology to India but was pressurised by the US not to do so owing to the nuclear and missile
related policies prevalent then. Since 2001, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has
been involved in the development of cryogenic engine. It witnessed one failure on April 15, 2010
when the launch using indigenously developed cryogenic engine failed. The failure to develop
cryogenic technology appears to be almost universal.
In order to understand where India stands globally in respect of developments into lift vehicles
capable of carrying more than two tonnes of payload following paragraphs compares and
contrasts the available global launch systems in this category. This could allow for a better
understanding about how these vehicles are similar and diverse.
Equating the Vehicles
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicles
Click here for Table
Cryogenic Engines

The above table making a broad comparison of vehicle characteristics indicates that:
1. Mostly cryogenic engine technology has been at heart of development of various launch
vehicles designed for launch of more than 2 tonnes weight into GTO and other orbits.
2. Vehicles of Russian, Chinese and Indian origin are three/four stage vehicles while that of
Western and Japanese origin are two stage vehicles. Except India in all other cases the
combination constitutes of stages with liquid and semi cryogenic or cryogenic
propellants. For Indian vehicle the first stage is with solid propellant. The specific details
about the propellant are discussed in next section.
3. Participation of private sector towards the overall development of the launch vehicle
family is evident barring India and China where no major involvement of the private
sector is evident.
4. The payload capacity of GSLV-MK II is comparatively very low in comparison with
other vehicles. However, GSLV-Mk II is the first variant of GSLV family and further
Varriant
Delta IV and
atlas v
arian 5 eca Japan hiib1
Long
march
3B/e
GSLV
MArk ii
FAlcon
9
Engine
RL10A-4-2
variant of
RL10
HM7-B variant of
HM7
LE-5B
variant of
LE 5
YF 75
variant of
YF 73
CE 7.5 Merlin
1D
Developer
US and Pratt
& Whitney
Earlier as part of
Europe program
currently by Snecma
(Safran)
japan
(JAXA)
China
India
(ISRO)
Space
X
time for
development
11 years
(1950-1961)
8 years (1973-1979)
15 years
(1975-
1990)

14
(1994-
2008)

modifications of this system are in the pipeline. Currently, GSLV-Mk III launch vehicle
is under development and is expected to launch payload weighing 4500 to 5000 kg. The
vehicle envisages multi-mission launch capability for GTO, LEO, Polar and intermediate
circular orbits. GSLV-Mk III is designed to be a three stage vehicle. First stage comprises
two identical S200 Large Solid Booster (LSB) with 200 tonne solid propellant, which are
strapped on to the second stage, the L110 re-startable liquid stage. The third stage is the
C25 LOX/LH2 cryo-stage.2
5. The time taken for the development of cryogenic engine technology appears to be quite
significant in each case mostly more than ten years. ISRO took about fourteen years for
this development and it appears that they had no late starter advantage. One of the
reasons for this could be the cryogenic haves club been tight-lipped about the
technological knowhow. One another important aspect could have been that during 1994
two important ISRO scientists working on cryogenic project were falsely named in some
scam and by the time their innocence was proved their careers and Indias cryogenic
programme suffered significantly.3
6. The success rate for India and China is lowest, hovering around 50%. In case of India it
may be noted that number of launches are two, one failure and success. Therefore critical
assessment is foreseeable only by their future launch record.
7. In the Indian case, the thrust produced by CE7.5 GSLV MKII cryogenic engine is
comparatively less. However, it also needs to be considered that the GSLV-D5 launch
was with small payload.
For any assessment of launch vehicles it is important to recognize the importance of the
propellants used for the rocket system. The history of research, design and manufacture of rocket
systems indicate that correct handling of propellants has always been a challenge for the
scientific community. Particularly for heavy launch vehicles mostly cryogenic engine technology
has been found put in use. Mastering the cryogenic technology has proved to be the most
challenging task for the rocket scientists. One of the complex challenges in this field has been the
handling of the propellants.
The various propellants put in use has certain limits in terms of their overall composition and
energy characteristics. Hence in order to understand the best option available in terms of
propellant selection it is important to analyse the composition on certain vital parameters and
their impact on the performance of the propellant.
Propellant
Propellant is the chemical mixture burned to produce thrust in rockets. Presently, most rockets
operate with either solid or liquid propellants or combination of both. The propellant does not
mean simply fuel; it means both fuel and oxidizer. The fuel constitutes of the chemical the rocket
burns but, for burning to take place; an oxidizer (oxygen) is required to be present. Jet engines
draw oxygen into their engines from the surrounding air. However, the rockets do not have the
luxury that jet planes have; they need to carry oxygen with them into space, where there is no
air.4 It may be noted that cryogenic is low temperature physics and propellants used for
cryogenic stage in the overall rocket assembly usually involves a combination of liquid hydrogen
and liquid oxygen or methane and liquid oxygen.
For understanding the importance of cryogenic engine in heavy launch vehicles it is essential to
examine various important propellant characteristics of such system. Relevant discussion in this
regard has been carried below.
The major components of rockets are rocket motor or engine, propellant as a fuel, control system
and payload such as satellite. Typically of total mass, 91 percent is shared by propellant and 6
percent is that of payload . Therefore, the propellant plays significant role in the success of a
mission. Following table indicates the amount of propellants put in use for various stages of
rocket. The values presented below are under ideal conditions and do not cater for the reduction
in efficiency of rocket owing to losses due to atmospheric drag and heating:
Propellant Rocket Percent Propellant for Earth Orbit
Solid Rocket 96
Kerosene-Liquid Oxygen 93
Hypergolic5 94
Methane-Liquid Oxygen 90
Liquid Hydrogen-Liquid Oxygen 83
Table 1: Mass fractions (given as percent of the total rocket mass). Source: Expedition 30/31
Flight Engineer Don Pettit, NASA6
The above table indicates that to carry same payload, solid rocket has to carry 96 percent of
propellant to the total mass leaving small margin for payload. It is also notable that this value
reduces to 83 percent for cryogenic stage which leaves wide leeway of higher mass and payload
integration.
Thrust is a force that moves rocket through air and space. Thrust is generated by the propulsion
system of the rocket through the application of Newton's third law of motion (for every action
there is an equal and opposite reaction).7 The amount of thrust produced is directly associated
with kind of propellant used on basis of its performance. For instance to produce 1 tonnes of
thrust, Vikas liquid engine used in PSLV and GSLV, require 3.4 kg of propellant per second.
Same thrust can be produced by cryogenic engine with only 1.85 kg of propellant per second.8
In order to appreciate the physics and chemistry of propellants it is important to compare few
important features. Four explicit features like specific impulse, mixture ratio, oxidizer to fuel
ratio and density are discussed below.
Oxidizer Fuel Type Specific
Impulse

(s, sea
level)
Mixture
ratio
Oxidizer to
fuel ratio
Density
(g/cc) 9
Ammonium Aluminium Solids 277 2.12 - 1.21
Perchlorate

(solid)
+ HTPB
Aluminium
+ PBAN
Solids 274 2.13 - -
Liquid
Oxygen
Liquid
Hydrogen
Cryogenic 391 5.0 6.0 1.48
Kerosene
(RP-1)
Semi- Cryogenic 352 2.30 2.56 1.02
Hydrazine - Monopropellants 303 - -
Nitrogen
Tetroxide
Kerosene Hypergolic 267 1.08 1.34
Hydrazine Hypergolic 286 1.22
MMH Hypergolic 280 1.73 2.52 1.20
UDMH Hypergolic 282 2.10 2.61 1.18
HTPB stands for Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Butadiene and PBAN for Polybutadiene
acrylonitrile
MMH and UDMH is Mono methyl hydrazine and Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine
Source: Compiled, edited and written in part by Robert A. Braeunig, 1996, 2005, 2006, 2008
Source: Compiled by authors from Robert A. Braeunig study and Encyclopaedia Astronautica
The Specific impulse (Isp) is an important factor to measure efficiency of rocket. Specific
impulse is defined as the thrust divided by the mass of propellant consumed per second. The
result is expressed in seconds. The higher the specific impulse, the less propellant is needed to
gain a given amount of momentum. Isp depends on combination of propellant and medium in
which they are employed. In general trend propellant gives less Isp at sea level than vacuum.
The following table indicates Isp of various combination commonly used in HLV:
The above table indicates that cryogenic engines are much more efficient in delivering high Isp.
Liquid Oxygen and liquid Hydrogen combination is one of most energetic chemical reaction to
produce high Isp used by rocket industry so far. However, due to its complex storage systems (it
may be noted that Hydrogen remains liquid at temperatures of -253oC and Oxygen remains in a
liquid state at temperatures of -183oC) high overall cost of propellants and highly corrosive
nature makes it less attractive option to be used in all stages of rocket. Majority of the heavy lift
vehicles use cryogenic in its upper stage, while for other stages there is a shift for semi-cryogenic
propellants. This includes combination of liquid oxygen as oxidizer and kerosene (RP-1) as a
fuel. Kerosene offers less Isp than cryogens, but due to its other properties like earth storable, no
requirement of handling of any extremely low temperatures and ease in fabrication of the
propellant chamber, they are preferred over other propellant combinations.
Mixture ratio is another important factor which explains the importance of the type of propellant
put in use. Mixture Ratio is the ratio of oxidizer mass to fuel mass. We define the optimum
mixture ratio as that which will produce the highest specific impulse for the given reactants. An
engine with a high combustion chamber pressure and a low nozzle exit pressure, i.e. a large
section ratio, will have the highest optimum mixture ratio. A propellant's optimum mixture ratio
is a function of the pressures at which the rocket engine will operate. Higher mixture ratio means
the propellant have fuel rich mixture and burn much more efficiently by producing higher thrust.
This mixture ratio is also extended to oxidizer to fuel ratio (O/F). It is similar to air to fuel ratio
in combustion engine10 . This means that the amount of oxidant present in the reaction is just
enough to completely burn the fuel. Therefore higher ratio indicates complete combustion hence
better efficiency. Following table indicates the mixture ratio and O/F ratio to various
compositions.
It is obvious that cryogens is undoubtedly has edge over other propellants. Semi-cryogens have
higher O/F and mixture ratio, hence performs better than hypergols and solids.
Density of the propellant affects the design, manufacture and the efficiency of rocket engines.
Propellants density depends on the nature for fuel (like solid, liquid etc.) being used. It is
important to note that both high and low density of any propellant has both advantages and
limitations. For a given weight, dense propellant can be carried in smaller and lighter tanks,
resulting in low overall weight of rocket11 . Beside, higher density also implies higher mass
flow, resulting in high exhaust velocity.
Lower density propellant can results in complication related to their storage. Liquid hydrogen for
example has a very low density (0.071 g/cc) and, therefore, requires a storage volume many
times greater. Nevertheless the overall density could be enhanced and compensated with high
mixture ratio, resulting in reduction of storage volume. Hypergolic has better overall density,
thus can be stored in smaller tanks. Hence, normally for a heavy lift vehicle the last stage is a
cryogenic stage and earlier stages are hypergolic stages.
Conclusion
This brief has carried out an assessment of the launch vehicles used globally for launching of
heavy satellites into the geostationary orbit. This assessment is mainly based on the comparison
of the various features of different launch systems and the characteristics of the propellants put in
use.
India has recently joined the club of countries capable of launching of satellites weighing more
than 2 tonnes. The above assessment indicates that India has taken a long route develop the
technology for heavy launch vehicles. Particularly, development of cryogenic technology has
been a major challenge for India. However, the overall assessment indicates that other states too
have undergone a longer gestation periods. Indias trajectory for the technology development is
similar to that of other agencies. However, presently India is a nascent player in this field and is
required to make quick progress. India current launch vehicle has three states namely solid,
liquid and cryogenic. In order to increase its payload carrying capability India needs to change
this configuration and opt for semi-cryogenic stage as one of the stages in its GSLV programme.
Since, now India has developed cryogenic engine technology it should not take much of a time to
evolve a system with semi-cryogenic and cryogenic stages.
The current configuration for launch vehicles of major space agencies is based on semi-
cryogenic and cryogenic approach. The futuristic porgrammes of various space agencies are also
found revolving around advancing the semi-cryogenic technology. Presently, Russia has plans to
advance its next version of Proton rockets for lifting 80 metric tons into low Earth orbit in a
single launch. Subsequently, this system could be upgraded to launch 160 metric tons. The
primary fuels for such heavy launches are proposed as semi-cryogenics. For India also it is
essential to develop semi-cryogenic engines to launch heavy payloads in future.
Modernising the Armys Tactical-level
Communications Systems
Gurmeet Kanwal
February 14, 2014
The MNCs manufacturing defence equipment have been rushing to India as the country is likely
to spend approximately US$ 100 billion (Rs 250,000 crore) over the next ten years on defence
acquisitions. This has been evident in the recently concluded DefExpo 2014.
However, most of this expenditure will be on weapons platforms like main battle tanks, 155 mm
artillery, infantry combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, ships and submarines and very little on
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
systems (C4I2SR). In fact, the modernisation of communications systems has lagged far behind
that of weapons platforms, particularly in the Indian army.
While some modern frequency-hopping radio sets with integral encryption devices have been
introduced into service in recent years, networked communications, which form the backbone of
an effective command and control system, need substantial upgradation. The existing Plan
AREN system that is designed to roll forward and keep pace with offensive operations in the
plains has been in service for almost three decades and is based on outdated and bulky
technologies like second generation radio relay hubs.
Requests for Information (RFI) were floated for a Tactical Communication System (TCS) for
offensive operations and a Battlefield Management System (BMS) for communication at the
tactical level in defensive operations a few years ago, but since then the acquisition process has
meandered continuously and this has resulted in prolonged delays in introducing both these
systems into service.
The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum surrendered by the
armed forces will go a long way in providing modern land-line communications in peace stations
and to limited extent up to the war-time locations of higher formation HQ. However, future
communication systems will need to provide wide-band data capabilities to facilitate the real
time transmission of images and battlefield video while on the move all the way down to
armoured and artillery regiments and infantry battalions.
This will be done by the BMS, which will be integrated with the Army Static Communications
(ASCON) system. ASCON is the backbone communication network of the army. ASCON
provides voice and data links between static headquarters and those in peace-time locations. It is
expected to be of modular design so that it can be upgraded as better technology becomes
available. The BMS is meant for communications from the battalion headquarters forward to the
companies and platoons. It will enable the Commanding Officer to enhance his situational
awareness and command his battalion through a secure communications network with built-in
redundancy.
The BMS system will integrate all surveillance resources available at the battalion or regiment
level, including from locally launched UAVs and ground sensors. It will also provide the
accurate location of all the troops and key weapons platforms as well as the location of enemy
troops and terrain analysis. The BMS will also automatically receive and transmit data, voice
and images from multiple sources above the regiment and battalion level, including radars,
cameras and laser range finders, simultaneously providing junior commanders on the battlefield
all relevant information that has been received from the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS).
The system will be based on net radio-cum-hand-held computers.
The TCS is a system that is meant for offensive operations a mobile system that can leapfrog
forward as offensive operations progress into enemy territory. The offensive operations echelons
of the pivot or holding Corps deployed on the international boundary and the three Strike
Corps will be equipped with TCS. TCS will replace the obsolescent Plan AREN system.
It was reported on July 23, 2013, that BMS has been categorised as a make India system by the
Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence Minister. This implies that the system must
be designed and developed in India by domestic companies. According to the US-based Defense
News, In the months ahead, expressions of interest (EOIs) will be sent to more than a dozen
Indian defence companies, private and state-owned, inviting them to participate in the program.
The EOIs are likely to be sent to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of
India, Computer Maintenance Corporation, ITI, domestic private-sector major Tata Power
SED, Rolta India, Wipro, Larsen & Toubro, HCL, Punj Lloyd, Bharat Forge, Tata Consultancy,
Info Systems and Tech Mahindra. This will ensure that Indian companies invest in developing
the required communications technology and acquire the ability to design and implement robust
tactical communications systems.
MNCs with suitable technologies and the right experience to help the Indian companies should
be considered for forming either a joint venture or for buying technology and assistance as
system integrators. According to Defense news, The overseas defence companies expected to
compete include Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael and Elbit of Israel; Thales and Nexter of
France; Rhode & Schwartz of Germany; BAE Systems of the UK; Lockheed Martin, Raytheon
and General Dynamics of the US; and, Selex of Italy. Indian companies planning to bid for
these contracts must carefully evaluate the technological capabilities of these MNCs and how
their systems have fared during recent combat operations, the type of experience they have in
integrating tactical communications systems and whether they are likely to bring a long-term
commitment to the Indian projects.
Defense News has reported further that The government expects to select two vendors after four
months of evaluation of the EOIs. Each of those two companies will be asked to develop four
BMS prototypes for mountain, jungle, plains and desert operations. The development of the
prototypes is projected to cost about $67 million with the MoD covering 80 per cent of the
expense and the shortlisted domestic company 20 per cent. The prototypes will be put through
extensive field trials and the selected defence company will be asked to produce more than 500
systems in India for an estimated $5 billion. It will take up to three years for the final bidder to
be selected before production begins.
Meanwhile, the acquisition process for the TCS system is also underway. Both TCS and BMS
will need to be mutually compatible systems and the MNC that can supply state-of-the-art
technology for both the systems at competitive prices will have a clear edge. In fact, it may be
cost-effective for the MoD to award both the contracts to the same Indian company so that
communications compatibility can be ensured.
India must skilfully leverage its buyers clout to ensure that each defence acquisition contract
results in the transfer of cutting edge defence technology to Indian companies. This is necessary
not only for communication systems but also for all other weapons and equipment so that the
country's technological threshold is raised by an order of magnitude.
Future defence acquisitions must be firmly rooted in joint research and development with leading
MNCs, joint trials and testing and joint manufacture and marketing. The patron-client, buyer-
seller relationship in arms procurement in which India had been involved in the past, with first
the Soviet Union and then Russia, must be consigned to history as a sorry chapter that is best
forgotten.
Drugs and the Golden Triangle: Renewed
Concerns for Northeast India
Namrata Goswami
February 10, 2014
India has been working on plans of building economic corridors in Northeast Indias
neighborhood to boost foreign trade and to give the economy the much needed leap forward.
Execution of these plans is crucial to achieve the goals of India's Look-East policy.
Northeast India can develop, prosper and eventually overcome its troubles by engaging eastern
foreign neighbours. Especially with the recent agreement on the Bangladesh, China, India,
Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor blueprint, India can access markets in China's west and
southwest, through the Northeastern borders. Yunnan, the neighbouring province in China is the
network hub for trade and connectivity with the rest of the country. Equally important for
Northeast India is the regional connectivity under the sub-regional and regional cooperation such
as ASEAN, SAARC, and the Greater Mekong Sub-region Cooperation (GMS). That said, a word
of caution is appropriate to understand the ugly behemoth of narcotics trafficking intertwined
with ethnic insurgencies in the neighbouring Golden Triangle. Huge quantities of illicit narcotics
can easily ride the new access routes of greater connectivity and can blow up already existing
issues of secured human health and wellbeing of society.
Indias security strategy for the economic corridors and connectivity will have to entail water
tight anti-drugs control measures and mechanisms to snuff out the possibilities of surges in
narcotics trafficking that may result from better connectivity and established networks of peoples
across the region.
Bordering Myanmar to the east are the four Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur,
Mizoram and Nagaland. Each states data from the National AIDS Control Organisation reports
show high numbers of HIV-related diseases and volumes of drug trafficking. Narcotics and
contraband firearms are regularly trafficked across the unmanned border as the routes of western
Myanmar are controlled by Indias north-east insurgents. In recent years, Manipur has witnessed
huge quantities of contraband high Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride (PH)-content drugs,
manufactured in India, being trafficked into Myanmar for processing narcotics especially heroin.
The thriving ethnic insurgencies of Manipur with their own tax structure help to exacerbate the
problem. Pseudoephedrine is smuggled from New Delhi to Myanmar and China via Guwahati by
conduits based in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram (See Figure I)
Figure I: Flow of Drugs in the Golden Triangle and Northeast India

Source: Namrata Goswami
Traditionally, the Golden Triangle is a region between the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and
Thailand; a famous region for its opium production. According to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) latest Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2013, opium cultivation in the
Golden Triangle went up by 22 per cent in 2013 propelled by a 13 per cent growth in Myanmar.
This registered a 26 per cent rise from 2012 in opium cultivation and yield.1 A decade ago, the
Golden Triangle supplied half the worlds heroin, but drug barons backed by ethnic militias in
Myanmar have turned to trafficking massive quantities of amphetamines and methamphetamines
which can be produced cheaply in small, hidden laboratories, without the need for acres of
exposed land2 and these narcotics now dominate the Myanmar part of the Triangle.
Insurgencies in Myanmar have been funded by narcotics trafficking. Cease-fires with the civilian
government of Myanmar have left rebel groups free to continue their manufacturing and
smuggling without interference. Since insurgencies based on purely ethnic issues are on the way
out, high profits and access to the lucrative Thai and foreign markets now drive narcotics
production and trafficking. The Myanmar government can do little to counter drug trafficking in
the Golden Triangle as traffickers are well organized Chinese syndicates operating from outside
Myanmar.3
Myanmars Wa ethnic group is the largest producer of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS).
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is sustained by narcotics money in addition to arms
contraband. Increases in the use of methamphetamine in Thailand have contributed to regional
instability and Thailands National Security Council now recognizes narcotics smuggling as a
critical threat to its national security. Thailand accuses Myanmar of unleashing narcotic
aggression on Thailand and with the stupendous increase of methamphetamine production
within Myanmar, drug trafficking into Thailand from Myanmar is on the rise. Ethnic militias
like the UWSA and Shan State Army (SSA) control most of the 1800 km Myanmar border with
Thailand and corruption within the Thai security forces has abetted a thriving narcotics trade.
Within Myanmar, the UWSA has emerged as the largest producer of methamphetamine. Mong
Yawn, the drug base of the UWSA in the Shan state in Myanmar, enjoys direct access to the Thai
province of Chiang Mai, emerging as one of the biggest drug boom towns near the Myanmar-
Thailand border. Methamphetamine smuggling from Myanmar into Thailand by UWSA amounts
to 200 million pills per year. Besides tackling border corruption within its ranks, the Thai
military has a dangerous task, challenged as it is by the Shan and Wa armies complicit with
narcotics crossing the border.
Chinas Drug Control Strategy
The former military junta in Myanmar had been at war with the ethnic rebel groups of the Wa
and the Shans interspersed with periodic ceasefires. The UWSA had earlier supported the
Tatmadaw (Burmese military) but later retreated to the northern part of Shan state. The
Tatmadaw also propped up several ethnic militias as a check against the ceasefire rebels. These
various ethnic armed groups struck deals amongst themselves to facilitate the profitable narcotic
trade.
Chinas Yunnan province has a 1997-km border with Myanmar and narcotics have adversely
affected many Chinese border villages. Previously heroin use made Yunnan suffer the highest
HIV rate of any Chinese province or autonomous region. Ruili, the border town in Yunnan,
suffers from two-thirds of drug users infected with HIV due to sharing contaminated injections.
This situation is further aggravated by the presence of guns and a heightened risk of border
related violence.
In 2000, taking advantage of the ongoing conflicts in Shan state in Myanmar, China persuaded
the ethnic Wa to relocate with their drug production units from the Myanmar-China border to the
Myanmar-Thailand border (See Figure II). The UWSA, aided by the Tatmadaw, had wrested the
new acquired territory from the control of the SSA of Khun Sa, the opium warlord and King of
the Golden Triangle. This move reduced drug trafficking into China and at the same time
dumped the problem on Thailand. China armed the Wa with weapons and supplied money. In
return the Wa would control the entrance and exit regions of Shan state and help the Chinese in
constructing roads through the territory giving China the much desired access to the Myanmar
coast. The Tatmadaw also formed an alliance with the UWSA to first defeat the Shans and
second to serve as proxies in fighting the Thai army at the border.
Figure II: Migration of Wa from the China-Myanmar Border to the China-Thai Border

Source: Namrata Goswami
However China still suffers narcotics trafficking, with 3.2 tons of ATS seized in the Yunnan
province in 2009. China has taken measures in the pharmaceutical industry to deter illegal drug
production. The latest seizure of 3.3 tons of crystal methamphetamine in South China,
Guangdong province, was made in early 2014.4 However, China is far from ensuring that the
flow of drugs remains limited, and its own provinces escape its lethal effects.
Implications for Northeast India
Illicit drug trade along the Golden Triangle has serious implications for Northeast India. First,
opening up to Southeast Asia carries a double edged sword. On one hand, it promises
development and investments. On the other hand, it invites the danger of rapid flow of illicit
drugs and arms. Second, without effective drug control mechanisms that guarantee that illicit
trade is kept to the minimum, the adverse consequences of illicit drugs on Northeast society
could leave long term negative effects. Third, India should establish institutional mechanisms
with China, Myanmar and Thailand to counter-illicit trafficking. Finally, there must be a long
term Indian strategy to limit drugs trafficking, address the social impact of drug addiction, spread
the word about the ill effects of drug abuse in schools, and established efficient rehabilitation
centres in the HIV and drug zones in Northeast India. There is perhaps no other way to address
the life threatening effects of drug addiction and HIV, currently destroying youths in Northeast
India especially Manipur.
Where is Egypt going?
K. P. Fabian
February 3, 2014
Now that three years have elapsed since the 2011 Revolution in Egypt, it is pertinent, nay,
imperative, to ask the central question: Where is Egypt? Where is it going? On January 25, 2011
Egyptians shed fear of their repressive government that had deprived them of their human rights
for decades and gathered in the world famous Tahrir Square to demand that President Hosni
Mubarak resign. Mubarak, in office for thirty years, fell eighteen days later. Millions of
Egyptians in Tahrir Square and elsewhere saw the exit of Mubarak as signaling the beginning of
Egypts journey towards democracy. Three years later, it is painfully clear that Egypt has lost its
way towards democracy; in fact, it is heading fast in the opposite direction. The police state
under Mubarak is being restored; freedom of expression has been drastically abridged; dissent
does provoke punishment; political prisoners total up to twenty one thousand; and political
demonstrations need prior permission. Egypt is under military rule and a field marshal is soon
going to be elected president.
The Egyptians who assembled, or more accurately, who were permitted to assemble, in Tahrir
Square on January 2014 did not go there to celebrate the 2011 Revolution. They went there to
bury that Revolution and to celebrate the 2003 coup. Many carried big photos of General Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi and of Nasser, the most charismatic leader in the Arab world in our times. The
obvious intention was to suggest that al-Sisi is the Nasser of the day, and the savior of Egypt.
Some carried photographs of Mubarak, a clear indication that the Mubarak loyalists, known as
fulul, are actively engaged in politics, supporting the regime in power. It was a state-funded and
state-sponsored, superbly and expensively choreographed event. There was a state-of-the-art
stage, a far cry from the rickety, shaky one in 2011 the same day. The lighting system was
sophisticated and expensive. The crowd was there to cheer General al-Sisi. There were t-shirts
and sweets displaying his image in galore. Predictably enough on January 27 the General was
promoted Field Marshal and the SCAF(Supreme Council of Armed Forces) approved his
candidature at the Presidential election, dates for which are yet to be announced. Incidentally, the
choreography is unerring. The interim President, Adly Mansour, appointed by al- Sisi, had
earlier said that the election to the Parliament would take place before that of the President.
Later, it was announced that there was flexibility, meaning the sequence could be reversed. The
intention is to take advantage of the current high popularity of al-Sisi whom many women say on
television that they want to marry.
It is time to look analytically and critically at the political developments in Egypt since the exit
of Mubarak in February 2011. Otherwise it will not be possible to understand what is now
happening. The first and foremost point to note is that it was a flawed and incomplete revolution:
Mubarak fell, but the the Deep State that supported and enabled him to sustain his dictatorship
did not fall. The concept of the Deep State was originally applied to Ottoman Turkey and its
republican successor founded by Ataturk. It basically meant secret sources of political power.
Currently, in Egypts case, it means the triumvirate of the Army, the Higher Judiciary, and the
Intelligence agencies, generally known as the Mukhabarat in the Arab world. Out of the three the
Army is the leader and others are attendant lords.
The second point to underline is that the Deep State did not want Egypt to be a democracy as it
had everything to lose if that were to happen. The SCAF grabbed power when Mubarak fell;
Egyptians hold the Army in high esteem and when the Army announced that it would arrange for
election in six months time and hand over power to a democratically elected government most
Egyptians believed it. However, the Army was in no hurry to hand over power. It delayed the
election, finally held and completed in eleven months. Here it is important to look at the
collaboration between the Army and the Higher Judiciary. Judge Tahani el Gebali, Deputy
President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was the friend, philosopher, and guide to SCAF
in legal matters. She advised the postponement of the election to the parliament pointing out the
risk of the Muslim Brotherhoods victory. When the results came with the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Salafists winning a 70% majority, SCAF regretted the holding of election and told her
that she was right.
The Higher Judiciary in Egypt is exceptionally smart and cunning in pursuing its goals. It had
made sure that there was a minor technical flaw in the procedure adopted for the election; the
intention was to make use of it, if necessary, to declare the parliament to have been illegally
elected. This is precisely what happened. The parliament met in January 2012, only to discover
that it was devoid of any powers. There was an Army-appointed Prime Minister, Kamal el
Ganzouri, not answerable to the parliament. He threatened the Speaker (Saad el- Katatni) many a
time that he would get the parliament dissolved.
The parliament was dissolved by the Higher Judiciary in June 2012. By then it was clear that the
Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi might win the election for the president. After
the parliament was dissolved, SCAF issued a declaration arrogating to itself powers to decide on
the budget and for issuing laws. The excuse given was that since there was no parliament it was
necessary to fill the legal vacuum. The real intention was to render President Morsi as powerless
as the dissolved parliament was. Morsi who took office on June 30, 2012, bided his time to
recover his lost powers. In August 2012, unknown armed men killed 16 Egyptian soldiers in the
Sinai, close to the border with Israel. Earlier, Morsi had attracted attention and praise from US
for effecting a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. Morsi invited Field Marshal Tantawi, the
head of SCAF and ruler of Egypt after Mubarak to resign. General Sami Anan, the chief of the
Army, too was invited to resign.They did and Tantawi was offered and accepted the post of
Advisor to the President. Morsi appointed General al- Sisi as Defence Minister. A superficial
observer might have thought that Morsi scored a decisive victory over SCAF and that the latter
accepted defeat stoically. The future was to show that SCAF was determined to win the war after
losing a battle. Morsi believed that his victory over SCAF was decisive and permanent.
Morsi decided to accelerate the constitution making process. A constituent assembly appointed
by the dissolved parliament was writing the draft. It was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood
numerically and otherwise. There was reason to believe that at any time the Higher Judiciary
might dissolve the assembly. Morsi had to recover the powers taken away by the Army before he
came into office. In November 2012, Morsi issued a declaration that gave himself immunity
from judicial scrutiny for certain acts. The primary intention was to complete the writing of the
draft of the constitution, put it to a referendum, and hold election to the parliament as early as
possible. In other words, Morsi wanted to take Egypt towards democracy. But he was viciously
attacked for behaving like a Pharao and wit sent him a letter in hieroglyphics.
However, Morsi failed to notice that his adversaries were succeeding in portraying him as an
undemocratic leader taking Egypt in the direction of an Islamic state, shackled by Sharia, and
anti-modern. In fact, some of his actions did lend weight to such an interpretation. For example,
he appointed as Governor of Luxor a man believed to be associated with an attack on foreign
tourists killing in all sixty in November 1997.
The Higher Judiciary bided its time. It did not, though it could have, quash the presidential order.
Earlier, it had quashed Morsis order reviving the dissolved parliament. The intention of the
Deep State was to give Morsi a long rope. The public was turning against him as the economy
was going from bad to worse, with shortages and soaring prices of essential goods. Given the
precarious political situation, the number of foreign tourists dropped. Naturally, Morsis promise
to create employment was not carried out. The Deep State watched the swelling anti-Morse tide
with some satisfaction. Morsi won the referendum on the constitution. But, it was a Pyrrhic
victory. His adversaries got emboldened and protests against him mounted. The Army started to
look for an opportunity to get rid of Morsi. The police was not fully cooperating with the
government in meeting the protests as the higher officials in the ministry of the interior were part
of the Deep State. They were not going to take orders from the Brotherhood whom they had
tortured for decades. Finally, Morsi had to call in the army to deal with the protestors. Military
tanks were deployed in Cairo in December 2012 as the anti-Morsi protests mounted. That
marked a decisive point in Morsis downfall.
The coalition against Morsi was broad based with practically all Egyptians minus the followers
of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Army was not only watching, but giving much more than
encouragement to the protesters. They read the writing on the wall correctly: If they keep
mobilizing, at some point the Army will step in and remove Morsi. The D-date chosen was the
30th of June, 2013 when Morsi will complete one year in office. Predictably, General al- Sisi
gave a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi: Settle through negotiations or else. There was no way Morsi
could have negotiated his way out as his foes did not want to talk to him. It seems that he was
under the false impression that US will not permit a coup against him. What game US played is
yet to be fully revealed. Probably, it was a double game. On July 3, 2013, President Morsi was
physically taken to an undisclosed place and kept incommunicado for weeks. The SCAF got
back in power and promptly appointed the President of the Superior Constitutional Court, Judge
Adly Mansour as interim president once again manifesting the close coordination between the
two principal pillars of the Deep State.
Once we understand the truth about Morsis fall it is easier to understand what has happened
since then. It is true that Morsi was inept and did not play his cards well. But, it is also true that
he was dealt a bad hand. He could get a prime minister only in August 2013. With hindsight one
might say that the Deep State was astute enough to get the Brotherhood to replace its original
choice of presidential candidate Khairat el-Shater , an experienced and politically smart leader by
Morsi, rather inexperienced . The reason given for the disqualification of el-Shater is rather
strange considering that a revolution was supposed to have taken place: He had not completed
six years after release from prison. It is believed that Morsi was not all wanting to take on the
burden and that he wept when he was nominated.
The above account with the Deep State playing a crucial role in the post-Mubarak Egypt can be
contested. But, more and more scholars are agreeing with it.
To sum up, Egypt is proving that time travel is possible in politics. From 1952 onwards Egypt
had only military rulers, none elected in a free and fair election, except for Morsi for one year.
Col. Nasser and General Naguib led from 1952 to 54; Nasser alone till 1970; Sadat succeeded
and ruled till his assassination in 1982 when Mubarak took over. When Mubarak fell Tantawi
stepped in. Morsi was an aberration that was rapidly rectified. From early 1950s, Egypt became a
police state. That police state is being restored after a brief break of less than one year. It could
also be said that even under Morsi the police state was not completely dismantled. He too availed
of the police state at times.
Soon there will be a presidential election. al - Sisi will be elected either unopposed or against
conveniently placed opponents to choreograph the election process. Sooner or later, the people of
Egypt will realize that they have been fooled. Once again, not in the immediate future, they will
try to go to Tahrir Square. But this time the Deep State will play its cards with consummate skill.
The people might not be permitted to reach the Square unless they want to show support to the
regime.
With Egypts reversion to military rule, even if it is sanctified through an election process less
than free and fair, one can say definitely that the pro-democracy tide in the Arab world is
subsiding. The only success story so far is Tunisia where the Ennahda , an affiliate of the Muslim
Brotherhood, has shown maturity and superior political navigational skills . As of now,
democracy is growing roots in Tunisia where the Arab Spring began. In Yemen the move
towards democracy was stalled, but it has recovered with the successful conclusion of a broad
based dialogue on the new constitution. In Libya, there is anarchy with the state lacking in
authority . Egypt accounts for about a quarter of the Arab world in terms of population and its
centrality is beyond question. Egypts reversion to military rule will have its repercussions in the
Arab world. Yet, it is remarkable that Tunisia and Yemen seem unlikely to follow Egypt's bad
example.It will be wrong to conclude that Egypt's embrace of military rule will be invariably
replicated elsewhere in the Arab world.
ndia-South Korea Relations: A New
Beginning
Pranamita Baruah
January 29, 2014
India and South Korea enjoy warm and friendly relations. However despite its strong economic
foundation, the relationship has so far failed to realize its full potential. South Korean President
Park Geun-hyes recent visit to India was hoped to rectify that situation and add depth to the
bilateral relations. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, after his meeting with
President Park on January 16, 2014, averred that her visit would enable to impart further
substance, greater content and new momentum to the Strategic Partnership.
President Park four-day state visit was accompanied by a high level delegation which included
the foreign, trade, ICT and science ministers. During the visit, both Park and Manmohan Singh
presented the following three elements as a common vision: stronger high level political
cooperation, open economic and trade environment and deeper cultural understanding. In order
to implement the common vision, they agreed to set the following policy directions:
strengthening bilateral strategic communication channels in the political and security field;
consolidating the institutional framework for economic cooperation and creating more
favourable conditions for further expansion of trade and investment; deepening mutual
understanding by expanding cultural exchanges and people-to-people interactions and last but
not the least, closely cooperating with each other as partners on the regional and international
stages to address common challenges of mankind so as to usher in a new era of prosperity for the
international community. Both the countries signed nine pacts, including the Agreement on the
Protection of Classified Military Information, the MoU on Joint applied research, the conclusion
of negotiations for revision of the existing Double Taxation Avoidance Convention, etc. Both
sides are hoping that this would not only intensify the bilateral relationship but also open up new
opportunities for engagement.
One of the major focus of Parks visit was to discuss about the final clearance for the multi
billion dollar POSCO Steel Plant and the Port project in Odisha, which is one of the major South
Korean ventures in India. In 2005, the project was initially proposed to be set up in the coastal
town of Jagatsinghpur (Odisha). Not much progress could be achieved due to several factors like
environmental clearance, delay in land procurement and popular protest. However just few
weeks ahead of Parks visit, the Ministry of Environment and Forests gave the go ahead for the
POSCO plant. The Odisha government too has managed to provide about 2700 acres of land and
instead of setting up a 12 million tones per annum steel plant (as proposed originally), it has been
decided that the project would go ahead with 8 million tones. India has assured South Korea that
grant of mining concession for the project is at an advanced stage and so the project could finally
move ahead.
Both the leaders agreed that sustaining trade growth and expanding economic exchanges are vital
for a stronger India-South Korea relation. Over the years, the relationship has witnessed
tremendous growth in the economic sector. The enforcement of the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2010 has helped in boosting trade relations from $12 billion in
2008 to $20 billion in 2011. It is projected to reach $40 billion by 2015. While taking advantage
of the domestic market in India, South Korean firms (Hyundai, Samsung, LG, etc) have
performed quite well here. Although India has maintained by and large a restrictive investment
environment for foreign investors, it is significantly relaxed in the case of South Korean firms
pursuant to the CEPA. During Parks visit, the two countries announced the conclusion of
negotiations for the revision of the present Double Taxation Avoidance Convention. They also
agreed to establish a Joint Trade and Investment Promotion Committee at the cabinet level. The
two sides also agreed to establish a CEOs Forum comprising of captains of the industry and
commerce from both sides to provide new ideas for deepening bilateral economic ties. They even
explored the possibility of setting up a Korean Industrial Park in the state of Rajasthan. As South
Korea is one of the few countries which have been able to maintain a trade surplus with China,
India is hoping that the proposed park could provide a fillip to its industry suffering from slow
growth in exports and subsequently help the industrial sector to get integrated in the global
supply chain.
As far as political and security ties are concerned, India-South Korea relations have been steadily
forging ahead. During Parks visit, the two sides emphasized on enhancing political interaction
through mutual visits, including parliamentarians and high-level officials from central as well as
provincial governments. They also underlined the need to expand the current bilateral security
consultations. As for defense cooperation, in recent years, both the countries have not only
conducted joint naval exercises, but also working together on defense R&D and anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. During Parks visit, the two countries concluded an Agreement
on the Protection of Classified Military Information which would boost defence engagement.
They have not only agreed to hold annual interactions between their two national security
structures, but also to launch a Cyber Affairs Dialogue. India is also now strongly considering
purchase of South Korean minesweepers.
Civilian uses of space have opened up new avenues for engagement. South Korea has an
ambitious space programme and it has been looking for international partners. Indias cost-
effective space launches are attractive to Seoul, particularly after the recent success of
Chandrayaan and GSLV launches. Both the countries signed the implementing agreement
between the Indian Space Research Organization and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute for
cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The two countries also agreed to increase
collaboration in the peaceful uses of space science and technology. While appreciating the
contribution of the Science and Technology Cooperation Fund worth $10 million towards joint
research projects since 2011, the two countries agreed to create an additional fund of $10 million
(with a contribution of $5 million by each side) to promote joint mega projects. Moreover they
have inked a MoU on Joint Applied Research and Development Programme in Science and
Technology. The two countries also agreed to establish the India-ROK ICT Policy Forum to
discuss cooperation on software and information security. As far as implementation of the New
Delhi-Seoul civil nuclear deal (2011) is concerned, the India has assured Seoul that it would take
up the latters proposal for setting up nuclear plants as and when India starts working on phase II
of those projects.
India-South Korea relations have come a long way since the establishment of their diplomatic
relationship in 1973. Throughout the Cold War, the ideological differences largely deterred the
two countries from realizing the full potential of the relationship. The growing economic
interaction since Indias economic liberalization pushed both to explore the possibility of
cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Of course Indias growing emphasis on its Look East
Policy and South Koreas New Asia Diplomatic Initiative has helped elevate the relationship
to one of strategic partnership. In the coming years, the two can expand their sphere of
cooperation in areas like intelligence sharing, infrastructure development projects (e.g.,
shipping). At the multilateral level, they can even explore the possibility of cooperation with
countries like Japan in sectors like maritime security, counter terrorism, drug trafficking, climate
change, UNPKOs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, etc.

Articles

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Articles

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Internal Security Priorities for the New

Government: Institutional Reforms

Você também pode gostar