DISCUSS THE MERIT AND DEMERIT OF THE AFRICOM

PROJECT PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES. DO YOU

THINK IT IS IN AFRICA’S BEST STRATEGIC INTEREST TO
SUBSCRIBE TO THE PROJECT?

BY

CLIFFORD OGBEIDE
Ogbeide2000@yahoo.com
Tel: 08058773326,
07067040962

AAU/SPS/CSDS/2008/M.SC/2540

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED AT THE CENTRE FOR

STRATEGIC AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (CSDS), AMBROSE
ALLI UNIVERSITY, EKPOMA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF M.Sc. DEGREE IN
STRATEGIC STUDIES, NOVEMBER 2009.

LECTURER: JOHN ANEGBODE PhD

 ABSTRACT.
This seminar paper seeks to examine the merits and de-merits of AFRICOM, its
definition, concept, functions, Location and mission as a project being proposed by the
United States of America and its implication on the African Continent. The African
response to the concept of AFRICOM was critically looked into through the ways and
manner African leaders, heads of government, sub-regional and continental economic
blocs have reacted to the US proposal for AFRICOM.

In the research work, it was established that Africans are apprehensive about the
AFRICOM project because its perceived negative influence and security threats
implications might constitute thorough militarization of the already militarized continent;
the fear of the continent being a battle field for terrorists or groups that are looking for
American and western targets for sabotage and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, it learnt
that the initiators of the proposed AFRICOM project have not been able to convince the
African leaders that the project will not be used for regime change in any country (which
is perceived as un-cooperative toward their policies or installation of a puppet regime;
stating that this is not neocolonialism. As it is all about securing Africa’s oil and other
mineral resources for their industrial needs, which will bring about competition or rivalry
between the Western capitalist nations and the communist nation of china. Obviously,
the demerits outweighs the merits and thus, detrimental to the proposed African Host.

To overcome these situations, it is suggested that, African leaders should vehemently

reject the AFRICOM proposal in its entirety as it is a “dead project on delivery”.

The research methodology adopted includes; consultation of relevant literatures,

journals, informative materials from the internet and the historical methods of data
analyses.
 INTRODUCTION

What is AFRICOM?

On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced
the creation of U.S. Africa Command. [1] The decision was the culmination of a 10-year
thought process within the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledging the emerging
strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent
impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as
well. Yet, the department’s regional command structure did not account for Africa in a
comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining
relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command enables
Department of Defense (DoD) to better focus its resources to support and enhance
existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional
economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional
organizations an integrated Department of Defense (DoD) coordination point to help
address security and related needs. [2]

The designers of U.S. Africa Command clearly understood the relationships between
security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa. As a result, U.S. Africa
Command, or AFRICOM, reflects a much more integrated staff structure, one that
includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State,
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government
agencies involved in Africa. The command also will seek to incorporate partner nations
and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S.
staff on common approaches to shared interests. The United state Africa command or
“AFRICOM, is a new U.S. military headquarters devoted solely to Africa. AFRICOM is
the result of an internal re-organization of the U.S. military command structure, creating
one administrative headquarters that is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S.
military relations with 53 African countries.” [3] Previously, Africa had been covered by
three separate commands – European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command
(PACOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM).

However, AFRICOM is not simply a re-organization of the US military. If re-organization

were the only goal, there would be no reason to oppose the command. What goes
unsaid in the above definition is the fundamental shift in the roles of the State
Department and the Department of Defense. (DoD) Many duties that previously
belonged to non-military US agencies – things such as building schools and digging
wells – will now fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DoD). The
resulting dual-nature of the military is not only confusing to our African partners but sets
a negative example for countries who already over use the military in civilian affairs.[4]

AFRICOM will not be fashioned entirely from scratch; however the newest
Combatant Command (CCOCOM) will inherit a series of missions initiated by its
predecessors. Two of the most significant—Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–Trans
Sahara (OOEF-TS) and the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CCJTF-HOA)
—carry a mandate directly linked to the Global War on Terrorism (GGWOT).

Because of its incorporation of security, development, and humanitarian functions

into one organization, AFRICOM may be particularly susceptible to strategic failure if
it uncritically incorporates the operational concepts that have guided its predecessors.
If AFRICOM is seen as camouflaging militarism in the guise of humanitarianism, even
non-DoD American efforts in Africa are likely to suffer a loss of legitimacy and
effectiveness. It follows that, in order to be successful, AFRICOM must divorce itself
from the model of recent U.S. military engagement in Africa. [5]

AFRICOM’s birth underscores a recent, significant change in U.S. policy toward Africa.
Despite conducting at least 20 military operations in Africa during the 1990s, in mid-
decade DoD planners maintained that the United States had “very little traditional
strategic interest in Africa.” [6] In 1998, President Bill Clinton’s National Security
Strategy of the United States listed Africa last in its inventory of “Integrated Regional
Approaches” to U.S. security. [7] During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate
George W. Bush noted that “while Africa may be important, it doesn’t fit into [American]
national strategic interests, as far as I can see them.” [8] As one respected analyst
noted at the time, U.S. relations with Africa at the turn of the 21st century seemed to
mirror those of the 20th: marginalized at best. [9]

Since 2001, however, Africa has steadily gained strategic importance in the eyes of
American policymakers. Africa recently surpassed the Middle East as the largest U.S.
regional supplier of crude oil. [10] Nigeria, the continent’s largest oil exporter, now ranks
as America’s fifth leading supplier, while Angola and Algeria rank sixth and seventh.[11]
The continent’s oil production is expected to rise in coming years: Ghana’s president
has declared his country “an African tiger” on the strength of its recent oil discoveries;
Sierra Leone’s president has hinted that his country too may hold rich deposits. [12]
These new discoveries and an American desire to wean itself from Middle East
suppliers are reflected in recent figures: the United States imported 22 percent of its
crude oil from African states in 2006, rising from 15 percent 2 years prior. [13] A Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) report projects that this share will rise to 25 percent y 2015. [14]

The United States is not the only country to take note of Africa’s increasing energy
stores. With an economy growing at roughly 9 percent per year, China is looking to
Africa to sate its precipitously rising oil requirements. China currently imports nearly a
third of its crude oil from African sources, and President Hu Jintao has made a recent
priority of courting African leaders. [15] China has cancelled over $110 billion of debt for
31 African states since 2000, and has overtaken the World Bank in terms of overall
lending to the continent. [16] As both the United States and China vie for Africa’s
expanding oil resources, several analysts have noted Africa’s emergence as a theater
for strategic competition.[17]
AFRICOM also reflects a post-9/11 response to perceived security threats emanating
from the continent. Foremost in many American minds is Africa’s potential as a haven
for international terrorist organizations. Extreme poverty, ethno-religious divisions,
corrupt and weak governance, failed states, and large tracts of “ungoverned space”
combine to offer what many experts believe to be fertile breeding grounds for
transnational Islamist error. [18]

Reflecting both the terrorism threat and desired stability in Africa’s energy-producing
states, DoD is designing AFRICOM around a linkage between humanitarianism and
U.S. strategic interests. Remove the precursors to internal strife and humanitarian
disaster, so the thinking goes, and you also eliminate threats to U.S. security.

LOCATION:

AFRICOM is currently located in Stuttgart, Germany, alongside European Command.

Originally, AFRICOM sought a headquarters on the continent, but after a strong outcry
from African governments, the Pentagon decided to leave the Command in Stuttgart.
AFRICOM has said that it will remain there until they find it necessary to relocate on the
continent. The command inherited a small but meaningful U.S. military presence
already existing in numerous African nations, to include Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, as
well as Defense Department personnel assigned to U.S. Embassies and diplomatic
missions to coordinate Defense Department programs supporting U.S. diplomacy. Any
additional presence on the continent will take place only in full diplomatic consultation
and agreement with potential host nations. [19]

AFRICOM is a piece of a broader shift in US foreign policy – a foreign policy that places
an emphasis on defense above diplomacy. Donald Rumsfeld, a man expelled from
office for his failed policies in the Middle East, approved the creation of this command.
AFRICOM is designed to fulfill the immediate special interests of the United States with
little heed to the implications for the people of Africa. [20]

AFRICOM MISSION STATEMENT:

1. Military-to-military programs : The official AFRICOM website states that

“United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government agencies
and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through
military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military
operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in
support of U.S. foreign policy. (Mission statement approved by the Secretary of
Defense May 2008.) [21]
However, in several meetings, briefings, and statements, high-level officials have said
that AFRICOM has three main goals: (1) to counter terrorism on African soil as part of
the Global War on Terror, (2) to protect oil resources, recognizing that the US currently
purchases approximately 24 percent of its oil from Africa, and (3) to counter China’s
growing economic investment on the continent. [22]

2. Building Partners Capacity :

The creation of U.S. Africa Command does not mean the U.S. military will take a
leading role in African security matters, nor will it establish large U.S. troop bases.
Rather, Africa Command is a headquarters staff whose mission entails coordinating the
kind of support that will enable African governments and existing regional organizations,
such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity to provide security and
respond in times of need. Africa Command builds on the many African-U.S. security
cooperation activities already underway, yet will be able to better coordinate DoD
support with other U.S. government departments and agencies to make those activities
even more effective. [23]

But on the contrary, One of AFRICOM's primary functions will be to train and equip
African militaries to "legitimize" and "professionalize" soldiers. The history of U.S. train
and equip programs has resulted in devastation and violence as a result of the infusion
of weapons and training into unstable areas of Africa and the rest of the world. During
the Cold War, the U.S. provided weapons and training to governments which were
willing to help fight the ideological war against communism, regardless of their human
rights or good governance standards. For instance they trained and equipped
Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan to help they fight against the
occupation of the Soviet Union. But today, it has been a miscalculation on their part as
the Taliban and Bin Laden has turned against the US in Afghanistan and their interest
around the world. The U.S. continues such programs today under the mantra of
counterterrorism and is currently providing military aid to countries such as Chad and
Equatorial Guinea.

3. Security and Stability: AFRICOM is designed to bring stability to Africa , but

[24]

only as it serves US interests. AFRICOM will actually destabilize the continent in

the long-run and will put our partners in Africa at risk. For all the talk of it being a
new, innovative engagement, AFRICOM may simply serve to protect unpopular
regimes that are friendly to US interests while Africa slips further into poverty, as
was the case during the Cold War. Creating security and stability in Africa is not
something that can be accomplished by the U.S. military- to-military programmes
regardless of specialized training and cooperation with experts and good
intentions. If the US government truly wants to promote peace, stability, and
 human development in Africa, it should not do so by a military command but by
offering a civilian-driven just security approach.

AFRICAN RESPONSE AND QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF AFRICOM

According to Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department officials, most African
governments have welcomed the presence of AFRICOM and have expressed positive
interest.[25] However, the African government, press, academicians, and leaders have
all expressed hostility to AFRICOM. [26] The United States needs to appreciate why
Africans voice such concerns. The success of AFRICOM requires that it gain legitimacy
in the eyes of Africans. This requires interacting differently with African leaders and
institutions.

“Victory is from God alone.” [27] This is the motto of the Nigerian Army, according to
Abba Mahmood. He continues: “For us in Africa, protection is from God alone and not
any superpower.” [28] How the AFRICOM issue is resolved, he asserts, will determine
the continued sovereignty, territorial integrity, and dignity of Africa or otherwise. An
important American ally is equally dismissive. Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Chief Ojo
Maduekwe, was adamant: “No foreign troops are welcomed on African soil, we have not
received a formal document on what AFRICOM is all about. We need better and more
adequate information from the U.S. government.” [29]

More troubling is the public statement of General Tsadkan Gebretensae of Ethiopia,

former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces, who serves as an advisor on the
transformation of liberation forces into legitimate armies. “There is widespread
skepticism even in countries where the security policy of those countries is very much in
line with the security thinking in Washington.” [30] Worse yet is the South African and
Southern African Development Community (SADC) rejection of AFRICOM. “SADC -
has rejected a US request to base its African Command (AFRICOM) force in the region”
according to South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota. [31]

To keep AFRICOM attuned to local issues, planners expected to locate the

headquarters (or several headquarters) on the continent, which did not gladden
Africans. The row over AFRICOM’s location further confirms the need to understand
African sensibilities. [32]

West African As A Base For Africom:

AFRICOM’s first public links with the West African country of Liberia was through a
Washington Post written by the African- American businessman Robert L. Johnson,
"Liberia's Moment of Opportunity." Forcefully endorsing AFRICOM, Johnson urged that
it be based in Liberia. [33]

Liberia’s president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, said “AFRICOM Can Help Governments
Willing to Help Themselves,” touting AFRICOM’s potential to “help” Africa “develop a
stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans
can be improved.” [34]

Despite these high-profile endorsements, the consolidation and expansion of U.S.

military power on the African continent is misguided and could lead to disastrous
outcomes. Liberia's 26-year descent into chaos started when the Reagan administration
prioritized military engagement and funneled military hardware, training, and financing
to the regime of the ruthless dictator Samuel K. Doe. This military "aid," seen as “soft
power” at that time, built the machinery of repression that led to the deaths of an
estimated 250,000 Liberians.

Basing AFRICOM in Liberia will put Liberians at risk now and into the future. Liberia’s
national threat level will dramatically increase as the country becomes a target of those
interested in attacking U.S. assets. This will severely jeopardize Liberia’s national
security interests while creating new problems for the country’s fragile peace and its
nascent democracy. [35]

The pattern of abuse and with the U.S. military suggests that if AFRICOM is based in
Liberia, the US administration will have an unacceptable amount of power to dictate
Liberia’s security interests and orchestrate how the country manages those interests. By
placing a military base in Liberia, the United States could systematically interfere in
Liberian and African politics in order to ensure that those who succeed in obtaining
power are subservient to U.S. national security and other interests. And this will be neo-
colonialism. [36]

Many countries and African civil society (e.g. Nigeria, Libya, Botswana Algeria, and
Zambia) and regional institutions (including SADC, ECOWAS, and the Arab Maghreb
Union) have opposed a physical AFRICOM presence and voiced a resounding “NO” to
AFRICOM. Only President Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia has invited AFRICOM to establish
a headquarters, and even Liberia’s support waned since the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) expressed reservations. [37] The Department of
Defense (DoD) failed to adequately consult with African governments and regional
bodies before announcing the establishment of the command, though now it appears to
be in continued consultation with African governments.

In mid-February 2008, General William “Kip” Ward, AFRICOM’s Commander, stated

that the headquarters would remain in Stuttgart, Germany for the foreseeable future. [38]
While visiting Ghana, President Bush also confirmed that the U.S. had no intention of
establishing bases in Africa. [39]

General Ward told the Senate Armed Services Committee that AFRICOM would first
seek “African solutions to African problems.” His testimony made AFRICOM sound like
a magnanimous effort for the good of the African people. In truth AFRICOM is a
dangerous continuation of US military expansion around the globe. Such foreign- policy
priorities, as well as the use of weapons of war to combat terrorist threats on the African
continent, will not achieve national security. AFRICOM will only inflame threats against
the United States, make Africa even more dependent on external powers and delay
responsible African solutions to continental security issues.[40]

But according to Dr Wafula Okumu [41] he summed up African responses and views
toward the establishment of AFRICOM in Africa soil in the following manners.
“Firstly, any country hosting the command will be criticized for violating Africa’s common
positions on African defence and security, which discourages the hosting of foreign
troops on the African soil. In particular, it is thought, such troops could be used to
undermine the Continent’s Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on common
African defence and security, and other positions on hosting foreign bases in Africa.

Secondly, Africans vividly remember that colonialism was preceded by philanthropic

missionaries who came to fulfill God’s Will of rescuing Africans from the clutches of
barbarism. Africa’s colonial history was characterized by military occupations,
exploitation of its natural resources and suppression of its people. After tasting decades
of independence, these countries are now jealously guarding their sovereignty and are
highly suspicious of foreigners, even those with good intentions.

Thirdly, when Africans reflect on the continent’s relations with the U.S., they see
ambiguity, neglect, and selective engagement. For instance, during the period of
decolonization, the U.S. did not openly support the UN decolonization initiatives,
particularly when these were not aligned with its Cold War positions. Often, the U.S.
was reluctant to support anti-colonial and anti-apartheid liberation movements in
Southern Africa and colonial Portugal, a member of NATO. U.S. forcefully reacted to
African regimes that forged close relations with the Soviet Union and China, while
aligning closer to anti-Communist African despots who were anti-democratic and had
horrendous human rights records. With this historical background, AFRICOM might be
considered in Africa if its objectives did not appear to be based on the principle of
“manifest destiny” of “saving Africa.” [42] The proposal will be seriously considered if it
primarily seeks to strengthen the capacity of the African Union and other African
organizations to implement Africa’s development, peace and security agendas.

Fourthly, Africans are not comfortable dealing with the military in matters related to their
development and sovereignty. Africans are concerned that the establishment of
AFRICOM might do more harm than good. They would be much more comfortable
dealing with American diplomats, USAID and Peace Corp volunteers rather than the
U.S. Marine.

Africans are nervously concerned that AFRICOM will sanction the militarization of
diplomacy and severely undermine multilateralism on the continent. Africans have
consciously adopted multilateralism as a common approach to addressing the
continent’s problems and confronting its challenges. AFRICOM seems to be a unilateral
approach that would be counter to the current trend towards unity on the continent.
Consequently, the establishment of AFRICOM must secure an African consensus
otherwise it would bring new and grave threats and challenges to the continent’s peace
and security agenda. The issue of foreign military presence on the African soil is in
violation of this agenda.

Additionally, the U.S. should bear in mind that following the emergence of other players
in Africa; any initiative aimed at the whole continent cannot be unilaterally conceived
and implemented. Although it is factually acknowledged that the U.S., as the most
powerful global military and economic power, has the will and capacity to undertake
unilateral actions, there are severe limitations and far-reaching consequences for the
unconsidered use of power. The U.S. engagement in the Middle East has proved that
the policy of consolidating democracy in the region, destroying al-Qaeda and removing
abhorrent regimes from power can fail despite all its seemingly good intentions.

Fifth, the launching and the aggressive promotion of AFRICOM are taking place at the
same time that Africa is debating the “Union Government” proposal. There are feelings,
as expressed in a recently held consultative meeting of the African Union PCRD in
Lusaka, Zambia, that AFRICOM is an American attempt to ensure that the aspiration for
African Unity is checked by a heavy U.S. military presence on the continent.

This concern is based on the track record of American military intervention in Africa.
The image of U.S. military involvement in Africa becomes more confusing when one
looks at the “hard” security concerns of Africa. Many Africans are asking why American
troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwandan genocides. Why the U.S.
forces remained anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the nearest
thing America ever had to an African colony, faced brutal disintegration in 2003?

Why the U.S. has not supported the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and instead
supported the Ethiopian intervention through airpower from CJTF-HOA stationed in
Djibouti? Is the U.S. really interested in addressing the felt security needs of Africans, or
does its proposed military presence foreshadow the kind of destruction we have seen
recently in Somalia? [43]

Is Africa to become merely another theatre of operations in which winning the “hearts
and minds” forms an essential component of a “security” driven agenda? Why should
ordinary Africans welcome an American presence that will create African targets for
extremists where none existed, and add an unwelcome dimension to already complex
local conflicts? Why is Washington not able to do something to address Africa’s needs
by modifying its trade policy? If the U.S. is really committed to participating in the
continent’s development why not support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD)? This would surely have a greater developmental impact, if improving the
livelihoods of the people is what the U.S. wants; maybe this has not been clearly stated
as such in the previous definition of Africa’s needs.

Sixth, Africans were never consulted during the conceptualization of AFRICOM. Rather
AFRICOM was announced and has been presented as a fait accompli. Africans are
presently experiencing the exuberance of self-importance and confidence to drive their
own destiny. There is a prevailing mood on the continent to reassert African self-worth
and self-determination. This is why “consultation” has become a common cliché on the
continent.

Seventh, there is also a concern that AFRICOM will suffer from mission creep by being
transformed from engagement in humanitarian missions to an interventionist force, as
was the case with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. The change of the
humanitarian objectives could also come about due to the nexus of energy, poverty, and
terrorism. Despite the oil wealth of African countries, 23 West African nations are
ranked bottom on the UN human development index on poverty. [44]

The test case for this mission would be the Niger Delta region where an insurgency has
been taking place since 2004, when unemployed youths took up arms to demand an
equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Besides using violence, sabotage and
kidnapping tactics, these youths under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND), have shut off approximately 711,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Nigeria’s
output of 2.5 million bpd. [45]

There is a strong feeling that if such activities interfere with U.S. oil supplies in Africa,
there is a high likelihood that AFRICOM could be used to protect U.S. interests.
Eighth, militarization of U.S.-Africa relations: Africans are wary of the U.S. record in Iraq
and concerned that the Pentagon is taking the lead role in the promotion of U.S.
interests. Establishment of AFRICOM could be seen as US approach of using military
force to pursue U.S. strategic interests.

AFRICOM will not only militarize U.S.-African relations but also those African countries
in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence
of American bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the U.S.
and make Americans targets of violence.

Ninth, the mixed messages being relayed to Africa by the U.S. government have
compounded the confusion and heightened the suspicions Africans have of AFRICOM’s
objectives: These countries are aware that the generosity of providing military advisors
can easily turn into sending of conventional forces and a full-blown military intervention.
For instance, AFRICOM could provide Nigerian armed forces training to combat the
Niger delta insurgence, which could later be upgraded to limited special operations to
rescue American hostages and hunt down those who have attacked American
economic interests” [46]

Competition for Resources

For a long time, the strategic thinking has been that the U.S. has “no compelling
interests in Africa” and “do not want anybody else to have any, either.” However,
whenever a non-Western nation or idea made its way into Africa, the U.S. got very
nervous.

Since1960- 1990, when the Soviet Union tried to spread its communist ideology to
Africa, and today, many think the U.S. is very nervous of Chinese economic penetration
into Africa. America’s concern is that the Chinese are trying to control the continent’s
natural resources and gain influence over it. “Ironically, AFRICOM was announced as
Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring eight African nations to negotiate deals that
will enable China to secure oil flows from Africa.” [47]

The U.S. is also worried that radical Islamism is a dangerous idea that could germinate
in poorly and badly governed states of Africa. AFRICOM is being sold as an answer to
these threats. This military-driven U.S. engagement with Africa reflects the desperation
of the U S administration to control the increasingly strategic natural resources on the
African continent, especially oil, gas, and uranium. With increased competition from
China, among other countries, for those resources, the United States wants above all
else to strengthen its foothold in resource-rich regions of Africa.
Nigeria is the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United States. The West Africa region
currently provides nearly 20% of the U.S. supply of hydrocarbons, up from 15% just five
years ago and well on the way to a 25 share forecast for 2015.[48] While the US
administration endlessly beats the drums for its “global war on terror,” the rise of
AFRICOM underscores that the real interests of neo-conservatives has less to do with
al-Qaeda than with more access and control of extractive industries, particularly oil.

Responsibility for operations on the African continent is currently divided among three
distinct Commands: U.S. European Command, which has responsibility for nearly 43
African countries; U.S. Central Command, which has responsibility for Egypt, Sudan,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya; and U.S. Pacific Command, which has
responsibility for Madagascar, the Seychelles, and the countries off the coast of the
Indian Ocean. Until December 2006 when the United States began to assist Ethiopia in
its invasion of Somalia, all three existing Commands have maintained a relatively low-
key presence, often using elite special operations forces to train, equip, and work
alongside national militaries.[49]

South Africa is one of the major political power houses in Africa that US President
Barack Obama’s administration will lobby to support the Command for Africa
(AFRICOM) programme. During former president Thabo Mbeki’s time in office,
AFRICOM was met with scepticism by some members of the African Union (AU).
South Africa led the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC’s) position
against co-operating with the US on what was believed to be the militarization of
American foreign policy and aid. The Obama’s administration believes that with the
Bush administration out of the picture and a new leadership in South Africa, the attitude
towards the US in general has changed.

MERITS OF AFRICOM
1. AFRICOM will strengthen the base for the US’s platform to contribute to Social,
economic and relief work. And strengthen security cooperation with Africa and create
new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of US partners in Africa. Africa Command
will also enhance US efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and
promote common goals of development in health, education, democracy, and
economic growth in Africa.

2. AFRICOM will develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the
quality of life for Africans can be improved.
3. AFRICOM will play a supportive role as Africans continue to build democratic
institutions and establish good governance across the continent. AFRICOM’S foremost
mission is to help Africans achieve their own security, and to support African leadership
efforts.

DEMERITS OF AFRICOM BASE IN AFRICA

(1) AFRICOM is designed to fulfill the immediate special interests of the United
States with little heed to the implications for the people of Africa.

(2) AFRICOM is designed to bring stability to Africa, but only as it serves US

Interests. It is believed that AFRICOM will actually destabilize the continent in
the long-run and will put our partners in Africa at risk. For all the talk of it being a
new, innovative engagement, AFRICOM may simply serve to protect unpopular
regimes that are friendly to US interests while Africa slips further into poverty, as
was the case during the Cold War.

(3) Creating security and stability in Africa is not something that can be
accomplished by the U.S. military- by any military- regardless of specialized
training and cooperation with experts and good intentions. If the US government
truly wants to promote peace, stability, and human development in Africa, it
should not do so by a military command but by offering a civilian-driven just
security approach.

(4) AFRICOM is a dangerous continuation of US military expansion around the

globe. And, as well as the use of weapons of war to combat terrorist threats on
the African continent, will not achieve national security. AFRICOM will only
inflame threats against the United States, make Africa even more dependent on
external powers and delay responsible African solutions to continental security
issues.

(5) South Africa led the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC’s)
position against co-operating with the US on what was believed to be the
militarization of American foreign policy and aid.

(6) The body wants to avoid the continent becoming yet another battle ground for
superpowers such as China and Russia, which might want to follow the US
strategy.
 (7) Despite these high-profile endorsements, the consolidation and expansion of
U.S. military power on the African continent is misguided and could lead to
disastrous outcomes.

(8) The United States could systematically interfere in Liberian and African politics in
order to ensure that those who succeed in obtaining power are subservient to
U.S. national security and other interests. And this will be neo-colonialism.

Conclusion
From the above analyses, it is obvious that the demerits of AFRICOM project in Africa
out weight its merits of the project. As the merits is only of selfish economic and
political interest to the US government under the guise of promoting democracy, peace
and stability, good governance and human development in Africa.

Conclusively, the US administration’s new obsession with AFRICOM and its militaristic
approach has many malign consequences. It increases U.S. interference in the affairs
of Africa. It brings more military hardware to a continent that already has too much. By
helping to build machineries of repression, these policies reinforce undemocratic
practices and reward leaders that are not to responsible to the yearnings of their
people but to the demands and dictates of U.S. military agents.

Making military force a higher priority than development and diplomacy creates an
imbalance that can encourage irresponsible regimes to use U.S. sourced military might
to oppress and suppress their own people, now or potentially in the future. These fatally
flawed policies create instability, foment tensions, and lead to a less secure world.

What Africa needs least is U.S. military expansion on the continent (and elsewhere in
the world). What Africa needs most is its own mechanism to respond to peacemaking
priorities. Today, as the African Union deliberates on continental governance, there
couldn’t be a better time to reject U.S. military expansion and push forward African
responses to Africa’s priorities. The long suffering effects of militaristic "assistance"
from the United States, is Liberia. Therefore, Liberia would be the worst possible base
for AFRICOM. As there are no good locations for such a poorly conceived project.
Africa does not need AFRICOM.
 RECOMMENDATION

To overcome the enormous challenges of legitimacy faced by the United States of

America with the AFRICOM proposal and the obvious suspicion from the Africans, it is
my candid opinion I hereby make the following recommendations viz:

1. New transparent principles for interacting with Africans should be adopted by the
United States of America. In doing so, it should be devoid of economic
exploitation and militaristic tendencies so as to allay the fears of neocolonialism
in Africa.

2. Africa should be assigned the leadership role in defining solutions to their

problems in Africa. Therefore, the AFRICOM project needs to engage with the
different African institutions to surmount the challenges facing the continent in
form of partnership with regional economic blocs. AFRICOM could train the
stand-by brigades, a role endorsed by Nigeria’s President Yar’Adua and other
ECOWAS members. [50] These principles involve Africans in identifying
challenges and solutions. Placing Africans in a leadership role requires the U.S.
or other donors to support indigenous efforts to bring about economic growth,
peace, and stability. Recognizing that change does not take place linearly
requires patience. This multidisciplinary approach includes diplomatic,
development, and military assistance.

3. The United States of America with it AFRICOM proposal needs to put major
effort into understanding how Africans define Africa’s security. Americans and
Africans agree that Africa faces major security challenges that impede
development. Rather than determining unilaterally how to assist African leaders
in their efforts to address these security challenges, AFRICOM must coordinate
with ongoing African processes and approaches. several possible areas for
cooperation including disaster prevention and response, technical support in
areas such as mapping and satellite imagery, capacity building for crisis
prevention, even assistance in addressing trans-border issues such as terrorism,
maritime security and the like.

4. AFRICOM should work closely with the African Union and African nations with
strong security forces willing to shoulder the burden, and with states aspiring to
play leading roles on the continent such as Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. By
focusing on common interests.

5. AFRICOM must highlight that U.S. security interests can benefit both Americans
and Africans and must not undermine legitimate African interests. AFRICOM
must work hard to allay African suspicions.
6. To achieve legitimacy, AFRICOM must learn the agendas, strengths and
weaknesses of the new African institutions, and engage them appropriately.
Never in the post-colonial era has there been a stronger effort on the part of
African leaders to address their fundamental challenges. If AFRICOM chooses to
ignore or bypass these new institutional arrangements, Africans will interpret this
as a lack of genuine interest in promoting a mutual U.S.-African security agenda.
 REFERENCES:

1. President George W. Bush, “President Bush Creates a Department of

Defense Unified
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Washington, D.C.; available from
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2. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

3. Ibid

4. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4427
5. Robert Berschinski, Africom’s Dilemma: The “Global War On Terrorism,””
“Capacity Building,”” Humanitarianism, And The Future Of US. Security Policy
In Africa ( Washington: US Army Publication 2007) p.1

6. Richard Catoire, “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa?

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7. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington

DC: the white House, October 1998.

8. Ian Fisher, “Africans Ask if Washington’s Sun Will Shine on

Them,”” New York Times, February 8, 2001, p. A3

9. J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism,

Crisis, and Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: 1994)
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11. U.S. Department of Energy statistics as of July 2007. Available online at

www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imp
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12. “Ghana ‘Will be an African Tiger”” BBC News Online, June 19, 2007,
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14. Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role f the U.S.
Military in Africa.”

15. J. Peter Pham, “Africa Command: A Historic Opportunity for Enhanced

Engagement —I f Done Right,” Testimony Before the House Committee on
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16. Danna Harman, “China Takes Up Civic Work in Africa,” Christian Science
Monitor, Vol. 99, Issue 148, June 27, 2007, pp. 1-13.

17. J. Peter Pham, ““ Africa Command: A Historic Opportunity for Enhanced

Engagement —I f Done Right”; Council on Foreign Independent Task Force
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18. Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa”
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 83, Issue 1, January/February 2004; pp. 75-886.

19. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

20. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4427

21. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

22. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4427

23. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Valerie Reed,” Prospects for an African Headquarters for AFRICOM,” Straus
Military Reform Project (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 13
December 2007)
27. Abba Mahmood, “Nigeria: Looking into the Year 2008,”
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712280417.html accessed Nov. 29 2009
28. Ibid
 29. Chief Ojo Maduekwe, “U.S. AFRICOM and African Development,” (11
October 2007)
From http://allAfrica.com/stories/printable/200710110233.html accessed 29
Nov 2009.
30.General Tsadkan Gebretensae, “Transcript of Event: AFRICOM: Implications
for African Security and U.S.-African Relations American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, Panel II: African Security Priorities,” 20
September 2007. http://www.aei.org/ accessed 28 November 2009.

31.Boyd Webb, “SADC snubs US force on African Soil,” (30 August 2007).
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?
from=rss_Africa&set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=vn20070830041224745C8044
00; accessed 29 November 2009.
32.Brian Chigawa, The location of AFRICOM (Nairobi: COMESA 7 March 2008.)

33.Pajibo, Ezekiel & Woods, Emira, "AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for
Africa" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, July 26, 2007) a project of
the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org)

34.Ibid

35.Ibid

36.ibid

37.James Butty, “Liberia Assured of Help with Debt Relief during U.S. Visit,” 25
October 2007 in VOA.com http://128.11.143.121/english/archive/2007-
10/2007-10-25 voa4.cfm?CFID=213011222&CFTOKEN=68658320. 29
October 2009.

38.General William Ward, “US shifts on Africom base plans,” 18 February 2008
interview
with BBC News, London, England; available from http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/
mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7251648.stm;
Accessed 26
November 2009.

39.President George W. Bush, “On AFRICOM and U.S. military base in Ghana:
Baloney!” 21 February 2008 in Accra Daily Mail
www.accramail.com/mailnews.asp?id=3949; accessed 26 November 2009.

40. http://www.thenation.com
41. Wafula Okumu, “Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or
the Militarization of U.S-Africa Relations?” Testimony Before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health,
August 2, 2007.

42.Ibid

43.Ibid

44.Ibid

45.Ibid

46.Ibid

47. Editorial, Daily Nation (Nairobi), 8 February 2007

48. U.S. Department of State/U.S. Agency for International

Development, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2012
(Washington, D.C.: DOS/USAID, May 7, 2007).

49. Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org

50. Ikechukwu Eze, “AFRICOM: Furore over America’s African

Trail,“

24 December 2007 in Business Day

http://www.businessdayonline.com/analysis/
features/1718.html

Accessed 24 November2009.