[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005]CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

,
petitioner, vs
. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE
BALLESTEROS, RONALDCENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO
CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO
GALICIA, RAMONMOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD,
ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO,
ENRICOROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS
GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA
SALVACIONDAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE
AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO
MENDOZA,FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN,
RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO,
LAMBERTOCONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE,
MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO
URBANO,ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS
STA.BARBARA, JR.,
FACTS: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB), The Union alleged as
grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal
tobargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-
organization.
A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB but no agreement was
reached. the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that thenotice of
strike be dismissed;
the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a
copy of a notice of the meeting where the strikevote was conducted.On November 20,
1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote
purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot infront of the peti
tioners premises.
It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results
were as follows: 156 members voted to strike;14 members cast negative votes; and eight
votes were spoiled.
On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a
strike. Subsequently, the Union filed An ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its
assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the
labor disputes, Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return towork within
twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume
normal operations and accept back all striking workers under thesame terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike.In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the
officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work.The
Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the
cancellation of the respondent
Unions certift
cate of registration. In aparallel development, Labor Arbiter Leda rendered a Decision
in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal.The
Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover,
no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours
prior to the intended holding of the strike vote.
According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees who
alleged that
no strikevote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking
lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike
votepresented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article
263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writof
execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this
Court instead of staging a strike.The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC
which granted their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
also denied the
petitioners petition to declare the strike illegal.
In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November
10, 1997, the NLRC ruled asfollows:
We find untenable the Labor Arbiters finding that no actual strike voting took place on
November 10, 1997, claiming that thi
s is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across
the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (
sic
) union members. While it is true that no strikevoting took place in the parking lot
which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all
because the same was conducted in theparking lot immediately/directly fronting, not
across, the hospital building. Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (
sic
) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did
so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are
uniform and
pro forma
.The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997,
absent a showing that the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of asecret balloting
and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such request was made by any
of the parties who would be affected by the secret ballotingand to which the NCMB
agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice
before the strike vote was conducted.ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENTS COMPLIED
WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT
STRIKE.HELD: No. We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to
comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of
theNLRC which reads:Section 10. Strike or lockout vote.

A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concernedobtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by
a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the
partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.The regional
branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party,
supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, theunion or the employer
shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the
preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hoursbefore such meetings as well as the
results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject
to the cooling-off period provided in thisRule. Although the second paragraph of
Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines,
nevertheless, the same was incorporated inthe Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code and has the force and effect of law.
Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of
the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notifythe NCMB of
the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such
meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and timeof the meeting of the
union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to
supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides toexercise its power of
supervision. In
National Federation of Labor v. NLRC
,
[25]
the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and
theImplementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB:1) A
notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically
the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of theunion;2) A
cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual
execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock andfifteen (15)
days in case of unfair labor practice.
However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the
cooling
-off period need not beobserved.

4)
Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting,
with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB
. The decision to declare a strikerequires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., ET AL. VS. JOSEPHINE JULIAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004

Facts: On November 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of the Philippine Agricultural
Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), sent a letter to Rosario
Apacible, treasurer and general manager of Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP
Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine
Marketing Corporation and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. The letter informed her that
the rank-and-file employees of the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises
Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP and demanded that it be recognized. After such
notice, the following three cases arose:
In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and
Jecina Burabod, a Board Member and a member of the said union, were dismissed.
They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter alleging that their employer had not paid them
with their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13th month pay for
the year 1994 salaries for services actually rendered, and that illegal deduction had been
made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond. Stamford alleged that
the three were dismissed for not reporting for work when required to do so and for not
giving notice or explanation when asked.
In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50 employees allegedly
dismissed illegally for union membership by the petitioners, a case for unfair labor
practice against GSP which denied such averments. GSP countered that the BLR did not
list Apacible Enterprises Employees Union as a local chapter of PACIWU or TUCP.
Thus, the strike that said union organized after the GSP refused to negotiate with them
was illegal and that they refused to return to work when asked.
The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees dismissed in the second case.
Petitioner corporations, however, maintained that they have been paying complainants
the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in
view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated
and the respondent corporations were under one management.
First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was ordered to reinstate the
complainants as well as pay the backwages and other benefits claimed. It was held that
the reassignment and transfer of the complainants were forms of interference in the
formation and membership of a union, an unfair labor practice. Stamford also failed to
substantiate their claim that the said employees abandoned their employment. It also
failed to prove the necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and failed to furnish written
notice of dismissal to any complainants. Further, it failed to prove payments of the
amounts being claimed.
Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the union have lost their
employment status, thus terminating their employment with GSP. GSP is however
ordered to reinstate the complainants who were members of the union without
backwages, save some employees specified. It was established that the union was not
registered, and thus had staged an illegal strike. The officers of the union should be
liable and dismissed, but the members should not, as they acted in good faith in the
belief that their actions were within legal bounds.
Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant their claims, as computed by
each individual. All other claims were dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for
petitioners failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as
required by law. It was also ordered to return the cash deposits of the complainants,
citing the same reasons as in the First Case.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and Third Cases, but set aside
the judgment of the Second Case for further proceedings in view of the factual issues
involved.
On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal was filed which was decided in
favor of Stamford, upholding the dismissal of the union officers. The officers made no
prior notice to strike, no vote was taken among union members, and the issue involved
was non-strikable, a demand for salary increases
On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the officers should be given
separation pay, and that Jacina Burabod and the rest of the members should be
reinstated without loss of seniority, plus backwages. It provided for the payment of the
backwages despite the illegality of the strike because the dismissals were done prior to
the strike. Such is considered an unfair labor practice as there was lack of due process
and valid cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled to backwages and
reinstatement, with exception to the union officers who may be given separation pay
due to strained relations with their employers.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents union officers and members were validly
and legally dismisses from employment considering the illegality of the strike.
(2) Whether or not the respondents union officers were entitled to backwages,
separation pay and reinstatement, respectively.

Held: (1) The termination of the union officers was legal under Article 264 of the Labor
Code as the strike conducted was illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action.
Holding a strike is a right that could be availed of by a legitimate labor organization,
which the union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements of following the procedures
in conducting a strike under paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 were not followed by
the union officers.
Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal strike, as well as the distinction
between officers and members who participated therein. Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike is a sufficient ground to terminate the employment of a union officer but
mere participation is not sufficient ground for termination of union members. Thus,
absent clear and substantial proof, rank-and-file union members may not be terminated.
If he is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement.
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal dismissal of the union members,
as there was non-observance of due process requirements and union busting by
management. It also affirmed that the charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada
were without credence. It reversed the ruling that the dismissal was unfair labor
practice as there was nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were
discouraged from joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for
participation in an illegal strike was upheld. However, union officers also must be given
the required notices for terminating employment, and Article 264 of the Labor Code
does not authorize immediate dismissal of union officers participating in an illegal
strike. No such requisite notices were given to the union officers.
The Court upheld the appellate courts ruling that the union members, for having
participated in the strike in good faith and in believing that their actions were within
the bound of the law meant only to secure economic benefits for themselves, were
illegally dismissed hence entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
(2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union officers as valid hence, the
award of separation pay was deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with
the notice requirements for a lawful termination, backwages were awarded to the union
officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of the
judgment.



ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE VS. TORRES
210 SCRA 565GR. NO 100158 JUNE 29, 1992
FACTS:
The Union and College initiated negotiations fora first ever
CBA which resulted in a deadlockand prompted the union to file a notice of strikewith
the DOLE.
Union declared a strike which paralyzed theoperations of the College and public
respondentSec. of Labor immediately assumed jurisdictionover the labor dispute.
Instead of returning to work, the union filed amotion for reconsideration of the return
towork order.
The college sent individual letters to the strikingemployees requiring them to return to
work. Inresponse union presented demands, the mostimportant of which is the
unconditionalacceptance back to work of the strikingemployees. But these were
rejected.
Sec. of Labor denied the motion forreconsideration for his return to work order
andsternly warned striking employees to complywith its terms.
Conciliation meetings were held but this provedfutile as the college remained steadfast
in itsposition that any return to work order shouldbe unconditional.
The College manifested to respondent Sec. thatthe union continued to defy his return to
workorder.
The College sent termination letters toindividual strikers and filed a complaint forillegal
strike against the union.
nforcement of thereturn to work order before the Sec.
The Sec. issued an order directingreinstatement of striking union members andholding
union officers responsible for theviolation of the return to work order and
werecorrespondingly terminated.
Both parties moved for the partial considerationof the return to work order.
Hence tis petition.
ISSUE:
WON striking union members, terminated forabandonment of work after failing to
comply with thereturn to work order of Sec. of labor, reinstated.
HELD:
The Labor Code provides that if a strike hasalready taken place at the time of
assumption, allstriking employees should immediately return to work.This means that
a return to work order is immediatelyeffective and executory, notwithstanding the
filing of amotion for reconsideration. It must be strictly compliedwith even during the
pendency of any petitionquestioning its validity. After all, the assumption
and/orcertification order issue
d in the exercise of the Sec.s
compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside,must therefore be complied with
immediately.The college correspondingly had every right toterminate the services of
those who chose to disregardthe return to work order issued by the Sec. of Labor
inorder to protect the interest of the students who formpart of the youth of the land.
MSF Tire and Rubber vs CA
GR 128632

Facts:

Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging (Phildtread) with
unfair labor
practice. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtreads plant.
Philtread,
on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor
assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement
with Siam Tyre whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company,
herein
petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the
land on
which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be
owned
by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.

Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. As
the
respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint for
injunction with
damages before the RTC. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging
lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Petitioner asserts that its status as an innocent bystander with respect to the labor
dispute
between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts.

Issue: WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of
injunction under
the innocent bystander rule.

Held:

In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through
Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows:

The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is
a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully
carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship.

The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as
an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or
localize the
sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute,
including those
with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial
connection or
having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
regulated at
the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable
result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no
connection or
interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.

Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court
it is
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the
dispute and,
therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute.
We find that the negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction between
Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them
which, in the interestof petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction
between Philtread and Siam Tyre,
was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its
sold
assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60%
owner
of Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the
terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were
subject plant
is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or
factory;
similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and
equipment; and
manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private
respondents
personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.

Petition denied.

from Atty. Alba^^

Labor Law Reviewer Part IV (p.79 of 309)
In PLDT vs. NLRC and Abucay, [164 SCRA 671], it was declared that while it would be
compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if he were dismissed for his
inability to fill his quota, surely, however, he does not deserve such generosity if his
offense is the misappropriation of the receipts of his sales.
In Gustilo vs. Wyeth Phils., Inc., [G. R. No. 149629, October 4, 2004], the Court of
Appeals, despite its finding that the dismissal was legal, still awarded the complainant
separation pay of P106,890.00 allegedly by reason of several mitigating factors
mentioned in its assailed Decision. The Supreme Court, however, reversed said award
based on the afore-mentioned case of PLDT. It ruled that an employee who was legally
dismissed from employment is not entitled to an award of separation pay. Despite this
holding, however, the Supreme Court was constrained not to disturb the award of
separation pay in this case because respondent company did not interpose an appeal
from said award. Hence, no affirmative relief can be extended to it. A party in a case
who did not appeal is not entitled to any affirmative relief. chanrobles virtual law
library

The San Miguel test.

In line with the 2002 case of San Miguel [supra], it is now a matter of established rule
that the question of whether separation pay should be awarded depends on the cause of
the dismissal and the circumstances of each case.
National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 127718 (March 2, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioners are employees of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga. With the advent
of the RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the government
sought the compulsory acquisition of the land for agrarian reform. Because of this, the
private respondents who are owners of the estate decided to shut down its operation.
Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Now, the petitioners pray, with the
representation of their labor group, claiming that they were illegally dismissed. They
cite Article 283 of the Labor code where an employer may terminate the employment
of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court should apply the legal maxim verbal legis in construing
Article 283 of the Labor Code as regards its applicability to the case at bar.
Held:
Yes, the legal maxim is applicable in this case. The use of the word may, in its plain
meaning, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. Also,
Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the
business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the
employees. The Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the
said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. The severance of employer-
employee relationship between the parties came about involuntarily, as a result of an
act of the State. Consequently, complainants are not entitled to any separation pay.
Reasoning:
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Policy:
Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and
reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves
neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated
under the article.