The Later Wittgenstein and The Later Husserl On Language

tudes Ricuriennes / Ricur Studies, Vol 5, No 1 (2014), pp.
28-48
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) DOI 10.5195/errs.2014.245
http://ricoeur.pitt.edu

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0
United States License.

This journal is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its
D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press.
The Laler Willgenslein and lhe Laler HusserI on Language
IauI Ricour
Abstract:
This arlicIe resenls an ediled version of Ieclures given by IauI Ricour al }ohns Hokins Universily in AriI
1966. Ricour offers a comaralive anaIysis of Willgenslein's and HusserI's Iale vorks, laking lhe robIem of
Ianguage as lhe common ground of invesligalion for lhese lvo cenlraI figures of henomenoIogy and
anaIylic hiIosohy. Ricour deveIos his sludy in lvo arls. The firsl arl considers HusserI's aroach lo
Ianguage afler lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns and concenlrales on |crna| an! Transccn!cnia| Icgic, Ieaving a
lranscendenlaI refIeclion on Ianguage behind il re-examines a henomenoIogicaI concelion, according lo
vhich lhe shere of Iogic is nol searabIe from lhal of exerience. The main focus of lhe second arl is
Willgenslein's Ialer hiIosohy as il moved on from lhe concelion of an isomorhic reIalion belveen
Ianguage and lhe vorId, as sel oul in lhe iclure lheory in lhe Traciaius Icgicc-Pni|cscpnicus, lo lhe more
ragmalic nolion of a Ianguage-game in lhe Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns. In order lo gel beyond lhe
irrevocabIe differences belveen lhe lvo hiIosohies and lhe unresoIved lheorelicaI issues on bolh sides,
Ricour suggesls lurning lo a semioIogicaI aradigm based on lhe Saussurean dislinclion belveen
Ianguage and seaking.
Kcqucr!s. Ana|qiic Pni|cscpnq, Husscr|, Pncncncnc|cgq, Scnic|cgq, Wiiigcnsicin.
Rsum:
Cel arlicIe esl une version edilee de conferences donnees ar IauI Ricour a Ia }ohns Hokins Universily en
avriI 1966. Ricour roose une anaIyse comaree des dernieres ouvres de Willgenslein el HusserI, avec Ie
robIeme du Iangage comme soI commun d'invesligalions our ces deux figures cenlraIes de Ia
henomenoIogie el Ia hiIosohie anaIylique. Celle anaIyse de Ricour se |oue a lravers deux arlies. La
remiere arlie revienl sur I'aroche du Iangage chez HusserI deuis |ccncrcncs |cgiqucs avec une allenlion
arlicuIiere aux deveIoemenls de Icgiquc jcrnc||c ci |cgiquc iransccn!ania|c, dans Ie cadre d'une refIexion
lranscendanlaIe sur Ie Iangage iI revienl sur une concelion henomenoIogique seIon IaqueIIe, Ie domaine
du Iogique n'esl as searabIe de ceIui de I'exerience. La deuxieme arlie se concenlre rinciaIemenl sur
Ia derniere hiIosohie de Willgenslein aIors qu'iI s'esl dearli de I'idee d'une reIalion isomorhique enlre
Ie Iangage el Ie monde leIIe que osee ar Ia lheorie du labIeau dans Ie Traciaius |cgicc-pni|cscpnicus, our
s'engager vers Ia nolion Ius ragmalique de |eu de Iangage dans Ies |ntcsiigaiicns pni|cscpniqucs. Afin de
surmonler Ies differences irremediabIes enlre Ies deux hiIosohies el, dans une cerlaine mesure, cerlains
des robIemes lheoriques non resoIus deuis Ies deux bords, Ricour fail finaIemenl reference a un
aradigme semioIogique el a Ia dislinclion saussurienne enlre Iangue el aroIe.
Mcis-c|cs. Husscr|, Pncncncnc|cgic, Scnic|cgic, Pni|cscpnic Ana|qiiquc, Wiiigcnsicin.

|iu!cs |icuricnncs / |icur Siu!ics
VoI 5, No 1 (2014) ISSN 2155-1162 (onIine) DOI 10.5195/errs.2014.245 hll://ricoeur.ill.edu
The Laler Willgenslein and lhe Laler HusserI on Language
IauI Ricour

|15847j
1
AIIov me lo say somelhing aboul lhe aim of lhis aer. Il forms arl of a vider
underlaking of comaralive sludies aimed al muluaI underslanding belveen AngIo-American
and Iuroean hiIosohy, al Ieasl as regard lhe Iine of lhoughl lhal, lo a grealer or Iesser exlenl,
Iies vilhin lhe lradilion of HusserI's henomenoIogy. We have undoubledIy reached lhe momenl
vhen lhis inexcusabIe muluaI ignorance shouId be overcome.
We do hovever share a common inleresl: |anguagc. The robIem of Ianguage loday
rovides a oinl of encounler and confronlalion for bolh hiIosohies. We mighl even find a
common goaI lo lhem. We are aII Iooking for a greal hiIosohy of Ianguage, vhich is aIso caIIed
for by disciIines as diverse as sychoanaIysis and exegesis.
This confronlalion belveen Iinguislic hiIosohy and henomenoIogy on lhe queslion of
Ianguage is made ossibIe by a arlicuIar characlerislic of lhese lvo movemenls of lhoughl. One
can in facl make oul some simiIarily in lheir deveIomenl: vilh regard lo Ianguage, bolh began,
as regards Ianguage, vilh a lheory in vhich lhe use of ordinary Ianguage had lo be measured by
an ideaI Ianguage, vhich meanl, on lhe one side, a Ianguage founded uon inleIIecluaI inluilion,
and, on lhe olher, a Ianguage conslrucled in accordance vilh lhe requiremenls of a |cgica| synlax
and semanlics. Iurlher deveIomenls on bolh sides vere made regarding a descrilion of
Ianguage as il vorks, of Ianguage in everyday use, and allenlion vas direcled lo lhe diversily of
lhese uses and funclions, vilhoul reference lo or deendence uon lhe conslrucled Ianguages of
malhemalicians or Iogicians.
One finds, moreover, lhal Willgenslein's vrilings have successiveIy borne vilness lo
bolh aroaches, firsl in lhe Traciaius Icgicc-Pni|cscpnicus and lhen in lhe Pni|cscpnica|
|ntcsiigaiicns. He lherefore is oen lo a comarison vilh HusserI al lvo momenls of his
deveIomenl: lhe HusserI of lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns lakes lhe measure of Ianguage using a
cIearIy defined IogicaI ideaI and lhe Ialer HusserI of |crna| an! Transccn!cnia| Icgic, |xpcricncc
an! ju!gncni, and Tnc Crisis cj |urcpcan Scicnccs an! Transccn!cnia| Pni|cscpnq rovides an
aroach lo Ianguage from lhe oinl of viev of a meaningfuI olenliaI imIied by lhe Iived
vorId or lhe IifevorId (Ic|cnsuc|i).
2

I have aIready allemled, in anolher Ieclure I gave in lhis counlryin Washinglona
reIiminary comaralive sludy vilh regard lo lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns and lhe Traciaius Icgicc-
Pni|cscpnicus.
3
Today, I vouId Iike lo lry a second confronlalion al lhe IeveI of Willgenslein's
Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns and HusserI's Iasl vrilings. |15848j In order lo make lhe comarison
even more significanl, I roose lo lie il lo one secific loic, deIiberaleIy chosen as lyicaI of
each aulhor and as reresenlalive of lheir vork as a vhoIe. In my firsl comaralive sludy, I
focused uon lhe nolion of lhe piciurc, vhich I conlrasled vilh lhal of an inicniicna| signijicaiicn.
Today, vilh regard lo Willgenslein, I viII focus my anaIysis on lhe concelion of significalion as
usc, and I viII be considering lhe deveIomenl of lhis nolion of usc lhrough lhal of a |anguagc-
ganc, vilh regard lo HusserI, I viII essenliaIIy be Iooking al his lexls aboul lhe foundalion
(|un!icrung) of IogicaI significalion lhrough a rcjcrcncc |ack lo lhe IifevorId. These nolions of
jcun!aiicn and rcjcrcncc |ack are cerlainIy very differenl from lhose of usc and a |anguagc-ganc.
NeverlheIess, lhey are Iocaled vilhin a same hase of a deveIomenl lhal I viII caII lhe grasp cj
Pau| |icur

29

|anguagc cn cxpcricnccvhelher one underslands lhe lerm exerience in lhe narrov sense of
exerience governed by Iogico-malhemalicaI or exerimenlaI rocedures or in lhe vider sense of
everyday exerience reIaled lo common ob|ecls, olher eoIe, and lo a cuIluraI vorId.
Il seems lo me lhal one can consider any aggregale of signs from lvo differenl oinls of
viev. On lhe one hand, il can be regarded as a syslem governed by inlernaI reIalions, lhal is,
mereIy by reIalions from sign ic sign, semanlic reIalions vilhin a Iexicon, morhoIogicaI reIalions
vilhin a synlax. Irom lhis firsl oinl of viev, one does nol have lo consider lhe reIalion of signs
lo lhings bul onIy lhe reIalion belveen signs in a deIimiled coruslhis mighl be a Iexicon, a
grammar, lhe Iileralure of a given eriod, a coIIeclion of mylhs, in each case, one oerales
according lo lhe rinciIe of a cIosure of lhe universe of meanings. ul, on lhe olher hand, one
can ask hov lhis syslem of signs ucrks, vhal use eoIe make of lhem, hov lhey aIy lhem lo
silualions. Il seems lo me lhal every syslem of signs has lo fil a duaI requiremenl: on lhe one
hand, il has lo eslabIish ilseIf as a sqsicn lhrough inlerreIalions of meanings lhereby eslabIishing
lhe !isccnncciicn belveen lhe sign and lhe lhing, on lhe olher hand, il has lo gel hoId of lhe
lolaIily of vhal can be lhoughl and sai! aboul exerience and, by seaking of such exerience,
eslabIish a reIalion belveen seaking sub|ecls. If lhe firsl hase reresenls lhe !isccnncciicn
belveen lhe sign and lhe lhing, lhe second momenl is lhal in vhich lhe sign, by aIying lo
somelhing, by grasing lhe sayabIe or lhinkabIe exerience, rciurns lo lhe vorId. This is lhe
momenl vhen Ianguage is, so lo seak, re-orienlaled lovard lhe universe.
4
The robIem of
meaning deaIs vilh lhese lvo movemenls and nol |usl vilh lhe firsl or lhe second one. Irege sav
lhis in his veII-knovn arlicIe of 1892 on Scnsc an! |cjcrcncc.
5
There is lhe robIem of scnsc, vhich
concerns lhe conslilulion of non-reaI and ideaI |15849j ob|ecls, and lhere is lhe robIem of
rcjcrcncc, vhich is lhe over of our senlences lo reach and designale reaIily. The nolions ve are
going lo examine vilh regard lo Willgenslein and HusserI are reIaled lo lhis second aroach lo
Ianguage, lhal of lhe junciicning of Ianguage, bul onIy vilh one asecl of il. Olher asecls, such as
lhe nolion of lhoughl, communicalion, elc., couId aIso be discussed, lhere vouId eseciaIIy be a
Iol lo say aboul lhe crilique of lhe menlaI and, in generaI, aboul lhe case againsl
sychoIogism in lhe vrilings of bolh Willgenslein and HusserI. I lhoughl I couId make a
lighler comarison by considering |usl usc as lhe aIicalion lo exerience, lo reaIily, vhalever
lhal may mean. This is vhal guided me in my choice of lhe lerms usc and rcjcrcncc |ack lo lhe
IifevorId in lhe Ialer Willgenslein and in lhe Ialer HusserI. In bolh cases, Ianguage is considered
in ils acluaI funclioning as a over of reaching oul lo., of grasing, in shorl of spcaking a|cui lhe
exerience.
This vay of osing lhe robIem aIready rovides us vilh an indicalion aboul vhal can
be execled from such a comaralive sludy. I vanl righl avay lo dismiss lhe exlravaganl and
naive idea of reaching a ccnprcnisc belveen HusserI and Willgenslein. In doing lhe hislory of
hiIosohy, one has lo be conlenl vilh imroving our underslanding of a hiIosoher lhrough
comarison vilh anolher. Here lhen, lhings have lo be Iefl as lhey are: HusserI viII remain
HusserI and Willgenslein viII remain Willgenslein. There robabIy is no singIe lheory lhal
vouId embrace bolh lheir soIulions. I vouId |usl Iike lo make use of lheir difference lo highIighl
lhe reIalionshi belveen lvo vays of aroaching Ianguage, lhrough ils ideaI meaning and
lhrough ils reference lo reaIily.
Ior lhis reason, I viII roose, al lhe end of lhis hisloricaI survey, lo exIain lhe
difference belveen Willgenslein and HusserI lhrough reference lo a lhird lerm, vhich viII have
lo do vilh somelhing Iike a semioIogy, lhal is, an invesligalion of lhe inlernaI reIalions of sign
syslems. Ierhas Willgenslein and HusserI viII be beller underslood if ve consider lhem as
Tnc Iaicr Wiiigcnsicin an! inc Iaicr Husscr| cn Ianguagc

30

roviding lvo differenl vays lo overcome lhe disconneclion belveen lhe sign and lhe lhing, of
breaching lhe cIosure of lhe universe of signs, and of redirecling lhem lovard lhe universe.
I.
|15850j The origins of lhe robIem ve are going lo address in HusserI's Ialer vrilings are
lo be found in lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns. There one can see lhal lhe lheory of meaning remains
incomIele as Iong as onIy lhe ideaI unils of meaning (or vaIid idenlilies), vhich conslilule lhe
IogicaI lenor of our Ianguage, are considered. These ideaI unils are indeendenl of lhe differenl
acls conslilulive of a muIliIicily of sychoIogicaI exeriences in vhich lhey are reresenled.
Regarded for lheir |cgica| icncr, lhese ideaI unils are sub|ecl lo formaIizalion and axiomalizalion,
and lhey deend on lhe conslilulion of a lheory of lheories, lhe uIlimale lask of Iogic. ul in
shoving hov lhese significalions enabIe reaIily lo be exressed, everylhing sliII remains lo be
done. In lerms of a relurn lo lhe vorId of lhings, HusserI dislinguished a lhreefoId hierarchy for
Iogic: a Iogic of significalion or of ure grammar, vhich eIiminales maIformed meanings and
grammalicaI nonsense, a Iogic of coherence or Iogic of inference, vhich eIiminales formaI
conlradiclion, and finaIIy a Iogic of lrulh, vhich eIiminales lhe maleriaI conlradiclion or
discordance belveen Ianguage and exerience. Il is in lhis lhird form of Iogic lhal our enquiry
lakes Iace. Whal is il lhal marks lhe resence of a Iogic of lrulh vilhin lhe conslilulion of
significalion` Whal is il lhal assimiIales significalion lo lhis lhird form of Iogic` Il is Irege's
robIem of Bc!cuiungvery arorialeIy lransIaled by reference in IngIishand vhich he
dislinguished from Sinn (sense). The Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns made severaI suggeslions lovard an
ansver: firsl of aII, lhe meanings of ordinary Ianguage, Iike RusseII's egocenlric arlicuIars,
6

carry a much reduced IogicaI lenorif one lakes inlo consideralion vhal is indeendenl of
circumslances. They reciseIy conslilule circumslanliaI significalions, lhal is, meanings
underslood onIy lhrough reference lo an environmenl |15851j suosedIy knovn by a arlicuIar
audience, and in reIalion lo ob|ecls lhal one couId oinl lo in lhis environmenl: for examIe,
here, I, roer names, and aII lhe lyicaI asecls of a vorId erceived by a arlicuIar
communily. To be sure, lhe earIy HusserI vas convinced lhal circumslanliaI meanings couId be
reduced lo ideaI meanings, indeendenl of any audience and environmenl. Hovever, lhis
reresenled a firsl breach in lhe ideaIily of Iogic.
Nexl, lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns noled lhal saying somelhing differs from ia|king a|cui
somelhing. Saying somelhing inlends an ideaIily, ia|king a|cui somelhing refers lo an ob|ecl.
HusserI caIIed Ncnnung lhis funclion of nominalion and dislinguished il from lhal of
significalion pcr sca dangerous vay of exressing lhings, vhich seems lo Iink Ncnnung lo lhe
dislinclion belveen nancs and scnicnccs, and more reciseIy lo lhe funclion of lhe prcpcr nanc as
designaling a ecuIiar lhing. Ior HusserI, nominalion (Ncnnung) is vider lhan denominalion
(Bcncnnung) and designales lhe reference lo an ob|ecl: for examIe, lhe conqueror of }ena and lhe
man defealed al WalerIoo signify differenl lhings bul name one arlicuIar individuaI, universaI
names (Unitcrsc||cn Nancn) have an idenlicaI meaning as redicales bul are dislribuliveIy
aIied lo numerous ob|ecls. So nominalion has a vider funclion lhan lhal of lhe name as such: il
indicales lhe movemenl by vhich lhe designalion can reach lhe reaIily of lhe ob|ecl lhrough lhe
ideaIily of lhe sense. Thus lvo conlrary movemenls inhabil a meaning: one lhal slos al lhe
sense, lhe olher lhal conlinues on lo lhe ob|ecl, lhe firsl searales lhe sense from lhe lhing, lhe
second refers lhe sense lo lhe lhing.
Pau| |icur

31

Il is in lhe funclion of ju|ji||ncni (|rju||ung), hovever, lhal lhe significalion is reaIIy
comIeled. In lhe firsl hiIosohy of HusserI, lhis lhird Iogic vas Iinked lo lhis concel of
fuIfiIImenl. Denominalion sliII remains an asecl of significalion lhal is relained even if lhe
vaIidily of lhis meaning is nol guaranleed by ils ob|ecl. (Willgenslein said |15852j simiIar lhings
aboul lhe roer name in lhe absence of lhe lhing lo vhich il refers, in conneclion vilh lhe svord
IxcaIibur vhen il is broken.)
7
IuIfiIImenl means lhe coincidence belveen lhe emliness of lhe
inlended significalion and lhe fuIIness of lhe lhing as resenl. If nominalion is sliII an asecl of
significalion as inlenlionaI, il is quile differenl from fuIfiIImenl, vhich resonds lo lhe emly
signifying inlenlion by resenling lhe lhing. We are here al lhe origins of HusserI's Ialer
hiIosohy as a vhoIe. Ior lhe nolion of fuIfiIImenl is a robIem more lhan a soIulion. The
difficuIly reIales bolh lo a maller of facl and one of rinciIe. A maller of facl: lhe fuIfiIImenl
resenls ilseIf as a ic|cs, lhe ic|cs of a comIele idenlificalion belveen meaning and inlenlion, bul
lhis is a Iimil-idea, lhe ideaI of an uIlimale fuIfiIImenl, vhal cIassicaI hiIosohy caIIed
adequalion or being as lrulh. In lhis uIlimale fuIfiIImenl, lhe acl lhal confers sense and lhe
acl lhal fuIfiIIs lhis sensea lhe inlended ob|ecl and lhe seen ob|eclare lhe same, in lhe acl of
fuIfiIIing lhe sense, ve are somehov exeriencing a lhal's exaclIy il.
Hovever, lhe deveIomenl of knovIedge, as verified by us, aIvays remains a fuIfiIImenl
in rogress, a confIicl belveen saying and seeing. The absoIule il (!as a|sc|uic Sc||si) is never
allained, lhe fuII coincidence of vhal is inlended vilh vhal is given is onIy a Iimil case. Tvo
consideralions eIaboraled al Ienglh by HusserI reveaI cIearIy lhe inaccessibIe nalure of lhis lolaI
fuIfiIImenl.
Iirsl of aII, lhere is lhe universaI roIe of synlax: vhal ve beIieve lo be a simIe ercelion
is nol one imression or a comIex of imressions bul an exerience overIaid by Ianguage. We no
Ionger knov vhal a dumb ercelion vouId be, ve refIecl uon |udgmenls of ercelion, uon
slalemenls aboul ercelion, vhich conlain a lhis, lhal, here, or lhere, roer names,
cIasses of universaIs, cIasses of quaIilies, cIasses of reIalions. The resuIl is lhal, in order lo fuIfiII
lhe sense of lhe simIesl slalemenl aboul ercelion, one vouId have lo |15853j fuIfiII nol onIy
lhe significalion of each roer name, vilh lhe resence of a arlicuIar lhing, bul aII lhe olher
kinds of meanings loodemonslralives, universaIs, cIasses of quaIilies, cIasses of reIalions. In
shorl, somelhing Iike a calegoriaI inluilion vouId be required, vhich vouId sland in lhe same
reIalion lo lhese comIexes as does lhe inluilion of an individuaI lo lhe roer name. In olher
vords, one vouId have lo lake u aII our exressions Iike roer names.
ul a second difficuIly vouId foIIov from lhe firsl one: assuming lhal one couId
eIiminale vhal is synlaclic from our slalemenls of ercelion, lhis aIIegedIy urified ercelion
remains comIex from anolher oinl of viev. The vhoIe henomenoIogy of ercelion, from
HusserI lo MerIeau-Ionly, has deveIoed lhe lheme lhal lhe pcrccpiicn of an ob|ecl as a vhoIe
makes no sense: I pcrccitc a lhing from one side and lhen from anolher, under one asecl and
lhen under anolher, vhal I caII pcrccpiicn is lhe resuosed synlhesis of a converging sequence
of ercelions, a fIov of oulIines or rofiIes. I resuose lhis convergence in a synlhesis of
idenlificalionaIready described by Kanl in lhe firsl edilion of lhe Criiiquc: run lhrough
(!urcn|aujcn), relain, idenlify. Whal lhen becomes of lhe lhing in ilseIf` Is ils resence
reduced lo lhe resenl oulIine, lo lhe resenl rofiIe` Whal I caII a lhing, isn'l il more an
execlalion or a memory lhan an acluaI resence, a relained asl and an anlicialed fulure`
Doesn'l lhe henomenoIogy of ercelion bring us back lo Hume's |c|icj` In any case, lhe
erceluaI synlhesis makes ercelion an ina!cquaic iniuiiicn nol by accidenl bul by ils very

32

nalure. ul lhese lvo consideralionslhe firsl on lhe medialion of calegoriaI inluilion lovard
sensibIe inluilion, lhe second on lhe inadequale characler of sensibIe inluilionconfirm lhe
ureIy ideaI characler of lhe nolion of comIele fuIfiIImenl or of erfecl adequalion. AII
fuIfiIImenl is a fuIfiIImenl in rogress |15854j resenling differenl IeveIs of comIelion,
indefinileIy dislincl from erfecl adequalion.
eyond lhis facluaI difficuIly, lhere is aIso a difficuIly of rinciIe: lhe fuIfiIImenl is
slaled using lhe melahoricaI lerm of seeing, iniucri in Lalin means lo see. ul vision is
helerogeneous vilh seech, vhich in lhe firsl Iace is heard, a helerogeneily lhal underIines an
aIvays ossibIe inlerrelalionaIbeil one aIien lo HusserIof evidence as a gross oaque
feeIing, exlraneous lo lhe ariicu|aiicn inlroduced inlo meaning by Ianguage. Doesn'l inluilion
have lo be nol |usl meaning bul an arlicuIaled meaning` Hov can an inlended meaning and a
seen resence be ad|usled lo one anolher, coincide, be lhe same` In lerms of a hiIosohy of
Ianguage, hov can seech, vhich is invisibIe, and vision, vhich is dumb, coincide` Doesn'l
vision have lo be meaning ilseIf in order lo overIa lhe meaning of seech`
HusserI vas lhus Ied lo ose in Iess and Iess naive lerms lhe queslion of fuIfiIImenl. Il
vas lhis research lhal Ied him, in lhe second seclion of |crna| an! Transccn!cnia| Icgic and in
|xpcricncc an! ju!gncni, lo lhe idea of a re-Iinguislic or re-redicalive meaning, vhich vouId
conslilule lhe origin, lhe re-eslabIished foundalion of Iogic. ul one vouId nol undersland vhal
aII lhis is aboul if lhe melhod lhal HusserI caIIs queslioning back (|uckjragc) vas nol
inlroduced al lhe same lime.
In facl, lhe danger of any resorl lo lhe idea of a sensibIe inluilion of lhe IifevorId (lhe
vorId of exerience) is lhal of osluIaling a non-Iinguislic given, an imression in Hume's sense,
vhich vouId be comIeleIy foreign lo lhe Iinguislic order and uIlimaleIy undiscoverabIe for
human beings invoIved in a syslem of cuIlure and Ianguage, such as ve are. The melhod of lhe
queslioning back exressIy excIudes lhis resorl lo a brule given, helerogeneous lo lhe semiolic
order.
Queslioning back means, firsl of aII, lhal ve are queslioning |15855j from vilhin lhe
vorId of signs and on lhe basis of slalemenls and senlences. In HusserI's Ianguage, il is from lhe
hearl of a !cxa lhal an enquiry is conducled. The lerm doxa is nol meanl lo oose oinion lo
lrulh, !cxa is laken in lhe osilive sense of lhe Tncacicius vhere oinion is lhe |udgmenl lhal
occurs al lhe Iasl slage of a !iancia, of diaIogue of lhe souI vilh ilseIf. Ocxa is hoIding somelhing
lo be lrue, il invoIves laking u a osilion in vhich one reaches a |udgmenl aboul a slale of
affairs. Il is lherefore nol a queslion of slarling from anylhing olher lhan an aIready slruclured
and meaningfuI order, ordered synlaclicaIIy. On lhis basis, il is ossibIe lo deveIo a
queslioning back lovard rimordiaI Iived exerience lhal viII never be direclIy confronled bul
viII aIvays be designaled by a movemenl of referring back.
Whal lhen is lhis referring back and vhal does il refer back lo` This referring back
is a gcncsisrovided one roerIy underslands lhe lerm genesis. Il is nol a chronoIogicaI
genesis, vhich vouId bring us back lo a hislory of aII of our acquisilions since chiIdhood or even
from lhe origins of humanily, neilher is il a genelic eislemoIogy in Iiagel's sense. Il is a genesis
of meaning, lhal is, a search for vhal Iegilimizes, for vhal founds lhe meaning, and nol for vhal
recedes il in hislory. Il has lo do vilh lhe resuosilion invoIved in lhe currenl use of
Ianguage. Il is nolevorlhy lhal, in order lo be beller underslood, HusserI look u again lhe
robIem of occasionaI significalions, sel aside since lhe Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns, lhal is, of
Pau| |icur

33

|udgmenls comrising lerms such as lhis, here, I, you, demonslralives, roer names,
everyday names common lo lhose laIking lo one anolher. HusserI admilled lhal lhe Icgica|
|ntcsiigaiicns did nol gel lo lhe bollom of lhe queslion lhey vere aimed al: for occasionaI
significalions are onIy underslood given lhe resuosilion of a common ubIic and
environmenl, vhal HusserI nov caIIs siiuaiicna| ncrizcns.
8
This |15856j resuosilion is a
ccncca|c! one, discIosing il reveaIs an imIicil inlenlionaIily, lhe ncrizcn-inicniicna|iiq.
9

This examIe shovs quile cIearIy vhy lhis crilique of evidence shouId be caIIed an
inlenlionaI crilique by HusserI, lhal is, an uncovering of hidden inlenlions anlerior lo lhe
conslilulion of a IogicaI formaIism.
10
Widening lhe scoe of lhe discussion on occasionaI
|udgmenls lo an inlenlionaI lheory of |udgmenl, ve shaII say lhal every redicalive lrulh refers
back lo uIlimale ob|ecls aboul vhich ve ass |udgmenl, lo ju!gncni-su|siraics. In |crna| an!
Transccn!cnia| Icgic, HusserI indicales lhal ve musl slarl by gcing |ack jrcn inc ju!gncni ic inc
ju!gncni-su|siraics, from lrulhs lo lheir c|jcci-a|cui-unicn. ul vilh lhese subslrales aear
c|cncniarq ccrcs unicn nc |cngcr ccniain anq sqniax,
11
in shorl, in!iti!ua|s. So il is lhe Iogic of lrulh
lhal refers us lo lhese uIlimale cores vhich one has lo render inluilive.
Here one can see vhal referring back means: il is nol aboul an imIicalion lhal vouId
sliII beIong lo lhe domain of Iogic. Ior formaI Iogic ignores lhe individuaI, il onIy recognizes
somelhing in generaIa oinl eslabIished in lhe firsl arl of |crna| an! Transccn!cnia| Icgic.
12
Il is
nol a queslion of an imIicalion from a homogeneous rinciIe al lhe IeveI of formaI Iogic, bul of
an inlenlionaI referring back from lhe domain of lhe IogicaI lo lhal of lhe re-IogicaI. In order
lo reIale lo somelhing in generaI, lhe |udgmenl has lo reIale lo individuaIs. This conslilules lhe
requiremenl for a regressive move lhal HusserI names reduclion of |udgmenls lo uIlimale
|udgmenls: |cxancn rc!ucicur.
13

Have ve reinlroduced an oaque eIemenl, radicaIIy helerogeneous lo discourse, as ve
did al lhe beginning, in a slalic anaIysis of evidence` We suggesl lvo reIies lo lhis queslion: firsl
of aII, il is from vilhin lhe domain of Iogic lhal lhis inicniicna| rcjcrring |ack is carried oul. Il is
noliceabIe |15857j lhal HusserI no Ionger seaks of fuIfiIImenl, of fuIIness (|u||c), vhich sliII
relains somelhing of a helerogeneous reIalion belveen an emliness and a fuIIness (a conlainer
and a conlenl), a saying and a seeing, bul inslead of jcun!aiicn and ncrizcn. A horizon of lhe
vorId, a horizon of individuaIs, lhese are nol lhe immediale exeriences lhal ve can sel
ourseIves aarl from or from vhich ve couId slarl oul. We are sliII concerned vilh a genesis of
meaning, vilh a reduclion of lhe IogicaI lo lhe rimordiaI. Which is vhy HusserI laIks aboul
ni!!cn inicniicna| inp|icaiicns or again of a henomenoIogicaI pciniing |ackfor examIe,
from lhe nominaIized redicale red, lhrough lhe aclivily of nominaIizalion, lovard lhe originaI
redicale red.
14
In generaI lerms, ve can say lhal il is lhe Iace syslemalicaIIy, siariing jrcn inc
ju!gncni, ic !iscctcr lhal. lrueness of being (being acluaI) and lrulh as correclness of sense.
|c|cng a|rca!q ic inc inicniicna|iiq cj cxpcricncc.
15

The very movemenl of queslioning back revenls us from lransforming lhe re-
redicalive inlo a oinl of dearlure. To lhe queslion: haven'l ve reinlroduced a vision aIien lo
lhe |cgcs` Our firsl ansver vouId be lhal il is lhe !cxa ilseIf lhal refers back endIessIy lo lhe
originary rimordiaI. And ve vouId aIso reIy lhal lhis referring back from one synlaclic
slruclure lo anolher synlaclic slruclure never resenls us vilh an unarlicuIaled absoIule bul vilh
an cxpcricncc lhal Iends ilseIf lo formuIalion in Ianguage, an essenliaIIy sayabIe exerience. This
second oinl is as imorlanl as lhe firsl one: lhe recourse lo lhe individuaI aIIovs us lo beIieve

34

lhal lhis referring back lo lhe simIe is lhe Iasl sle in lhe reduclion lo lhe rimordiaI. Ire-
redicalive synlaxes are lo be found in ercelion as veII as in affeclivily.
16

Whal does aII lhal mean` MainIy lhal synlax and Iogic require a nciitaiicn in exerience
in order lo be founded in lhal exerience. We have one examIe in lhe synlhesis |15858j of
idenlificalion of ercelion insofar as il reresenls a rocess of convergence among rofiIes
enabIing us lo resuose one and lhe same lhing. This rocess lakes lhe lemoraI form of
relenlion and ro|eclion (rolenlion). This lemoraI slruclure is an examIe of re-redicalive
synlax. Il allesls lhal aII lhe lhis inlo vhich lhe reference lo lhe individuaI seems lo dissoIve,
does nol conslilule an absoIule diversily bul have an affinily among lhemseIves and aIIovs one
lo assume exerience lo be a reIaled sequence, a harmonious deveIomenl, a unily. Such are lhe
essenliaI foundalions of molivalion
17
ve cannol insisl loo slrongIy uon lhis vilhoul vhich
lhal characlerizes HusserI's regressive anaIysis. HusserI conlinues:
18
Has lo do vilh, a neulraI
exression lhal encomasses cases of discordance and concordance as a rescrilion of
exerience.
19
Il is lhis coherence of lhings lhal resuIls in our Ianguage being lied dovn, even
lhough lhe convenlions of symboIic Iogic are free, lhe Iogic of lrulh is lied dovn by lhe
coherence of lhings (Zusanncnnang). The form of redicalion, vilh ils S and p, vouId nol exisl
vilhoul lhis maleriaI congruily of lhe sluffs of ossibIe |udgmenls.
20
IormaI Iogic ilseIf imIies,
in a hidden vay, lhal lhrough lhis conneclion lhe S's, p's, elc. have scncining ic !c uiin cacn
cincr naicria||q.
21
To say lhe same lhing even more slrongIy: TradilionaI Iogic is formaI
aohanlic Iogic and a formaI onloIogy for a reaI vorId suosed lo be aIready consliluled from
lhe beginning. Il is lo lhis vorId lhal aII |udgmenls, aII lrulhs, aII lhe sciences vilh vhich Iogic
has lo do, are reIaled.
22

Al lhe concIusion of lhis anaIysis il aears lhal lhe exercise of Ianguage requires lvo
oIes: a ic|cs and an crigin. Ivery hiIosohy of Ianguage arises from such consideralion. On lhe
one hand, discourse caIIs for formaIizalion by eIiminalion |15859j of lhe secific, and lhe
ossibiIily of such formaIizalion is nol eIiminaled by lhe reference back lo lhe originary: il is
ralher reveaIed as somelhing aslonishing. ul vhal foIIovs is even more surrising: inis vorId
exisls vilh ils rescrilions of meaning. Il is lhrough lhe queslioning back lhal I undersland al
lhe same lime lhe ic|cs and lhe origin.
Therefore il vouId be comIeleIy misIeading lo reresenl HusserI as lhe hiIosoher
vho slarls vilh lhe IogicaI in order lo relurn lo lhe vorId. We are aIvays Iocaled vilhin
Ianguage, cuIlure, in lhe movemenl lovard formaIizalion and lhe conslruclion of lheories, aIong
vilh lhe originary remains vhal our signs refer lo. We are meaningfuI lhrough and lhrough and
reaIily is vhal is aimed by lhe lolaIily of our signs. We shaII never gel back lo lhe eacefuI oinl
of viev of lhe immediale, for ve are referred back lo lhe oinl of origin (lhe originary) from lhe
very hearl of lhe IogicaI domain. Il is from lhe domain of discourse lhal ve incIine lovards lhe
siIenl resence, aIvays criss-crossed by our signs. Iven lhough signs, cuIlure, and science drav
us avay from lhe rimordiaI and even searale us from il, our signs onIy remain signs because
lhey conlinue lo rc|aic lo individuaIs vilhin lhe horizon of a vorId. The Iogic of lhe lrulh is vhal
brings us back endIessIy from lhe IogicaI domain lovard lhe vorId.
II.
|15860j When one reads Willgenslein afler HusserI, il reaIIy seems difficuIl lo find a oinl
of conlacl belveen lhese lvo hiIosohies of Ianguage. In Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns,
Pau| |icur

35

Willgenslein makes no alleml lo move from a IogicaI Ianguage lo ordinary Ianguage by means
of lranscendenlaI refIeclion, from Ianguage lo lhe vorId by means of a queslioning back inlo
lhe condilions of Ianguage. On lhe conlrary, lhe hiIosoher direclIy confronls Ianguage and
Iooks al hov il vorks in everyday silualions. We are loId nol lo lhink bul lo Iook. Language is
shifled from lhe fieId of hiIosohicaI vorries lo lhal of ils successfuI funclioning. Il is lhe fieId of
use, vhere Ianguage roduces cerlain effecls, lhal is, adaled resonses in lhe reaIm of human
and sociaI aclion. One mighl argue lhal Willgenslein slands in lhe Iace lhal HusserI IaboriousIy
slruggIes lo reach: HusserI asks hov formaIism refers back, lhrough a lheory of lrulh, lo a re-
exisling vorId of individuaIs, vhereas Willgenslein examines lhe funclioning of a Ianguage lhal
cannol be searaled from lhe non-Iinguislic conlexl of needs and raclicaI inlenlions. This is vhy
lhe one carries oul an enquiry and lhus a queslioning back, vhiIe lhe olher describes vhal
human beings do vhen lhey successfuIIy say somelhing.
Does lhis mean lhal because of such an iniliaI divergence, no furlher oinl of conlacl
vouId exisl` I vouId Iike lo shov lhal one can al Ieasl find HusserI's robIem, if nol his ansver
lo il, vilhin lhe unresoIved difficuIlies of Willgenslein's lheories.
The firsl consequenceand ve couId reaIIy say lhe firsl advanlage of Willgenslein's
aroachis lo reIax lhe hoId of a unilary lheory of Ianguage funclioning. As Iong as one refers
lo an ideaI modeIvhich for Willgenslein can onIy be a conslrucled modeIlhe various uses of
Ianguage derive lheir unily from lhis reference lo a modeI. When one slarls off vilhoul |15861j a
modeI, vhal can be found` InnumerabIe uses, a fev of vhich are suIied by Willgenslein in
aragrah 23 of his Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns.
23

In order lo do |uslice lo lhis uncounlabIe muIliIicily, Willgenslein inlroduces a
comarison of lhese uses vilh games. One shouId nol Iose sighl lhal il is an anaIogy and lhal
onIy cerlain lhings are carried over from lhe nolion of game lo lhal of Ianguage. Ior examIe, il
seems lo me lhal lhe oosilion belveen vhal is serious as oosed lo vhal is |usl a gamean
oosilion lhal can be found in IIaloIays no arl here. The oinl of comarison Iies in lhe facl
lhal lhe diversily of games is nol subsumed by some essence of Ianguage and lhal each game is
aroriale lo a secific silualion. Iach game deIimils a fieId vherein cerlain rocedures are
vaIid as Iong as one Iays lhis game and nol anolher, il vorks Iike a condensed modeI of
behavioraI allerns vherein differenl Iayers Iay differenl roIes. The mosl imorlanl
consequence for lhis reduclion of each Ianguage-game lo a secific and Iimiled use is quile veII
knovn, il concerns lhe issue of denominalion (naning) lhal ve have aIready Iooked al in
HusserI's vrilings, lhrough lhe referring back of Iogic lo reaIily.
The crilique of denominalion shouId be exlricaled beforehand from vhal makes il
comIicaled and from vhal secificaIIy beIongs lo IngIish-Ianguage hiIosohy, slarling vilh
lhe crilique of lhe alomislic lheory of Ianguage, according lo vhich il is ossibIe lo anaIyze
names inlo irreducibIe meaningfuI consliluenls lhal vouId reresenl simIe consliluenls of
reaIily. This crilique of simIes
24
is vraed u in lhal of denominalion: in effecl, lrue roer
names, IogicaIIy simIe names, vouId be lhe goaI of lhe lheory of denominalion in a comIeleIy
anaIyzed Ianguage. We viII nol ask here vhelher lhe Ianguage is vhoIIy anaIyzabIe, bul ve are
concerned vilh |15862j lhe queslion vhelher simIes are names. The same lhing shouId be
said aboul lhe crilique of lhe iclure lheory vhich vas Willgenslein's lheory in lhe Traciaius
Icgicc-Pni|cscpnicus. Il is aIso imIied in lhe crilique of denominalion: lhe slrucluraI araIIeIism al
slake in lhe iclure lheory is regarded here as a riviIeged form of lhe name/lhing reIalion.
Saying lhal lhere is a homoIogicaI slruclure in reaIily corresonding lo every significalion is sliII

36

lo subIimale lhe aIIeged reIalion belveen lhe name and lhe named lhing. Therefore, lhe
robIem of anaIysis inlo simIes (according lo lhe IogicaI alomism) and lhal of slrucluraI
araIIeIism (vilhin lhe iclure lheory) are cIoseIy inlermingIed in lhe discussion of
denominalion. Here ve have lo ignore lhis lvofoId oIemic vhich does nol direclIy concern lhe
comarison vilh HusserI, since henomenoIogy is in queslion neilher in lhe anaIysis inlo simIe
consliluenls nor even in lhe iclure lheory for vhich il has an aIlernalive soIulion. On lhe olher
hand, henomenoIogy is in queslion in lhe generaI crilique of denominalion, in lhal
henomenoIogy considers lhal laIking aboul somelhing is nol one game among olhers bul a
funclion of aII significalion. Thal is vhy ve have lo ay cIose allenlion lo lhis argumenl.
According lo Willgenslein, a good arl of our hiIosohy of meaning roceeds from an
overeslimalion of lhe roIe of denominalion, vhich has been regarded since Sainl Augusline as
lhe aradigm of lhe seech acl. Ior Willgenslein, naming is a seciaI game, Iayed under cerlain
circumslances. Ior examIe, vhen I am asked: vhal is lhal caIIed` I reIy: lhal is caIIed N,
mosl frequenlIy, I am shoved lhe ob|ecl, and I Iink lhe name ronounced lo me and lhe lhing I
am shoved. So il is reIalive lo a cerlain need and lhanks lo a cerlain raclice lhal ve resorl lo
vhal Willgenslein caIIs oslensive definilions, vhich remain deendenl uon lhe game of
Iearning and assigning names. Whal is more, lhese oslensive definilions are lhemseIves very
diverse. |15863j Can someone be doing lhe same lhing vhen defining a coIor and a form` Can
someone be laIking aboul coIors in lhe same vay vhen using lhem lo idenlify an ob|ecl or lo
comare nuances, or lo oblain a nev coIor by mixing` The Iimiled characler of lhis game aears
even more cIearIy vhen ve incIude, in lhe Iisl of lhings named, lhe names of numbers, of
demonslralives (lhis, lhal, here, lhere), vhich do nol aear al aII in lhe cIass of names. Nobody
ever says, lhal is caIIed 'lhis'. Il is lherefore necessary lo ask hov one uses lhese vords in order
lo knov vhal lhey mean. Al anolher oinl, Willgenslein noles lhal denominalion oflen is nol a
game al aII, nor even a move in a game, bul lhe rearalion for lhe use of a vord vilhin an acluaI
inlerchange. Ior examIe, naming lhe ieces in a game of chess is nol yel Iaying, and one has lo
knov somelhing aboul lhe game lo name lhe ieces. Willgenslein aIso says, in order lo mark lhe
Iimils of lhe game of denominalion, lhal lhe ascrilion of coIors is a game in vhich il is nol
somelhing lhal is reresenled bul a means of reresenling somelhing lhal is al Iay.
25

The crilique of denominalion lhus oens lhe horizon lo a resoIuleIy IuraIisl and, so lo
seak, muIliIisl concelion of lhe use of Ianguage.
26
As for lhe games lhemseIveslhe
anaIogy vouId be lhe mosl slriking al lhis oinllhese uses form jani|ics, vhose members are
more or Iess reIaled, vilhoul lhere being a fixed essence lo lhe Ianguage-game and lherefore lo
Ianguage
27
nor even a comIele enumeralion of lhe differenl kinds of games. If one Iooks
inslead of lhinking, one can see lhe shifl from one game lo anolher lhrough a series of
simiIarilies and differences lhal overIa and inlersecl. There is nol even a border, an incIusive
erimeler lhal vouId aIIov saying: lhe games end here. The mosl lhal can be said is: lhis and
lhose simiIar lhings are caIIed games.
28
So one has lo sellIe for a |15864j non-deIimiled concel
of ganc, for vhich lhere are onIy examIes and famiIies of examIes, aIIoving in lurn simiIar
conslruclions. No lolaIizalion of lhese varied lyes is ossibIe, lherefore, one cannol argue for a
generaI form of roosilions or of Ianguage.
29
Words onIy aear aIike, lhe diversily of lheir uses
is conceaIed.
Has Willgenslein succeeded, hovever, in nol eIaboraling a generaI lheory of Ianguage`
This is oen lo disule. As soon as one asserls lhal lhere are various Ianguages, lhal lhese
Ianguages resembIe games, lhal lhese games are innumerabIe, one says somelhing generaI aboul
Pau| |icur

37

Ianguage. Indeed lhere is al Ieasl one idea lhal Iooks Iike a generaI idea in lhe Pni|cscpnica|
|ntcsiigaiicns, lhal of usc. In sile of his recaulions, Willgenslein has enuncialed a generaI
roosilion.
30
Il is vorlh dveIIing on lhis nolion of use, as il can aIIov inilialing lhe discussion
vilh HusserI. Tvo issues are invoIved: a oIemicaI one and an affirmalive one. The nolion of use
vas originaIIy inlended by IngIish-Ianguage hiIosohy as a vay of laking u again lhe oId
ballIe againsl enlilies. This crilique is vhal is al slake in lhe discussion on denominalion:
enlilies are subIimaled names. Ior Locke, vords are names for ideas.
31
Taking advanlage of lhis
subIimalion, Ianguage becomes a conlemIalive lheorelicaI aclivily, a vision of lhe meaning of
vords. The nolion of use is lhus direcled againsl any lheory lhal vouId make meaning
somelhing occuIl, eilher in lhe sense of somelhing indeslruclibIe or in lhe sense of a menlaI
enlily. ecause of ils ob|eclive and, so lo seak, ubIic nalure, lhe nolion of use conceaIs no
myslery, il avoids examining vhal eoIe lhink, feeI, or exerience. AII lhal mallers is vhal one
does vilh a game. In lhe raclice of Ianguage, everylhing is exosed, if meaning is use, il is a
maller of indifference vhelher lhis use is or is nol accomanied by a menlaI rocess, by images,
or by feeIings. In lhis |15865j vay, aII myslery is dismissed from Ianguage, everylhing is reveaIed
lo us. Language becomes a funclion in vhich nolhing is occuIl: Whal ve do is lo bring vords
back from lheir melahysicaI lo lheir everyday use.
32

In more osilive lerms, lhe nolion of use imIies lhal Ianguage-games are incororaled
inlo human aclivily lhal vorks: lhey reresenl jcrns cj |ijc: Here lhe lerm '|anguagc-ganc' is
meanl lo bring inlo rominence lhe facl lhal lhe spcaking of Ianguage is arl of an aclivily, or of a
form of Iife.
33
Inlerreled lhis vay, lhe nolion of use Iends ilseIf direclIy lo a confronlalion vilh
HusserI. Do lhey bolh nol seak of a IifevorId` On vhal oinls do lhey agree or disagree,
hovever` And vhy`
Il seems lo me lhal lhe discussion can be carried oul on lvo IeveIs: on lhe IeveI of lhe
Ianguage lhal one is laIking a|cui and on lhe IeveI of lhe Ianguage lhal one laIks inlhal is, lhe
hiIosohicaI Ianguage emIoyed by HusserI and Willgenslein in lheir reseclive hiIosohicaI
enquiries.
Lel us firsl remain on lhe IeveI of lhe Ianguage bolh of lhem laIk aboul. HusserI and
Willgenslein laIk aboul Ianguage in reIalion lo Iife, bul lhey seem lo say lhings lhal are
incomalibIe and lhal hardIy admil comarison. Ior HusserI, lhe IifevorId is nol direclIy vieved
bul indireclIy inlended as vhal lhe Iogic of lrulh refers back lo, lhe IifevorId is inlenlionaIIy
aimed by vay of a queslioning back from IogicaI roosilions. Willgenslein, on lhe conlrary,
vouId immedialeIy Iocale himseIf in lhis IifevorId, vhere Ianguage is a form of aclivily, Iike
ealing, drinking, and sIeeing. NeverlheIess, I vonder if il vouId nol ossibIe lo imrove our
underslanding of lhese lvo underlakings by roviding lhem vilh a common norm of
comarison borroved from Iinguislics, |15866j lo vhich neilher HusserI nor Willgenslein make
reference. In arlicuIar, lhey do nol seem lo be avare of lhe dislinclion, inlroduced by Ierdinand
de Saussure in his Ccursc in Gcncra| Iinguisiics, belveen Ianguage and seaking.
34
We viII
see if lhis dislinclion mighl cIarify lhe debale. I viII slarl from Willgenslein's Iasl roosilion:
Here lhe lerm '|anguagc-ganc' is meanl lo bring inlo rominence lhe facl lhal lhe spcaking of
Ianguage is arl of an aclivily, or of a form of Iife.
35
This lexl mighl rove lhal Willgenslein vas
nol afler a lheory of Ianguage bul of seaking. Il is lhe seaking lhal is arl of an aclivily
or a form of Iife, nol lhe Ianguage. ul seaking resuoses Ianguage, firsl, as a sociaI
henomenonlhal is, as an inslilulion lhal beIongs lo everyday Iife, vhich is even a form of
Iifelhen (and more eseciaIIy) as a syslem of signs. Nov, if seaking is a form of aclivily, lhal

38

is nol lrue of Ianguage underslood as a cIosed syslem in vhich one sign is oosed lo anolher
and in vhich signs considered individuaIIy resuose lhe lolaIily of lhe syslem. The syslem
becomes delached from Iife in lhal il lends lo cIose in on ilseIf. Therefore, a lheory of Ianguage
vouId resuose lvo definilions of meaning and nol |usl one: a definilion lhal refIecls lhe
beIonging lo a syslem of signs and a definilion lhal refIecls lhe aIicalion lo reaIily, ils use. The
second definilion couId be Willgenslein's: lhe meaning of a vord is ils use in a Ianguage,
roviding one underslands by Ianguage lhe combinalion of signs in senlences in a given
silualion. ul lhis definilion resuoses lhe receding one, vhich concerns lhe conslilulion of
lhe sign as a sign, rior lo ils use. In lhis sense, one shouId say lhal any ragmalic definilion of
Ianguage resuoses a semioIogicaI definilion. In lhis semioIogicaI definilion, ve musl consider
Ianguage as a syslem and nol seaking as a use, each sign has lo be defined |15867j as lhe
inlernaI reIalion belveen a signifier and a signified, and aII lhe signs have lo be inlerreIaled by
vay of lheir differenlialion vilhin lhe syslem.
Al lhis rice, il is ossibIe lo relain Willgenslein's nolion of use and even lo drav from
il aII lhe advanlages of ils aIicalion lo Iife in an indefinile variely of uses, exceeding ils IogicaI
funclion in every direclion. ul use does resuose lhe conslilulion of lhe symboIic funclion.
This dislinclion belveen Ianguage and seaking aIIovs us lo ground lhe diversily of
Ianguage-games uon a unilary funclion of Ianguage, vilhoul lhe Ialler imIying an essence
common lo lhe muIliIicily of uses. This unilary funclion is lhe unily of Ianguage as a syslem,
vhal is found in honoIogy, in morhoIogy, and even in IexicoIogy, since lhe corus of a
Ianguage al any given momenl is aIvays a finile and deIimiled corus. So ve can relain nol onIy
lhe nolion of use bul aIso lhal of muIliIicily of Ianguage-games, roviding lhal incsc Ianguages
are referred back lo inc Ianguage, as seaking is referred back lo Ianguage. We can even give
free reign more easiIy lo lhe diversily of uses in lhal ve have slrongIy emhasized lhe syslemalic
nalure of Ianguage. Wilh lhis syslemalic unily of Ianguage as oosed lo lhe innumerabIe
diversily of lhe uses of seaking, ve are broughl back lo HusserI's robIem of Ianguage as
referring back lo lhe IifevorId. In effecl, Ianguage, as oosed lo seaking is nol one pari
of an aclivily or a form of Iife, Iike ealing, drinking, sIeeing, il refers lo a form of Iife. Il is nol
because lhe sign as such is nol resenl lo reaIily and inslilules a dislance from Iife lhal Ianguage
is nol a arl of an aclivily or a form of Iife, il is reciseIy because il does nol beIong lo Iife,
because il is an incororeaI enlily or a |ccicnaccording lo lhe Sloics' anaIysislhal il can
lransform aII our human aclivilies and aII our forms of Iife inlo meaningfuI aclivilies.
|15868j Thus, lhere is a rimary oeralion before any use, a rimary inslilulion, lhal of
lhe sign, vhich ccnjcrs ncaning uon sensibIe eIemenls. Il is lhis conslilulion of meaning lhal
rimariIy deserves lhe name of significalion or, lo laIk in Irege's Ianguage, of sense (Sinn). AII
lhe various IogicaI aclivilies are grafled onlo lhis conslilulion of sensesince lhis meaning
conlains, al Ieasl olenliaIIy, a IogicaI lenor IikeIy lo be incIuded in lhe aclivilies of formaIizalion
lhal give signs a second degree, a lhird degree, elc., absence comared lo reaIily and Iife. Il is
because lhe firsl movemenl is a cenlrifugaI movemenl, vilh resecl lo Iife and lhe aclivilies of
Iife, lhal lhe use of Ianguage, lhal is lo say, ils aIicalion lo reaIily and Iife, becomes robIemalic.
Il is no Ionger enough lo Iook, one has lo lhink. One has lo lhink vhal lhe use means vhen lhe
conneclion belveen Ianguage as a syslem of signs and as sense has been re-connecled. One has lo
lhink in order lo reIale Ianguage as a seech-acl lo Ianguage as a syslem of signs. In shorl, one
has lo lhink aboul lhe reIalion of lhe evenl lo lhe inslilulion. ConsequenlIy, lhe aIicalion of
Ianguage lo reaIily cannol be laken for granled, il even becomes beviIdering: if Ianguage is olher
Pau| |icur

39

lhan reaIily, hov can lhe sign exress lhe lhing` The robIem of lhe meaning is lhus osed a
second lime: il is no Ionger a maller of one lerm oosed lo anolher vilhin a syslem, bul of a
reference lo an ob|ecl, of a gras uon reaIily.
We lhus relurn lo HusserI's nolion of reference back, afler having sel oul from
Willgenslein's nolion of use. Il is necessary lo gel back from lhe domain of Iogic lo Iife by vay of
a queslioning back, for ve are forever searaled from Iife by lhe very funclion of lhe sign: ve
no Ionger Iive Iife, ve onIy designale il, ve signify il, and ve lherefore are indefinileIy referred
back lo il, by inlerreling il in many differenl vays. Iurlhermore, in addilion lo |15869j lhe
nolion of reference back from lhe IogicaI domain lo Iife, ve rediscover a form of denominalion
lhal cannol be reduced lo Ianguage-games. Maybe one shouId say lhal lhere are lvo senses of
denominalion, a narrov sense and a broad sense. The narrov sense is reIaled lo seaking: il
reresenls one game among olher games (Hov is lhis caIIed` Il is caIIed N). The broad sense of
lhe denominalion has lo do vilh Ianguage (as a syslem): il reresenls a gcncra| cnaracicrisiic cj
scnic|cgq, nameIy, lhe counlerarl, vilhin any sign, of ils incororalion as a differenliaI eIemenl
in a syslem. This counlerarl consisls in lhe reference lo somelhing: vhen I seak, I say
somelhing aboul somelhing, lo seak aboul is lo denominale in lhe broad sense. Irege made a
dislinclion belveen Sinn and Bc!cuiung lhis vay, and HusserIvho re|ecled Irege's lerminoIogy
bul did lake u his melhod of anaIysisdislinguished, on lhe one hand, Sinn (or Bc!cuiung) and
Bcncnnung, on lhe olher.
Does lhis amounl lo saying lhal one faIIs back inlo lhe subIimalion of names and
reconslilules a vorId of hidden enlilies` I do nol lhink so. The dicholomy lhal Willgenslein
vanls lo imose uon us is misIeading: vhal, in a meaning, is nol a use, is nol necessariIy a
lranscendenl or menlaI enlily. Since lhe MiddIe Ages, lhe lheory of concel and lhe lheory of
universaIs has been a slruggIe lo found lhe use of vords uon significalions vilhoul lhe Ialler
being reaIized in a higher or an inlerior vorId, lhese significalions reresenl lhe syslemalic
condilions according lo vhich a delerminale use of lhe forms of Ianguage is ossibIe, in shorl, il
comes dovn lo an alleml lo avoid lhe dicholomy belveen IIalonic reaIism and emiricism.
Linguislics and henomenoIogy loday aIIov laking u lhis slruggIe again. Linguislics does lhis
by reIaling Ianguage lo lhe semanlic olenliaIilies from vhich a muIlilude of uses is ossibIe. Il is
cerlainIy lrue lhal, in comarison lo acluaI use, a significalion |15870j is indeslruclibIe: il
reresenls a aradigm case of use. ul lheir Iace in lhe syslem conslilules lhe vhoIe reaIily of
lhese indeslruclibIe names, lhis simIy means lhal use of lhe same vord in differenl conlexls
does nol aIler lhe Iace of lhe vord in lhe Iinguislic syslem. IhenomenoIogy exlends lhis
semanlics of lhe Iinguisl by describing lhe acl of signifying as an inlenlionaI acl lhal cannol be
reduced lo a conlemIalion of essences or an inlroseclion direcled lovard menlaI enlilies. This
inlenlionaI acl aims al lhe unily of a meaning, as a unily of vaIidily, and lhis meaning is an
ideaIily, unreaI in comarison vilh lhe vhoIe of nalure. Il is lherefore from lhe erseclive of
Ianguage (as a syslem) lhal a significalion can be heId lo be a unily of meaning. This lrealmenl of
lhe significalion, al lhe IeveI of Ianguage, does nol excIude bul ralher requires anolher definilion
of meaning, vhich vouId erlain lo lhe vord as il oerales in a senlence. Then aII of
Willgenslein's consideralions on lhe muIliIe uses of Ianguage become reIevanl: indeed, il is onIy
in a senlence considered as a unil of seech lhal lhe vord has a meaning, and lhis meaning is ils
use.

40

In lhis vay, ve have nol reconciIed HusserI and Willgenslein. We have |usl p|acc! lhem,
nol by giving lhem nol a common denominalor bul a common reference, aIien lo bolh of lhem:
lhe reIalion belveen Ianguage (as a syslem) and seaking in Saussure's Iinguislics.
The differenl meaning lhal lhey give lo hiIosohicaI aclivily is vhal revenls us from
combining lhem inside a convenienl ecIeclic syslem. We viII lake u lhis queslion onIy in lerms
of a second queslion vilh resecl lo vhich ve vouId Iike lo confronl lhe lvo hiIosohers,
nameIy, hov lhey bolh deveIo a refIeclion on Ianguage. One can in facl ask lo vhal kind of
Ianguage, lo vhal Ianguage-game, lhe Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns beIongs. y asking lhis queslion,
ve re|oin, bul lhis lime al a |15871j second-degree IeveI, lhe dislance from Ianguage lo Iife, and so
lhe ossibiIily of queslioning lhe reference back of lhis second-degree Ianguage lo lhe
rimordiaI reaIily of a vorId.
Al firsl sighl, Willgenslein's underlaking seems very modesl: il amounls lo a descrilion
of Ianguage-games vhich does nol seem lo sel al a dislance lhe lhings described. HusserI, on lhe
conlrary, aears lo sel oul from furlher off or from higher u, from a suer-Ianguage
eslabIished as a |udiciaI aulhorily, lhal is vhy he is abIe lo ose lhe robIem of a relurn lo lhe
IifevorId. Willgenslein seems never lo have Iefl il. ul ve have our susicions: is lhis descrilion
as dovn-lo-earlh as il aears` Does il nol roceed from an evaIualion of lhe deslinalion of
Ianguage, and lherefore from a oinl of viev lhal has aIready laken ils dislance in reIalion lo
every game and vhich considers ilseIf aulhorized lo confirm some and excIude olhers` AII of lhe
Ianguages lhal govern raclicaI aclivilies are acceled, such as lhose deaIing vilh bricks, aIes,
labIes, coIors, elc., each of lhese aclivilies is a IillIe vorId vherein a number of Iayers and quile
fIexibIe ruIes are invoIved. These games are diverse and disconlinuous, as ordinary concerns of
Iife are. Il is underslood, on lhe olher hand, lhal lo laIk aboul lhe vorId, aboul human beings in
lhe vorId, or silualions and ro|ecls vouId be lo formuIale lyicaIIy hiIosohicaI roosilions
in vhich Ianguage vouId sin ils vheeIs in a vacuum, vouId go on vacalion. A lheraeulic
rogram, lhal of curing human beings of melahysicaI queslions, is lhus imIied in vhal makes
ilseIf oul lo be a mere descrilion. Ior lhis reason, Willgenslein can say al lhe same lime lhal
hiIosohy Ieaves lhings as lhey are, lhal il does nol relend lo be abIe lo reair sider's vebs
vilh ils fingers,
36
and lhal il has lo cure ilseIf of ils ovn enquiries. Iveryday Iife, and nol simIy
everyday Ianguage, is vhal is acluaIIy Iefl as il is, lhe ruIes lhal games roose are lhose of an
acceled |15872j raclice. CailuIalion lo everyday Iife, vilh ils concerns and scallered games,
disguises ilseIf benealh lhe aarenl modesly of lhe vork of descrilion. Indeed, every Ianguage
game has lo be resecled, excel lhose roceeding from aslonishmenl and erIexily aboul
everyday Iife ilseIf. Such is lhe normalive or evaIualive asserlion underIying lhe onIy osilive
lhesis of lhe book: lhe aim of descrilion is lo bring Ianguage back from ils melahysicaI use lo
ils use in everyday Iife. ul bringing Ianguage back lo everyday Iife aIso means lo obIige il lo end
ils career in lhe same ragmalic shere lo vhich il had been confined in lhe firsl Iace.
This araisaI and lhis normalive aclivily, underIying lhe descrilion, allesl lhal lhe
Ialler does nol beIong lo lhe same circIe of aclivilies as do lhe Ianguage-games lhus described.
IhiIosohy is nol ilseIf a Ianguage-game or ralher ils Ianguage-game is nol a form of Iife.
IhiIosohy vilhdravs ordinary Ianguage from Iife by reveaIing il lo be a game, il gives Ianguage
lhe aearance of a game. There is an exression of Willgenslein's lhal ve have ignored so far
and vhich enunciales lhal dislance: lhe nolion of grannar. Willgenslein uses il in a sense lhal is
nol rigorousIy a Iinguislic one, vilh regards lo lhe ruIes of a arlicuIar game. The man in lhe
slreel does nol knov lhal il is grammar lhal decides vhal kind of game is being Iayed, onIy
Pau| |icur

41

lhe hiIosoher knovs lhal lhe game is ruIed by a grammar. The man in lhe slreel moves from
one game lo anolher and is aIvays in lhis or lhal game, onIy lhe hiIosoher can say lhal he
comIies vilh lhe grammar of a game. Hovever, nev kinds of queslions are raised vilh lhis
nolion of grammar, lhey may be caIIed lranscendenlaI queslions in lhe sense lhal lhey are no
Ionger inside a Ianguage-game bul are aboul Ianguage-games comared one vilh anolher. So
lhere is a Iinguislic aclivilylhal of Willgenslein, reciseIylhal consisls in laIking aboul
Ianguage-games and lheir grammar. Il is for such aclivily lhal lhe |15873j queslion of lhe reIalion
belveen lhese grammars and reaIily ineIuclabIy arises. Il can be seen in lhe discussion aboul
sensalions and maleriaI lhings: in facl, Ianguage aboul sensalions is quile dislincl from Ianguage
aboul ob|ecls. ShouId one say lhal lhe exislenliaI asserlion according lo vhich lhere are lhings
such as sensalions and lhings such as maleriaI ob|ecls is onIy a grammalicaI slalemenl` ul lo say
lhal a Ianguage-game of a cerlain kind is being Iayed acluaIIy amounls lo ullering a discourse
aboul lhe condilions of lhe ossibiIily for one kind of ob|ecl in one kind of Ianguage. And aII lhe
robIems aboul lhe reIalion lo lhe ob|ecl, from Kanl lo HusserI and Slravson
37
, arise again. Il is
even a lyicaIIy Kanlian slalemenl lo say lhal il is lhe funclioning of vords in Ianguage lhal
confers meaning on asserlions aboul sensalions and maleriaI ob|ecls. CerlainIy, lhis robIem can
be soIved in a differenl vay. HusserI, for examIe, refuses lo admil lhal lhe nolion of maleriaI
ob|ecl mighl be defined by lhe grammar of a game, nor by any arlicuIar kind of Iinguislic
raclice. Grammar cannol say vhal kind of ob|ecl somelhing is, lhe ossibiIily of a given
Iinguislic raclice is founded by lhe differenl kinds of ob|ecls in referring back inlenlionaIIy lo
lhis or lhal kind of ob|ecl.
Whalever lhe manner chosen lo resoIve il, lhe robIem of lhe reIalion of grammar lo lhe
vorId is osed as a lranscendenlaI robIem: one no Ionger slands vilhin a game bul ralher lhinks
aboul games. This refIexive aclivily loo has ils Ianguage, vhich cerlainIy has ils rools in ordinary
Ianguagevhen one seaks of bodies, mind, sensalion, ob|ecl, lhoughl, exislence,
and Ianguage. We can neilher accel lhis Ianguage as il is, nor re|ecl il, bul ralher have lo
correcl and crilicize il. And lhis crilique is no Ionger an aclivily of Iife, nor one game among
olhers. We are nol engaged in a raclicaI aclivily anymore, bul in a lheorelicaI enquiry. So
Willgenslein vouId be righl in lhinking lhal lhe seaking of Ianguage is arl of an aclivily or a
form of Iife. The Ianguage in |15874j in vhich lhis is said, hovever, is no Ionger a form of Iife bul
of refIeclion. And il is for lhis allilude of refIeclion lhal lhe IifevorId figures as a foundalion of
meaning, lo vhich queslioning back endIessIy refers.


42

The Laler Willgenslein and lhe Laler HusserI on Language from
lhe IauI Ricour Archive
SamueI LeIievre and Calherine GoIdenslein

This lexl comes from a seclion of lhe foIders IabeIed |ntcnicrq | (Ieclures, seminars,
conferences) in lhe IauI Ricour Archives (Ionds Ricour, IIT, Iaris). This coIIeclion incIudes
maleriaI lhal runs from Ieclures lilIed Ia pncncncnc|cgic !c Husscr|. |angagc ci pncncncnc|cgic
given al lhe IacuIle de Nanlerre in 1964 (dossier 139, Invenlory I) lo lhe lhose deIivered al lhe
Universily of Toronlo (Canada) and lhe Universily of Texas al Auslin (USA) in November 1968
(dossier 103), aIong vilh Ieclures given al Nanlerre in 1965 on anaIylic hiIosohy (dossier 100)
and Ieclures on Ianguage, given in 1965, 1966, and 1967 (dossier 109, 116), again al Nanlerre,
aIong vilh imorlanl handvrillen noles for his Ieclures on Ianguage, reared in Irench, for
Nanlerre, and in IngIish, for Norlh America (dossier 120). A mimeograhed documenl lilIed
IhenomenoIogy and Language (dossier 102), reIaled lo lhree Ieclures given al Whealon
CoIIege, IIIinois (USA) in Oclober 1967, shouId aIso be menlioned.
In al Ieasl lvo of lhe foIders, in vhich Ieclures from Nanlerre vere kel (dossiers 109,
116, and 120), il is noled, al lhe oinl vhere Ricour Ianned lo laIk aboul Willgenslein, lhal lhe
assages aboul lhis hiIosoher are missing. Yel, according lo noles laken by some sludenls al
lhe lime, lhose Ieclures on Willgenslein vere in facl deIivered. Ricour robabIy meanl lo
indicale lo lhe sludenls rearing summaries for lhe cIass from lheir noles lhal he vas nol
conlenl vilh lhese Ieclures as resenled. As can be seen in olher Iaces in his aers, he vouId
somelimes remove a seclion in order lo exand il, Iike roIIing a snovbaII. So vhere somelhing is
noled as missing one can somelimes find indicalions added Ialer by Ricour lo his Ieclure
manuscrils such as here Iecl. aboul Willgenslein II and HusserI II or Willg. I and HusserI I.
The Ieclures and conferences on HusserI and Willgenslein vere broughl logelher in a
searale foIder (dossier 134) by Ricour. This foIder has lhe foIIoving maleriaI:
1 - Willgenslein: Traciaius. Noles for a Ieclure |15671-15695j. Lesson Ian on lhe Traciaius
|15696j. Handvrillen on smaII grid sheels (robabIy from 19641965).
2 - Reading noles on Max Iack: A Ccnpanicn ic Wiiigcnsicins Traciaius |15704-15706j and
rearalory noles for a Ieclure (Nanlerre in 1966): II. Iigures and facls |15707-15712j.
Handvrillen on smaII grid sheels.
3 - Willgenslein: Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns |15713-15730j. Handvrillen on smaII grid
sheels.
4 - HusserI and Willgenslein: I. Icgica| |ntcsiigaiicns and Traciaius |15731-15749j and
|15696-15703j. Handvrillen noles in IngIish on A4 sheels. Leclures given in Washinglon DC on
6 Oclober 1965.
5 - HusserI and Willgenslein: II. The Ialer HusserI and lhe Pni|cscpnica| |ntcsiigaiicns
|15750-15888j. Leclures given al }ohns Hokins Universily in AriI 1966. This is vhere lhe ages
of lhe lexl The Ialer Willgenslein and lhe Ialer HusserI on Ianguage |15847-15873j and ils
Irench version Ic !crnicr Wiiigcnsicin ci |c !crnicr Husscr| sur |c |angagc |15799-15822j are
Iocaled. They have never been ubIished before.
Pau| |icur

43

6 - HusserI and Willgenslein on Language: III. Synlhesis |15889-15912j. Leclure deIivered
al lhe IennsyIvania Slale Universily (USA) on 22 Oclober 1966, for lhe Symosium on lhe
IhiIosohy of Languages. HusserI and Willgenslein. This is lhe conference lhal resuIled in lhe
ubIicalion in IngIish of HusserI and Willgenslein on Language, in Pncncncnc|cgq an!
|xisicniia|isn, ediled by Idvard N. Lee and Maurice MandeIbaum (aIlimore: }ohn Hokins
Universily Iress, 1967), 207217, reubIished in Ana|qiic Pni|cscpnq an! Pncncncnc|cgq, ediled by
HaroId A. Duree (The Hague: M. Ni|hoff, 1976), 8795.
7 - The Traciaius of Willgenslein and lhe queslion of lhe sub|ecl. |15913-15925j
CIearIy, lhe Irench archivaI documenl lhal ve ubIish loday had received a Iol of
allenlion from Ricour. We find aII lhe rearalory sles: from drafl manuscrils lo lhe finaI
lyed lexl, carefuIIy roofread and correcled by his hand. He incIuded references lo lhe assages
ciled from lhe books in his vorking Iibrary, vhich are accessibIe loday al lhe |cn!s |icur, lhe
reIevanl assages can be found underIined or framed in lhese books.
The lexl vas robabIy vrillen firsl in Irench, lhen deIivered in IngIish by Ricour, vho
managed lo have il lransIaled. This IngIish version ve offer loday is a documenl based on
maleriaI reared by Ricour bul ediled in order lo reare a cIearer IngIish lexl, aIbeil one sliII
reresenlalive of vhal is in lhe archive. Given ils reIevance for lhis issue of |iu!cs
|icuricnncs/|icur Siu!ics, lhe IdiloriaI Commillee of lhe |cn!s |icur has aulhorized lhe
ubIicalion of lhis lexl, quile reresenlalive of lhe vay IauI Ricour vas vorking al lhe lime in
queslion. A firsl Irench version vas reared and ediled by Marc-Anloine VaIIee in 2009. This
version has been comIeleIy revised and re-ediled by SamueI LeIievre, vho has aIso reared
and ediled lhe IngIish version. Assislance in accessing lhe archivaI maleriaIs and in lhe ediling
rocess vas rovided by Calherine GoIdenslein.

We musl lhank lhe edilors of lhis issue of |iu!cs |icuricnncs/|icur Siu!ics for lheir
suggeslions regarding lhe rearalion of a schoIarIy version of Ricour's lexl and Irof. David
W. IeIIauer for his roofreading of lhe IngIish version.
S L. & C. G.

44

1
Editors note: the numbers in brackets indicate the sheet numbers of the original document in the
Ricur Archives. The edition of this text, prepared by Paul Ricur for teaching purposes, is ruled by
the three following principles: 1) to leave the features of a verbal presentation as they are; 2) to be
the closest to the original document in Englishcorrections have been made, however, regarding the
punctuation, mistakes (missing words, typographical errors, or regarding the English language etc.),
and regarding the academic presentation; 3) to include bibliographical references and quotations
Ricur is relying on for his analysis. Therefore, this English version is left with some imperfections
and is not completely similar to the French version. For more details on these issues relating to the
origin of this text, we refer to the note entitled The later Wittgenstein and the later Husserl on
language in Paul Ricur Archives, which is included at the end of this article.
2
Editors note: Cf. Edmund Husserl, (1900-1901) Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London:
Routledge Paris: PUF, 1973); Edmund Husserl, (1929) Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans.
D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969); Edmund Husserl, (1939) Experience and Judgement, trans.
J. S. Churchill, J. S. and K. Ameriks (London: Routledge, 1973); Edmund Husserl, (1936) The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1970).
3
Editors note: in the Ricur Archives (Fonds Ricur, IPT, Paris), cf. dossier n
o
134: Husserl et
Wittgenstein: I. Recherches logiques and Tractatus [15731-15749] and [15696-15703] (Lectures
given in Washington DC on 6 October 1965).
4
Editors note: the original document includes the following indication at this point: (note sur
Guillaume). This may refer to the dossier n
o
104 in the Ricur Archives. This dossier deals with
linguist Gustave Guillaume and contains around twenty handwritten pages prepared for a course.
5
Gottlob Frege (1892), Sense and Reference, trans. M. Black, The Philosophical Review 57 (May 1948):
20930.
6
Editors note: Cf. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1948), chapter 4.
7
Editors note: Ricur refers here to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 39: But why does it occur to one to want to
make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?That is just the reason. For
one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this:
a name ought really to signify a simple. And for this one might perhaps give the following reasons:
The word Excalibur, say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of
parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is
clear that the sentence Excalibur has a sharp blade makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is
broken up. But if Excalibur is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is
broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But
then the sentence Excalibur has a sharp blade would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence
the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something
corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word Excalibur must disappear when the
sense is analyzed and its place be taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call

Pau| |icur

45

these words the real names. When consulting Paul Ricurs personal library, it appears that the
philosopher seemed to have a good knowledge of the English translation of Wittgensteins book, for
he used to annotate terms in English to replace terms used in the French translation of 1961.
8
Edmund Husserl (19001901), Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1969), 199. Editors note: from now on, the footnotes that do not start with Editors note
refer to bibliographical references within the document; in the French manuscript, Ricur indicated in
parenthesis either a page number from the French translation of Husserls Formal and Transcendental
Logic or a paragraph number or several paragraph numbers from the French translation of
Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations. (In a few rare cases of repetition of the same information,
we have included only one note to this text.)
9
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 199.
10
Editors note: Paul Ricur notes in the margin of the French handwritten version: Lire 270 (Read
270). He is referring to to page 270 of Logique formelle et logique transcendantale (French edition)
and to page 200 of Formal and Transcendental Logic.
11
12
Editors note: Ricur notes in the text of the English version of this document: Read p. 276 end 282.
The reference is to the French translation of Logique formelle et logique transcendantale; pages 204-
208 of the English translation of Formal and Transcendental Logic.
13
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 204. Editors note: Ricur quotes the beginning of
a sentence from Logique formelle et logique transcendantale, 276. Here is the full passage from
Formal and Transcendental Logic, 204: and reductive deliberation teaches, as an Apriori, that every
conceivable judgment ultimately (and either definitely or indefinitely) has relation to individual objects
(in an extremely broad sense, real objects), and therefore has relation to a real universe, a world or
a world-province, for which it holds good.
14
15
16
Editors note: Ricur notes in the text of the English version of this document: 286 and note b. The
reference is to Logique formelle et logique transcendantale along with footnote b; page 212 of Formal
and Transcendental Logic along with footnote 2.
17
18
Editors note: a full quotation is missing here; Ricur only notes 294 in different documents. He
reference is again to page 286 of Formal and Transcendental Logic (French edition) and to page 218
of Formal and Transcendental Logic, especially the following passage: Every judgment as such has
its intentional genesis or, as we can also say, its essentially necessary motivational foundations,
without which it could not at first exist in its primitive mode, certainty, nor be modelized thereafter.


46

These foundations include the necessity that the syntactical stuffs occurring in the unity of judgment
have something to do with one another.
19
20
21
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 219. Editors note: Here is the full passage from
Formal and Transcendental Logic: Formal-logical considerations and theory, with their focusing on
what is Objective, have nothing to say about that; but every one of their logical forms, with their Ss
and ps, with all the literal symbols occurring in the unity of a formal nexus, tacitly presuppose that,
in this nexus, S and p, and so forth, have something to do with each other materially.
22
Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic.
23
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 23. Editors note: Here is the passage form the
Philosophical Investigations: But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question,
and command?there are countless kinds [] Review the multiplicity of language-games in the
following examples, and in others: Giving orders and obeying them [] Asking, thanking, cursing,
greeting, praying. It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways
they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the
structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)
24
Editors note: This is the concept Wittgenstein used for simple objects, in making his distinction
between name, word, and object. Wittgenstein notably used the example of the distinction
between the word Excalibur and the sword Excaliburplaying on the phonetic proximity of these
words in English. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 39. This passage is already
quoted in note 7 (supra).
25
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 50. Editors note: here is this passage from the
Philosophical Investigations: What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-
being to elements?One might say: if everything that we call being and non-being consists in the
existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an
elements being (non-being); just as when everything that we call destruction lies in the separation
of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the destruction of an element. One would, however, like to
say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it
and so one could say nothing at all of it []Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in
Paris like the standard metre. We define: sepia means the colour of the standard sepia which is there
kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this
colour or that it is not. We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in
ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of
representation.
26
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 18. Editors note: here is this passage from
Philosophical Investigations: Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets

Pau| |icur

47

and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.
27
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 65. Editors note: here is this passage of
Philosophical Investigations: Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I
am saying that these phenomena [i.e., the general form of propositions and of language] have no one
thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,but that they are related to one another
in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them
all language.
28
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 69.
29
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 65 and 77.
30
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 43. Editors note: here is this passage of
Philosophical Investigations: For a large class of casesthough not for allin which we employ the
word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the
meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
31
Editors note: John Locke (1689), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford
University Press/Clarendon Press, 1975), III, II, 2.
32
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 116. Editors note: here is the full passage: When
philosophers use a wordknowledge, being, object, I, proposition, nameand try to grasp the
essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the
language-game which is its original home?What we do is to bring words back from their
metaphysical to their every-day use.
33
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 23.
34
Editors note: Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin
(Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), notably 1415 and 7778. We have included Ferdinand de
Saussures concepts, i.e., langue and parole translated as language and speaking in English. In
his notes and corrections, Ricur refers to the Saussurean distinction as an opposition between
language as a system and language as speech-act and discourse; he in fact mainly uses the term
discourse in his subsequent analysis instead of language of speech-act and discourse. The choice
to replace it by speaking has been made because (1) this is the term used for parole in English
translations of Saussures work, (2) it does not alter or change the sense of Ricurs developments,
and (3) it actually fits in with his developments on Wittgenstein.
35
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 23. Editors note: we have added the quotation in
the text.
36
Editors note: Ricur here refers to Wittgensteins formula in Philosophical Investigations, 106: Here
it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-
day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in


48

turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to
repair a torn spiders web with our fingers.
37
Editors note: Cf. Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London:
Methuen, 1959).

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