Legal Maxims

Statutory Construction
Midterm Project
Legal Maxims Case Digest

AVES. Mariannejoy R.
CABALLES, Jeramie M.
FERNANDO, Kristin Jomafer C.
SANTOS, Justinne Marie D.
TICKE, Kathlene Fyle B.
ID 2014

Atty. Balboa-Cahig

1D 2014
Midterm Project
Legal Maxims Case Digests
1
Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent
When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required

Gan vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 145527
May 28, 2002
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:
Bernadette C. Pondevida instituted on behalf og her daughter, Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, private
respondent, a complaint against Augustus Caezar R. Gan, petitioner, for support with prayer for support pendent
lite.
Petitioner, denying paternity of the child, moved to dismiss the case but was denied by the trial court.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on
12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate
child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15
April 2000. Private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by
issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling.
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment.
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be
stayed by an appeal.

ISSUE:
Can judgment for support be executed despite absence of good reasons for its immediate execution?

RULING:
Yes. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court,
judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. The aforesaid
provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction
between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. Petitioner is reminded that to the
plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.
Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance
negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. Therefore, judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
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2
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus
An act done by me against my will is not my act

People vs. Dimapanan
G.R. No. 177570
January 19, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo)
were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, with Violations of Section 4, in relation to
Section 21, paragraphs (e-l), (f), (m), and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana
under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to
accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.

ISSUE:
Is Dequina exempt form criminal liability because she acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force?

RULING:
No. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Therefore, Dequina is not exempt from criminal liability.
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3
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so

People vs. Ojeda
G.R. No. 104238-58
June 3, 2004
Corona, J.

FACTS:
Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was charged in 21 separate Informations for estafa in and for violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. On November 5, 1983, appellant purchased from Chua various fabrics and textile
materials worth P228,306 for which she issued 22 postdated checks bearing different dates and amounts. Chua
later presented to the bank for payment check no. 033550 dated November 5, 1983 in the amount of P17,100 but
it was dishonored due to Account Closed. On April 10, 1984, Chua deposited the rest of the checks but all were
dishonored for the same reason. Demands were allegedly made on the appellant to make good the dishonored
checks, to no avail.
With the exception of six checks which did not bear her signature, appellant admitted that she issued the
postdated checks which were the subject of the criminal cases against her. She, however, alleged that she told
Chua not to deposit the postdated checks on maturity as they were not yet sufficiently funded. Appellant also
claimed that she made partial payments to Chua in the form of finished garments worth P50,000. This was not
rebutted by the prosecution.
In her Second and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, appellant attached an Affidavit of Desistance of
complainant Ruby Chua which stated in part that the defendant Mrs. Cora Ojeda has already fully paid her
monetary obligation to me in the amount of P228,306.00 which is the subject of the aforementioned cases.

ISSUE:
Was there good faith on the part of the appellant? If yes, does this constitute a valid defense against
estafa?

RULING:
Yes. Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885,[20] the elements of estafa
are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. It must be noted that
our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes
mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom,
intelligence and intent which together make up the criminal mind behind the criminal act. Thus, to constitute a
crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
Therefore, appellant acted in good faith and should be acquitted for estafa and for violation of BP 22.

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4
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia
Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires

Mapa vs. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78585
July 5, 1989
Regalado, J.

FACTS:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation (Labrador) payable in ten years. Mapa
defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter
informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four
contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the
services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner
contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots,
and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of PD 957 and its implementing rules form part of the contracts to sell executed by
petitioner and respondent corporation?

RULING:
No. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia.
Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the
employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of
development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics
that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. Thus, if ever
there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly installments due from petitioner, it would only be based on non-
performance of the obligations provided in Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged non-construction of
the cul-de-sac.

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5
Argumentum a contrario
Negative-opposite doctrine

Chung Fook vs. White
264 U.S. 443
April 7, 1924
Sutherland, J.

FACTS:
Chung Fook is a native-born citizen of the United States. Lee Shee, his wife, is an alien Chinese woman,
ineligible for naturalization. In 1922 she sought admission to the United States, but was refused and detained at
the immigration station, on the ground that she was an alien, afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease.

ISSUE:
Is Lee Shee entitled to admission under Section 22 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917?

RULING:
No. The pertinent words of the proviso are that if the person sending for wife or minor child is
naturalized, a wife to whom married or a minor child born subsequent to such husband or father's naturalization
shall be admitted without detention for treatment in hospital. xxx" The measure of the exemption is plainly stated
and, in terms, extends to the wife of a naturalized citizen only. The Court is inclined to
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6
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally

COA vs. Province of Cebu
G.R. No. 141386
November 29, 2001
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98
of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle
extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools.
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the
period January to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers
appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund
(SEF). Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA
issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and
scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

ISSUE:
May the expenses for college scholarship grants be charged to the SEF?

RULING:
No. A reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among
the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and
272 of the Local Government Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of
salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of establishment and maintenance of extension classes and
operation and maintenance of public schools, the granting of government scholarship to poor but deserving
students was omitted in Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted
it. Therefore, the expenses for college scholarship grants cannot be charged to the SEF.
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7
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases

Comendador vs. De Villa
G.R. No. 96948
August 2, 1991
Cruz, J.

FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are
violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW
94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the president and members of General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14. They invoked
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been
discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

ISSUE:
Can the petitioners exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War?

RULING:
Yes. P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8, which empowers the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces to create military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically. When the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. The withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge
in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge. Therefore, petitioners should be allowed to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War.

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8
Contemporanea expositia est est optima et fortissimo in lege
The contemporary construction is strongest in law

People vs. Puno
G.R. No. 97941
February 17, 1993
Regalado, J.

FACTS:
The accused, Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, was the temporary driver of Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento.
When they were about to go home, while the car was stopped, the accused, Enrique Amurao y Puno, boarded the
car and sat next to Socorro and poked a gun at her. Isabelo then announced that they want to get money from her.
This occurred while the car was travelling on the North superhighway. They were adjudged by the Regional Trial
Court to be guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under P.D. No. 532.

ISSUE:
Are the accused guilty of violating P.D. No. 532?

RULING:
No. Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo), we find that a band of brigands,
is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was
passed. The purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could
not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to
the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn
from the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. Therefore, the accused are not guilty of violating
P.D. No. 532.

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9
Disingue tempora et concordabis jura
Distinguish times and you will harmonize laws

The Commissioner of Customs vs. Superior Gas And Equipment Co.
G.R. No. L-14115
May 25, 1960
Bengzon, J.

FACTS:
In August 1956, the steamship "Chi Chung" arrived in Manila, from Formosa, carrying 1,200 metric tons of
industrial salt consigned to Superior Gas & Equipment Co. (Sugeco). With official permit, the cargo was discharged
and delivered shipside, within the harbor sea wall but outside the breakwater, into four lighters of the Luzon
Stevedoring Co. for final unloading at the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. at Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila.
Sugeco was required to pay and did pay the sum of P2,400.00 as wharfage fee on August 23, 1956.
Respondent contends that its importation should not pay wharfage fees because it made no use of the
facilities of government wharves or piers, the cargo having been discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic
Gulf Co.
Petitioner-appellant, invoking the decision under the Tariff Act of 1909 in the Sugar Centrals case, claims
that even if not loaded from a Government wharf, goods exported (or imported) shall pay wharfage fees.

ISSUE:
Is Sugeco required to pay the wharfage fees?

RULING:
No. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. We have laws enacted at different times, under dissimilar
circumstances. At the time the Tariff of Act of 1909 was approved, the Government had no wharves of its own;
therefore, the wharfage fee imposed by it could not have meant charges for the use of Government wharves,
which was the generally accepted idea; so this Court in view of the surrounding circumstances believed and held
(in the Sugar Centrals case) that the charges were payable even if no Government wharf be used, because they
were meant to be used as a trust fund "for the purpose of acquiring and constructing wharves by the Government
of the Philippine Islands." However, at the time Republic Act 1371 was approved, the Government had wharves;
and the discussions in the Legislature showed the intention not to levy wharfage fees on merchandise unloaded at
places other than Government wharves or without making use of pier facilities. Therefore, Sugeco is not required
to pay the wharfage fees.

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10
Dura lex sed lex
The law may be harsh, but that is the law

Romarico J. Mendoza vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 183891
October 19, 2011
Brion, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner has a pending case of failure to remit SSS premium contribution of his employees. During the
pendency, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the
effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent contributions to the
SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the laws effectivity. The petitioner claims that in view of
RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an
acquittal. He invokes the equal protection clause in support of his plea.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner covered by R.A. No. 9903?

RULING:
No. The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or
pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the
law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-
month availment period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903. Unfortunately for him, he paid his
delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner effectively placed
himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903. This is how the law is written: it condones employers
and only those employers with unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month
period following the laws date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex. Therefore, petitioner is not covered by R.A. No.
9903.

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11
Ejusdem generis
Of the same kind or specie

Parayno vs. Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
July 14, 2006
Corona, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. The SB then recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners
gasoline station and issued Resolution No. 50, which stated, among others, that the existing gasoline station is in
violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, which states: In business or industrial zones, no
gasoline service station x x x shall be allowed within one hundred (100) meters away from any public or private
school, public library, playground, church, and hospital x x x.
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code
since it was not a gasoline service station but a gasoline filling station governed by Section 21 thereof.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioners gasoline station covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao?

RULING:
No. The zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between gasoline service
station and gasoline filling station. Section 21 pertains to filling stations while Section 42 pertains to service
stations. It is evident that the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other.
Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis which means of the
same kind, class or nature. Under this maxim, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes
of persons or things, the general words will apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as
those enumerated. Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included
gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not
automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. Therefore, petitioners gasoline station is not covered by
Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao.
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Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis
A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule

Hodges vs. Municipal Board of the City of Iloilo
G.R. No. L-18276
January 12, 1967
Castro, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner C. N. Hodges, engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate in the city and the
Province of Iloilo, was subjected to the tax imposed in Ordinance 31 of the City of Iloilo. Petitioner contends that
the ordinance was beyond the corporate powers of the respondent City.
The respondents justified the enactment of the ordinance not only under the city charter but also upon
the authority vested in the respondent City by section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act.

ISSUE:
Is the ordinance beyond the corporate powers of the City of Iloilo?

RULING:
No. The grant of the power to tax to chartered cities under section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act is
sufficiently plenary to cover "everything, excepting those which are mention" therein, subject only to the
limitation that the tax so levied is for "public purposes, just and uniform." There is no showing that the tax levied
comes under any of the specific exceptions listed in section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Not being excepted, it
must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non
exceptis. Since its public purpose, justness and uniformity of application are not disputed, the tax so levied must be
sustained as valid. Therefore, the ordinance is within the corporate powers of the City of Iloilo.

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Ex dolo malo non oritur action
No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing

Bough v. Cantiveros
G.R. No. 13300
September 29, 1919
Malcolm, J.

FACTS:
Matilde Cantiveros was among the richest in the town of Carigara, Leyte owning parcels of realty
amounting to more than P30,000.00. She is separated from her husband Jose Vasquez, and is living with a cousin
closed to her, Basilia Hanopol, with the latters husband, Gustavus Bough.
The presence of her husband in town was brought to her attention by Bough who made her believe that
the ex-husband might contest the contract for separation of their conjugal property. She was induced to sign a
fictitious contract of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough for the amount P10,000.00 instead of P30,000.00
actual value. Cantiveros remained in possession of the property since Bough prepared and signed another
document, which is a donation by them to Cantiveros of all the property to be effective in case of the death of
themselves and their children before the death of Cantiveros.
Petitioner, then sought that they will be put in possession of the property covered by the Deed of Sale.
Cantiveros denied and asked that the contract made between herself and Basilia be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Is there an effect of illegality in the contract?

RULING:
In this instance, the grantor, reposing faith in the integrity of the grantee, and relying on a suggested
occurrence, which did not in fact take place, was made the dupe of the grantee, and led into an agreement against
public policy. The party asking to be relieved from the agreement which she was induced to enter into by means of
fraud, was thus in delicto, but not in pari delicto with the other party. The deed was procured by
misrepresentation and fraud sufficient to vitiate the transaction. The rights of creditors are not affected. We feel
that justice will be done if we place the grantor in the position in which she was before these transactions were
entered into.
It is further well settled, that a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have
his illegal objects carried out. The rule is expressed in the maxims: Ex dolo malo non oritur actio, and In pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the
parties where it finds them. (Article 1306, Civil Code; Perez vs. Herranz [1907], 7 Phil., 693.) Where, however, the
parties to an illegal contract are not equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as advanced by allowing
the more excusable of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief is given to him.

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Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Malinias v. Comelec
G.R. No. 146943
October 4, 2002
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Sario Malinias and Roy Pilando were candidates for governor and congress representatives
respectively during the May 15, 1998 elections in Mountain Province. Petitioners filed a complaint with COMELEC
against private respondents Governor Dominguez, and Provincial Director Corpuz and Police Chief Tangilag for
alleged violations of:
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 and,
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881, respectively.

Petitioners alleged that on May 15, 1998, an illegal police checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc Provincial Capitol Building for the
canvassing of votes. They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to
be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those
of Dominguez. To support their claims, their supporters executed so-called mass affidavits

Private respondents submitted counter-affidavit stating that the checkpoint was not a sole case and that
it was set-up to enforce COMELECs gun ban and that no group will disrupt the canvass proceedings which
happened several times in the past.

After investigation was conducted, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed the case against the private
respondents for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:
Can COMELEC prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Sections 25 of RA 6646 and 232 of
B.P. Blg. 881?

RULING:

No. The alleged violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are
not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively.

The COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the
election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically
states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the
election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Though not a criminal election offense,
a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties.

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to
order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely
because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
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Expressum facit cessare tacitum
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied

CHREA V. CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
Congress passed the General Appropriations Act of 1998 which provided special provisions applicable to
Constitutional Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In this light, CHR upgraded or raised the salaries (A98-0555
October 1998) reclassified selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047 September, 1998) and collapsed vacant
positions (A98-062 November 1998) which were later denied by DBM.
Consequently, the CSC Regional Office ordered the Central Office to reject pending appointments owing
to the disapproval issued by DBM.
The petitioners Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) who found the
reorganization favorable only to top-ranking employees and detrimental to rank-and-file employees requested
Central Office to honor the directive of the Regional Office. The Central Office denied the request. Petitioner
elevated the matter to Court of Appeals but it upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE:
Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
RULING:
No. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not
among the class of Constitutional Commissions which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. The
Constitution provides that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall belong to Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person,
thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Thus, not being expressly mentioned, the CHR does not have the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While CHR is a constitutional creation, it is not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy
by constitutional or legislative fiat.

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Ex necessitate legis
By necessary implication of law

Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. v Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 96663
10 August 1999
Purisima, J.

FACTS:
Supervisors of Pepsi Cola Philippines filed certification election for Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-
UOEF (PCEU) to act as its exclusive bargaining agent. Three unions under Pepsi, two of which consist of rank-and-
file unions will be affiliated to PCEU.
Pepsi filed a petition for cancellation and suspension of certification election against PCEU because they
are consist of managers, and that supervisors union cannot mix with another union whose composition are rank
and file employees.
PCEU avers that the Labor Code does not prohibit a union composed of supervisory employees from being
affiliated with one whose members are rank-and-file. Likewise inclusion of managerial employees in a union
cannot be a ground for cancellation of registration of a labor union. On Sept. 1, 1992, the Union issued a resolution
withdrawing themselves from the Federation.

ISSUE:
Can a union such as PCEU composed of supervisory employees be affiliated with rank-and-file unions?

RULING:
The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of
which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case
at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit.
Likewise, the court ruled that Credit and Collection managers and Accounting Managers are regarded as
highly confidential employees in nature and must not be deemed eligible to join such supervisors union. The court
asserts that while Article 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. According to the doctrine of necessary implication, what is impelled in a statue is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed.

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Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat
False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute

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Favores ampliandi sunt; odia restringenda
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect

Estioca v. People
G.R. No. 173876
June 27, 2008
Chico- Nazario, J.

FACTS:
A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an elementary school. One of which is
Boniao who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. They were found guilty by the lower
court. When the case was appealed to the CA, RA 9344 took effect and Boniao was acquitted since he was a minor
at the time of the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability. Custody was given to his parents.

ISSUE:
Can RA 9344 be given retroactive effect to Boniaos case?

RULING:
Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the time of the commission of the crime. In this case
Boniao is 14 years old hence exempted from criminal liability without prejudice to his civil liability. Art 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws may be given retroactive effect if they are in favor of the accused.

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Generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum
A general statement is understood in a general sense

Macalintal v. Comelec
G.R. No. 157013
10 July 2003
Austria- Martinez, J.

FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought the declaration of certain provisions of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 as unconstitutional. He said that a lawyer and a taxpayer, he has actual and
material legal interest in the case and in ensuring that public funds are properly appropriated.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of the
winning candidates violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

RULING:
The judge reiterated the majority opinion the phrase proclamation of winning candidates used in the
assailed statute is a sweeping statement, which thus includes even the winning candidates for the presidency and
vice-presidency. Following a basic principle in statutory construction, generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum
(a general statement is understood in a general sense), the said phrase cannot be construed otherwise. To uphold
the assailed provision of Rep. Act No. 9189 would in effect be sanctioning the grant of a power to the COMELEC,
which under the Constitution, is expressly vested in Congress; it would validate a course of conduct that the
fundamental law of the land expressly forbids.

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Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda
What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.

Diaz v. IAC
G.R. No. L-66574
February 21, 1990
Paras, J.

FACTS:
Pablo Santero was a legitimate son of Simona and Pascual. The petitioner had four (4) illegitimate children
with the Pablo so that when Pablo died, the petitioner invoked the right to inheritance of her illegimitate children
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The respondent refuted this claim saying that
she was the lone heir to such estate as provided in the Art. 922 of the New Civil Code. The said provision states
that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of his father
or mother.

ISSUE:
Can illegitimate children of Pablo Santero inherit from Simona Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona?

RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise
right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to
say: The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with
the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as
the term is a general one. Generalia verbasunt generaliter intelligenda. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general
term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense. The court declared
the respondent as the sole legitimate heir

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Generalia specialibus non derogant
A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

Laureano v. CA
G.R. No. 114776
February 2, 2000
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
Menandro Laureano was hired by Singaporean Airlines (SAL) as pilot in 1978. When the company was hit
by recession, Laureano was relieved. This prompted the petitioner to file labor case against illegal dismissal of SAL.
He then withdrew this motion and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of his contract.
SAL moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of Philippine laws and estoppel. It
also asserts that the termination was valid pursuant to the Singaporean Law. The trial court denied the request
and ruled in favor of Laureano. This decision, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Is Singaporean law applicable to this case?

RULING:
No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. The
particular law was not pointed out. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is
indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. Failure
to prove such law, the Philippine laws shall apply in this case.

Under our laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already
barred by prescription

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Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est
The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written

People V. Palermo
G.R. No. 120630
June 28, 2001
Per curiam

FACTS:
On September 9, 1994, an Information was filed in RTC of Boac, Marinduque involving a case of
incestuous rape committed by Marcelo Palermo to his 14- year old daughter, Merly Palermo. On the night of April
2, 1992, Marcelo succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her daughter Merly against her will and to her
damage and prejudice. Two months thereafter, Merly suffered vaginal bleeding which caused her to be confined in
the hospital. Medico legal results showed that the bleeding was in fact an incomplete abortion. Merly accounted
that from that date, Marcelo succeeded in forcing her to have sexual intercourse for about ten times.
During the direct examination question, Marcelo admitted having raped his daughter. He cited as an
excused his drunkness. The Trial Court rendered its decision imposing death penalty upon the Marcelo.
The appellant Marcelo Palermo, thru counsel, claims that the trial court "erred in sentencing (him) the
maximum penalty of death despite his voluntary admission of guilt. They further argued that the apellant
deserves a reduction of penalty for the sake of compassionate justice.

ISSUE:
Does Marcelos confession of his guilt a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence from death
penalty to reclusion perpetua?

HELD:
No. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, Article 13 (7) of the RPC requires that the offender "had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. In
the case at bar, it was only during his turn to present evidence that apellant confessed having committed the crime
charged.
It may now be trite, but nonetheless apt, to restate the legal maxim "Hoc quidem per quam durum est
sed ita lex scripta est." (The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.). Appellant himself knows he is
facing the death penalty for his crime, but he is ready for it because, as he, said, "Ako po'y nagkasala.".

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Impossibilium nulla obligation est
There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.

Chui v. Posadas
G.R. No. L-23487
February 11, 1925
Malcolm, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese alien residing in Manila. He owned three (3) dry good stores located the same city.
His tax for the 3
rd
quarter amounting to P507.13 was due October 20, 2014. However, that day, was the height of
riot being waged against Chinese. It started since October 18. As part of mutual agreement, they decided to close
their stores and stay home as it is not safe for the Chinese to stay outside.
Due to the circumstances, the petitioner managed to bring his tax payment a day after the due date which
was on October 21. It is mandatory for late payment to pay a surcharge of 25%. The petitioner requested the
respondent to waive the penalty owing to the circumstances. The respondent refused for he lacked power to grant
the request, although admitting that the additional tax of twenty-five per cent "seems unjust and excessive."
The court was asked to declare that the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power to remit
additional percentage taxes and that the said Collector can exercise his discretion.

ISSUE:
Can the petitioner be exempt from 25% surcharge for late payment on the discretion of the respondent?

HELD:
Yes. It may be possible that there might be excuses for non-payment. The maxim is: Impossibilium nulla
obligatio est. There is no obligation to do impossible things. But here, there is no allegation in the complaint that
the inability of the Chinese to pay their taxes on time was due to any order by the Government or to any action
taken by the Government, and no allegation that the delay in payment was caused by the fault of him to whom it
was to be paid.
The demurrer is sustained, and unless the petitioner shall within a period of five days so amend his
complaint as to state a cause of action, it shall be dismissed with costs against him.

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Index animi sermo est
Speech is the index of intention

Victoria v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 109005
January 10, 1994
Quiason, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner sought to set aside the resolution issued by COMELEC certifying the private respondent as
the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay. Both the petitioner and
respondent rank number 1 in their respective districts during May 11, 1992 elections.
Due to the suspension of the then Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, the vice-governor assumed the
powers and functions of the governor. The seat of the vice-governor, now being vacant, shall be occupied by the
highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner contends that he should be declared as
the highest ranking member and not the respondent. He said that in determining the percentage, the number of
votes garnered must be divided with the actual number of people who voted in the district (not on the total
number of registered voters per district). If such is the case, he will get 25.84% and the respondent, 23.40%. He
believed the formula will prejudice candidates in districts where there were low number of people who actually
voted.
Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code provides for the guidelines stating that ranking in the Sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

ISSUE:
Can the Court honor the formula provided by the petitioner in determining the ranking of Sangguniang
Panliligawan members as substantiated by his arguments?

HELD:
No. Petitioners contention is untenable. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of
registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law.
Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing
it differently.

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In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus
The greater includes the lesser

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA
ELISEO F. SORIANO versus MTRCB
G.R. No. 164785
G.R. No. 165636
April 29, 2009
Corona, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano utters indecent, scandalous, insulting and offensive words in his television
program Ang Dating Daan. MTRCB receives complaints arising from such statements. Subsequently, MTRCB
suspended the airing of the program for 20 days and eventually suspended the petitioner for three months. Hence,
this petition assailing his suspension as a violation of his right to free speech.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MTRCB has the power , granted by law, to suspend a program or a host.

RULING:
Yes, MTRCB has the implied and necessary power to suspend a program or a host.
To begin with, Section 3(d) of PD 1986 explicitly gives the MTRCB the power to supervise and regulate the
television broadcast of all television programs. Under Section 3(e) the MTRCB is also specifically empowered to
classify television programs. In the effective implementation of these powers, the MTRCB is authorized under
Section 3(a) *t+o promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of *PD
1986+. Finally, under Section 3(k), the MTRCB is warranted *t+o exercise such powers and functions as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of *PD 1986+.
Clearly, the law intends to give the MTRCB all the muscle to carry out and enforce the law effectively. In
consonance with this legislative intent, we uphold the implied and necessary power of the MTRCB to order the
suspension of a program or a host thereof in case of violation of PD 1986 and rules and regulations that implement
it.
The grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power. In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et
minus. The MTRCB has the power to cancel permits for the exhibition or television broadcast of programs
determined by the said body to be objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs x x
x.This power is a power to impose sanctions. The MTRCBs power to cancel permits is a grant of authority to
permanently and absolutely prohibit the showing of a television program that violates MTRCB rules and
regulations. It necessarily includes the lesser power to temporarily and partially prohibit a television program that
violates MTRCB rules and regulations by suspending either the showing of the offending program or the
appearance of the programs offending host.
Clearly, therefore, in case of violation of PD 1986 and its implementing rules and regulations, it is within
the authority of the MTRCB to impose the administrative penalty of suspension to the erring broadcaster. A
contrary stance will emasculate the MTRCB and render illusory its supervisory and regulatory powers, make
meaningless the public trustee character of broadcasting and afford no remedy to the infringed fundamental rights
of viewers.

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Interest republicae ut sit finis litium
Public interest requires that by the very nature if things there must be an end to a legal controversy

MERALCO vs PCFI
G.R. No. 101783
January 23, 2002
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J

FACTS:
Presidential Decree No. 551 was promulgated on 1974. This decree provides for the reduction from 5% to
2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the
Board of Energy (BOE) a petition for violation of P. D. No. 551 against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco). PCFI
sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. The
petition was dismissed. Meralco was authorized by the BOE to retain its savings. PCFI elevated the case before the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 63018 but was again dismissed. After four years, PCFI and private
respondents filed a petition with the same subject/ issue before the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3659. RTC
grant the petition of respondents declaring the decision of the SC in the case G.R. No. 63018 null and void. Hence,
petitioners Meralco filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 is already barred by prior judgements Courts Resolution
in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198.

RULING:
Yes, Case No. Q-89-3659 is already barred by prior judgements. The issue - whether or not Meralco is duly
authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its
rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus, the
relitigation of the same issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res judicata.
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium - it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by
the same parties and their privies over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. From this overwhelming concern
springs the doctrine of res judicata an obvious rule of reason according stability to judgments.
In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and
received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other
matters that could have been adjudged therein. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites
must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the
two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. All these requisites are present and beyond
dispute on the case at bar.
The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are likewise identical since both
refer to the savings realized by Meralco from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. As can be
gleaned from the records, private respondents arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance
with those raised in BOE Case No. 82-198.
In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as determined by the BOE and sustained by this
Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged.

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Interpotare et concodare legibus est optimus interpotandi modus
Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN
THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON vs. ADELFA
FRANCISCO THORNTON
G.R. No. 154598
August 16, 2004
Corona, J.

FACTS:
Respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband (petitioner).
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
claiming that they dont have jurisdiction because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Then, petitioner
filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country. However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980). Hence, the petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors.

RULING:
Yes. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes,
what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal
interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favoured. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject."
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.

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Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat
A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it

MATRIANO vs. NLRC and SIA
G.R. No. L-65786
July 16, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petioner, Cecilia Matriano, underwent a caesarian operation. Thereafter, Matriano filed a claim to her
employer, Singapore Airlines (SIA), for reimbursement of hospital, medical, and surgical fees incurred. This is
pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by SIAs Employees Association and SIA which
provides for reimbursement of hospitalization and medical care expenses incurred by employees. Respondent SIA
refused to reimburse her contending that maternity expenses are not included in the term hospitalization and
medical care expenses. SIAs Employees Association charged SIA of unfair labor practice in violation of the CBA
before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the charges. Petitioner also filed a case before the NLRC but
was also dismissed. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not under the CBA petitioner Matriano is entitled to reimbursement of her hospitalization
expenses as a result of her caesarian operation.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner, Matriano, is entitled to reimbursement of her hospitalization expenses as a result of her
caesarian operation under the CBA. The provisions of the CBA in question are clear and from them we gather the
intent of the contracting parties.
The disputed CBA provision states that the "Company will meet expenses up to P9,000 per calendar year for ward
expenses and surgical fees in respect of each employee ..." Undoubtedly, the hospitalization expenses of petitioner
for her caesarian operation are covered by the very wordings of the provision, as it involves surgery. To adopt
respondent's strained interpretation would be to create an absurd situation whereby an employee may no longer
avail of the benefits under Article XI when one is on vacation, sick, or compassionate leave, which are also
separated granted in the same way that maternity leave benefits are provided as distinct privileges. Such a
construction would, of course, be absurd, and yet the respondents would apply it to another form of leave.
Reasonable and practical interpretation must be placed on contractual provisions. Interpretatio fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted, that the thing may continue to have efficacy
rather than fail.
Hence, the petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of her hospitalization expenses.

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Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted

CIR vs TMX Sales and CTA
G.R. No. 83736
January 15, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J

FACTS:
Private respondent TMX Sales filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring
an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981.
During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its
Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of P6,156,525. Thereafter,
on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with BIR a claim for refund of the overpaid income tax. CIR ruled that the
petitioner (TMX Sales) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2) years had
already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in Court (March 14, 1984).
Respondent, TMX Sales, however, elevated the case to the Court of Tax Appeals. CTAs decision is in favour of TMX
Sales. Hence, CIR filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking reversal of the decision of the CTA.

ISSUE:
Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now
Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) commence to run from the date the quarterly income
tax was paid or from the date the filing of the Final Adjustment Return?

RULING:
The two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now
Section 230) of the NIRC should be counted from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return.
Section 292 (now Sec 230) of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in
order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience
and absurdity. In the case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court stated that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET
ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a
particular provision thereof, should be considered. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive
period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally
ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income
tax. A literal application of Section 292 (now Section 230) would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive
period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the
quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 (Section
230) would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a refund on March 14, 1984. Since the two-year prescriptive period should be
counted from the filing of the Adjustment Return on April 15, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. is not yet barred by
prescription.

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Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet
The authoritative interpretation of the court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof

People vs Jabinal
G.R. No. L-30061
February 27, 1974
Antonio, J.

FACTS:
Jose Jabinal, appellant, was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
the Municipal Court of Batangas. He was convicted on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the
cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered
as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. An appeal
from above judgement was filed raising in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of
Supreme Courts ruling in People v. Mapa.

ISSUE:
Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

RULING:
The appellant, Jose Jabinal, should be acquitted on the basis of rulings in Macarandang and Lucero. It will
be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential
Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by the
Supreme Court in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). The decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
Decisions of Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true
that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite
of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

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Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant
A later law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is repugnant thereto

Carabao, Inc. vs Agricultural Productivity Commission
G.R. No. L-29304
September 30, 1970
TEEHANKEE, J

FACTS:
Plaintiff ,Carabao Inc., had filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of
money representing the unpaid price of goods sold and delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity
Commission. It alleged that it had presented a claim for payment of the sum with the Auditor General, but that
since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two (2) months from date of its presentation, it had acquired
the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the lower court. The case was dismissed on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to the implied repeal of Act 3083 by C.A. 327. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 3083 was repealed by C.A. 327.

RULING:
Yes, Act No. 3083 was effectively repealed by C.A. 327.
The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of Commonwealth
Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under principle of "leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant" a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one
on the same subject matter.
Inaction by the Auditor General for the sixty-day period now provided by Commonwealth Act 327
(exclusive of Sundays and holidays) and of time consumed in referring the matter to other persons or officers no
longer entitles the claimant to file a direct suit in court, as he was formerly authorized under Act 3083 in the event
of the Auditor General's failure to decide within a flat period of two months. Since the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act 327 expressly enjoin the Auditor General to act on and decide the claim within the fixed 60-
day period, a claimant's remedy is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by the
Auditor General in the event of such inaction.
The courts of first instance no longer have the original jurisdiction to act on such claims, which actions,
under section 4 of Act 3083 now discarded, "shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and
appellate, as if the litigants were private parties" since exclusive original jurisdiction under Article XI of the
Constitution and the implementing Act, Commonwealth Act 327 is vested in the Auditor General, and appellate
jurisdiction is vested in the President in cases of accountable officers, and in the Supreme Court in cases of private
persons and entities upon proper and timely petitions for review.
In the case at bar, no error was committed, therefore, by the lower court dismissing the case and declaring itself
without jurisdiction over the same.

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Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito
The law provides for the future, the judge for the past

PDIC vs Stockholders of Intercity Bank
G.R. No. 181556
December 14, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J

FACTS:
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) was found insolvent and Petitioner Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was assigned as the petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. Creditors were paid in
their principal claim in 2002. In July 27, 2004, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302) was approved. Section 12 of this act
entitles creditors to surplus dividends. PDIC later filed a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and
Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings. Makati RTC granted the motion except the parts giving authority to
PDIC to act as trustee of the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated for creditors of Intercity Bank. PDIC
assailed the decision of RTC and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was dismissed. Hence,
the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether R.A. 9302 may be applied retroactively, entitling creditors to surplus dividends.

RULING:
No. R.A. 9302 cannot be applied retroactively . Hence, creditors are not entitled to surplus dividends.
RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause
indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary.
Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the
future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future,
the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and
oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.

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Lex prospicit, non respicit
The law looks forward, not backward

Laceste vs. Santos
G.R. No. L-36886
February 1, 1932
ROMUALDEZ, J

FACTS:
Clemente Laceste and Nicolas Lachica, had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to commitment
for the crime of rape. Lachica married the victim and was accordingly released from the criminal prosecution by
virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that such a
marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner herein continued serving his
sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party. However, under the
Revised Penal Code Lancestre is now entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage in accordance with the
last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in force since the first of this year, providing as in cases of
seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 344 of RPC be applied retroactively in the case at bar.

RULING:
Yes. Article 344 of RPC should be applied retroactively in the case at bar. The present case is an exception
to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, contained in the following maxim: Lex prospicit,
non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). Article 22 of the new Penal Code is applicable to the petitioner,
who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code: this is a point upon which
there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties to this case.

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Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum
It is dangerous construction which is against the text

Chinabank vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 140687
December 18, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J

FACTS:
Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing and received these amounts from
Citibank N.A. through checks which she allegedly deposited in a foreign currency account at China Banking
Corporation (China Bank). A subpoena was issued to employees of China Bank to appear before the court and
testify only as to the name or in whose name the said fund is deposited. China Bank filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals claiming absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under the law, but it was denied.
Hence, China Bank elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner China Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank dollar checks with both
Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees, deposited with China Bank, may not be looked into under the
law on secrecy of foreign currency deposits.

RULING:
No. Citibank dollar checks with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees, deposited with
China Bank, may be looked into under the law on secrecy of foreign currency deposits.
The contention of petitioner that the [prescription] on absolute confidentiality under the law in question
covers even the name of the depositor and is beyond the compulsive process of the courts is palpably untenable as
the law protects only the deposits itself but not the name of the depositor. To uphold the theory of petitioner CBC
is reading into the statute something that is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from
the statute itself, for to depart from the meaning expressed by the words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and
not to interpret, and judicial legislation should be avoided. Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum It is a
dangerous construction which is against the words.
All things considered and in view of the distinctive circumstances attendant to the present case, we are
constrained to render a limited pro hac vice ruling. Clearly it was not the intent of the legislature when it enacted
the law on secrecy on foreign currency deposits to perpetuate injustice. This Court is of the view that the
allowance of the inquiry would be in accord with the rudiments of fair play, the upholding of fairness in our judicial
system and would be an avoidance of delay and time-wasteful and circuitous way of administering justice.

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Noscitur a sociis
Words construed with reference to accompanying or associated words

Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242
July 17, 2012
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest
in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners
belated filing of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. The current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Under the legal maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Applying the foregoing principle, the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

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Nova constitution futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis
A new statute should affect the future, not the past.

Llave vs Republic
G.R. No. 169766
March 30, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws
and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for thedeclaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita
and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958
under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was void ab initio.

RULING:
Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the
Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. A new law ought to
affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be
impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.

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Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasu
No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong

Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao
G.R. No. L-16109
October 2, 1922
Street, J.

FACTS:
On December 12, 1918, M.D. Taylor, plaintiff-appellant, contracted his services to Tan Liuan and Co. as
superintendent of an oil factory. The period of the contract extended over two years from the date mentioned.
The salary was to be at the rate of P600 per month during the first year and P700 during the second, with electric
light and water for domestic consumption, and a residence to live in, or in lieu thereof, P60 per month.
At the time this agreement was made, the machinery for the contemplated factory has not been acquired
yet, though ten expellers had been ordered from the United States. Also, found in the contract was a provision
stating that, It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in the said factory fail, for any
reason, to arrive in the city of Manila within a period of six months from the date hereof, this contract may be
cancelled by the party of the second part at its option, such cancellation, however, not to occur before the
expiration of such six months.
Within six months, the machinery and any other equipment necessary for the establishment of the
factory did not arrive in Manila succeeding the making of this contract. The defendants wrote to the plaintiff
expressing that they had decided to rescind the contract. The plaintiff proceeded on the idea that the stipulation
of the contract giving rights to defendants to cancel the contract upon the non-arrival of machinery in Manila
within six months must be understood as applicable only to those cases not having their origin in the will or act of
the defendants. On this ground, the plaintiff instituted an action to recover damages in the amount of P13,000
which covers salary and perquisites due and to become due under contract.

ISSUE:
Are the defendants liable to pay for the additional damages claimed by the plaintiff?

RULING:
NO. The language used in the stipulation should be given effect in its ordinary sense. The phrase for any
reason is broad enough to cover any case of the non-arrival of the machinery, due to whatever cause, whether
involving the defendants own volition or not. The citation of the appellant of the case of Hall vs. Hardaker where
the maxim No man shall take advantage of his own wrong should not be given merit in this case as there was no
breach of contract on the part of the defendants.

The Court of First Instance did not err in granting the plaintiff the sum of P300 to cover for the damages
within the six-month period of the contract. However, this was modified by the Supreme Court to include the
commutation of house rent for the month of June 1919. The amount of P360 is awarded to the plaintiff for
damages, but only for the period covering the six-month contract. Other than this, the defendants are not liable to
pay for additional damages, as claimed by the plaintiff, as no breach of contract occurred.

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Nullum tempus occurit regi
There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends

Providence Washington Insurance Co vs. Republic of the Philippines and Bureau of Customs
G.R. No. L-26386
September 30, 1969
Fernando, J.

FACTS:
On October 21, 1966, Providence Washington Insurance Co., plaintiff-appellant, filed a case against an
order of the lower court dismissing its suit for the non-delivery of thirty cases of steel files, which cargo was
insured by the plaintiff against loss and damage. The Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs,
defendants-appellees, are the operator of the arrastre service being sued. This case gives rise to the well-settled
doctrine of non-suability of the government.

ISSUE:
Are the defendants suable?

RULING:
NO. It was held in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service that The Bureau of
Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service,
pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune
from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. For a suit against the government to prosper, an express consent
through laws and statutes or an implied consent through the use of plain statutory language shall be present. This
is in accordance with the classic formulation of Holmes that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.

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Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum
The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

Hannah Eunice D. Serana vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu and as
a student of a state university, is known as a government scholar. On December 21, 1999, she was appointed by
then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one year term from January 1, 2000 to
December 31, 2000.
In early 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman as part of the projects of the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSFRI), which was duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 4, 2000. For this project, President Estrada
gave her P15,000,000.00 as financial assistance from the Office of the President. However, the renovation failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On July 3, 2003, after due investigation, the Ombudsman found a probable cause to indict the
petitioner and her brother, Jade Ian D. Serana, for estafa.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner liable for estafa?

RULING:
YES. The Court found that the petitioner was a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent
of the University of the Philippines-Diliman, and though she contends that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27 and that she does not receive salary as a Student Regent, it is well established that compensation is not
an essential element of public office and that she was indeed a public officer irrespective of her salary grade.
Considering this fact, she clearly committed said offense in relation to her office as a public officer.
Moreover, she contends that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her case. Pursuant to Section 4
of R.A. 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving... 1(g) President,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. The Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation, and thus, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Further, the petitioner contends, relying on Section 4 of P.D. 1606, that estafa is not among the crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner erred in isolating the first paragraph of Section 4 from the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. It is well established in statutory construction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision, or clause
of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. A statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is
the statute itself, or Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

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Optimus interpres rerum usus
The best interpreter of the law is usage

Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board
G.R. No. L-12727
February 29, 1960

FACTS:
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the basic
law on horse racing in the Philippines, as later amended by Republic Act No. 983, are as follows: 12 Sundays for
Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, 6 Sundays for PCSO, 4 Sundays White Cross, Inc.,1 Sunday for Grand Derby
Race of Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society and 29 Sundays for private individuals and entities (30 for leap year).
Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the
days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, the Gams and Amusements Board
(GAB) resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants
protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for
charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday,
and legal holiday.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional sweepstakes should be inserted in the club races in relation to the debate in the
House of Representatives before voting on House Bill No. 5732

RULING:
Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and,
hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to
determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that
passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have
agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other. In view of these conflicting
authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of them. It is to be noted in the specific case
before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were, admittedly, of the view that the additional
sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally
enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House
of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any
such indication. Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the
long, continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during
the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional
sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then
prevailing situation and practice. On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice
under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value
in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has
extended over a long period of time (Optimus interpres rerum usus).
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Pari materia
Relating to same matter

Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila
G.R. No. 138496
February 23, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co, born on March 23, 1974, and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on May 19, 1975, have birth
certificates which stated that their parents, Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan, are both Chinese citizens. Co
Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a Filipino citizen and was granted Philippine citizenship
under P.D. No. 1055.
On August 27, 1998, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth, alleging, among others, that they were born
in the Philippines and are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng. They prayed that the citizenship of their father
be changed from Chinese to Filipino and that under Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473, as amended by CA No. 535, they be naturalized as well.
On September 23, 1998, the court dismissed the petition outright on the ground that the petition was
insufficient. According to the court, Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship under P.D. No. 1055, and not under Commonwealth Act No. 473
which provides that Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to naturalization under CA 473?

RULING:
YES. The decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was grounded on the fact that LOI No. 270 and CA 473
should be construed separately and distinctly. However, the Supreme Court reversed the RTCs decision, stating
that P.D. 1055 and C.A 473 are in pari materia or relating to the same matter, and thus, should be construed
together. Enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform
system and later statutes are complementary or supplementary to the earlier enactments.
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the
Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, both statutes have the same purpose and objective of
enabling aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and
loyalty to the Philippines, and contributed to the economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be
integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, which
extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be
similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

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Privilegia reciprint largan interpretationem voluntate consonan concedentis
Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them

Antonio Ma. Barretto y Rocha vs. Augusto H. Tuason y De La Paz
G.R. No. 36872 (which was consolidated with G.R. Nos. L-36811, 36827, 36840)
March 31, 1934
Imperial, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by the defendants and some intervenors from certain portions of the decision and order
rendered by the court during the new trial held pursuant to the resolution settling the properties of the
mayorazgo, which was founded by Don Antonio Tuason on February 25, 1974. Don Antonio Tuason died on June 4,
1794, leaving properties to his legal heirs.
This case is an appeal to the resolution made by the trial court wherein one-fifth of the properties of the
deceased was already settled. However, the defendants allege twelve errors in the said resolution, thereby filing
this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the appeal meritorious?

RULING:
NO. The court clearly adhered to and reiterated the conclusions and principles already established in the
decision originally rendered, notwithstanding the motion for reconsideration and the abovementioned new trial.
There can be no doubt as to the questions which the court considered definitely resolved and which should not be
the subject of further discussion. The errors raised by the defendants do not justify a different result from that
already reached in the resolution. They are merely repetitions of the same arguments already brought out by
counsel for the same appellants.
Defendants-appellants also allege that the said resolution is without legal force because it was not
concurred in by a sufficient majority of the members then composing the court. However, it has been ruled out
that eight of the nine members then composing the court authorized and concurred in the resolution.
Further, Don Antonio Tuason already specified the recipients of one fifth of the revenues in the sixth
clause of the instrument of foundation, which the court honored. It was the understanding of the court that Don
Antonio Tuason was not to restrict the grant of the fifth of the revenue by limiting it to a certain number of
generations of the younger children, but that he intended to extend it to all of his descendants. Applicable to this
case is the maxim Privilegia recipiunt largum interpretationem voluntati consonan concedentis, which translates
to Privileges are to be interpreted with liberality in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

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Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure
He who is first in time is preferred in right

Pacifico Garcia Vs. Benjamin M. Gozon, Tecla Gutierrez, Rosario Felix, Paulino D. Buenaventura, Raymundo
Dionisio, Virgilio Austria And Marceon Vicencio;
Philippine National Bank Vs. Court Of Appeals (Third Division), Carolina Lapuz- Gozon, Assisted By Her Husband
Benjamin M. Gozon, Tecla Gutierrez, Rosario Felix, Paulino D. Buenaventura, Raymundo Dionisio, Virgilio Austria
And Marceon Vicencio
G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011
January 22, 1980
Aquino, J.

FACTS:
On August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon,
Rizal and covered by Original Certificate No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant
thereof. The deed of sale itself contains the entries showing that it was annotated on the back of OCT No. 983.
However, contrary to the foregoing entry and the official routine or standard operating procedure, the deed of
sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that, consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled.
When Lapus died, his daughter, Carolina Lapus-Gozon, inherited the two parcels of land. However, in
1962, certain alleged heirs (the Riveras) of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion alleging that they
were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo. This was a result of the non-cancellation of the title
given to Lapus. Lapus acquired the title in 1920 while the Riveras acquired the title for the same parcels of land in
1963.

ISSUE:
Should the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom prevail over the 1963 title issued to
the Riveras and to the subsequent titles derived from it?

RULING:
YES. Lapus was an innocent purchaser of value. The issue sprang out due to the failure of the register of
deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. Moreover, the maxim Prior est in tempore, potior est
in jure or He who is first in time is preferred in right is followed in land registration matters. The general rule is
that in cases of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether
the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate (Hogg,
Australian Torrens System 823, citing cases and cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595). Because
of this, Lapus, who acquired the lot earlier than the Riveras, is the rightful owner of the disputed parcels of land.

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Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum
What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Seagate Technology (Philippines)
G.R. No. 153866
February 11, 2005
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Respondent is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to do business in the Philippines. Moreover, respondent is registered with the Philippine Export Zone
Authority (PEZA) and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 66, as
amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components primarily used in computers for export. As a
member of PEZA, respondent is a VAT (Value Added Tax)-registered entity as evidenced by VAT Registration
Certification No. 97-083-000600-V, issued on April 2, 1997. VAT returns, in the amount of P28,369,226.38, for the
period of April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 were filed by the respondent on October 4, 1999 with the Revenue District
Office No. 83, Talisay, Cebu. However, no final action has been received by respondent from the petitioner for the
formers claim for VAT refund.
The petitioner, for its part, alleges that even while the respondent is PEZA-registered, its business is not
subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7916 in relation to Section 103 of the tax Code, as
amended. As respondents business is not subject to VAT, the capital goods and services it alleged to have
purchased are considered not used in VAT taxable business. As such, respondent is not entitled to refund of input
taxes on such capital goods pursuant to Section 4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 7-95, and of input taxes
on services pursuant to Section 4.103 of said regulations.

ISSUE:
Is the respondent entitled to a VAT refund?

RULING:
YES. The Court of Appeals held that the citations given by the petitioner were not applicable in this case.
Having paid the input VAT on the capital goods it purchased, respondent correctly filed the administrative and
judicial claims for its refund within the two-year prescriptive period. Such payments were, to the extent of the
refundable value, duly supported by VAT invoices or official receipts.
As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic zone, respondent is entitled to the fiscal
incentives and benefits provided for in either PD 66 or Executive Order (EO) 226. It shall also enjoy all privileges,
benefits, advantages or exemptions under both RA Nos. 722711 and 7844.
Further, RA 7916 states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business establishments
operating within the ecozone". Since this law does not exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is deemed included.
In addition, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the transaction, it may still be passed on and,
therefore, indirectly imposed on the same entity. That no VAT shall be imposed directly upon business
establishments operating within the ecozone under RA 7916 also means that no VAT may be passed on and
imposed indirectly. This is expressed in the maxim Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per
obliquum which translates to When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly. As a member
of PEZA, and as not subject to direct or indirect imposition of VAT, respondent is entitled for a VAT refund.

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Ratihabito mandato aquiparatur
Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

The Government of the Philippine Islands vs. The Standard Oil Company of New York
G.R. No. 5876
September 1, 1911
Arellano, C.J.

FACTS:
On July 27, 1901, the defendant imported in the Philippine Islands 30,000 cases of refined petroleum and
presented to the Bureau of Customs an affidavit setting forth that the said 30,000 cases of refined petroleum had
been sold by the defendant to the commissary department of the United States Army in Manila. The customs
authorities of Manila issued a permit for the introduction into the Islands of the 30,000 cases of refined petroleum
which were taken from the ship, then in the port of Manila, to the bonded warehouse of the defendant company
where they were to remain in bond until they should be withdrawn and delivered to the commissary department
of the United States Army in Manila, under the free entry privilege.
From August 7 to October 28, 1901, the defendant company removed from its warehouse the 30,000
cases there deposited, but of the 30,000 cases, only 10,679 were actually delivered to the commissary department
of the United States Army, and the remaining 19,321 cases were, free of customs duties, sold to private parties. As
prescribed by Section 30 of the Provisional Customs Tariff, then in force in the Philippine Islands, the duty
chargeable was 6.318 pesos Mexican currency for each 100 kilograms; so that, for the 608,321.685 kilograms, the
defendant company was indebted in the sum of 38,433.76 pesos Mexican currency which, at the exchange of one
dollar for each 2 pesos in Mexican currency, make exactly 38,433.76 pesos in Philippine currency.

ISSUE:
Is the defendant liable to pay the customs duties demanded by the petitioner?

RULING:
YES. The defendant contends that there was no law in force in the Philippines in year 1901 where the
payment of tariff or customs duties on the merchandise concerned could be exacted. However, tracing the
legislative history for the alleged period, August 13, 1898 to November 15, 1901, President McKinley, in his
capacity as Commander-In-Chief of the Army, issued a military order, on July 12, 1898, in which he provided a
schedule of tariff duties which were to be imposed and collected in all the posts and places occupied and held by
troops of the United States. This order entered into full and absolute effect on November 10, 1898, and continued
to govern until November 15, 1901, when the tariff established by Act No. 230 of the Philippine Commission
became operative. Said order was alleged by defendant to be stillborn.
The military order dated July 12, 1898 cannot be considered stillborn for it is undeniably effective up to
the exchange of ratification. Further, the intention and will of the legislator to approve, confirm, and ratify as by an
act of his own, the acts of the legislator and of the officials of the Government of the Philippines, with respect to
"the collection of all the said duties prior to March 8, 1902," and also with regard to "the import and export duties
levied by the authorities of the United States or of the provisional military government of the same in the
Philippine Islands prior to March 8, 1902", are valid and constitutional as the ratification of the order is equivalent
to a mandate, as expressed in the maxim, Ratihabitio aequiparatur mandato. Therefore, the order being binding
on the dates August 7 to October 28, 1901, the defendants are liable to pay the customs duties demanded by the
petitioner.

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Ratio legis
Interpretation according to spirit

Comendador vs. De Villa
G.R. No. 96948 (which was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 93177, 95020, 97454)
August 2, 1991
Cruz, J.

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1-9, 1989.
The petitioners challenge the legality of General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14 and seek certiorari against its
ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to peremptory challenge?

RULING:
YES. First, the legality of GCM No. 14 is affirmed in that a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted to investigate the petitioners. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
PTI but they failed to submit their counter-affidavits, thus, they cannot claim that they have been denied due
process. The PTI Panel substantially complied with Article of War 71. Moreover, it is now settled that even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction. Also, in
response to the allegation of the petitioners that GCM No. 14 was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of
Staff, Gen. de Villa doubtless authorized it because the order itself said it was issued By Command of General De
Villa, making GCM No. 14 legal.
Second, the Supreme Court grants the petition for peremptory challenge. The respondent erred in not
granting the petitioners peremptory challenge on the ground that President Marcos promulgated P.D. 39 which
disallowed said peremptory challenge. However, on June 17, 1981, President Marcos proclaimed the termination
of the state of martial law, declaring the dissolution of military tribunals. P.D. 39 was issued to implement the
military tribunals, but with the termination of martial law and the dissolution of said military tribunals, the reason
for the existence of P.D. 39 ceased automatically.
In statutory construction, when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. This is also expressed
in the legal maxim ratio legis est anima, or the reason of law is its soul. Therefore, with the dissolution of P.D.
39, the petitioners are entitled to peremptory challenge.

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Ratio legis est anima legis
The reason of the law is its soul

People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr
G.R. No. 152532
August 16, 2005
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Bienvenido Tan, respondent and head of the Commission on Internal Revenue (CIR), issued an assessment
against San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding payment of P342 million of taxes in July 1987. SMC filed a
request for reinvestigation. The respondent granted the request and he eventually reduced the tax liability to P302
million. However, in October 1987, the respondent referred the case to the Legal Service Division of the BIR.
Various BIR officials then reviewed the case and recommended that SMCs tax liability be reduced to P22 million,
which is a significant reduction from the original P342 million. The reduction was justified by the BIR officials on
the ground that the tax examiners had made some errors in computing SMCs tax liability.
Based on this, the SMC was demanded to pay P22 million, but then SMC asked for a compromise of P10
million. The matter was again referred to various BIR officials who agreed and recommended to the respondent
that he should accept the compromise offer, which the latter thereby accepted. This resulted to a criminal case
against the respondent for the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to the
petitioners, the act of accepting the P10 million compromise offer caused undue injury to the government and
gave SMC unwarranted benefits due to the significantly reduced tax liability. The respondent was initially convicted
by the Sandiganbayan which later reversed its own decision upon the motion of the respondent.

ISSUE:
Is the respondent liable for the conviction of the crime filed against him?

RULING:
NO. The Sandiganbayan found that there was an improper computation in the tax liability of SMC. The
error basically imposed tax on top of another tax which, if allowed, would be unfair to the taxpayer. It was
therefore proper to have the tax be reduced from P302 million to P22 million. Allowing a tax to be imposed upon
another tax constitutes tax pyramiding, which has been rejected by the Court, the legislature, and our tax
authorities since 1922. Pursuant to the maxim Ratio legis est anima legis or The reason for the law is its spirit,
the intent behind the law is clearly to prevent tax imposed upon another tax.
On the issue of the P10 million offer received by the respondent, it was well within his power to accept
the compromise offer. This is actually referred to as abatement, and not compromise as termed by SMC.
Respondent is actually prudent to accept the P10 million offer so as to avoid a protracted and costly litigation. The
CIR has the power to abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability, inclusive of increments, if its
assessment is excessive or erroneous, or if the administration costs involved do not justify the collection of the
amount due. Further, respondent cannot be said to have acted in bad faith. He acted upon concurrence and
recommendation of the various BIR officials. Therefore, he should not be held liable for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

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Reddendo Singula Singulis
Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its
proper place

Gutierrez vs. The House of The Representatives Committee On Justice
G.R. No. 193459
February 15, 2011
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez on July
22, 2010, based on the grounds of betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. On August 3,
2010 a second complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. On September 1, 2010 the committee on Justice found the First
and Second complaints sufficient in form. And on the 13
th
of September petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 3(5), Article XI of the constitution, I states that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner further contends that start of the
one year ban is from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before
the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15
th
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

ISSUE:
When does the start of one year ban of subsequent filing of impeachment case starts?

RULING:
Section 3(5), Article XI of The Constitution refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment
proceeding. As explained by Father Bernas, following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term cases
must be distinguished from the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the senate. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the senate,
a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. And under the Francisco doctrine, the term initiate
means to file the complaint and referral of the complaints to the Committee on Justice. Therefore, the one-year
period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House
Committee on Justice.

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Salus Populi Est Suprema Lex
The voice of the people is the supreme law

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 74457
March 20, 1987
Cruz, J.

FACTS:
Restituto Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo, as it was prohibited under an
existing law that time, EO 626. Ynot averred that EO 626-A is unconstitutional for it violated his right to due
process. But the lower court ruled against Ynot, ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.

RULING:
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the state to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. And the justification is found in the venerable latin
maxim,salus populi est suprema lex. And this is the power invoked by the government to justify EO No. 626-A. But
while conceding that the amendatory measure has some lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. Hence,
the law is invalid since it deprives a person of due process.

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Surplusagium Non Nocet
Surplusage does not vitiate a statute

Santos v. Municipaity of Caloocan
GR No. L-15807
April 22, 1963
Regala, J.

FACTS:
The respondent issued an Ordinance which charge slaughterhouses with certain fees that includes
slaughterhouse fees, meat inspection fees, corral fees and internal organ fees, those which are pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 655. Thus, petitioner is questioning the validity of Ordinance No. 24.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance exceeds its limit of jurisdiction provided by the Commonwealth Act 655.

RULING:
The respondent had exceeded its jurisdiction, for the commonwealth act only allows the charge of
slaughterhouse fees. The other payment of fees ordained by the respondent overstepped the limits of its statutory
grant. The court orders the refund of the fees with the exception of slaughterhouse fees. One of the rules in
constructing the law, if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one does not necessarily
vitiates the others.

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Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere
Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 95022
March 23, 1992
Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition to reverse the decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the
withholding tax or income.
An exemption from all the retirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms was given
to GCL Retirement Plan by RA 4917. Then, PD 1959 was promulgated which abolishes exemption from withholding
tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by PD 1739. The GCL plan is one of those exempted from income
tax under RA 4917. Now, petitioner contends that PD 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917, and that
GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not GCL Retirement Plan retains its exemption.

RULING:
Yes. The deletion in PD 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law cant be
deemed to be applicable to the employees trusts. PD 1959 is a general law, hence. It cant repeal a specific
provision impliedly.
Also in Villegas v. Subido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently
comprehensive to induce what was set forth in the special act. It is known in statutory construction, that do not
disturb what has been settled.

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Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium
Where there is a right, there is a remedy

Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co.
GR No. L-6690
March 29, 1912
Carson, J.

FACTS:
Manila Railroad Co., took possession and occupied a small parcel of land without Tenorios consent and
without having made payment therefore. Defendants alleged that the land is a part of certain lands described in
condemnation proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenorio has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land
on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Manila Railroad
Co.

RULING:
Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure, they
must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner and must be at least substantially fully and fairly complied
with. The plaintiff is clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover damages which she may have
suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property.
Thus, plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract and recover damages for its full value.

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Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus
Where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish

Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons
GR No. L-278
July 18, 1946
Per Curiam, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Sucurity
Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged and detained under (a) active collaboration with
the Japanese and (b) previous association with the enemy. And under the same charge during all the time referred
to, she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is constitutionally entitled to bail.

RULING:
Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Since the Peoples Court Act and the
Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, the most natural and logical
conclusion to follow in such cases is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. Where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. And to hold that the
peoples court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is
strong, is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but to also to the spirit of the Constitution.

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Utile Per Inutile Non Vitiatur
The useful is not vitiated by non-useful

Sales v. Director of Prisons
GR No. L-3972
October 13, 1950
Ozaeta, J.

FACTS:
Fidel Ariston was convicted of frustrated murder, but was released under conditional pardon granted by
the President. The condition being that he shall not violate any of the penal laws. On April 1950, the Executive
Secretary ordered the director of prisons to recommit to prison the said prisoner to serve the remaining unexpired
portion of the sentence, in view of the fact that he had violated the condition of his pardon.

ISSUE:
Whether sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code has been repealed by sec 159 of the Revised Penal
Code.

RULING:
The Revised Penal Code contains a repealing clause, which expressly repeals among other Acts but does
not repeal section 64 (i). The legislative intent was clear, to preserve the power of the president to authorize the
arrest and reincarceration. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Feria, it is said that Revised Administrative Code of
1917 did not repeal and incorporate the provisions of Act No. 1524, but repealed Act No. 1651 and incorporated its
provisions in section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The word pardon in the last line of said section
must have been inserted through inadvertence, and according to the maxim utile par inutile non vitiatur (the
useful is not vitiated by the non-useful), it must be disregarded.

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Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
That construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute - its every word

JMM vs. NLRC
GR No. 109835
November 22, 1993
Cruz, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of POEA to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the
appeal, because of failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules. Petitioner contended that its payment of license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond are enough, no
need for an appeal bond. According to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising
from violations of the conditions. While in sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond.

RULING:
Yes. Because of the stringent requirements, its possible for monetary rewards to exceed 350,000.
Because the overseas employees are subjected to greater risks so the money would be used to insure more care. It
is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

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Verba Accipienda Sunt Secundum Subjectam Materiam
A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
GR No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
Concepcion, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners sought the refund of margin fees relying on RA 2609 which in Central Bank of The Philippines
fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The Auditor of the Bank refused said refunds
for petitioners separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2 Par.
18 of RA 2609. And which states that XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood
when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempted from the payment of margin fee.

RULING:
The term urea formaldehyde used in Section 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product, and is distinct
and separate from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in manufacture of synthetic resin.
The one mentioned in the law is a finish product while the ones imported by the petitioner are raw materials.
Hence, it is not exempted from margin fee.

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Verba intentioni, non e contra,debent inserverie
Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words

People vs. Ferrer
GR No. L-32613
December 27, 1972
Castro, J.

FACTS:
Judge Simeon Ferrer of Tarlac trial court declared RA1700 or the Anti-Submersive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against members and leaders of Communist Part of the
Philippines and NPA. The trial court is of opinion that the congress usurped the powers of the judge by
pronouncing guilt without any trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1700 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
The court holds the validity of RA 1700. In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CCP as an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of Sec. 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP, but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The test
formulated in Nebia vs. New York, and adopted by this court in Lansang v. Garcia is that if laws are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. The requirements
of due process are satisfied and judicial interpretation to that effect renders a court functus officio, following the
maxim Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inserverie.

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Verba Legis
Plain meaning rule

Republic vs. Lacap
GR No. 158253
March 2, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS:
The Dist. Engr. of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid, Lacap and 2 other contractors were pre-qualified,
Lacap won the bid. When Lacap sought for the payment, DPWH withheld on the grounds that the CoA disapproved
final release of funds since Lacaps license is expired. DPWH Legal Department recommended that payment be
made to Lacap. Under the Contractors License Law (RA 4566), it does not provide that a contract entered into by a
contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such
contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a contractor with expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects.

RULING:
A contractor with expired license is entitled to payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate
him from corresponding fines thereof. This rule is explicitly provided under Sec. 35 of RA No. 4566. The plain
meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. And the wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It
does not declare impliedly or expressly as void contracts entered into by contractor whose license had already
expired. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.

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Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt
The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights

Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 7960
December 8, 1989
Paras, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner constructed his house without permit from the owner, with the knowledge of PD 722. He never
showed a title of the land which he claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of PD 722, Anti-Squatting Law has three
elements, (a) accused is not the owner of the land, (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property. . .
and (c) such occupation of the property is without consent or against the will of the owner. And Sec. 15, Rule 119
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that after prosecution has rested its case the court may dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of squatting and a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting
his evidence.

RULING:
Yes. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present
evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgement on the basis of the evidence for
the prosecution.

1D 2014
Midterm Project
60
Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum
From the words of statute there should be no departure

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. L-34150
October 16, 1971
Barredo, J.

FACTS:
There was a proposal to amend the voting age from 21 to 18 years under the 1971 Constitution. The
convention wanted to submit it to the people for ratification via plebiscite. Senator Tolentino petitioned to restrain
COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite. Since under Article XV of the Constitution, there shall be only one
election/plebiscite where all the amendments shall be ratified by the people as a whole.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed plebiscite is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, the proposed plebiscite is unconstitutional. The Article XV of the Constitution contemplates only a
single election- regardless of the number of amendments- to ratify the proposed amendment in the constitution.
One relevant maxim to the case would be ,verba legis non est recedendum, there should be no departure from the
words of the statute. The constitution should be taken as an organic act as well. Thus, any amendment is as
important as the whole of it.

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