Torts and Damages Magic Notes

TORTS AND DAMAGES - CASIS A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES c(~_!
)o PAGE 1
! C L A S S N O T E S
Torts: not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law
BUT many scattered provisions on tortuous acts
-usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies
granted; (3) social/public policy protected
Damages: much longer treatment in the NCC; more
practical importance on damages
Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents
IntentionaI tort: not a delict (any act or omission
punishable by law)
Why? ntentional act causing damage to another, not a
crime
Act: intentional, voluntary
-damage
-may or may not violate a crime
NegIigence: any act or omission causing damage to
another but w/o intent (only difference w/intentional tort)
Strict IiabiIity: it doesn't matter if you're negligent or if
you intended it as long as sets of circumstances make
you liable
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definitions
1. Tort and Quasi-deIict
a. Tort
Naguiat v NLRC
FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of
Clark Field Taxi, nc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the
US bases in the country, Clark Air Base was closed and
the taxi drivers of CFT were separated from service.
The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay
due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat
and the company solidarily liable for the payment of sep.
pay.
ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable
with CFT. YES.
HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable
bec: (1) he actively managed the business; (2) there
was evidence that CFT obtained reasonably adequate
insurance; and (3) there was a corporate tort in this
case.
Our jurisprudence is wanting to the definite scope of
"corporate tort. EssentiaIIy, "tort" consists in the
vioIation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by Iaw. SimpIy stated, it is a breach of IegaI
duty.
CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President
of CFT: no definition of corporate tort
2 definitions: long and short (legal basis)
Short definition: from a law dictionary
What's wrong with the definition in Naguiat? TOO
BROAD. Any breach of legal duty becomes a tort (so it
would include crimes, QD, breach of contract)
.very sloppy definition but it's the only case that
defines Tort
Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine
the liability of the officers (Naguiat) so is it part of the
ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFT
liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to
establish liability through tort
AQUINO (pp. 1-2)
Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of
the Latin word "torquere meaning "to twist
-common law: an unlawful violation of private right, not
created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for
damages
-an act or omission producing an injury to another,
without any previous existing lawful relation of which the
said act or omission may be said to be a natural
outgrowth or incident (other definitions not discussed)
-no universal formula for torts liability
-includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability
*IntentionaI tort: includes conduct where the actor
desires to cause the consequences of his act or
believes the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.
-includes assault, batter, false imprisonment,
defamation, invasion of privacy and interference of
property
*NegIigence: involves voluntary acts or omissions
which result in injury to others, without intending to
cause the same
-actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts
or omissions
*Strict LiabiIity: where the person is made liable
independent of fault or negligence upon submission of
proof of certain facts
DE LEON (pp. 1-3)
Tort: common law expression
-used in French to mean "wrong, derived from Latin
"tortus meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is
twisted conduct or conduct that departs from the existing
norm
- a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is
subject to civil liability
-fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission +
resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished
from a mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from
said breach of duty (of such character as to afford a
right of redress at law in favor of the injured party
against the wrongdoer)
Note (explained definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): the
term "tort used by SC has same meaning as tort in
common law jurisdictions, as it was used in cases
involving QD and delicts
Tortious act: a wrongful act
-commission or omission of duty of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives some injury,
directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation
(74 Am. Jur. 2d 620)
Essence of tort: defendant's potential for civil liability to
the victim for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly
the victim's potential fro compensation or other relief
b. Quasi-deIict
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - CASIS A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES c(~_!)o PAGE 2
A 2176 expIanation: First sentence refers to ALL CVL
LABLTES. Second sentence limits QD.
Barredo v Garcia
FACTS: A Head-on collision between a taxi and
carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old boy who
was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was
convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil
action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued
Barredo, the driver's employer for damages. Barredo
contends that under the RPC, his liability is only
subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil
action has been filed against the driver.
SSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil
action against Barredo, making him primarily liable as
employer under the CC. YES.
HELD: The same negIigent act causing damage may
produce civiI IiabiIity arising from a crim under the
RPC or create an action for quasi-deIict under the
CC. Thus, there were 2 liabilities of Barredo: a
subsidiary one arising from the driver's crim negligence
nd a primary one as employer under the CC. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and
they preferred the second remedy. They were acting
within their rights in doing so.
-during that time, culpa aquiliana (QD) doesn't cover
acts against law? A1903, oId CC expressIy excIude
acts not punishabIe by Iaw
-SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow
what the old law says because if A1903 applied literally
there would be no culpa aquiliana, if read together with
RPC (all acts would be under criminal negligence and
imprudence)
-so in this case, emphasize scope of cuIpa aquiIiana
and deIict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he
was not solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily
liable
-if applied today, would the result be the same? YES
through stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed
phrase "not punishable by law
EIcano v HiII
FACTS: n criminal case where Reginald Hill was
charged with the killing of Agapito Elcano, the former
was acquitted for "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake. The deceased's parents thereafter sued
Reginald and his father for dmages. CF dismissed the
civil cases on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by
Hill's acquittal in the crim case. NO.
HELD: Hill's acquittal in the crim case has not
extinguished his liability for QD, hence the acquittal is
not a bar to the instant civil action.
Art. 2176 where it refers to "fauIt or negIigence,"
covers not onIy acts "not punishabIe by Iaw" but
aIso acts criminaI in character, whether intentionaI
and voIuntary or negIigent.
-why make intentional acts under QD? To make father
and son liable
-A 2177, NCC expressly points out that there's a
separate civil liability from criminal negligence BUT it
seems to apply to QD only so court dealt with this
limitation by upholding the construction that upholds
"the spirit that giveth Iife rather than that which is
IiteraI that kiIIeth the intent of the Iawmaker" (A2176
is not just QD, so A2177 really has no problem)
Cinco v Canonoy
FACTS: Cinco's car and a eepney collided. Cinco filed a
civil action for damage to property against the eepney's
driver and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a crim
case against the eepney driver. CF upheld the
suspension of the civil case pending the determination
of the crim case.
ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action. YES.
HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case
may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of the CC.
Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it incIudes not
onIy injuries to persons but aIso damage to
property. It makes no distinction bet. Damage to
persons and damage to property.
Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to
property (same highlight in reviewer)
Problem: A2191(2) gave exampIe where QD and
damage to property [liability of proprietors of excessive
smoke]; but this is a Tort on STRCT LABLTY, not QD!
Baksh v CA
FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of
promise to marry. CA affirmed TC's award of damages,
relying on Art. 21 CC.
ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach
of promise to marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES.
HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books.
Art. 2176 which defined a QD is Iimited to negIigent
acts or omissions and excIudes the notion of
wiIIingness or intent. Torts is much broader than
cuIpa aquiIiana bec. it incIudes not onIy negIigence,
but intentionaI criminaI acts as weII.
so what's correct? nclude or not to include intentional
acts? n Baksh, Davide showed role of A21, so he
limited A2176 to negligent acts or omissions. A2176
discussion is not necessary for the disposition of
the case (OBITER) THEREFORE, QD stiII incIudes
intentionaI acts!
***ssue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? f it
covers intentional acts..
Fr litigation pt of view: it doesn't matter
Fr academic pt of view: it matters!
2. Damages
AQUINO (pp. 842-843)
-Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it
that whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of
loss or injury is compensated for in some way or
another.
-A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to
all obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract,
or quasi-contract).
-A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice
to special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in
the Code.
-A2198: principles of general law on damages are
adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
NCC.
-ndemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the
loss caused thereby.
-n actions for damages, courts should award an amount
(money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent
in property.
SANCO, (pp. 940-941)
Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American
Law since they were either not expressly recognized or
rarely allowed under old code, particularly on subject of
moral damages
Scope of appIicabiIity of provisions on damages:
applicable to all obligations arising from sources
enumerated in A1157, NCC, without prejudice to special
provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in said
code.
-don't apply to compensation of workmen and other
employees in cases of death, injury or illness
-in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as
not in conflict with Civil Code
Concept of damages:
Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or
imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a
consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a
tortious act
-pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach
of some duty or violation of some right.
Kinds: compensatory, punitie, liquidated damages
(damages recoverable upon breach of a contract, as
stipulated by the parties), nominal damages (given in
vindication of a breach of duty which does not result in
any actual or pecuniary damages)
Damage, damages, injury: materiaI distinctions
Injury: llegal invasion of a legal right
Damage: loss, hurt, or harm which results from an
injury; in a popular sense, it is the depreciation in value,
regardless if caused by a wrongful or legal act; as
defined by statutes providing for damages: actionable
loss, injury or harm which results from unlawful act,
omission or negligence of another
-not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment,
revenge, discipline, chastisement
Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for
damages suffered.
Pecuniary Ioss: loss of money or something by which
money or something of money value may be acquired
PeopIe v BaIIesteros
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder.
They were ordered to pay actual, compensatory, and
moral damages to the heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES
HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right.
ActuaI or compensatory damages are those awarded
in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. The party claiming such must present the
best evidence available such as receipts.
MoraI damages may be invoked when the complainant
has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety,
physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result
of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
Custodio v CA
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the
passageway to Mabasa's apartment narrower. Mabasa
filed a civil action for the grant of easement of right of
way against them. CA, aside from granting right of way,
awarded damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
HELD: n the case at bar, although there was damage,
there was no legal injury. Custodio et al's act of
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of
their right as owners.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is
the loss, hurt or harm, which results from the injury.
Damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded fro the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. n such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone.
b. Damnum absque injuria
AQUINO (pp. 843-845)
-"There is no liability even if there is damage because
there was no injury. Mere damage without injury does
not result in liability.
-A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum
facit one who exercises a right does no injury.
Custodio v CA, supra
"Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
B. History and DeveIopment
AQUINO (pp.1-5)
"Tort provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish,
French and Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC
borrows heavily from decisions of the Court in other
countries especially Spain and US and relies from
annotation of foreign author.
Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite
evident in the field of QD: it added 4 new category of
obligations that arise quasi ex delicto (a. liability of a
judge who misconducts a case or gives a wrong
decision; b. liability of an occupier of a building for
double the damage caused by anything thrown or forced
out of the building, no matter by whom, on to a public
place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he keeps any
object suspended from the building which would do
damage if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper,
innkeeper, or keeper of a stable for any theft or damage
caused by slaves or employees, or in case of the
innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].)
-Code Commission initially wanted to adopt the word
"tort in our NCC but decided later against it because
"tort" in AngIo-American Iaw "is much broader
(incIudes negIigence, intentionaI criminaI acts, faIse
imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-PhiIippine
concept of obIigations arising from non-contractuaI
negIigence. ntentional acts would be governed by
RPC. However, some provisions used "tort and
therefore recognize it as a source of IiabiIity [Sec22
& 100, Corporation Code; Art.68 ChiId and Youth
WeIfare Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage
Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding
cases invoIving negIigent acts or omissions as weII
as invoIving intentionaI acts. They defined it in
Naguiat vs. NLRC.
-There is an evident intent to adopt the common law
concept of tort and to incorporate the different,
intentional and unintentional common law torts in the
NCC. Tortious conduct for which civil remedies are
available are embodied in different provisions of the
code. E.g. Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on
contributory negligence and proximate cause (however,
a blending of American and Spanish-Philippine Law)
NCC
SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xI)
Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of
1889 (Spanish and French in origin); but many
provisions from codes of other countries were adopted.
Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because
of element of American culture that has been
incorporated into Fil life during US occupation; because
economic relations that continue between US and RP;
and because US and English Courts have developed
certain equitable rules that are not recognized in the
1889 Civil Code
1889 Civil Code
1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses
A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and
quasi-delicts.
-civil obligations from crime or misdemeanor was
governed only by Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal
action was instituted, the civil action arising from the
crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately
(A122, Law of CrimPro)
-right to recover damages arising from crime is
completely dependent on the result of the criminal case.
f an earlier civil action is instituted, upon start of criminal
case, the civil action is suspended and would be
determined by the result of the criminal case. f criminal
action is dismissed, civil action is also deemed
dismissed, regardless if instituted with the criminal
action or separately. Civil liability is treated as purely
incidental to the criminal liability of the offender. The
cases of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co., US vs. Guy Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and
Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this principle. As
ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense
committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasi-
contract, or QD) cannot be instituted with the criminal
action.
-When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now
contained in A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is
contained in Rule 107 (check if still correct)
2. Civil Liability arising from QD
A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable fro the damage done
n re: A1903: punish wrongful acts or omissions not
punishable by law
-said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute either punishable offenses(delicts) or
breach of contract.
-thus, the liability of employers, et. al. under now A2180
are only subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws)
-QD or culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual culpa:
causative act or omission not punished by law and is
done ONLY negligently, where civil liability could arise
as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws), and
the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for
damages using only preponderance of evidence. t gives
rise only to civil liability. Here, the employer's liability for
his employee's NONCRMNAL NEGLGENCE is direct
and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be directly
imputed in an action for recovery of damages.
-an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it
causes damage or injury to another or others.
DE LEON (pp.4-8)
Tort law emerged out of criminal law; originally
concerned principally with violent breaches of the place.
(1) Common law tort judges usually define what
counts as torts and how compensation is to be
measured. Still, a statute or even Consti may
make certain conduct legally wrongful and may
permit recovery of damages for such conduct.
(2) No clear distinction between tort and crime
initially, this was the case sine the development
of anything like a clearly formulated conception
of a tort is comparatively recent.
(3) Notion of tort as a specific wrong there was
an attempt in 1720 to consider several specific
wrongs in a work consolidating them under the
general heading of torts. Torts of a specific
character have been increasing.
(4) Place of torts in the Philippine law even if RP
was a civil law country, some of the provisions
in the 1889 CC dealth with cases of the nature
of torts + with US occupation, a number of laws
patterned after Anglo-American models have
been passed amplifying the field of torts in
Philippine legal system.
Functions or goaIs of tort Iaw
Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge
Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence
of undesirable behavior:
System of thoughts (sorry, no paraIIeIism in the
enumeration of de Ieon):
(1) MoraIity or corrective justice defendants should
be liable fro harms they wrongfully caused and no
others; liability imposed when and only when it is "right
to do so
(2) SociaI utiIity or poIicy a good-for-all-of-us view:
provide a system of rules that works toward the good of
society
(3) LegaI process litigation process is a good to be
preserved rather than abstract ideal of justice or social
utility
(4) potentiaI confIicts between justice and policy
outlook and legal process outlook
(5) distribution of Ioss the cost of loss suffered by
plaintiff is not simply transferred to the defendant but is
distributed through the defendant to a large number of
individuals
(6) redress of sociaI grievances tort law a popular
mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority
on trial
(7) a mixed system tort law a "mixed set of functions
CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts
II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A. EIements
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Garcia v FIorido
FACTS: A public utility car and a bus collided, resulting
in injuries to Garcia et al. The chief of police filed a
criminal case against the bus driver. Garcia et al filed a
civil action for damages against the owners and drivers
of both vehicles. Bus company and driver filed a motion
to dismiss. CF dismissed the civil action holding that the
right to file a separate civil action was not reserved and
that the action was not based on QD.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case was proper. NO
HELD: The action was based on QD and it may proceed
independently. The essential averments for a QD action
are present in this case, namely:
(1) act or omission of private respondents;
(2) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care in
the operation of the passenger bus by its driver resulting
in the collision;
(3) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
(4) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
(5) the absence of preexisting contractual relations
between the parties.
The allegation that private respondents violated traffic
rules does not detract from the nature and the character
of the actions as one based on culpa aquiliana.
Excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence.
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: Take note of 4 elements of QD: (1)
acts or omission constituting negligence; (2)
damage; (3) direct causal connection between
damage and act or omission; (4) no preexisting
contractual relation.
" The case mentions 5 elements but Prof. Casis
mentioned 4.
Andamo v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
caused the construction of waterpaths and contrivances
in its compound. This allegedly caused flooding and
damage to the adjacent lot, property of the Andamo
spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for
destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a
civil action for damages against respondent corporation.
The civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as
the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may
proceed independently of the criminal case. All the
elements of QD are present in the complaint, to wit:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1)
damages suffered by plaintiff; (2) fault or
negligence of defendant; (3) fault of defendant
caused damages suffered by plaintiff
TayIor v MERALCO
FACTS: 15-year old David Taylor with 2 others (Manuel
and Jessie) experimented with detonating caps were
taken from the premises of MERALCO. David and
Manuel ignited the contents of the cap, resulting in an
explosion which led to David's loss of his right eye.
David's father filed an action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages in this
case.
HELD: NO. n order to recover damages, the following
must be established:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: Qualification of negligence fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when
between such negligence and the injury there
exists the relation of cause and effect
Tayag v AIcantara
FACTS: Tayag who was riding on a bicycle along
McArthur Highway was bumped by a bus and died. His
heirs sued the bus owner and driver for damages. A
crim case was also filed against the bus driver. The bus
driver was acquitted in the crim case on the ground of
reasonable doubt. CF sustained private respondents'
MTS the civil case on the ground of lack of COA due to
the acquittal of the bus driver in the crim case.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: No. The petitioner's COA being based on a QD,
the acquittal of the driver in the crim case is not a bar to
the civil case for damages based on QD.
All the essential averments for a QD action are
present, namely:
1) Act or omission constituting fault or negligence
on the part of private respondent;
2) Damage caused by the said act or omission;
3) Direct causal relation between the damage and
the act or omission; and
4) No pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties.
! C L A S S N O T E
mportant: There must exist a direct causal connection
1. act or omission
I SANGCO (pp. 1-4)
- Conduct may be legally described in terms of action
and inaction or "misfeasance or "nonfeasance.
Misfeasance is active misconduct working positive
injury to others; while nonfeasance is passive
inaction or failure to take steps to protect them from
harm
- Liability in tort may be predicated upon an injury
resulting from an unlawful or illegal act or omission,
whether injury is on property or person
2. cause damage
I SANGCO (pp. 87-90)
- QD liability presupposes 2 conditions: (1) a
connection of cause and effect between the person
liable and the fact from which damage results; (2) a
fault of this person, which implies at once an act of
intelligent volition that is illicit, or contrary to law
- t must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff,
who must prove it, was the natural and probable, or
direct and immediate consequence of defendant's
culpable act or omission
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
3. fault or negligence
I SANGCO (p5-7)
- Negligence is the "failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably impose. When the
danger is great a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary
care.
- Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the
use of sound judgment.
- Negligence is a matter of risk that is to say, of
cognizable danger of injury. The actor does not
desire to bring about the consequences which
follow, nor does he know that they are substantially
to occur, or believe they will. There is merely a risk
of such consequences sufficiently great to lead a
reasonable man in his position to anticipate them,
and to guard against them.
- The culpability of the actor's conduct must be
judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to
him at the time and not by looking backward "with
the wisdom born of the event. The standard must
be one of conduct, rather than consequences. At
the same time, the standard imposed must be an
external one, based upon what society demands of
the individual rather than upon his own notion of
what is proper.
- ntentional omissions must not be treated as cases
of negligence. These are not cases of omissions;
they are cases of positive action.
B. Distinguished
A. Quasi-deIict v DeIict
Art 2177, NCC
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstance regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate not
he danger clearly manifest.
Barredo v Garcia, supra
RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the CC, with a substantially all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from crime.
DeIict Quasi-DeIict
Public interest Private interest
Penal Code Civil Code
Punished only by penal
law
Any kind of fault of
negligence
Guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
Preponderance of
evidence
PeopIe v Ligon
FACTS: Based on the testimony of a taxi driver, Gabat
was convicted of Robbery with Homicide committed
against a 17-yo student working as a cigarette vendor.
ISSUE: WON Gabat's guilt was proven BRD.
HELD: NO. Gabat's guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt, but preponderance of
evidence establishes that by his ct or omission, with
fault and negligence, he caused damage to the victim
and should answer civilly for the damage done.
t does not follow that a person who is not criminally
liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal case must be established BRD,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
" Need to indemnify heirs even if not criminally
liable.
PadiIIa v CA
FACTS: Padilla, a municipal mayor, together with
policemen and a civilian, demolished a store and took
away its contents, pursuant to a municipal ordinance.
CA acquitted them of the charge of grave coercion
based on reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay
damages.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in requiring petitioners to pay
damages after acquitting them of the criminal charge.
HELD: NO. The civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
count as only a preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases.
There is nothing contrary to Art 29,CC in the
rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. t does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise
did not exist.
Cruz v CA
FACTS: Ninevetch Cruz, a surgeon, was convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
ISSUE: WON Cruz's conviction is supported by the
evidence.
HELD: Her guilt was not proved BRD. However, the
Court finds her civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali,
for while a conviction requires proof BRD, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil
liability.
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: elements of reckless imprudence:
(1) the offender does or fails to do an act; (2)
doing or failure to do the act is voluntary; (3)
without malice; (4) material damage results
from the reckless imprudence; (5) there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and
place
PhiIippine Rabbit v PeopIe
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit's employee was convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property, and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages.
The driver jumped bail. Phil Rabbit's notice of appeal
was dismissed.
ISSUE: WON an employer who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused employee may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
NO.
HELD: The subsidiary liability of Phil. Rabbit is
incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability
of the latter has become final and executory by reason
of his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable.
Under the 2000 Rules of Crim Proc., the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime is deemed
impliedly instituted in a crim action unless the offended
party waives the action, reserves the rt to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the crim action. Hence,
the subsidiary liability of the employer under Art 103,
RPC, may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
The 2000 Rules of Crim Proc deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal
actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Arts 32, 33,
34 & 2176 of the CC shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any crim prosecution based on the same
act.
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: Clarified 2000 Rules of Court
B. Quasi-DeIict v. Breach of Contract
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action
for future fraud is void.
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in
the performance of every kind of obligation is also
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
f the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are
also applicable to a quasi-delict.
Notes: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the
same way as provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue
for negligence, you can base the action on quasi-delict,
delict, or contract.
Cangco v ManiIa RaiIroad
FACTS: Cangco's arm was amputated because he was
drawn from under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a
melon at the moment he stepped upon the platform. He
sues for negligence in the performance of a contract.
MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of
servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection
and supervision. HeId: MR is liable. The contract to
transport carries with it the duty to provide safe means
of entering and leaving the train. t is unnecessary for
plaintiff for BoC to prove the breach was due to
negligence. When a contractual relation exists, the
obligor may break the contract by means of an act which
would have constituted a violation of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed.
Doctrine: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are
broader. Plaintiff with a pre-existing contractual relation
may still sue for QD so long as "had there been a no
contract, there is still a quasi-delict.
Notes: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if
Cangco did not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the
4 main differences of QD and BoC in this case:
Under QD Under BoC
1. liability of
defendant
employer
Presumptive
liability
Direct and
immediate
2. defendant
employer's
defense
Rebut
presumption
through proof of
the exercise of
due care in
selection and
supervision
Prove
performance of
contract or
contributory
negligence
3. vinculum
juris (legal tie)
Created by the
wrongful or
negligent
act/omission
itself
ndependent the
breach of the
duty assumed by
the parties
4. what a
plaintiff needs
to prove
Defendant's
fault or
negligence
The contract and
its
nonperformance.
The negligence
need not be
proven
" What is the breach of contract committed?
Negligence, failure to exercise due care
" Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is
preexisting relationship
" Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a
contract of carriage at issue? t should be a
contract of employment.
" MERALCO was held liable for breach of
contract. What was the breach?
" Failure to exercise due diligence
" This is a landmark case because there is a
glaring statement in Cangco that contradicts
the other cases
" True of False-a breach of contract is not a
basis for QD: FALSE
" Court in Sangco said that the circle is
CONCENTRC: QD is larger and that culpa
contractual is the yolk
" So Cangco doesn't say that the two are
mutually exclusive and therefore Cangco is
consistent with Air France
" Vinculum juris distinction doesn't matter
because here the act & the breach coincided
Fores v Miranda
FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a
wall and fractured his right humerus. He sues under
contract of carriage. CA awarded him with moral
damages.
HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are
not recoverable for actions based on BoC unless there
is bad faith. There was no bad faith because: [1] mere
carelessness of the driver does not justify the inference
of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is
that common carriers acted negligently (and not
maliciously)
Doctrine: DiIIerences between QD and BoC in
this case:
Under QD Under BoC
1. moral
damages
Anywhere there
are physical
injuries (Art
2219[2])
Recoverable
only if
passenger dies
or there is
malice or bad
faith
2. defendant
carrier's
defense
Proof of due
diligence in
selection and
supervision
(proof of due
diligence not
available)
3. what plaintiff
needs to prove
Carrier's fault or
negligence
njury to
passenger. No
need to prove it
was carrier's
Fault
" Does not say that when there is a contract, you
can't sue for QD.
" A2176 expressly excludes cases where there
is a pre-existing contractual relationship. But
even if there is a pre-existing contractual
relationship, there is still a cause of action for
quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited.
" The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not
ratio, just obiter.
" Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity
Rakes v AtIantic
FACTS: Rakes's leg was amputated because it was
crushed by an iron rail he was carrying on a hand car for
Atlantic, his employer. He sues for damages because of
Atlantic's negligence in not repairing the weakened
track. Atlantic argues that remedey for injuries through
negligence lies only in a criminal action
HELD: Atlantic's liability to Rakes ariss out of the
contract of employment because failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for its workmen
Doctrine: Employer's liability arising out of negligence
in contract of employment may be enforced separate
from criminal action.
" Statement that you can't sue for QD when
there is a contract is mere obiter, not ratio.
" Court already decided that employee is liable
" Art 1092 & 1903 come from pre existing
relationship
" Rakes is not the basis of the doctrine that
quasi-delict may arise from breach of contract.
" f there is no contract, it does not mean that
there is no existing relationship
Far East v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which
was dishonored at a despedida party due to a hotlist
policy compelled by the loss of the complementary card.
He sues for damages. RTC awarded him moral and
exemplary damages.
HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without
the contract, the act or omission complained of cannot
by itself be an actionable tort. Moral damages were
deleted because negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or
bad faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because
DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be
deemed to underlie the BoC s where, without a pre-
existing contract between 2 parties, an act or omission
can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Qualifies Air France case: QD should be
independent of BoC
Notes: Differences between QD and BoC in this case:
Unde QD Under BoC
1. award for
moral damages
njury f there was bad
faith or gross
negligence
2. award for
exemplary
damages
Gross negligence
as to
approximate
malice (Art 2231)
Act that is
wanton,
fraudulent,
reckless,
oppressive or
malevolent (Art.
2232)
Air France v Carrasco
FACTS: Carraso was told by the manager that he must
vacate his 1
st
class seats because a white man who had
a better right to it. RTC and CA awarded moral
damages. Air France argues that there was no finding of
bad faith to justify the award of moral damages
HELD: Although there was a pre-existing contract, the
stress of the action was put on the wrongful expulsion,
which is a violation of a public duty, which is a QD.
Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Doctrine: The act that breaks the contract may also be
a tort. # why discuss this? To determine damages
# contradicts A2176? No. This is tort not QD
PSBA v CA
FACTS: A PSBA student was stabbed and killed by
non-students while in the school premises. His parents
sued PSBA and its officers under A2180 for ther
negligence, recklessness and lack of security measures.
Defendants argue that they are not covered by 2180 as
they are an academic institution. RTC and CA denied
motion to dismiss.
HELD: The school is not liable under QD because [1]
A2180 applies only if damage was caused by students
or pupils [2] a 2176 applies only if there isno contractual
relation. However, the SC ordered the remand of the
case because there was a contractual obligation to
provide both education and security. Trial must proceed
to determine if the breach was due to negligence.
Doctrine: Qualified Air France v Carrasco's
pronouncement by saying the phrase, "the act that
breaks the contract may also bea tort only applies if the
BoC was done in [1] bad faith and [2] in violation of Art
21 (willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy)
! C L A S S N O T E
" QD not applicable when there is a contract
" According to Prof. Casis, the court said that
A2176 only applies if no contract exists. But in
the latter part, it ruled that A2176 can apply if a
contract exists.
" This statement (can't have QD if there's a
contract) contradicts Air France yet later on it
cites Air France
" Based on the cases, the second statement of
2176 defines a QD but it is not laying down a
rule that when there is a pre-existing
contractual relationship, there can be no QD.
Air France is safer, it said "tort referring to first
sentence of 2176 such that if there is pre-
existing contractual relationship there can still
be a tort.
Syquia v CA
FACTS: The parents and siblings of the deceased
Syquia file suit for damages arising from BoC and/or QD
against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery because the
coffin was flooded due to a hole in the wall of the
concrete vault placed by defendants. CA determined
that there was no negligence.
HELD: Action is based on BoC. The Deed of Sale and
Certificate of Perpetual Care govern the relation of the
parties and defined their rights and obligations. There is
no stipulation that the vault would be waterproof. Plus,
Memorial exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in preventing the accumulation of the water inside
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of
earth around the grave filling the same with earth.
Doctrines:[1] f there is a pre-existing contractual
relation, then any negligence would be actionable under
BoC, not QD. [2] f there is no stipulation or legal
provision to the contrary, the diligence to be observed in
the performance of a contractual obligation is that which
is expected of a good father of a family.
" The notes in this case are rather confusing.
Prof. Casis asks how putting a hole in the vault
would prevent water from entering it.
AQUINO (pp. 25-26)
1. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Culpa
Contractual
Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual (BoC)
ndependent contract Foundation of liability is
the contract and its breach
Defense is available No defense of diligence of
a good father of a family in
the selection and
supervision of employees
Employer's
responsibility is
presumptive
employer's liability is
direct and immediate
2. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Crimes
Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Crimes
Affect Private
Concerns
Public nterest
ndemnification
Repairs Damage
Penal Code Punishes
or Corrects
Broad- include all acts
where any fault or
negligence intervenes
Narrow punished
only if there is a penal
law punishing it
Employer's liability is
direct and primary
Employer's liability is
subsidiary
3. Concurrence of Causes of Action
- Far East Banc v. CA a single act or
omission may give rise to two or more causes
of action (i.e. delict, QD, or BoC)
- liability for a tort may arise even under a
contract, where tirt us that which breaks the
contract, where an act which constitutes a
breach would have itself constituted the source
of a quasi-delictual liability has the contract not
existed.
De Leon (pp.157-160)
1. Requisites of QD:
a. An act or omission by defendant
b. Fault or negligence by defendant
c. Damage or injury to plaintiff
d. Direct relation of cause and effect
between act or omission and the
damage
e. No pre-existing contractual
relationship
2. Burden of Proof
a. Falls on the person claiming damages
b. To be established with satisfactory
evidence
c. Negligence is not presumed. Only
under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191 is
presumed and burden of proof shifts
to defendant
3. QD arising from BoC
a. "the existence of a contract does not
preclude the commission of a QD..
b. Contractual responsibility and extra-
contractual liability exclude each other
and cannot be cumulated.
Tort liability arises from BoC when the is
act or omission is in itself wrongful
independent of the contract, the breach of
which being merely incidental to the
commission of the tort.
4. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual
Distinguished
Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual
(BoC)
Wrongful or negligent
act or omission itself
the source of the
obligation
The act or omission is
merely an incident in
the performance of an
obligation
Plaintiff has burden to
prove the defendant
was at fault or
negligent
Plaintiff need not
plead or prove it was
defendants fault or
negligence
No presumption that
defendant was at fault
or negligent
Mere proof of
existence of a contract
and its breach raises
presumption of fault or
negligence
Governed by Art.
2176; and also
governed by Art.
1172-1174 under Art.
2178
Governed by Arts.
1170- 1174
Based on voluntary act or omission which has
caused damage to another
Requires only preponderance of evidence
" Note from discussion: (hindi ko alam kung
saang case to related) if there is a pre-existing
contractual relation, base action on Art. 21.
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept of NegIigence
1. Definition; EIements
Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
f the law or contact does not state
the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a father of a family shall be required.
AQUINO on negligence (pp. 23-27)
Actionable negligence may either be culpa contractual,
culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. Thus, an action
for damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may
be based on contract, quasi-delict or delict. The bases
of liability are separate and distinct from each other
even if only one act or omission is involved.
Picart v Smith
FACTS: Picart improperly pulled his horse on the right
side (wrong side of the road) of the bridge. Smith drove
his car toward the horse, veering away only when the
car was only a few feet away from the horse. The horse
got spooked and got killed.
HELD: Smith is liable for damages because applying
the standard of a prudent man, he was negligent. A
prudent man "would have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a
reasonable consequence of that course. Smith should
have: 1. Stopped 2. Slowed down or 3. Veered to the
right.
Doctrines: 1. The Constitutive fact of negligence is the
reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this pre-vision.
2. Test of negligence "would a prudent man. foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued?
3. Take note however, that a person can be expected to
take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Omniscience of the future is
not a requirement.
Notes: The car was on the proper side of the bridge.
Sir thinks that the ruling is problematic because had the
car veered away, it would then be on the improper side
of the road.
" definition: conduct is said to be negligent when
a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
" Test: prudent man
! fictitious character: ordinary prudent
man
! can be reasonably foreseen
! knowledge of tortfeasor at that time
Wright v MERALCO
FACTS: An intoxicated Wright was thrown off his
calesa after it was pitched forward by Meralco's
protruding railtrack. CF awarded him damages but
apportioned the same since he was negligent as well,
although not as negligent as Meralco in failing to
maintain the tract. Both appealed.
HELD: Wright was not negligent because the sudden
falling of the horse, would ordinarily be sufficient to
throw a sober man from the vehicle.
Doctrine: f a person's conduct is characterized by s
proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether hi is drunk or sober.
Notes: Sir asks the question following the doctrine: f
this happened today, would an intoxicated driver be held
liable for hitting a man?
- mere intoxication is not in itself negligence
- inconclusive factor
CorIiss v ManiIa
FACTS: Plaintiff orliss' husband died of some serious
burns because the jeep he was driving collided with
Manila Railroad's train at the railroad crossing because
of his eagerness to beat the locomotive and reach the
other side.
HELD: Complaint is dismissed. Husband was negligent
because [1] one approaching a railroad crossing do so
cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and
do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do
before he attempts to cross the track; [2] a prudent man
under similar circumstances would have heeded the
siren of the oncoming train, stopped and allowed the
train to pass; [3] the train driver had already applied its
brakes and was running at 23-30kph; and [4] he had the
duty to stop his jeep to avoid a collision because the
driver of the locomotive was not qualified to do so at the
time.
Doctrine: Negligence is defined as the "want of care
required by the circumstances. t is not an absolute
term and its application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a higher degree of care is necessary.
Notes: Sir says that based on jurisprudence, the
standard of care required for crossing railroads is "stop,
look and listen. Nevertheless as provided by the SC in
this case, we cannot provide a standard for all specific
cases because it is difficult. There is no formula to
determine negligence. Every case must be dependent of
its facts.
VaIenzueIa v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Valenzuela was hit by defendant's car
while she was attending to a flat tire. She sued for
damages based on QD. He argues that he is not liable
because of her contributory negligence in parking in a
no-park zone and he was driving at a safe speed of
55kph.
HELD: The average motorist alert to road conditions
would have had no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by him. Therefore his
failure to be alert must be due either to his intoxication
or his speeding. Also there was no contributory
negligence because the Emergency Rule exempts
plaintiff from negligence since the time for reflective
thought or opportunity to weight the situation was absent
because she was confronted by danger.
Doctrines: [1] adds to the definition in Corliss v. Manila
negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others it is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
[2]the emergency rule can be considered a defense.
Notes: SC took into consideration "normal human
circumstances in determining WON defendant was
negligent. (Examples: the light rainfall, visibility of the
street 100 meters away, etc.)
Far Eastern v CA
FACTS: While on compulsory pilotage for docking, the
vessel rams into pier because anchor did not take hold
HELD: Both the shipmaster and compulsory pilot are
liable. The shipmaster is liable because of his blind
reliance on the compulsory pilot and because he
"supinely stood by with no watchful vigilance on his
part. The compulsory pilot is liable because he failed to
react (or reacted too late) and because he miscalculated
the bulk and size of the vessel.
Doctrines: [1] Unmindful disregard or neglectful
relinquishment of duty is tantamount to negligence [2]
Extraordinary risk demands extraordinary diligence. [3]
The presumption of fault against a moving vessel that
strikes a stationary object is rebuttable by proof that the
driver was without fault, the collision was the fault of the
stationary object, or that it was the result of an inevitable
accident.
Notes: The defense of liability of another person is not
available to join tortfeasors.
CiviI Aeronautics v CA
FACTS: The plaintiff broke his thigh bone because he
slipped over a 4-inch elevation at the end of the
viewing deck of the airport since he wanted a better
view of the incoming passengers including his future
son- in- law. He filled an action for damages based on
QD.
HELD: Defendant is liable for exemplary damages since
there was gross negligence in failing in its duty to insure
the safety of the viewers because the tendency of the
viewers on the deck would be to look to where the
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look
down on the floor or pavement.
Doctrines: [1] An object can still be placed negligently
even if it has a 'legitimate purpose' for being there. [2]
Definition of gross negligence as equivalent to
"notorious negligence which "consists in the failure to
exercise even slight care
Notes: SC, just like in Valenzuela v. CA, took into
consideration "normal human circumstances (i.e. that
people would be looking up) in determining WON
defendant was negligent. But sir asks, "what if the
planes had already landed?
2. Standard of conduct

1. the prudent men
2. chiIdren
3. experts. ProfessionaIs
4. intoxication
5. insanity
1. The Prudent Man
Picart v Smith
Doctrines: [1] The standard of care is that of a "prudent
man [2] the conduct of a prudent man is determined "in
the light of human experience an in the particular case
I Sangco (pp.7-8) -
1) STANDARD OF CONDUCT
- it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all
conceivable human conduct because of the infinite
variety of situations which may arise
- standard of conduct must be:
i. external and objective
ii. the same for all persons
iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to
the act for his capacity to meet it and for the
circumstances under which he must act
a. ChiIdren
Article 8, RPC
A minor fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable
of committing a crime and is to be held criminally liable
therefore. (this was in Taylor. This also might mean Art
80 RPC)???
" The new law on negligence of children would
still not affect the laws on negligence outlined
by Sangco because it does not expressly
repeal the provisions of the RPC.
" RA 9344 does not affect presumptions of
negligence. However, it affects Art. 2180, CC.
TayIor v ManiIa RaiIroad
FACTS: David Taylor, 15, and MANUEL, 12, were
experimenting with fulminating caps they found lying
around the company's premises. After applying a lighted
match to an opened cap, it exploded causing injuries.
David's father filed a complaint for damages.
HELD: n the Turntable and Torpedo cases, the owner
of the premises was held liable because of the doctrine
of implied invitation
1
. This doctrine, however was
overturned by Railroad Company vs. Stout which held
that while it is the general rule in regard to an adult that
to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case. The law fixes no arbitrary
age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts. Plaintiff was
sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted for his own
deliberate act. Although the owner of the premises was
1
In the case of young chdren, and other persons not
fuy su |urs, an mped cense mght sometmes arse
when t not on behaf of others. Thus eavng a
temptng thng for chdren to pay wth exposed, where
they woud be key to gather for that purpose, may be
equvaent to an nvtaton to them to make use of t;
and perhaps, f one were to throw upon hs premses,
near the common way, thngs temptng to chdren, the
same mpcaton shoud arse.
negligent leaving the caps exposed n its premises,
plaintiff's own act was the principal and proximate cause
of the accident.
RULE: The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only and this is to
be determines in each case by the circumstances of the
case.
" when children trespass
" child & adult: not same appreciation with
regard to contributory negligence
" for children, you don't stop at age, you look at
circumstances as well
" 2 cases: "Torpedo (flare gun cases) and
"Turntable (DJ stuff) cases: the question
involved has been whether a railroad company
is liable for an injury received by an infant of
tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or
for purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where
the railroad company's premises, at a place
where the railroad company knew, or had a
good reason to suppose, children who would
likely to come, and there found explosive signal
torpedoes left exposed by the railroad
company's employees, one of which when
carried away by the visitor, exploded and
injured him; or where such infant found upon
the premises a dangerous machine, such as a
turntable left in such condition as to make it
probable that children in playing with it would
be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and
where the infant did in fact suffer injury in
playing with such machine. n these, and in a
great variety of similar cases, the great weight
of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.
" Examples: What if it's a 25-year old with the
mental capacity of a 9-year old? What if it's a
9-year old with the mental capacity of a 25-year
old? Would the doctrine still apply?
Jarco Marketing v CA
FACTS: Zhieneth, 6, was pinned by the bulk of the
department store's gift-wrapping counter/structure and
died. The department store contended that it was the
child's own act of climbing into the structure that was the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter.
HELD: (Citing Sangco) Since negligence may be a
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to
be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is
rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the
child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
RULE: A child under 9 years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Casis: Does this mean that Sangco did not set a
standard of conduct for children but merely a formula?
No. The court did not cite him correctly. Sangco had the
standard of an ordinary prudent child.
" Make a distinction between children as a
tortfeasor and children as a victim
" f a child is 8 years old and makes a counter
fall over another person who dies, QD can still
be filed because negIigence is not equaI to
IiabiIity
" Difference between accident and negligence:
an accident cannot be foreseen while
negligence can be foreseen. So in this case,
negligence and accident cannot coincide.
" Company's counterargument: "t never
happened before.
" n citing Sangco, there is an analogy between
the RPC and the new Civil Code. f below 9,
presumed incapable of negligence (conclusive
presumption), if above 9 and below 15,
rebuttable presumption of incapacity of
negligence, if above 15, that of a prudent child
or adult.
" Prof. Casis asks what about a child who is
exactly 9 years old? Apply the rules on above
9 below 15 because the law should be
construed in favor of the accused.
" s there mutual exclusivity between negligence
and accident? According to the Jarco case,
none.
Magtibay v Tiangco
FACTS: Rowel Tiangco, under 18, was found guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence. Being under 18,
his sentence was suspended until he reached majority.
Later, in view of his conduct, his lawyer recommended
the dismissal of his case. CF dismissed but reversed
the right of the heirs to recover damages in a civil action.
HELD: The suspension of sentence did not wipe out his
guilt, but merely put off the imposition of the
corresponding penalty in order to give the delinquent
minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after
he had observed good conduct, the criminal case was
dismissed, this does not mean that he was exonerated
from the crime charged, but simply that he would suffer
no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the case obliterate
is civil liability for damages.
RULE: Liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is
imposed as a mode, not of punishment but of
compensation. For every tortuous act of violence or
other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and in
the same extent as an adult.
" Minority is not a factor to escape liability
because even though minority is not a factor
for negligence, it is a factor for liability
DeI Rosario v ManiIa EIectric
FACTS: Alberto Del Rosario, 9, despite the warning of
one of his companions, after saying that he had been in
the habit of touching wires, put out his index finger and
touched a fallen electrical wire. He immediately fell face
downwards, exclaiming "Ay! Madre. The end of the wire
remained in contact with his body which fell near the
post. Upon being taken to the hospital, he was
pronounced dead.
HELD: t is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and natural curiosity which a child would
feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere
fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not alter the case.
But even supposing that the contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the
deceased, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal
to the right of action in this case,not having been the
determining cause of the accident.
RULE: t is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and natural curiosity.
" Different from Taylor:
! Taylor contributory negligence, child
as tortfeasor
! Del Rosario victim only
" mmaturity and natural curiosity taken into
account
YIarde v Aquino
FACTS: Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig
beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a whole
to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the
loose soil around the open hole but allegedly telling
them "not to touch the stone. They, however, playfully
jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete
block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasn't able to
climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained.
HELD: The child Ylarde cannot be charged with
reckless imprudence. (citing Sangco) The degree of
care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A
minor should not be held to the same degree of care as
an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to
the average conduct of persons of his own age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a chiId
must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinariIy exercised by chiIdren of the same
age, capacity, discretion, knowIedge and experience
under the same or simiIar circumstances. (RULE)
" Kid was 10/11 yo: *disputable presumption
under Sangco*
" *in a case between children and adults, the
trend is that adults should know better*
SANGCO (pp. 70-74)
UNDER 9 YEARS # conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment and is exempt from criminal
liability
OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 # may or may not be guilty
of contributory negligence, depending upon his mental
development and other circumstances (rebuttable
presumption)
OVER 15 YEARS # presumed to have sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger
with the power to avoid it
(STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity,
and not that of an adult.)
STANDARD: ORDNARLY PRUDENT CHLD
$ The standard of conduct which a child must
conform for his own protection is that of a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence and
experience under like or similar circumstances
or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances.
TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the
same standard of care as an adult:
1. type of activity involved is one that is usually
engaged in by children
2. one involving the use of "potentially
dangerous, adult-oriented instrument, like a car.
WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF
CARE OF AN ADULT, his violation of a statute or
other enactment entails the same consequences as
those of an adult.
3. Experts, professionaIs
CuIion v PhiI. Motors
FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor
schooner repaired, he went to PMC where Quest,
PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs.
Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and
the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel
mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine
compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he
took it lightly. When the engine was started, there
was a backfire and burned the boat.
HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would
not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak
along the pipeline and the flooding of the
carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a
prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat
engines, would have taken precaution to avoid.
When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest
is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but
not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with
boats would have been sufficiently warned by the
circumstances to cause him to take precaution
against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert
in repairing gasoline engine on boats.
RULE: When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do.
" Johnny Quest
" when a person who holds himself out as being
competent to do things, he will be held liable
for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care &
skill of an expert
" high degree of care
US v Pineda
FACTS: Pineda, a pharmacist, sold barium
chlorate(poisonous) instead of potassium chlorate
which killed 2 horses.
HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility to use care has
been variously qualified as "ordinary care, "care of
a specially high degree, "the highest degree of
care known to practical men, which is "the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness,
vigilance, and the most exact and reliable
safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct
of business, in order that human life may not
constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine.
The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands. The question of
negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is
responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he
sells.
RULE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility to use care has
been variously qualified as "ordinary care, "care of
a specially high degree, "the highest degree of
care known to practicaI men".
" Relationship: danger
! pharmacist: knowledgeable
! buyer: can't check for himself
" Consider nature of work and danger involved
Cruz v CA
FACTS: Lydia Umali underwent a surgery under Dr.
Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy clinic ran out of
medicine, blood and oxygen that the patient had to be
transferred to another hospital, where she died.
HELD: While it may be true that the circumstances
seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence
on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is best
arrived at not through the educated surmises nor
conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For
whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion
of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that
the circumstances cited are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same
operation.
RULE: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating.
" Plaintiff has burden of proof; present expert
testimony
BPI v CA
FACTS: BP's money market people pre-terminated
Fernando's placement through a phone call and only
verified her identity by phone. The phony Fernando
deposited the two BP checks to China Bank and
thereafter withdrew it all. BP claimed reimbursement
from China Bank under its clear warranty.
HELD: By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of
ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons,
the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree
of diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. No matter how many justifications both
banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase
the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising
extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervisions
of employees.
RULE: The banks are expected to exercise the highest
degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees (stems from the nature of their industry)
" Nature of banks: imbued with public interest so
there is a higher degree of diligence required
4. Intoxication
" Not negligence in itself but it can be a factor
" *questions to ask: (1) how do you know if a
person is intoxicated or not? (2) when is it a
factor enough that it impairs your judgment?*
Wright v ManiIa EIectric
FACTS: Plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing
the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled,
leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike out
of the rails with great force, throwing the plaintiff from
the vehicle and causing injuries. The tops of the rails
appear to be 5 or 6 inches more above the level of the
street. Plaintiff was intoxicated at the time.
HELD: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the
mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care. General rule: it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence
can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his
own protection than by a sober one. f one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence,
it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. t is
impossible to say that a sober man would not have
fallen from the vehicle under the conditions. A horse
crossing the tracks with not only the rails but a portion of
the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason
of unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing
against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no
matter what his condition; and to conclude that a sober
man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is
to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
speculation and guesswork.
RULE: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the
mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care.
" Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence
" nconclusive factor
5. Insanity
Art. 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. Even though the former
are nor engaged in any business or industry.
The state is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2182
f the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
US v Baggay
FACTS: n a song service, Baggay suddenly, without
provocation attacked a woman with a bolo on her head ,
from which she died. He likewise inflicted various
wounds on other women with the same bolo, including
his own mother. Since defendant was suffering from
mental aberration, trial court rendered him exempt from
criminal liability but was obligated to indemnify the heirs
of the murdered woman.
HELD: n the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in
spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and
justly liable with his property for the consequences of his
acts, even though performed unwittingly, for the reason
that his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous
results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in
spite of his unfortunate condition. According to law, the
person in the first place liable are those who have the
insane party under their care or guardianship, unless
they prove that there was no blame or negligence on
their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a
guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the
latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the
civil liability.
RULE: Although he may not be held criminally liable, a
lunatic or imbecile is still held civilly liable. The person
in the first pIace IiabIe is those who have the insane
party under their care or guardianship.
" Exemption form criminal liability doesn't mean
exemption from civil liability
B. Degrees of NegIigence
Art. 2231
n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Grossly negligent vs slightly negligent
" degree of danger
" cf. value
" RA 9044 Sec. 6: child 15 & below-incapable of
negligence
" question still to be resolved is the law's effect
on 2180 CC
Amedo v Rio
FACTS: Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped
overboard from his ship into the water to retrieve a 2-
peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea. He
drowned.
HELD: He failed to exercise "even the slightest care and
diligence, that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the
safety of his person, that he could not have been but
conscious of the probable consequences of his
carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to
the danger of his injury. There is more reason to hold
that his death was caused by his notorious negligence.
f while he was working, his bill merely fell from his
pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor something
accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would
surely be entitled to compensation, his act being
obviously innocent. Jumping into the sea, however, is
entirely different, the danger which it entails being clear,
potent and obvious.
RULE: "Notorious negligence has been held to be
tantamount to "gross negIigence, which is want of
even sIight care and diIigence.
- what determines if an act if negligent is the
danger of an act
- the nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger
" What determines if an act if negligent is the
danger of an act.
" The nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger per se.
" Why notorious negligence? Because
compared with other cases, the danger is
apparent and imminent because the shore is
1 miles away from the location of the ship. t
was not a case of the money falling off
someone's pocket to the floor. He is not said
to be a good swimmer but he jumped into the
water as opposed to Cuervo vs. Barretto
wherein the emoloyer ordered him to jump into
the water to protect the property of the
company.
" What determines the grossness of negligence?
The degree of danger and other factors which
would justify the dangerous act.
Marinduque Iron Mines v Workmen's
Compensation
FACTS: Mamador hitched a ride together with other
laborers on a company-owned truck. When the truck
tried to overtake another truck, it collided with a coconut
tree, which resulted in his death. There was a company
prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks.
Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's
"notorious negligence which, under the law, precludes
recovery.
HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule
promulgated by a commission or board is not
negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
Under the circumstances, the laborer could not be
declared to have acted with negligence since the
prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of
riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's
haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because "no
danger or risk was apparent.
RULE: VioIation of a ruIe promuIgated by a
commission or board is not negIigence per se; but it
may be evidence of negligence.
" There's only an alleged prohibition on part of
employer
" Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation
of policy is not necessarily negligence per se
but it may be an evidence of negligence
SANGCO (10-12)
The amount of care demanded by the standard of
reasonable conduct must be proportionate to the
apparent risk.
DEGREES OF NEGLGENCE:
SLGHT NEGLGENCE - an absence of that degree of
vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and
foresight are accustomed to use. (failure to exercise
care)
GROSS NEGLGENCE described as failure to
exercise even that care which a careless person would
use. There is no generally accepted meaning, but the
probability is that it signifies more than ordinary
inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious
indifference to consequences. (extreme departure from
the ordinary standard of care)
WLFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS "quasi-intent,
lying between intent to do harm and the mere
reasonable risk of harm to another. They apply to
conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many
respects as if it were intended (actor has intentionally
done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a
risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probably that harm would follow).
There is often NO CLEAR DSTNCTON between the
above and "gross, and the two have tended to merge
and take on the same meaning as an AGGRAVATED
form of negligence, differing in QUALTY rather than in
DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.
C. Proof of NegIigence
1. Burden of Proof
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND
PRESUMPTIONS
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must
prove his own affirmative allegations. Evidence need not
be given in support of a negative allegation except when
such negative allegation is an essential part of the
statement of the right or title on which the cause of
action or defense is founded, nor even in such case
when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a
document the custody of which belongs to the opposite
party. The burden of proof lies on the party who would
be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases.
Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions.
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. -
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. - The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of his jurisdiction;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed;
ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long
as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. -
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the
spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his allegation.
1. Presumption
Art. 2184
n motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. t is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
f the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Art. 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from
his possession of dangerous weapons or substances,
such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Art. 1734
Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international
or civil;
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Art. 1735
n all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3,
4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
Art 2184 CC
" disputable presumption:
! 2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos:
guilty of reckless driving / violation of
traffic rules
" if the owner is not in the car, does the
disputable presumption apply?
! n/a when the owner is not in the car /
common carrier
" requires conviction
Art 2185 CC
" disputable presumption: violate traffic
regulation
! no conviction required
! however, Sangco says this also
requires conviction
" ** but when is one "found guilty of traffic
violation?
Art 2188
" prima facie presumption
! injury results from possession of
dangerous weapons/ substances,
except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his
occupation/business
Arts 1734 & 1735
" common carriers
" loss, destroyed, deteriorate
" presume negligence common carrier
! UNLESS prove extraordinary
diligence
SANGCO (18-27)
t is NEGLGENCE PER SE when:
1. a professional driver permits any
unlicensed person to drive the car placed
under his responsibility
2. violation of an ordinance prohibiting
pedestrians from crossing a street in
places other than regular cross-walks
3. driving a motor vehicle without a license,
at a high rate of speed and under the
influence of alcohol
Where there is NO local regulation restricting the
pedestrian's rights in the use of a street, a pedestrian
HAS THE RGHT TO TRAVEL upon roads and streets
WHETHER THERE BE SDEWALKS OR NOT, although
he should have due regard for the rights of motor
vehicles and should exercise due care for his own
safety.
Where proof of violation makes:
1. a prima facie case of negligence
2. gives rise to a presumption of lack of
ordinary care
PRESUMPTON S REBUTTABLE
FOUR GENERAL GROUNDS OR EXCUSES FOR
VOLATON OF A STATUTE:
1. anything that would make it impossible to
comply with the statute or ordinance
2. anything over which the defendant has no
control and which places him or an
instrumentality that he is operating in a
position contrary to that required by the
statute or ordinance
3. an emergency not of the actor's own
making which causes him to fail to obey
the enactment
4. conduct which comes within an excuse or
exception provided in the statute
One who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality EXTREMELY DANGEROUS in character
is bound to take EXCEPTONAL precautions to prevent
injury being done thereby.
- The care required is a great or high
degree, or the HGHEST degree of
precaution.
- The presumption DOES NOT APPLY to
those whose occupation or business
REQURES the possession or use of a
firearm, such as peace officers or armed
forces, or in the case of poison, the drug
companies or stores.
WRT to COMMON CARRERS
Common carriers from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy are bound to observe
EXTRAORDNARY DLGENCE in the vigilance over
the goods and safety of passengers transported by them
according to all circumstances of each case.
- The law on averages under the Code of
Commerece cannot be applied in
determining liability where there is
negligence.
N ALL CASES, violation must be the PROXMATE
CAUSE.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitor
Layugan v IAC
FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a
companion were repairing the tire of their parked truck
along the right side of the highway. He sustained
injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate cause
was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install
an early warning device. AC concluded that under the
doctrine, the plaintiff was negligent. The question is
whether the doctrine was applicable.
HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself)
Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have he management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. t is not rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. t can be involved when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. t cannot
be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and
testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of
negligence which is the cause of injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of
want of care of the driver has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not apply.
RULE: Res ipsa can be involed when and onIy when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readiIy avaiIabIe.
" RL made a special defense by sidro to allege
negligence of the truck driver and Layugan.
" AC ruled RL as the basis for holding Layugan
negligent.
" RL N/A because there's direct (clear &
convincing) evidence
" Why? Because the mode of proof only, so
when there's evidence, use evidence / facts so
that judgment will be based on facts and not
presumptions
Ramos v CA
FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation,
went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated.
HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for
itself) the fact of the occurrence of the injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make
out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Requisites are:
1. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence
2. it is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants
3. the possibility of contributing conduct
which would make plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
The fundamental element is "control of instrumentality
which caused the damage. Generally, expert testimony
is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove a physician
has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from
the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is
availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. n cases where the
doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised.
RULE: n cases where the doctrine is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
" RL applicable:
" No expert testimony
" Court adjudicated based on common
knowledge fund
" The foundation of RL is common knowledge
" evidentiary rule: doesn't do away with
presenting evidence
" must prove these elements:
" accident doesn't occur w/o person's negligence
" defendant has exclusive control over the
instrumentality
" no contributory negligence on plaintiff's part
" RL & malpractice suits:
! Gen rule: expert testimony needed
(Cruz v CA)
! Exception: f case can be gleaned
from common knowledge (Ramos v
CA)
" in Cruz, they didn't provide expert testimony
therefore they lost
" in Ramos, can use common knowledge
" medical malpractice
" domain of medical science: expert needed
" RL
" common knowledge: no need for expert
" preparation for procedure
" if there's failure / didn't get the results
expected, RL n/a
" *question: when is a medical malpractice case
common knowledge or in the domain of
medical science?*
" RL is NA in malpractice suits if the only
showing is that the desired result was not
accomplished if the problem is based on
medical science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common
knowledge can be applied, RL applies.
Batiguin v CA
FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation
on a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish.
When the patient submitted herself to another surgery,
she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left and
right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material
was embedded on the right side of the uterus.
HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the
injury is shown to under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the
management used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of
care. All the requisites are present in this case. (1) The
entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin.
(2) The patient underwent no other operation which
could habe caused the offending piece of rubber to
appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could
habe only been a by-product of the caesarian section.

RULE: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the Defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary
care.
" RL applies; all elements present:
! entire C-section under control &
management of doctor
! no other operation after C-section
" although there is no proof directly linking Dr.
Batiquin to the rubber, applying RL, Dr. is
liable
" Theoretical basis for RL: The proof should
come from the defendant (RL is the "bridge
which allows the plaintiff to reach the
defendant).
DM Consunji v CA
Facts: A construction worker fell from the 14
th
floor
when the platform assembly he was standing on fell
down.
HeId: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its
necessity, i.e., that the necessary evidence is not
available. The defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and the plaintiff has no such knowledge.
t furnishes a bridge by which the plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who
knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of
care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter
of which the plaintiff complains. t is a rule of necessity.
RuIe: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its
necessity.
" RL applies
" theoretical basis:
! proof is in exclusive control of
defendant
! bridge that connects plaintiff to the
proof
" Prof. Casis's problem: there's evidence (police
report, testimony & affidavit). t is like saying
that even if there is evidence, one could still
argue RL to win the case.
" Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victim's fault for
falling off the platform.
SANCO (27-32)
RES PSA LOQUTOR the facts or circumstances
attending an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or permit an inference, of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
t relates to the MODE rather than the BURDEN of
establishing negligence.
t is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption
of negligence, but is DESCRPTVE of a class of cases
wherein the initial presumption is overcome by evidence
inherently carrying with it implications of negligence
without the necessity of proof of specific facts or
conduct.
WHEN DOES T APPLY? Upon the satisfaction of 3
conditions:
1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur unless someone is negligent
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured
COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDTON:
4. Plaintiff had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident
F. DEFENSES
1. Plaintiff's negligence
2. Contributory negligence
3. Fortuitous event
4. Assumption of risk
5. Due diligence
6. Damnum absque injuria
7. Prescription
8. Double recovery
1. PIaintiff's NegIigence
Art. 2179, NCC
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Applies only when both parties are negligent.
ManiIa EIectric v RemonquiIIo
FACTS: Magno was repairing the "media agua when
he was electrocuted to death. The galvanized iron
sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric
wire.
HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But
assuming it was Magno's heirs still can't recover
because the proximate cause of the electrocution was
not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent act of
Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without precaution. t is assumed that due to
his age and experience, he was qualified to do the job.
" proximate cause: negligence of repairman in
turning with G sheet
" difference between this & Astudillo v. Manila
Electric Co.:
! Meralco would've had to have been
more careful if public place
" * The son could have sued stepbrother of his
father for building the house so close to the
wire*
Bernardo v Legaspi
FACTS: CF dismissed the complaint filed in an action
to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff's
automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in
causing a collision. Court also dismissed a cross-
complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages
on the ground that the injuries sustained by his
automobile, and those to the plaintiff's car were caused
by plaintiff's own negligence.
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant
were negligent in handling their automobile so both
cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action
by his own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he
cannot recover.
RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and
the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident,
they cannot recover from each other.
BernaI v House
FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street,
with the child a few steps ahead. She got startled by an
automobile and ran back to her mother. She fell into a
ditch with hot water and later died. CF denied damages
to parents because they were negligent.
HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a
right to be on that street. There was nothing abnormal
in letting a child run along a few paces ahead of the
mother. Contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but
could only result in reduction of damages.
" No contributory negligence of mother & kid
" Even if they did have contributory negligence, it
is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates
PLDT v CA
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Esteban's jeep ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system.
HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of
the street but it swerved abruptly, causing the jeep to hit
the mound. Proximate cause was the unexplained and
abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the
jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his
wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages.
NOTES: negligence imputed included knowledge of the
place. The Estebans passed that mound several times.
2. Contributory NegIigence
Art. 2179, NCC
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2214, NCC
n quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in
awarding damages.
Genobiagon v CA
FACTS: Rig driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady
who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was
the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory
negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate
accused. The defense of contributory negligence does
not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
Rakes v A tIantic
FACTS: The truck plaintiff was riding fell because the
track sagged. The rails that they were transporting slid
off the truck and caught his lag. Later, his leg was
amputated. Company said Rakes was negligent
because: (1) he continued his work despite having
noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked
on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of
along the boards.
HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been
working for less than 2 days. He could not have known
that one rail was lower than the other or that the
stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the
second, Court found that there was a general prohibition
against walking by the side of the car. The disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
its primary cause. The Court made a distinction between
the accident and the injury. f the plaintiff's negligence
contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his
negligence only contributed to his injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the
accident should pay fpr the injury, less a sum deemed
an equitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
" accident v. injury
! accident: can't recover
" contrib. to primary event
! injury: may recover
" Defendant's contrib.
Plaintiff's contrib. = Recovery
" 2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the
principal event; (2) contribution to his own
injury
PhiI. Bank of Commerce v CA
FACTS: For over a year, RMC's secretary had been
depositing the company's money to her husband's bank
account, without the company noticing it. RMC sued
PBC to collect the money.
HELD: Court held that the proximate cause was the
negligence of the bank. The bank teller was negligent in
validating the duplicate copy of the deposit slip even if
ccount name was left blank, contrary to the bank's self-
imposed procedure; and PBC was negligent in the
selection and supervision of employees. However, Court
found that RMC was also negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account for more than one year.
This omission by RMC amounts to contributory
negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may
be awarded to it. Therefore: 60 - 40 ratio in damages.
" Both negligent but proximate cause is the teller
allowing the practice of validating incomplete
form
" Solution to proximate cause issue: 60-40
" *Sir has doubts as to the use of the Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance in this case*
3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
" ** s this really a defense? **
" there's only one case cited because in Transpo
course, Court was not always consistent
whether a tire blowout is a fortuitous event or
not
" *how different is a tire blowout from a fire?*
" *memorize elements of Fortuitous Event*
NOTES: Sir said force majeure is not the same as Acts
of God.
JuntiIIa v Funtanar
FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat
of a public utility jeepney when the right tire blew up. He
was thrown out of the jeep and suffered injuries. He
also lost his omega watch.
HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of
negligence on the part of the respondents. Jeep was
running at a very fast speed and was overloaded. n
this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of human will. t was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of the mechanical defects in the tire.
CHARACTERSTCS OF CASO FORTUTO:
1. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation must be independent of human will.
2. t must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is
impossible to avoid.
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner
4. Obligor must be free from participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
" Many possibilities were pposed by the Court to
justify that the tire blowing up was not a
fortuitous event.
" mportant: memorize characteristics of caso
fortuito
Hernandez v COA
FACTS: Hernandez encashed 2 checks salaries of
employees and operating expenses of the project. He
chose to bring the money with him to his house in
Bulacan instead of returning to the office in Cavite. On
his way home, 2 robbers boarded the jeep and took the
money. He ran after them, but was only able to
apprehend one. He filed a request for relief from money
accountability. COA denied the request.
HELD: SC held in favor of Hernandez. The decision he
made seemed logical at that time and one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if,
as it happened, the 2 robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep, while it was on a busy highway, and
in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said
that all this was a result of his imprudence and
negligence. t was a fortuitous event, something that
could not have reasonably be foreseen though it could
have happened, and it did.
NOTES: This case doesn't say that robberies are
fortuitous events. t just said that this particular robbery
was a fortuitous event.
" robbery in this case was FE
! but not all robberies are FE's
" some human acts can be considered FE
" it may be an accident but not really FE
Gotesco Investment v Chato
FACTS: Chato and 15 yo daughter went to see a movie
at the theater owned by Gotesco. Balcony collapsed
and they sustained injuries. Chato even went to llinois
for further treatment. Gotesco's defense: force
majeure.
HELD: (1) Having interposed force majeure as a
defense, Gotesco had the burden to prove that the
collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. This
Gotesco did not do. ts own witness admitted that he
could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed.
(2) Force majeure inevitable accident or casualty;
even which we could neither foresee nor resist; any
accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively
without human intervention, such as could not have
been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care
reasonably to have been expected.
(3) Assuming that the cause was force majeure,
Gotesco could still be held liable because it was guilty of
negligence.
NOTE: Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
" Ong's incompetence is not equal to Act of God
" not necessarily Act of God just because there
are no / unknown explanations
" even assuming that there's FE, Gotesco is still
liable because there's implied warranty in
public places
! still negligent
" Just because you cannot explain it, it does not
necessarily mean that it is fortuitous.
Servando v PhiIippine Steam
FACTS: Plaintiffs loaded their cargo on board
appellant's vessel. Cargoes were discharged unto the
warehouse of Bureau of Customs. A fire of unknown
origin razed the warehouse, destroying the remaining
cargo.
HELD: Court said that where the fortuitous event is the
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, obligor is
exempt from liability for non-performance. Caso fortuito
an event that takes place by accident and could not
have been foreseen. n this case, there was not a shred
of proof that the cause of the fire was in any way
attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its
employees.
NOTE: This case established that fire is a fortuitous
event.
" fire was FE
" *it was taken for granted that a fire is a
fortuitous event (there was no explanation
given why fire was a fortuitous event)*
NationaI Power v CA
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages
against NPC for loss of lives and property caused by the
flooding of Norzagaray, Bulacan. They claimed that
despite knowledge of the impending entry of the
typhoon Kading, NPC failed to exercise due diligence in
monitoring the water level so when the water level went
beyond the maximum allowable limit, NPC suddenly,
negligently and recklessly opened 3 of the dam's
spillways.
HELD: SC did not accept defense of force majeure.
PRNCPLE OF ACT OF GOD strictly requires that the
act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence
of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering inot the cause of the mischief.
When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered,
is found to be in part the result of the participation of
man, whether to be from active intervention or neglect,
or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
humanized.
" the flooding of the Angat River was not FE but
due to the negligence of NPC
" is typhoon a force majeure? No because in this
case there was negligence
" *so is force majeure really a defense then?*
Southeastern CoIIege v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, school's roof was partly
ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of respondent's house. A team of
engineers conducted an ocular inspection and found
that the causes may have been the U-shaped formation
of the building and the improper anchorage of the
trusses to the roof beams.
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted
by the engineers, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the incident. Respondents
did not even show that the plans, specs and design of
the school building were defective. On the other hand,
city building official testified that the school obtained
both building permit and certificate of occupancy; same
official gave go signal for repairs of damage of typhoon
and subsequently authorized the use of the entire 4
th
floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and
repair of the school building was regularly undertaken;
and that no complaints have been lodged in the past.
Therefore, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at
fault regarding the construction and maintenance of the
school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause.
CASO FORTUTO event which takes place by
accident and could not have been reasonably foreseen,
it is an unexpected event or act of God which could
neither be foreseen nor resisted.
2 GENERAL CAUSES:
1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.
2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits,
governmental prohibition, etc.
" typhoon is FE
" flying roof is FE
" typhoon was proximate cause of damage to
neighboring house
" *take this case for definition of force majeur*
" *credibility of ocular inspection discredited so
this is strange because this runs counter to
Gotesco*
" *they could have used RL*
4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AfiaIda v HisoIe
FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao
and he later died as a consequence of his injuries.
Action was predicated on Art 1905 CC.
HELD: Court said A1905 makes possessory user of
animal liable for any damages it may cause. n this
case, the animal was under the control of the caretaker.
t was his business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being
injured by the animal under these circumstances was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
" inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed
by caretaker when he agreed to be caretaker
IIocos Norte v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, sabel went out of her
house to check on her grocer store. She waded in waist-
deep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC
Engr, there were no NELCO linemen who were going
around.
HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioner's claim, the
maxim "violenti non fit injuria does not apply here.
sabel should not be punished for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon
her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the
risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger, he must abide by the consequence, if an
emergency is found to exist, or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
" Rule is the Emergency Rule: A person is
excused from the force of the assumption of
risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
*SANGCO (pp.81-84)
NOTES:
VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to non-
contractual relations;
3 requisites:
(1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
damage;
(2) he understood an appreciated the risk from
danger;
(3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
5. DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos v PEPSI
FACTS: Ramos' car collided with Pepsi truck driven by
Andres Bonifacio.
HELD: SC found Bonifacio negligent, but absolved
Pepsi for having sufficiently proven that it exercised due
diligence in the selection of its driver (background
check, clearance, previous experience, physical exam,
driver's exam- theoretical and practical driving exams).
n order that defendant may be considered as having
exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service. The
presumption of negligence on the part of the master or
employer, either in the selection of servant/ employee or
in their supervision, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant/employee may be rebutted if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
the selection and supervision, he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family.
Metro ManiIa v CA
FACTS: A jeep and a bus collided. Their owners
refused to pay damages to the injured passenger.
HELD: SC held that testimonial evidence of due
diligence, in order to hold sway, must be corroborated
by documentary evidence. Mere formulation of various
company policies on safety (as testified by Christian
Bautista), without showing documentary proof that they
were being followed or complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of
its employees.
NOTES: defense of due diligence is plausible when
defendant has presented enough evidence to overcome
the presumption of negligence. t is not enough that it is
alleged.
(Sir: MMTC said that it was not enough to issue
manuals etc, but implementation or actual enforcement
is more important.)
" it is not enough that the company provides
manuals
" there has to be proof of enforcement and
actual application
6. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
7. PRESCRIPTION
Kramer v CA
FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided
- 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision
was due to M/V Asia's negligence
-1982: Coast Guard suspended 2
nd
mate of M/V Asia.
-1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages
against respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the
basis of prescription.
HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to
Art. 1146, action based on quasi-delict must be
instituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period begins from
the day the quasi-delict was committed.
AIIied Banking v CA
FACTS: Apr 1, 1976 Yujuico obtained loan fr
GenBank payable on or before Apr 1, 1977
- Mar 25, 1977 Monetary Board issued resolution
forbidding GenBank from doing business in Phils.
- Allied acquired all assets and assumed all liabilities of
GenBank
- Feb 7, 1979 Allied filed complaint against resp
Joselita for collection of a sum of money
- 1987 in the course of the proceedings, resp sought
to implead Central Bank and Aurellano as 3
rd
party
defendants. t was alleged that by reason of the tortous
interference by the CB with affairs of GenBank, resp
was prevented from performing his obligation under the
loan.
- RTC denied admission of 3
rd
party complainant.
- Petitioner claims that cause of action has already
prescribed. Since it was founded on tortuous
interference, it prescribes in 4 yrs. Petitioner believes
that the cause of action accrued on Mar 25, 1977, the
date when Monetary Board ordered GenBank to desist
from doing business in the Philippines. Complainant
should have filed before Mar 25, 1981.
- Respondent relies on the Doctrine of Relations or
Relations Bank Doctrine to support his claim that the
cause of action as against the proposed 3
rd
party
defendant accrued only on Dec 12, 1986 when the
decision became final and executory. Thus, it is
contended that while the 3
rd
party complaint was filed
only on Jun 17, 1987, it must be deemed to have been
instituted on Feb 7, 1979, when the complain in the case
was filed.
HELD: Action for damages arising from QD should be
filed within 4 yrs from the day cause of action accrued.
The cause of action in this case accrued on Mar 25,
1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GenBank to
desist fr doing biz in the Phils, while 3
rd
party complaint
was filed only on Jun 17, 1987 the action has
prescribed.
NOTE, MEMORIZE ME (in footnote so not doctrine)!
"ReIations Bank Doctrine" principle of law by which
an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law
to have been done at some antecedent period. t is a
doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well
recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal
fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to
prevent injustice and the occurrence of injuries where
otherwise there would be no remedy.
" Take note of Relations Bank Doctrine
" *Not sure if Relations Bank Doctrine is ratio in
this case*
8. DOUBLE RECOVERY
Art. 2177, NCC
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.
IV. CAUSATION
A. Proximate cause
!C L A S S N O T E S
Usually it's the shorter definition that's being cited in the
other cases. So for our purpose-shorter version
The longer version can be shortened by removing
"sufficient intervening cause
*memorize definition of proximate cause*

1. Definition
BatacIan v Medina
FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at
2am when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which
the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and
turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get out of
the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the
neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
fueled with petroleum. When they approached the bus,
a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4
passengers. t appears that as the bus overturned, the
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it,
and that the lighted torch set it on fire.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that
burned the bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of
the men with the torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.
" Definition #1 of proximate cause according to
Bataclan v. Medina:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.
" Definition #2 of proximate cause according to
Bataclan vs. Medina:
More comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the
injury either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an in jury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Fernando v CA
FACTS: Bertulano was invited to bid for the re-
emptying of a septic tank, which had not been cleaned
for 19 years. Before the award was made (he lost), he
and 4 companions surreptitiously entered the septic
tank, without clearance from the market master. They
died in the septic tank due to the intake of toxic gas
produced from the waste matter therein.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the death of
the victims?
HELD: The proximate cause of the death of the victims
was their failure to take precautionary measures for their
safety. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a
septic tank, especially one which has not been cleaned
for years, an ordinarily prudent person would
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. More so
with Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who
is presumed to know the hazards of the job.
Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of
proximate cause.
" Government negligence was not the proximate
cause because it was not continuing.
" The claimant must establish that he had no
negligence.
" A higher degree of diligence is expected from
an expert.
" Prof. Casis included the case to show that it is
not necessary to attend school to be an expert.
" Quoted Taylor, but it should have been Rakes
Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in
his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who
issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9
days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON the hacking by Urbano of Javier was the
proximate cause of Javier's death. ---NO.
HELD: The tetanus, not the hacking, was the proximate
cause of Javier's death. The death of the victim must be
the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused (People v
Cardenas). Medical findings lead to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of
proximate cause.
Phoenix Construction Inc. v IAC
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked
askew on the right hand side of the street in such a
manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna St., partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30AM,
Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights
allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright and saw the truck looming 2 meters away
from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck.
HELD: The wrongful and negligent parking of the truck,
and not the negligence of Dionisio, was the proximate
cause of the accident.
The truck driver's negligence was far from being a
passive and static condition and was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence. The improper parking of the truck
created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna St. and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held liable.
What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause
was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the
risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck
driver had parked the dump truck.
Quoting Posser and Keeton on "Foreseeable
intervening causes": f the intervening cause is one
which in ordinary human experience is reasonable to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligent xxx because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may e negligent only
for that reason. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence.
Note: Court mentioned foreseeability.
PiIipinas Banking v CA
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks.
To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCB to effect a withdrawal from his savings account
there and have it deposited with his current account with
Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the
wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the
name of Florencio Reyes as the depositor's name. The
Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing
that the account number coincided with the name
Florencio, deposited the amount in the account of
Florencio Amador.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to
Reyes?
HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the
negligence of Pilipinas Bank's employee in erroneously
positing the cash deposit of Reyes in the name of
another depositor who had a similar first name. The
employee should have continuously gone beyond mere
assumption.
Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of
and without which would not have occurred and from
which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result
therefrom as a natural and probable cause.
Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This
case adds the element of foreseeability.
Prof. Casis's opinion: There's no basis for this additional
element. Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a
factor.
*Sir said that there is a problem with foreseeability as an
element. So as a solution, if there's a case similar to
Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition*
Quezon City v Dacara
FACTS: At about 1AM, Dacara, (son of petitioner), while
driving a Toyota Corolla, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings (accident mound) found at
Matahimik St. The lower court found that no evidence
was presented that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed in the said street.
HELD: The negligence of the Quezon City Government
was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise.
Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
Note: Followed Bataclan's definition.
" An admission by the court that proximate
cause is what they think is fair in each case.
2. Distinguished from other kinds
a. Remote
Gabeto v Araneta
FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and lano took a
carromata to go to a cockpit. When the carromata was
about to move, Araneta held the reins of the horse,
saying he hailed the carromata first. Driver Pagnaya
pulled the reins to take it away from Araneta's control,
as a result of which, the bit came off the horse's mouth.
Pagnaya fixed the bridle on the curb. The horse, free
form the control of the bit, moved away, causing the
carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to
crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up
the street with Gayetano still inside the carromata.
Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, causing injuries
from which he soon died.
ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable for Gayetano's death.
---NO.
HELD: Araneta's act of stopping the rig was too remote
from the accident to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. After Pagnaya alighted, the
horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable
interval of time elapsed before the horse started to
career up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and
taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was
the person primarily responsible for the control of the
animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for
the accident resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter.
" Classical description of remote cause with
series of events.
" t is not the counting of the time but the
SERES
Urbano v IAC
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On
ISSUE: WON the hacking was the proximate cause of
Javier's death. ---NO.
HELD: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
Urbano had nothing to do.
Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior
and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened except but for such condition or occasion.
! C L A S S N O T E
" The remote cause was noted to be the wound
of Urbano.
b. Concurrent
Far Eastern Shipping Company v CA
FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron
of the pier. Kavankov was the master of the vessel.
Gavino was the compulsory pilot.
ISSUE: Who was negligent --- Gavino or Kvankov?
---BOTH.
HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov
(master of the vessel) were concurrently negligent.
Gavino was negligent for failing to react on time;
Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking
procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant.
Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. Where several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved
from liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and
is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the whole damage.
Reason: t is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury.
Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.
!C L A S S N O T E
f the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the
degree of participation does not matter.
" What is the rule on liability? liability is
impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury
Sabido v Custodio
FACTS: Custodio, a passenger of a bus, was hanging
onto its left side. While the bus was negotiating a sharp
curve of a bumpy and downward slope, a speeding truck
going in the opposite direction side-swiped Custodio,
who died as a result thereof.
ISSUE: Who was negligent and what is the extent of
liability? ---BOTH solidarily liable.
HELD: The carrier and its driver were negligent for
allowing Custodio to hang by the side of the bus. The
truck driver was also negligent for speeding through the
middle portion of the road.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the
truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are
the proximate cause of Custodio's death.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tortfeasor.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Prof. Casis thinks that this is a problematic
case because the facts would indicate that the
victim was at fault because he was negligent.
3. Tests
a. "But for"
BatacIan v Medina
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Note: talicized phrase=but for test
! C L A S S N O T E
" Refers to absolute cause
" This is the strictest test
b. SubstantiaI Factor
PhiIippine Rabbit Bus Lines v IAC
FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan
when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to
be unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which
made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite
lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane
bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers
of the jeep died as a result.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was
negligent. t applied the substantial factor test: It is a
rule under this test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm to
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable.
ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep.
HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the
application of the substantial factor test. Even though
the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the
speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little
time to react and had no options available: it could not
swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and
had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it
would have it the jeep head-on).
Note: The substantial factor test contains no element of
foreseeability.
! C L A S S N O T E S ()
" Prof. Casis thinks that this case shouId not be
cited for the substantiaI factor test because
the SC did not appIy the test; only the CA
did.
" Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only
cause
" mportant : memorize the test
" *This is the only case that defines substantial
factor test*
" *Also see Pilipinas Bank*
1 SANGCO (pp. 103-114)
Tests of proximate cause
1. Cause in fact
" Traditionally, courts have used the term
proximate cause as descriptive of the actual
"cause in fact relation which must exist
between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's
injury before liability may arise.
" The first step is to determine whether the
defendant's conduct was a factor in causing
plaintiff's damage.
" f the injury as to causes, in fact show that the
defendant's conduct was not a factor in
causing plaintiff's damage, the matter ends
there. But if it shows that his conduct was a
factor in causing such damage then the further
question is whether his conduct played such a
part in causing the damage as would make him
the author of such damage and be liable in the
eyes of the law.
2. Effectiveness of the cause; 'but for' ruIe
" Whether such conduct is a cause without which
the injury would not have taken place (referred
to as the sine qua non rule) or is the efficient
cause which set in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to the injury
" A cause need not be the sole cause of the
injury but it is enough that it should be the
concurrent proximate cause
" t is useful and generally adequate for
determining whether specific conduct actually
caused the harmful result in question but it
cannot be indiscriminately used as an
unqualified measure of the defendant's liability
because an actor's negligence is not a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another if the harm was sustained even if the
actor were negligent.
" The converse of the rule: a negligent act
cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an
accident unless the accident could have been
avoided without such negligent act.
3. SubstantiaI factor test under Restatement
" Question to ask: Was the defendant's conduct
a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's
injuries?
" The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause
of harm to another if:
a) his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm
b) there is no law relieving the actor of
liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in
the harm
" t is preferable to use the 'but for' test in
connection with the substantial factor test since
the former is the adverse of the restatement
formulation.
" The Restatement adopts the rule that if the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm to another, the fact
that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner
in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable.
4. ForeseeabiIity test
" Negligence involves a foreseeable risk, a
threatened danger or injury and conduct
unreasonable in proportion to danger.
" Foreseeability becomes a test in an effort to
limit liability to a consequence which has a
reasonably close connection with the
defendant's conduct and the harm which it
originally threatened.
" When the result complained of is not
reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of
ordinary care under all the facts as they
existed, an essential element of actionable
negligence is lacking.
" The foreseeability test is applied in conjunction
with the natural and probable consequences
test.
5. NaturaI and probabIe consequence test
" This test is designed to limit the liability of a
negligent actor by holding him responsible only
for injuries which are the probable
consequences of his conduct as distinguished
from consequences that are merely possible.
For this purpose, the term "probable is used in
the sense of "foreseeable.
" An injury is deemed the natural and probable
result of a negligent act if after the event, and
viewing the event in retrospect to the act, the
injury appears to be the reasonable rather than
the extraordinary consequence of the wrong, or
such as, according to common experience and
the usual course of events, might reasonably
have been anticipated.
" The consequence of the negligent act must be
within the range of probability as viewed by the
ordinary man.
" The natural and probable consequences have
been said to be those which human foresight
can anticipate because they happen so
frequently they may be expected to recur.
6. Ordinary and naturaI or direct consequences
" This test states that, as a matter of legal policy,
if negligence is a cause in fact of the injury
under the criteria previously discussed, the
liability of the wrongdoer extends to all the
injurious consequences.
" This is based on the principle that in tort, the
wrongdoer is liable for all the consequences
which naturally flow from his wrongful act,
provided only that they are not too remote, and
that as far as proximate cause is concerned,
the question is not whether the damage was
foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where it in
fact resulted as a direct consequence of the
defendant's act.
7. Hindsight test
" The hindsight test eliminates foreseeability as
an element.
" A party guilty of negligence or omission of duty
is responsible for all the consequences which a
prudent and experienced party, fully
acquainted with all the circumstances which in
fact exist, whether they could have been
ascertained by reasonable diligence, or not,
would have thought at the time of the negligent
act as reasonably possible to follow, if they had
been suggested to his mind.
8. Orbit of the risk test
" This was intended to be a test of duty and not a
test of proximate cause.
" f the foreseeable risk to plaintiff created a duty
which the defendant breached, liability is
imposed for any resulting injury within the orbit
or scope of such injury, it is not the unusual
nature of the of the act resulting in injury to
plaintiff that is the test of foreseeability but
whether the result of the act is within the ambit
of the hazards covered by the duty imposed
upon the defendant.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Prof. Casis thinks that the 8 tests mentioned in
Sangco are not practical and relevant because
they are all similarly described and the courts
never use them.
c. Cause and Condition
Phoenix v CA
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked
askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a
manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna Street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30
am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car
headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright and saw the truck looming 2
meters away from his car. His car smashed into the
dump truck.
HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition
have already been almost entirely discredited.
Posser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active
forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone
before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the "condition remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
" The cause is the active aspect whereas the
condition is the passive action that may
produce the injury.
" t is difficult to distinguish between a cause
and a condition because of the time element.
A condition was a cause at some point in
time.
" t cannot be cited in saying that cause and
condition are no longer applicable in our
jurisdiction because it only said that it is
discredited.
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below
Pealoza's 3-storey house. n the course of the repair,
the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into
contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila
Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The
distance from the electric wire to the media agua was
only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of
Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the
accident?
HELD: The cause was Magno's own negligence. The
condition was the too close proximity of the media agua,
or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company
by reason of the violation of the original permit given by
the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of media agua.
Rodrigueza v ManiIa RaiIroad
FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were
burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of
sparks from its smokestack. Rodrigueza's house was
partly within the property of the Manila Railroad.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad's negligence was the
proximate cause of the fire
HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodrigueza's house was
partly on the defendant's property is an antecedent
condition that may have made the fire possible but
cannot be imputed as contributory negligence because:
(1) that condition was not created by himself; (2) his
house remained on this ground by the tolerance, and
thus consent of the train company; (3) even supposing
the house to be improperly there, this fact would not
justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
Rodrigueza's house was built on the same spot before
the defendant laid its tracks over the land.
Note: Condition = plaintiff's house was partly within the
defendant's property. Cause = the sparks on the train
which was the negligent act of the defendant.
" Rodrigueza was not guilty of contributory
negligence
" Even if condition was created, the company is
not going to be justified in negligently
destroying the house
4. Efficient Intervening cause
" The efficient intervening cause destroys the
link between the negligent act and injury. t
should occur after the purported proximate
cause because it would then be a condition.
" Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by
the negligence of the plaintiff.
" The efficient intervening cause is actually a
proximate cause.
" Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by
the Court, any violation of administrative
ordinances and the like would either be seen
as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie
evidence of negligence.
" t is not an efficient intervening cause when it is
already in existence during the happening of
the proximate cause.
McKee v IAC
FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling
in opposite directions. When the car was 10 meters
away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the
car's lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the
left and entered the truck's lane. He then switched on
the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his
lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause
YES.
HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car
driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence
of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
t was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing
to take the proper measure and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision, which was the
proximate cause of the tragedy.
BatacIan v Medina
FACTS: A bus was speeding on its way to Pasay City at
2AM when one of its front tires burst, as a result of
which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch,
and turned turtle. Four passengers were unable to get
out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in
the neighborhood. At 2:30AM, 10 men came, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a
wick fueled in petroleum. When they approached the
bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4
passengers. t appears that as the bus overturned, the
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it,
and that the lighted torch set it on fire.
NO.
HELD: The coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of passengers and the call for
outside help.
t may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say,
by lightning, or if some highway men after looting the
vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause
of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle.
" The Court did not agree with the theory of the
defense that it was the bringing of the torch
which was the proximate cause as it was an
act of rescue and hence cannot be considered
as negligence
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below
Penaloza's 3-story house. n the course of the repair,
the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into
contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila
Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The
distance from the electric wire to the media agua was
only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of
Manila requiring 3 feet.
YES.
HELD: Efficient intervening cause: the negligent and
reckless act of MAgno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the
latter's length of 6 feet.
" The C here was the "turning
" What could have been the C now becomes the
remote cause
Teague v Fernandez
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture
had only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance
requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store
and the students panicked and caused a stampede.
Four students died.
ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening
cause NO.
HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended
to prevent. n the present case, the violation was a
continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure
of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of
undue crowding in case of evacuation.
Note: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought
about by the violation. However, the court did not
specifically identify the violation itself as the PC.
" Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which
the statute violated tended to prevent, the
violation of the statute can be considered
negligence per se and is the proximate cause.
But this is only of limited application and is not
yet settled.
" Effects of violation of statute is not settled. t
can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie
proof of negligence, c) rebuttable proof of
negligence, d) proof of negligence
" *Limited application because it's municipal
ordinance. Can you apply this if what is
involved is a national statute?- You might be
able to use argument by analogy*
Urbano v IAC
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON
ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause
YES.
HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show
that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an
effacing intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of death.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Was there expert testimony here or did they
use RL?-no discussion in the case
4. Last CIear Chance
" Take note of the definition of last clear chance
in all the cases.
Picart v Smith
*Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance:
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of
the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane
and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane.
Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane
quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became
frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of
the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against
Smith
RATIO: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT
contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the
negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. th saw
the pony when he was still far and he had control of the
situation. was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by
bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to
avoid the collision. t take into consideration the
NATURE OF HORSES and the ANMAL NOT BENG
ACQUANTED TO CARS. ligence of Smith: when it
exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of
Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the
accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a
more remote factor
-AppIied the LCCD and made the defendant IiabIe
! C L A S S N O T E
" mportant: there should be a sequence of
events
Bustamante v CA
- Practical importance of LCCD
The negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has
been grossly negligent in placing himself in
peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or
should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact had an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to
avoid an accident
FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the
bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. Bus saw that the
truck's wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading
towards his lane. Still, bus driver did not mind and
instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed
and injured. Victims' heirs filed this case to claim
damages from bus and truck
RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The practical
import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant
shall be liable to negligent plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD
does not arise where the passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into
the field of joint tortfeasors as a test whether one of
them should be liable to the injured person. So, the
doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a
suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by
the heirs of the deceased passengers against both
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles
- did not appIy LCCD
! C L A S S N O T E S ()
" Last clear chance contemplates a series of
negligent acts.
" The definition of last clear chance in the case
of Bustamante is deemed to be the common
definition (from the point of view of recovery of
plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a
rule.
" The doctrine of last clear chance would apply
even if the plaintiff is grossly negligent.
Exceptions, however, include joint tortfeasors
(according to Americn Jurisprudence).
" Last clear chance cannot apply when there are:
1) contractual relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3)
concurrent negligence
Phoenix Construction v IAC
- basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of
the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179.
However, the statements made on the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine were mereIy obiter
FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails
and dinner-meeting when he collided with the dumptruck
of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the
road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against
Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of
avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to
take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries
alone
RATIO: The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the
Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by
Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by
Common Law because they had a rule that contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent
plaintiff. BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of
the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine
of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case
stated that it does not believe so that the general
concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our
jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is
not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is
important is the negligent act or omission of each party
and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community. To
say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would
come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a
man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of
his own negligent act or omission.
-LCCD was not appIied because the court thinks
that it is not appIicabIe in our jurisdiction
" The issue on the element of foreseeability:
There is no general concept of last clear
chance. Rather, what is more important is the
nature, not the order of events. n last clear
chance, timing is of the essence.
" n the case at hand, the truck driver's parking
askew led to an increased diligence for the
driver of the car. # court should allocate risks
(policy of consideration)
" Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate
harshness of doctrine of contributory
negligence
" Nature of negligent act should determine
liability, not sequence of events
" Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand?
Yes, because it was still used in later cases
" Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in
time
PhiIippine Bank of Commerce v CA
- apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or
negligence is difficult to attribute
FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of
RMC was tasked to deposit its money. However, it
turns out that the Secretary would leave blank the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the bank's teller
would validate it. nstead of writing the account number
of the company in the original copy retained by the
bank, Secretary would write the account number of
husband. Thus, RMC's funds were now in Secretary's
husband's account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers
and then filed a case against PBC to return its money
RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller,
validated a blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip.
PBC was also lackadaisical in its selection and
supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank
deposit slips were validated until this incident . Court
also applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that
PBC was really negligent.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Aka supervening negligence or discovered
peril
Where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequence thereof
The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self-imposed validation procedure. Still, court said
that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on
contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the
damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC
-appIied LCCD in knowing whether PBC was
negIigent
" Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable
time bet. 2 negligent acts and it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused
injury
" Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent
negligence
GIan PeopIe's Lumber & Hardware v IAC
- may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last
Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix
FACTS
jeep and cargo truck collided
jeepney driver came from a beach party
jeep was zigzagging
cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line
in the road was wrongly painted
case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died
as a result of the collision
RATIO:
- The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be
held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance also cannot apply because there is no
negligence of the other party
- Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the
doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him
from any actionable responsibility for the accident
because both drivers had full view of each other's
vehicle.
The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by
this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved
Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident
t was the jeep's driver who had the duty to seize the
opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve
and leave him a clear path
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid
and complete defense to accident liability today as it
did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of
Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts
- Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate
truck driver
- did not appIy the doctrine of Iast cIear chance
because the other party was not negIigent
" How did the case of Glan People's Lumber
affect the case of Phoeix? n the case of Glan,
last clear chance was deemed to be a valid
defense.
Pantranco North express Inc v Baesa
- awareness and opportunity
FACTS:
Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when
Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepney's lane
Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this
case against Pantranco
Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying
that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in
avoiding the collision.
RATIO:
- Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for
the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff
who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat
claim for damages
- Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to
escape liability
- However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied in this case!
- For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedlty had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it
n this case, jeepney driver did not know of the
impending danger because he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite
direction
- Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered
n this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at
the speed of the approaching bus prevented
jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision
Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it
- Sole and proximate cause of the accident:
Pantranco's driver in encroaching into the lane of the
incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its
own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney
coming from the opposite direction
- did not appIy LCCD because there was no
opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney
driver was not aware of the periI.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Do not apply last clear chance under the
emergency rule
" mportant: memorize emergency rule
Ong v MetropoIitan Water District
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied in this
case because there was no negligence on the part of
the Metropolitan Water District
FACTS
Kid drowned in one of the pools of Metropolitan Water
District
Reason why the kid drowned is unknown
Employees of the Metropolitan Water District acted as
soon as calls for help were heard and tried to revive
the kid but he still died
Case filed by parents of kid who drowned claiming
damages against Metropolitan Water District
Parents of kid claim that Metropolitan Water District
may still be held liable for the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance because it had the last opportunity to save
the kid
RATIO:
There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan
Water District had taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patron or prevent
accidents which may cause their deaths
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: negligence of a
claimant does not preclude recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence
The Last Clear Chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril
is or should have been discovered.
n this case, it was unknown how the kid got into the
pool and whether the kid violated one of the
regulations of Metropolitan Water District because he
went unaccompanied. t also appears that the
lifeguard responded to the call for held and
immediately made all efforts to resuscitate the kid
There is no room in this case for the application of the
doctrine!
LCCD not appIied because no negIigence on the
part of MetropoIitan Water District was proven
Anuran v B uno
FACTS:
A passenger jeepney was parked at the side of the
road since one of the passengers alighted
A motor truck, speeding, then bumped into the
jeepney from behind with such violence that 3
passengers died
Thus, this case was filed by the heirs of the deceased
and of the injured to recover damages from the driver
and owner of the truck and the owner of the jeepney
CA: applied the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance and
held that only the truck was liable because although
the jeepney was guilty of antecedent negligence, the
truck was guilty of greater negligence which was the
efficient cause of the collision
RATIO:
Disagreed with the CA and held that both the truck
and jeepney were liable
The principle of Last Clear Chance would call for the
application in a suit between the owners and drivers
of the 2 colliding vehicles. t does NOT arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence
- did not appIy LCCD because there was a
contractuaI obIigation on the part of the carrier to
transport its passengers safeIy
CanIas v CA
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine can apply in commercial
transactions
FACTS:
2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to
Manosca
Manosca issued 2 check that bounced
Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings
Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security
2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the
spouses Canlas
mortgage was foreclosed
Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the
mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their
consent
Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of
real estate mortgage against ASB
RATIO:
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify
the identity of the sps Canlas
The Bank should have required additional proof of the
true identity of the impostor aside from their residence
certificate
Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which
states that:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciable later in a point of time that
that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about
the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom
n this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent
fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with
the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of
the persons transacting with them
For not observing the degree of diligence required of
banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued
upon
-appIied the LCCD
" The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their
title to the property to Maosca.
" With regard to the special power of attorney:
the SPA given to Maosca was to mortgage so
the presence of the Canlas sps. was actually
not a requirement.
" Was there really negligence on the part of the
bank even if Manosca had an SPA and the
land title?
" n Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitions-
short and long: take note of these
ConsoIidated Bank & Trust Corporation v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in
culpa contractual
FACTS:
LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank.
After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took
so long so he had to leave the passbook
Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody
else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz)
and was able to withdraw P300,000.00 from its
account.
Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum
of money against Solidbank
CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the
last clear chance to avoid the injury if it had only
called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal
RATIO:
n this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract
due to negligence or culpa contractual
The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
However, in this case, they failed to do this.
Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only
to the depositor or his authorized representative, but
here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone else
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return
the passbook only to the authorized representative of
LC Diaz
Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the
passbook to messenger of LC Diaz # proximate
cause
CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance.
Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case
because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due
to negligence in the performance of contractual
obligation to LC Diaz
This case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by
the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of
damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the
defendant from his breach of contract
# LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to
fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of
Solidbank should be reduced.40-60
- LCCD not appIied
! C L A S S N O T E
" mplied that the last clear chance doctrine is
not applicable to culpa contractual
Engada v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead
applied the emergency rule.
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because
there was no clear chance emergency situation.
FACTS
ran driving a tamaraw jeepney
n the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was
speeding.
Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left
and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney
Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the suzu pick-up but
suzu pick-ip swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was
going and so they collided
nformation was then filed against the driver of the
suzu pick-up charging him with serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence
RATIO:
t was the suzu pick-up truck's negligence that was
the proximate cause of the collision
- suzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it
that the opposite lane was free from on-coming
traffic and was available for safe passage.
- After seeing the tamaraw, suzu did not slow down
ran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he
swerved to the lane of suzu to the lane of suzu to
avoid collision
suzu driver's acts had put tamaraw driver in an
emergency situation which forced him to act quickly
EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, it not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence
Defense of suzu: invoked Last Clear Chance
Doctrine
SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident
- However, no convincing evidence was adduced to
support this defense
- Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be applied
because there was no time or opportunity to ponder
the situation at all. There was no clear chance to
speak of
Thus, driver of suzu guilty!
- did not appIy LCCD because no cIear chance
1 Sangco, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last CIear Chance
" Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril,
doctrine of supervening negligence, humanitarian
doctrine, doctrine of gross negligence
" The negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.
" A negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an
accident.
1. As a phase of proximate cause principIe
" The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an
essential element of the defense of contributory
negligence by rendering plaintiff's negligence a
mere condition or remote cause of the accident.
" The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying
a position of peril may be a supervening cause.
2. EIements and conditions of doctrine
" Facts required:
! That the plaintiff was in a position of
danger and by his own negligence became
unable to escape from such position by the use
of ordinary care, either because it became
physically impossible for him to do so or
because he was totally unaware of the danger.
! The defendant knew that the plaintiff
was in a position of danger and further knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
known that the plaintiff was unable to escape
therefrom
! That thereafter the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the accident by the
exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise
such last clear chance and the accident
occurred as a proximate result of such failure
" To state a cause of action, the pleader must
disclose:
! The exposed condition brought about
by the negligence of plaintiff or the injured party
! The actual discovery by the defendant
of the perilous situation of the person or
property injured in time to avert injury
! Defendant's failure thereafter to
exercise ordinary care to avert the injury
3. Parties who invoke doctrine
" Many courts take the view that the doctrine of
last clear chance is not available to defendant.
LCC can only be invoked in favor of the person
injured, since it implies contributory negligence on
his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative
in those cases where, notwithstanding the injured
person's want of care, another person wantonly, or
with knowledge of the perilous situation of the
person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him.
" The doctrine embraces successive acts of
negligence: primary negligence on the part of the
defendant then contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff which creates a situation of
inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive
or static followed by the subsequent negligence of
the defendant in failing to avoid injury to the plaintiff.
" Although the defendant may not invoke the
doctrine, it does not preclude him from proving that
the plaintiff had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury complained of and thus establish that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused the accident and consequently
bars plaintiff's recovery.
" Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot
be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a
test of whether only one of them should be held
liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latter's peril and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants concurrently
negligent.
" LCC applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of colliding vehicles. t does not arise where
a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations.
Summary on Last CIear Chance
- The Last Clear Chance Doctrine
renders plaintiff's contributory negligence as a mere
condition
- nvoked by the plaintiff
- Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors
Case PIaintiff WON
appIied
the
LCCD
Why?
Picart vs.
Smith
Picart (one
of the parties
who caused
the collision)
YES Smith had a
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
Bustamante Passengers NO No
Picart v
Smith
Picart (one
of the
parties who
caused the
collision)
Yes Smith had
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
Bustamante v
CA
Passengers
of the bus
No No negligent
plaintiff
because the
plaintiff in
the case are
the
passengers
of the bus
who are
asking for
damages
Phoenix v
AC
Phoenix
(one of the
parties who
caused the
collision)
No Doctrine
was not
carried over
to the CC
Philippine
Bank of
Commerce v
CA
RMC (one of
the parties
who caused
the accident)
Yes Just to know
if PBC was
negligent
but
damages
were divided
40-60
Glan v AC Heirs of the
driver of the
jeep (one of
the parties
who caused
the collision)
No Truck driver
(other party
in the
collision)
was not
negligent
Pantranco v
Baesa
Heirs of the
passengers
of jeepney
(no contract)
No There was
no
opportunity
to avoid the
accident and
driver was
not aware of
the peril
Ong v
Metropolitan
Parents of
the
deceased
No Defendant
was not
negligent
Anuran v
Buno
Heirs of the
passengers
of jeep (with
contract)
No There was
contractual
relation
Canlas v CA Canals (one
of the
parties who
caused the
incident)
for the
annulment
of the deed
Yes Defendant
bank had
the last clear
chance to
prevent the
fraud
Note: there
was no
contractual
relation
between
Canlas and
the bank
Consolidated
Bank v CA
LC Diaz
for the
recovery of
the sum of
money
No Liability of
bank arose
from culpa
contractual
and so
doctrine
cannot be
applied
Engada v CA nured party
(owner of
the
Tamaraw)
No There was
no clear
chance in
avoiding the
accident
because it
was an
emergency
situation
" According to Sangco, the last clear chance
doctrine is a phase of contributory negligence.
t is considered in determining proximate cause
and should only apply when there is a time
sequence.
" Other names: doctrine of discovered peril,
doctrine of supervening negligence, doctrine of
gross negligence, humanitarian doctrine.
" Last clear chance doctrine considered to
determine the proximate cause.
" Last clear chance doctrine should not apply
when there is a time sequence.
" The elements of the doctrine of last clear
chance:
a) the plaintiff is in danger
b) the defendant knew of plaintiff's state
c) the defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident
Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiff's benefit
V. STRICT LIABILITY
BIack's Law Dictionary definition:
Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent
to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute
duty to make something safe. t most often applies
either to ultra hazardous activities or in product liability
cases. t is also known as "absolute liability or "liability
without fault.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Test: when the conditions provided in the law
exist, you are already liable
A. Possessor of animaIs
Art. 2183, NCC
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
VestiI v IAC
FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of
Vestil's father, when the victim was playing with Vestil's
child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs
old, was brought to the hospital and was later
discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for
exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva.
The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia.
-Uys sued Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy.
Vestils claimed that they don't own the dog, that it was a
tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it
bit her.
HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. t is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service
must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate,
there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question.
- t does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have
done to the animal.
" Remote control argument does not lie. This is a
strict liability case.
" Does it matter if the dog is tame? No. Law
covers even tame animals as long as they
produce injury
" Dog follows the house: accessory follows the
principal (so would a rat living in the house
make the house owners liable if the rat bites a
guest and causes the latter's death?)
B. Things thrown or faIIing from a buiIding
Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or
a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same.
" This provision applies regardless of
how things fell from the house.
Dingcong v Kanaan
FACTS:
-The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central
Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the ground floor of house
where they established the "American Bazaar.
Echeverria rented room in the hotel.
-One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open
when retiring to bed, causing the water to run off and
spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise
of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor.
Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria
and Dingcongs.
HELD:
-Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by
his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the
water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and
merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel,
with complete possession of the house, must also be
responsible for the damages caused. He failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent these damages, despite his power and authority
to cause the repair of the pipes.
! C L A S S N O T E
" s A2193,CC applicable in this case? Prof.
Casis seems to believe otherwise since A2193
speaks of the liability of a head of family when
a structure or similar object falls off the balcony
or second storey of his building. Dingcong is
not the head of a family.
" Can water be considered as a thing thrown or
falling?
C. Death/Injuries in the course of empIoyment
Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers
are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or
injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees, even though the event may have been
purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if
the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. The employer is also liable
for compensation if the employee contracts any illness
or disease caused by such employment or as the result
of the nature of the employment. f the mishap was due
to the employee's own notorious negligence, or
voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be
liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of
due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
" Who is liable? Employers, owners of
establishment
" Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees
" Under what conditions? Death or illness arising
out of the course of employment
Art. 1712 f the death or injury is due to the negligence
of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be
solidarily liable for compensation. f a fellow worker's
intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death
or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's
fellow worker.
AfabIe v Singer Sewing Machine
FACTS:
-One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a
collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, while
riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At
the time of his death he was returning home after
making some collections.
-The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an
action to recover from the defendant corporation under
Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812. The
complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought
to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428.
RATIO:
-The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to "arising out of and in the course of".
-The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of
the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. By
the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment, but only for such
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar
to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to
some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed
in a special degree by reason of such employment.
Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally
exposed and not traceable in some special degree to
the particular employment are excluded.
-As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover
from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise
out of and in the course of his employment.
-f the deceased saw fit to change his residence from
San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a
bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk,
as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle
or require him to use one; and if he made collections on
Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his
employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury
sustained by him.
! C L A S S N O T E
" Defenses available to an employer: a)
notorious negligence, b) voluntary act of the
employee and c) drunkenness.
" Case distinguishes "arising out of and "in the
course of. The first refers to the origin or
cause of the accident. The latter refers to the
time, place, and circumstances under which
the accident takes place.
D. Product IiabiIity
Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for
death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful
substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.
" Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors
of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles
" Under what circumstances? Death or injuries
caused by noxious or harmful substances
" Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed
goods (even if goods were stolen)
Consumer Act
Art. 97. LiabiIity for the Defective Products. - Any
Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any
importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of
fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects
resulting from design, manufacture, construction,
assembly and erection, formulas and handling and
making up, presentation or packing of their products, as
well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on
the use and hazards thereof.

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety
rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances
into consideration, including but not limited to:
(a) presentation of product;
(b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
(c) the time it was put into circulation.
A product is not considered defective because another
better quality product has been placed in the market.

The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall
not be held liable when it evidences:
(a) that it did not place the product on the market;
(b) that although it did place the product on the
market such product has no defect;
(c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at
fault.
Art. 99. LiabiIity for Defective Services. - The service
supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for
damages caused to consumers by defects relating to
the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient
or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards
thereof.

The service is defective when it does not provide the
safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking
the relevant circumstances into consideration, including
but not limited to:
(a) the manner in which it is provided;
(b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be
expected of it;
(c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because of the use
or introduction of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable
when it is proven:
(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
Art. 106. Prohibition in ContractuaI StipuIation.
The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing,
exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for
damages effected, as provided for in this and in the
preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more
than one person responsible for the cause of the
damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress
established in the pertinent provisions of this Act.
However, if the damage is caused by a component or
part incorporated in the product or service, its
manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who
incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.
Art. 107. PenaIties.
Any person who shall violate any provision of this
Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with
respect to any consumer product which is not food,
cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction,
be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one
(1) year or both upon the discretion of the court.
n case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed
upon its president, manager or head. f the offender is
an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of
sentence, be deported without further deportation
proceedings.
CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and PenaIties (RA3720
- Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)
Sec. 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are
hereby prohibited:
(a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of
any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or
misbranded.
(b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic.
(c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as
authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow
samples to be collected.
(d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to
in Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or
undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon
a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by,
and containing the name and address of, the person
residing in the Philippines from whom he received in
good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the
giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section
twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false.
(e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely
representing or without proper authority using any mark,
stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized
or required by regulations promulgated under the
provisions of this Act.
( f ) The using by any person to his own advantage, or
revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or
employees of the Department or to the courts when
relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any
information acquired under authority of Section nine, or
concerning any method or process which as a trade
secret is entitled to protection.
(g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration,
or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or
the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug,
device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article
is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results
in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
(h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any
advertising relating to such drug, of any representation
or suggestion that an application with respect to such
drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or
that such drug complies with the provisions of such
section.
(i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales
promotion of any reference to any report or analysis
furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.
" s a restaurant owner a seller or a processor?
" Could the company stipulate limited liability?
No. A106 of the Consumer Act. f basis is not
Consumer Act, you can use 2187 on strict
liability which is a powerful provision except
against sellers (law on SALES will be the basis
in this case)
" Elements of 2187: 1) causal link 2)
manufacturers, processors
" What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangco-
consumed by humans. Question: What about
those consumed by animals?
" Do you apply strict liability even if defendant
exercised due diligence? Yes. Precisely why it
is called strict liability
Coca-CoIa v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school
canteen. A group of parents complained that fibrous
materials were found in the softdrink bottles bought by
their children. Upon inspection by the DOH, the bottles
were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo
drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop.
She brought an action for damages against Coca-cola
and the trial court ruled that the complaint was based on
a contract, not quasi-delict and should have been filed
within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks.
Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict
and should prescribe in 4 years.
HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendee's
remedies against a vendor with respect to the
warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of
the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case
the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
" Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused
by noxious substance and 2) by manufacturer
or processor
" What is "similar goods? Anything intended to
be consumed by humans.
" What if the person who consumed the goods
did not buy them but stole them? The
manufacturer/processor may still be held liable.
II SANGCO (p. 714-734)
Product LiabiIity
1. Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC
The elimination in this article of both fault or
negligence and contract as the basis of liability
thereunder are the essence of strict liability. The
consumer's cause of action does not depend upon
the validity of his contract with the person from
whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected
by any disclaimer or other agreement.
However, Art. 2187 does not preclude an
action based on negligence for the same act of
using noxious or harmful substance in the
manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks,
toilet articles, or similar goods which caused the
death or injury complained of, if the injured party
opts to recover on that theory. Neither does this
article preclude an action for breach of contract and
warranty.
2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code
(1) Defendant is a manufacturer or processor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods;
(2) He use noxious or harmful substances in the
manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks,
toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff;
(3) Plaintiff's death or injury was caused by the product
so consumed or used; and
(4) The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff
and the amount thereof.
The burden of proof that the product was in a
defective condition at the time it left the hands of
the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the
injured pIaintiff.
3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what
products
Manufacturers and processors who used
noxious or harmful substances may be held liable.
-seIIers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be
injuriously defective CANNOT be held liable for the
obvious reason that they have nothing to do either with
the defect or with the manufacture of such product
Products: limited to "foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods
4. Proof that food product was defective or
unwholesome
The one seeking to recover is under the duty of
proving with reasonable certainty that the food
eaten was in fact deleterious.
Proof of a defect in the product may not be
supplied by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless
the product is one whose character and content
must necessarily have remained unchanged since it
left the manufacturer's possession.
Expert testimony is generally necessary to
prove the defect in the product.
t must appear that the unwholesome or
unsound quality of the food product in question
existed at the time the defendant sold it, and did not
come into existence thereafter.
5. Proof of causation
One seeking recovery has the burden of proof
that the resulting illness was caused by the
deleterious food.
A manufacturer's strict liability in tort should be
defined in terms of the safety of the product "in
normal and proper use. The plaintiff must allege
and prove that he was using the product in the way
it was intended to be used.
6. Who may recover
A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer
or user of a defective food product or toilet article is
entitled to recover damages for physical injuries
caused thereby.
7. Compensable Damages
Expressly limited to "death or injuries caused
by any noxious or harmful substance used by
"manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods.
Applicable only to personal injuries, which
includes death, and only damages arising
therefrom. This precludes claims for purely
pecuniary or commercial losses in absence of
personal injuries.
8. Unavoidably unsafe product
The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with
qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with apparently reasonable risk.
LiabiIity for negIigence in food products.
To constitute negligence an act must be one
from which a reasonably careful person would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him to forego the act or to
do it in a more careful manner.
Whether recovery is sought under strict liability
or on fault or negligence, it would seem
contributory negligence would diminish
recovery.
a. Duty of care of manufacturer or processor of
food.
The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of
food products intended for human consumption is
commensurate with the danger and the possible and
probable result of a lack of care.
A high degree of care is required of the producer of
foods (in the production of such product, advertising,
inspecting the ingredients and warning the consumers of
possible injury from consumption of a food).
b. Duty of care of restaurant operator
A restaurateur has no duty to serve "perfect products.
But the law of negligence requires him to exercise a
care proportionate to the serious consequences that
may follow from a want of care.
c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator.
A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to
the purchaser for his immediate use is bound to know
the peril that the provisions are sound and wholesome
and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to be
unsound and not wholesome, and the purchaser is
injured thereby, the vendor is liable to him.
d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing.
A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual
or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has
a duty to give warning of such danger. As a matter of
elementary logic, no duty to warn arises with respect to
a product which is not in fact dangerous.
The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against
latent defects contained in the product which the
vendee, by inspection or taste, could not have
discovered himself.
The test of commodities required is no more than that
commonly or usually practised by careful dealers under
the same conditions and circumstances, which is at
least as high a duty of care as the consumer expects or
has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer.
Note:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition and subsequent mishandling or other
causes makes it harmful by the time it is consumed.
" mportant: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco
" f it falls under A2187, can you still sue for
breach of contract? Sangco says, yes.
E. Interference with contractuaI reIations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the
other contracting party.
GiIchrist v Cuddy
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film "Zigomar.
Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in loilo. They
entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to
Gilchrist the "Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a
week for P125.
-Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the
money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the
film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350
for the film for the same period.
-Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the
parties
HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for
interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This
liability arises from unlawful acts and not from
contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
-ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage
done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order
that the injured party may recover for the damages
suffered.
" Had legal liability but not under A1314.
" s malice required to apply A1314?
" No damages were due from Espejo because
no malice was proven (the motive was only to
make profit).
" s malice an element of tortuous interference?
Court does not say that it is.
So Ping Bun v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease
agreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo.
The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued
on month to month basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek
Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua
formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong
as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were
occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the
original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name
Trendsetter Marketing.
-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to
THE, although not signed.
-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the
stalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUT
instead, SO PNG BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE
AGEEMENT WTH DC CHUAN.
ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous
interference of contract
HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned
with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of
action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other
of his private property. n the case at bar, petitioner,
Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latter's property right.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the
invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the
general negligence rules.
- elements of tort interference:
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its
existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal
justification or excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek
Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in
asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted
solely for the purpose of furthering his own
financial or economic interest. t stated that it is
sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives to
conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing
on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or
malice on the part of So. Hence the Iack of maIice
precIudes the award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314.
" Did not include malice as one of the
elements under A1314. Then discussed
Gilchrist in saying that to award damages,
there should be malice but it was never
mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place.
" mplied malice as an element.
" De Leon included malice as an element.
" Sir said as guidance: f we apply Gilchrist
and So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314.
But if question is just on the elements, just
answer the three elements given by So
Ping Bun.
" So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited
Gilchrist
" Sir said that it seems this is the case right
now: You can compete in Business
Contracts as long as intention is financial
interest and there is no malice. f this is the
case, then one cannot recover from 1314
as against the third party.
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)
Interference with contracts:
A. Statutory provision and rationaIe: Under Article
1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a third
party not for breach of contract but for inducing another
to commit such breach. This tort is known as
interference with contractual relations. Such interference
is considered tortious because it violates the rights of
the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it
fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to
compel the performance by the other party. The theory
is that a right derived from a contract is a property right
that entitles each party to protection against all the world
and any damage to said property should be
compensated.
B. History: This particular tort started in the UK in
Lumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in the
Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy.
C. EIements:
1. Existence of a vaIid contract: This existence is
necessary and the breach must occur because of the
alleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the
party had already broken the contract. Neither can
action be maintained if the contract is void. However,
there is authority for the view that an action for
interference can be maintained even if the contract is
unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if
reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally
reprehensible in an unenforceable one.
2. KnowIedge on the part of the third party of the
existence of the contract: The elements do
not include malice as a necessary act in interference.
However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have
held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to
damages if malice was present in the commission of the
tortious act. t was held that mere competition is not
sufficient unless it is considered unfair competition or
the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury.
3. Interference of the third party without IegaI
justification or excuse: n general, social policy
permits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade
the legally protected interests of others only if the
defendant acts to promote the interests of others or
himself if the interest which he seeks to advance is
superior to the interest invaded in social importance.
Competition in business also affords a privilege to
interfere provided that the defendant's purpose is a
justifiable one and the defendant does not employ fraud
or deception which are regarded as unfair.
D. Extent of IiabiIity: The rule is that the defendant
found guilty of interference with contractual relations
cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which
the party who was induced to break the contract can be
held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the
contracting party who was induced to break the contract
was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the
party who breached the contract is only liable for
consequence that can be foreseen. n fact, it is possible
for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the
case where the defendant prevented him from
performing his obligation through force or fraud.
F. LiabiIity of IocaI government units
Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
GuiIatco v City of Dagupan
FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole
at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the national
Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was
hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer
testified that he supervises the maintenance of said
manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered.
City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city
supervises and manages National roads and national
sidewalks.
HELD: City liable
- The liability of private corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
- t is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street.
- n this case, control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating that
liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189
applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective
streets, public buildings and other public works.
" Can last clear chance apply? Wasn't it
Guilatco's fault that she was negligent in
alighting a tricycle? No because it is under
strict liability.
" Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of
PLDT and the accident mound case (DACARA)

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