Against Against Intuitionism

Against against Intuitionism
Author(s): Dirk Schlimm

Source: Synthese, Vol. 147, No. 1, Reflections on Frege and Hilbert (Oct., 2005), pp. 171-188
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118651 .
Accessed: 14/09/2014 11:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 138.26.16.5 on Sun, 14 Sep 2014 11:44:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DIRK SCHLIMM
AGAINST AGAINST INTUITIONISM
ABSTRACT. The main ideas behind Brouwer's
philosophy
of Intuitionism are
presented.
Then some critical remarks
against
Intuitionism made
by
William
Tait in
"Against
Intuitionism"
[Journal of Philosophical Logic, 12, 173-195]
are
answered.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the
following
I shall
present
what I take to be the core of
Brouwer's
philosophy
of Intuitionism and defend it
against
critical
remarks that have been
put
forward
by
William Tait in
"Against
Intuitionism"
(1983).
To understand Brouwer's
philosophy
of Intuitionism it is
helpful
to
first
bring
to mind the
questions
that it was intended to address. The
famous
quotation
from Kant's
Critique of
Pure Reason can
help
us
illustrating
the fundamental difference between Brouwer's and other
approaches:
"Thus all human
knowledge begins
with
intuitions, pro
ceeds to
concepts,
and ends with ideas"
(A702/B730). According
to
Howard
Stein,
Hilbert chose this sentence as the
epigraph
to his Grund
lagen
der
Geometrie,
because he wanted to
get
rid of the Kantian intu
itions and
proceed
to the
concepts
of
mathematics,
following
Dirichlet's
call to a "maximum of clear
seeing thoughts" (Stein 1988, 241).
Brou
wer's direction was
opposite,
he wanted to trace mathematics back to
its
origins,
which he considered to be rooted in the human intellect. To
take the natural numbers for
granted,
as
suggested,
for
example, by
Kro
necker and
Poincar?,
was not
enough
for Brouwer. He wanted to know
where the natural numbers came
from,
to descend to the
ground,
to find
the ultimate
explanation
for the
possibility
of
practicing
mathematics.
Mathematics, then,
was to be built
up
on these
grounds, according
to
the
principles
that resulted from this
investigation.
Van
Stigt
calls Brou
wer's method of
philosophical exploration genetic:
"it searches for the
ultimate nature of
things
and human
activity
in their
origins,
the
pro
cesses that
brought
them into
being" (van Stigt 1996, 382).
Synthese (2005)
147: 171-188
DOI
10.1007/sll229-004-6299-y
?
Springer
2005
172 DIRK SCHLIMM
Given these motivations Brouwer
developed
a
very
broad
philos
ophy,
which
incorporated epistemological, psychological,
as well as
moral
aspects.
Traces of this
philosophy
can
be found in almost all
of his
writings. Clearly,
this
goes
well
beyond
what are
tradition
ally
considered to be the
topics
of
philosophy
of mathematics. In
the end Brouwer's
philosophy
of Intuitionism has not found
many
followers,
and in
particular
most mathematicians
(then
and
now)
have not
regarded
it as
necessary
for
motivating investigations
of
intuitionistic mathematics.
However,
given
the
importance
of Intu
itionism for the debate about the foundations of mathematics in the
early
20th
century (Mancosu 1998),
which extends also to contem
porary
discussions
(Detlefsen 1990),
I
regard
a clear understand
ing
of Brouwer's basic
writings
as
indispensable
for the
historically
minded
philosopher
of mathematics.
2. BROUWER'S PHILOSOPHY OF INTUITIONISM
2.1. What Intuition Is
Let us
begin
this
exposition
of Brouwer's
philosophy
of mathemat
ics
by taking
a closer look at the
meaning
of
'intuition',
the central
concept
of Intuitionism.
In the
ordinary
use of
language
'intuition' means
the
ability
of
direct
apprehension,
to
grasp something
without the
process
of rea
soning,
to have
an immediate
understanding.
Brouwer
begins
his
dissertation of 1907 with
an
example
of what he
regards
an
intuitive
act:
counting.
His former student Arend
Heyting explains
that even
children know what the natural numbers
are
and how the
sequence
of the natural numbers
can be constructed
(Heyting 1971, 7).
These
uses of 'intuition' are in accordance with the
ordinary meaning.
However,
Brouwer introduces
a
second,
somewhat different mean
ing
of intuition.1 He considers
the basic intuition of mathematics
(and
of
every
intellectual
activity)
as the
substratum,
divested of all
quality,
of
any perception
of
change,
a
unity
of
continuity
and
discreteness,
a
possibility
of
thinking together
several entities.
(Brouwer 1907, 8)
It is in this sense that 'intuition' is used as the cornerstone for
Brouwer's
philosophy.
For the sake of
clarity
I shall use the term
'Intuition' with
a
capital
letter to refer to Brouwer's notion and
'intuition' when it is meant in the usual
sense.
AGAINST AGAINST INTUITIONISM 173
For
Brouwer,
Intuition is a "substratum" as well as a
"possibility
of
thinking".
Intuition is the abstract form
("empty form"; (Brouwer
1929, 154))
of
any perception
of
change,
and as human
beings
we have
the
ability
to
recognize
this form and to make use of it in our
thinking
(through
its
"self-unfolding";
Brouwer
1929,154).
What remains when we divest
any
perception
of
change
from
all
qualities
is the
discerning
of two
things
as
being
different. At
the same time these two
things
are
regarded
as a
unity,
in which
the
change
manifests itself. The
perception
of a continuous
change
is
thereby
broken
up
into two discrete
parts,
which can be consid
ered
separately
without
losing
the idea of
continuity.
The result is a
"unity
of
continuity
and discreteness"
(Brouwer 1907, 8).
The
perception
of
change
can be
analyzed
as
realizing
that two
qualitatively
distinct
things belong
to one and the same
unity,
but
it can
also be
thought
of as an act of
construction,
where two dis
tinct
parts
are
put together
to form a whole.
Intuition, thus,
is that
which is common to both
imagining
a
unity
as
being composed
of
two different
things,
and
thinking
two distinct
things
as
being part
of the same
unity.
For
example,
we can
imagine
a
cup
as
being
one
single unity,
but we can also think of the same
cup
as
being
com
posed
of a
vessel and
a
handle. "Invariance in
change" (Brouwer
1907, 179)
and "intuition of two-in-one"
(Brouwer 1909, 116)
are
other terms Brouwer uses to
highlight
these
aspects
of Intuition.
Brouwer holds
on to these ideas
regarding
the nature of Intuition
through
his entire life. In his
inaugural
lecture of 1912 he declares:
the
falling apart
of moments of life into
qualitatively
different
parts,
to be
reunited
only
while
remaining separated by
time as the fundamental
phenome
non of the human
intellect, passing by abstracting
from its emotional content
into the fundamental
phenomenon
of mathematical
thinking,
the intuition of bare
two-oneness.
(Brouwer 1912, 85)
This
description
is
paraphrased
in Brouwer's lectures in Berlin
(Brouwer 1927),
in
(Brouwer 1933),
in the
Cambridge
lectures on
Intuitionism
given
between 1946 and 1951
(Brouwer 1981),
and
again
in
(Brouwer 1952) (see below).
2.2. The Relevance
of
Intuition
for
Mathematics
Now that we have an idea about what Intuition
is,
we can ask what
role it
plays
in Brouwer's
philosophy
of mathematics. Brouwer him
self tells us:
174 DIRK SCHLIMM
This intuition of
two-oneness,
the basal intuition of
mathematics,
creates not
only
the numbers one and
two,
but also all finite ordinal
numbers,
inasmuch as one of
the elements of the two-oneness
may
be
thought
of as a new
two-oneness,
which
process may
be
repeated indefinitely. (Brouwer 1912, 85-66)
On the basis of Intuition we can connect two
things
to form a new
totality,
and then this
totality
can be taken
together
with another
thing
to form a
totality again.
This
process
allows us to
gather
many particulars
and
thereby stepwise
to build
a
unity. Thus,
Brou
wer also refers to Intuition as "the intuition of the
many-one
ness"
(Brouwer 1907, 98)
or
"unity
in multitude"
(Brouwer 1907,
179).
Not
only
can the natural numbers be created on the basis
of
Intuition,
but also the continuum
("intuition
of the
continuum";
Brouwer
1908, 569),
and the entire
body
of mathematics: "Math
ematics
(...) develops
from a
single aprioristic
basic intuition"
(Brouwer 1907, 179).
If mathematics is to be
developed
from
Intuition,
then Intuition
has to
provide
means to create all mathematical
objects. Here,
Brou
wer
distinguishes
two
phases
in the
development
of Intuitionism. In
the "first act of
Intuitionism",
in which mathematics is
separated
from
language
and the
importance
of Intuition is
recognized,
new
entities are formed from
objects
that have been obtained
previously.
The "second act of Intuitionism"
recognizes
also
infinitely proceed
ing sequences
and mathematical
species
as forms of entities that can
be
generated
on the basis of Intuition
(Brouwer 1952, 140-142).
Since all
(intuitionistic)
mathematics can be tracked back to
the basal Intuition and its
"self-unfolding"
in the
mind,
it follows
that mathematics itself is
a
construction of the mind: "Intuition
istic mathematics is a mental
construction, essentially independent
of
language.
It comes into
being by self-unfolding
of the basic
intuition of
mathematics,
which consists in the abstraction of two
ity" (Brouwer 1947).
As this statement
shows,
Brouwer
sharply
dis
tinguishes
between mathematics and the
language
of mathematics.
Mathematics is done in the
mind,
not in an externalized
way using
language
or written
signs:
"The words of
your
mathematical dem
onstration
merely accompany
a mathematical construction that is
effected without words"
(Brouwer 1907, 127).
The
presence
of such
a construction is in fact Brouwer's criterion of existence in mathe
matics: "to exist in mathematics means: to be constructed
by
intu
ition"
(Brouwer 1907, 177).
A mathematical statement is true
only
when
a
corresponding
construction has been made. Brouwer writes:
"truth is
only
in
reality
i.e. in the
present
and
past experiences
of
consciousness"
(Brouwer 1948, 1243) (see
also Detlefsen
1990).
Brouwer's view that all mathematics is
essentially
a
language-less
activity
has led to the harsh confrontation with views that are based
on the
possibility
of
representing
mathematics in a formal
language,
as
advocated,
for
example, by
his
contemporaries
Russell and Hil
bert. We shall return to this
later,
when
addressing
Tait's criticisms.
2.3. The
Origins of
Intuition
So far the nature of Intuition and its role in mathematics have been
presented.
In this section we shall see where Intuition comes
from,
and
why
human
beings
have come to be able to make use of it.
In Brouwer's dissertation a whole
chapter
is dedicated to the rela
tion between mathematics and
experience.
Here he introduces the
notion of
"taking
the mathematical view" and discusses it in rela
tion to Intuition:
Proper
to man is a
faculty
which
accompanies
all his interactions with
nature,
namely
the
faculty
of
taking
a mathematical view of his
life,
of
observing
in the world
repe
titions of
sequences
of
events,
i.e. of causal
systems
in time. The basic
phenomenon
therein is the
simple
intuition of
time,
in which
repetition
is
possible
in the form:
'thing
in time and
again thing',
as a
consequence
of which moments of life break
up
into
sequences
of
things
which differ
qualitatively. (Brouwer 1907, 81)
Brouwer further
distinguishes
between two distinct
phases
involved
in
taking
the mathematical view: In the
first,
a
temporal
succession
of
things
or events is
perceived,
and in the
second,
some
of these are
identified as
being causally
related. These two
phases
are also called
the
"temporal
view" and the "causal view"
(Brouwer 1927, 153).
Underlying
and
making possible
the mathematical view is the
"intuition of
time",
which bears some
affinity
to Kant. In
fact,
Brouwer names the
purpose
of his dissertation to be "to
rectify
Kant's
point
of view
on
apriority
in the
experience
and
bring
it
up
to date"
(Brouwer 1907, 113).
As is well
known,
Kant
rejects
the
possibility
of
having
an unstructured
experience
of some kind
of raw
stuff,
but claims that all
experience
is determined
by
the
forms of
intuition, space
and time. After the
development
of non
Euclidean
geometries
in the 19th
century
it was no
longer
tenable to
regard
three-dimensional Euclidean
space
as the
only possible
con
ception
of
space
and therefore Kant's
apriority
of
space
had to be
abandoned. Brouwer
places
himself
exactly
in this tradition: "the
position
of intuitionism
(...)
has recovered
by abandoning
Kant's
176 DIRK SCHLIMM
apriority
of
space
but
adhering
the more
resolutely
to the
apriority
of time"
(Brouwer 1912, 69).
In contrast to the Kantian intuition of
time, however,
Brouwer
rejects
the view that all
experience
is neces
sarily organized
in advance
by
this intuition:
Mathematical attention is not a
necessity
but a
phenomenon
of life
subject
to
the free
will, everyone
can find this out for himself
by
internal
experience: every
human
being
can at will either
dream-away
time-awareness and the
separation
between the Self and the
World-of-perception
or
by
his own
powers bring
about
this
separation
,and call into
being
the
world-of-perception
the condensation of
separate things. (Brouwer 1933, 418^419)
To take the causal view consists in
identifying objects
in the tem
poral sequences,
and relations between
them,
causal relations. In
this
way patterns
are created which can be observed in the world.
"This
'seeing', however,
is a human act of externalization: there is
no real existence of
objective
natural
phenomena
as can
be ascribed
to nature itself: the
seeing originates
in
man,
is an
expression
of
man's will
alone, independent
of nature which itself exists
indepen
dent of man's will"
(van Stigt 1979,
394).2
The
ability
to take the mathematical view has contributed to the
survival of
mankind,
because of its
great utility
for human self
preservation.
To be able to see causal
sequences
in the world
by
taking
the mathematical view allows us to
jump
from "the end to
the means"
(Brouwer 1907, 81).
If a
sequence
of events is
recog
nized,
it becomes
possible
to estimate the
consequences
of one's
actions. "The human tactics of
'acting purposively'
then consists in
replacing
the end
by
the means
(a
later occurrence in the intellec
tually
observed
sequence by
an earlier
occurrence)
when the human
instinct feels that chance favours the means"
(van Stigt 1979, 395).
A
simple example may
illustrate this
point. People
who like
strawberries are
likely
to
go
into the woods in summer to look for
them.
Doing
this
requires only
the
knowledge
that the
probability
of
finding
strawberries is
higher
in summer than
during
the rest of
the
year. Imagine
now,
that
somebody
discovered that strawberries
are
bigger
and tastier when
they grow
where it has rained in
spring.
This
very simple
causal
sequence
'water in
spring,
tastier strawber
ries in summer' leads
our
person
not
only
to look for strawberries
in
summer,
but also to take
care that the
plants get enough
water
in
spring,
and to water them if
necessary.
The act of
watering
the
plants
does not have an immediate
goal,
but an indirect
one,
namely
to have tastier strawberries. The
advantage
of this tactic is that it
is easier to water the
plants
than to look for strawberries that
hap
pened by
chance to
grow
in areas where it rained in
spring.
Exploiting
causal
sequences
that are
projected
into the world is not
an
absolutely
reliable
process,
because it can
always happen
that a
pre
sumed
pattern
does not lead to success.
But, despite
this
possibility
"in
general
the consideration of
sequences
and
consequent going
back
from the end to the
means,
where intervention
appears easier,
show
themselves
very
efficient tactics from which mankind derives its
power"
(Brouwer 1907, 82).
The
ability
to take the mathematical stance is not
only
a
contingent
human
ability,
but the most
important
human
faculty,
which secures survival:
"Indeed,
if this
faculty
did not achieve its end
it would not
exist,
as lion's
paws
would not exist if
they
failed of their
purpose" (van Stigt 1979, 395).
This
faculty
of the human
intellect, developed though evolution,
is
present
in
every
human
being, just
as
every
lion has
paws.3
And
since Intuition is the basis of the mathematical view and is also the
origin
of
mathematics,
it follows that all human
beings develop
simi
lar mathematics. This is not
necessarily
so for the
language
in which
mathematics is
expressed:
it is
easily conceivable, given
the same
organizations
of the human intellect
and
consequently
the same
mathematics,
a different
language
would have been
formed,
into which the
language
of
logical reasoning,
well known to
us,
would
not fit.
Probably
there are still
peoples, living
isolated from our
culture,
for which this is
actually
the case.
(Brouwer 1907, 129)
Here Brouwer tries to answer the
objection
that Intuitionism does
not account for the
public
character of
mathematics,
which is
raised,
for
example, by
Tait.
2.4. The Value
of
Intuition
We have seen that Intuition forms the basis of our
ability
to
perceive
sequences
of
events,
which in turn allows us to shift from actions
with direct
goals
to actions that serve as means to some
future end.
Herein lies "the source of human
power" (van Stigt 1979, 395).
Brouwer does not
give
a
value
judgment
about this
ability
in this
published work,
but he does so in those
parts
of the thesis that he
was
urged
to leave out
by
his advisor.
Korteweg
was of the
opin
ion that these
parts represented
Brouwer's
pessimistic
view of life
and that this had
nothing
to do with foundations of mathematics.
178 DIRK SCHLIMM
However,
for Brouwer these
parts
contained the basic ideas which
held
together
his whole thesis.
They
deal
with the
way
mathematics is rooted in
life,
what
therefore
should be the
starting-point of
mathematical
theories;
all
particular topics
in
my
dissertation
only
make sense when related to this fundamental thesis.
(Letter
from Brouwer
to
Korteweg,
November
5, 1906; quoted
from
(van Stigt 1990, 491)
I discuss Brouwer's views here to
give
the full
picture
of his
philoso
phy
of
mathematics,
which not
only
is concerned with mathematical
objects,
but also with the
way they
are connected to life.
In
"Leven,
Kunst en
Mystiek (Life, Art,
and
Mysticism)"4
Brou
wer relates a
myth
that is the
key
to
many
of his ideas:
Originally
man lived in
isolation;
with the
support
of nature
every
individual
tried to maintain his
equilibrium
between sinful
temptations.
This filled the whole
of his
life,
there was no room for interest in
others,
nor for
worry
about the
future;
as a result labour did not
exist,
nor did
sorrow, hate, fear,
or lust. But
man was not
content,
he
began
to search for
power
over others and for cer
tainty
about the future. In this
way
the balance was
broken,
labour become
more and more
painful
to those
oppressed
and the
conspiracy
of those in
power
gradually
more and more diabolical. In the end
everyone
wielded
power
and
suffered
suppression
at the same time. The old instinct of
separation
and isolation
has survived
only
in the form of
pale envy
and
jealousy. (Brouwer 1905, 7)
This
mythological
time is lost for
Brouwer,
the human race discov
ered its will to
power
over nature and over other human
beings.
In
contrast to the often told
success-story
of
science,
Brouwer's ver
sion is a
negative
one,
a
story
of
decay.
The
breaking
off from the
state of
equilibrium
was made
possible by
the mathematical
view,
which itself
originates
in Intuition: "In this life of lust and desire the
Intellect renders man diabolical service of
connecting
two
images
of
the
imagination
as means and end. Once in the
grip
of desire for
one
thing
he is made
by
the Intellect to strive after another
as a
means to obtain the former"
(Brouwer 1905, 19). Taking
the math
ematical view allows
us to
objectify
the
world,
to
perceive
causal
sequences
and to communicate with each other.
But,
the main
pur
pose
of communication is "to enforce man's will over others out of
fear or desire"
(van Stigt 1979, 397).
Why then,
if these
were his
views,
did
Brouwer, nevertheless,
become a mathematician? He answers: "But mathematics
practised
for its own sake can achieve all the
harmony (i.e.,
an
overwhelming
multiplicity
of different
visible, simple
structures within
one
and the
same
all-embracing edifice)
such as can be found in architecture and
music,
and also
yield
all the illicit
pleasures
which ensue from the
free and full
development
of one's force"
(van Stigt
1979,
399).
He
later also talks of the constructional
beauty,
the
introspective beauty
of
mathematics,
when the Intuition is left to free
unfolding
without
the restrictions
imposed by
the exterior world
(Brouwer 1948, 1239).
Even in
logic
this
beauty
can be found: "in
itself,
as an edifice of
thought,
it
[logic]
is a
thing
of
exceptional harmony
and
beauty"
(Brouwer 1955, 1).
Only through self-reflection,
free from fear and
desire,
free from
the influences of the
world,
one can
experience
the transcendental
truth, according
to Brouwer. And those
"imprisoned
in life call this
mysticism, they
think it
obscure,
but
truly,
it is the
light
that is
only
darkness to those who are in darkness themselves"
(Brouwer 1905,
74).
We turn now to the discussion of some
critical remarks
against
Brouwer's
philosophy.
3. AGAINST INTUITIONISM
On the first four
pages
of
"Against Intuitionism",
William Tait
puts
forward a number of observations and
arguments
in order to cast
doubt
on
the
plausibility
of Brouwer's views of mathematics. The
remainder of Tait's article is dedicated to
suggesting
an account of
the
meanings
of mathematical
propositions
that is
adequate
for both
constructive and classical mathematics. What
distinguishes
these two
are then
only
the
principles
admitted for
constructing
mathemat
ical
objects
and the fact that some terms are used with different
meanings (e.g., 'function').
The
upshot
is that constructive mathe
matics can be subsumed under classical mathematics.
My
concern
here, however,
is
only
with the first
part
of Tait's
essay.
Tait
begins
his discussion
by quoting
the
following passage
from
Brouwer's
(1952)
"Historical
background, principles
and methods
of
intuitionism",
which
by
now should sound
quite
familiar to the
reader. Here Brouwer states that Intuitionistic mathematics
is an
essentially languageless activity
of the mind
having
its
origin
in the
percep
tion of a move
of time,
i.e. of the
falling apart
of a life moment into two dis
tinct
things,
one of which
gives way
to the
other,
but is retained
by memory.
If
the
two-ity
thus born is divested of all
quality,
there remains the
empty form of
the common substratum
of
all two-ities. It is this common
substratum,
this
empty
form,
which is the basic intuition
of
mathematics.
(Brouwer 1952, 141)
180 DIRK SCHLIMM
For each of the
following
12 criticisms of Intuitionism that Tait
pro
duces,
I shall first
very briefly
state his claim
(in italics)
and then
reply
to it from
a
Brouwerian
point
of view.
1. Tait
begins
with the claim that Brouwer's insistence on
mathe
matics
being essentially
a
language-less activity
was no doubt
partly
motivated
by
his
polemic against
those he called
formalists,
in
partic
ular
against
Hilbert.
We have seen that the idea that mathematics is
independent
of
language
is
expressed
in Brouwer's earliest
writings
and
represents
one of the core
views of his
philosophy.
This motivated his
polem
ics
against
Hilbert's
'formalism',
which started five
years
after Brou
wer's dissertation with "Intuitionism and formalism"
(1912),
but not
the other
way
around. Brouwer indeed discusses
Dedekind, Cantor,
Peano, Hilbert,
and
Russell,
a
group
he later referred to as the "old
formalist school"
(Brouwer 1981, 2),
in his 1907 dissertation and
criticizes them for
placing
too much
emphasis
on the
language
of
mathematics and for
denying
the role of intuition. How far these
discrepancies
influenced the
development
of Brouwer's
philosophy
or
resulted from it has not
yet
been determined and
possibly
never
will be. It should be
kept
in
mind, however,
that Brouwer's critical
attitude towards
language
as an
adequate
carrier of
thought
is in
an
important
characteristic of his views
expressed
as
early
as 1905
(Brouwer 1905).
2.
Referring
to the above
quotation,
Tait
infers
that "in one
life
moment we
perceive infinitely many falling aparts,f (p. 174),
which he
regards
as
paradoxical.
Here
my reply hinges
on
the correct
understanding
of a
"life
moment". Brouwer characterizes the
"falling apart
of a
life
moment",
which is rendered
possible by Intuition,
as a move of time. This indi
cates that he
regards
this as
the
perception
of an
interval,
rather
than of a
single point
in time.5 Tait himself later
interprets
Brou
wer's claim as
being
about time intervals
(p. 176).
Tait
argues
from the
perception
of a
two-ity
and the fact that this
can
be
repeated
to the
perception
of an
infinity,
which "strains the
notion of
perception" (p. 174).
But for Brouwer the
repeated appli
cation of this
process,
the
unfolding
of
Intuition,
is carried out in
thought
and thus it is not a
perception
in the sense of a
sensory
experience.
In
fact,
even the notion of an intuitive continuum is
one
that Brouwer describes as
being
based
on
Intuition:
In the Primordial Intuition of two-oneness the intuitions of continuous and dis
crete meet: 'first' and 'second' are held
together,
and in this
holding-together
consists the intuition of the continuum
(continere
=
hold
together). (Brouwer
1908, 569;
quoted
from van
Stigt 1990, 155;
see also the first
quote
in this
text.)
Brouwer
regarded
this view
as
necessary
in
explaining
how we could
possibly
make
sense of the continuum.
By
1918-1919 Brouwer had
ceased to mention the intuitive continuum after he had
developed
the notions of choice
sequence
and
spread
for
talking
about the
mathematical continuum.
3.
Continuing
his
analysis of
the 1952
passage,
Tait wants to inter
pret
"retained in
memory" quite literally,
as
if
the
past
"were
a sub
stance in a box that I could take out and examine'
(p. 174).
This,
he
says,
does not make sense to him.
To understand Brouwer such
a literal
interpretation
is not called
for. If I see a
leaf
falling
from a tree as a downward motion of
an
object,
I must be able to retain at least
some
impressions
in
my
memory. Otherwise,
I could not
speak
of a
motion,
but
only
of the
perception
of the leaf at various
positions
between the branch and
the
ground. Thus,
I do not see
the need of
keeping
the
past
as it
were in a
box for
examination,
to be
expressed by
Brouwer's writ
ings.
In
fact,
what Tait calls the
ordinary way
of
understanding
this
phrase,
in the sense of
remembering past
events and
experiences,
is
all that Brouwer needs for his account.
4. Tait introduces
an
example for being
conscious
of
time: "to hear
two successive ticks
of
a
clock",
which he thinks to be "the likeliest
candidate
for
what Brouwer has in mind"
(p. 175).
Here, however,
he
sees no
falling apart of
a
life
moment.
In none of his
writings
does Brouwer ever talk about
auditory
experiences
to illustrate the
origin
of Intuition. What he talks about
instead is
"seeing"
a
sequence,
"objectifying"
the world
(see above).
Nevertheless,
if Brouwer's
analysis
is
complete,
we should be able to
make sense of Tait's
example.
When we hear the second tick of the
clock,
we are aware of it as one
single
tick. But because of the near
past
that is still retained in our
memory,
we can think of it as
being
related to the first
tick,
and therefore as
being part
of a
sequence
of
ticks. Our consciousness of time arises because we realize the second
tick as
being something
different from the first
one,
and at the
same
time
recognizing
it as
falling
under the same
concept, namely
'tick'.
The second tick divides time into two distinct
phases: (1)
the last
tick,
and
(2)
the rest of the
sequence
of
ticks,
which is still
present
in
182 DIRK SCHLIMM
memory.
These two
phases
are what Brouwer calls the "two distinct
things,
of which one
gives way
to the
other,
but is retained in mem
ory" (Brouwer 1952, 141). Thus,
the
falling apart
does take
place,
even if Tait refuses to see it.
5. The above
example
is used
by
Tait to
infer
that the number
thirty
can be "created in the
experience of thirty
successive ticks
of
a clock"
(p
.
175).
He then claims to never have had such an
experi
ence,
though possibly
he has heard
thirty
consecutive ticks. And
even
when he had counted
up
to
thirty,
the basis on which he could
verify
his count was
objective
evidence, e.g., saying 'thirty',
rather than an
introspective
one.
Even if Tait never
actually experienced
the creation of the num
ber
thirty,
it is the
knowledge
that he could come to
say
'thirty'
after
counting
a
certain number of ticks of a clock that constitutes
what he means
by saying 'thirty'.
That the character of the evidence
used to
verify
the result of an act of
counting
is
objective
comes
from the fact that we
usually
count exterior
objects,
not internal
ones,
and that
we can
repeat
the
process
of
counting
in case we feel
uncertain about the result. But the act of
counting itself,
the abil
ity
to discern different
objects is,
for
Brouwer,
the
application
of
a
sequence
obtained from Intuition to the world. And if I hear the
clock
striking
three
times,
and
my
friend afterwards tells me that
it must have struck four
times,
because it is four
o'clock,
isn't it
reliance on
my introspection
if I answer "There must be
something
wrong
with the
clock,
because I heard it
only
three times"?
6. Tait
argues
that on the basis
of
Brouwer's account we cannot
justify
the
principle
that
every
number has a
successor,
since we can
not
possibly
have an
experience of
a series
of
1010 elements. The
underlying problem
is that the
concept of "my experience of
succes
sion" has
no
precise
extension.
For
Brouwer,
we do not have to
actually experience
that
every
single
number has a
successor,
because numbers are what are
gen
erated
by putting
two units
together,
then another one and so on.
Since this is a
conceptual point,
there is
no reason whatsoever to
assume that the
application
of the basal Intuition of mathematics
cannot be continued after
a
certain
point. Indeed,
for
understanding
an
unlimited iteration of
applications
of Intuition
no
corresponding
actual
experiences
are
necessary.
7. As an aside and without
discussing
it
further,
Tait remarks that
Brouwer's view does not
give
an account
of
the
public
character
of
mathematics.
This kind of criticism culminates in
accusing
Brouwer's
philoso
phy
of
being
a form of
solipsism.
As noted
above,
it seems indeed
compatible
with Brouwer's
theory
of Intuition that all human
beings
possess
the
faculty
of
taking
the mathematical
view,
and
this leads to
everybody creating
similar
(intuitionistic)
mathematics.
Furthermore,
because
language
is needed to
practice
mathematics
as a
public activity,
Brouwer is able to
point
to the
origin
of
some
problems
that arise in mathematical
practice.
Just
recently
some
authors have
argued
that the informal
language
of mathematics is
not
adequately captured by
formal
systems (e.g.,
Rav
1999),
oth
ers that mathematical
proofs
are better understood within a social
context
(e.g.,
Heintz
2000).
Brouwer would
clearly agree
with the
former
claim,
and would
regard
the latter as
arising
from conflat
ing proofs
as mental
objects
with their
linguistic representations,
which do
depend
on the social context. The fact that
proofs
can be
accepted
or refuted
(Grabiner 1974)
also indicates
a
certain amount
of
ambiguity
in the
language
of mathematics. These observations
directly
follow from Brouwer's account of mathematics:
In a human mind
empowered
with unlimited
memory
therefore
pure mathematics,
practised
in solitude and without the use of
linguistic symbols
would be exact.
However,
this exactness would
again
be lost in mathematical communication between individu
als,
even between those
empowered
with unlimited
memory
since
they
have to
rely
on
language
as a means of communication.
(Brouwer 1934, 58)
Thus,
instead of this
being
a serious criticism of
Intuitionism,
it
points
at a
phenomenon
in mathematical
practice
that can be
accounted for in the framework of Brouwer's
philosophy,
but which
can be
explained only
with
difficulty by
other views of mathematics
that are
less critical towards the use of
language.
8. Brouwer's
affinity
with Kant's
argument for
the a
priori
charac
ter
of
time is
acknowledged by
Tait,
but he
regards
it as no more via
ble than Kanfs
analogous
view
concerning space,
which is
rejected by
Brouwer. Tait claims that "0
=
Sn
may very
well be
compatible
with
our
experience for
some n"
(p. 176),
when this statement is
regarded
as
being
about
time, e.g.,
about a clock
Brouwer
regards
Intuition
as
being
a
priori
in
particular
with
regard
to scientific
experience,
and
explicitly
stresses the
indepen
dence of mathematics and
experience.
When Tait takes
a statement
about
a
clock to be
a statement about
time,
he is
talking
about time
in a
scientific,
measurable sense. This is a
conception
of time which
Brouwer
regards
as
being already
infected
by
the mathematical
view,
184 DIRK SCHLIMM
as he makes
explicit
in a footnote to his claim that time is a
pri
ori: "Of course we mean here intuitive time which must be distin
guished
from
scientific
time.
By
means of
experience
and
very
much
a
posteriori
it
appears
that scientific time can
suitably
be introduced
for the
cataloguing
of
phenomena,
as a
one-dimensional coordinate
having
a
one-parameter group" (Brouwer 1907, 99).
True
experi
ence of time is
only possible
after we remove the scientific attitude:
"For
example,
in the case of the word time the awareness of
solitary
weakness,
of
roaming,
deserted after
rejection
of
guidance,
may only
break
through
when it is no
longer possible
to include the
indepen
dent,
variable coordinate of mechanics"
(van Stigt
1979, 398).
But
then
no
equation
like the one
suggested by
Tait is
applicable any
more.
9. That
counting
is a
temporal
process
is
rejected by
Tait as an
answer to the
question of why
we understand
temporal
succession
any
better than other kinds
of
succession,
"at
least,
once we
give up
Brou
wer's idea that the
counting experience
is
itself
an
object
with a well
defined
structure
from
which we can abstract"
(p. 176).
The
point
here is that for Brouwer the basic intuition of math
ematics is the
same as the intuition of time as he understands it
(see above).
Whenever we count or
perceive
some
change
this
pro
cess takes
place
in time and it therefore cannot be
separated
from
time itself. The
underlying
"substratum" of
any
such
process
is the
same,
namely
"the basic intuition of mathematics
(or
of
any
intel
lectual
activity)" (Brouwer 1907, 8).
What
we do in
counting,
for
Brouwer,
is to
apply
the abstract structure of the ordinal numbers
obtained
by
the
unfolding
of Intuition to the
objects
of
experience.
10. Tait
challenges
the
argument
"that without consciousness
of
temporal
passage
we would not understand succession" because "it
is
very
hard to understand the antecedent
of
the
counterfactual"
(p. 176).
Here I can
only
refer back to Brouwer's view as
expressed
in the
quotation
above from
(Brouwer 1933, 418-419): According
to Brou
wer we can make sense of the antecedent of this counterfactual
by
dreaming-away
time-awareness.
11. Tait accuses Brouwer
of applying
a vicious circle
(to
use the
explanandum
in the
explanans)
in his
argument
that the
concept of
number is
generated by
successive
applications of
the Intuition
of
two
oneness. To
explain
the
concept of
number
as iterations
of
succes
sion,
implies
that we
already
understand the notion
of
number,
because
iteration means
iterating
a "finite number of times"
(p.
176;
emphasis
in
original).
The
generation
of the
representation
of a number consists of
constructing
the successor of an
already existing entity. Thus,
this
process requires only
an initial element and the
application
of the
successor
function,
or in Brouwer's
words,
another element that can
be
put together
with the first one under a new
concept.
If we
rep
resent numbers
by
a series of strokes
on
paper,
we
need one stroke
to start with and
then,
whenever
we
have a series of strokes to
rep
resent the number
n,
add a new one to obtain
n
+ 1. To
say
that
'III' represents 3,
we do not have to understand the
meaning
of '3'
in
advance,
because we define its
meaning
to be
'|||'. Furthermore,
to see whether a series of strokes is
'|||',
we do not need to know
what '3' means other than
'|||'.
We can
compare
a
different num
ber constructed
by
the same
process
without the
concept
of number
already present:
we
successively
take
away
one stoke from both
rep
resentations,
until one of them is
empty.
If the other one
is
empty,
too,
then
they represented
the same
number,
if it is not
empty,
the
numbers were not
equal.
12. The last remark
of
Tait I want to discuss here is the claim that
mathematics is a
linguistic activity of
a
community.
He arrives at this
conclusion
by asking
"in what sense is construction
according
to a
rule
not
linguistic?"
and
answering
that "a rule is a
symbol" (p. 176).
Brouwer
vehemently disagrees
with the
premiss
that the rule has
to be a
symbol
and is therefore
linguistic.
The
separation
between
mathematics and the
language
of mathematics is one of the crucial
points
of Brouwer's
philosophy:
"The words of
your
mathematical
demonstration
merely accompany
a mathematical construction that
is effected without words"
(Brouwer 1907, 127).
That such a con
struction is
according
to a
rule,
Brouwer would
respond,
does not
mean that this rule has to be
presented linguistically.
4. CONCLUSION
In this
paper
Brouwer's
understanding
of mathematics was
pre
sented.
Questions
such as "What is the
origin
of
mathematics?",
"How does mathematics come into
being?",
and
"Why
did math
ematics come into
being?"
were
answered
according
to his
philos
ophy
of Intuitionism. Then a series of criticisms
against
this view
were
presented
and
replied
to from a
Brouwerian
perspective.
These
186 DIRK SCHLIMM
replies
have
shown,
I
hope,
that the last word on
Intuitionism has
not
yet
been
spoken.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank
Jeremy Avigad,
Michael
Hallett,
Colin
McLarty,
Wilfried
Sieg,
Bill
Tait,
and Dirk van
Dalen for their
comments on earlier versions of this
paper, parts
of which were
pre
sented at the 1998 Midwest
Conference
on the
History of
Mathemat
ics at Iowa State
University, Ames,
IA.
Special
thanks are
also due
to two
anonymous
referees of this
journal,
whose
insightful
com
ments have been
extremely helpful.
NOTES
1
Brouwer's
writings
are often not as clear as one
might
wish them to be. In
order to leave it to the reader to
verify (or
to call in
question) my interpreta
tion,
a number of
passages
are
quoted
from his
writings.
2
Quotations
from
(van Stigt 1979)
are from
passages
that Brouwer
originally
wrote for his
dissertation,
but that were omitted in the final version.
3
Evolution is not
explicitly
mentioned
by Brouwer,
but it
helps
in
understanding
the
place
of mathematics in the human intellect.
4
Even
though
this article was written in
1905,
when Brouwer was
24,
he tried
to
republish
it in 1927 and
thought
of
translating
it into
English
even in
1964,
two
years
before his death.
3
Compare
this view to the
following
remarks
by
Kronecker. He introduces the
ordinal numbers as a stock of
signs
"which we can
adjoin
to a collection of dis
tinct
objects
that we are able to tell
apart" (Kronecker 1887, 949)
and tells us in
a footnote what kind of
objects
he has in mind: "The
objects
can in a certain
sense be similar to one
another,
and
only spatially, temporally,
or
mentally
dis
tinguishable
-
for
example,
two
equal lengths,
or two
equal temporal
intervals"
(Kronecker 1887, 949).
REFERENCES
Benacerraf,
P. and H.
Putnam, (ed.): 1964, Philosophy of
Mathematics
-
Selected
readings,
Prentice
Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1905, Leven,
Kunst en
Mystiek, Waltman,
Delft.
English
translation
(only excerpts): Life,
Arts and
Mysticism,
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
1-10. Full trans
lation in
(Brouwer 1996).
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1907,
Over de
Grondslagen
der Wiskunde. Maas & Van Suche
len,
Amsterdam.
English
translation: On the Foundations of
Mathematics,
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
11-101.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1908,
'Die
m?glichen M?chtigkeiten',
Atti IV
Congr.
Int. Mat.
Roma
III, pp.
569-71.
Reprinted
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
102-104.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1909,
Het wezen der
meetkunde, Amsterdam,
1909.
English
transla
tion: The Nature of
Geometry,
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
112-120.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1912,
Tntuitionism and
Formalism',
Bulletin
of
the American Math
ematical
Society
20
(1913),
81-96.
Reprinted
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
123-138 and
in
(Benacerraf
and Putnam
1964), pp.
66-77.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1927,
Berliner
Gastvorlesungen,
in
(Brouwer 1992).
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1929, 'Mathematik',
Wissenschaft und
Sprache', Monatshefte
der
Mathematik
36,
153-164.
Reprinted
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
417-428.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1934, Changes
in the Relation between Classical
Logic
and Mathe
matics. In
(van Stigt 1990), pp.
453?458. Handwritten
manuscript,
German ver
sion
presumably
from 1930-1934.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1947, 'Richtlijnen
der intuitionistische
wiskunde',
KNAW Proceed
ing,
Vol.
51, p.
339.
English
translation: Guidelines of Intuitionistic
Mathematics,
in
(Brouwer 1975), p.
477.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1948, 'Consciousness, Philosophy
and
Mathematics', Proceedings of
the 10th International
Congress of Philosophy,
Amsterdam 1948
III, pp.
1235-1249.
Reprinted
in
pp.
480?196.
Excerpts reprinted
in
(Benacerraf
and Putnam
1964),
pp.
78-84.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1952,
'Historical
Background, Principles
and Methods of Intuition
ism',
South
African
Journal
of
Science
49,
139-146.
Reprinted
in
(Brouwer 1975),
pp.
508-515.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1955,
'The Effect of Intuitionism on Classical
Algebra
of
Logic',
Proceedings of
the
Royal
Irish
Academy
Section A
57,
113-116.
Reprinted
in
(Brouwer 1975), pp.
551-554.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1975,
Collected
Works,
Vol. 1.
North-Holland,
Amsterdam. Edited
by
Arend
Heyting.
Brouwer, L.E.J..1981, Cambridge
Lectures on Intuitionism
Cambridge. Manuscript
of
lectures held from 1946-1951. Edited
by
Dirk van Dalen.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1992, Intuitionismus,
B.I.
Wissenschaftsverlag,
Mannheim. Edited
by
Dirk van Dalen.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1993,
in
'Willen, Weten,
Spreken',
Euclides
9,
177-193. Also in
De
uitdrukkingwijze
der
wetenschap,
kennistheoretische voordrachten
gehouden
aan
de Universiteit von Amsterdam
(1932-1933), pp.
43-63.
English
translation:
Will,
Knowledge
and
Speech,
in
(van Stigt 1990), pp.
418?431.
Excerpts
in
(Brouwer
1975), pp.
443-146.
Brouwer,
L.E.J.:
1996, 'Life, Art,
and
Mysticism',
Notre Dame Journal
of
Formal
Logic, 37(3),
389-429. Translated
by
Walter P. van
Stigt.
Detlefsen,
M.:
1990,
'Brouwerian
Intuitionism',
Mind
99(396),
501-534.
Ewald,
W:
1996,
From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in
Mathematics',
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford.
Grabiner,
V:
1974,
'Is Mathematical Truth
Time-Dependent?'
American Mathemati
cal
Monthly 81(4),
354-365.
Heintz,
B.:
2000,
Die Innenwelt der Mathematik. Zur Kultur und Praxis einer bewei
senden
Disziplin, Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,
New-York.
Heyting,
A.:
1911, Intuitionism,
an
Introduction,
3rd edn.
North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
188 DIRK SCHLIMM
Kronecker,
L:
1887,
'?ber den
Zahlbegriff', (Grelles)
Journal
f?r
reine und
angewandte Mathematik, 101,
337-355.
English
translation: On the
Concept
of
Number,
in
(Ewald 1996), pp.
947-955.
Mancosu,
P.:
1998,
in From Brouwer to Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations
of
Mathematics in the
1920s,
Oxford
University Press,
Oxford.
Rav,
Y:
1999, 'Why
Do We Prove Theorems?'
Philosophia
Mathematica
(Ser. Ill)
7(1),
5-41.
Stein,
H.:
1988, 'Logos, Logic,
and
Logistik?:
Some
Philosophical
Remarks on
Nineteenth-Century
Transformation of
Mathematics',
in W
Aspray
and P. Kit
cher, (eds), History
and
Philosophy of
Modern
Mathematics,
vol. 11 of Minnesota
Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, University
of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, pp.
238-259.
Tait,
W.W.:
1983, Against
Intuitionism: Constructive Mathematics is Part of Classi
cal
Mathematics',
Journal
of Philosophical Logic 12,
173-195.
van
Stigt,
W.P.:
1979,
'The
Rejected
Parts of Brouwer's Dissertation on the Founda
tions of
Mathematics',
Historia Mathematica
6,
385-404.
van
Stigt,
W.P.:
1990,
Brouwer's
Intuitionism, North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
van
Stigt,
W.P.:
1996,
'Introduction to
Life, Art,
and
Mysticism',
Notre Dame Jour
nal
of
Formal
Logic 37(3),
381-387.
Department
of
Philosophy
Carnegie
Mellon
University
Baker Hall 135
Pittsburgh,
PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
E-mail:
dschlimm@andrew.cmu.edu

Against Against Intuitionism

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Against Against Intuitionism

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Against against Intuitionism

Author(s): Dirk Schlimm

Você também pode gostar