[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.

]
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL.,respondents.
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:
1.CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE;
PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. The categorical statement by this Court on
the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to prevent
abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public
concern. cda
R E S O L U T I O N
CRUZ, J p:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1.What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2.Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3.What is meant by "publication"?
4.Where is the publication to be made?
5.When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed,
and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of
the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only
by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting
these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the
new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the
decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both
on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. cdphil
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence
in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they
did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as
is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate. LexLib
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the
law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature. LibLex
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. cdasia
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),
the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital
law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were
categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9

One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the
need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is
therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in
the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function
of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though,
is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but
to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.LLphil
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason,
to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not
need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a
request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no
further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once
again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public
scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority
to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their
lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking
in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber
that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published
in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code. dctai
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C .J ., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,
Jr ., and Paras, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J ., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague,
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a
Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the
insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made
effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature
been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative
mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising
to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same
number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of
two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one
granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President's nephew
and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with air-
conditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also
on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey
Moore and Dennis George Still. cdll
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any
law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers
and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J ., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying. cdlex
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil
Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally
to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without
need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to
the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical
governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in
the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a
newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil
Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the
Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be
changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional
problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of
the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette
and not in any other medium. LLjur
[G.R. No. 6791. March 29, 1954.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-
appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor
Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING
PENALTIES, NEED BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT
MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE. Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation, should
be published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by
its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
2.ID.; JURISDICTION; APPEALS; QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the
eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently
the accused committed no violation of the circular, and the trial court may be
said to have no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings whether or not raised in the court below.
D E C I S I O N
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in
connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to
suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign
exchange consisting of U. S. dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders
amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim
that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the
act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and
Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it
being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General
answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do
not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not
require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein
mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws
provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect.
In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of
the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of
Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take
effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according
to settled jurisprudence. (See U. S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and
authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and especifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision
about the effectivity of laws (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be
binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation
shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication
of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the
opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in
accordance with the same. He says:
"El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del
CodigoCivil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido
de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo
asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones
contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su
publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si
no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1. del Codigo Civil."(Manresa,
Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I, p. 52).
In the present case, although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued
in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3
months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said
Circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November
1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession within one day following his taking possession
thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-
publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this
Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on
appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and
which is within the issues made by the parties, in their pleadings. (Section 19,
Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is
fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been
published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law
there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant
committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial
court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and
acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
[G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996.]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND
FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC., respondents.
The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
O.F. Santos & P.C. Nolasco for Remington & Branch 58, RTC, Makati.
Arturo S. Santos for Firestone.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; EXECUTIVE BRANCH; EXECUTIVE ORDER
133; DOES NOT REPEAL THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC). While PITC'S power to
engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and
allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now limited only to new or
non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private
business sector. There is no indication in the law of the removal of the powers of
the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from
SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power,
EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers,
previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC. Likewise, the general
repealing clause in EO 133 stating that "all laws, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the
grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal of the said
powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy
between the issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC. The PITC
was attached as an integral part to the Department of Trade and Industry as one
of its line agencies, and was given the focal task of implementing the
department's programs. The absence of the regulatory power formerly enshrined
in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation
of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however,
that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It
is our view that PITC still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an
implementing arm, and under the supervision of the Department of Trade and
Industry.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT IN PROMULGATING THE
ORDER. The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul
the functions of the PITC. The Department of Trade and Industry was
established, and was given powers and duties including those previously held by
the PITC as an independent government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444.
The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said
department. EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive,
facilitative and regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry
and investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private
sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. In
furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan,
implement, and coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry
and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the
investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate
country and product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and
development thrusts of the government. Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE FOR THE GRANT OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. The grant of quasi-
legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a
result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary
to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its
ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can
deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now
not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Evidently, in
the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and
apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is
no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
(Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-50444,
August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399). With global trade and business becoming more
intricate nay even with new discoveries in technology and electronics
notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with legislations and even judicial
decisions aimed at resolving issues affecting not only individual rights but also
activities of which foreign governments or entities may have interests. Thus,
administrative policies and regulations must be devised to suit these changing
business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
4.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED TO BE
CONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. Consistency in statutes as in executive
issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is
possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to
harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a construction of a statutory
provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions. The
fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal to the latter,
since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
5.ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION, A REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVITY. "We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letter of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws." Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446.
6.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. SOCPEC 89-08-01;
DECLARED INVALID UNTIL IT IS PUBLISHED. The original Administrative
Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally,
until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were
filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative
Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. HASTCa
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J p:
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity)
filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. 92-158
entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation. et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial
Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process,
declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITC's Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Petitioner and Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:
1)Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the
following issuances relative to the applications for importation of
products from the People's Republic of China, to Wit:
a)Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30,
1989 (Annex A, Amended Petition);
b)Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);
c)Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-
exporter-importer (Annex C, Id.);
d)Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);

e)Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule
of Fees for the processing of import applications (Annexes
E, E-1., Ind.);
f)Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled
Undertakings and expired export credits (Annex Z,
Supplemental Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional, and,
2)Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending
applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the
petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without the
requirements prescribed in the above-mentioned issuances.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation
from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by
a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried
out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an
amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for,
or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:
3.COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import
application for goods and commodities originating from PROC, it is
declared that:
3.1All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied
by a viable and confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine
products to PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of
the importation from PROC being applied for. Such export
program must be carried out and completed within six (6)
months from date of approval of the Import Application by
PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for
importation from PROC without the accompanying export
program mentioned above.
3.2The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the
following:
a.By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and
facilities to carry out the export of Philippine products to
PROC in his own name; or
b.Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a
legitimate exporter (of Philippine products) who is willing
to carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTER
under these rules. The tie-up shall not make the
IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merely
ensure that the importation sought to be approved is
matched one-to-one (1:1) in value with a corresponding
export of Philippine products to PROC. 2
3.3EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by
the importer together with his Import Application are as
follows:
a)Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.
b)Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).
c)IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter
IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This form should be
used if IMPORTER has a tie-up with an exporter for the
export of Philippine Products to PROC.
4.EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried
out in accordance with these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are
required to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the
"Guarantee") at the time of filing of the Import Application. The amount
of the guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing
cash deposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC
Form No. M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit (with
all bank opening charges for account of Importer) opened
in favor of PITC as beneficiary.
4.2The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be
automatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if
the required export program is not completed by the
importer within six (6) months from date of approval of the
Import Application.
4.3Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER
is entitled to a (i) refund of the cash deposited without
interest; (ii) cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii)
Cancellation of the Domestic Letter of Credit upon showing
that he has completed the export commitment pertaining
to his importation and provided further that the following
documents are submitted to PITC:
a)Final Sales Invoice
b)Bill of lading or Airway bill
c)Bank Certificate of Inward Remittance
d)PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005
5.MISCELLANEOUS
5.1All other requirements for importations of goods and
commodities from PROC must be complied with in
addition to the above.
5.2PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all
import applications not in accordance with the rules
and regulations herein prescribed.
5.3Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized
representatives make any false statements or
fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export
Application, or falsify, forge or simulate any
document required under these rules and
regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pending
and future import/export applications of said
IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from
doing any business with SOCPEC through PITC."
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and
Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine-
laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner.
They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers,
and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations
from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and
other similar goods. Firestone, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite,
which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications
were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter
were both barred from importing goods from PROC. 3
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus,
with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati
Branch 58. 4 The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21,
1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to process
applications of goods from PROC. 5 Hearings on the application for writ of
preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondent Firestone was allowed to intervene in the petition on
July 2, 1992, 6 thus joining Remington in the latter's charges against PITC. It
specifically asserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue
restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing
on the Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely adjudicate the case,
thus, the parties deemed it proper that the entire case be submitted for
decision upon the evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision 7 on January 4, 1992. The court ruled
that PITC's authority to process and approve applications for imports from
SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No.
1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987
by President Aquino.
The court observed:
"Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITC's
regulatory authority under the Special provisions embodied in LOI 444
from the enumeration of powers that it could exercise effective February
27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may now be
successfully argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific
regulatory power in question conformably with the legal precept
"expresio unius est exclusio alterius."
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or
1991, has empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or
promulgate the assailed Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continued
exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicial
approval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative
power vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other
similar issuances by PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having
been promulgated in pursuance of an international agreement (the
Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which has
not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine
Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution, and
therefore, null and void.
"Section 21.No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate."
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in
violation of Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
"Section 1.The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in
the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and, an expanding productivity as the key to raising the
equality of life for all, especially the underprivileged."
"Section 19.The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the
public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed."
Lastly the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the
same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which
provides, that:
"Article 2.Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless the law
otherwise provides. . . ."

Petitioner now comes to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 8 questioning
the court's decision particularly on the propriety of the lower court's declarations
on the validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed the
respondents to file their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent,
the submissions of the parties to the present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos' trip to Beijing, People's Republic of
China (PROC), from April 25 to 30, 1993, a new trade agreement was entered
into between the Philippines and PROC, encouraging liberalization of trade
between the two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President,
through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the
Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by PITC Board
Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08. 9
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo,
Jr. issued a corporate Memorandum 10 instructing that all import applications
for the PROC filed with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer be
covered by the trade balancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew
from the PROC, without being required to comply anymore with the lifted
requirement of balancing its imports with exports of Philippine products to
PROC. 11 In its Constancia 12 filed with the Court on November 22, 1993,
Remington expressed its desire to have the present action declared moot and
academic considering the new supervening developments. For its part,
respondent Firestone made a Manifestation 13 in lieu of its Memorandum,
informing the court of the aforesaid developments of the new trade program
of the Philippines with China, and prayed for the court's early resolution of the
action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and
academic, respondent Remington cites Executive Order No. 244, 14 issued by
President Ramos on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:
"WHEREAS, continued coverage of the People's Republic of China by
Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the country's
national interest, as coursing Republic of the Philippines-People's
Republic of China Trade through the Philippine International Trading
Corporation as provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is
becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order:
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist
Countries to delete the People's Republic of China from the list of
countries covered by Letter of Instructions No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Five."
PITC filed its own Manifestation 15 on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted
the arguments raised in its Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with
Remington on the latter's submission that the case has become moot and
academic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-
08-01, since respondent Remington had incurred obligations to the petitioner
consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service provided
by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain outstanding. 16 The propriety of
such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby maintaining the
issue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by
Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trade balancing
measures with PROC were lifted by the President, Administrative Order
SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer has force and effect, and respondents are
thus entitled anew to apply for authority to import from the PROC, without
the trade balancing requirements previously imposed on proposed importers.
Indeed, it appears that since the lifting of the trade balancing measures,
Remington had been allowed to import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of the outstanding obligations of
the respondents for the charges relating to the 0.5% Counter Export
Development Service in favor of PITC, for the period when the questioned
Administrative Order remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or
are the respondents freed from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, based on the arguments set up
by the parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire
into the nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created
under P.D. No. 252 17 dated August 6, 1973 and P.D. No. 1071, 18 issued on
May 9, 1977 which revised the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and
powers of the said governmental entity were enumerated under Sections 5
and 6 thereof. 19, 19-a, 19-b, 19-c
On August 9, 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter
of Instruction (LOI) No. 444, 20 directing, inter alia, that trade (export or
import of all commodities), whether direct or indirect, between the Philippines
and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries
(SOCPEC), including the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be
undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under the LOI, PITC was mandated
to: 1) participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the
Philippines and SOCPEC; 2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions
under its instructions; and, 3) undertake the processing and approval of all
applications for export to or import from the SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
xxx xxx xxx
II.CHANNELS OF TRADE
1.The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the
Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries shall upon
issuance hereof, be undertaken by or coursed through the Philippine
International Trading Corporation. This-shall apply to the export and
import of all commodities of products including those specified for export
or import by expressly authorized government agencies.
xxx xxx xxx
4.The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all
official trade and economic discussions between the Philippines and
other centrally-planned economy countries.
V.SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such
measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the effective discharge of its functions under these instructions. In this
connection, the processing and approval of applications for export to or
import from the Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries
shall, henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation. (Emphasis
ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) No.
133 21 reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering
the said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and
regulatory arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and
investment activities" (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTI's line
agencies. 22
The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
xxx xxx xxx
Section 16.Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.
The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in
Section 9 (c) of this Executive Order that will perform their specific
regulatory functions, particularly developmental responsibilities and
specialized business activities in a manner consonant with the
Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:
xxx xxx xxx
d)Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation,
which shall be supervised by the Undersecretary for International Trade
shall only engage in both export and trading on new or non-traditional
products and markets not normally pursued by the private business
sector; provide a wide range of export oriented auxiliary services to the
private sector; arrange for or establish comprehensive system and
physical facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution
of cargoes and other commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance
services for existing institutions; promote and organize, whenever
warranted, production enterprises and industrial establishments and
collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of
production, marketing, procurement, and other relate businesses; and
provide technical advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management
services with respect to any and all of the functions, activities, and
operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the
PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding 23 (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts
within the next five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600-US $800 Million
by 1992, and to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance
between the value of their imports and exports during the period, agreeing for
the purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum, both sides shall
undertake to establish the necessary steps and procedures to be adopted within
the framework of the annual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol,
in order to monitor and ensure the implementation of the MOU.

Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a
Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, 24 under which was
specified the commodities to be traded between them. The protocols affirmed
their agreement to jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance
between the values of their imports and exports in their bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with
the MOU and Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued its now assailed
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 25 on August 30, 1989 (amended
in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to
modify and amend the provisions of LOI 444, which was issued by then
President Marcos, both issuances being executive directives. As observed by
us in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 26
"there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to
revoke the Letter of Instruction by way of an Executive Order. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the subject LOI 1190 was issued by
President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered to exercise
legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino when
her transitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was
found that LOI 1190 was a mere administrative directive, hence, may be
repealed, altered, or modified by EO 450."
We do not agree, however, with the trial court's ruling that PITC's authority to
issue rules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI 444 and P.D.
No. 1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITC's power to engage in commercial import and export
activities is expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133,
the same is now limited only to new or non-traditional products and markets
not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is no indication in
the law of the removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory
functions in the area of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does
not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to
the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D.
1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that "all laws,
ordinances, rules, and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the
PITC. There can be no repeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of
irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances, relating to
the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul
the functions of the PITC. The DTI was established, and was given powers
and duties including those previously held by the PITC as an independent
government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby
attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive,
facilitative and regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry
and investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private
sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. 27 In
furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan,
implement, and coordinate activities of the government related to trade
industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines
for the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to
formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the export
promotion and development thrusts of the government. 28 Corollarily, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans,
programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the
said department as one of its line agencies, 29 and was given the focal task of
implementing the department's programs. 30 The absence of the regulatory
power formerly enshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16
of EO 133, and the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is
noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue
the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such
authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the
supervision of, the Department of Trade and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower court's ruling to the effect that the PITC's
authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and
to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been
repealed by EO 133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the
issuance of the later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power
to regulate the flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC under the two
countries' Memorandum of Understanding, a power which necessarily flows
from her office as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the
President intended merely to reorganize the Department of Trade and
Industry to cope with the need of a streamlined bureaucracy. 31
Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133.
There is, admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the
administrative bodies affected by the edict, but not an abolition of executive
power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime
importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are
presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is
the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile
them, and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes
and reconciles it with other statutory provisions. 32 The fact that a later
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law
may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 33
Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies
is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the
modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected
from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is
now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the
rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication
of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation
vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA
399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate nay even with
new discoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has
come to grapple with legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at
resolving issues affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which
foreign governments or entities may have interests. Thus, administrative
policies and regulations must be devised to suit these changing business
needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:
"Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create
detailed rules, however, it was soon clear that new governmental
arrangements would be needed to handle the job of rule-making. The
courts, moreover, many of them already congested, would have been
swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the new
legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to
handle a great diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to
acquire the knowledge they needed to deal intelligently with all the new
types of controversy.
So the need to "create a large number of specialized administrative
agencies and to give them broader powers than administrators had
traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue regulations
having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases
powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the
courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p.
166)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the
Administrative Order because no grant of such power was made under the Trade
Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocols
aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which the
signatory countries have agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory
power, for executive power is vested in the Executive Department, 35 and it is for
the latter to delegate the exercise of such power among its designated agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative
Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is
valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative
Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order,
legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil
Code, which reads:

"Article 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided..
. ."
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
This court, in Taada vs. Tuvera 36 stated, thus:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and
Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws."
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the
petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never
legally effective, and private respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject
to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was
never published, as mandated by law, for its effectivity. It was only on March
30, 1992 when the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in
the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and
strengthen trade relations with the People's Republic of China. As declared by
the President in EO 244 issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the
People's Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer
consistent with the country's national interest, as coursing RP-PROC trade
through the PITC as provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is
becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade. 37
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained
atmosphere of trading between the Philippines and PROC should be done
away with, so as to allow economic growth and renewed trade relations with
our neighbors to flourish and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
private respondents, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1)Enjoining the petitioner:
a)From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export
Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of
the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the
private respondents;
b)From further implementing the provisions of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its
appurtenant rules; and,
2)Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending
applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by,
the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without
complying with the requirements prescribed in the above-
stated issuances.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
[G.R. No. 80718. January 29, 1988.]
FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ
BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PERIOD FOR APPEALING OR
FOR FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NON-EXTENDIBLE. The rule
laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; GRACE PERIOD IN BOCAVA CASE, INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR. The one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration may still be allowed cannot be invoked by the petitioners
as their motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than
a year after the grace period on June 30, 1986.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORTES, J p:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr.,
et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioner's motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed
out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if
the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned out building
owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial
Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion
for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that
the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule
shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule
and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 16, 1985, 144
SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period, to wit: LibLex
In other words, there is one-month grace period from the promulgation
on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas
case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of
time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27,
1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986,
and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed
on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period
on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period. prLL
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyasdecision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision
of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is
no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a
building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents
had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning
to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.