THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs.

ROSALMEDIALDEA;
September 24, 1991
NATURE Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court
FACTS
- On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522
creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of
themuni ci pal i ty of Sogod i n the provi nce of Leyte,
whi ch shal l be composed of the barrios of Bontoc,
Di vi sori a, Oni on, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz,
Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios.- A boundary dispute
however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the
municipality of Sogod with thelatter claiming that the former
exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-mentioned
but also over other ten(10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.-
The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing
the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the people in
these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod
or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conductedon August 1, 1952,
and the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor
of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc.- On Apri l 4, 1959, the
Provi nci al Board of Leyte i ssued Resol uti on No. 519
recommending to the Presi dent of thePhi l ippines
and/or to the Congress of the Phi l ippines that Republ i c
Act 522 be amended so as to i nclude in sai d
Actcreati ng the muni ci pali ty of Bontoc, the fol l owing
barri os cl ai med by Sogod whi ch are in the heart of
Bontoc but notincl uded i n sai d
l aw, namel y: Baugo, Hi maki l o, Esperanza, Hi bagwan,
Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o andMaoylab The
Board also recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the
municipality of Sogod the following barrioswhich are very near
Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law
creating Bontoc, namely: Laogawan,Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and
Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line
between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.-
On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garci a, then
Presi dent of the Phi l i ppines, promul gated Executive
Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the
provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and
sitios which shallcompose the municipalities of Bontoc and
Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the
boundary lineseparating Bontoc and Sogod.- However the
Presi dent of the Phi l ippines sent a tel egram to the
Provi nci al Board of Southern Leyte suspending
theimplementation of EO 368.- The Provincial Board of Southern
Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation
of Executive Order 368. The Board al so created a
commi ttee to conduct the holdi ng of a pl ebisci te i n the
barri os and si ti os affected byExecutive Order 368 and to
finally settle the boundary dispute.- The municipality of Sogod
filed two civil cases:1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
provincial board and provincial governor from taking cognizance
of the
long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities a
nd to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercisingterritorial
jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to the
municipality of Sogod.2. For recovery of taxes with receivership
against the municipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality
of Bontoc,without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only
over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also
over ten (10) barri os belongi ng to the compl ainant
muni ci pal i ty of Sogod. The compl ai nt prayed that the
muni ci pal i ty of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod one half of
the total amount of taxes collected by the former from the
inhabitants of theaforesaid barrios during the period from 1950
to 1959.- The trial court issued an order dismissing the two civil
cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.MR denied.
ISSUE
WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for
lack of jurisdiction.
HELD
NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes betwee
n municipalities on the provincial board pursuant toSection 2167
of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads:SEC. 2167.
Municipal boundary disputes ? How settled ?
Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over
placesor barri os shal l be deci ded by the province boards
of the provinces i n which such muni ci pal i ti es are
si tuated, after an investigation at which the municipalities
concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the
provincial board appealmay be taken by the municipality
aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of the
Executive Secretary),whose decision shall be final. Where the
places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities
situated in different provinces, the provincial
boards of the provinces concerned shall
come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their
failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of
Interior (Executive Secretary), whose decision shall befinal.
(Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil.
394).
Reasoning
It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority
to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongsto the
provinci al boards and not to the tri al courts. The
deci si ons of the boards are then appealabl e to the
Executi veSecretary. Records in the instant case show that when
petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before
the trialcourt, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet
conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive
Departmentin 1960 or rendered any order settling the dispute.
Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay
to thethen Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for
action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although
existingl aws then vested on the provi nci al board the
power to determi ne or even al ter muni cipal
boundari es, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive
Department for that matter, was not precluded during that time
from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the
boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825,
December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA569, whi c h appl i ed
Republ i c Ac t No. 2370, k nown as t he Bar r i o
Char t er , We hel d t hat t he power t o f i x
c ommon boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of juris
diction between adjoining
municipalities may also partake of anadministrative nature that
can be decided by the administrative department, involving as it
does, the adoption of meansand ways to carry into effect the
laws creating said municipalities.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the
respondent judge are AFFIRMED.

Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Davao; G.R. No.
55380, Sept. 26, 1994
GENERAL RULE: Rule 108, Rules of Court justifies
the correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent
on the face of the record and capable of being
corrected by mere reference to it.
EXCEPTION: Even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta.
When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of Davao City issued
a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing
therein was Flaviano Castro Zapanta albeit the date of death
and all other circumstances and information reflected therein
clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to
therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria,
therefore, filed a petition forcorrection of entry in the register of
death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that
the correction of the name Flaviano Castro Zapanta to
Florencio B. Zapanta was not merely clerical but substantial in
nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error
HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under
Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical
errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being
corrected by mere reference to it, such as misspellings and
obvious mistakes.
However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.

Adversary Proceeding, defined

Blacks Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding as
follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from
an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it...

Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is
appropriate.

Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals (310 SCRA 343)
Related Topic: Jurisdiction over the parties.This is a petition for
review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA dismissing
Ang Ping's prayer for annulment of the judgment of the RTC in
Civil Case entitled "Unibancard Corporation vs. Tingson and Ang
Ping." Likewise under review is the Court of Appeals'
Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Juan Tingson applied for and was issued a Unicard credit
card, Harry Ang Ping as co-obligor(jointly and severally). Tingson
defaulted on his obligations with Unibancard prompting the
latter tofile a collection suit with the RTC of Makati. The
summonses for both Tingson and Ang Ping wereallegedly
served on February 15, 1988 at Mandaluyong and San Juan,
Metro Manila, respectively.In both cases, the person who
received the summons was a certain Jonas Umali. On May 12,
1988,a certain Atty. Benito Salazar filed an answer purportedly
on behalf of Tingson and Ang Ping. Atthe pre-trial, on the other
hand, a certain Atty. Lauro Sandoval represented Tingson and
Ang Ping.Later, during trial, defendants' counsel did not
present any evidence on their behalf; hence, the trialcourt
deemed that the defendants had waived their right to present
evidence and submitted the casefor decision on the basis solely
of the respondent Corporation's evidence. The trial court
rendered judgment holding Tingson and Ang Ping jointly and
severally liable. Thereafter, series of writ ofexecutions were
served against Ang Ping. On 1994, Ang Ping filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court
which was the basis of the various writs ofexecution issued
against him. He alleged that the judgment in question was
rendered without due process of law as he was not given his day
in court. He argued that since there was no valid serviceof
summons upon him and he never appeared before the court by
himself or by counsel, the trialcourt never acquired jurisdiction
over his person, thus, the judgment cannot be enforced
againsthim.The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after
finding that petitioner Ang Ping was properly placed under the
jurisdiction of the trial court which rendered the assailed
judgment.Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Ang Ping either by hisvoluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons?
Ruling: No. As regards the alleged appearance of a lawyer in
behalf of the petitioner during the proceedings in the trial court,
the same cannot be considered as the voluntary
appearancecontemplated by the rules. In the first place,
the records are bereft of any showing that petitionerAng Ping
personally appeared at any stage in the proceedings of the trial
court. Second, nodocument vesting authority in the lawyer
who purportedly represented him appears on record. Atthe pre-
trial, for instance, Atty. Sandoval who claimed to be the counsel
for the defendants did not present any special power of attorney
executed by Ang Ping. The rules require that the party-
litiganthimself must appear for pre-trial but if he chooses to be
represented thereat, he should grant aspecial power of attorney
to his counsel or representative. Likewise, In this case, the
records showthat the summons addressed to Ang Ping was
delivered by substituted service, with a certain JonasUmali
signing as the one who received the summons. As correctly
pointed out by Ang Ping,however, there was no explanation in
the proof of service justifying the resort to substituted service.In
fact, the records are bereft of any showing that a proof of service
was even filed after suchsubstituted service.
Held: The judgment sought to be executed against Ang Ping was
indeed rendered without jurisdiction as he was not properly
served with summons and neither did he voluntarily
submithimself to the authority of the trial court. The essence of
due process is to be found in thereasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his
defense.It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of
his property, he should first be informed ofthe claim against him
and the theory on which such claim is premised. Not having been
dulyaccorded his day in court, petitioner cannot thus be bound
by the judgment in the collection suit.
The petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED. Accordingly,the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 18843 is SET ASIDE.

NAVIDA v. DIZON JR
FACTS:
Navida et. al. filed for damages against Shell Oil, Dow chemicals,
Occidental Chemicals, Dole food,Chiquita Brands, and Del Monte
tropical fruit co. for injuries and illness due to exposure to
dibromochlropropane(DBCP), which is used to kill worms, while
working in Banana plantations. They blame said companies
fornegligence in producing, using, and selling DBCP containing
products. said personal injury suits was first filed indifferent
Texas state courts by Citizens of twelve foreign countries
including the Philippines. however, thedefendants in the
consolidated cases prayed fro the dismissal of all the actions
under the doctrine of forum nonconveniens which the Federal
District Court conditionally granted said motion to dismiss saying
thatnotwithstanding the said dismissal, in the event the highest
court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissalfor lack
of jurisdiction of these actions they may return to the said
federal courts and upon proper motion the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if it was never dismissed.In
accordance with said order of the Federal court Navida et al filed
a case with RTC of General Santos. Saidcourt however, withour
resolving the motions filed by the parties, issued an order
dismissing the complaint on lackof jurisdiction saying further
that the filing of the case in US divested the RTC of its own
jurisdiction since thedistrict court did not decline jurisdiction
over the cause of action and it was dismissed on the ground of
forum nonconveniens which is really a matter of venue; that
taking cognizance of the case the US district court has, in
essence,concurrent jurisdiction and the acquisition of which
divest another of its own
jurisdiction. Another case was also filed in the RTC of Davao City
by Abella et al similar to the complaint of Navida et al which was
also dismissed by said court saying that the cause of action accru
ed abroad (since the products weremade abroad) and that the
Philippine courts are not the proper tribunal, relying on the
opinions of legal experts(includes Justice Demetria. retired SC
justice Sarmiento, and retired high court justice Nocom) in an
interview madeby inquirer, and as such said actions would not
prosper here.
ISSUE:
W/N RTC of General Santos and Davao City erred in dismissing
the cases for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
Said RTCs have jurisdiction over the case at hand. The rule is
settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by theallegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitledto all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or
body, the jurisdiction overthe subject matter or nature of the
action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the
legislature through anenactment of law. at the time of the filing
of the complaints, the jurisdiction for the claim of damages by
theplaintiffs is with the RTC. Jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations
of the complaint,irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein -it cannnot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise,the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. Where the factual allegations in theamended joint-
complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably
occurred in the Philippines, it is erroron the part of the courts a
quo to dismiss the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the mistakenassumption that the cause of action narrated by the
plaintiffs tool place abroad and had occurred outside andbeyond
the territorial boundaries of the Philippines.Furthermore, the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the courts a quo by makingseveral voluntary appearances, by
praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively
participating during thecourse of the proceedings below. in fact,
none of the parties actually contended that the RTCs in question
do nothave jurisdiction. The Court explained that "jurisdiction" is
different from "exercise of jurisdiction" - jurisdictionrefers to the
authority to decide a case, no the orders or the decision
rendered therein, and any error that the courtmay commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which
does not affect its authority todecide the case, much less divest
the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

Manila Hotel Corporation vs NLRC
343 SCRA 1 Private International Law Forum Non Conveniens
In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman.
In June 1988, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China.
Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotels job
offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The
employment contract between him and Palace Hotel was
however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace
Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business
reverses. In September 1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel
International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but
no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned
and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign
corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace
Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of
Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the
following reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that
Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations
MHC cannot be held liable because it merely owns 50% of MHIL,
it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The
veil of corporate fiction cant be pierced because it was not
shown that MHC is directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence,
they are separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in
the Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention of
the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not have
jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the
Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of the
Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the
relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to
determine the facts because the acts complained of happened
outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is
applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be
enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not
served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non
conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction
over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.